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-rw-r--r--src/tls/tls_misc.c129
1 files changed, 110 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_misc.c b/src/tls/tls_misc.c
index b7acd1d..cf8f6fa 100644
--- a/src/tls/tls_misc.c
+++ b/src/tls/tls_misc.c
@@ -118,6 +118,14 @@
/*
/* const EVP_MD *tls_validate_digest(dgst)
/* const char *dgst;
+/*
+/* void tls_enable_client_rpk(ctx, ssl)
+/* SSL_CTX *ctx;
+/* SSL *ssl;
+/*
+/* void tls_enable_server_rpk(ctx, ssl)
+/* SSL_CTX *ctx;
+/* SSL *ssl;
/* DESCRIPTION
/* This module implements public and internal routines that
/* support the TLS client and server.
@@ -215,6 +223,12 @@
/*
/* tls_validate_digest() returns a static handle for the named
/* digest algorithm, or NULL on error.
+/*
+/* tls_enable_client_rpk() enables the use of raw public keys in the
+/* client to server direction, if supported by the OpenSSL library.
+/*
+/* tls_enable_server_rpk() enables the use of raw public keys in the
+/* server to client direction, if supported by the OpenSSL library.
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
@@ -762,7 +776,7 @@ int tls_library_init(void)
/*
* The default global config file is optional. With "default"
- * initialisation we don't insist on a match for the requested
+ * initialization we don't insist on a match for the requested
* application name, allowing fallback to the default application
* name, even when a non-default application name is specified.
* Errors in loading the default configuration are ignored.
@@ -1028,7 +1042,6 @@ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
SSL *ssl = TLScontext->con;
int srvr = SSL_is_server(ssl);
EVP_PKEY *dh_pkey = 0;
- X509 *local_cert;
EVP_PKEY *local_pkey = 0;
X509 *peer_cert;
EVP_PKEY *peer_pkey = 0;
@@ -1060,18 +1073,23 @@ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
}
/*
- * On the client end, the certificate may be preset, but not used, so we
+ * On the client end, the certificate may be present, but not used, so we
* check via SSL_get_signature_nid(). This means that local signature
* data on clients requires at least 1.1.1a.
*/
- if (srvr || SSL_get_signature_nid(ssl, &nid))
- local_cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
- else
- local_cert = 0;
-
+ if (srvr || SSL_get_signature_nid(ssl, &nid)) {
+ local_pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
+ }
/* Signature algorithms for the local end of the connection */
- if (local_cert) {
- local_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(local_cert);
+ if (local_pkey) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2)
+ if (srvr)
+ TLScontext->stoc_rpk = TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk ==
+ SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(ssl);
+ else
+ TLScontext->ctos_rpk = TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk ==
+ SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(ssl);
+#endif
/*
* Override the built-in name for the "ECDSA" algorithms OID, with
@@ -1097,7 +1115,6 @@ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
break;
#endif
}
- /* No X509_free(local_cert) */
}
/*
@@ -1107,9 +1124,26 @@ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
if (SSL_get_signature_nid(ssl, &nid) && nid != NID_undef)
locl_sig_dgst = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
}
- /* Signature algorithms for the peer end of the connection */
- if ((peer_cert = TLS_PEEK_PEER_CERT(ssl)) != 0) {
+ peer_cert = TLS_PEEK_PEER_CERT(ssl);
+ if (peer_cert != 0) {
peer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert);
+ }
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2)
+ else {
+ peer_pkey = SSL_get0_peer_rpk(ssl);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Signature algorithms for the peer end of the connection */
+ if (peer_pkey != 0) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2)
+ if (srvr)
+ TLScontext->ctos_rpk = TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk ==
+ SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(ssl);
+ else
+ TLScontext->stoc_rpk = TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk ==
+ SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(ssl);
+#endif
/*
* Override the built-in name for the "ECDSA" algorithms OID, with
@@ -1144,8 +1178,9 @@ void tls_get_signature_params(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(ssl, &nid) && nid != NID_undef)
peer_sig_dgst = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- TLS_FREE_PEER_CERT(peer_cert);
