Adding upstream version 2:4.20.0+dfsg.upstream/2%4.20.0+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

53 files changed, 23750 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/auth/auth_log.c b/auth/auth_log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a110fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1083 @@
+/*
+
+   Authentication and authorization logging
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2017
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+/*
+ * Debug log levels for authentication logging (these both map to
+ * LOG_NOTICE in syslog)
+ */
+#define AUTH_FAILURE_LEVEL 2
+#define AUTH_SUCCESS_LEVEL 3
+#define AUTHZ_SUCCESS_LEVEL 4
+#define KDC_AUTHZ_FAILURE_LEVEL 2
+#define KDC_AUTHZ_SUCCESS_LEVEL 3
+
+/* 5 is used for both authentication and authorization */
+#define AUTH_ANONYMOUS_LEVEL 5
+#define AUTHZ_ANONYMOUS_LEVEL 5
+
+#define AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE "Authorization"
+#define AUTH_JSON_TYPE  "Authentication"
+#define KDC_AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE "KDC Authorization"
+
+/*
+ * JSON message version numbers
+ *
+ * If adding a field increment the minor version
+ * If removing or changing the format/meaning of a field
+ * increment the major version.
+ */
+#define AUTH_MAJOR 1
+#define AUTH_MINOR 3
+#define AUTHZ_MAJOR 1
+#define AUTHZ_MINOR 2
+#define KDC_AUTHZ_MAJOR 1
+#define KDC_AUTHZ_MINOR 0
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
+#include "common_auth.h"
+#include "lib/util/util_str_escape.h"
+#include "libcli/security/dom_sid.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security_token.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/server_id.h"
+#include "source4/lib/messaging/messaging.h"
+#include "source4/lib/messaging/irpc.h"
+#include "lib/util/server_id_db.h"
+#include "lib/param/param.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/windows_event_ids.h"
+#include "lib/audit_logging/audit_logging.h"
+
+/*
+ * Determine the type of the password supplied for the
+ * authorisation attempt.
+ *
+ */
+static const char* get_password_type(const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_JANSSON
+
+#include <jansson.h>
+#include "system/time.h"
+
+/*
+ * Write the json object to the debug logs.
+ *
+ */
+static void log_json(struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+		     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+		     struct json_object *object,
+		     int debug_class,
+		     int debug_level)
+{
+	audit_log_json(object, debug_class, debug_level);
+	if (msg_ctx && lp_ctx && lpcfg_auth_event_notification(lp_ctx)) {
+		audit_message_send(msg_ctx,
+				   AUTH_EVENT_NAME,
+				   MSG_AUTH_LOG,
+				   object);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the Windows logon type for the current authorisation attempt.
+ *
+ * Currently Samba only supports
+ *
+ * 2 Interactive      A user logged on to this computer.
+ * 3 Network          A user or computer logged on to this computer from
+ *                    the network.
+ * 8 NetworkCleartext A user logged on to this computer from the network.
+ *                    The user's password was passed to the authentication
+ *                    package in its unhashed form.
+ *
+ */
+static enum event_logon_type get_logon_type(
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui)
+{
+	if ((ui->logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED)
+	   || (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN)) {
+		return EVT_LOGON_NETWORK_CLEAR_TEXT;
+	} else if (ui->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) {
+		return EVT_LOGON_INTERACTIVE;
+	}
+	return EVT_LOGON_NETWORK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a machine parsable json formatted authentication log entry.
+ *
+ * IF removing or changing the format/meaning of a field please update the
+ *    major version number AUTH_MAJOR
+ *
+ * IF adding a new field please update the minor version number AUTH_MINOR
+ *
+ *  To process the resulting log lines from the command line use jq to
+ *  parse the json.
+ *
+ *  grep "^  {" log file |
+ *  jq -rc '"\(.timestamp)\t\(.Authentication.status)\t
+ *           \(.Authentication.clientDomain)\t
+ *           \(.Authentication.clientAccount)
+ *           \t\(.Authentication.workstation)
+ *           \t\(.Authentication.remoteAddress)
+ *           \t\(.Authentication.localAddress)"'
+ */
+static void log_authentication_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct timeval *start_time,
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	enum event_id_type event_id,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	struct json_object wrapper = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object authentication = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object client_policy = json_null_object();
+	struct json_object server_policy = json_null_object();
+	char logon_id[19];
+	int rc = 0;
+	const char *clientDomain = ui->orig_client.domain_name ?
+				   ui->orig_client.domain_name :
+				   ui->client.domain_name;
+	const char *clientAccount = ui->orig_client.account_name ?
+				    ui->orig_client.account_name :
+				    ui->client.account_name;
+
+	authentication = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&authentication)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_version(&authentication, AUTH_MAJOR, AUTH_MINOR);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_int(&authentication,
+			  "eventId",
+			  event_id);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	snprintf(logon_id,
+		 sizeof( logon_id),
+		 "%"PRIx64"",
+		 ui->logon_id);
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication, "logonId", logon_id);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_int(&authentication, "logonType", get_logon_type(ui));
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication, "status", nt_errstr(status));
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_address(&authentication, "localAddress", ui->local_host);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc =
+	    json_add_address(&authentication, "remoteAddress", ui->remote_host);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "serviceDescription", ui->service_description);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "authDescription", ui->auth_description);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "clientDomain", clientDomain);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "clientAccount", clientAccount);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "workstation", ui->workstation_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication, "becameAccount", account_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication, "becameDomain", domain_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_sid(&authentication, "becameSid", sid);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "mappedAccount", ui->mapped.account_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "mappedDomain", ui->mapped.domain_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication,
+			     "netlogonComputer",
+			     ui->netlogon_trust_account.computer_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authentication,
+			     "netlogonTrustAccount",
+			     ui->netlogon_trust_account.account_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_flags32(
+	    &authentication, "netlogonNegotiateFlags",
+	    ui->netlogon_trust_account.negotiate_flags);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_int(&authentication,
+			  "netlogonSecureChannelType",
+			  ui->netlogon_trust_account.secure_channel_type);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_sid(&authentication,
+			  "netlogonTrustAccountSid",
+			  ui->netlogon_trust_account.sid);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authentication, "passwordType", get_password_type(ui));
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	if (client_audit_info != NULL) {
+		client_policy = json_from_audit_info(client_audit_info);
+		if (json_is_invalid(&client_policy)) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = json_add_object(&authentication, "clientPolicyAccessCheck", &client_policy);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	if (server_audit_info != NULL) {
+		server_policy = json_from_audit_info(server_audit_info);
+		if (json_is_invalid(&server_policy)) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = json_add_object(&authentication, "serverPolicyAccessCheck", &server_policy);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	wrapper = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&wrapper)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_timestamp(&wrapper);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&wrapper, "type", AUTH_JSON_TYPE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_object(&wrapper, AUTH_JSON_TYPE, &authentication);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * While not a general-purpose profiling solution this will
+	 * assist some to determine how long NTLM and KDC
+	 * authentication takes once this process can handle it.  This
+	 * covers transactions elsewhere but not (eg) the delay while
+	 * this is waiting unread on the input socket.
+	 */
+	if (start_time != NULL) {
+		struct timeval current_time = timeval_current();
+		uint64_t duration =  usec_time_diff(&current_time,
+						    start_time);
+		rc = json_add_int(&authentication, "duration", duration);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_json(msg_ctx,
+		 lp_ctx,
+		 &wrapper,
+		 DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON,
+		 debug_level);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	return;
+failure:
+	json_free(&server_policy);
+	json_free(&client_policy);
+	/*
+	 * On a failure authentication will not have been added to wrapper so it
+	 * needs to be freed to avoid a leak.
+	 *
+	 */
+	json_free(&authentication);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	DBG_ERR("Failed to write authentication event JSON log message\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of a successful authorization to a service,
+ * in a machine parsable json format
+ *
+ * IF removing or changing the format/meaning of a field please update the
+ *    major version number AUTHZ_MAJOR
+ *
+ * IF adding a new field please update the minor version number AUTHZ_MINOR
+ *
+ *  To process the resulting log lines from the command line use jq to
+ *  parse the json.
+ *
+ *  grep "^  {" log_file |\
+ *  jq -rc '"\(.timestamp)\t
+ *           \(.Authorization.domain)\t
+ *           \(.Authorization.account)\t
+ *           \(.Authorization.remoteAddress)"'
+ *
+ */
+static void log_successful_authz_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *transport_protection,
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	struct json_object wrapper = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object authorization = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object client_policy = json_null_object();
+	struct json_object server_policy = json_null_object();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	authorization = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&authorization)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_version(&authorization, AUTHZ_MAJOR, AUTHZ_MINOR);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_address(&authorization, "localAddress", local);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_address(&authorization, "remoteAddress", remote);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "serviceDescription", service_description);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "authType", auth_type);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "domain", session_info->info->domain_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "account", session_info->info->account_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_sid(
+	    &authorization, "sid", &session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX]);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_guid(
+	    &authorization, "sessionId", &session_info->unique_session_token);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "logonServer", session_info->info->logon_server);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "transportProtection", transport_protection);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_flags32(&authorization, "accountFlags", session_info->info->acct_flags);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	if (client_audit_info != NULL) {
+		client_policy = json_from_audit_info(client_audit_info);
+		if (json_is_invalid(&client_policy)) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = json_add_object(&authorization, "clientPolicyAccessCheck", &client_policy);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	if (server_audit_info != NULL) {
+		server_policy = json_from_audit_info(server_audit_info);
+		if (json_is_invalid(&server_policy)) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = json_add_object(&authorization, "serverPolicyAccessCheck", &server_policy);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	wrapper = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&wrapper)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_timestamp(&wrapper);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&wrapper, "type", AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_object(&wrapper, AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE, &authorization);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	log_json(msg_ctx,
+		 lp_ctx,
+		 &wrapper,
+		 DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON,
+		 debug_level);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	return;
+failure:
+	json_free(&server_policy);
+	json_free(&client_policy);
+	/*
+	 * On a failure authorization will not have been added to wrapper so it
+	 * needs to be freed to avoid a leak.
+	 *
+	 */
+	json_free(&authorization);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	DBG_ERR("Unable to log Authentication event JSON audit message\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of an authorization to a service, in a machine parsable json
+ * format
+ *
+ * IF removing or changing the format/meaning of a field please update the
+ *    major version number KDC_AUTHZ_MAJOR
+ *
+ * IF adding a new field please update the minor version number KDC_AUTHZ_MINOR
+ *
+ *  To process the resulting log lines from the command line use jq to
+ *  parse the json.
+ *
+ *  grep "^  {" log_file |\
+ *  jq -rc '"\(.timestamp)\t
+ *           \(."KDC Authorization".domain)\t
+ *           \(."KDC Authorization".account)\t
+ *           \(."KDC Authorization".remoteAddress)"'
+ *
+ */
+static void log_authz_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	const struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const char *logon_server,
+	const struct timeval authtime,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	struct json_object wrapper = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object authorization = json_empty_object;
+	struct json_object server_policy = json_null_object();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	authorization = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&authorization)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_version(&authorization, KDC_AUTHZ_MAJOR, KDC_AUTHZ_MINOR);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "status", nt_errstr(status));
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_address(&authorization, "localAddress", local);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_address(&authorization, "remoteAddress", remote);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(
+	    &authorization, "serviceDescription", service_description);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "authType", auth_type);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "domain", domain_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "account", account_name);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_sid(&authorization, "sid", sid);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&authorization, "logonServer", logon_server);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_time(&authorization, "authTime", authtime);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	if (server_audit_info != NULL) {
+		server_policy = json_from_audit_info(server_audit_info);
+		if (json_is_invalid(&server_policy)) {
+			goto failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = json_add_object(&authorization, "serverPolicyAccessCheck", &server_policy);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	wrapper = json_new_object();
+	if (json_is_invalid(&wrapper)) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_timestamp(&wrapper);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_string(&wrapper, "type", KDC_AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+	rc = json_add_object(&wrapper, KDC_AUTHZ_JSON_TYPE, &authorization);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto failure;
+	}
+
+	log_json(msg_ctx,
+		 lp_ctx,
+		 &wrapper,
+		 DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON,
+		 debug_level);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	return;
+failure:
+	json_free(&server_policy);
+	/*
+	 * On a failure authorization will not have been added to wrapper so it
+	 * needs to be freed to avoid a leak.
+	 */
+	json_free(&authorization);
+	json_free(&wrapper);
+	DBG_ERR("Unable to log KDC Authorization event JSON audit message\n");
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void log_no_json(struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+                        struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	if (msg_ctx && lp_ctx && lpcfg_auth_event_notification(lp_ctx)) {
+		static bool auth_event_logged = false;
+		if (auth_event_logged == false) {
+			auth_event_logged = true;
+			DBG_ERR("auth event notification = true but Samba was "
+				"not compiled with jansson\n");
+		}
+	} else {
+		static bool json_logged = false;
+		if (json_logged == false) {
+			json_logged = true;
+			DBG_NOTICE("JSON auth logs not available unless "
+				   "compiled with jansson\n");
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void log_authentication_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct timeval *start_time,
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	enum event_id_type event_id,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	log_no_json(msg_ctx, lp_ctx);
+}
+
+static void log_successful_authz_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *transport_protection,
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	log_no_json(msg_ctx, lp_ctx);
+}
+
+static void log_authz_event_json(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	const struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const char *logon_server,
+	const struct timeval authtime,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	log_no_json(msg_ctx, lp_ctx);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Determine the type of the password supplied for the
+ * authorisation attempt.
+ *
+ */
+static const char* get_password_type(const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui)
+{
+
+	const char *password_type = NULL;
+
+	if (ui->password_type != NULL) {
+		password_type = ui->password_type;
+	} else if (ui->auth_description != NULL &&
+		   strncmp("ServerAuthenticate", ui->auth_description, 18) == 0)
+	{
+		if (ui->netlogon_trust_account.negotiate_flags
+		    & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+			password_type = "HMAC-SHA256";
+		} else if (ui->netlogon_trust_account.negotiate_flags
+		           & NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS) {
+			password_type = "HMAC-MD5";
+		} else {
+			password_type = "DES";
+		}
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE &&
+		   (ui->logon_parameters & MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2) &&
+		   ui->password.response.nt.length == 24) {
+		password_type = "MSCHAPv2";
+	} else if ((ui->logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED)
+		   || (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN)) {
+		password_type = "Plaintext";
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH) {
+		password_type = "Supplied-NT-Hash";
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE
+		   && ui->password.response.nt.length > 24) {
+		password_type = "NTLMv2";
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE
+		   && ui->password.response.nt.length == 24) {
+		password_type = "NTLMv1";
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE
+		   && ui->password.response.lanman.length == 24) {
+		password_type = "LANMan";
+	} else if (ui->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE
+		   && ui->password.response.nt.length == 0
+		   && ui->password.response.lanman.length == 0) {
+		password_type = "No-Password";
+	}
+	return password_type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a human readable authentication log entry.
+ *
+ */
+static void log_authentication_event_human_readable(
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	struct dom_sid *sid,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
+
+	const char *ts = NULL;		   /* formatted current time      */
+	char *remote = NULL;		   /* formatted remote host       */
+	char *local = NULL;		   /* formatted local host        */
+	char *nl = NULL;		   /* NETLOGON details if present */
+	char *trust_computer_name = NULL;
+	char *trust_account_name = NULL;
+	char *logon_line = NULL;
+	const char *password_type = NULL;
+	const char *clientDomain = ui->orig_client.domain_name ?
+				   ui->orig_client.domain_name :
+				   ui->client.domain_name;
+	const char *clientAccount = ui->orig_client.account_name ?
+				    ui->orig_client.account_name :
+				    ui->client.account_name;
+
+	frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+	password_type = get_password_type(ui);
+	/* Get the current time */
+        ts = audit_get_timestamp(frame);
+
+	/* Only log the NETLOGON details if they are present */
+	if (ui->netlogon_trust_account.computer_name ||
+	    ui->netlogon_trust_account.account_name) {
+		trust_computer_name = log_escape(frame,
+			ui->netlogon_trust_account.computer_name);
+		trust_account_name  = log_escape(frame,
+			ui->netlogon_trust_account.account_name);
+		nl = talloc_asprintf(frame,
+			" NETLOGON computer [%s] trust account [%s]",
+			trust_computer_name, trust_account_name);
+	}
+
+	remote = tsocket_address_string(ui->remote_host, frame);
+	local = tsocket_address_string(ui->local_host, frame);
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		struct dom_sid_buf sid_buf;
+
+		logon_line = talloc_asprintf(frame,
+					     " became [%s]\\[%s] [%s].",
+					     log_escape(frame, domain_name),
+					     log_escape(frame, account_name),
+					     dom_sid_str_buf(sid, &sid_buf));
+	} else {
+		logon_line = talloc_asprintf(
+				frame,
+				" mapped to [%s]\\[%s].",
+				log_escape(frame, ui->mapped.domain_name),
+				log_escape(frame, ui->mapped.account_name));
+	}
+
+	DEBUGC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT, debug_level,
+	       ("Auth: [%s,%s] user [%s]\\[%s]"
+		" at [%s] with [%s] status [%s]"
+		" workstation [%s] remote host [%s]"
+		"%s local host [%s]"
+		" %s\n",
+		ui->service_description,
+		ui->auth_description,
+		log_escape(frame, clientDomain),
+		log_escape(frame, clientAccount),
+		ts,
+		password_type,
+		nt_errstr(status),
+		log_escape(frame, ui->workstation_name),
+		remote,
+		logon_line,
+		local,
+		nl ? nl : ""
+	));
+
+	talloc_free(frame);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of an authentication attempt.
+ * Successful and unsuccessful attempts are logged.
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx is optional, but when supplied allows streaming the
+ * authentication events over the message bus.
+ */
+void log_authentication_event(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct timeval *start_time,
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui,
+	NTSTATUS status,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info)
+{
+	/* set the log level */
+	int debug_level = AUTH_FAILURE_LEVEL;
+	enum event_id_type event_id = EVT_ID_UNSUCCESSFUL_LOGON;
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		debug_level = AUTH_SUCCESS_LEVEL;
+		event_id = EVT_ID_SUCCESSFUL_LOGON;
+		if (dom_sid_equal(sid, &global_sid_Anonymous)) {
+			debug_level = AUTH_ANONYMOUS_LEVEL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVLC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT, debug_level)) {
+		log_authentication_event_human_readable(ui,
+							status,
+							domain_name,
+							account_name,
+							sid,
+							debug_level);
+	}
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVLC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON, debug_level) ||
+	    (msg_ctx && lp_ctx && lpcfg_auth_event_notification(lp_ctx))) {
+		log_authentication_event_json(msg_ctx,
+					      lp_ctx,
+					      start_time,
+					      ui,
+					      status,
+					      domain_name,
+					      account_name,
+					      sid,
+					      client_audit_info,
+					      server_audit_info,
+					      event_id,
+					      debug_level);
+	}
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Log details of a successful authorization to a service,
+ * in a human readable format.
+ *
+ */
+static void log_successful_authz_event_human_readable(
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+	int debug_level)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
+
+	const char *ts = NULL;       /* formatted current time      */
+	char *remote_str = NULL;     /* formatted remote host       */
+	char *local_str = NULL;      /* formatted local host        */
+	struct dom_sid_buf sid_buf;
+
+	frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+	/* Get the current time */
+        ts = audit_get_timestamp(frame);
+
+	remote_str = tsocket_address_string(remote, frame);
+	local_str = tsocket_address_string(local, frame);
+
+	DEBUGC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT, debug_level,
+	       ("Successful AuthZ: [%s,%s] user [%s]\\[%s] [%s]"
+		" at [%s]"
+		" Remote host [%s]"
+		" local host [%s]\n",
+		service_description,
+		auth_type,
+		log_escape(frame, session_info->info->domain_name),
+		log_escape(frame, session_info->info->account_name),
+		dom_sid_str_buf(&session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX],
+				&sid_buf),
+		ts,
+		remote_str,
+		local_str));
+
+	talloc_free(frame);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of a successful authorization to a service.
+ *
+ * Only successful authorizations are logged.  For clarity:
+ * - NTLM bad passwords will be recorded by log_authentication_event
+ * - Kerberos decrypt failures need to be logged in gensec_gssapi et al
+ *
+ * The service may later refuse authorization due to an ACL.
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx is optional, but when supplied allows streaming the
+ * authentication events over the message bus.
+ */
+void log_successful_authz_event(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *transport_protection,
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info)
+{
+	int debug_level = AUTHZ_SUCCESS_LEVEL;
+
+	/* set the log level */
+	if (security_token_is_anonymous(session_info->security_token)) {
+		debug_level = AUTH_ANONYMOUS_LEVEL;
+	}
+
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVLC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT, debug_level)) {
+		log_successful_authz_event_human_readable(remote,
+							  local,
+							  service_description,
+							  auth_type,
+							  session_info,
+							  debug_level);
+	}
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVLC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON, debug_level) ||
+	    (msg_ctx && lp_ctx && lpcfg_auth_event_notification(lp_ctx))) {
+		log_successful_authz_event_json(msg_ctx, lp_ctx,
+						remote,
+						local,
+						service_description,
+						auth_type,
+						transport_protection,
+						session_info,
+						client_audit_info,
+						server_audit_info,
+						debug_level);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of an authorization to a service.
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx are optional, but when supplied, allow streaming the
+ * authorization events over the message bus.
+ */
+void log_authz_event(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	const struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const char *logon_server,
+	const struct timeval authtime,
+	NTSTATUS status)
+{
+	/* set the log level */
+	int debug_level = KDC_AUTHZ_FAILURE_LEVEL;
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		debug_level = KDC_AUTHZ_SUCCESS_LEVEL;
+	}
+
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVLC(DBGC_AUTH_AUDIT_JSON, debug_level) ||
+	    (msg_ctx && lp_ctx && lpcfg_auth_event_notification(lp_ctx))) {
+		log_authz_event_json(msg_ctx, lp_ctx,
+				     remote,
+				     local,
+				     server_audit_info,
+				     service_description,
+				     auth_type,
+				     domain_name,
+				     account_name,
+				     sid,
+				     logon_server,
+				     authtime,
+				     status,
+				     debug_level);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/auth/auth_sam_reply.c b/auth/auth_sam_reply.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c0ebe5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_sam_reply.c
@@ -0,0 +1,955 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Convert a server info struct into the form for PAC and NETLOGON replies
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2011
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>  2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
+
+/* Returns true if this SID belongs in SamBaseInfo, otherwise false. */
+static bool is_base_sid(const struct auth_SidAttr *sid,
+			const struct dom_sid *domain_sid)
+{
+	if (sid->attrs & SE_GROUP_RESOURCE) {
+		/*
+		 * Resource groups don't belong in the base
+		 * RIDs, they're handled elsewhere.
