diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 1418 |
1 files changed, 1418 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b12986b96 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c @@ -0,0 +1,1418 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <cxlpci.h> +#include <cxlmem.h> +#include <cxl.h> + +#include "core.h" +#include "trace.h" + +static bool cxl_raw_allow_all; + +/** + * DOC: cxl mbox + * + * Core implementation of the CXL 2.0 Type-3 Memory Device Mailbox. The + * implementation is used by the cxl_pci driver to initialize the device + * and implement the cxl_mem.h IOCTL UAPI. It also implements the + * backend of the cxl_pmem_ctl() transport for LIBNVDIMM. + */ + +#define cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) \ + for ((cmd) = &cxl_mem_commands[0]; \ + ((cmd) - cxl_mem_commands) < ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_mem_commands); (cmd)++) + +#define CXL_CMD(_id, sin, sout, _flags) \ + [CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##_id] = { \ + .info = { \ + .id = CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##_id, \ + .size_in = sin, \ + .size_out = sout, \ + }, \ + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_##_id, \ + .flags = _flags, \ + } + +#define CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD ~0U +/* + * This table defines the supported mailbox commands for the driver. This table + * is made up of a UAPI structure. Non-negative values as parameters in the + * table will be validated against the user's input. For example, if size_in is + * 0, and the user passed in 1, it is an error. + */ +static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = { + CXL_CMD(IDENTIFY, 0, 0x43, CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE), +#ifdef CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS + CXL_CMD(RAW, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0), +#endif + CXL_CMD(GET_SUPPORTED_LOGS, 0, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE), + CXL_CMD(GET_FW_INFO, 0, 0x50, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_PARTITION_INFO, 0, 0x20, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_LSA, 0x8, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_HEALTH_INFO, 0, 0x12, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_LOG, 0x18, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE), + CXL_CMD(SET_PARTITION_INFO, 0x0a, 0, 0), + CXL_CMD(SET_LSA, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_ALERT_CONFIG, 0, 0x10, 0), + CXL_CMD(SET_ALERT_CONFIG, 0xc, 0, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, 0, 0x1, 0), + CXL_CMD(SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, 0x1, 0, 0), + CXL_CMD(GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS, 0x10, 0x4, 0), +}; + +/* + * Commands that RAW doesn't permit. The rationale for each: + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW: Firmware activation requires adjustment / + * coordination of transaction timeout values at the root bridge level. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO: The device memory map may change live + * and needs to be coordinated with HDM updates. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA: The label storage area may be cached by the + * driver and any writes from userspace invalidates those contents. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE: Set shutdown state assumes no writes + * to the device after it is marked clean, userspace can not make that + * assertion. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that + * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_,INJECT_,CLEAR_]POISON: These commands require kernel + * driver orchestration for safety. + */ +static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = { + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA, + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA, + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON, + CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON, + CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON, +}; + +/* + * Command sets that RAW doesn't permit. All opcodes in this set are + * disabled because they pass plain text security payloads over the + * user/kernel boundary. This functionality is intended to be wrapped + * behind the keys ABI which allows for encrypted payloads in the UAPI + */ +static u8 security_command_sets[] = { + 0x44, /* Sanitize */ + 0x45, /* Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security */ + 0x46, /* Security Passthrough */ +}; + +static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(security_command_sets); i++) + if (security_command_sets[i] == (opcode >> 8)) + return true; + return false; +} + +static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_security_state *security, + u16 opcode) +{ + switch (opcode) { + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode) +{ +#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43 + + if ((opcode >> 8) == CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static void cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_poison_state *poison, + u16 opcode) +{ + switch (opcode) { + case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA: + set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS, poison->enabled_cmds); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +static struct cxl_mem_command *cxl_mem_find_command(u16 opcode) +{ + struct cxl_mem_command *c; + + cxl_for_each_cmd(c) + if (c->opcode == opcode) + return c; + + return NULL; +} + +static const char *cxl_mem_opcode_to_name(u16 opcode) +{ + struct cxl_mem_command *c; + + c = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode); + if (!c) + return NULL; + + return cxl_command_names[c->info.id].name; +} + +/** + * cxl_internal_send_cmd() - Kernel internal interface to send a mailbox command + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * @mbox_cmd: initialized command to execute + * + * Context: Any context. + * Return: + * * %>=0 - Number of bytes returned in @out. + * * %-E2BIG - Payload is too large for hardware. + * * %-EBUSY - Couldn't acquire exclusive mailbox access. + * * %-EFAULT - Hardware error occurred. + * * %-ENXIO - Command completed, but device reported an error. + * * %-EIO - Unexpected output size. + * + * Mailbox commands may execute successfully yet the device itself reported an + * error. While this distinction can be useful for commands from userspace, the + * kernel will only be able to use results when both are successful. + */ +int cxl_internal_send_cmd(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, + struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd) +{ + size_t out_size, min_out; + int rc; + + if (mbox_cmd->size_in > mds->payload_size || + mbox_cmd->size_out > mds->payload_size) + return -E2BIG; + + out_size = mbox_cmd->size_out; + min_out = mbox_cmd->min_out; + rc = mds->mbox_send(mds, mbox_cmd); + /* + * EIO is reserved for a payload size mismatch and mbox_send() + * may not return this error. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(rc == -EIO, "Bad return code: -EIO")) + return -ENXIO; + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (mbox_cmd->return_code != CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SUCCESS && + mbox_cmd->return_code != CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_BACKGROUND) + return cxl_mbox_cmd_rc2errno(mbox_cmd); + + if (!out_size) + return 0; + + /* + * Variable sized output needs to at least satisfy the caller's + * minimum if not the fully requested size. + */ + if (min_out == 0) + min_out = out_size; + + if (mbox_cmd->size_out < min_out) + return -EIO; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_internal_send_cmd, CXL); + +static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode) +{ + int i; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS)) + return false; + + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS)) + return false; + + if (cxl_raw_allow_all) + return true; + + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_disabled_raw_commands); i++) + if (cxl_disabled_raw_commands[i] == opcode) + return false; + + return true; +} + +/** + * cxl_payload_from_user_allowed() - Check contents of in_payload. + * @opcode: The mailbox command opcode. + * @payload_in: Pointer to the input payload passed in from user space. + * + * Return: + * * true - payload_in passes check for @opcode. + * * false - payload_in contains invalid or unsupported values. + * + * The driver may inspect payload contents before sending a mailbox + * command from user space to the device. The intent is to reject + * commands with input payloads that are known to be unsafe. This + * check is not intended to replace the users careful selection of + * mailbox command parameters and makes no guarantee that the user + * command will succeed, nor that it is appropriate. + * + * The specific checks are determined by the opcode. + */ +static bool cxl_payload_from_user_allowed(u16 opcode, void *payload_in) +{ + switch (opcode) { + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO: { + struct cxl_mbox_set_partition_info *pi = payload_in; + + if (pi->flags & CXL_SET_PARTITION_IMMEDIATE_FLAG) + return false; + break; + } + default: + break; + } + return true; +} + +static int cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor(struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox, + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, u16 opcode, + size_t in_size, size_t out_size, u64 in_payload) +{ + *mbox = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = opcode, + .size_in = in_size, + }; + + if (in_size) { + mbox->payload_in = vmemdup_user(u64_to_user_ptr(in_payload), + in_size); + if (IS_ERR(mbox->payload_in)) + return PTR_ERR(mbox->payload_in); + + if (!cxl_payload_from_user_allowed(opcode, mbox->payload_in)) { + dev_dbg(mds->cxlds.dev, "%s: input payload not allowed\n", + cxl_mem_opcode_to_name(opcode)); + kvfree(mbox->payload_in); + return -EBUSY; + } + } + + /* Prepare to handle a full payload for variable sized output */ + if (out_size == CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD) + mbox->size_out = mds->payload_size; + else + mbox->size_out = out_size; + + if (mbox->size_out) { + mbox->payload_out = kvzalloc(mbox->size_out, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mbox->payload_out) { + kvfree(mbox->payload_in); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static void cxl_mbox_cmd_dtor(struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox) +{ + kvfree(mbox->payload_in); + kvfree(mbox->payload_out); +} + +static int cxl_to_mem_cmd_raw(struct cxl_mem_command *mem_cmd, + const struct cxl_send_command *send_cmd, + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + if (send_cmd->raw.rsvd) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike supported commands, the output size of RAW commands + * gets passed along without further checking, so it must be + * validated here. + */ + if (send_cmd->out.size > mds->payload_size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(send_cmd->raw.opcode)) + return -EPERM; + + dev_WARN_ONCE(mds->cxlds.dev, true, "raw command path used\n"); + + *mem_cmd = (struct cxl_mem_command) { + .info = { + .id = CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, + .size_in = send_cmd->in.size, + .size_out = send_cmd->out.size, + }, + .opcode = send_cmd->raw.opcode + }; + + return 0; +} + +static int cxl_to_mem_cmd(struct cxl_mem_command *mem_cmd, + const struct cxl_send_command *send_cmd, + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_mem_command *c = &cxl_mem_commands[send_cmd->id]; + const struct cxl_command_info *info = &c->info; + + if (send_cmd->flags & ~CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (send_cmd->rsvd) + return -EINVAL; + + if (send_cmd->in.rsvd || send_cmd->out.rsvd) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Check that the command is enabled for hardware */ + if (!test_bit(info->id, mds->enabled_cmds)) + return -ENOTTY; + + /* Check that the command is not claimed for exclusive kernel use */ + if (test_bit(info->id, mds->exclusive_cmds)) + return -EBUSY; + + /* Check the input buffer is the expected size */ + if ((info->size_in != CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD) && + (info->size_in != send_cmd->in.size)) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Check the output buffer is at least large enough */ + if ((info->size_out != CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD) && + (send_cmd->out.size < info->size_out)) + return -ENOMEM; + + *mem_cmd = (struct cxl_mem_command) { + .info = { + .id = info->id, + .flags = info->flags, + .size_in = send_cmd->in.size, + .size_out = send_cmd->out.size, + }, + .opcode = c->opcode + }; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * cxl_validate_cmd_from_user() - Check fields for CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND. + * @mbox_cmd: Sanitized and populated &struct cxl_mbox_cmd. + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * @send_cmd: &struct cxl_send_command copied in from userspace. + * + * Return: + * * %0 - @out_cmd is ready to send. + * * %-ENOTTY - Invalid command specified. + * * %-EINVAL - Reserved fields or invalid values were used. + * * %-ENOMEM - Input or output buffer wasn't sized properly. + * * %-EPERM - Attempted to use a protected command. + * * %-EBUSY - Kernel has claimed exclusive access to this opcode + * + * The result of this command is a fully validated command in @mbox_cmd that is + * safe to send to the hardware. + */ +static int cxl_validate_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd, + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, + const struct cxl_send_command *send_cmd) +{ + struct cxl_mem_command mem_cmd; + int rc; + + if (send_cmd->id == 0 || send_cmd->id >= CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX) + return -ENOTTY; + + /* + * The user can never specify an input payload larger than what hardware + * supports, but output can be arbitrarily large (simply write out as + * much data as the hardware provides). + */ + if (send_cmd->in.size > mds->payload_size) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Sanitize and construct a cxl_mem_command */ + if (send_cmd->id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW) + rc = cxl_to_mem_cmd_raw(&mem_cmd, send_cmd, mds); + else + rc = cxl_to_mem_cmd(&mem_cmd, send_cmd, mds); + + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Sanitize and construct a cxl_mbox_cmd */ + return cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor(mbox_cmd, mds, mem_cmd.opcode, + mem_cmd.info.size_in, mem_cmd.info.size_out, + send_cmd->in.payload); +} + +int cxl_query_cmd(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, + struct cxl_mem_query_commands __user *q) +{ + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + struct device *dev = &cxlmd->dev; + struct cxl_mem_command *cmd; + u32 n_commands; + int j = 0; + + dev_dbg(dev, "Query IOCTL\n"); + + if (get_user(n_commands, &q->n_commands)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* returns the total number if 0 elements are requested. */ + if (n_commands == 0) + return put_user(ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_mem_commands), &q->n_commands); + + /* + * otherwise, return max(n_commands, total commands) cxl_command_info + * structures. + */ + cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) { + struct cxl_command_info info = cmd->info; + + if (test_bit(info.id, mds->enabled_cmds)) + info.flags |= CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_ENABLED; + if (test_bit(info.id, mds->exclusive_cmds)) + info.flags |= CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE; + + if (copy_to_user(&q->commands[j++], &info, sizeof(info))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (j == n_commands) + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user() - Dispatch a mailbox command for userspace. + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * @mbox_cmd: The validated mailbox command. + * @out_payload: Pointer to userspace's output payload. + * @size_out: (Input) Max payload size to copy out. + * (Output) Payload size hardware generated. + * @retval: Hardware generated return code from the operation. + * + * Return: + * * %0 - Mailbox transaction succeeded. This implies the mailbox + * protocol completed successfully not that the operation itself + * was successful. + * * %-ENOMEM - Couldn't allocate a bounce buffer. + * * %-EFAULT - Something happened with copy_to/from_user. + * * %-EINTR - Mailbox acquisition interrupted. + * * %-EXXX - Transaction level failures. + * + * Dispatches a mailbox command on behalf of a userspace request. + * The output payload is copied to userspace. + * + * See cxl_send_cmd(). + */ +static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, + struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd, + u64 out_payload, s32 *size_out, + u32 *retval) +{ + struct device *dev = mds->cxlds.dev; + int rc; + + dev_dbg(dev, + "Submitting %s command for user\n" + "\topcode: %x\n" + "\tsize: %zx\n", + cxl_mem_opcode_to_name(mbox_cmd->opcode), + mbox_cmd->opcode, mbox_cmd->size_in); + + rc = mds->mbox_send(mds, mbox_cmd); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * @size_out contains the max size that's allowed to be written back out + * to userspace. While the payload may have written more output than + * this it will have to be ignored. + */ + if (mbox_cmd->size_out) { + dev_WARN_ONCE(dev, mbox_cmd->size_out > *size_out, + "Invalid return size\n"); + if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(out_payload), + mbox_cmd->payload_out, mbox_cmd->size_out)) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + } + + *size_out = mbox_cmd->size_out; + *retval = mbox_cmd->return_code; + +out: + cxl_mbox_cmd_dtor(mbox_cmd); + return rc; +} + +int cxl_send_cmd(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, struct cxl_send_command __user *s) +{ + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + struct device *dev = &cxlmd->dev; + struct cxl_send_command send; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + int rc; + + dev_dbg(dev, "Send IOCTL\n"); + + if (copy_from_user(&send, s, sizeof(send))) + return -EFAULT; + + rc = cxl_validate_cmd_from_user(&mbox_cmd, mds, &send); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(mds, &mbox_cmd, send.out.payload, + &send.out.size, &send.retval); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (copy_to_user(s, &send, sizeof(send))) + return -EFAULT; + + return 0; +} + +static int cxl_xfer_log(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, uuid_t *uuid, + u32 *size, u8 *out) +{ + u32 remaining = *size; + u32 offset = 0; + + while (remaining) { + u32 xfer_size = min_t(u32, remaining, mds->payload_size); + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + struct cxl_mbox_get_log log; + int rc; + + log = (struct cxl_mbox_get_log) { + .uuid = *uuid, + .offset = cpu_to_le32(offset), + .length = cpu_to_le32(xfer_size), + }; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_LOG, + .size_in = sizeof(log), + .payload_in = &log, + .size_out = xfer_size, + .payload_out = out, + }; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + + /* + * The output payload length that indicates the number + * of valid bytes can be smaller than the Log buffer + * size. + */ + if (rc == -EIO && mbox_cmd.size_out < xfer_size) { + offset += mbox_cmd.size_out; + break; + } + + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + out += xfer_size; + remaining -= xfer_size; + offset += xfer_size; + } + + *size = offset; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * cxl_walk_cel() - Walk through the Command Effects Log. + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * @size: Length of the Command Effects Log. + * @cel: CEL + * + * Iterate over each entry in the CEL and determine if the driver supports the + * command. If so, the command is enabled for the device and can be used later. + */ +static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel) +{ + struct cxl_cel_entry *cel_entry; + const int cel_entries = size / sizeof(*cel_entry); + struct device *dev = mds->cxlds.dev; + int