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-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/inode.c1434
1 files changed, 1434 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fca29dba7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1434 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Novell Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/fiemap.h>
+#include <linux/fileattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+#include "overlayfs.h"
+
+
+int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
+ bool full_copy_up = false;
+ struct dentry *upperdentry;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+
+ err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
+ /* Truncate should trigger data copy up as well */
+ full_copy_up = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!full_copy_up)
+ err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
+ else
+ err = ovl_copy_up_with_data(dentry);
+ if (!err) {
+ struct inode *winode = NULL;
+
+ upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+
+ if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
+ winode = d_inode(upperdentry);
+ err = get_write_access(winode);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_drop_write;
+ }
+
+ if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID))
+ attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
+
+ /*
+ * We might have to translate ovl file into real file object
+ * once use cases emerge. For now, simply don't let underlying
+ * filesystem rely on attr->ia_file
+ */
+ attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_FILE;
+
+ /*
+ * If open(O_TRUNC) is done, VFS calls ->setattr with ATTR_OPEN
+ * set. Overlayfs does not pass O_TRUNC flag to underlying
+ * filesystem during open -> do not pass ATTR_OPEN. This
+ * disables optimization in fuse which assumes open(O_TRUNC)
+ * already set file size to 0. But we never passed O_TRUNC to
+ * fuse. So by clearing ATTR_OPEN, fuse will be forced to send
+ * setattr request to server.
+ */
+ attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_OPEN;
+
+ inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ if (!err)
+ ovl_copyattr(dentry->d_inode);
+ inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
+
+ if (winode)
+ put_write_access(winode);
+ }
+out_drop_write:
+ ovl_drop_write(dentry);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void ovl_map_dev_ino(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat, int fsid)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
+ bool samefs = ovl_same_fs(ofs);
+ unsigned int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(ofs);
+ unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits;
+
+ if (samefs) {
+ /*
+ * When all layers are on the same fs, all real inode
+ * number are unique, so we use the overlay st_dev,
+ * which is friendly to du -x.
+ */
+ stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
+ return;
+ } else if (xinobits) {
+ /*
+ * All inode numbers of underlying fs should not be using the
+ * high xinobits, so we use high xinobits to partition the
+ * overlay st_ino address space. The high bits holds the fsid
+ * (upper fsid is 0). The lowest xinobit is reserved for mapping
+ * the non-persistent inode numbers range in case of overflow.
+ * This way all overlay inode numbers are unique and use the
+ * overlay st_dev.
+ */
+ if (likely(!(stat->ino >> xinoshift))) {
+ stat->ino |= ((u64)fsid) << (xinoshift + 1);
+ stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
+ return;
+ } else if (ovl_xino_warn(ofs)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("inode number too big (%pd2, ino=%llu, xinobits=%d)\n",
+ dentry, stat->ino, xinobits);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The inode could not be mapped to a unified st_ino address space */
+ if (S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+ /*
+ * Always use the overlay st_dev for directories, so 'find
+ * -xdev' will scan the entire overlay mount and won't cross the
+ * overlay mount boundaries.
+ *
+ * If not all layers are on the same fs the pair {real st_ino;
+ * overlay st_dev} is not unique, so use the non persistent
+ * overlay st_ino for directories.
+ */
+ stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
+ stat->ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * For non-samefs setup, if we cannot map all layers st_ino
+ * to a unified address space, we need to make sure that st_dev
+ * is unique per underlying fs, so we use the unique anonymous
+ * bdev assigned to the underlying fs.
+ */
+ stat->dev = ofs->fs[fsid].pseudo_dev;
+ }
+}
+
+int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
+ struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+ enum ovl_path_type type;
+ struct path realpath;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
+ int fsid = 0;
+ int err;
+ bool metacopy_blocks = false;
+
+ metacopy_blocks = ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(dentry);
+
+ type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Report the effective immutable/append-only STATX flags */
+ generic_fill_statx_attr(inode, stat);
+
+ /*
+ * For non-dir or same fs, we use st_ino of the copy up origin.
+ * This guaranties constant st_dev/st_ino across copy up.
+ * With xino feature and non-samefs, we use st_ino of the copy up
+ * origin masked with high bits that represent the layer id.
