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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 19:43:11 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 19:43:11 +0000 |
commit | fc22b3d6507c6745911b9dfcc68f1e665ae13dbc (patch) | |
tree | ce1e3bce06471410239a6f41282e328770aa404a /upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | manpages-l10n-fc22b3d6507c6745911b9dfcc68f1e665ae13dbc.tar.xz manpages-l10n-fc22b3d6507c6745911b9dfcc68f1e665ae13dbc.zip |
Adding upstream version 4.22.0.upstream/4.22.0
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl')
-rw-r--r-- | upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl | 401 |
1 files changed, 401 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl b/upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70e0c599 --- /dev/null +++ b/upstream/debian-bookworm/man7/EVP_RAND.7ssl @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 4.14 (Pod::Simple 3.43) +.\" +.\" Standard preamble: +.\" ======================================================================== +.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) +.if t .sp .5v +.if n .sp +.. +.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text +.ft CW +.nf +.ne \\$1 +.. +.de Ve \" End verbatim text +.ft R +.fi +.. +.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will +.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left +.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will +.\" give a nicer C++. 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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes +.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. +.if n .ad l +.nh +.SH "NAME" +EVP_RAND \- the random bit generator +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.IX Header "SYNOPSIS" +.Vb 2 +\& #include <openssl/evp.h> +\& #include <rand.h> +.Ve +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" +The default OpenSSL \s-1RAND\s0 method is based on the \s-1EVP_RAND\s0 classes to provide +non-deterministic inputs to other cryptographic algorithms. +.PP +While the \s-1RAND API\s0 is the 'frontend' which is intended to be used by +application developers for obtaining random bytes, the \s-1EVP_RAND API\s0 +serves as the 'backend', connecting the former with the operating +systems's entropy sources and providing access to deterministic random +bit generators (\s-1DRBG\s0) and their configuration parameters. +A \s-1DRBG\s0 is a certain type of cryptographically-secure pseudo-random +number generator (\s-1CSPRNG\s0), which is described in +[\s-1NIST SP 800\-90A\s0 Rev. 1]. +.SS "Disclaimer" +.IX Subsection "Disclaimer" +Unless you have very specific requirements for your random generator, +it is in general not necessary to utilize the \s-1EVP_RAND API\s0 directly. +The usual way to obtain random bytes is to use \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) or +\&\fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3), see also \s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7). +.SS "Typical Use Cases" +.IX Subsection "Typical Use Cases" +Typical examples for such special use cases are the following: +.IP "\(bu" 2 +You want to use your own private \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. +Multiple \s-1DRBG\s0 instances which are accessed only by a single thread provide +additional security (because their internal states are independent) and +better scalability in multithreaded applications (because they don't need +to be locked). +.IP "\(bu" 2 +You need to integrate a previously unsupported entropy source. +Refer to \fBprovider\-rand\fR\|(7) for the implementation details to support adding +randomness sources to \s-1EVP_RAND.\s0 +.IP "\(bu" 2 +You need to change the default settings of the standard OpenSSL \s-1RAND\s0 +implementation to meet specific requirements. +.SH "EVP_RAND CHAINING" +.IX Header "EVP_RAND CHAINING" +An \s-1EVP_RAND\s0 instance can be used as the entropy source of another +\&\s-1EVP_RAND\s0 instance, provided it has itself access to a valid entropy source. +The \s-1EVP_RAND\s0 instance which acts as entropy source is called the \fIparent\fR, +the other instance the \fIchild\fR. Typically, the child will be a \s-1DRBG\s0 because +it does not make sense for the child to be an entropy source. +.PP +This is called chaining. A chained \s-1EVP_RAND\s0 instance is created by passing +a pointer to the parent \s-1EVP_RAND_CTX\s0 as argument to the \fBEVP_RAND_CTX_new()\fR call. +It is possible to create chains of more than two \s-1DRBG\s0 in a row. +It is also possible to use any \s-1EVP_RAND_CTX\s0 class as the parent, however, only +a live entropy source may ignore and not use its parent. +.SH "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" +.IX Header "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" +Currently, there are three shared \s-1DRBG\s0 instances, +the <primary>, <public>, and <private> \s-1DRBG.