Merging upstream version 4.23.0.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/upstream/debian-unstable/man7/random.7 b/upstream/debian-unstable/man7/random.7
index bca67cef..d4e2df93 100644
--- a/upstream/debian-unstable/man7/random.7
+++ b/upstream/debian-unstable/man7/random.7
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 .\" The following web page is quite informative:
 .\" http://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/
 .\"
-.TH random 7 2023-02-10 "Linux man-pages 6.05.01"
+.TH random 7 2024-05-02 "Linux man-pages 6.8"
 .SH NAME
 random \- overview of interfaces for obtaining randomness
 .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The kernel random-number generator relies on entropy gathered from
 device drivers and other sources of environmental noise to seed
 a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG).
 It is designed for security, rather than speed.
-.PP
+.P
 The following interfaces provide access to output from the kernel CSPRNG:
 .IP \[bu] 3
 The
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ flag.
 The cryptographic algorithms used for the
 .I urandom
 source are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes.
-.PP
+.P
 The disadvantage of
 .B GRND_RANDOM
 and reads from
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ or Diffie-Hellman private key has an effective key size of 128 bits
 (it requires about 2\[ha]128 operations to break) so a key generator
 needs only 128 bits (16 bytes) of seed material from
 .IR /dev/random .
-.PP
+.P
 While some safety margin above that minimum is reasonable, as a guard
 against flaws in the CSPRNG algorithm, no cryptographic primitive
 available today can hope to promise more than 256 bits of security,