+		 */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This SID belongs in the base structure only if it's in the account's
+	 * domain.
+	 */
+	return dom_sid_in_domain(domain_sid, &sid->sid);
+}
+
+/* Stores a SID in a previously allocated array. */
+static NTSTATUS store_extra_sid(struct netr_SidAttr *sids,
+				uint32_t *sidcount,
+				const uint32_t allocated_sids,
+				const struct auth_SidAttr *sid)
+{
+	/* Check we aren't about to overflow our allocation. */
+	if (*sidcount >= allocated_sids) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	sids[*sidcount].sid = dom_sid_dup(sids, &sid->sid);
+	if (sids[*sidcount].sid == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	sids[*sidcount].attributes = sid->attrs;
+	*sidcount += 1;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores a resource SID in a previously allocated array, either Extra SIDs or
+ * Resource SIDs. Any SID within the domain of the first SID so added is stored
+ * there, while remaining SIDs are stored in Extra SIDs.
+ */
+static NTSTATUS store_resource_sid(struct netr_SidAttr *sids,
+				   uint32_t *sidcount,
+				   const uint32_t allocated_sids,
+				   const struct auth_SidAttr *sid,
+				   struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *resource_groups,
+				   const uint32_t allocated_resource_groups)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	struct dom_sid *resource_domain = NULL;
+	uint32_t rid;
+
+	if (resource_groups == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* Split the SID into domain and RID.  */
+	status = dom_sid_split_rid(resource_groups, &sid->sid, &resource_domain, &rid);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (resource_groups->domain_sid == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * There is no domain SID set. Set it to the domain of this SID.
+		 */
+		resource_groups->domain_sid = resource_domain;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * A domain SID has already been set. Check whether this SID's
+		 * domain matches.
+		 *
+		 * Assuming that resource SIDs have been obtained with
+		 * dsdb_expand_nested_groups(), they should all be within the
+		 * same domain (ours), so unless something has gone horribly
+		 * wrong, we should always find that they match.
+		 */
+		bool match = dom_sid_equal(resource_groups->domain_sid, resource_domain);
+		talloc_free(resource_domain);
+		if (!match) {
+			/*
+			 * It doesn't match, so we can't store this SID here. It
+			 * will have to go in Extra SIDs.
+			 */
+			return store_extra_sid(sids, sidcount, allocated_sids, sid);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Store the SID in Resource SIDs. */
+
+	/* Check we aren't about to overflow our allocation. */
+	if (resource_groups->groups.count >= allocated_resource_groups) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	resource_groups->groups.rids[resource_groups->groups.count].rid = rid;
+	resource_groups->groups.rids[resource_groups->groups.count].attributes = sid->attrs;
+	resource_groups->groups.count++;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores a SID in a previously allocated array, or excludes it if we are not
+ * storing resource groups. It will be placed in either Extra SIDs or Resource
+ * SIDs, depending on which is appropriate.
+ */
+static NTSTATUS store_sid(struct netr_SidAttr *sids,
+			  uint32_t *sidcount,
+			  const uint32_t allocated_sids,
+			  const struct auth_SidAttr *sid,
+			  struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *resource_groups,
+			  const uint32_t allocated_resource_groups,
+			  const enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion)
+{
+	/* See if it's a resource SID. */
+	if (sid->attrs & SE_GROUP_RESOURCE) {
+		/*
+		 * If this is the SID of a resource group, determine whether it
+		 * should be included or filtered out.
+		 */
+		switch (group_inclusion) {
+		case AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS:
+			/* Include this SID in Extra SIDs. */
+			break;
+		case AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS_COMPRESSED:
+			/*
+			 * Try to include this SID in Resource Groups. If this
+			 * can't be arranged, we shall fall back to Extra
+			 * SIDs.
+			 */
+			return store_resource_sid(sids,
+						  sidcount,
+						  allocated_sids,
+						  sid,
+						  resource_groups,
+						  allocated_resource_groups);
+		case AUTH_EXCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS:
+			/* Ignore this SID. */
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		default:
+			/* This means we have a bug. */
+			DBG_ERR("invalid group inclusion parameter: %u\n", group_inclusion);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Just store the SID in Extra SIDs. */
+	return store_extra_sid(sids,
+			       sidcount,
+			       allocated_sids,
+			       sid);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_sambaseinfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+				struct netr_SamBaseInfo *sam)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	const struct auth_user_info *info;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCTP(sam);
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX) {
+		status = dom_sid_split_rid(sam, &user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].sid,
+					   &sam->domain_sid, &sam->rid);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX) {
+		status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, &user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX].sid,
+					   NULL, &sam->primary_gid);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* if we have to encode something like SYSTEM (with no
+		 * second SID in the token) then this is the only
+		 * choice */
+		sam->primary_gid = sam->rid;
+	}
+
+	info = user_info_dc->info;
+
+	sam->logon_time = info->last_logon;
+	sam->logoff_time =  info->last_logoff;
+	sam->kickoff_time = info->acct_expiry;
+	sam->last_password_change = info->last_password_change;
+	sam->allow_password_change = info->allow_password_change;
+	sam->force_password_change = info->force_password_change;
+
+#define _COPY_STRING_TALLOC(src_name, dst_name) do { \
+	if (info->src_name != NULL) {\
+		sam->dst_name.string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, info->src_name); \
+		if (sam->dst_name.string == NULL) { \
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; \
+		} \
+	} \
+} while(0)
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(account_name, account_name);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(full_name, full_name);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(logon_script, logon_script);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(profile_path, profile_path);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(home_directory, home_directory);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(home_drive, home_drive);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(logon_server, logon_server);
+	_COPY_STRING_TALLOC(domain_name, logon_domain);
+#undef _COPY_STRING_TALLOC
+
+	sam->logon_count = info->logon_count;
+	sam->bad_password_count = info->bad_password_count;
+	sam->groups.count = 0;
+	sam->groups.rids = NULL;
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > REMAINING_SIDS_INDEX) {
+		size_t i;
+		sam->groups.rids = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_RidWithAttribute,
+						user_info_dc->num_sids);
+
+		if (sam->groups.rids == NULL)
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+
+		for (i=REMAINING_SIDS_INDEX; i<user_info_dc->num_sids; i++) {
+			struct auth_SidAttr *group_sid = &user_info_dc->sids[i];
+
+			bool belongs_in_base = is_base_sid(group_sid, sam->domain_sid);
+			if (!belongs_in_base) {
+				/* We handle this elsewhere */
+				continue;
+			}
+			sam->groups.rids[sam->groups.count].rid =
+				group_sid->sid.sub_auths[group_sid->sid.num_auths-1];
+
+			sam->groups.rids[sam->groups.count].attributes = group_sid->attrs;
+			sam->groups.count += 1;
+		}
+
+		if (sam->groups.count == 0) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam->groups.rids);
+		}
+	}
+
+	sam->user_flags = info->user_flags; /* w2k3 uses NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS | NETLOGON_NTLMV2_ENABLED */
+	sam->acct_flags = user_info_dc->info->acct_flags;
+	sam->sub_auth_status = 0;
+	sam->last_successful_logon = 0;
+	sam->last_failed_logon = 0;
+	sam->failed_logon_count = 0;
+	sam->reserved = 0;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(sam->key);
+	if (user_info_dc->user_session_key.length == sizeof(sam->key.key)) {
+		memcpy(sam->key.key, user_info_dc->user_session_key.data, sizeof(sam->key.key));
+	}
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(sam->LMSessKey);
+	if (user_info_dc->lm_session_key.length == sizeof(sam->LMSessKey.key)) {
+		memcpy(sam->LMSessKey.key, user_info_dc->lm_session_key.data,
+		       sizeof(sam->LMSessKey.key));
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Note that the validity of the _sam6 and resource_groups structures is only as
+ * long as the user_info_dc it was generated from */
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo6(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					    enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					    struct netr_SamInfo6 **_sam6,
+					    struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP **_resource_groups)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct netr_SamInfo6 *sam6 = NULL;
+	struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *resource_groups = NULL;
+	size_t i;
+
+	const uint32_t allocated_sids = user_info_dc->num_sids;
+	uint32_t allocated_resource_groups = 0;
+
+	sam6 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo6);
+	if (sam6 == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (_resource_groups == NULL) {
+		if (group_inclusion == AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS_COMPRESSED) {
+			DBG_ERR("_resource_groups parameter not provided to receive resource groups!\n");
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	} else if (group_inclusion == AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS_COMPRESSED) {
+		*_resource_groups = NULL;
+
+		/* Allocate resource groups structure. */
+		resource_groups = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP);
+		if (resource_groups == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Allocate enough space to store user_info_dc->num_sids
+		 * RIDs in the worst case.
+		 */
+		allocated_resource_groups = user_info_dc->num_sids;
+		resource_groups->groups.rids = talloc_zero_array(resource_groups,
+								 struct samr_RidWithAttribute,
+								 allocated_resource_groups);
+		if (resource_groups->groups.rids == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* No resource groups will be provided. */
+		*_resource_groups = NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_sambaseinfo(sam6,
+						       user_info_dc,
+						       &sam6->base);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+		TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate enough space to store user_info_dc->num_sids SIDs in the
+	 * worst case.
+	 */
+	sam6->sids = talloc_zero_array(sam6, struct netr_SidAttr,
+				       allocated_sids);
+	if (sam6->sids == NULL) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+		TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* We don't put the user and group SIDs in there */
+	for (i=REMAINING_SIDS_INDEX; i<user_info_dc->num_sids; i++) {
+		struct auth_SidAttr *group_sid = &user_info_dc->sids[i];
+		bool belongs_in_base = is_base_sid(group_sid, sam6->base.domain_sid);
+		if (belongs_in_base) {
+			/* We already handled this in the base. */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		status = store_sid(sam6->sids,
+				   &sam6->sidcount,
+				   allocated_sids,
+				   group_sid,
+				   resource_groups,
+				   allocated_resource_groups,
+				   group_inclusion);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+			return status;
+		}
+	}
+	if (sam6->sidcount) {
+		sam6->base.user_flags |= NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS;
+	} else {
+		sam6->base.user_flags &= ~NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS;
+		TALLOC_FREE(sam6->sids);
+	}
+
+	if (user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name != NULL) {
+		sam6->dns_domainname.string = talloc_strdup(sam6,
+					user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name);
+		if (sam6->dns_domainname.string == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name != NULL) {
+		sam6->principal_name.string = talloc_strdup(sam6,
+					user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name);
+		if (sam6->principal_name.string == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sam6);
+			TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*_sam6 = sam6;
+	if (resource_groups != NULL) {
+		if (resource_groups->groups.count > 0) {
+			*_resource_groups = resource_groups;
+		} else {
+			TALLOC_FREE(resource_groups);
+		}
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Note that the validity of the _sam2 structure is only as long as
+ * the user_info_dc it was generated from */
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo2 **_sam2)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct netr_SamInfo6 *sam6 = NULL;
+	struct netr_SamInfo2 *sam2 = NULL;
+
+	sam2 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo2);
+	if (sam2 == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo6(sam2, user_info_dc,
+						    group_inclusion, &sam6,
+						    NULL);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(sam2);
+		return status;
+	}
+	sam2->base	= sam6->base;
+	/*
+	 * We have nowhere to put sam6->sids, so we follow Windows here and drop
+	 * it. Any resource groups it happened to contain are lost.
+	 */
+	sam2->base.user_flags &= ~NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS;
+	TALLOC_FREE(sam6->sids);
+
+	*_sam2 = sam2;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Note that the validity of the _sam3 structure is only as long as
+ * the user_info_dc it was generated from */
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo3 **_sam3,
+					   struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP **_resource_groups)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct netr_SamInfo6 *sam6 = NULL;
+	struct netr_SamInfo3 *sam3 = NULL;
+
+	sam3 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo3);
+	if (sam3 == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo6(sam3, user_info_dc,
+						    group_inclusion, &sam6,
+						    _resource_groups);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(sam3);
+		return status;
+	}
+	sam3->base	= sam6->base;
+	sam3->sidcount	= sam6->sidcount;
+	sam3->sids	= sam6->sids;
+
+	*_sam3 = sam3;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info struct from the info3 or similar returned by a domain logon.
+ *
+ * The netr_SamInfo3 is also a key structure in the source3 auth subsystem
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_SamBaseInfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				    const char *account_name,
+				    const struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base,
+				    bool authenticated,
+				    struct auth_user_info **_user_info)
+{
+	struct auth_user_info *info;
+
+	info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info);
+	if (info == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (base->account_name.string) {
+		info->account_name = talloc_strdup(info, base->account_name.string);
+	} else {
+		info->account_name = talloc_strdup(info, account_name);
+	}
+	if (info->account_name == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(info);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (base->logon_domain.string) {
+		info->domain_name = talloc_strdup(info, base->logon_domain.string);
+		if (info->domain_name == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (base->full_name.string) {
+		info->full_name = talloc_strdup(info, base->full_name.string);
+		if (info->full_name == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	if (base->logon_script.string) {
+		info->logon_script = talloc_strdup(info, base->logon_script.string);
+		if (info->logon_script == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	if (base->profile_path.string) {
+		info->profile_path = talloc_strdup(info, base->profile_path.string);
+		if (info->profile_path == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	if (base->home_directory.string) {
+		info->home_directory = talloc_strdup(info, base->home_directory.string);
+		if (info->home_directory == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	if (base->home_drive.string) {
+		info->home_drive = talloc_strdup(info, base->home_drive.string);
+		if (info->home_drive == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	if (base->logon_server.string) {
+		info->logon_server = talloc_strdup(info, base->logon_server.string);
+		if (info->logon_server == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+	info->last_logon = base->logon_time;
+	info->last_logoff = base->logoff_time;
+	info->acct_expiry = base->kickoff_time;
+	info->last_password_change = base->last_password_change;
+	info->allow_password_change = base->allow_password_change;
+	info->force_password_change = base->force_password_change;
+	info->logon_count = base->logon_count;
+	info->bad_password_count = base->bad_password_count;
+	info->acct_flags = base->acct_flags;
+
+	info->user_flags = base->user_flags;
+	if (!authenticated) {
+		/*
+		 * We only consider the user authenticated if NETLOGON_GUEST is
+		 * not set, and authenticated is set
+		 */
+		info->user_flags |= NETLOGON_GUEST;
+	}
+
+	*_user_info = info;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+struct auth_user_info *auth_user_info_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info *src)
+{
+	struct auth_user_info *dst = NULL;
+
+	dst = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info);
+	if (dst == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	*dst = *src;
+#define _COPY_STRING(_mem, _str) do { \
+	if ((_str) != NULL) { \
+		(_str) = talloc_strdup((_mem), (_str)); \
+		if ((_str) == NULL) { \
+			TALLOC_FREE(dst); \
+			return NULL; \
+		} \
+	} \
+} while(0)
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->account_name);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->user_principal_name);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->domain_name);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->dns_domain_name);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->full_name);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->logon_script);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->profile_path);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->home_directory);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->home_drive);
+	_COPY_STRING(dst, dst->logon_server);
+#undef _COPY_STRING
+
+	return dst;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the info3 returned by a domain logon
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      const char *account_name,
+					      uint16_t validation_level,
+					      const union netr_Validation *validation,
+					       bool authenticated,
+					      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
+	const struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base = NULL;
+	uint32_t sidcount = 0;
+	const struct netr_SidAttr *sids = NULL;
+	const char *dns_domainname = NULL;
+	const char *principal = NULL;
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	switch (validation_level) {
+	case 2:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam2) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam2->base;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam3) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam3->base;
+		sidcount = validation->sam3->sidcount;
+		sids = validation->sam3->sids;
+		break;
+	case 6:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam6) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam6->base;
+		sidcount = validation->sam6->sidcount;
+		sids = validation->sam6->sids;
+		dns_domainname = validation->sam6->dns_domainname.string;
+		principal = validation->sam6->principal_name.string;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info_dc);
+	if (user_info_dc == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	   Here is where we should check the list of
+	   trusted domains, and verify that the SID
+	   matches.
+	*/
+	if (!base->domain_sid) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot operate on a Netlogon Validation without a domain SID\n"));
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+	 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check */
+	if (base->groups.count > 65535) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc->num_sids = PRIMARY_SIDS_COUNT;
+
+	user_info_dc->sids = talloc_array(user_info_dc, struct auth_SidAttr,  user_info_dc->num_sids + base->groups.count);
+	if (user_info_dc->sids == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].sid = *base->domain_sid;
+	if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].sid, base->rid)) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].attrs = SE_GROUP_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX].sid = *base->domain_sid;
+	if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX].sid, base->primary_gid)) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * This attribute value might be wrong if the primary group is a
+	 * resource group. But a resource group is not meant to be in a primary
+	 * group in the first place, and besides, these attributes will never
+	 * make their way into a PAC.
+	 */
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX].attrs = SE_GROUP_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < base->groups.count; i++) {
+		user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].sid = *base->domain_sid;
+		if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].sid, base->groups.rids[i].rid)) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].attrs = base->groups.rids[i].attributes;
+		user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy 'other' sids.  We need to do sid filtering here to
+	   prevent possible elevation of privileges.  See:
+
+           http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/administration/security/sidfilter.asp
+         */
+
+	/*
+	 * The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+	 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check
+	 */
+	if (sidcount > UINT16_MAX) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (sidcount > 0) {
+		struct auth_SidAttr *dgrps = user_info_dc->sids;
+		size_t dgrps_count;
+
+		dgrps_count = user_info_dc->num_sids + sidcount;
+		dgrps = talloc_realloc(user_info_dc, dgrps, struct auth_SidAttr,
+				       dgrps_count);
+		if (dgrps == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < sidcount; i++) {
+			if (sids[i].sid) {
+				dgrps[user_info_dc->num_sids].sid = *sids[i].sid;
+				dgrps[user_info_dc->num_sids].attrs = sids[i].attributes;
+				user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+			}
+		}
+
+		user_info_dc->sids = dgrps;
+
+		/* Where are the 'global' sids?... */
+	}
+
+	status = make_user_info_SamBaseInfo(user_info_dc, account_name, base, authenticated, &user_info_dc->info);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (dns_domainname != NULL) {
+		user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc->info,
+								    dns_domainname);
+		if (user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (principal != NULL) {
+		user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name = talloc_strdup(user_info_dc->info,
+									principal);
+		if (user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* ensure we are never given NULL session keys */
+
+	if (all_zero(base->key.key, sizeof(base->key.key))) {
+		user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	} else {
+		user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, base->key.key, sizeof(base->key.key));
+		if (user_info_dc->user_session_key.data == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (all_zero(base->LMSessKey.key, sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key))) {
+		user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	} else {
+		user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, base->LMSessKey.key, sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key));
+		if (user_info_dc->lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*_user_info_dc = user_info_dc;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the PAC_LOGON_INFO supplied in the krb5
+ * logon. For group_inclusion, pass AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS if SIDs from
+ * the resource groups are to be included in the resulting structure, and pass
+ * AUTH_EXCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS otherwise.
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			      const struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *pac_logon_info,
+			      const struct PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO *pac_upn_dns_info,
+			      const enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+			      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	union netr_Validation validation;
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+	const struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *rg = NULL;
+	size_t sidcount;
+
+	validation.sam3 = discard_const_p(struct netr_SamInfo3, &pac_logon_info->info3);
+
+	nt_status = make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx, "", 3, &validation,
+							  true, /* This user was authenticated */
+							  &user_info_dc);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_logon_info->info3.base.user_flags & NETLOGON_RESOURCE_GROUPS) {
+		switch (group_inclusion) {
+		case AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS:
+			/* Take resource groups from the PAC. */
+			rg = &pac_logon_info->resource_groups;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_EXCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS:
+			/*
+			 * The PAC is from a TGT, or we don't want to process
+			 * its resource groups.
+			 */
+			break;
+		default:
+			DBG_ERR("invalid group inclusion parameter: %u\n", group_inclusion);
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (rg != NULL && rg->groups.count > 0) {
+		/* The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+		 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check */
+		if (rg->groups.count > 65535) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		  Here is where we should check the list of
+		  trusted domains, and verify that the SID
+		  matches.