+ *
+ * If lower filesystem supports NFS file handles, this also guaranties
+ * persistent st_ino across mount cycle.
+ */
+ if (!is_dir || ovl_same_dev(OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb))) {
+ if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type)) {
+ fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid;
+ } else if (OVL_TYPE_ORIGIN(type)) {
+ struct kstat lowerstat;
+ u32 lowermask = STATX_INO | STATX_BLOCKS |
+ (!is_dir ? STATX_NLINK : 0);
+
+ ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
+ err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, &lowerstat, lowermask,
+ flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Lower hardlinks may be broken on copy up to different
+ * upper files, so we cannot use the lower origin st_ino
+ * for those different files, even for the same fs case.
+ *
+ * Similarly, several redirected dirs can point to the
+ * same dir on a lower layer. With the "verify_lower"
+ * feature, we do not use the lower origin st_ino, if
+ * we haven't verified that this redirect is unique.
+ *
+ * With inodes index enabled, it is safe to use st_ino
+ * of an indexed origin. The index validates that the
+ * upper hardlink is not broken and that a redirected
+ * dir is the only redirect to that origin.
+ */
+ if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry)) ||
+ (!ovl_verify_lower(dentry->d_sb) &&
+ (is_dir || lowerstat.nlink == 1))) {
+ fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid;
+ stat->ino = lowerstat.ino;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are querying a metacopy dentry and lower
+ * dentry is data dentry, then use the blocks we
+ * queried just now. We don't have to do additional
+ * vfs_getattr(). If lower itself is metacopy, then
+ * additional vfs_getattr() is unavoidable.
+ */
+ if (metacopy_blocks &&
+ realpath.dentry == ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry)) {
+ stat->blocks = lowerstat.blocks;
+ metacopy_blocks = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (metacopy_blocks) {
+ /*
+ * If lower is not same as lowerdata or if there was
+ * no origin on upper, we can end up here.
+ * With lazy lowerdata lookup, guess lowerdata blocks
+ * from size to avoid lowerdata lookup on stat(2).
+ */
+ struct kstat lowerdatastat;
+ u32 lowermask = STATX_BLOCKS;
+
+ ovl_path_lowerdata(dentry, &realpath);
+ if (realpath.dentry) {
+ err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, &lowerdatastat,
+ lowermask, flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ lowerdatastat.blocks =
+ round_up(stat->size, stat->blksize) >> 9;
+ }
+ stat->blocks = lowerdatastat.blocks;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ovl_map_dev_ino(dentry, stat, fsid);
+
+ /*
+ * It's probably not worth it to count subdirs to get the
+ * correct link count. nlink=1 seems to pacify 'find' and
+ * other utilities.
+ */
+ if (is_dir && OVL_TYPE_MERGE(type))
+ stat->nlink = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the overlay inode nlinks for indexed upper inodes.
+ * Overlay inode nlink counts the union of the upper hardlinks
+ * and non-covered lower hardlinks. It does not include the upper
+ * index hardlink.
+ */
+ if (!is_dir && ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry)))
+ stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
+
+out:
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode);
+ struct inode *realinode;
+ struct path realpath;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Careful in RCU walk mode */
+ realinode = ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
+ if (!realinode) {
+ WARN_ON(!(mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK));
+ return -ECHILD;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check overlay inode with the creds of task and underlying inode
+ * with creds of mounter
+ */
+ err = generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+ if (!upperinode &&
+ !special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
+ mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
+ /* Make sure mounter can read file for copy up later */
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ }
+ err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ return p;
+}
+
+bool ovl_is_private_xattr(struct super_block *sb, const char *name)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
+
+ if (ofs->config.userxattr)
+ return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) == 0;
+ else
+ return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) == 0;
+}
+
+int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
+ struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode);
+ struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
+ struct path realpath;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+
+ err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!value && !upperdentry) {
+ ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ err = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, name, NULL, 0);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_drop_write;
+ }
+
+ if (!upperdentry) {
+ err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_drop_write;
+
+ realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+ }
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ if (value) {
+ err = ovl_do_setxattr(ofs, realdentry, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
+ err = ovl_do_removexattr(ofs, realdentry, name);
+ }
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ /* copy c/mtime */
+ ovl_copyattr(inode);
+
+out_drop_write:
+ ovl_drop_write(dentry);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ ssize_t res;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ struct path realpath;
+
+ ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ return res;
+}
+
+static bool ovl_can_list(struct super_block *sb, const char *s)
+{
+ /* Never list private (.overlay) */
+ if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, s))
+ return false;
+
+ /* List all non-trusted xattrs */
+ if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+ return true;
+
+ /* list other trusted for superuser only */
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
+ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
+{
+ struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
+ ssize_t res;
+ size_t len;
+ char *s;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
+ return res;
+
+ /* filter out private xattrs */
+ for (s = list, len = res; len;) {
+ size_t slen = strnlen(s, len) + 1;
+
+ /* underlying fs providing us with an broken xattr list? */
+ if (WARN_ON(slen > len))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ len -= slen;
+ if (!ovl_can_list(dentry->d_sb, s)) {
+ res -= slen;
+ memmove(s, s + slen, len);
+ } else {
+ s += slen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+/*
+ * Apply the idmapping of the layer to POSIX ACLs. The caller must pass a clone
+ * of the POSIX ACLs retrieved from the lower layer to this function to not
+ * alter the POSIX ACLs for the underlying filesystem.
+ */
+static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl(const struct inode *realinode,
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct posix_acl *acl)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *fs_userns = i_user_ns(realinode);
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < acl->a_count; i++) {
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid;
+ vfsgid_t vfsgid;
+
+ struct posix_acl_entry *e = &acl->a_entries[i];
+ switch (e->e_tag) {
+ case ACL_USER:
+ vfsuid = make_vfsuid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_uid);
+ e->e_uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
+ break;
+ case ACL_GROUP:
+ vfsgid = make_vfsgid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_gid);
+ e->e_gid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The @noperm argument is used to skip permission checking and is a temporary
+ * measure. Quoting Miklos from an earlier discussion:
+ *
+ * > So there are two paths to getting an acl:
+ * > 1) permission checking and 2) retrieving the value via getxattr(2).
+ * > This is a similar situation as reading a symlink vs. following it.
+ * > When following a symlink overlayfs always reads the link on the
+ * > underlying fs just as if it was a readlink(2) call, calling
+ * > security_inode_readlink() instead of security_inode_follow_link().
+ * > This is logical: we are reading the link from the underlying storage,
+ * > and following it on overlayfs.
+ * >
+ * > Applying the same logic to acl: we do need to call the
+ * > security_inode_getxattr() on the underlying fs, even if just want to
+ * > check permissions on overlay. This is currently not done, which is an
+ * > inconsistency.
+ * >
+ * > Maybe adding the check to ovl_get_acl() is the right way to go, but
+ * > I'm a little afraid of a performance regression. Will look into that.
+ *
+ * Until we have made a decision allow this helper to take the @noperm
+ * argument. We should hopefully be able to remove it soon.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl_path(const struct path *path,
+ const char *acl_name, bool noperm)
+{
+ struct posix_acl *real_acl, *clone;
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap;
+ struct inode *realinode = d_inode(path->dentry);
+
+ idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
+
+ if (noperm)
+ real_acl = get_inode_acl(realinode, posix_acl_type(acl_name));
+ else
+ real_acl = vfs_get_acl(idmap, path->dentry, acl_name);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(real_acl))
+ return real_acl;
+
+ if (!is_idmapped_mnt(path->mnt))
+ return real_acl;
+
+ /*
+ * We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that
+ * would alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower
+ * filesystem. Instead we can clone the ACLs and then apply the
+ * relevant idmapping of the layer.
+ */
+ clone = posix_acl_clone(real_acl, GFP_KERNEL);
+ posix_acl_release(real_acl); /* release original acl */
+ if (!clone)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ ovl_idmap_posix_acl(realinode, idmap, clone);
+ return clone;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When the relevant layer is an idmapped mount we need to take the idmapping
+ * of the layer into account and translate any ACL_{GROUP,USER} values
+ * according to the idmapped mount.
+ *
+ * We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that would
+ * alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower filesystem. Instead we
+ * can clone the ACLs and then apply the relevant idmapping of the layer.