i; + + cel_entry = (struct cxl_cel_entry *) cel; + + for (i = 0; i < cel_entries; i++) { + u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode); + struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode); + int enabled = 0; + + if (cmd) { + set_bit(cmd->info.id, mds->enabled_cmds); + enabled++; + } + + if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) { + cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode); + enabled++; + } + + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) { + cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode); + enabled++; + } + + dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x %s\n", opcode, + enabled ? "enabled" : "unsupported by driver"); + } +} + +static struct cxl_mbox_get_supported_logs *cxl_get_gsl(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_mbox_get_supported_logs *ret; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + int rc; + + ret = kvmalloc(mds->payload_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ret) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SUPPORTED_LOGS, + .size_out = mds->payload_size, + .payload_out = ret, + /* At least the record number field must be valid */ + .min_out = 2, + }; + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) { + kvfree(ret); + return ERR_PTR(rc); + } + + + return ret; +} + +enum { + CEL_UUID, + VENDOR_DEBUG_UUID, +}; + +/* See CXL 2.0 Table 170. Get Log Input Payload */ +static const uuid_t log_uuid[] = { + [CEL_UUID] = DEFINE_CXL_CEL_UUID, + [VENDOR_DEBUG_UUID] = DEFINE_CXL_VENDOR_DEBUG_UUID, +}; + +/** + * cxl_enumerate_cmds() - Enumerate commands for a device. + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * + * Returns 0 if enumerate completed successfully. + * + * CXL devices have optional support for certain commands. This function will + * determine the set of supported commands for the hardware and update the + * enabled_cmds bitmap in the @mds. + */ +int cxl_enumerate_cmds(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_mbox_get_supported_logs *gsl; + struct device *dev = mds->cxlds.dev; + struct cxl_mem_command *cmd; + int i, rc; + + gsl = cxl_get_gsl(mds); + if (IS_ERR(gsl)) + return PTR_ERR(gsl); + + rc = -ENOENT; + for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(gsl->entries); i++) { + u32 size = le32_to_cpu(gsl->entry[i].size); + uuid_t uuid = gsl->entry[i].uuid; + u8 *log; + + dev_dbg(dev, "Found LOG type %pU of size %d", &uuid, size); + + if (!uuid_equal(&uuid, &log_uuid[CEL_UUID])) + continue; + + log = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!log) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = cxl_xfer_log(mds, &uuid, &size, log); + if (rc) { + kvfree(log); + goto out; + } + + cxl_walk_cel(mds, size, log); + kvfree(log); + + /* In case CEL was bogus, enable some default commands. */ + cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) + if (cmd->flags & CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE) + set_bit(cmd->info.id, mds->enabled_cmds); + + /* Found the required CEL */ + rc = 0; + } +out: + kvfree(gsl); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_enumerate_cmds, CXL); + +/* + * General Media Event Record + * CXL rev 3.0 Section 8.2.9.2.1.1; Table 8-43 + */ +static const uuid_t gen_media_event_uuid = + UUID_INIT(0xfbcd0a77, 0xc260, 0x417f, + 0x85, 0xa9, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x16, 0x21, 0xeb, 0xa6); + +/* + * DRAM Event Record + * CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1.2; Table 8-44 + */ +static const uuid_t dram_event_uuid = + UUID_INIT(0x601dcbb3, 0x9c06, 0x4eab, + 0xb8, 0xaf, 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xfb, 0x5c, 0x96, 0x24); + +/* + * Memory Module Event Record + * CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1.3; Table 8-45 + */ +static const uuid_t mem_mod_event_uuid = + UUID_INIT(0xfe927475, 0xdd59, 0x4339, + 0xa5, 0x86, 0x79, 0xba, 0xb1, 0x13, 0xb7, 0x74); + +static void cxl_event_trace_record(const struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, + enum cxl_event_log_type type, + struct cxl_event_record_raw *record) +{ + uuid_t *id = &record->hdr.id; + + if (uuid_equal(id, &gen_media_event_uuid)) { + struct cxl_event_gen_media *rec = + (struct cxl_event_gen_media *)record; + + trace_cxl_general_media(cxlmd, type, rec); + } else if (uuid_equal(id, &dram_event_uuid)) { + struct cxl_event_dram *rec = (struct cxl_event_dram *)record; + + trace_cxl_dram(cxlmd, type, rec); + } else if (uuid_equal(id, &mem_mod_event_uuid)) { + struct cxl_event_mem_module *rec = + (struct cxl_event_mem_module *)record; + + trace_cxl_memory_module(cxlmd, type, rec); + } else { + /* For unknown record types print just the header */ + trace_cxl_generic_event(cxlmd, type, record); + } +} + +static int cxl_clear_event_record(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, + enum cxl_event_log_type log, + struct cxl_get_event_payload *get_pl) +{ + struct cxl_mbox_clear_event_payload *payload; + u16 total = le16_to_cpu(get_pl->record_count); + u8 max_handles = CXL_CLEAR_EVENT_MAX_HANDLES; + size_t pl_size = struct_size(payload, handles, max_handles); + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + u16 cnt; + int rc = 0; + int i; + + /* Payload size may limit the max handles */ + if (pl_size > mds->payload_size) { + max_handles = (mds->payload_size - sizeof(*payload)) / + sizeof(__le16); + pl_size = struct_size(payload, handles, max_handles); + } + + payload = kvzalloc(pl_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!payload) + return -ENOMEM; + + *payload = (struct cxl_mbox_clear_event_payload) { + .event_log = log, + }; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_EVENT_RECORD, + .payload_in = payload, + .size_in = pl_size, + }; + + /* + * Clear Event Records uses u8 for the handle cnt while Get Event + * Record can return up to 0xffff records. + */ + i = 0; + for (cnt = 0; cnt < total; cnt++) { + payload->handles[i++] = get_pl->records[cnt].hdr.handle; + dev_dbg(mds->cxlds.dev, "Event log '%d': Clearing %u\n", log, + le16_to_cpu(payload->handles[i])); + + if (i == max_handles) { + payload->nr_recs = i; + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc) + goto free_pl; + i = 0; + } + } + + /* Clear what is left if any */ + if (i) { + payload->nr_recs = i; + mbox_cmd.size_in = struct_size(payload, handles, i); + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc) + goto free_pl; + } + +free_pl: + kvfree(payload); + return rc; +} + +static void cxl_mem_get_records_log(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, + enum cxl_event_log_type type) +{ + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = mds->cxlds.cxlmd; + struct device *dev = mds->cxlds.dev; + struct cxl_get_event_payload *payload; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + u8 log_type = type; + u16 nr_rec; + + mutex_lock(&mds->event.log_lock); + payload = mds->event.buf; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_EVENT_RECORD, + .payload_in = &log_type, + .size_in = sizeof(log_type), + .payload_out = payload, + .size_out = mds->payload_size, + .min_out = struct_size(payload, records, 0), + }; + + do { + int rc, i; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc) { + dev_err_ratelimited(dev, + "Event log '%d': Failed to query event records : %d", + type, rc); + break; + } + + nr_rec = le16_to_cpu(payload->record_count); + if (!nr_rec) + break; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_rec; i++) + cxl_event_trace_record(cxlmd, type, + &payload->records[i]); + + if (payload->flags & CXL_GET_EVENT_FLAG_OVERFLOW) + trace_cxl_overflow(cxlmd, type, payload); + + rc = cxl_clear_event_record(mds, type, payload); + if (rc) { + dev_err_ratelimited(dev, + "Event log '%d': Failed to clear events : %d", + type, rc); + break; + } + } while (nr_rec); + + mutex_unlock(&mds->event.log_lock); +} + +/** + * cxl_mem_get_event_records - Get Event Records from the device + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * @status: Event Status register value identifying which events are available. + * + * Retrieve all event records available on the device, report them as trace + * events, and clear them. + * + * See CXL rev 3.0 @8.2.9.2.2 Get Event Records + * See CXL rev 3.0 @8.2.9.2.3 Clear Event Records + */ +void cxl_mem_get_event_records(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, u32 status) +{ + dev_dbg(mds->cxlds.dev, "Reading event logs: %x\n", status); + + if (status & CXLDEV_EVENT_STATUS_FATAL) + cxl_mem_get_records_log(mds, CXL_EVENT_TYPE_FATAL); + if (status & CXLDEV_EVENT_STATUS_FAIL) + cxl_mem_get_records_log(mds, CXL_EVENT_TYPE_FAIL); + if (status & CXLDEV_EVENT_STATUS_WARN) + cxl_mem_get_records_log(mds, CXL_EVENT_TYPE_WARN); + if (status & CXLDEV_EVENT_STATUS_INFO) + cxl_mem_get_records_log(mds, CXL_EVENT_TYPE_INFO); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_get_event_records, CXL); + +/** + * cxl_mem_get_partition_info - Get partition info + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * + * Retrieve the current partition info for the device specified. The active + * values are the current capacity in bytes. If not 0, the 'next' values are + * the pending values, in bytes, which take affect on next cold reset. + * + * Return: 0 if no error: or the result of the mailbox command. + * + * See CXL @8.2.9.5.2.1 Get Partition Info + */ +static int cxl_mem_get_partition_info(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_mbox_get_partition_info pi; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + int rc; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_PARTITION_INFO, + .size_out = sizeof(pi), + .payload_out = &pi, + }; + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc) + return rc; + + mds->active_volatile_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(pi.active_volatile_cap) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->active_persistent_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(pi.active_persistent_cap) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->next_volatile_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(pi.next_volatile_cap) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->next_persistent_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(pi.next_volatile_cap) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * cxl_dev_state_identify() - Send the IDENTIFY command to the device. + * @mds: The driver data for the operation + * + * Return: 0 if identify was executed successfully or media not ready. + * + * This will dispatch the identify command to the device and on success populate + * structures to be exported to sysfs. + */ +int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + /* See CXL 2.0 Table 175 Identify Memory Device Output Payload */ + struct cxl_mbox_identify id; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + u32 val; + int rc; + + if (!mds->cxlds.media_ready) + return 0; + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_IDENTIFY, + .size_out = sizeof(id), + .payload_out = &id, + }; + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + mds->total_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(id.total_capacity) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->volatile_only_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(id.volatile_capacity) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->persistent_only_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(id.persistent_capacity) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + mds->partition_align_bytes = + le64_to_cpu(id.partition_align) * CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER; + + mds->lsa_size = le32_to_cpu(id.lsa_size); + memcpy(mds->firmware_version, id.fw_revision, + sizeof(id.fw_revision)); + + if (test_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, mds->poison.enabled_cmds)) { + val = get_unaligned_le24(id.poison_list_max_mer); + mds->poison.max_errors = min_t(u32, val, CXL_POISON_LIST_MAX); + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_dev_state_identify, CXL); + +static int __cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, u16 cmd) +{ + int rc; + u32 sec_out = 0; + struct cxl_get_security_output { + __le32 flags; + } out; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd sec_cmd = { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE, + .payload_out = &out, + .size_out = sizeof(out), + }; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd }; + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = &mds->cxlds; + + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &sec_cmd); + if (rc < 0) { + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to get security state : %d", rc); + return rc; + } + + /* + * Prior to using these commands, any security applied to + * the user data areas of the device shall be DISABLED (or + * UNLOCKED for secure erase case). + */ + sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags); + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) + return -EINVAL; + + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE && + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc < 0) { + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc); + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/** + * cxl_mem_sanitize() - Send a sanitization command to the device. + * @cxlmd: The device for the operation + * @cmd: The specific sanitization command opcode + * + * Return: 0 if the command was executed successfully, regardless of + * whether or not the actual security operation is done in the background, + * such as for the Sanitize case. + * Error return values can be the result of the mailbox command, -EINVAL + * when security requirements are not met or invalid contexts, or -EBUSY + * if the sanitize operation is already in flight. + * + * See CXL 3.0 @8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize and @8.2.9.8.5.2 Secure Erase. + */ +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u16 cmd) +{ + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + struct cxl_port *endpoint; + int rc; + + /* synchronize with cxl_mem_probe() and decoder write operations */ + device_lock(&cxlmd->dev); + endpoint = cxlmd->endpoint; + down_read(&cxl_region_rwsem); + /* + * Require an endpoint to be safe otherwise the driver can not + * be sure that the device is unmapped. + */ + if (endpoint && cxl_num_decoders_committed(endpoint) == 0) + rc = __cxl_mem_sanitize(mds, cmd); + else + rc = -EBUSY; + up_read(&cxl_region_rwsem); + device_unlock(&cxlmd->dev); + + return rc; +} + +static int add_dpa_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *parent, + struct resource *res, resource_size_t start, + resource_size_t size, const char *type) +{ + int rc; + + res->name = type; + res->start = start; + res->end = start + size - 1; + res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM; + if (resource_size(res) == 0) { + dev_dbg(dev, "DPA(%s): no capacity\n", res->name); + return 0; + } + rc = request_resource(parent, res); + if (rc) { + dev_err(dev, "DPA(%s): failed to track %pr (%d)\n", res->name, + res, rc); + return rc; + } + + dev_dbg(dev, "DPA(%s): %pr\n", res->name, res); + + return 0; +} + +int