+		*/
+		if (rg->domain_sid == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			DEBUG(0, ("Cannot operate on a PAC without a resource domain SID\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		sidcount = user_info_dc->num_sids + rg->groups.count;
+		user_info_dc->sids
+			= talloc_realloc(user_info_dc, user_info_dc->sids, struct auth_SidAttr, sidcount);
+		if (user_info_dc->sids == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < rg->groups.count; i++) {
+			bool ok;
+
+			user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].sid = *rg->domain_sid;
+			ok = sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].sid,
+					    rg->groups.rids[i].rid);
+			if (!ok) {
+				talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+			user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids].attrs = rg->groups.rids[i].attributes;
+			user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pac_upn_dns_info != NULL) {
+		if (pac_upn_dns_info->upn_name != NULL) {
+			user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name =
+				talloc_strdup(user_info_dc->info,
+					      pac_upn_dns_info->upn_name);
+			if (user_info_dc->info->user_principal_name == NULL) {
+				talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+
+		user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name =
+			talloc_strdup(user_info_dc->info,
+				      pac_upn_dns_info->dns_domain_name);
+		if (user_info_dc->info->dns_domain_name == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		if (pac_upn_dns_info->flags & PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_CONSTRUCTED) {
+			user_info_dc->info->user_principal_constructed = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*_user_info_dc = user_info_dc;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/auth/auth_sam_reply.h b/auth/auth_sam_reply.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57a9824
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_sam_reply.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Convert a server info struct into the form for PAC and NETLOGON replies
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>  2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef __AUTH_AUTH_SAM_REPLY_H__
+#define __AUTH_AUTH_SAM_REPLY_H__
+
+#include "libcli/util/ntstatus.h"
+#include "libcli/util/werror.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+
+#undef _PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE
+#define _PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(a1, a2) PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(a1, a2)
+/* this file contains prototypes for functions that are private
+ * to this subsystem or library. These functions should not be
+ * used outside this particular subsystem! */
+
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/auth_sam_reply.c  */
+
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_SamBaseInfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				    const char *account_name,
+				    const struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base,
+				    bool authenticated,
+				    struct auth_user_info **_user_info);
+
+struct auth_user_info *auth_user_info_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info *src);
+
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo6(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo6 **_sam6,
+					   struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP **_resource_groups);
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo2 **_sam2);
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo3 **_sam3,
+					   struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP **_resource_groups);
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the info3 returned by a domain logon
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      const char *account_name,
+					      uint16_t validation_level,
+					      const union netr_Validation *validation,
+					      bool authenticated,
+					      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc);
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the PAC_LOGON_INFO supplied in the krb5 logon
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			      const struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *pac_logon_info,
+			      const struct PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO *pac_upn_dns_info,
+			      enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
+			      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc);
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/wbc_auth_util.c  */
+
+struct wbcAuthUserInfo;
+
+struct netr_SamInfo6 *wbcAuthUserInfo_to_netr_SamInfo6(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						       const struct wbcAuthUserInfo *info);
+
+#undef _PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE
+#define _PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(a1, a2)
+
+#endif /* __AUTH_AUTH_SAM_REPLY_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/auth_util.c b/auth/auth_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec9094d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Authentication utility functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2017
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_auth.h"
+#include "auth_util.h"
+
+struct auth_session_info *copy_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    const struct auth_session_info *src)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	struct auth_session_info *dst;
+	DATA_BLOB blob;
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(
+		&blob,
+		frame,
+		src,
+		(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_auth_session_info);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		DBG_ERR("copy_session_info(): ndr_push_auth_session_info "
+			"failed: %s\n",
+			ndr_errstr(ndr_err));
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	dst = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_session_info);
+	if (dst == NULL) {
+		DBG_ERR("talloc failed\n");
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
+		&blob,
+		dst,
+		dst,
+		(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_auth_session_info);
+
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		DBG_ERR("copy_session_info(): ndr_pull_auth_session_info "
+			"failed: %s\n",
+			ndr_errstr(ndr_err));
+		TALLOC_FREE(dst);
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return dst;
+}
diff --git a/auth/auth_util.h b/auth/auth_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0af6ff5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Authentication utility functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2017
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef __AUTH_AUTH_UTIL_H__
+#define __AUTH_AUTH_UTIL_H__
+
+#include "replace.h"
+#include <talloc.h>
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+
+struct auth_session_info *copy_session_info(
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	const struct auth_session_info *src);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth/authn_policy.c b/auth/authn_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5929c00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/authn_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Samba Active Directory authentication policy functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Catalyst.Net Ltd 2023
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "lib/replace/replace.h"
+#include "auth/authn_policy.h"
+#include "auth/authn_policy_impl.h"
+
+bool authn_policy_is_enforced(const struct authn_policy *policy)
+{
+	return policy->enforced;
+}
+
+/* Authentication policies for Kerberos clients. */
+
+/* Is an authentication policy enforced? */
+bool authn_kerberos_client_policy_is_enforced(const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy *policy)
+{
+	return authn_policy_is_enforced(&policy->policy);
+}
+
+/* Get the raw TGT lifetime enforced by an authentication policy. */
+int64_t authn_policy_enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw(const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy *policy)
+{
+	if (policy == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!authn_policy_is_enforced(&policy->policy)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return policy->tgt_lifetime_raw;
+}
+
+/* Auditing information. */
+
+enum auth_event_id_type authn_audit_info_event_id(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	bool is_enforced;
+
+	if (audit_info->event == AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OK) {
+		/* We didn’t get an error. */
+		return AUTH_EVT_ID_NONE;
+	}
+
+	if (audit_info->policy == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * We got an error, but there’s no policy, so it must have
+		 * stemmed from something else.
+		 */
+		return AUTH_EVT_ID_NONE;
+	}
+
+	is_enforced = authn_policy_is_enforced(audit_info->policy);
+
+	switch (audit_info->event) {
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION:
+		if (is_enforced) {
+			return AUTH_EVT_ID_KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION;
+		}
+
+		return AUTH_EVT_ID_KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION_AUDIT;
+
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION:
+		if (is_enforced) {
+			return AUTH_EVT_ID_KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION;
+		}
+
+		return AUTH_EVT_ID_KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION_AUDIT;
+
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_DEVICE_RESTRICTION:
+		if (is_enforced) {
+			return AUTH_EVT_ID_NTLM_DEVICE_RESTRICTION;
+		}
+
+		/* No relevant event ID. */
+		break;
+
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_SERVER_RESTRICTION:
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OTHER_ERROR:
+	default:
+		/* No relevant event ID. */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return AUTH_EVT_ID_NONE;
+}
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_silo_name(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	if (audit_info->policy == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return audit_info->policy->silo_name;
+}
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_policy_name(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	if (audit_info->policy == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return audit_info->policy->policy_name;
+}
+
+const bool *authn_audit_info_policy_enforced(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	if (audit_info->policy == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return &audit_info->policy->enforced;
+}
+
+const struct auth_user_info_dc *authn_audit_info_client_info(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	return audit_info->client_info;
+}
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_event(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	switch (audit_info->event) {
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OK:
+		return "OK";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION:
+		return "KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION:
+		return "KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_DEVICE_RESTRICTION:
+		return "NTLM_DEVICE_RESTRICTION";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_SERVER_RESTRICTION:
+		return "NTLM_SERVER_RESTRICTION";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OTHER_ERROR:
+	default:
+		return "OTHER_ERROR";
+	}
+}
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_reason(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	switch (audit_info->reason) {
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_DESCRIPTOR_INVALID:
+		return "DESCRIPTOR_INVALID";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_DESCRIPTOR_NO_OWNER:
+		return "DESCRIPTOR_NO_OWNER";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_SECURITY_TOKEN_FAILURE:
+		return "SECURITY_TOKEN_FAILURE";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_ACCESS_DENIED:
+		return "ACCESS_DENIED";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_FAST_REQUIRED:
+		return "FAST_REQUIRED";
+	case AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_NONE:
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+NTSTATUS authn_audit_info_policy_status(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	return audit_info->policy_status;
+}
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_location(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	return audit_info->location;
+}
+
+struct authn_int64_optional authn_audit_info_policy_tgt_lifetime_mins(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info)
+{
+	int64_t lifetime;
+
+	if (!audit_info->tgt_lifetime_raw.is_present) {
+		return authn_int64_none();
+	}
+
+	lifetime = audit_info->tgt_lifetime_raw.val;
+	lifetime /= INT64_C(1000) * 1000 * 10 * 60;
+
+	return authn_int64_some(lifetime);
+}
diff --git a/auth/authn_policy.h b/auth/authn_policy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2142fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/authn_policy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Samba Active Directory authentication policy functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Catalyst.Net Ltd 2023
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef KDC_AUTHN_POLICY_H
+#define KDC_AUTHN_POLICY_H
+
+#include "lib/replace/replace.h"
+#include "libcli/util/ntstatus.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/windows_event_ids.h"
+
+/* Authentication policies for Kerberos clients. */
+
+struct authn_kerberos_client_policy;
+
+/* Is an authentication policy enforced? */
+bool authn_kerberos_client_policy_is_enforced(const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy *policy);
+
+/* Get the raw TGT lifetime enforced by an authentication policy. */
+int64_t authn_policy_enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw(const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy *policy);
+
+/* Auditing information. */
+
+struct authn_audit_info;
+
+/* This enum should be kept in sync with authn_audit_info_event(). */
+enum authn_audit_event {
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OK = 0,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_DEVICE_RESTRICTION,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_KERBEROS_SERVER_RESTRICTION,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_DEVICE_RESTRICTION,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_NTLM_SERVER_RESTRICTION,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_EVENT_OTHER_ERROR,
+};
+
+/* This enum should be kept in sync with authn_audit_info_reason(). */
+enum authn_audit_reason {
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_NONE = 0,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_DESCRIPTOR_INVALID,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_DESCRIPTOR_NO_OWNER,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_SECURITY_TOKEN_FAILURE,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_ACCESS_DENIED,
+	AUTHN_AUDIT_REASON_FAST_REQUIRED,
+};
+
+enum auth_event_id_type authn_audit_info_event_id(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_silo_name(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_policy_name(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const bool *authn_audit_info_policy_enforced(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const struct auth_user_info_dc *authn_audit_info_client_info(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_event(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_reason(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+NTSTATUS authn_audit_info_policy_status(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+const char *authn_audit_info_location(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+struct authn_int64_optional {
+	bool is_present;
+	int64_t val;
+};
+
+struct authn_int64_optional authn_audit_info_policy_tgt_lifetime_mins(const struct authn_audit_info *audit_info);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth/authn_policy_impl.h b/auth/authn_policy_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..121c6cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/authn_policy_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Samba Active Directory authentication policy private implementation details
+
+   Copyright (C) Catalyst.Net Ltd 2023
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef KDC_AUTHN_POLICY_IMPL_H
+#define KDC_AUTHN_POLICY_IMPL_H
+
+#include "lib/replace/replace.h"
+
+#include "auth/authn_policy.h"
+#include "lib/util/data_blob.h"
+#include "libcli/util/ntstatus.h"
+
+struct authn_policy {
+	const char *silo_name;
+	const char *policy_name;
+	bool enforced;
+};
+
+bool authn_policy_is_enforced(const struct authn_policy *policy);
+
+struct authn_kerberos_client_policy {
+	struct authn_policy policy;
+	DATA_BLOB allowed_to_authenticate_from;
+	int64_t tgt_lifetime_raw;
+};
+
+struct authn_ntlm_client_policy {
+	struct authn_policy policy;
+	DATA_BLOB allowed_to_authenticate_from;
+	bool allowed_ntlm_network_auth;
+};
+
+struct authn_server_policy {
+	struct authn_policy policy;
+	DATA_BLOB allowed_to_authenticate_to;
+};
+
+/* Auditing information. */
+
+struct authn_audit_info {
+	struct authn_policy *policy;
+	const struct auth_user_info_dc *client_info;
+	enum authn_audit_event event;
+	enum authn_audit_reason reason;
+	NTSTATUS policy_status;
+	const char *location;
+	struct authn_int64_optional tgt_lifetime_raw;
+};
+
+static inline struct authn_int64_optional authn_int64_some(const int64_t val)
+{
+	return (struct authn_int64_optional) {
+		.is_present = true,
+		.val = val,
+	};
+}
+
+static inline struct authn_int64_optional authn_int64_none(void)
+{
+	return (struct authn_int64_optional) {
+		.is_present = false,
+	};
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth/common_auth.h b/auth/common_auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1afb79e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/common_auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Standardised Authentication types
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2010
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef AUTH_COMMON_AUTH_H
+#define AUTH_COMMON_AUTH_H
+
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+
+#define USER_INFO_CASE_INSENSITIVE_USERNAME 0x01 /* username may be in any case */
+#define USER_INFO_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PASSWORD 0x02 /* password may be in any case */
+#define USER_INFO_DONT_CHECK_UNIX_ACCOUNT   0x04 /* don't check unix account status */
+#define USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON         0x08 /* Interactive logon */
+/*unused #define USER_INFO_LOCAL_SAM_ONLY   0x10    Only authenticate against the local SAM, do not map missing passwords to NO_SUCH_USER */
+#define USER_INFO_INFO3_AND_NO_AUTHZ        0x20 /* Only fill in server_info->info3 and do not do any authorization steps */
+
+enum auth_password_state {
+	AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN = 1,
+	AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH = 2,
+	AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE = 3
+};
+
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS     0x01 /* Add the user to the default world and network groups */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED      0x02 /* Add the user to the 'authenticated users' group */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES  0x04 /* Use a trivial map between users and privileges, rather than a DB */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN         0x08 /* The returned token must have the unix_token and unix_info elements provided */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_NTLM               0x10 /* The returned token must have authenticated-with-NTLM flag set */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_FORCE_COMPOUNDED_AUTHENTICATION  0x20 /* The user authenticated with a device. */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEVICE_DEFAULT_GROUPS     0x40 /* Add the device to the default world and network groups */
+#define AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEVICE_AUTHENTICATED      0x80 /* Add the device to the 'authenticated users' group */
+
+struct auth_usersupplied_info
+{
+	const char *workstation_name;
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote_host;
+	const struct tsocket_address *local_host;
+
+	uint32_t logon_parameters;
+
+	bool cracknames_called;
+	bool was_mapped;
+	uint64_t logon_id;
+	/* the values the client gives us */
+	struct {
+		const char *account_name;
+		const char *domain_name;
+	} client, mapped, orig_client;
+
+	enum auth_password_state password_state;
+
+	struct {
+		struct {
+			DATA_BLOB lanman;
+			DATA_BLOB nt;
+		} response;
+		struct {
+			struct samr_Password *lanman;
+			struct samr_Password *nt;
+		} hash;
+
+		char *plaintext;
+	} password;
+	uint32_t flags;
+
+	struct {
+		uint32_t negotiate_flags;
+		enum netr_SchannelType secure_channel_type;
+		const char *computer_name; /* [charset(UTF8)] */
+		const char *account_name; /* [charset(UTF8)] */
+		struct dom_sid *sid; /* [unique] */
+	} netlogon_trust_account;
+
+	const char *service_description;
+	const char *auth_description;
+
+	/*
+	 * for logging only, normally worked out from the password but
+	 * for krb5 logging only (krb5 normally doesn't use this) we
+	 * record the enc type here
+	 */
+	const char *password_type;
+};
+
+struct auth_method_context;
+struct tevent_context;
+struct imessaging_context;
+struct loadparm_context;
+struct ldb_context;
+struct smb_krb5_context;
+
+struct auth4_context {
+	struct {
+		/* Who set this up in the first place? */
+		const char *set_by;
+
+		DATA_BLOB data;
+	} challenge;
+
+	/* methods, in the order they should be called */
+	struct auth_method_context *methods;
+
+	/* the event context to use for calls that can block */
+	struct tevent_context *event_ctx;
+
+	/* the messaging context which can be used by backends */
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx;
+
+	/* loadparm context */
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+
+	/* SAM database for this local machine - to fill in local groups, or to authenticate local NTLM users */
+	struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
+
+	/* The time this authentication started */
+	struct timeval start_time;
+
+	/* Private data for the callbacks on this auth context */
+	void *private_data;
+
+	/* Kerberos context, set up on demand */
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
+
+	struct tevent_req *(*check_ntlm_password_send)(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct tevent_context *ev,
+					struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
+					const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info);
+	NTSTATUS (*check_ntlm_password_recv)(struct tevent_req *req,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					uint8_t *pauthoritative,
+					void **server_returned_info,
+					DATA_BLOB *nt_session_key,
+					DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key);
+
+	NTSTATUS (*get_ntlm_challenge)(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, uint8_t chal[8]);
+
+	NTSTATUS (*set_ntlm_challenge)(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx, const uint8_t chal[8], const char *set_by);
+
+	NTSTATUS (*generate_session_info)(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+					  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					  void *server_returned_info,
+					  const char *original_user_name,
+					  uint32_t session_info_flags,
+					  struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+
+	NTSTATUS (*generate_session_info_pac)(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
+					      TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
+					      DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+					      const char *principal_name,
+					      const struct tsocket_address *remote_address,
+					      uint32_t session_info_flags,
+					      struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+};
+
+#define AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_NONE "NONE"
+#define AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SMB "SMB"
+#define AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_TLS "TLS"
+#define AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SEAL "SEAL"
+#define AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SIGN "SIGN"
+
+/*
+ * Log details of an authentication attempt.
+ * Successful and unsuccessful attempts are logged.
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx is optional, but when supplied allows streaming the
+ * authentication events over the message bus.
+ */
+struct authn_audit_info;
+void log_authentication_event(struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+			      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+			      const struct timeval *start_time,
+			      const struct auth_usersupplied_info *ui,
+			      NTSTATUS status,
+			      const char *domain_name,
+			      const char *account_name,
+			      struct dom_sid *sid,
+			      const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+			      const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info);
+
+/*
+ * Log details of a successful authorization to a service.
+ *
+ * Only successful authorizations are logged.  For clarity:
+ * - NTLM bad passwords will be recorded by log_authentication_event
+ * - Kerberos decrypt failures need to be logged in gensec_gssapi et al
+ *
+ * The service may later refuse authorization due to an ACL.
+ *
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx is optional, but when supplied allows streaming the
+ * authorization events over the message bus.
+ */
+void log_successful_authz_event(struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+				struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+				const struct tsocket_address *local,
+				const char *service_description,
+				const char *auth_type,
+				const char *transport_protection,
+				struct auth_session_info *session_info,
+				const struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info,
+				const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info);
+
+/*
+ * Log details of an authorization to a service.
+ *
+ * NOTE: msg_ctx and lp_ctx are optional, but when supplied, allow streaming the
+ * authorization events over the message bus.
+ */
+void log_authz_event(
+	struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote,
+	const struct tsocket_address *local,
+	const struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info,
+	const char *service_description,
+	const char *auth_type,
+	const char *domain_name,
+	const char *account_name,
+	const struct dom_sid *sid,
+	const char *logon_server,
+	const struct timeval authtime,
+	NTSTATUS status);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20ab858
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1941 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   User credentials handling
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2005
+   Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "tevent.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "system/filesys.h"
+#include "system/passwd.h"
+
+/**
+ * Create a new credentials structure
+ * @param mem_ctx TALLOC_CTX parent for credentials structure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *cred = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct cli_credentials);
+	if (cred == NULL) {
+		return cred;
+	}
+
+	cred->winbind_separator = '\\';
+
+	cred->kerberos_state = CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED;
+
+	cred->signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * The default value of lpcfg_client_ipc_signing() is REQUIRED, so use
+	 * the same value here.
+	 */
+	cred->ipc_signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+	cred->encryption_state = SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT;
+
+	return cred;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init_server(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *server_creds = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	bool ok;
+
+	server_creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	if (server_creds == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_conf(server_creds, lp_ctx);
+	if (!ok) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(server_creds);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(server_creds, lp_ctx);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to obtain server credentials: %s\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		TALLOC_FREE(server_creds);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return server_creds;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_callback_data(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						void *callback_data)
+{
+	cred->priv_data = callback_data;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void *_cli_credentials_callback_data(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->priv_data;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a new anonymous credential
+ * @param mem_ctx TALLOC_CTX parent for credentials structure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init_anon(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *anon_credentials;
+
+	anon_credentials = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	cli_credentials_set_anonymous(anon_credentials);
+
+	return anon_credentials;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+						 enum credentials_use_kerberos kerberos_state,
+						 enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= creds->kerberos_state_obtained) {
+		creds->kerberos_state = kerberos_state;
+		creds->kerberos_state_obtained = obtained;
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_forced_sasl_mech(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+						   const char *sasl_mech)
+{
+	TALLOC_FREE(creds->forced_sasl_mech);
+	creds->forced_sasl_mech = talloc_strdup(creds, sasl_mech);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_krb_forwardable(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+						  enum credentials_krb_forwardable krb_forwardable)
+{
+	creds->krb_forwardable = krb_forwardable;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ enum credentials_use_kerberos cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->kerberos_state;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_forced_sasl_mech(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->forced_sasl_mech;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ enum credentials_krb_forwardable cli_credentials_get_krb_forwardable(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->krb_forwardable;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_gensec_features(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+						  uint32_t gensec_features,
+						  enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= creds->gensec_features_obtained) {
+		creds->gensec_features_obtained = obtained;
+		creds->gensec_features = gensec_features;
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ uint32_t cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->gensec_features;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the username for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The username set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_username(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+					cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->username_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running) {
+	    	cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->username = cred->username_cb(cred);
+	    	cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->username_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->username_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+			cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->username_obtained);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cred->username;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the username for this credentials context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  cred  The credential context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  obtained  A pointer to store the obtained information.
+ *
+ * return The user name or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *
+cli_credentials_get_username_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					  enum credentials_obtained *obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained != NULL) {
+		*obtained = cred->username_obtained;
+	}
+
+	return cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_username(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *val, enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->username_obtained) {
+		cred->username = talloc_strdup(cred, val);
+		cred->username_obtained = obtained;
+		cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->username_obtained);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_username_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*username_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->username_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->username_cb = username_cb;
+		cred->username_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_bind_dn(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				 const char *bind_dn)
+{
+	cred->bind_dn = talloc_strdup(cred, bind_dn);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the BIND DN for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The username set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will be NULL if not specified explicitly
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_bind_dn(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->bind_dn;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the client principal for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The username set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ char *cli_credentials_get_principal_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, enum credentials_obtained *obtained)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+					cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->principal_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running) {
+	    	cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->principal = cred->principal_cb(cred);
+	    	cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->principal_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->principal_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+			cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->principal_obtained);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cred->principal_obtained < cred->username_obtained
+	    || cred->principal_obtained < MAX(cred->domain_obtained, cred->realm_obtained)) {
+		const char *effective_username = NULL;
+		const char *effective_realm = NULL;
+		enum credentials_obtained effective_obtained;
+
+		effective_username = cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
+		if (effective_username == NULL || strlen(effective_username) == 0) {
+			*obtained = cred->username_obtained;
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (cred->domain_obtained > cred->realm_obtained) {
+			effective_realm = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
+			effective_obtained = MIN(cred->domain_obtained,
+						 cred->username_obtained);
+		} else {
+			effective_realm = cli_credentials_get_realm(cred);
+			effective_obtained = MIN(cred->realm_obtained,
+						 cred->username_obtained);
+		}
+
+		if (effective_realm == NULL || strlen(effective_realm) == 0) {
+			effective_realm = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
+			effective_obtained = MIN(cred->domain_obtained,
+						 cred->username_obtained);
+		}
+
+		if (effective_realm != NULL && strlen(effective_realm) != 0) {
+			*obtained = effective_obtained;
+			return talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s@%s",
+					       effective_username,
+					       effective_realm);
+		}
+	}
+	*obtained = cred->principal_obtained;
+	return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, cred->principal);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the client principal for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The username set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ char *cli_credentials_get_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	enum credentials_obtained obtained;
+	return cli_credentials_get_principal_and_obtained(cred, mem_ctx, &obtained);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				   const char *val,
+				   enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->principal_obtained) {
+		cred->principal = talloc_strdup(cred, val);
+		if (cred->principal == NULL) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		cred->principal_obtained = obtained;
+
+		cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->principal_obtained);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Set a callback to get the principal.  This could be a popup dialog,
+ * a terminal prompt or similar.  */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*principal_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->principal_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->principal_cb = principal_cb;
+		cred->principal_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Some of our tools are 'anonymous by default'.  This is a single
+ * function to determine if authentication has been explicitly
+ * requested */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
+	if (cred->bind_dn) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we forced the mech we clearly want authentication. E.g. to use
+	 * SASL/EXTERNAL which has no credentials.
+	 */
+	if (cred->forced_sasl_mech) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (cli_credentials_is_anonymous(cred)){
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->principal_obtained >= CRED_SPECIFIED) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (cred->username_obtained >= CRED_SPECIFIED) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(cred) == CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the password for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval If set, the cleartext password, otherwise NULL
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_password(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+						    cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->password_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running &&
+	    !cred->password_will_be_nt_hash) {
+		cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->password = cred->password_cb(cred);
+		cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->password_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->password_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+			cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->password_obtained);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cred->password;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the password for this credentials context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  cred  The credential context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  obtained  A pointer to store the obtained information.
+ *
+ * return The user name or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *
+cli_credentials_get_password_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					  enum credentials_obtained *obtained)
+{
+	const char *password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
+
+	if (obtained != NULL) {
+		*obtained = cred->password_obtained;
+	}
+
+	return password;
+}
+
+/* Set a password on the credentials context, including an indication
+ * of 'how' the password was obtained */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *val,
+				  enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->password_obtained) {
+
+		cred->lm_response = data_blob_null;
+		cred->nt_response = data_blob_null;
+		cred->nt_hash = NULL;
+		cred->password = NULL;
+
+		cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, obtained);
+
+		cred->password_tries = 0;
+
+		if (val == NULL) {
+			cred->password_obtained = obtained;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		if (cred->password_will_be_nt_hash) {
+			struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+			size_t val_len = strlen(val);
+			size_t converted;
+
+			nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+			if (nt_hash == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+
+			converted = strhex_to_str((char *)nt_hash->hash,
+						  sizeof(nt_hash->hash),
+						  val, val_len);
+			if (converted != sizeof(nt_hash->hash)) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+				return false;
+			}
+
+			cred->nt_hash = nt_hash;
+			cred->password_obtained = obtained;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		cred->password = talloc_strdup(cred, val);
+		if (cred->password == NULL) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		/* Don't print the actual password in talloc memory dumps */
+		talloc_set_name_const(cred->password,
+			"password set via cli_credentials_set_password");
+		cred->password_obtained = obtained;
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_password_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					   const char *(*password_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->password_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->password_tries = 3;
+		cred->password_cb = password_cb;
+		cred->password_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->password_obtained);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the 'old' password for this credentials context (used for join accounts).
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval If set, the cleartext password, otherwise NULL
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_old_password(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+						    cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	return cred->old_password;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_old_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				      const char *val,
+				      enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	cred->old_password = talloc_strdup(cred, val);
+	if (cred->old_password) {
+		/* Don't print the actual password in talloc memory dumps */
+		talloc_set_name_const(cred->old_password, "password set via cli_credentials_set_old_password");
+	}
+	cred->old_nt_hash = NULL;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the password, in the form MD4(unicode(password)) for this credentials context.
+ *
+ * Sometimes we only have this much of the password, while the rest of
+ * the time this call avoids calling E_md4hash themselves.
+ *
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval If set, the cleartext password, otherwise NULL
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ struct samr_Password *cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	enum credentials_obtained password_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained ccache_threshold;
+	enum credentials_obtained client_gss_creds_threshold;
+	bool password_is_nt_hash;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+
+	if (cred->nt_hash != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If we already have a hash it's easy.
+		 */
+		goto return_hash;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is a bit tricky, with password_will_be_nt_hash
+	 * we still need to get the value via the password_callback
+	 * but if we did that we should not remember it's state
+	 * in the long run so we need to undo it.
+	 */
+
+	password_obtained = cred->password_obtained;
+	ccache_threshold = cred->ccache_threshold;
+	client_gss_creds_threshold = cred->client_gss_creds_threshold;
+	password_is_nt_hash = cred->password_will_be_nt_hash;
+
+	cred->password_will_be_nt_hash = false;
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
+
+	cred->password_will_be_nt_hash = password_is_nt_hash;
+	if (password_is_nt_hash && password_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		/*
+		 * We got the nt_hash as string via the callback,
+		 * so we need to undo the state change.
+		 *
+		 * And also don't remember it as plaintext password.
+		 */
+		cred->client_gss_creds_threshold = client_gss_creds_threshold;
+		cred->ccache_threshold = ccache_threshold;
+		cred->password_obtained = password_obtained;
+		cred->password = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (password == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+	if (nt_hash == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (password_is_nt_hash) {
+		size_t password_len = strlen(password);
+		size_t converted;
+
+		converted = strhex_to_str((char *)nt_hash->hash,
+					  sizeof(nt_hash->hash),
+					  password, password_len);
+		if (converted != sizeof(nt_hash->hash)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		E_md4hash(password, nt_hash->hash);
+	}
+
+	cred->nt_hash = nt_hash;
+	nt_hash = NULL;
+
+return_hash:
+	nt_hash = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password);
+	if (nt_hash == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	*nt_hash = *cred->nt_hash;
+
+	return nt_hash;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the old password, in the form MD4(unicode(password)) for this credentials context.
+ *
+ * Sometimes we only have this much of the password, while the rest of
+ * the time this call avoids calling E_md4hash themselves.
+ *
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval If set, the cleartext password, otherwise NULL
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ struct samr_Password *cli_credentials_get_old_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	const char *old_password = NULL;
+
+	if (cred->old_nt_hash != NULL) {
+		struct samr_Password *nt_hash = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password);
+		if (!nt_hash) {
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		*nt_hash = *cred->old_nt_hash;
+
+		return nt_hash;
+	}
+
+	old_password = cli_credentials_get_old_password(cred);
+	if (old_password) {
+		struct samr_Password *nt_hash = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password);
+		if (!nt_hash) {
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		E_md4hash(old_password, nt_hash->hash);
+
+		return nt_hash;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the 'short' or 'NetBIOS' domain for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The domain set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+						    cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->domain_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running) {
+	    	cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->domain = cred->domain_cb(cred);
+	    	cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->domain_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->domain_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+			cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->domain_obtained);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cred->domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the domain for this credential context.
+ *
+ * @param[in] cred  The credential context.
+ *
+ * @param[out] obtained A pointer to store the obtained information.
+ *
+ * @return The domain name or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_domain_and_obtained(
+	struct cli_credentials *cred,
+	enum credentials_obtained *obtained)
+{
+	const char *domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
+
+	if (obtained != NULL) {
+		*obtained = cred->domain_obtained;
+	}
+
+	return domain;
+}
+
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				const char *val,
+				enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->domain_obtained) {
+		/* it is important that the domain be in upper case,
+		 * particularly for the sensitive NTLMv2
+		 * calculations */
+		cred->domain = strupper_talloc(cred, val);
+		cred->domain_obtained = obtained;
+		/* setting domain does not mean we have to invalidate ccache
+		 * because domain in not used for Kerberos operations.
+		 * If ccache invalidation is required, one will anyway specify
+		 * a password to kinit, and that will force invalidation of the ccache
+		 */
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_domain_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 const char *(*domain_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->domain_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->domain_cb = domain_cb;
+		cred->domain_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the Kerberos realm for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The realm set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_realm(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+						    cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->realm_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running) {
+	    	cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->realm = cred->realm_cb(cred);
+	    	cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->realm_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->realm_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+			cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->realm_obtained);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cred->realm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the realm for this credentials context, and force it to
+ * uppercase for the sanity of our local kerberos libraries
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_realm(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			       const char *val,
+			       enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->realm_obtained) {
+		cred->realm = strupper_talloc(cred, val);
+		cred->realm_obtained = obtained;
+		cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(cred, cred->realm_obtained);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_realm_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					const char *(*realm_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->realm_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->realm_cb = realm_cb;
+		cred->realm_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the 'short' or 'NetBIOS' workstation name for this credentials context.
+ *
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The workstation name set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_workstation(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->workstation_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK &&
+	    !cred->callback_running) {
+	    	cred->callback_running = true;
+		cred->workstation = cred->workstation_cb(cred);
+	    	cred->callback_running = false;
+		if (cred->workstation_obtained == CRED_CALLBACK) {
+			cred->workstation_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cred->workstation;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_workstation(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     const char *val,
+				     enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->workstation_obtained) {
+		cred->workstation = talloc_strdup(cred, val);
+		cred->workstation_obtained = obtained;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_workstation_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      const char *(*workstation_cb) (struct cli_credentials *))
+{
+	if (cred->workstation_obtained < CRED_CALLBACK) {
+		cred->workstation_cb = workstation_cb;
+		cred->workstation_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Given a string, typically obtained from a -U argument, parse it into domain, username, realm and password fields
+ *
+ * The format accepted is [domain\\]user[%password] or user[@realm][%password]
+ *
+ * @param credentials Credentials structure on which to set the password
+ * @param data the string containing the username, password etc
+ * @param obtained This enum describes how 'specified' this password is
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_parse_string(struct cli_credentials *credentials, const char *data, enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	char *uname, *p;
+	char *uname_free = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp("%",data) == 0) {
+		cli_credentials_set_anonymous(credentials);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	uname = talloc_strdup(credentials, data);
+	uname_free = uname;
+
+	if ((p = strchr_m(uname,'%'))) {
+		*p = 0;
+		cli_credentials_set_password(credentials, p+1, obtained);
+	}
+
+	if ((p = strchr_m(uname,'@'))) {
+		/*
+		 * We also need to set username and domain
+		 * in order to undo the effect of
+		 * cli_credentials_guess().
+		 */
+		cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained);
+		cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, "", obtained);
+
+		cli_credentials_set_principal(credentials, uname, obtained);
+		*p = 0;
+		cli_credentials_set_realm(credentials, p+1, obtained);
+		TALLOC_FREE(uname_free);
+		return;
+	} else if ((p = strchr_m(uname,'\\'))
+		   || (p = strchr_m(uname, '/'))
+		   || (p = strchr_m(uname, credentials->winbind_separator)))
+	{
+		const char *domain = NULL;
+
+		domain = uname;
+		*p = 0;
+		uname = p+1;
+
+		if (obtained == credentials->realm_obtained &&
+		    !strequal_m(credentials->domain, domain))
+		{
+			/*
+			 * We need to undo a former set with the same level
+			 * in order to get the expected result from
+			 * cli_credentials_get_principal().
+			 *
+			 * But we only need to do that if the domain
+			 * actually changes.
+			 */
+			cli_credentials_set_realm(credentials, domain, obtained);
+		}
+		cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, domain, obtained);
+	}
+	if (obtained == credentials->principal_obtained &&
+	    !strequal_m(credentials->username, uname))
+	{
+		/*
+		 * We need to undo a former set with the same level
+		 * in order to get the expected result from
+		 * cli_credentials_get_principal().
+		 *
+		 * But we only need to do that if the username
+		 * actually changes.
+		 */
+		credentials->principal_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+		credentials->principal = NULL;
+	}
+	cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained);
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(uname_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Given a a credentials structure, print it as a string
+ *
+ * The format output is [domain\\]user[%password] or user[@realm][%password]
+ *
+ * @param credentials Credentials structure on which to set the password
+ * @param mem_ctx The memory context to place the result on
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ char *cli_credentials_get_unparsed_name(struct cli_credentials *credentials, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	const char *bind_dn = cli_credentials_get_bind_dn(credentials);
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+	const char *username = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+
+	if (bind_dn) {
+		name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, bind_dn);
+	} else {
+		cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(credentials, mem_ctx, &username, &domain);
+		if (domain && domain[0]) {
+			name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s\\%s",
+					       domain, username);
+		} else {
+			name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s",
+					       username);
+		}
+	}
+	return name;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Specifies default values for domain, workstation and realm
+ * from the smb.conf configuration file
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ *
+ * @return true on success, false on error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_conf(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	const char *sep = NULL;
+	const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
+	enum credentials_client_protection protection =
+		lpcfg_client_protection(lp_ctx);
+	const char *workgroup = lpcfg_workgroup(lp_ctx);
+	const char *netbios_name = lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+	bool ok;
+
+	(void)cli_credentials_set_username(cred, "", CRED_UNINITIALISED);
+
+	if (workgroup != NULL && strlen(workgroup) == 0) {
+		workgroup = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (workgroup != NULL) {
+		if (lpcfg_parm_is_cmdline(lp_ctx, "workgroup")) {
+			ok = cli_credentials_set_domain(cred,
+							workgroup,
+							CRED_SPECIFIED);
+			if (!ok) {
+				DBG_ERR("Failed to set domain!\n");
+				return false;
+			}
+		} else {
+			(void)cli_credentials_set_domain(cred,
+							 workgroup,
+							 CRED_SMB_CONF);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (netbios_name != NULL && strlen(netbios_name) == 0) {
+		netbios_name = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (netbios_name != NULL) {
+		if (lpcfg_parm_is_cmdline(lp_ctx, "netbios name")) {
+			ok = cli_credentials_set_workstation(cred,
+							     netbios_name,
+							     CRED_SPECIFIED);
+			if (!ok) {
+				DBG_ERR("Failed to set workstation!\n");
+				return false;
+			}
+		} else {
+			(void)cli_credentials_set_workstation(cred,
+							      netbios_name,
+							      CRED_SMB_CONF);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (realm != NULL && strlen(realm) == 0) {
+		realm = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (realm != NULL) {
+		if (lpcfg_parm_is_cmdline(lp_ctx, "realm")) {
+			ok = cli_credentials_set_realm(cred,
+						       realm,
+						       CRED_SPECIFIED);
+			if (!ok) {
+				DBG_ERR("Failed to set realm!\n");
+				return false;
+			}
+		} else {
+			(void)cli_credentials_set_realm(cred,
+							realm,
+							CRED_SMB_CONF);
+		}
+	}
+
+	sep = lpcfg_winbind_separator(lp_ctx);
+	if (sep != NULL && sep[0] != '\0') {
+		cred->winbind_separator = *lpcfg_winbind_separator(lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->signing_state_obtained <= CRED_SMB_CONF) {
+		/* Will be set to default for invalid smb.conf values */
+		cred->signing_state = lpcfg_client_signing(lp_ctx);
+		if (cred->signing_state == SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT) {
+			switch (protection) {
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_DEFAULT:
+				break;
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_PLAIN:
+				cred->signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_OFF;
+				break;
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_SIGN:
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_ENCRYPT:
+				cred->signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		cred->signing_state_obtained = CRED_SMB_CONF;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->ipc_signing_state_obtained <= CRED_SMB_CONF) {
+		/* Will be set to required for invalid smb.conf values */
+		cred->ipc_signing_state = lpcfg_client_ipc_signing(lp_ctx);
+		cred->ipc_signing_state_obtained = CRED_SMB_CONF;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->encryption_state_obtained <= CRED_SMB_CONF) {
+		/* Will be set to default for invalid smb.conf values */
+		cred->encryption_state = lpcfg_client_smb_encrypt(lp_ctx);
+		if (cred->encryption_state == SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT) {
+			switch (protection) {
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_DEFAULT:
+				break;
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_PLAIN:
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_SIGN:
+				cred->encryption_state = SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF;
+				break;
+			case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_ENCRYPT:
+				cred->encryption_state = SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cred->kerberos_state_obtained <= CRED_SMB_CONF) {
+		/* Will be set to default for invalid smb.conf values */
+		cred->kerberos_state = lpcfg_client_use_kerberos(lp_ctx);
+		cred->kerberos_state_obtained = CRED_SMB_CONF;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->gensec_features_obtained <= CRED_SMB_CONF) {
+		switch (protection) {
+		case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_DEFAULT:
+			break;
+		case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_PLAIN:
+			cred->gensec_features = 0;
+			break;
+		case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_SIGN:
+			cred->gensec_features = GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_ENCRYPT:
+			cred->gensec_features =
+				GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN|GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		cred->gensec_features_obtained = CRED_SMB_CONF;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Guess defaults for credentials from environment variables,
+ * and from the configuration file
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_guess(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	const char *error_string;
+	const char *env = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	if (lp_ctx != NULL) {
+		ok = cli_credentials_set_conf(cred, lp_ctx);
+		if (!ok) {
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pwd = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (pwd != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(pwd->pw_name);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 1024) {
+			(void)cli_credentials_parse_string(cred,
+							   pwd->pw_name,
+							   CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+		}
+	}
+
+	env = getenv("LOGNAME");
+	if (env != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(env);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 1024) {
+			(void)cli_credentials_set_username(cred,
+							   env,
+							   CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+		}
+	}
+
+	env = getenv("USER");
+	if (env != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(env);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 1024) {
+			char *p = NULL;
+
+			(void)cli_credentials_parse_string(cred,
+							   env,
+							   CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+			if ((p = strchr_m(env, '%'))) {
+				memset(p, '\0', strlen(cred->password));
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	env = getenv("PASSWD");
+	if (env != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(env);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 1024) {
+			(void)cli_credentials_set_password(cred,
+							   env,
+							   CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+		}
+	}
+
+	env = getenv("PASSWD_FD");
+	if (env != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(env);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 1024) {
+			int fd = atoi(env);
+
+			(void)cli_credentials_parse_password_fd(cred,
+								fd,
+								CRED_GUESS_FILE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	env = getenv("PASSWD_FILE");
+	if (env != NULL) {
+		size_t len = strlen(env);
+
+		if (len > 0 && len <= 4096) {
+			(void)cli_credentials_parse_password_file(cred,
+								  env,
+								  CRED_GUESS_FILE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (lp_ctx != NULL &&
+	    cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(cred) != CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED) {
+		(void)cli_credentials_set_ccache(cred,
+						 lp_ctx,
+						 NULL,
+						 CRED_GUESS_FILE,
+						 &error_string);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Attach NETLOGON credentials for use with SCHANNEL
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_netlogon_creds(
+	struct cli_credentials *cred,
+	const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *netlogon_creds)
+{
+	TALLOC_FREE(cred->netlogon_creds);
+	if (netlogon_creds == NULL) {
+		return;
+	}
+	cred->netlogon_creds = netlogon_creds_copy(cred, netlogon_creds);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return attached NETLOGON credentials
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->netlogon_creds;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set NETLOGON secure channel type
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_secure_channel_type(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					     enum netr_SchannelType secure_channel_type)
+{
+	cred->secure_channel_type = secure_channel_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return NETLOGON secure channel type
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ time_t cli_credentials_get_password_last_changed_time(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->password_last_changed_time;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set NETLOGON secure channel type
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_password_last_changed_time(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							     time_t last_changed_time)
+{
+	cred->password_last_changed_time = last_changed_time;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return NETLOGON secure channel type
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ enum netr_SchannelType cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->secure_channel_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fill in a credentials structure as the anonymous user
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_anonymous(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	cli_credentials_set_username(cred, "", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_domain(cred, "", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_principal(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_realm(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_workstation(cred, "", CRED_UNINITIALISED);
+	cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(cred,
+					   CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED,
+					   CRED_SPECIFIED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Describe a credentials context as anonymous or authenticated
+ * @retval true if anonymous, false if a username is specified
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_is_anonymous(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	const char *username;
+
+	/* if bind dn is set it's not anonymous */
+	if (cred->bind_dn) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred,
+						    cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	/* if principal is set, it's not anonymous */
+	if ((cred->principal != NULL) && cred->principal_obtained >= cred->username_obtained) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	username = cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
+
+	/* Yes, it is deliberate that we die if we have a NULL pointer
+	 * here - anonymous is "", not NULL, which is 'never specified,
+	 * never guessed', ie programmer bug */
+	if (!username[0]) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mark the current password for a credentials struct as wrong. This will
+ * cause the password to be prompted again (if a callback is set).
+ *
+ * This will decrement the number of times the password can be tried.
+ *
+ * @retval whether the credentials struct is finished
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_wrong_password(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->password_obtained != CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->password_tries == 0) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	cred->password_tries--;
+
+	if (cred->password_tries == 0) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	cred->password_obtained = CRED_CALLBACK;
+	return true;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      const char **username,
+					      const char **domain)
+{
+	if (cred->principal_obtained >= cred->username_obtained) {
+		*domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "");
+		*username = cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, mem_ctx);
+	} else {
+		*domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
+		*username = cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a named file, and parse it for username, domain, realm and password
+ *
+ * @param credentials Credentials structure on which to set the password
+ * @param file a named file to read the details from
+ * @param obtained This enum describes how 'specified' this password is
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_parse_file(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *file, enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	uint16_t len = 0;
+	char *ptr, *val, *param;
+	char **lines;
+	int i, numlines;
+	const char *realm = NULL;
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	const char *username = NULL;
+
+	lines = file_lines_load(file, &numlines, 0, NULL);
+
+	if (lines == NULL)
+	{
+		/* fail if we can't open the credentials file */
+		d_printf("ERROR: Unable to open credentials file!\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < numlines; i++) {
+		len = strlen(lines[i]);
+
+		if (len == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* break up the line into parameter & value.
+		 * will need to eat a little whitespace possibly */
+		param = lines[i];
+		if (!(ptr = strchr_m (lines[i], '=')))
+			continue;
+
+		val = ptr+1;
+		*ptr = '\0';
+
+		/* eat leading white space */
+		while ((*val!='\0') && ((*val==' ') || (*val=='\t')))
+			val++;
+
+		if (strwicmp("password", param) == 0) {
+			password = val;
+		} else if (strwicmp("username", param) == 0) {
+			username = val;
+		} else if (strwicmp("domain", param) == 0) {
+			domain = val;
+		} else if (strwicmp("realm", param) == 0) {
+			realm = val;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * We need to readd '=' in order to let
+		 * the strlen() work in the last loop
+		 * that clears the memory.
+		 */
+		*ptr = '=';
+	}
+
+	if (realm != NULL && strlen(realm) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * only overwrite with a valid string
+		 */
+		cli_credentials_set_realm(cred, realm, obtained);
+	}
+
+	if (domain != NULL && strlen(domain) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * only overwrite with a valid string
+		 */
+		cli_credentials_set_domain(cred, domain, obtained);
+	}
+
+	if (password != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Here we allow "".