+ *
+ * This is obviously only relevant when idmapped layers are used.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *do_ovl_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode, int type,
+ bool rcu, bool noperm)
+{
+ struct inode *realinode;
+ struct posix_acl *acl;
+ struct path realpath;
+
+ /* Careful in RCU walk mode */
+ realinode = ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
+ if (!realinode) {
+ WARN_ON(!rcu);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+ }
+
+ if (!IS_POSIXACL(realinode))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (rcu) {
+ /*
+ * If the layer is idmapped drop out of RCU path walk
+ * so we can clone the ACLs.
+ */
+ if (is_idmapped_mnt(realpath.mnt))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+ acl = get_cached_acl_rcu(realinode, type);
+ } else {
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+ acl = ovl_get_acl_path(&realpath, posix_acl_xattr_name(type), noperm);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ }
+
+ return acl;
+}
+
+static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct path realpath;
+ const char *acl_name;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
+ struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+ struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
+
+ err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * If ACL is to be removed from a lower file, check if it exists in
+ * the first place before copying it up.
+ */
+ acl_name = posix_acl_xattr_name(type);
+ if (!acl && !upperdentry) {
+ struct posix_acl *real_acl;
+
+ ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ real_acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry,
+ acl_name);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ if (IS_ERR(real_acl)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(real_acl);
+ goto out_drop_write;
+ }
+ posix_acl_release(real_acl);
+ }
+
+ if (!upperdentry) {
+ err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_drop_write;
+
+ realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+ }
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+ if (acl)
+ err = ovl_do_set_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name, acl);
+ else
+ err = ovl_do_remove_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ /* copy c/mtime */
+ ovl_copyattr(inode);
+
+out_drop_write:
+ ovl_drop_write(dentry);
+ return err;
+}
+
+int ovl_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct dentry *workdir = ovl_workdir(dentry);
+ struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode);
+
+ if (!IS_POSIXACL(d_inode(workdir)))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!realinode->i_op->set_acl)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if sgid bit needs to be cleared (actual setacl operation will
+ * be done with mounter's capabilities and so that won't do it for us).
+ */
+ if (unlikely(inode->i_mode & S_ISGID) && type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS &&
+ !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, CAP_FSETID)) {
+ struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SGID };
+
+ err = ovl_setattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &iattr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return ovl_set_or_remove_acl(dentry, inode, acl, type);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ovl_update_time(struct inode *inode, int flags)
+{
+ if (flags & S_ATIME) {
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb);
+ struct path upperpath = {
+ .mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs),
+ .dentry = ovl_upperdentry_dereference(OVL_I(inode)),
+ };
+
+ if (upperpath.dentry) {
+ touch_atime(&upperpath);
+ inode->i_atime = d_inode(upperpath.dentry)->i_atime;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
+ u64 start, u64 len)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_realdata(inode);
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+
+ if (!realinode)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (!realinode->i_op->fiemap)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+ err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Work around the fact that security_file_ioctl() takes a file argument.
+ * Introducing security_inode_fileattr_get/set() hooks would solve this issue
+ * properly.
+ */
+static int ovl_security_fileattr(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa,
+ bool set)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ unsigned int cmd;
+ int err;
+
+ file = dentry_open(realpath, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+ if (set)
+ cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR : FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
+ else
+ cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR : FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
+
+ err = security_file_ioctl(file, cmd, 0);
+ fput(file);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int ovl_real_fileattr_set(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return vfs_fileattr_set(mnt_idmap(realpath->mnt), realpath->dentry, fa);
+}
+
+int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct path upperpath;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ int err;
+
+ err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
+ if (!err) {
+ ovl_path_real(dentry, &upperpath);
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+ /*
+ * Store immutable/append-only flags in xattr and clear them
+ * in upper fileattr (in case they were set by older kernel)
+ * so children of "ovl-immutable" directories lower aliases of
+ * "ovl-immutable" hardlinks could be copied up.
+ * Clear xattr when flags are cleared.
+ */
+ err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa);
+ if (!err)
+ err = ovl_real_fileattr_set(&upperpath, fa);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ /*
+ * Merge real inode flags with inode flags read from
+ * overlay.protattr xattr
+ */
+ flags = ovl_inode_real(inode)->i_flags & OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK & ~OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK);
+ flags |= inode->i_flags & OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK;
+ inode_set_flags(inode, flags, OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK);
+
+ /* Update ctime */
+ ovl_copyattr(inode);
+ }
+ ovl_drop_write(dentry);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Convert inode protection flags to fileattr flags */
+static void ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(struct inode *inode, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FS_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_COMMON_FL);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FSX_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_XFLAG_COMMON);
+
+ if (inode->i_flags & S_APPEND) {
+ fa->flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_APPEND;
+ }
+ if (inode->i_flags & S_IMMUTABLE) {
+ fa->flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
+ fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
+ }
+}
+
+int ovl_real_fileattr_get(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = vfs_fileattr_get(realpath->dentry, fa);
+ if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
+ err = -ENOTTY;
+ return err;
+}
+
+int ovl_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct path realpath;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ int err;
+
+ ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
+
+ old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+ err = ovl_real_fileattr_get(&realpath, fa);
+ ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(inode, fa);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations ovl_file_inode_operations = {
+ .setattr = ovl_setattr,
+ .permission = ovl_permission,
+ .getattr = ovl_getattr,
+ .listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
+ .get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl,
+ .get_acl = ovl_get_acl,
+ .set_acl = ovl_set_acl,
+ .update_time = ovl_update_time,
+ .fiemap = ovl_fiemap,
+ .fileattr_get = ovl_fileattr_get,
+ .fileattr_set = ovl_fileattr_set,
+};
+
+static const struct inode_operations ovl_symlink_inode_operations = {
+ .setattr = ovl_setattr,
+ .get_link = ovl_get_link,
+ .getattr = ovl_getattr,
+ .listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
+ .update_time = ovl_update_time,
+};
+
+static const struct inode_operations ovl_special_inode_operations = {
+ .setattr = ovl_setattr,
+ .permission = ovl_permission,
+ .getattr = ovl_getattr,
+ .listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
+ .get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl,
+ .get_acl = ovl_get_acl,
+ .set_acl = ovl_set_acl,
+ .update_time = ovl_update_time,
+};
+
+static const struct address_space_operations ovl_aops = {
+ /* For O_DIRECT dentry_open() checks f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO */
+ .direct_IO = noop_direct_IO,
+};
+
+/*
+ * It is possible to stack overlayfs instance on top of another
+ * overlayfs instance as lower layer. We need to annotate the
+ * stackable i_mutex locks according to stack level of the super
+ * block instance. An overlayfs instance can never be in stack
+ * depth 0 (there is always a real fs below it). An overlayfs
+ * inode lock will use the lockdep annotation ovl_i_mutex_key[depth].
+ *
+ * For example, here is a snip from /proc/lockdep_chains after
+ * dir_iterate of nested overlayfs:
+ *
+ * [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth] (stack_depth=2)
+ * [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]#2 (stack_depth=1)
+ * [...] &type->i_mutex_dir_key (stack_depth=0)
+ *
+ * Locking order w.r.t ovl_want_write() is important for nested overlayfs.
+ *
+ * This chain is valid:
+ * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2])
+ * - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0])
+ * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2])
+ * - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
+ *
+ * And this chain is valid:
+ * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2])
+ * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2])
+ * - lowerinode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1])
+ * - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
+ *
+ * But lowerinode->i_rwsem SHOULD NOT be acquired while ovl_want_write() is
+ * held, because it is in reverse order of the non-nested case using the same
+ * upper fs:
+ * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1])
+ * - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0])
+ * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1])
+ */
+#define OVL_MAX_NESTING FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
+
+static inline void ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+ static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
+ static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
+ static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_lock_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
+
+ int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth - 1;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= OVL_MAX_NESTING))
+ depth = 0;
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]);
+ else
+ lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_key[depth]);
+
+ lockdep_set_class(&OVL_I(inode)->lock, &ovl_i_lock_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ovl_next_ino(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb);
+
+ inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino);
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_ino))
+ inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino);
+}
+
+static void ovl_map_ino(struct inode *inode, unsigned long ino, int fsid)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb);
+ int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(ofs);
+ unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits;
+
+ /*
+ * When d_ino is consistent with st_ino (samefs or i_ino has enough
+ * bits to encode layer), set the same value used for st_ino to i_ino,
+ * so inode number exposed via /proc/locks and a like will be
+ * consistent with d_ino and st_ino values. An i_ino value inconsistent
+ * with d_ino also causes nfsd readdirplus to fail.
+ */
+ inode->i_ino = ino;
+ if (ovl_same_fs(ofs)) {
+ return;
+ } else if (xinobits && likely(!(ino >> xinoshift))) {
+ inode->i_ino |= (unsigned long)fsid << (xinoshift + 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For directory inodes on non-samefs with xino disabled or xino
+ * overflow, we allocate a non-persistent inode number, to be used for
+ * resolving st_ino collisions in ovl_map_dev_ino().
+ *
+ * To avoid ino collision with legitimate xino values from upper
+ * layer (fsid 0), use the lowest xinobit to map the non
+ * persistent inode numbers to the unified st_ino address space.
+ */
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+ ovl_next_ino(inode);
+ if (xinobits) {
+ inode->i_ino &= ~0UL >> xinobits;
+ inode->i_ino |= 1UL << xinoshift;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void ovl_inode_init(struct inode *inode, struct ovl_inode_params *oip,
+ unsigned long ino, int fsid)
+{
+ struct inode *realinode;
+ struct ovl_inode *oi = OVL_I(inode);
+
+ oi->__upperdentry = oip->upperdentry;
+ oi->oe = oip->oe;
+ oi->redirect = oip->redirect;
+ oi->lowerdata_redirect = oip->lowerdata_redirect;
+
+ realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode);
+ ovl_copyattr(inode);
+ ovl_copyflags(realinode, inode);
+ ovl_map_ino(inode, ino, fsid);
+}
+
+static void ovl_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
+{
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
+ inode->i_flags |= S_NOCMTIME;
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+ inode->i_acl = inode->i_default_acl = ACL_DONT_CACHE;
+#endif
+
+ ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
+
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFREG:
+ inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &ovl_file_operations;
+ inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ovl_aops;
+ break;
+
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ inode->i_op = &ovl_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &ovl_dir_operations;
+ break;
+
+ case S_IFLNK:
+ inode->i_op = &ovl_symlink_inode_operations;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ inode->i_op = &ovl_special_inode_operations;
+ init_special_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * With inodes index enabled, an overlay inode nlink counts the union of upper
+ * hardlinks and non-covered lower hardlinks. During the lifetime of a non-pure
+ * upper inode, the following nlink modifying operations can happen:
+ *
+ * 1. Lower hardlink copy up
+ * 2. Upper hardlink created, unlinked or renamed over
+ * 3. Lower hardlink whiteout or renamed over
+ *
+ * For the first, copy up case, the union nlink does not change, whether the
+ * operation succeeds or fails, but the upper inode nlink may change.
+ * Therefore, before copy up, we store the union nlink value relative to the
+ * lower inode nlink in the index inode xattr .overlay.nlink.
+ *
+ * For the second, upper hardlink case, the union nlink should be incremented
+ * or decremented IFF the operation succeeds, aligned with nlink change of the
+ * upper inode. Therefore, before link/unlink/rename, we store the union nlink
+ * value relative to the upper inode nlink in the index inode.
+ *
+ * For the last, lower cover up case, we simplify things by preceding the
+ * whiteout or cover up with copy up. This makes sure that there is an index
+ * upper inode where the nlink xattr can be stored before the copied up upper
+ * entry is unlink.
+ */
+#define OVL_NLINK_ADD_UPPER (1 << 0)
+
+/*
+ * On-disk format for indexed nlink:
+ *
+ * nlink relative to the upper inode - "U[+-]NUM"
+ * nlink relative to the lower inode - "L[+-]NUM"
+ */
+
+static int ovl_set_nlink_common(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *realdentry, const char *format)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct inode *realinode = d_inode(realdentry);
+ char buf[13];
+ int len;
+
+ len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format,
+ (int) (inode->i_nlink - realinode->i_nlink));
+
+ if (WARN_ON(len >= sizeof(buf)))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return ovl_setxattr(OVL_FS(inode->i_sb), ovl_dentry_upper(dentry),
+ OVL_XATTR_NLINK, buf, len);
+}
+
+int ovl_set_nlink_upper(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_upper(dentry), "U%+i");
+}
+
+int ovl_set_nlink_lower(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_lower(dentry), "L%+i");
+}
+
+unsigned int ovl_get_nlink(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *lowerdentry,
+ struct dentry *upperdentry,
+ unsigned int fallback)
+{
+ int nlink_diff;
+ int nlink;
+ char buf[13];
+ int err;
+
+ if (!lowerdentry || !upperdentry || d_inode(lowerdentry)->i_nlink == 1)
+ return fallback;
+
+ err = ovl_getxattr_upper(ofs, upperdentry, OVL_XATTR_NLINK,
+ &buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ buf[err] = '\0';
+ if ((buf[0] != 'L' && buf[0] != 'U') ||
+ (buf[1] != '+' && buf[1] != '-'))
+ goto fail;
+
+ err = kstrtoint(buf + 1, 10, &nlink_diff);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ nlink = d_inode(buf[0] == 'L' ? lowerdentry : upperdentry)->i_nlink;
+ nlink += nlink_diff;
+
+ if (nlink <= 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ return nlink;
+
+fail:
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get index nlink (%pd2, err=%i)\n",
+ upperdentry, err);
+ return fallback;
+}
+
+struct inode *ovl_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
+{
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ inode = new_inode(sb);
+ if (inode)
+ ovl_fill_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
+
+ return inode;
+}
+
+static int ovl_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *data)
+{
+ return inode->i_private == data;
+}
+
+static int ovl_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *data)
+{
+ inode->i_private = data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool ovl_verify_inode(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *lowerdentry,
+ struct dentry *upperdentry, bool strict)
+{
+ /*
+ * For directories, @strict verify from lookup path performs consistency
+ * checks, so NULL lower/upper in dentry must match NULL lower/upper in
+ * inode. Non @strict verify from NFS handle decode path passes NULL for
+ * 'unknown' lower/upper.
+ */
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && strict) {
+ /* Real lower dir moved to upper layer under us? */
+ if (!lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Lookup of an uncovered redirect origin? */
+ if (!upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow non-NULL lower inode in ovl_inode even if lowerdentry is NULL.
+ * This happens when finding a copied up overlay inode for a renamed
+ * or hardlinked overlay dentry and lower dentry cannot be followed
+ * by origin because lower fs does not support file handles.
+ */
+ if (lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode) != d_inode(lowerdentry))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow non-NULL __upperdentry in inode even if upperdentry is NULL.
+ * This happens when finding a lower alias for a copied up hard link.
+ */
+ if (upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode) != d_inode(upperdentry))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct inode *ovl_lookup_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *real,
+ bool is_upper)
+{
+ struct inode *inode, *key = d_inode(real);
+
+ inode = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key);
+ if (!inode)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, is_upper ? NULL : real,
+ is_upper ? real : NULL, false)) {
+ iput(inode);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
+ }
+
+ return inode;
+}
+
+bool ovl_lookup_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct inode *key = d_inode(dir);
+ struct inode *trap;
+ bool res;
+
+ trap = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key);
+ if (!trap)
+ return false;
+
+ res = IS_DEADDIR(trap) && !ovl_inode_upper(trap) &&
+ !ovl_inode_lower(trap);
+
+ iput(trap);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an inode cache entry for layer root dir, that will intentionally
+ * fail ovl_verify_inode(), so any lookup that will find some layer root
+ * will fail.
+ */
+struct inode *ovl_get_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct inode *key = d_inode(dir);
+ struct inode *trap;
+
+ if (!d_is_dir(dir))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+
+ trap = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test,
+ ovl_inode_set, key);
+ if (!trap)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!(trap->i_state & I_NEW)) {
+ /* Conflicting layer roots? */
+ iput(trap);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+ }
+
+ trap->i_mode = S_IFDIR;
+ trap->i_flags = S_DEAD;
+ unlock_new_inode(trap);
+
+ return trap;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Does overlay inode need to be hashed by lower inode?
+ */
+static bool ovl_hash_bylower(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *upper,
+ struct dentry *lower, bool index)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
+
+ /* No, if pure upper */
+ if (!lower)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Yes, if already indexed */
+ if (index)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Yes, if won't be copied up */
+ if (!ovl_upper_mnt(ofs))
+ return true;
+
+ /* No, if lower hardlink is or will be broken on copy up */
+ if ((upper || !ovl_indexdir(sb)) &&
+ !d_is_dir(lower) && d_inode(lower)->i_nlink > 1)
+ return false;
+
+ /* No, if non-indexed upper with NFS export */
+ if (ofs->config.nfs_export && upper)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Otherwise, hash by lower inode for fsnotify */
+ return true;
+}
+
+static struct inode *ovl_iget5(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *newinode,
+ struct inode *key)
+{
+ return newinode ? inode_insert5(newinode, (unsigned long) key,
+ ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key) :
+ iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key,
+ ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key);
+}
+
+struct inode *ovl_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct ovl_inode_params *oip)
+{
+ struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
+ struct dentry *upperdentry = oip->upperdentry;
+ struct ovl_path *lowerpath = ovl_lowerpath(oip->oe);
+ struct inode *realinode = upperdentry ? d_inode(upperdentry) : NULL;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *lowerdentry = lowerpath ? lowerpath->dentry : NULL;
+ struct path realpath = {
+ .dentry = upperdentry ?: lowerdentry,
+ .mnt = upperdentry ? ovl_upper_mnt(ofs) : lowerpath->layer->mnt,
+ };
+ bool bylower = ovl_hash_bylower(sb, upperdentry, lowerdentry,
+ oip->index);
+ int fsid = bylower ? lowerpath->layer->fsid : 0;
+ bool is_dir;
+ unsigned long ino = 0;
+ int err = oip->newinode ? -EEXIST : -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!realinode)
+ realinode = d_inode(lowerdentry);
+
+ /*
+ * Copy up origin (lower) may exist for non-indexed upper, but we must
+ * not use lower as hash key if this is a broken hardlink.
+ */
+ is_dir = S_ISDIR(realinode->i_mode);
+ if (upperdentry || bylower) {
+ struct inode *key = d_inode(bylower ? lowerdentry :
+ upperdentry);
+ unsigned int nlink = is_dir ? 1 : realinode->i_nlink;
+
+ inode = ovl_iget5(sb, oip->newinode, key);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out_err;
+ if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)) {
+ /*
+ * Verify that the underlying files stored in the inode
+ * match those in the dentry.
+ */
+ if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, lowerdentry, upperdentry,
+ true)) {
+ iput(inode);
+ err = -ESTALE;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ dput(upperdentry);
+ ovl_free_entry(oip->oe);
+ kfree(oip->redirect);
+ kfree(oip->lowerdata_redirect);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Recalculate nlink for non-dir due to indexing */
+ if (!is_dir)
+ nlink = ovl_get_nlink(ofs, lowerdentry, upperdentry,
+ nlink);
+ set_nlink(inode, nlink);
+ ino = key->i_ino;
+ } else {
+ /* Lower hardlink that will be broken on copy up */
+ inode = new_inode(sb);
+ if (!inode) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ ino = realinode->i_ino;
+ fsid = lowerpath->layer->fsid;
+ }
+ ovl_fill_inode(inode, realinode->i_mode, realinode->i_rdev);
+ ovl_inode_init(inode, oip, ino, fsid);
+
+ if (upperdentry && ovl_is_impuredir(sb, upperdentry))
+ ovl_set_flag(OVL_IMPURE, inode);
+
+ if (oip->index)
+ ovl_set_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode);
+
+ if (bylower)
+ ovl_set_flag(OVL_CONST_INO, inode);
+
+ /* Check for non-merge dir that may have whiteouts */
+ if (is_dir) {
+ if (((upperdentry && lowerdentry) || ovl_numlower(oip->oe) > 1) ||
+ ovl_path_check_origin_xattr(ofs, &realpath)) {
+ ovl_set_flag(OVL_WHITEOUTS, inode);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for immutable/append-only inode flags in xattr */
+ if (upperdentry)
+ ovl_check_protattr(inode, upperdentry);
+
+ if (inode->i_state & I_NEW)
+ unlock_new_inode(inode);
+out:
+ return inode;
+
+out_err:
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get inode (%i)\n", err);
+ inode = ERR_PTR(err);
+ goto out;
+}