cxl_mem_create_range_info(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = &mds->cxlds; + struct device *dev = cxlds->dev; + int rc; + + if (!cxlds->media_ready) { + cxlds->dpa_res = DEFINE_RES_MEM(0, 0); + cxlds->ram_res = DEFINE_RES_MEM(0, 0); + cxlds->pmem_res = DEFINE_RES_MEM(0, 0); + return 0; + } + + cxlds->dpa_res = + (struct resource)DEFINE_RES_MEM(0, mds->total_bytes); + + if (mds->partition_align_bytes == 0) { + rc = add_dpa_res(dev, &cxlds->dpa_res, &cxlds->ram_res, 0, + mds->volatile_only_bytes, "ram"); + if (rc) + return rc; + return add_dpa_res(dev, &cxlds->dpa_res, &cxlds->pmem_res, + mds->volatile_only_bytes, + mds->persistent_only_bytes, "pmem"); + } + + rc = cxl_mem_get_partition_info(mds); + if (rc) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to query partition information\n"); + return rc; + } + + rc = add_dpa_res(dev, &cxlds->dpa_res, &cxlds->ram_res, 0, + mds->active_volatile_bytes, "ram"); + if (rc) + return rc; + return add_dpa_res(dev, &cxlds->dpa_res, &cxlds->pmem_res, + mds->active_volatile_bytes, + mds->active_persistent_bytes, "pmem"); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_create_range_info, CXL); + +int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + struct cxl_mbox_set_timestamp_in pi; + int rc; + + pi.timestamp = cpu_to_le64(ktime_get_real_ns()); + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_TIMESTAMP, + .size_in = sizeof(pi), + .payload_in = &pi, + }; + + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + /* + * Command is optional. Devices may have another way of providing + * a timestamp, or may return all 0s in timestamp fields. + * Don't report an error if this command isn't supported + */ + if (rc && (mbox_cmd.return_code != CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_UNSUPPORTED)) + return rc; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_set_timestamp, CXL); + +int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len, + struct cxl_region *cxlr) +{ + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + struct cxl_mbox_poison_out *po; + struct cxl_mbox_poison_in pi; + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd; + int nr_records = 0; + int rc; + + rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&mds->poison.lock); + if (rc) + return rc; + + po = mds->poison.list_out; + pi.offset = cpu_to_le64(offset); + pi.length = cpu_to_le64(len / CXL_POISON_LEN_MULT); + + mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) { + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON, + .size_in = sizeof(pi), + .payload_in = &pi, + .size_out = mds->payload_size, + .payload_out = po, + .min_out = struct_size(po, record, 0), + }; + + do { + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(mds, &mbox_cmd); + if (rc) + break; + + for (int i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(po->count); i++) + trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i], + po->flags, po->overflow_ts, + CXL_POISON_TRACE_LIST); + + /* Protect against an uncleared _FLAG_MORE */ + nr_records = nr_records + le16_to_cpu(po->count); + if (nr_records >= mds->poison.max_errors) { + dev_dbg(&cxlmd->dev, "Max Error Records reached: %d\n", + nr_records); + break; + } + } while (po->flags & CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE); + + mutex_unlock(&mds->poison.lock); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_get_poison, CXL); + +static void free_poison_buf(void *buf) +{ + kvfree(buf); +} + +/* Get Poison List output buffer is protected by mds->poison.lock */ +static int cxl_poison_alloc_buf(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + mds->poison.list_out = kvmalloc(mds->payload_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mds->poison.list_out) + return -ENOMEM; + + return devm_add_action_or_reset(mds->cxlds.dev, free_poison_buf, + mds->poison.list_out); +} + +int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds) +{ + int rc; + + if (!test_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, mds->poison.enabled_cmds)) + return 0; + + rc = cxl_poison_alloc_buf(mds); + if (rc) { + clear_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, mds->poison.enabled_cmds); + return rc; + } + + mutex_init(&mds->poison.lock); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_poison_state_init, CXL); + +struct cxl_memdev_state *cxl_memdev_state_create(struct device *dev) +{ + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds; + + mds = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*mds), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mds) { + dev_err(dev, "No memory available\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + + mutex_init(&mds->mbox_mutex); + mutex_init(&mds->event.log_lock); + mds->cxlds.dev = dev; + mds->cxlds.type = CXL_DEVTYPE_CLASSMEM; + + return mds; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_memdev_state_create, CXL); + +void __init cxl_mbox_init(void) +{ + struct dentry *mbox_debugfs; + + mbox_debugfs = cxl_debugfs_create_dir("mbox"); + debugfs_create_bool("raw_allow_all", 0600, mbox_debugfs, + &cxl_raw_allow_all); +} |