+		 */
+		cli_credentials_set_password(cred, password, obtained);
+	}
+
+	if (username != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * The last "username" line takes preference
+		 * if the string also contains domain, realm or
+		 * password.
+		 */
+		cli_credentials_parse_string(cred, username, obtained);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < numlines; i++) {
+		len = strlen(lines[i]);
+		memset(lines[i], 0, len);
+	}
+	talloc_free(lines);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a named file, and parse it for a password
+ *
+ * @param credentials Credentials structure on which to set the password
+ * @param file a named file to read the password from
+ * @param obtained This enum describes how 'specified' this password is
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_parse_password_file(struct cli_credentials *credentials, const char *file, enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	int fd = open(file, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	bool ret;
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error opening password file %s: %s\n",
+				file, strerror(errno));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_parse_password_fd(credentials, fd, obtained);
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Read a file descriptor, and parse it for a password (eg from a file or stdin)
+ *
+ * @param credentials Credentials structure on which to set the password
+ * @param fd open file descriptor to read the password from
+ * @param obtained This enum describes how 'specified' this password is
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_parse_password_fd(struct cli_credentials *credentials,
+				       int fd, enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	char *p;
+	char pass[128];
+
+	if (credentials->password_obtained >= obtained) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	for(p = pass, *p = '\0'; /* ensure that pass is null-terminated */
+		p && p - pass < sizeof(pass) - 1;) {
+		switch (read(fd, p, 1)) {
+		case 1:
+			if (*p != '\n' && *p != '\0') {
+				*++p = '\0'; /* advance p, and null-terminate pass */
+				break;
+			}
+
+			FALL_THROUGH;
+		case 0:
+			if (p - pass) {
+				*p = '\0'; /* null-terminate it, just in case... */
+				p = NULL; /* then force the loop condition to become false */
+				break;
+			}
+
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Error reading password from file descriptor "
+				"%d: empty password\n",
+				fd);
+			return false;
+
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Error reading password from file descriptor %d: %s\n",
+					fd, strerror(errno));
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_password(credentials, pass, obtained);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the SMB signing state to request for a SMB connection.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds          The credentials structure to update.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  signing_state  The signing state to set.
+ *
+ * @param obtained            This way the described signing state was specified.
+ *
+ * @return true if we could set the signing state, false otherwise.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_smb_signing(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+					      enum smb_signing_setting signing_state,
+					      enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= creds->signing_state_obtained) {
+		creds->signing_state_obtained = obtained;
+		creds->signing_state = signing_state;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the SMB signing state from a credentials structure.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds  The credential structure to obtain the SMB signing state
+ *                    from.
+ *
+ * @return The SMB signing state.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ enum smb_signing_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_signing(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->signing_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the SMB IPC signing state to request for a SMB connection.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds          The credentials structure to update.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  signing_state  The signing state to set.
+ *
+ * @param obtained            This way the described signing state was specified.
+ *
+ * @return true if we could set the signing state, false otherwise.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool
+cli_credentials_set_smb_ipc_signing(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+				    enum smb_signing_setting ipc_signing_state,
+				    enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= creds->ipc_signing_state_obtained) {
+		creds->ipc_signing_state_obtained = obtained;
+		creds->ipc_signing_state = ipc_signing_state;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the SMB IPC signing state from a credentials structure.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds  The credential structure to obtain the SMB IPC signing
+ *                    state from.
+ *
+ * @return The SMB signing state.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ enum smb_signing_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_ipc_signing(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->ipc_signing_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the SMB encryption state to request for a SMB connection.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds  The credentials structure to update.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  encryption_state  The encryption state to set.
+ *
+ * @param obtained  This way the described encryption state was specified.
+ *
+ * @return true if we could set the encryption state, false otherwise.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_smb_encryption(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+						 enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state,
+						 enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= creds->encryption_state_obtained) {
+		creds->encryption_state_obtained = obtained;
+		creds->encryption_state = encryption_state;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static const char *obtained_to_str(enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	switch (obtained) {
+	case CRED_UNINITIALISED:
+		return "CRED_UNINITIALISED";
+	case CRED_SMB_CONF:
+		return "CRED_SMB_CONF";
+	case CRED_CALLBACK:
+		return "CRED_CALLBACK";
+	case CRED_GUESS_ENV:
+		return "CRED_GUESS_ENV";
+	case CRED_GUESS_FILE:
+		return "CRED_GUESS_FILE";
+	case CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT:
+		return "CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT";
+	case CRED_SPECIFIED:
+		return "CRED_SPECIFIED";
+	}
+
+	/* Never reached */
+	return "";
+}
+
+static const char *krb5_state_to_str(enum credentials_use_kerberos krb5_state)
+{
+	switch (krb5_state) {
+	case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED:
+		return "CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED";
+	case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED:
+		return "CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED";
+	case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED:
+		return "CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED";
+	}
+
+	/* Never reached */
+	return "";
+}
+
+static const char *krb5_fwd_to_str(enum credentials_krb_forwardable krb5_fwd)
+{
+	switch (krb5_fwd) {
+	case CRED_AUTO_KRB_FORWARDABLE:
+		return "CRED_AUTO_KRB_FORWARDABLE";
+	case CRED_NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE:
+		return "CRED_NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE";
+	case CRED_FORCE_KRB_FORWARDABLE:
+		return "CRED_FORCE_KRB_FORWARDABLE";
+	}
+
+	/* Never reached */
+	return "";
+}
+
+static const char *signing_state_to_str(enum smb_signing_setting signing_state)
+{
+	switch(signing_state) {
+	case SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT";
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT";
+	case SMB_SIGNING_OFF:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_OFF";
+	case SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED";
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED";
+	case SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED:
+		return "SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED";
+	}
+
+	/* Never reached */
+	return "";
+}
+
+static const char *encryption_state_to_str(enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state)
+{
+	switch(encryption_state) {
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT:
+		return "SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT";
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF:
+		return "SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF";
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_IF_REQUIRED:
+		return "SMB_ENCRYPTION_IF_REQUIRED";
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_DESIRED:
+		return "SMB_ENCRYPTION_DESIRED";
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED:
+		return "SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED";
+	}
+
+	/* Never reached */
+	return "";
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_dump(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	DBG_ERR("CLI_CREDENTIALS:\n");
+	DBG_ERR("\n");
+	DBG_ERR("  Username: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->username,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->username_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Workstation: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->workstation,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->workstation_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Domain: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->domain,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->domain_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Password: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->password != NULL ? "*SECRET*" : "NULL",
+		obtained_to_str(creds->password_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Old password: %s\n",
+		creds->old_password != NULL ? "*SECRET*" : "NULL");
+	DBG_ERR("  Password tries: %u\n",
+		creds->password_tries);
+	DBG_ERR("  Realm: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->realm,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->realm_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Principal: %s - %s\n",
+		creds->principal,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->principal_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Salt principal: %s\n",
+		creds->salt_principal);
+	DBG_ERR("  Impersonate principal: %s\n",
+		creds->impersonate_principal);
+	DBG_ERR("  Self service: %s\n",
+		creds->self_service);
+	DBG_ERR("  Target service: %s\n",
+		creds->target_service);
+	DBG_ERR("  Kerberos state: %s - %s\n",
+		krb5_state_to_str(creds->kerberos_state),
+		obtained_to_str(creds->kerberos_state_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Kerberos forwardable ticket: %s\n",
+		krb5_fwd_to_str(creds->krb_forwardable));
+	DBG_ERR("  Signing state: %s - %s\n",
+		signing_state_to_str(creds->signing_state),
+		obtained_to_str(creds->signing_state_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  IPC signing state: %s - %s\n",
+		signing_state_to_str(creds->ipc_signing_state),
+		obtained_to_str(creds->ipc_signing_state_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Encryption state: %s - %s\n",
+		encryption_state_to_str(creds->encryption_state),
+		obtained_to_str(creds->encryption_state_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  Gensec features: %#X\n",
+		creds->gensec_features);
+	DBG_ERR("  Forced sasl mech: %s\n",
+		creds->forced_sasl_mech);
+	DBG_ERR("  CCACHE: %p - %s\n",
+		creds->ccache,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->ccache_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  CLIENT_GSS_CREDS: %p - %s\n",
+		creds->client_gss_creds,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->client_gss_creds_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  SERVER_GSS_CREDS: %p - %s\n",
+		creds->server_gss_creds,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->server_gss_creds_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  KEYTAB: %p - %s\n",
+		creds->keytab,
+		obtained_to_str(creds->keytab_obtained));
+	DBG_ERR("  KVNO: %u\n",
+		creds->kvno);
+	DBG_ERR("\n");
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Obtain the SMB encryption state from a credentials structure.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  creds  The credential structure to obtain the SMB encryption state
+ *                    from.
+ *
+ * @return The SMB signing state.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ enum smb_encryption_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_encryption(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->encryption_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encrypt a data blob using the session key and the negotiated encryption
+ * algorithm
+ *
+ * @param state Credential state, contains the session key and algorithm
+ * @param data Data blob containing the data to be encrypted.
+ *
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS netlogon_creds_session_encrypt(
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *state,
+	DATA_BLOB data)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (data.data == NULL || data.length == 0) {
+		DBG_ERR("Nothing to encrypt "
+			"data.data == NULL or data.length == 0\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Don't crypt an all-zero password it will give away the
+	 * NETLOGON pipe session key .
+	 */
+	if (all_zero(data.data, data.length)) {
+		DBG_ERR("Supplied data all zeros, could leak session key\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	if (state->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		status = netlogon_creds_aes_encrypt(state,
+						    data.data,
+						    data.length);
+	} else if (state->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR) {
+		status = netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(state,
+						      data.data,
+						      data.length);
+	} else {
+		DBG_ERR("Unsupported encryption option negotiated\n");
+		status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.h b/auth/credentials/credentials.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..341c984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.h
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+/*
+   samba -- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Client credentials structure
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2004-2006
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+#ifndef __CREDENTIALS_H__
+#define __CREDENTIALS_H__
+
+#include "../lib/util/time.h"
+#include "../lib/util/data_blob.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/misc.h"
+
+struct cli_credentials;
+struct ccache_container;
+struct tevent_context;
+struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState;
+struct ldb_context;
+struct ldb_message;
+struct loadparm_context;
+struct ccache_container;
+struct gssapi_creds_container;
+struct smb_krb5_context;
+struct keytab_container;
+struct db_context;
+enum smb_signing_setting;
+enum smb_encryption_setting;
+
+/* In order of priority */
+enum credentials_obtained {
+	CRED_UNINITIALISED = 0,  /* We don't even have a guess yet */
+	CRED_SMB_CONF,           /* Current value should be used, which comes from smb.conf */
+	CRED_CALLBACK, 		 /* Callback should be used to obtain value */
+	CRED_GUESS_ENV,	         /* Current value should be used, which was guessed */
+	CRED_GUESS_FILE,	 /* A guess from a file (or file pointed at in env variable) */
+	CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT,    /* Value was obtained from a callback */
+	CRED_SPECIFIED		 /* Was explicitly specified on the command-line */
+};
+
+enum credentials_use_kerberos {
+	/** Sometimes trying kerberos just does 'bad things', so don't */
+	CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED = 0,
+	/** Default, we try kerberos if available */
+	CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED,
+	/** Sometimes administrators are paranoid, so always do kerberos */
+	CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED,
+};
+
+enum credentials_client_protection {
+	CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_DEFAULT = -1,
+	CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_PLAIN = 0,
+	CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_SIGN,
+	CRED_CLIENT_PROTECTION_ENCRYPT,
+};
+
+enum credentials_krb_forwardable {
+	CRED_AUTO_KRB_FORWARDABLE = 0, /* Default, follow library defaults */
+	CRED_NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE,       /* not forwardable */
+	CRED_FORCE_KRB_FORWARDABLE     /* forwardable */
+};
+
+#define CLI_CRED_NTLM2       0x01
+#define CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH 0x02
+#define CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH 0x04
+#define CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH   0x08
+#define CLI_CRED_CLEAR_AUTH  0x10   /* TODO:  Push cleartext auth with this flag */
+
+const char *cli_credentials_get_workstation(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_set_workstation(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     const char *val,
+				     enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_is_anonymous(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init_server(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx);
+void cli_credentials_set_anonymous(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_wrong_password(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_password(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_password_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						      enum credentials_obtained *obtained);
+void cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      const char **username,
+					      const char **domain);
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   int *flags,
+					   DATA_BLOB challenge,
+					   const NTTIME *server_timestamp,
+					   DATA_BLOB target_info,
+					   DATA_BLOB *_lm_response, DATA_BLOB *_nt_response,
+					   DATA_BLOB *_lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *_session_key);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_realm(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_username(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_username_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						      enum credentials_obtained *obtained);
+int cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				     struct smb_krb5_context **smb_krb5_context);
+int cli_credentials_get_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			       struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+			       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+			       struct ccache_container **ccc,
+			       const char **error_string);
+int cli_credentials_get_named_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+				     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				     char *ccache_name,
+				     struct ccache_container **ccc, const char **error_string);
+bool cli_credentials_failed_kerberos_login(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					   const char *principal,
+					   unsigned int *count);
+int cli_credentials_get_keytab(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+			       struct keytab_container **_ktc);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_domain_and_obtained(
+	struct cli_credentials *cred,
+	enum credentials_obtained *obtained);
+struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+void cli_credentials_set_machine_account_pending(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx);
+bool cli_credentials_set_conf(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx);
+char *cli_credentials_get_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+int cli_credentials_get_server_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					 struct gssapi_creds_container **_gcc);
+int cli_credentials_get_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+					 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					 struct gssapi_creds_container **_gcc,
+					 const char **error_string);
+void cli_credentials_set_forced_sasl_mech(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+					  const char *sasl_mech);
+bool cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+					enum credentials_use_kerberos kerberos_state,
+					enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+void cli_credentials_set_krb_forwardable(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+					 enum credentials_krb_forwardable krb_forwardable);
+bool cli_credentials_set_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				const char *val,
+				enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_domain_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 const char *(*domain_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+bool cli_credentials_set_username(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *val, enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_username_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*username_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+bool cli_credentials_set_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				   const char *val,
+				   enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*principal_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+bool cli_credentials_set_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *val,
+				  enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_init_anon(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+void cli_credentials_parse_string(struct cli_credentials *credentials, const char *data, enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+struct samr_Password *cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+struct samr_Password *cli_credentials_get_old_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						      TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+bool cli_credentials_set_realm(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			       const char *val,
+			       enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+void cli_credentials_set_secure_channel_type(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     enum netr_SchannelType secure_channel_type);
+void cli_credentials_set_password_last_changed_time(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							     time_t last_change_time);
+void cli_credentials_set_netlogon_creds(
+	struct cli_credentials *cred,
+	const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *netlogon_creds);
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_krb5_context(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					  struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context);
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_stored_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					      const char *serviceprincipal);
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_machine_account(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx);
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for the machine trust account, from the
+ * secrets.ldb or passed in handle to secrets.tdb (perhaps in CTDB).
+ *
+ * This version is used in parts of the code that can link in the
+ * CTDB dbwrap backend, by passing down the already open handle.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @param db_ctx dbwrap context for secrets.tdb
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_machine_account_db_ctx(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+						    struct db_context *db_ctx);
+
+bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_guess(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			   struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx);
+bool cli_credentials_set_bind_dn(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				 const char *bind_dn);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_bind_dn(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_parse_file(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *file, enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+char *cli_credentials_get_unparsed_name(struct cli_credentials *credentials, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+bool cli_credentials_set_password_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					   const char *(*password_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+enum netr_SchannelType cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+time_t cli_credentials_get_password_last_changed_time(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+void cli_credentials_set_kvno(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			      int kvno);
+bool cli_credentials_set_utf16_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					const DATA_BLOB *password_utf16,
+					enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_old_utf16_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					    const DATA_BLOB *password_utf16);
+void cli_credentials_set_password_will_be_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						  bool val);
+bool cli_credentials_is_password_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_set_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				 const struct samr_Password *nt_hash,
+				 enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_old_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     const struct samr_Password *nt_hash);
+bool cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				       const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+				       const DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key,
+				       const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+				       const DATA_BLOB *nt_session_key,
+				       enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+int cli_credentials_set_keytab_name(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				    const char *keytab_name,
+				    enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_gensec_features(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+					 uint32_t gensec_features,
+					 enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+uint32_t cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+int cli_credentials_set_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+			       const char *name,
+			       enum credentials_obtained obtained,
+			       const char **error_string);
+bool cli_credentials_parse_password_file(struct cli_credentials *credentials, const char *file, enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_parse_password_fd(struct cli_credentials *credentials,
+				       int fd, enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+void cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				       enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+void cli_credentials_set_salt_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *principal);
+void cli_credentials_set_impersonate_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					       const char *principal,
+					       const char *self_service);
+void cli_credentials_set_target_service(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *principal);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_salt_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_impersonate_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_self_service(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_target_service(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+enum credentials_use_kerberos cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+const char *cli_credentials_get_forced_sasl_mech(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+enum credentials_krb_forwardable cli_credentials_get_krb_forwardable(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_secrets(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				     struct ldb_context *ldb,
+				     const char *base,
+				     const char *filter,
+				     char **error_string);
+ int cli_credentials_get_kvno(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_username_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*username_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the client principal for this credentials context.
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval The username set on this context.
+ * @note Return value will never be NULL except by programmer error.
+ */
+char *cli_credentials_get_principal_and_obtained(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, enum credentials_obtained *obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				   const char *val,
+				   enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				  const char *(*principal_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+
+/**
+ * Obtain the 'old' password for this credentials context (used for join accounts).
+ * @param cred credentials context
+ * @retval If set, the cleartext password, otherwise NULL
+ */
+const char *cli_credentials_get_old_password(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+bool cli_credentials_set_old_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				      const char *val,
+				      enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+bool cli_credentials_set_domain_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 const char *(*domain_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+bool cli_credentials_set_realm_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					const char *(*realm_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+bool cli_credentials_set_workstation_callback(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      const char *(*workstation_cb) (struct cli_credentials *));
+
+void cli_credentials_set_callback_data(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				       void *callback_data);
+void *_cli_credentials_callback_data(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+#define cli_credentials_callback_data(_cred, _type) \
+	talloc_get_type_abort(_cli_credentials_callback_data(_cred), _type)
+#define cli_credentials_callback_data_void(_cred) \
+	_cli_credentials_callback_data(_cred)
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_smb_signing(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     enum smb_signing_setting signing_state,
+				     enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+enum smb_signing_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_signing(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_smb_ipc_signing(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					 enum smb_signing_setting ipc_signing_state,
+					 enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+enum smb_signing_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_ipc_signing(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_smb_encryption(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state,
+					enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+enum smb_encryption_setting
+cli_credentials_get_smb_encryption(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+bool cli_credentials_set_cmdline_callbacks(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+void cli_credentials_dump(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+
+/**
+ * Return attached NETLOGON credentials
+ */
+struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred);
+
+NTSTATUS netlogon_creds_session_encrypt(
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *state,
+	DATA_BLOB data);
+
+int cli_credentials_get_aes256_key(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				   struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				   const char *salt,
+				   DATA_BLOB *aes_256);
+
+/**
+ * Kerberos FAST handling
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+							 struct cli_credentials *armor_creds,
+							 bool require_fast_armor);
+
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+
+bool cli_credentials_get_krb5_require_fast_armor(struct cli_credentials *creds);
+
+#endif /* __CREDENTIALS_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_cmdline.c b/auth/credentials/credentials_cmdline.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8c7c18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_cmdline.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005      Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2016      Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/filesys.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+
+static const char *cmdline_get_userpassword(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	const char *name = NULL;
+	char *label = NULL;
+	char *ret = NULL;
+	char pwd[256] = {0};
+	int rc;
+
+	name = cli_credentials_get_unparsed_name(creds, frame);
+	if (name == NULL) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	label = talloc_asprintf(frame, "Password for [%s]:", name);
+	if (label == NULL) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rc = samba_getpass(label, pwd, sizeof(pwd), false, false);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	ret = talloc_strdup(creds, pwd);
+	if (ret == NULL) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	talloc_set_name_const(ret, __location__);
+fail:
+	ZERO_STRUCT(pwd);
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the command line password callback.
+ *
+ * This will set the callback to get the password from the command prompt or
+ * read it from 'stdin'.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  cred   The credential context.
+ *
+ * @return On success true, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool cli_credentials_set_cmdline_callbacks(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If there is no tty, we will try to read the password from
+	 * stdin.