}
+ TLS_FREE_PEER_CERT(peer_cert);
+
if (kex_name) {
TLScontext->kex_name = mystrdup(kex_name);
TLScontext->kex_curve = kex_curve;
@@ -1180,7 +1215,7 @@ void tls_log_summary(TLS_ROLE role, TLS_USAGE usage, TLS_SESS_STATE *ctx)
*/
vstring_sprintf(msg, "%s TLS connection %s %s %s%s%s: %s"
" with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
- !TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(ctx) ? "Anonymous" :
+ !TLS_CRED_IS_PRESENT(ctx) ? "Anonymous" :
TLS_CERT_IS_SECURED(ctx) ? "Verified" :
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(ctx) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
usage == TLS_USAGE_NEW ? "established" : "reused",
@@ -1199,9 +1234,13 @@ void tls_log_summary(TLS_ROLE role, TLS_USAGE usage, TLS_SESS_STATE *ctx)
vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " server-signature %s",
ctx->srvr_sig_name);
if (ctx->srvr_sig_curve && *ctx->srvr_sig_curve)
- vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s)", ctx->srvr_sig_curve);
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s%s)", ctx->srvr_sig_curve,
+ ctx->stoc_rpk ? " raw public key" : "");
else if (ctx->srvr_sig_bits > 0)
- vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bits)", ctx->srvr_sig_bits);
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bit%s)", ctx->srvr_sig_bits,
+ ctx->stoc_rpk ? " raw public key" : "s");
+ else if (ctx->stoc_rpk)
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (raw public key)");
if (ctx->srvr_sig_dgst && *ctx->srvr_sig_dgst)
vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " server-digest %s",
ctx->srvr_sig_dgst);
@@ -1210,9 +1249,13 @@ void tls_log_summary(TLS_ROLE role, TLS_USAGE usage, TLS_SESS_STATE *ctx)
vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " client-signature %s",
ctx->clnt_sig_name);
if (ctx->clnt_sig_curve && *ctx->clnt_sig_curve)
- vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s)", ctx->clnt_sig_curve);
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%s%s)", ctx->clnt_sig_curve,
+ ctx->ctos_rpk ? " raw public key" : "");
else if (ctx->clnt_sig_bits > 0)
- vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bits)", ctx->clnt_sig_bits);
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (%d bit%s)", ctx->clnt_sig_bits,
+ ctx->ctos_rpk ? " raw public key" : "s");
+ else if (ctx->ctos_rpk)
+ vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " (raw public key)");
if (ctx->clnt_sig_dgst && *ctx->clnt_sig_dgst)
vstring_sprintf_append(msg, " client-digest %s",
ctx->clnt_sig_dgst);
@@ -1288,6 +1331,8 @@ TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_alloc_sess_context(int log_mask, const char *namaddr)
TLScontext->cipher_name = 0;
TLScontext->kex_name = 0;
TLScontext->kex_curve = 0;
+ TLScontext->ctos_rpk = 0;
+ TLScontext->stoc_rpk = 0;
TLScontext->clnt_sig_name = 0;
TLScontext->clnt_sig_curve = 0;
TLScontext->clnt_sig_dgst = 0;
@@ -1702,6 +1747,52 @@ const EVP_MD *tls_validate_digest(const char *dgst)
return md_alg;
}
+void tls_enable_client_rpk(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2)
+ static int warned = 0;
+ static const unsigned char cert_types_rpk[] = {
+ TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk,
+ TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
+ };
+
+ if ((ctx && !SSL_CTX_set1_client_cert_type(ctx, cert_types_rpk,
+ sizeof(cert_types_rpk))) ||
+ (ssl && !SSL_set1_client_cert_type(ssl, cert_types_rpk,
+ sizeof(cert_types_rpk)))) {
+ if (warned++) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return;
+ }
+ msg_warn("Failed to enable client to server raw public key support");
+ tls_print_errors();
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+void tls_enable_server_rpk(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2)
+ static int warned = 0;
+ static const unsigned char cert_types_rpk[] = {
+ TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk,
+ TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
+ };
+
+ if ((ctx && !SSL_CTX_set1_server_cert_type(ctx, cert_types_rpk,
+ sizeof(cert_types_rpk))) ||
+ (ssl && !SSL_set1_server_cert_type(ssl, cert_types_rpk,
+ sizeof(cert_types_rpk)))) {
+ if (warned++) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return;
+ }
+ msg_warn("Failed to enable server to client raw public key support");
+ tls_print_errors();
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
#else
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-06-07 20:33:23 +0000