\s0 +While the <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 is a single global instance, the <public> and <private> +\&\s-1DRBG\s0 are created per thread and accessed through thread-local storage. +.PP +By default, the functions \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) and \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) use +the thread-local <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance, respectively. +.SS "The <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" +.IX Subsection "The <primary> DRBG instance" +The <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 is not used directly by the application, only for reseeding +the two other two \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. It reseeds itself by obtaining randomness +either from os entropy sources or by consuming randomness which was added +previously by \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3). +.SS "The <public> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" +.IX Subsection "The <public> DRBG instance" +This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3). +.SS "The <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 instance" +.IX Subsection "The <private> DRBG instance" +This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) +.SH "LOCKING" +.IX Header "LOCKING" +The <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 is intended to be accessed concurrently for reseeding +by its child \s-1DRBG\s0 instances. The necessary locking is done internally. +It is \fInot\fR thread-safe to access the <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 directly via the +\&\s-1EVP_RAND\s0 interface. +The <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 are thread-local, i.e. there is an +instance of each per thread. So they can safely be accessed without +locking via the \s-1EVP_RAND\s0 interface. +.PP +Pointers to these \s-1DRBG\s0 instances can be obtained using +\&\fBRAND_get0_primary()\fR, \fBRAND_get0_public()\fR and \fBRAND_get0_private()\fR, respectively. +Note that it is not allowed to store a pointer to one of the thread-local +\&\s-1DRBG\s0 instances in a variable or other memory location where it will be +accessed and used by multiple threads. +.PP +All other \s-1DRBG\s0 instances created by an application don't support locking, +because they are intended to be used by a single thread. +Instead of accessing a single \s-1DRBG\s0 instance concurrently from different +threads, it is recommended to instantiate a separate \s-1DRBG\s0 instance per +thread. Using the <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 as entropy source for multiple \s-1DRBG\s0 +instances on different threads is thread-safe, because the \s-1DRBG\s0 instance +will lock the <primary> \s-1DRBG\s0 automatically for obtaining random input. +.SH "THE OVERALL PICTURE" +.IX Header "THE OVERALL PICTURE" +The following picture gives an overview over how the \s-1DRBG\s0 instances work +together and are being used. +.PP +.Vb 10 +\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& | os entropy sources | +\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& | +\& v +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& RAND_add() ==> <primary> <\-| shared DRBG (with locking) | +\& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& <public> <private> <\- | per\-thread DRBG instances | +\& | | +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& v v +\& RAND_bytes() RAND_priv_bytes() +\& | ^ +\& | | +\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\& | general purpose | | used for secrets like session keys | +\& | random generator | | and private keys for certificates | +\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +.Ve +.PP +The usual way to obtain random bytes is to call RAND_bytes(...) or +RAND_priv_bytes(...). These calls are roughly equivalent to calling +EVP_RAND_generate(<public>, ...) and +EVP_RAND_generate(<private>, ...), +respectively. +.SH "RESEEDING" +.IX Header "RESEEDING" +A \s-1DRBG\s0 instance seeds itself automatically, pulling random input from +its entropy source. The entropy source can be either a trusted operating +system entropy source, or another \s-1DRBG\s0 with access to such a source. +.PP +Automatic reseeding occurs after a predefined number of generate requests. +The selection of the trusted entropy sources is configured at build +time using the \-\-with\-rand\-seed option. The following sections explain +the reseeding process in more detail. +.SS "Automatic Reseeding" +.IX Subsection "Automatic Reseeding" +Before satisfying a generate request (\fBEVP_RAND_generate\fR\|(3)), the \s-1DRBG\s0 +reseeds itself automatically, if one of the following conditions holds: +.PP +\&\- the \s-1DRBG\s0 was not instantiated (=seeded) yet or has been uninstantiated. +.PP +\&\- the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a +certain threshold, the so called \fIreseed_interval\fR. +This behaviour can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_interval\fR to 0. +.PP +\&\- the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time +interval, the so called \fIreseed_time_interval\fR. +This can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_time_interval\fR to 0. +.PP +\&\- the \s-1DRBG\s0 is in an error state. +.PP +\&\fBNote\fR: An error state is entered if the entropy source fails while +the \s-1DRBG\s0 is seeding or reseeding. +The last case ensures that the \s-1DRBG\s0 automatically recovers +from the error as soon as the entropy source is available again. +.SS "Manual Reseeding" +.IX Subsection "Manual Reseeding" +In addition to automatic reseeding, the caller can request an immediate +reseeding of the \s-1DRBG\s0 with fresh entropy by setting the +\&\fIprediction resistance\fR parameter to 1 when calling +\&\fBEVP_RAND_generate\fR\|(3). +.PP +The document [\s-1NIST SP 800\-90C\s0] describes prediction resistance requests +in detail and imposes strict conditions on the entropy sources that are +approved for providing prediction resistance. +A request for prediction resistance can only be satisfied by pulling fresh +entropy from a live entropy source (section 5.5.2 of [\s-1NIST SP 800\-90C\s0]). +It is up to the user to ensure that a live entropy source is configured +and is being used. +.PP +For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to +reseed them manually: +If \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3) is called with a positive \fIrandomness\fR argument +(or \fBRAND_seed\fR\|(3)), then this will immediately reseed the <primary> \s-1DRBG.\s0 +The <public> and <private> \s-1DRBG\s0 will detect this on their next generate +call and reseed, pulling randomness from <primary>. +.PP +The last feature has been added to support the common practice used with +previous OpenSSL versions to call \fBRAND_add()\fR before calling \fBRAND_bytes()\fR. +.SS "Entropy Input and Additional Data" +.IX Subsection "Entropy Input and Additional Data" +The \s-1DRBG\s0 distinguishes two different types of random input: \fIentropy\fR, +which comes from a trusted source, and \fIadditional input\fR', +which can optionally be added by the user and is considered untrusted. +It is possible to add \fIadditional input\fR not only during reseeding, +but also for every generate request. +.SS "Configuring the Random Seed Source" +.IX Subsection "Configuring the Random Seed Source" +In most cases OpenSSL will automatically choose a suitable seed source +for automatically seeding and reseeding its <primary> \s-1DRBG.\s0 In some cases +however, it will be necessary to explicitly specify a seed source during +configuration, using the \-\-with\-rand\-seed option. For more information, +see the \s-1INSTALL\s0 instructions. There are also operating systems where no +seed source is available and automatic reseeding is disabled by default. +.PP +The following two sections describe the reseeding process of the primary +\&\s-1DRBG,\s0 depending on whether automatic reseeding is available or not. +.SS "Reseeding the primary \s-1DRBG\s0 with automatic seeding enabled" +.IX Subsection "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding enabled" +Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR or \fBRAND_add()\fR is not necessary, because the \s-1DRBG\s0 +pulls the necessary entropy from its source automatically. +However, both calls are permitted, and do reseed the \s-1RNG.\s0 +.PP +\&\fBRAND_add()\fR can be used to add both kinds of random input, depending on the +value of the \fIrandomness\fR argument: +.IP "randomness == 0:" 4 +.IX Item "randomness == 0:" +The random bytes are mixed as additional input into the current state of +the \s-1DRBG.\s0 +Mixing in additional input is not considered a full reseeding, hence the +reseed counter is not reset. +.IP "randomness > 0:" 4 +.IX Item "randomness > 0:" +The random bytes are used as entropy input for a full reseeding +(resp. reinstantiation) if the \s-1DRBG\s0 is instantiated +(resp. uninstantiated or in an error state). +The number of random bits required for reseeding is determined by the +security strength of the \s-1DRBG.\s0 Currently it defaults to 256 bits (32 bytes). +It is possible to provide less randomness than required. +In this case the missing randomness will be obtained by pulling random input +from the trusted entropy sources. +.PP +\&\s-1NOTE:\s0 Manual reseeding is *not allowed* in \s-1FIPS\s0 mode, because +[\s-1NIST\s0 SP\-800\-90Ar1] mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided by +the consuming application for instantiation (Section 9.1) or +reseeding (Section 9.2). For that reason, the \fIrandomness\fR +argument is ignored and the random bytes provided by the \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3) and +\&\fBRAND_seed\fR\|(3) calls are treated as additional data. +.SS "Reseeding the primary \s-1DRBG\s0 with automatic seeding disabled" +.IX Subsection "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding disabled" +Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR will always fail. +.PP +\&\fBRAND_add()\fR needs to be called for initial seeding and periodic reseeding. +At least 48 bytes (384 bits) of randomness have to be provided, otherwise +the (re\-)seeding of the \s-1DRBG\s0 will fail. This corresponds to one and a half +times the security strength of the \s-1DRBG.\s0 The extra half is used for the +nonce during instantiation. +.PP +More precisely, the number of bytes needed for seeding depend on the +\&\fIsecurity strength\fR of the \s-1DRBG,\s0 which is set to 256 by default. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.IX Header "SEE ALSO" +\&\s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7), \s-1\fBEVP_RAND\s0\fR\|(3) +.SH "HISTORY" +.IX Header "HISTORY" +This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0. +.SH "COPYRIGHT" +.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" +Copyright 2017\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +.PP +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at +<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |