Adding upstream version 4.22.0.upstream/4.22.0

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 192 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/upstream/archlinux/man3/PKCS7_verify.3ssl b/upstream/archlinux/man3/PKCS7_verify.3ssl
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+.\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*-
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 5.01 (Pod::Simple 3.43)
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ========================================================================
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text
+.ft CW
+.nf
+.ne \\$1
+..
+.de Ve \" End verbatim text
+.ft R
+.fi
+..
+.\" \*(C` and \*(C' are quotes in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
+.ie n \{\
+.    ds C` ""
+.    ds C' ""
+'br\}
+.el\{\
+.    ds C`
+.    ds C'
+'br\}
+.\"
+.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el       .ds Aq '
+.\"
+.\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for
+.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index
+.\" entries marked with X<> in POD.  Of course, you'll have to process the
+.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
+.\"
+.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'.
+.de IX
+..
+.nr rF 0
+.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1
+.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{\
+.    if \nF \{\
+.        de IX
+.        tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+..
+.        if !\nF==2 \{\
+.            nr % 0
+.            nr F 2
+.        \}
+.    \}
+.\}
+.rr rF
+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "PKCS7_VERIFY 3ssl"
+.TH PKCS7_VERIFY 3ssl 2024-01-30 3.2.1 OpenSSL
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH NAME
+PKCS7_verify, PKCS7_get0_signers \- verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+.Vb 1
+\& #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+\&
+\& int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
+\&                  BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags);
+\&
+\& STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags);
+.Ve
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+\&\fBPKCS7_verify()\fR is very similar to \fBCMS_verify\fR\|(3).
+It verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure given in \fIp7\fR.
+The optional \fIcerts\fR parameter refers to a set of certificates
+in which to search for signer's certificates.
+\&\fIp7\fR may contain extra untrusted CA certificates that may be used for
+chain building as well as CRLs that may be used for certificate validation.
+\&\fIstore\fR may be NULL or point to
+the trusted certificate store to use for chain verification.
+\&\fIindata\fR refers to the signed data if the content is detached from \fIp7\fR.
+Otherwise \fIindata\fR should be NULL, and then the signed data must be in \fIp7\fR.
+The content is written to the BIO \fIout\fR unless it is NULL.
+\&\fIflags\fR is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the operation.
+.PP
+\&\fBPKCS7_get0_signers()\fR retrieves the signer's certificates from \fIp7\fR, it does
+\&\fBnot\fR check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The \fIcerts\fR
+and \fIflags\fR parameters have the same meanings as in \fBPKCS7_verify()\fR.
+.SH "VERIFY PROCESS"
+.IX Header "VERIFY PROCESS"
+Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
+.PP
+Initially some sanity checks are performed on \fIp7\fR. The type of \fIp7\fR must
+be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
+the content is detached \fIindata\fR cannot be NULL.  If the content is
+not detached and \fIindata\fR is not NULL then the structure has both
+embedded and external content. To treat this as an error, use the flag
+\&\fBPKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT\fR.
+The default behavior allows this, for compatibility with older
+versions of OpenSSL.
+.PP
+An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in
+the \fIcerts\fR parameter (if it is not NULL). Then they are looked up in any
+certificates contained in the \fIp7\fR structure unless \fBPKCS7_NOINTERN\fR is set.
+If any signer's certificates cannot be located the operation fails.
+.PP
+Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the \fBsmimesign\fR purpose and
+using the trusted certificate store \fIstore\fR if supplied.
+Any internal certificates in the message, which may have been added using
+\&\fBPKCS7_add_certificate\fR\|(3), are used as untrusted CAs unless \fBPKCS7_NOCHAIN\fR
+is set.
+If CRL checking is enabled in \fIstore\fR and \fBPKCS7_NOCRL\fR is not set,
+any internal CRLs, which may have been added using \fBPKCS7_add_crl\fR\|(3),
+are used in addition to attempting to look them up in \fIstore\fR.
+If \fIstore\fR is not NULL and any chain verify fails an error code is returned.
+.PP
+Finally the signed content is read (and written to \fIout\fR unless it is NULL)
+and the signature is checked.
+.PP
+If all signatures verify correctly then the function is successful.
+.PP
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the \fIflags\fR
+parameter to change the default verify behaviour.
+Only the flag \fBPKCS7_NOINTERN\fR is meaningful to \fBPKCS7_get0_signers()\fR.
+.PP
+If \fBPKCS7_NOINTERN\fR is set the certificates in the message itself are not
+searched when locating the signer's certificates.
+This means that all the signer's certificates must be in the \fIcerts\fR parameter.
+.PP
+If \fBPKCS7_NOCRL\fR is set and CRL checking is enabled in \fIstore\fR then any
+CRLs in the message itself are ignored.
+.PP
+If the \fBPKCS7_TEXT\fR flag is set MIME headers for type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR then an error is
+returned.
+.PP
+If \fBPKCS7_NOVERIFY\fR is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified.
+.PP
+If \fBPKCS7_NOCHAIN\fR is set then the certificates contained in the message are
+not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from
+the signer's certificates) must be contained in the trusted store.
+.PP
+If \fBPKCS7_NOSIGS\fR is set then the signatures on the data are not checked.
+.SH NOTES
+.IX Header "NOTES"
+One application of \fBPKCS7_NOINTERN\fR is to only accept messages signed by
+a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
+in the \fIcerts\fR parameter. In this case if the signer's certificate is not one
+of the certificates supplied in \fIcerts\fR then the verify will fail because the
+signer cannot be found.
+.PP
+Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
+setting \f(CW\*(C`PKCS7_NOVERIFY|PKCS7_NOSIGS\*(C'\fR will totally disable all verification
+and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however
+useful if one merely wishes to write the content to \fIout\fR and its validity
+is not considered important.
+.PP
+Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather
+than the current time. However, since the signing time is supplied by the
+signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted
+timestamp).
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+\&\fBPKCS7_verify()\fR returns 1 for a successful verification and 0 if an error occurs.
+.PP
+\&\fBPKCS7_get0_signers()\fR returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.
+.PP
+The error can be obtained from \fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
+.SH BUGS
+.IX Header "BUGS"
+The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signer's certificates.
+This is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current \fBX509_STORE\fR
+functionality.
+.PP
+The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must all
+be held in memory if it is not detached.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fBCMS_verify\fR\|(3), \fBPKCS7_add_certificate\fR\|(3), \fBPKCS7_add_crl\fR\|(3),
+\&\fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3), \fBPKCS7_sign\fR\|(3)
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
+Copyright 2002\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+.PP
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.