+	 */
+	return cli_credentials_set_password_callback(cred,
+						     cmdline_get_userpassword);
+}
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h b/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cda361e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+   samba -- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Client credentials structure
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2004-2006
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+#ifndef __CREDENTIALS_INTERNAL_H__
+#define __CREDENTIALS_INTERNAL_H__
+
+#include "../lib/util/data_blob.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/misc.h"
+#include "libcli/smb/smb_constants.h"
+
+struct cli_credentials {
+	enum credentials_obtained workstation_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained username_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained password_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained domain_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained realm_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained ccache_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained client_gss_creds_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained principal_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained keytab_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained server_gss_creds_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained signing_state_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained ipc_signing_state_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained encryption_state_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained kerberos_state_obtained;
+	enum credentials_obtained gensec_features_obtained;
+
+	/* Threshold values (essentially a MAX() over a number of the
+	 * above) for the ccache and GSS credentials, to ensure we
+	 * regenerate/pick correctly */
+
+	enum credentials_obtained ccache_threshold;
+	enum credentials_obtained client_gss_creds_threshold;
+
+	const char *workstation;
+	const char *username;
+	const char *password;
+	const char *old_password;
+	const char *domain;
+	const char *realm;
+	const char *principal;
+	char *salt_principal;
+	char *impersonate_principal;
+	char *self_service;
+	char *target_service;
+
+	const char *bind_dn;
+
+	/* Allows authentication from a keytab or similar */
+	struct samr_Password *nt_hash;
+	struct samr_Password *old_nt_hash;
+
+	/* Allows NTLM pass-though authentication */
+	DATA_BLOB lm_response;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_response;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_session_key;
+
+	struct ccache_container *ccache;
+	struct gssapi_creds_container *client_gss_creds;
+	struct keytab_container *keytab;
+	struct gssapi_creds_container *server_gss_creds;
+
+	const char *(*workstation_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+	const char *(*password_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+	const char *(*username_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+	const char *(*domain_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+	const char *(*realm_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+	const char *(*principal_cb) (struct cli_credentials *);
+
+	/* Private handle for the callback routines to use */
+	void *priv_data;
+
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *netlogon_creds;
+	enum netr_SchannelType secure_channel_type;
+	int kvno;
+	time_t password_last_changed_time;
+
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
+
+	/* We are flagged to get machine account details from the
+	 * secrets.ldb when we are asked for a username or password */
+	bool machine_account_pending;
+	struct loadparm_context *machine_account_pending_lp_ctx;
+
+	/* Is this a machine account? */
+	bool machine_account;
+
+	/* Should we be trying to use kerberos? */
+	enum credentials_use_kerberos kerberos_state;
+
+	/* Should we get a forwardable ticket? */
+	enum credentials_krb_forwardable krb_forwardable;
+
+	/* Forced SASL mechanism */
+	char *forced_sasl_mech;
+
+	/* gensec features which should be used for connections */
+	uint32_t gensec_features;
+
+	/* Number of retries left before bailing out */
+	uint32_t password_tries;
+
+	/* Whether any callback is currently running */
+	bool callback_running;
+
+	char winbind_separator;
+
+	bool password_will_be_nt_hash;
+
+	enum smb_signing_setting signing_state;
+
+	enum smb_signing_setting ipc_signing_state;
+
+	enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state;
+
+	/* Credentials to use for FAST */
+	struct cli_credentials *krb5_fast_armor_credentials;
+
+	/* Should we require FAST? */
+	bool krb5_require_fast_armor;
+};
+
+#endif /* __CREDENTIALS_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.c b/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4463401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1581 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Handle user credentials (as regards krb5)
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2005
+   Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "system/gssapi.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_credentials.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_srv_keytab.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_util.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#undef strncasecmp
+
+static void cli_credentials_invalidate_client_gss_creds(
+					struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					enum credentials_obtained obtained);
+
+/* Free a memory ccache */
+static int free_mccache(struct ccache_container *ccc)
+{
+	if (ccc->ccache != NULL) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				ccc->ccache);
+		ccc->ccache = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Free a disk-based ccache */
+static int free_dccache(struct ccache_container *ccc)
+{
+	if (ccc->ccache != NULL) {
+		krb5_cc_close(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+			      ccc->ccache);
+		ccc->ccache = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t smb_gss_krb5_copy_ccache(uint32_t *min_stat,
+					 gss_cred_id_t cred,
+					 struct ccache_container *ccc)
+{
+#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL /* MIT 1.10 */
+	krb5_context context = ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context;
+	krb5_ccache dummy_ccache = NULL;
+	krb5_creds creds = {0};
+	krb5_cc_cursor cursor = NULL;
+	krb5_principal princ = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code code;
+	char *dummy_name;
+	uint32_t maj_stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	dummy_name = talloc_asprintf(ccc,
+				     "MEMORY:gss_krb5_copy_ccache-%p",
+				     &ccc->ccache);
+	if (dummy_name == NULL) {
+		*min_stat = ENOMEM;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a dummy ccache, so we can iterate over the credentials
+	 * and find the default principal for the ccache we want to
+	 * copy. The new ccache needs to be initialized with this
+	 * principal.
+	 */
+	code = krb5_cc_resolve(context, dummy_name, &dummy_ccache);
+	TALLOC_FREE(dummy_name);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		*min_stat = code;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We do not need set a default principal on the temporary dummy
+	 * ccache, as we do consume it at all in this function.
+	 */
+	maj_stat = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(min_stat, cred, dummy_ccache);
+	if (maj_stat != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_close(context, dummy_ccache);
+		return maj_stat;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(context, dummy_ccache, &cursor);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_close(context, dummy_ccache);
+		*min_stat = EINVAL;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_next_cred(context,
+				 dummy_ccache,
+				 &cursor,
+				 &creds);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_close(context, dummy_ccache);
+		*min_stat = EINVAL;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	do {
+		if (creds.ticket_flags & TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH) {
+			krb5_data *tgs;
+
+			tgs = krb5_princ_component(context,
+						   creds.server,
+						   0);
+			if (tgs != NULL && tgs->length >= 1) {
+				int cmp;
+
+				cmp = memcmp(tgs->data,
+					     KRB5_TGS_NAME,
+					     tgs->length);
+				if (cmp == 0 && creds.client != NULL) {
+					princ = creds.client;
+					code = KRB5_CC_END;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
+
+		code = krb5_cc_next_cred(context,
+					 dummy_ccache,
+					 &cursor,
+					 &creds);
+	} while (code == 0);
+
+	if (code == KRB5_CC_END) {
+		krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, dummy_ccache, &cursor);
+		code = 0;
+	}
+	krb5_cc_close(context, dummy_ccache);
+
+	if (code != 0 || princ == NULL) {
+		krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
+		*min_stat = EINVAL;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the default principal for the cache we copy
+	 * into. This is needed to be able that other calls
+	 * can read it with e.g. gss_acquire_cred() or
+	 * krb5_cc_get_principal().
+	 */
+	code = krb5_cc_initialize(context, ccc->ccache, princ);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
+		*min_stat = EINVAL;
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+	krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
+
+#endif /* SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL */
+
+	return gss_krb5_copy_ccache(min_stat,
+				    cred,
+				    ccc->ccache);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				     struct smb_krb5_context **smb_krb5_context)
+{
+	int ret;
+	if (cred->smb_krb5_context) {
+		*smb_krb5_context = cred->smb_krb5_context;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_init_context(cred, lp_ctx,
+				    &cred->smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		cred->smb_krb5_context = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	*smb_krb5_context = cred->smb_krb5_context;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* For most predictable behaviour, this needs to be called directly after the cli_credentials_init(),
+ * otherwise we may still have references to the old smb_krb5_context in a credential cache etc
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_krb5_context(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					  struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context)
+{
+	if (smb_krb5_context == NULL) {
+		talloc_unlink(cred, cred->smb_krb5_context);
+		cred->smb_krb5_context = NULL;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (!talloc_reference(cred, smb_krb5_context)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	cred->smb_krb5_context = smb_krb5_context;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static int cli_credentials_set_from_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					   struct ccache_container *ccache,
+					   enum credentials_obtained obtained,
+					   const char **error_string)
+{
+	bool ok;
+	char *realm;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	char *name;
+
+	if (cred->ccache_obtained > obtained) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				    ccache->ccache, &princ);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to get principal from ccache: %s\n",
+						  smb_get_krb5_error_message(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+									     ret, cred));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_unparse_name(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ, &name);
+	if (ret) {
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to unparse principal from ccache: %s\n",
+						  smb_get_krb5_error_message(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+									     ret, cred));
+		krb5_free_principal(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_principal(cred, name, obtained);
+	krb5_free_unparsed_name(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, name);
+	if (!ok) {
+		krb5_free_principal(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
+		cred, ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+	krb5_free_principal(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+	if (realm == NULL) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_realm(cred, realm, obtained);
+	TALLOC_FREE(realm);
+	if (!ok) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* set the ccache_obtained here, as it just got set to UNINITIALISED by the calls above */
+	cred->ccache_obtained = obtained;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_set_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					const char *name,
+					enum credentials_obtained obtained,
+					const char **error_string)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	struct ccache_container *ccc;
+	if (cred->ccache_obtained > obtained) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ccc = talloc(cred, struct ccache_container);
+	if (!ccc) {
+		(*error_string) = error_message(ENOMEM);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx,
+					       &ccc->smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		(*error_string) = error_message(ret);
+		talloc_free(ccc);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	if (!talloc_reference(ccc, ccc->smb_krb5_context)) {
+		talloc_free(ccc);
+		(*error_string) = error_message(ENOMEM);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (name) {
+		ret = krb5_cc_resolve(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, name, &ccc->ccache);
+		if (ret) {
+			(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to read krb5 ccache: %s: %s\n",
+							  name,
+							  smb_get_krb5_error_message(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+										     ret, ccc));
+			talloc_free(ccc);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ret = krb5_cc_default(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &ccc->ccache);
+		if (ret) {
+			(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to read default krb5 ccache: %s\n",
+							  smb_get_krb5_error_message(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+										     ret, ccc));
+			talloc_free(ccc);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	talloc_set_destructor(ccc, free_dccache);
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccc->ccache, &princ);
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		krb5_free_principal(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+		ret = cli_credentials_set_from_ccache(cred, ccc, obtained, error_string);
+
+		if (ret) {
+			(*error_string) = error_message(ret);
+			TALLOC_FREE(ccc);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cred->ccache = ccc;
+	cred->ccache_obtained = obtained;
+
+	cli_credentials_invalidate_client_gss_creds(
+		cred, cred->ccache_obtained);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
+/*
+ * This function is a workaround for old MIT Kerberos versions which did not
+ * implement the krb5_cc_remove_cred function. It creates a temporary
+ * credentials cache to copy the credentials in the current cache
+ * except the one we want to remove and then overwrites the contents of the
+ * current cache with the temporary copy.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code krb5_cc_remove_cred_wrap(struct ccache_container *ccc,
+						krb5_creds *creds)
+{
+	krb5_ccache dummy_ccache = NULL;
+	krb5_creds cached_creds = {0};
+	krb5_cc_cursor cursor = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code code;
+	char *dummy_name;
+
+	dummy_name = talloc_asprintf(ccc,
+				     "MEMORY:copy_ccache-%p",
+				     &ccc->ccache);
+	if (dummy_name == NULL) {
+		return KRB5_CC_NOMEM;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_resolve(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+			       dummy_name,
+			       &dummy_ccache);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_resolve failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		TALLOC_FREE(dummy_name);
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(dummy_name);
+
+	code = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				     ccc->ccache,
+				     &cursor);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				dummy_ccache);
+
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_start_seq_get failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	while ((code = krb5_cc_next_cred(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					 ccc->ccache,
+					 &cursor,
+					 &cached_creds)) == 0) {
+		/* If the principal matches skip it and do not copy to the
+		 * temporary cache as this is the one we want to remove */
+		if (krb5_principal_compare_flags(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				creds->server,
+				cached_creds.server,
+				0)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		code = krb5_cc_store_cred(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				dummy_ccache,
+				&cached_creds);
+		if (code != 0) {
+			krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					dummy_ccache);
+			DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_store_cred failed: %s\n",
+				smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+					ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					code, ccc));
+			return code;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (code == KRB5_CC_END) {
+		krb5_cc_end_seq_get(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				    dummy_ccache,
+				    &cursor);
+		code = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				dummy_ccache);
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_next_cred failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_initialize(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				  ccc->ccache,
+				  creds->client);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				dummy_ccache);
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_initialize failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_copy_creds(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				  dummy_ccache,
+				  ccc->ccache);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				dummy_ccache);
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_copy_creds failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	code = krb5_cc_destroy(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+			       dummy_ccache);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_destroy failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				code, ccc));
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	return code;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Indicate that we failed to log in to this service/host with these
+ * credentials.  The caller passes an unsigned int which they
+ * initialise to the number of times they would like to retry.
+ *
+ * This method is used to support re-trying with freshly fetched
+ * credentials in case a server is rebuilt while clients have
+ * non-expired tickets. When the client code gets a logon failure they
+ * throw away the existing credentials for the server and retry.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_failed_kerberos_login(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						    const char *principal,
+						    unsigned int *count)
+{
+	struct ccache_container *ccc;
+	krb5_creds creds, creds2;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (principal == NULL) {
+		/* no way to delete if we don't know the principal */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ccc = cred->ccache;
+	if (ccc == NULL) {
+		/* not a kerberos connection */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (*count > 0) {
+		/* We have already tried discarding the credentials */
+		return false;
+	}
+	(*count)++;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(creds);
+	ret = krb5_parse_name(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, principal, &creds.server);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* MIT kerberos requires creds.client to match against cached
+	 * credentials */
+	ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				    ccc->ccache,
+				    &creds.client);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		krb5_free_cred_contents(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					&creds);
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				ret, ccc));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccc->ccache, KRB5_TC_MATCH_SRV_NAMEONLY, &creds, &creds2);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* don't retry - we didn't find these credentials to remove */
+		krb5_free_cred_contents(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &creds);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_remove_cred(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccc->ccache, KRB5_TC_MATCH_SRV_NAMEONLY, &creds);
+#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
+	if (ret == KRB5_CC_NOSUPP) {
+		/* Old MIT kerberos versions did not implement
+		 * krb5_cc_remove_cred */
+		ret = krb5_cc_remove_cred_wrap(ccc, &creds);
+	}
+#endif
+	krb5_free_cred_contents(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &creds);
+	krb5_free_cred_contents(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &creds2);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* don't retry - we didn't find these credentials to
+		 * remove. Note that with the current backend this
+		 * never happens, as it always returns 0 even if the
+		 * creds don't exist, which is why we do a separate
+		 * krb5_cc_retrieve_cred() above.
+		 */
+		DBG_ERR("krb5_cc_remove_cred failed: %s\n",
+			smb_get_krb5_error_message(
+				ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				ret, ccc));
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+
+static int cli_credentials_new_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+				      char *ccache_name,
+				      struct ccache_container **_ccc,
+				      const char **error_string)
+{
+	bool must_free_cc_name = false;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct ccache_container *ccc = talloc(cred, struct ccache_container);
+	if (!ccc) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx,
+					       &ccc->smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		talloc_free(ccc);
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "Failed to get krb5_context: %s",
+						  error_message(ret));
+		return ret;
+	}
+	if (!talloc_reference(ccc, ccc->smb_krb5_context)) {
+		talloc_free(ccc);
+		(*error_string) = strerror(ENOMEM);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (!ccache_name) {
+		must_free_cc_name = true;
+
+		if (lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "credentials", "krb5_cc_file", false)) {
+			ccache_name = talloc_asprintf(ccc, "FILE:/tmp/krb5_cc_samba_%u_%p",
+						      (unsigned int)getpid(), ccc);
+		} else {
+			ccache_name = talloc_asprintf(ccc, "MEMORY:%p",
+						      ccc);
+		}
+
+		if (!ccache_name) {
+			talloc_free(ccc);
+			(*error_string) = strerror(ENOMEM);
+			return ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_resolve(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccache_name,
+			      &ccc->ccache);
+	if (ret) {
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to resolve a krb5 ccache (%s): %s\n",
+						  ccache_name,
+						  smb_get_krb5_error_message(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+									     ret, ccc));
+		talloc_free(ccache_name);
+		talloc_free(ccc);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (strncasecmp(ccache_name, "MEMORY:", 7) == 0) {
+		talloc_set_destructor(ccc, free_mccache);
+	} else {
+		talloc_set_destructor(ccc, free_dccache);
+	}
+
+	if (must_free_cc_name) {
+		talloc_free(ccache_name);
+	}
+
+	*_ccc = ccc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_named_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+					      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					      char *ccache_name,
+					      struct ccache_container **ccc,
+					      const char **error_string)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	enum credentials_obtained obtained;
+
+	if (cred->machine_account_pending) {
+		cli_credentials_set_machine_account(cred, lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (cred->ccache_obtained >= cred->ccache_threshold &&
+	    cred->ccache_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+		time_t lifetime;
+		bool expired = false;
+		ret = smb_krb5_cc_get_lifetime(cred->ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					       cred->ccache->ccache, &lifetime);
+		if (ret == KRB5_CC_END || ret == ENOENT) {
+			/* If we have a particular ccache set, without
+			 * an initial ticket, then assume there is a
+			 * good reason */
+		} else if (ret == 0) {
+			if (lifetime == 0) {
+				DEBUG(3, ("Ticket in credentials cache for %s expired, will refresh\n",
+					  cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred)));
+				expired = true;
+			} else if (lifetime < 300) {
+				DEBUG(3, ("Ticket in credentials cache for %s will shortly expire (%u secs), will refresh\n",
+					  cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred), (unsigned int)lifetime));
+				expired = true;
+			}
+		} else {
+			(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "failed to get ccache lifetime: %s\n",
+							  smb_get_krb5_error_message(cred->ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+										     ret, cred));
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		DEBUG(5, ("Ticket in credentials cache for %s will expire in %u secs\n",
+			  cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred), (unsigned int)lifetime));
+
+		if (!expired) {
+			*ccc = cred->ccache;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (cli_credentials_is_anonymous(cred)) {
+		(*error_string) = "Cannot get anonymous kerberos credentials";
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_new_ccache(cred, lp_ctx, ccache_name, ccc, error_string);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = kinit_to_ccache(cred,
+			      cred,
+			      (*ccc)->smb_krb5_context,
+			      lp_ctx,
+			      event_ctx,
+			      (*ccc)->ccache,
+			      &obtained,
+			      error_string);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_set_from_ccache(cred, *ccc,
+					      obtained, error_string);
+
+	cred->ccache = *ccc;
+	cred->ccache_obtained = cred->principal_obtained;
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+	cli_credentials_invalidate_client_gss_creds(cred, cred->ccache_obtained);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+					struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					struct ccache_container **ccc,
+					const char **error_string)
+{
+	return cli_credentials_get_named_ccache(cred, event_ctx, lp_ctx, NULL, ccc, error_string);
+}
+
+/* We have good reason to think the ccache in these credentials is invalid - blow it away */
+static void cli_credentials_unconditionally_invalidate_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->client_gss_creds_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+		talloc_unlink(cred, cred->client_gss_creds);
+		cred->client_gss_creds = NULL;
+	}
+	cred->client_gss_creds_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+}
+
+void cli_credentials_invalidate_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						 enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	/* If the caller just changed the username/password etc, then
+	 * any cached credentials are now invalid */
+	if (obtained >= cred->client_gss_creds_obtained) {
+		if (cred->client_gss_creds_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+			talloc_unlink(cred, cred->client_gss_creds);
+			cred->client_gss_creds = NULL;
+		}
+		cred->client_gss_creds_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	}
+	/* Now that we know that the data is 'this specified', then
+	 * don't allow something less 'known' to be returned as a
+	 * ccache.  Ie, if the username is on the command line, we
+	 * don't want to later guess to use a file-based ccache */
+	if (obtained > cred->client_gss_creds_threshold) {
+		cred->client_gss_creds_threshold = obtained;
+	}
+}
+
+/* We have good reason to think this CCACHE is invalid.  Blow it away */
+static void cli_credentials_unconditionally_invalidate_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->ccache_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+		talloc_unlink(cred, cred->ccache);
+		cred->ccache = NULL;
+	}
+	cred->ccache_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+
+	cli_credentials_unconditionally_invalidate_client_gss_creds(cred);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_invalidate_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				       enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	/* If the caller just changed the username/password etc, then
+	 * any cached credentials are now invalid */
+	if (obtained >= cred->ccache_obtained) {
+		if (cred->ccache_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+			talloc_unlink(cred, cred->ccache);
+			cred->ccache = NULL;
+		}
+		cred->ccache_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	}
+	/* Now that we know that the data is 'this specified', then
+	 * don't allow something less 'known' to be returned as a
+	 * ccache.  i.e, if the username is on the command line, we
+	 * don't want to later guess to use a file-based ccache */
+	if (obtained > cred->ccache_threshold) {
+		cred->ccache_threshold  = obtained;
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_invalidate_client_gss_creds(cred,
+						    obtained);
+}
+
+static int free_gssapi_creds(struct gssapi_creds_container *gcc)
+{
+	OM_uint32 min_stat;
+	(void)gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &gcc->creds);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						  struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+						  struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+						  struct gssapi_creds_container **_gcc,
+						  const char **error_string)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	struct gssapi_creds_container *gcc;
+	struct ccache_container *ccache;
+#ifdef HAVE_GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X
+	gss_buffer_desc empty_buffer = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_OID oid = discard_const(GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X);
+#endif
+	krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL;
+
+	if (cred->client_gss_creds_obtained >= cred->client_gss_creds_threshold &&
+	    cred->client_gss_creds_obtained > CRED_UNINITIALISED) {
+		bool expired = false;
+		OM_uint32 lifetime = 0;
+		gss_cred_usage_t usage = 0;
+		maj_stat = gss_inquire_cred(&min_stat, cred->client_gss_creds->creds,
+					    NULL, &lifetime, &usage, NULL);
+		if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Credentials for %s expired, must refresh credentials cache\n", cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred)));
+			expired = true;
+		} else if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE && lifetime < 300) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Credentials for %s will expire shortly (%u sec), must refresh credentials cache\n", cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred), lifetime));
+			expired = true;
+		} else if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+			*error_string = talloc_asprintf(cred, "inquiry of credential lifetime via GSSAPI gss_inquire_cred failed: %s\n",
+							gssapi_error_string(cred, maj_stat, min_stat, NULL));
+			return EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (expired) {
+			cli_credentials_unconditionally_invalidate_client_gss_creds(cred);
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(5, ("GSSAPI credentials for %s will expire in %u secs\n",
+				  cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, cred), (unsigned int)lifetime));
+
+			*_gcc = cred->client_gss_creds;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_ccache(cred, event_ctx, lp_ctx,
+					 &ccache, error_string);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(cred) == CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get kerberos credentials (kerberos required): %s\n", *error_string));
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(4, ("Failed to get kerberos credentials: %s\n", *error_string));
+		}
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	gcc = talloc(cred, struct gssapi_creds_container);
+	if (!gcc) {
+		(*error_string) = error_message(ENOMEM);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = smb_gss_krb5_import_cred(&min_stat, ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					    ccache->ccache, NULL, NULL,
+					    &gcc->creds);
+	if ((maj_stat == GSS_S_FAILURE) &&
+	    (min_stat == (OM_uint32)KRB5_CC_END ||
+	     min_stat == (OM_uint32)KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND ||
+	     min_stat == (OM_uint32)KRB5_FCC_NOFILE))
+	{
+		/* This CCACHE is no good.  Ensure we don't use it again */
+		cli_credentials_unconditionally_invalidate_ccache(cred);
+
+		/* Now try again to get a ccache */
+		ret = cli_credentials_get_ccache(cred, event_ctx, lp_ctx,
+						 &ccache, error_string);
+		if (ret) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Failed to re-get CCACHE for GSSAPI client: %s\n", error_message(ret)));
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		maj_stat = smb_gss_krb5_import_cred(&min_stat, ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+						    ccache->ccache, NULL, NULL,
+						    &gcc->creds);
+
+	}
+
+	if (maj_stat) {
+		talloc_free(gcc);
+		if (min_stat) {
+			ret = min_stat;
+		} else {
+			ret = EINVAL;
+		}
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "smb_gss_krb5_import_cred failed: %s", error_message(ret));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	 * transfer the enctypes from the smb_krb5_context to the gssapi layer
+	 *
+	 * We use 'our' smb_krb5_context to do the AS-REQ and it is possible
+	 * to configure the enctypes via the krb5.conf.
+	 *
+	 * And the gss_init_sec_context() creates it's own krb5_context and
+	 * the TGS-REQ had all enctypes in it and only the ones configured
+	 * and used for the AS-REQ, so it wasn't possible to disable the usage
+	 * of AES keys.
+	 */
+	min_stat = smb_krb5_get_allowed_etypes(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					       &etypes);
+	if (min_stat == 0) {
+		OM_uint32 num_ktypes;
+
+		for (num_ktypes = 0; etypes[num_ktypes]; num_ktypes++);
+
+		maj_stat = gss_krb5_set_allowable_enctypes(&min_stat, gcc->creds,
+							   num_ktypes,
+							   (int32_t *) etypes);
+		krb5_free_enctypes(ccache->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				   etypes);
+		if (maj_stat) {
+			talloc_free(gcc);
+			if (min_stat) {
+				ret = min_stat;
+			} else {
+				ret = EINVAL;
+			}
+			(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "gss_krb5_set_allowable_enctypes failed: %s", error_message(ret));
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X
+	/*
+	 * Don't force GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG.
+	 *
+	 * This allows us to disable SIGN and SEAL on a TLS connection with
+	 * GSS-SPNENO. For example ldaps:// connections.
+	 *
+	 * https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/cat-ietf/conversations/topics/575
+	 * http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=6938
+	 */
+	maj_stat = gss_set_cred_option(&min_stat, &gcc->creds,
+				       oid,
+				       &empty_buffer);
+	if (maj_stat) {
+		talloc_free(gcc);
+		if (min_stat) {
+			ret = min_stat;
+		} else {
+			ret = EINVAL;
+		}
+		(*error_string) = talloc_asprintf(cred, "gss_set_cred_option failed: %s", error_message(ret));
+		return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+	cred->client_gss_creds_obtained = cred->ccache_obtained;
+	talloc_set_destructor(gcc, free_gssapi_creds);
+	cred->client_gss_creds = gcc;
+	*_gcc = gcc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+   Set a gssapi cred_id_t into the credentials system. (Client case)
+
+   This grabs the credentials both 'intact' and getting the krb5
+   ccache out of it.  This routine can be generalised in future for
+   the case where we deal with GSSAPI mechs other than krb5.
+
+   On success, the caller must not free gssapi_cred, as it now belongs
+   to the credentials system.
+*/
+
+ int cli_credentials_set_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					  struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					  gss_cred_id_t gssapi_cred,
+					  enum credentials_obtained obtained,
+					  const char **error_string)
+{
+	int ret;
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	struct ccache_container *ccc = NULL;
+	struct gssapi_creds_container *gcc = NULL;
+	if (cred->client_gss_creds_obtained > obtained) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	gcc = talloc(cred, struct gssapi_creds_container);
+	if (!gcc) {
+		(*error_string) = error_message(ENOMEM);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_new_ccache(cred, lp_ctx, NULL, &ccc, error_string);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = smb_gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_stat,
+					    gssapi_cred,
+					    ccc);
+	if (maj_stat) {
+		if (min_stat) {
+			ret = min_stat;
+		} else {
+			ret = EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (ret) {
+			(*error_string) = error_message(ENOMEM);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		ret = cli_credentials_set_from_ccache(cred, ccc, obtained, error_string);
+	}
+	cred->ccache = ccc;
+	cred->ccache_obtained = obtained;
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		gcc->creds = gssapi_cred;
+		talloc_set_destructor(gcc, free_gssapi_creds);
+
+		/* set the client_gss_creds_obtained here, as it just
+		   got set to UNINITIALISED by the calls above */
+		cred->client_gss_creds_obtained = obtained;
+		cred->client_gss_creds = gcc;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cli_credentials_shallow_ccache(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	const struct ccache_container *old_ccc = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained old_obtained;
+	struct ccache_container *ccc = NULL;
+	char *ccache_name = NULL;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+
+	old_obtained = cred->ccache_obtained;
+	old_ccc = cred->ccache;
+	if (old_ccc == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	cred->ccache = NULL;
+	cred->ccache_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	cred->client_gss_creds = NULL;
+	cred->client_gss_creds_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(
+		old_ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+		old_ccc->ccache,
+		&princ);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * This is an empty ccache. No point in copying anything.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	krb5_free_principal(old_ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, princ);
+
+	ccc = talloc(cred, struct ccache_container);
+	if (ccc == NULL) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+	*ccc = *old_ccc;
+	ccc->ccache = NULL;
+
+	ccache_name = talloc_asprintf(ccc, "MEMORY:%p", ccc);
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_resolve(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+			      ccache_name, &ccc->ccache);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(ccc);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	talloc_set_destructor(ccc, free_mccache);
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(ccache_name);
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_cc_copy_creds(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				     old_ccc->ccache, ccc->ccache);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(ccc);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	cred->ccache = ccc;
+	cred->ccache_obtained = old_obtained;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_shallow_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						struct cli_credentials *src)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *dst, *armor_credentials;
+	int ret;
+
+	dst = talloc(mem_ctx, struct cli_credentials);
+	if (dst == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	*dst = *src;
+
+	if (dst->krb5_fast_armor_credentials != NULL) {
+		armor_credentials = talloc_reference(dst, dst->krb5_fast_armor_credentials);
+		if (armor_credentials == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(dst);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_shallow_ccache(dst);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(dst);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return dst;
+}
+
+/* Get the keytab (actually, a container containing the krb5_keytab)
+ * attached to this context.  If this hasn't been done or set before,
+ * it will be generated from the password.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_keytab(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					struct keytab_container **_ktc)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct keytab_container *ktc;
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
+	const char *keytab_name;
+	krb5_keytab keytab;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	const char *username = cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
+	const char *upn = NULL;
+	const char *realm = cli_credentials_get_realm(cred);
+	char *salt_principal = NULL;
+	uint32_t uac_flags = 0;
+
+	if (cred->keytab_obtained >= (MAX(cred->principal_obtained,
+					  cred->username_obtained))) {
+		*_ktc = cred->keytab;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (cli_credentials_is_anonymous(cred)) {
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx,
+					       &smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(cred);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	switch (cred->secure_channel_type) {
+	case SEC_CHAN_WKSTA:
+	case SEC_CHAN_RODC:
+		uac_flags = UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+		break;
+	case SEC_CHAN_BDC:
+		uac_flags = UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+		break;
+	case SEC_CHAN_DOMAIN:
+	case SEC_CHAN_DNS_DOMAIN:
+		uac_flags = UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		upn = cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, mem_ctx);
+		if (upn == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
+			return ENOMEM;
+		}
+		uac_flags = UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_salt_principal_str(realm,
+					  username, /* sAMAccountName */
+					  upn, /* userPrincipalName */
+					  uac_flags,
+					  mem_ctx,
+					  &salt_principal);
+	if (ret) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_create_memory_keytab(mem_ctx,
+					    smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					    cli_credentials_get_password(cred),
+					    username,
+					    realm,
+					    salt_principal,
+					    cli_credentials_get_kvno(cred),
+					    &keytab,
+					    &keytab_name);
+	if (ret) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_get_keytab_container(mem_ctx, smb_krb5_context,
+					    keytab, keytab_name, &ktc);
+	if (ret) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	cred->keytab_obtained = (MAX(cred->principal_obtained,
+				     cred->username_obtained));
+
+	/* We make this keytab up based on a password.  Therefore
+	 * match-by-key is acceptable, we can't match on the wrong
+	 * principal */
+	ktc->password_based = true;
+
+	talloc_steal(cred, ktc);
+	cred->keytab = ktc;
+	*_ktc = cred->keytab;
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given the name of a keytab (presumably in the format
+ * FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab), open it and attach it */
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_set_keytab_name(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					     const char *keytab_name,
+					     enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct keytab_container *ktc;
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+
+	if (cred->keytab_obtained >= obtained) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx, &smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(cred);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_get_keytab_container(mem_ctx, smb_krb5_context,
+					    NULL, keytab_name, &ktc);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	cred->keytab_obtained = obtained;
+
+	talloc_steal(cred, ktc);
+	cred->keytab = ktc;
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Get server gss credentials (in gsskrb5, this means the keytab) */
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_server_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						  struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+						  struct gssapi_creds_container **_gcc)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	struct gssapi_creds_container *gcc;
+	struct keytab_container *ktc;
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	const char *error_string;
+	enum credentials_obtained obtained;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(cred);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx, &smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = principal_from_credentials(mem_ctx, cred, smb_krb5_context, &princ, &obtained, &error_string);
+	if (ret) {
+		DEBUG(1,("cli_credentials_get_server_gss_creds: making krb5 principal failed (%s)\n",
+			 error_string));
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (cred->server_gss_creds_obtained >= (MAX(cred->keytab_obtained, obtained))) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*_gcc = cred->server_gss_creds;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_keytab(cred, lp_ctx, &ktc);
+	if (ret) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get keytab for GSSAPI server: %s\n", error_message(ret)));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	gcc = talloc(cred, struct gssapi_creds_container);
+	if (!gcc) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (ktc->password_based || obtained < CRED_SPECIFIED) {
+		/*
+		 * This creates a GSSAPI cred_id_t for match-by-key with only
+		 * the keytab set
+		 */
+		princ = NULL;
+	}
+	maj_stat = smb_gss_krb5_import_cred(&min_stat,
+					    smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+					    NULL, princ,
+					    ktc->keytab,
+					    &gcc->creds);
+	if (maj_stat) {
+		if (min_stat) {
+			ret = min_stat;
+		} else {
+			ret = EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		cred->server_gss_creds_obtained = cred->keytab_obtained;
+		talloc_set_destructor(gcc, free_gssapi_creds);
+		cred->server_gss_creds = gcc;
+		*_gcc = gcc;
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set Kerberos KVNO
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_kvno(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+			      int kvno)
+{
+	cred->kvno = kvno;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return Kerberos KVNO
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_kvno(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->kvno;
+}
+
+
+const char *cli_credentials_get_salt_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->salt_principal;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_salt_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *principal)
+{
+	talloc_free(cred->salt_principal);
+	cred->salt_principal = talloc_strdup(cred, principal);
+}
+
+/* The 'impersonate_principal' is used to allow one Kerberos principal
+ * (and it's associated keytab etc) to impersonate another.  The
+ * ability to do this is controlled by the KDC, but it is generally
+ * permitted to impersonate anyone to yourself.  This allows any
+ * member of the domain to get the groups of a user.  This is also
+ * known as S4U2Self */
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_impersonate_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->impersonate_principal;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The 'self_service' is the service principal that
+ * represents the same object (by its objectSid)
+ * as the client principal (typically our machine account).
+ * When trying to impersonate 'impersonate_principal' with
+ * S4U2Self.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const char *cli_credentials_get_self_service(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->self_service;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_impersonate_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							const char *principal,
+							const char *self_service)
+{
+	talloc_free(cred->impersonate_principal);
+	cred->impersonate_principal = talloc_strdup(cred, principal);
+	talloc_free(cred->self_service);
+	cred->self_service = talloc_strdup(cred, self_service);
+	cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(cred,
+					   CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED,
+					   CRED_SPECIFIED);
+}
+
+/*
+ * when impersonating for S4U2proxy we need to set the target principal.
+ * Similarly, we may only be authorized to do general impersonation to
+ * some particular services.
+ *
+ * Likewise, password changes typically require a ticket to kpasswd/realm directly, not via a TGT
+ *
+ * NULL means that tickets will be obtained for the krbtgt service.
+*/
+
+const char *cli_credentials_get_target_service(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->target_service;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_target_service(struct cli_credentials *cred, const char *target_service)
+{
+	talloc_free(cred->target_service);
+	cred->target_service = talloc_strdup(cred, target_service);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ int cli_credentials_get_aes256_key(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					    const char *salt,
+					    DATA_BLOB *aes_256)
+{
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
+	int ret;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	krb5_data cleartext_data;
+	krb5_data salt_data = {
+		.length = 0,
+	};
+	krb5_keyblock key;
+
+	if (cred->password_will_be_nt_hash) {
+		DEBUG(1,("cli_credentials_get_aes256_key: cannot generate AES256 key using NT hash\n"));
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
+	if (password == NULL) {
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password);
+	cleartext_data.length = strlen(password);
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_krb5_context(cred, lp_ctx,
+					       &smb_krb5_context);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	salt_data.data = discard_const_p(char, salt);
+	salt_data.length = strlen(salt);
+
+	/*
+	 * create ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 key out of
+	 * the salt and the cleartext password
+	 */
+	krb5_ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+						   NULL,
+						   &salt_data,
+						   &cleartext_data,
+						   ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+						   &key);
+	if (krb5_ret != 0) {
+		DEBUG(1,("cli_credentials_get_aes256_key: "
+			 "generation of a aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 key failed: %s\n",
+			 smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+						    krb5_ret, mem_ctx)));
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+	*aes_256 = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
+				    KRB5_KEY_DATA(&key),
+				    KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&key));
+	krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key);
+	if (aes_256->data == NULL) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+	talloc_keep_secret(aes_256->data);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This take a reference to the armor credentials to ensure the lifetime is appropriate */
+
+NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+							 struct cli_credentials *armor_creds,
+							 bool require_fast_armor)
+{
+	talloc_unlink(creds, creds->krb5_fast_armor_credentials);
+	if (armor_creds == NULL) {
+		creds->krb5_fast_armor_credentials = NULL;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	creds->krb5_fast_armor_credentials = talloc_reference(creds, armor_creds);
+	if (creds->krb5_fast_armor_credentials == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	creds->krb5_require_fast_armor = require_fast_armor;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->krb5_fast_armor_credentials;
+}
+
+bool cli_credentials_get_krb5_require_fast_armor(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return creds->krb5_require_fast_armor;
+}
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h b/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae60104
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* 
+   samba -- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Client credentials structure
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2004-2006
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef __CREDENTIALS_KRB5_H__
+#define __CREDENTIALS_KRB5_H__
+
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+struct gssapi_creds_container {
+	gss_cred_id_t creds;
+};
+
+/* Manually prototyped here to avoid needing gss headers in most callers */
+int cli_credentials_set_client_gss_creds(struct cli_credentials *cred, 
+					 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					 gss_cred_id_t gssapi_cred,
+					 enum credentials_obtained obtained,
+					 const char **error_string);
+
+struct cli_credentials *cli_credentials_shallow_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						struct cli_credentials *src);
+
+
+#endif /* __CREDENTIALS_KRB5_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c b/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a018be1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   User credentials handling
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2005
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   int *flags,
+					   DATA_BLOB challenge,
+					   const NTTIME *server_timestamp,
+					   DATA_BLOB target_info,
+					   DATA_BLOB *_lm_response, DATA_BLOB *_nt_response,
+					   DATA_BLOB *_lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *_session_key)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	const char *user = NULL;
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_response = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob_null;
+	const struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (cred->kerberos_state == CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+	}
+
+	/* We may already have an NTLM response we prepared earlier.
+	 * This is used for NTLM pass-though authentication */
+	if (cred->nt_response.data || cred->lm_response.data) {
+		if (cred->nt_response.length != 0) {
+			nt_response = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+							   cred->nt_response);
+			if (nt_response.data == NULL) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+		if (cred->nt_session_key.length != 0) {
+			session_key = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+							   cred->nt_session_key);
+			if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+		if (cred->lm_response.length != 0) {
+			lm_response = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+							   cred->lm_response);
+			if (lm_response.data == NULL) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+		if (cred->lm_session_key.length != 0) {
+			lm_session_key = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+							      cred->lm_session_key);
+			if (lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (cred->lm_response.data == NULL) {
+			*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+		}
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	nt_hash = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(cred, frame);
+
+	cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(cred, frame, &user, &domain);
+	if (user == NULL) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	if (domain == NULL) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* If we are sending a username@realm login (see function
+	 * above), then we will not send LM, it will not be
+	 * accepted */
+	if (cred->principal_obtained > cred->username_obtained) {
+		*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+	}
+
+	/* Likewise if we are a machine account (avoid protocol downgrade attacks) */
+	if (cred->machine_account) {
+		*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+	}
+
+	if (!nt_hash) {
+		/* do nothing - blobs are zero length */
+
+		/* session key is all zeros */
+		session_key = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 16);
+		if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 16);
+		if (lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		/* not doing NTLM2 without a password */
+		*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_NTLM2;
+	} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH) {
+
+		if (!target_info.length) {
+			/* be lazy, match win2k - we can't do NTLMv2 without it */
+			DEBUG(1, ("Server did not provide 'target information', required for NTLMv2\n"));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		/* TODO: if the remote server is standalone, then we should replace 'domain'
+		   with the server name as supplied above */
+
+		if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(frame,
+					   user,
+					   domain,
+					   nt_hash->hash, &challenge,
+					   server_timestamp, &target_info,
+					   &lm_response, &nt_response,
+					   NULL, &session_key)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		/* LM Key is incompatible... */
+		*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+		if (lm_response.length != 0) {
+			/*
+			 * We should not expose the lm key.
+			 */
+			memset(lm_response.data, 0, lm_response.length);
+		}
+	} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM2) {
+		uint8_t session_nonce[16];
+		uint8_t session_nonce_hash[16];
+		uint8_t user_session_key[16];
+
+		lm_response = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 24);
+		if (lm_response.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		generate_random_buffer(lm_response.data, 8);
+
+		memcpy(session_nonce, challenge.data, 8);
+		memcpy(&session_nonce[8], lm_response.data, 8);
+
+		rc = gnutls_hash_fast(GNUTLS_DIG_MD5,
+				      session_nonce,
+				      sizeof(session_nonce),
+				      session_nonce_hash);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP challenge set by NTLM2\n"));
+		DEBUG(5, ("challenge is: \n"));
+		dump_data(5, session_nonce_hash, 8);
+
+		nt_response = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 24);
+		if (nt_response.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		rc = SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash,
+				   session_nonce_hash,
+                                   nt_response.data);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
+		}
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(session_nonce_hash);
+
+		session_key = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 16);
+		if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, user_session_key);
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      user_session_key,
+				      sizeof(user_session_key),
+				      session_nonce,
+				      sizeof(session_nonce),
+				      session_key.data);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(user_session_key);
+
+		dump_data_pw("NTLM2 session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+
+		/* LM Key is incompatible... */
+		*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+	} else {
+		const char *password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
+		uint8_t lm_hash[16];
+		bool do_lm = false;
+
+		nt_response = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 24);
+		if (nt_response.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		rc = SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash, challenge.data,
+				   nt_response.data);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
+		}
+
+		session_key = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 16);
+		if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, session_key.data);
+		dump_data_pw("NT session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+
+		/* lanman auth is insecure, it may be disabled.
+		   We may also not have a password */
+
+		if (password != NULL) {
+			do_lm = E_deshash(password, lm_hash);
+		}
+
+		if (*flags & CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH && do_lm) {
+			lm_response = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 24);
+			if (lm_response.data == NULL) {
+				ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+
+			rc = SMBencrypt_hash(lm_hash,
+					     challenge.data,
+					     lm_response.data);
+			if (rc != 0) {
+				ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* just copy the nt_response */
+			lm_response = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame, nt_response);
+			if (lm_response.data == NULL) {
+				ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (do_lm) {
+			lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc_zero(frame, 16);
+			if (lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+				ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
+				TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			memcpy(lm_session_key.data, lm_hash, 8);
+
+			if (!(*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH)) {
+				memcpy(session_key.data, lm_session_key.data, 16);
+			}
+			ZERO_STRUCT(lm_hash);
+		}
+	}
+
+done:
+	if (_lm_response != NULL) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_response.data);
+		*_lm_response = lm_response;
+	} else {
+		data_blob_clear(&lm_response);
+	}
+	if (_nt_response != NULL) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, nt_response.data);
+		*_nt_response = nt_response;
+	} else {
+		data_blob_clear(&nt_response);
+	}
+	if (_lm_session_key != NULL) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_session_key.data);
+		*_lm_session_key = lm_session_key;
+	} else {
+		data_blob_clear(&lm_session_key);
+	}
+	if (_session_key != NULL) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, session_key.data);
+		*_session_key = session_key;
+	} else {
+		data_blob_clear(&session_key);
+	}
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a utf16 password on the credentials context, including an indication
+ * of 'how' the password was obtained
+ *
+ * This is required because the nt_hash is calculated over the raw utf16 blob,
+ * which might not be completely valid utf16, which means the conversion
+ * from CH_UTF16MUNGED to CH_UTF8 might lose information.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_utf16_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						 const DATA_BLOB *password_utf16,
+						 enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	cred->password_will_be_nt_hash = false;
+
+	if (password_utf16 == NULL) {
+		return cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, obtained);
+	}
+
+	if (obtained >= cred->password_obtained) {
+		struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+		char *password_talloc = NULL;
+		size_t password_len = 0;
+		bool ok;
+
+		nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+		if (nt_hash == NULL) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		ok = convert_string_talloc(cred,
+					   CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
+					   password_utf16->data,
+					   password_utf16->length,
+					   &password_talloc,
+					   &password_len);
+		if (!ok) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		ok = cli_credentials_set_password(cred, password_talloc, obtained);
+		TALLOC_FREE(password_talloc);
+		if (!ok) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		mdfour(nt_hash->hash, password_utf16->data, password_utf16->length);
+		cred->nt_hash = nt_hash;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a old utf16 password on the credentials context.
+ *
+ * This is required because the nt_hash is calculated over the raw utf16 blob,
+ * which might not be completely valid utf16, which means the conversion
+ * from CH_UTF16MUNGED to CH_UTF8 might lose information.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_old_utf16_password(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						     const DATA_BLOB *password_utf16)
+{
+	struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+	char *password_talloc = NULL;
+	size_t password_len = 0;
+	bool ok;
+
+	if (password_utf16 == NULL) {
+		return cli_credentials_set_old_password(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+	if (nt_hash == NULL) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ok = convert_string_talloc(cred,
+				   CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
+				   password_utf16->data,
+				   password_utf16->length,
+				   &password_talloc,
+				   &password_len);
+	if (!ok) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_old_password(cred, password_talloc, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	TALLOC_FREE(password_talloc);
+	if (!ok) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	mdfour(nt_hash->hash, password_utf16->data, password_utf16->length);
+	cred->old_nt_hash = nt_hash;
+	return true;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_password_will_be_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							   bool val)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We set this here and the next cli_credentials_set_password()
+	 * that resets the password or password callback
+	 * will pick this up.
+	 *
+	 * cli_credentials_set_nt_hash() and
+	 * cli_credentials_set_utf16_password() will reset this
+	 * to false.
+	 */
+	cred->password_will_be_nt_hash = val;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_is_password_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+{
+	return cred->password_will_be_nt_hash;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+				 const struct samr_Password *nt_hash,
+				 enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	cred->password_will_be_nt_hash = false;
+
+	if (obtained >= cred->password_obtained) {
+		cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, obtained);
+		if (nt_hash) {
+			cred->nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+			if (cred->nt_hash == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+			*cred->nt_hash = *nt_hash;
+		} else {
+			cred->nt_hash = NULL;
+		}
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_old_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      const struct samr_Password *nt_hash)
+{
+	cli_credentials_set_old_password(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	if (nt_hash) {
+		cred->old_nt_hash = talloc(cred, struct samr_Password);
+		if (cred->old_nt_hash == NULL) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		*cred->old_nt_hash = *nt_hash;
+	} else {
+		cred->old_nt_hash = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+						const DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key,
+						const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+						const DATA_BLOB *nt_session_key,
+						enum credentials_obtained obtained)
+{
+	if (obtained >= cred->password_obtained) {
+		cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, obtained);
+
+		data_blob_clear_free(&cred->lm_response);
+		data_blob_clear_free(&cred->lm_session_key);
+		data_blob_clear_free(&cred->nt_response);
+		data_blob_clear_free(&cred->nt_session_key);
+
+		if (lm_response != NULL && lm_response->length != 0) {
+			cred->lm_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+							lm_response->data,
+							lm_response->length);
+			if (cred->lm_response.data == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+		if (lm_session_key != NULL && lm_session_key->length != 0) {
+			cred->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+							lm_session_key->data,
+							lm_session_key->length);
+			if (cred->lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (nt_response != NULL && nt_response->length != 0) {
+			cred->nt_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+							nt_response->data,
+							nt_response->length);
+			if (cred->nt_response.data == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+		if (nt_session_key != NULL && nt_session_key->length != 0) {
+			cred->nt_session_key = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+							nt_session_key->data,
+							nt_session_key->length);
+			if (cred->nt_session_key.data == NULL) {
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_secrets.c b/auth/credentials/credentials_secrets.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8469d6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_secrets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   User credentials handling (as regards on-disk files)
+
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2005
+   Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "lib/events/events.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+#include "param/secrets.h"
+#include "system/filesys.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_util.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "lib/events/events.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "source3/include/secrets.h"
+#include "dbwrap/dbwrap.h"
+#include "dbwrap/dbwrap_open.h"
+#include "lib/util/util_tdb.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for the machine trust account, from the secrets database.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+static NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_secrets_lct(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+						struct ldb_context *ldb,
+						const char *base,
+						const char *filter,
+						time_t secrets_tdb_last_change_time,
+						const char *secrets_tdb_password,
+						char **error_string)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+
+	int ldb_ret;
+	struct ldb_message *msg;
+
+	const char *machine_account;
+	const char *password;
+	const char *domain;
+	const char *realm;
+	enum netr_SchannelType sct;
+	const char *salt_principal;
+	char *keytab;
+	const struct ldb_val *whenChanged;
+	time_t lct;
+
+	/* ok, we are going to get it now, don't recurse back here */
+	cred->machine_account_pending = false;
+
+	/* some other parts of the system will key off this */
+	cred->machine_account = true;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_named(cred, 0, "cli_credentials_set_secrets from ldb");
+
+	if (!ldb) {
+		/* Local secrets are stored in secrets.ldb */
+		ldb = secrets_db_connect(mem_ctx, lp_ctx);
+		if (!ldb) {
+			*error_string = talloc_strdup(cred, "Could not open secrets.ldb");
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(ldb, mem_ctx, &msg,
+				  ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, ldb, base),
+				  LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+				  NULL, 0, "%s", filter);
+
+	if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		*error_string = talloc_asprintf(cred, "Could not find entry to match filter: '%s' base: '%s': %s: %s",
+						filter, base ? base : "",
+						ldb_strerror(ldb_ret), ldb_errstring(ldb));
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
+	}
+
+	password = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "secret", NULL);
+
+	whenChanged = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "whenChanged");
+	if (!whenChanged || ldb_val_to_time(whenChanged, &lct) != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		/* This attribute is mandatory */
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't set secrets.ldb info if the secrets.tdb entry was more recent */
+	if (lct < secrets_tdb_last_change_time) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+	}
+
+	if ((lct == secrets_tdb_last_change_time) &&
+	    (secrets_tdb_password != NULL) &&
+	    (password != NULL) &&
+	    (strcmp(password, secrets_tdb_password) != 0)) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_password_last_changed_time(cred, lct);
+
+	machine_account = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+
+	if (!machine_account) {
+		machine_account = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL);
+
+		if (!machine_account) {
+			const char *ldap_bind_dn = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "ldapBindDn", NULL);
+			if (!ldap_bind_dn) {
+				*error_string = talloc_asprintf(cred,
+								"Could not find 'samAccountName', "
+								"'servicePrincipalName' or "
+								"'ldapBindDn' in secrets record: %s",
+								ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
+				talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+				return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
+			} else {
+				/* store bind dn in credentials */
+				cli_credentials_set_bind_dn(cred, ldap_bind_dn);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	salt_principal = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "saltPrincipal", NULL);
+	cli_credentials_set_salt_principal(cred, salt_principal);
+
+	sct = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "secureChannelType", 0);
+	if (sct) {
+		cli_credentials_set_secure_channel_type(cred, sct);
+	}
+
+	if (!password) {
+		const struct ldb_val *nt_password_hash = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "unicodePwd");
+		struct samr_Password hash;
+		ZERO_STRUCT(hash);
+		if (nt_password_hash) {
+			memcpy(hash.hash, nt_password_hash->data,
+			       MIN(nt_password_hash->length, sizeof(hash.hash)));
+
+			cli_credentials_set_nt_hash(cred, &hash, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		} else {
+			cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		}
+	} else {
+		cli_credentials_set_password(cred, password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	domain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "flatname", NULL);
+	if (domain) {
+		cli_credentials_set_domain(cred, domain, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	realm = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "realm", NULL);
+	if (realm) {
+		cli_credentials_set_realm(cred, realm, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	if (machine_account) {
+		cli_credentials_set_username(cred, machine_account, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_kvno(cred, ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0));
+
+	/* If there was an external keytab specified by reference in
+	 * the LDB, then use this.  Otherwise we will make one up
+	 * (chewing CPU time) from the password */
+	keytab = keytab_name_from_msg(cred, ldb, msg);
+	if (keytab) {
+		cli_credentials_set_keytab_name(cred, lp_ctx, keytab, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		talloc_free(keytab);
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for the machine trust account, from the secrets database.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_secrets(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					      struct ldb_context *ldb,
+					      const char *base,
+					      const char *filter,
+					      char **error_string)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status = cli_credentials_set_secrets_lct(cred, lp_ctx, ldb, base, filter, 0, NULL, error_string);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		/* set anonymous as the fallback, if the machine account won't work */
+		cli_credentials_set_anonymous(cred);
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for the machine trust account, from the secrets database.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_machine_account(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	struct db_context *db_ctx;
+	char *secrets_tdb_path;
+	int hash_size, tdb_flags;
+
+	secrets_tdb_path = lpcfg_private_db_path(cred, lp_ctx, "secrets");
+	if (secrets_tdb_path == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	hash_size = lpcfg_tdb_hash_size(lp_ctx, secrets_tdb_path);
+	tdb_flags = lpcfg_tdb_flags(lp_ctx, TDB_DEFAULT);
+
+	db_ctx = dbwrap_local_open(
+		cred,
+		secrets_tdb_path,
+		hash_size,
+		tdb_flags,
+		O_RDWR,
+		0600,
+		DBWRAP_LOCK_ORDER_1,
+		DBWRAP_FLAG_NONE);
+	TALLOC_FREE(secrets_tdb_path);
+
+	/*
+	 * We do not check for errors here, we might not have a
+	 * secrets.tdb at all, and so we just need to check the
+	 * secrets.ldb
+	 */
+	return cli_credentials_set_machine_account_db_ctx(cred, lp_ctx, db_ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for the machine trust account, from the
+ * secrets.ldb or passed in handle to secrets.tdb (perhaps in CTDB).
+ *
+ * This version is used in parts of the code that can link in the
+ * CTDB dbwrap backend, by passing down the already open handle.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @param db_ctx dbwrap context for secrets.tdb
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_machine_account_db_ctx(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+							     struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+							     struct db_context *db_ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	char *filter;
+	char *error_string = NULL;
+	const char *domain;
+	bool secrets_tdb_password_more_recent;
+	time_t secrets_tdb_lct = 0;
+	char *secrets_tdb_password = NULL;
+	char *secrets_tdb_old_password = NULL;
+	uint32_t secrets_tdb_secure_channel_type = SEC_CHAN_NULL;
+	int server_role = lpcfg_server_role(lp_ctx);
+	int security = lpcfg_security(lp_ctx);
+	char *keystr;
+	char *keystr_upper = NULL;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_named(cred, 0, "cli_credentials_set_secrets from ldb");
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* Bleh, nasty recursion issues: We are setting a machine
+	 * account here, so we don't want the 'pending' flag around
+	 * any more */
+	cred->machine_account_pending = false;
+
+	/* We have to do this, as the fallback in
+	 * cli_credentials_set_secrets is to run as anonymous, so the domain is wiped */
+	domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
+
+	if (db_ctx) {
+		TDB_DATA dbuf;
+		keystr = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/%s",
+					 SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME,
+					 domain);
+		keystr_upper = strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx, keystr);
+		status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, tmp_ctx, string_tdb_data(keystr_upper),
+				      &dbuf);
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) && dbuf.dsize == 4) {
+			secrets_tdb_lct = IVAL(dbuf.dptr,0);
+		}
+
+		keystr = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/%s",
+					 SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD,
+					 domain);
+		keystr_upper = strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx, keystr);
+		status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, tmp_ctx, string_tdb_data(keystr_upper),
+				      &dbuf);
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			secrets_tdb_password = (char *)dbuf.dptr;
+		}
+
+		keystr = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/%s",
+					 SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD_PREV,
+					 domain);
+		keystr_upper = strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx, keystr);
+		status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, tmp_ctx, string_tdb_data(keystr_upper),
+				      &dbuf);
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			secrets_tdb_old_password = (char *)dbuf.dptr;
+		}
+
+		keystr = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/%s",
+					 SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE,
+					 domain);
+		keystr_upper = strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx, keystr);
+		status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, tmp_ctx, string_tdb_data(keystr_upper),
+				      &dbuf);
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) && dbuf.dsize == 4) {
+			secrets_tdb_secure_channel_type = IVAL(dbuf.dptr,0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	filter = talloc_asprintf(cred, SECRETS_PRIMARY_DOMAIN_FILTER, 
+				 domain);
+	status = cli_credentials_set_secrets_lct(cred, lp_ctx, NULL,
+						 SECRETS_PRIMARY_DOMAIN_DN,
+						 filter, secrets_tdb_lct, secrets_tdb_password, &error_string);
+	if (secrets_tdb_password == NULL) {
+		secrets_tdb_password_more_recent = false;
+	} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO, status)
+	    || NT_STATUS_EQUAL(NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, status)) {
+		secrets_tdb_password_more_recent = true;
+	} else if (secrets_tdb_lct > cli_credentials_get_password_last_changed_time(cred)) {
+		secrets_tdb_password_more_recent = true;
+	} else if (secrets_tdb_lct == cli_credentials_get_password_last_changed_time(cred)) {
+		secrets_tdb_password_more_recent = strcmp(secrets_tdb_password, cli_credentials_get_password(cred)) != 0;
+	} else {
+		secrets_tdb_password_more_recent = false;
+	}
+
+	if (secrets_tdb_password_more_recent) {
+		enum credentials_use_kerberos use_kerberos =
+			CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED;
+		char *machine_account = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s$", lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx));
+		cli_credentials_set_password(cred, secrets_tdb_password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		cli_credentials_set_old_password(cred, secrets_tdb_old_password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		cli_credentials_set_domain(cred, domain, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		if (strequal(domain, lpcfg_workgroup(lp_ctx))) {
+			cli_credentials_set_realm(cred, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+			switch (server_role) {
+			case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER:
+				if (security != SEC_ADS) {
+					break;
+				}
+
+				FALL_THROUGH;
+			case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC:
+			case ROLE_IPA_DC:
+				use_kerberos = CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(cred,
+						   use_kerberos,
+						   CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		cli_credentials_set_username(cred, machine_account, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+		cli_credentials_set_password_last_changed_time(cred, secrets_tdb_lct);
+		cli_credentials_set_secure_channel_type(cred, secrets_tdb_secure_channel_type);
+		status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		if (db_ctx) {
+			error_string
+				= talloc_asprintf(cred,
+						  "Failed to fetch machine account password for %s from both "
+						  "secrets.ldb (%s) and from %s",
+						  domain,
+						  error_string == NULL ? "error" : error_string,
+						  dbwrap_name(db_ctx));
+		} else {
+			char *secrets_tdb_path;
+
+			secrets_tdb_path = lpcfg_private_db_path(tmp_ctx,
+								 lp_ctx,
+								 "secrets");
+			if (secrets_tdb_path == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+
+			error_string = talloc_asprintf(cred,
+						       "Failed to fetch machine account password from "
+						       "secrets.ldb: %s and failed to open %s",
+						       error_string == NULL ? "error" : error_string,
+						       secrets_tdb_path);
+		}
+		DEBUG(1, ("Could not find machine account in secrets database: %s: %s\n",
+			  error_string == NULL ? "error" : error_string,
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		/* set anonymous as the fallback, if the machine account won't work */
+		cli_credentials_set_anonymous(cred);
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fill in credentials for a particular principal, from the secrets database.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @retval NTSTATUS error detailing any failure
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_set_stored_principal(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+					      struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					      const char *serviceprincipal)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	char *filter;
+	char *error_string = NULL;
+	/* Bleh, nasty recursion issues: We are setting a machine
+	 * account here, so we don't want the 'pending' flag around
+	 * any more */
+	cred->machine_account_pending = false;
+	filter = talloc_asprintf(cred, SECRETS_PRINCIPAL_SEARCH,
+				 cli_credentials_get_realm(cred),
+				 cli_credentials_get_domain(cred),
+				 serviceprincipal);
+	status = cli_credentials_set_secrets_lct(cred, lp_ctx, NULL,
+					     SECRETS_PRINCIPALS_DN, filter,
+					     0, NULL, &error_string);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Could not find %s principal in secrets database: %s: %s\n",
+			  serviceprincipal, nt_errstr(status),
+			  error_string ? error_string : "<no error>"));
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ask that when required, the credentials system will be filled with
+ * machine trust account, from the secrets database.
+ *
+ * @param cred Credentials structure to fill in
+ * @note This function is used to call the above function after, rather
+ *       than during, popt processing.
+ *
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_set_machine_account_pending(struct cli_credentials *cred,
+						 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
+{
+	cred->machine_account_pending = true;
+	cred->machine_account_pending_lp_ctx = lp_ctx;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/auth/credentials/pycredentials.c b/auth/credentials/pycredentials.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a27e02d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/pycredentials.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1768 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org> 2007
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "lib/replace/system/python.h"
+#include "python/py3compat.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "python/modules.h"
+#include "pycredentials.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samr_Password */
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/util/pyerrors.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/pyparam.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include "libcli/smb/smb_constants.h"
+
+void initcredentials(void);
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_new(PyTypeObject *type, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwargs)
+{
+	return pytalloc_steal(type, cli_credentials_init(NULL));
+}
+
+static PyObject *PyCredentials_from_cli_credentials(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return pytalloc_reference(&PyCredentials, creds);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_username(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_username(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_username(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_username(creds, newval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_ntlm_username_domain(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	const char *user = NULL;
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+	PyObject *ret = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(creds,
+						 frame, &user, &domain);
+	ret = Py_BuildValue("(ss)",
+			    user,
+			    domain);
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_ntlm_response(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwargs)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	PyObject *ret = NULL;
+	int flags;
+	struct timeval tv_now;
+	NTTIME server_timestamp;
+	DATA_BLOB challenge = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB target_info = data_blob_null;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_response = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_session_key = data_blob_null;
+	const char *kwnames[] = { "flags", "challenge",
+				  "target_info",
+				  NULL };
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	tv_now = timeval_current();
+	server_timestamp = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now);
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwargs, "is#|s#",
+					 discard_const_p(char *, kwnames),
+					 &flags,
+					 &challenge.data,
+					 &challenge.length,
+					 &target_info.data,
+					 &target_info.length)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(creds,
+						   frame, &flags,
+						   challenge,
+						   &server_timestamp,
+						   target_info,
+						   &lm_response, &nt_response,
+						   &lm_session_key, &nt_session_key);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		PyErr_SetNTSTATUS(status);
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ret = Py_BuildValue("{sis" PYARG_BYTES_LEN "s" PYARG_BYTES_LEN
+			            "s" PYARG_BYTES_LEN "s" PYARG_BYTES_LEN "}",
+			    "flags", flags,
+			    "lm_response",
+			    (const char *)lm_response.data, lm_response.length,
+			    "nt_response",
+			    (const char *)nt_response.data, nt_response.length,
+			    "lm_session_key",
+			    (const char *)lm_session_key.data, lm_session_key.length,
+			    "nt_session_key",
+			    (const char *)nt_session_key.data, nt_session_key.length);
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_principal(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	PyObject *ret = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret = PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_principal(creds, frame));
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_principal(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_principal(creds, newval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_password(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	const char *newval = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	PyObject *result = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, PYARG_STR_UNI"|i", "utf8", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	result = PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_password(creds, newval, obt));
+	PyMem_Free(discard_const_p(void*, newval));
+	return result;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_utf16_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	PyObject *newval = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_null;
+	Py_ssize_t size =  0;
+	int result;
+	bool ok;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	result = PyBytes_AsStringAndSize(newval, (char **)&blob.data, &size);
+	if (result != 0) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError, "Failed to convert passed value to Bytes");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	blob.length = size;
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_utf16_password(creds,
+						&blob, obt);
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(ok);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_old_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_old_password(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_old_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *oldval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &oldval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_old_password(creds, oldval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_old_utf16_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *oldval = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_null;
+	Py_ssize_t size =  0;
+	int result;
+	bool ok;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O", &oldval)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	result = PyBytes_AsStringAndSize(oldval, (char **)&blob.data, &size);
+	if (result != 0) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError, "Failed to convert passed value to Bytes");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	blob.length = size;
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_old_utf16_password(creds,
+						    &blob);
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(ok);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_domain(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_domain(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_domain(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_domain(creds, newval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_realm(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_realm(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_realm(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_realm(creds, newval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_bind_dn(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_bind_dn(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_bind_dn(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "z", &newval))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_bind_dn(creds, newval));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_workstation(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_workstation(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_workstation(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_workstation(creds, newval, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_is_anonymous(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_is_anonymous(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_anonymous(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cli_credentials_set_anonymous(creds);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_authentication_requested(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+        return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_authentication_requested(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_wrong_password(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+         return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_wrong_password(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_cmdline_callbacks(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+        return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_cmdline_callbacks(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_parse_string(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, newval, obt);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_parse_file(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|i", &newval, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	cli_credentials_parse_file(creds, newval, obt);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_cli_credentials_set_password_will_be_nt_hash(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	PyObject *py_val = NULL;
+	bool val = false;
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O!", &PyBool_Type, &py_val)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	val = PyObject_IsTrue(py_val);
+
+	cli_credentials_set_password_will_be_nt_hash(creds, val);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_nt_hash(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	PyObject *ret;
+	struct samr_Password *ntpw = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ntpw = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(creds, creds);
+
+	ret = PyBytes_FromStringAndSize(discard_const_p(char, ntpw->hash), 16);
+	TALLOC_FREE(ntpw);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_nt_hash(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *py_cp = Py_None;
+	const struct samr_Password *pwd = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O|i", &py_cp, &_obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	if (!py_check_dcerpc_type(py_cp, "samba.dcerpc.samr", "Password")) {
+		/* py_check_dcerpc_type sets TypeError */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	pwd = pytalloc_get_type(py_cp, struct samr_Password);
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+		/* pytalloc_get_type sets TypeError */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return PyBool_FromLong(cli_credentials_set_nt_hash(creds, pwd, obt));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_kerberos_state(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	int state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state = cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(creds);
+	return PyLong_FromLong(state);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_kerberos_state(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	int state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i", &state))
+		return NULL;
+
+	cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(creds, state, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_krb_forwardable(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	int state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i", &state))
+		return NULL;
+
+	cli_credentials_set_krb_forwardable(creds, state);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_forced_sasl_mech(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return PyString_FromStringOrNULL(cli_credentials_get_forced_sasl_mech(creds));
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_forced_sasl_mech(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	char *newval;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s", &newval)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_forced_sasl_mech(creds, newval);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_conf(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "|O", &py_lp_ctx)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_conf(creds, lp_ctx);
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	if (!ok) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_guess(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "|O", &py_lp_ctx))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_guess(creds, lp_ctx);
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	if (!ok) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_machine_account(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "|O", &py_lp_ctx))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(creds, lp_ctx);
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	PyErr_NTSTATUS_IS_ERR_RAISE(status);
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *PyCredentialCacheContainer_from_ccache_container(struct ccache_container *ccc)
+{
+	return pytalloc_reference(&PyCredentialCacheContainer, ccc);
+}
+
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_named_ccache(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	char *ccache_name = NULL;
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	struct ccache_container *ccc;
+	struct tevent_context *event_ctx;
+	int ret;
+	const char *error_string;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "|Os", &py_lp_ctx, &ccache_name))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	event_ctx = samba_tevent_context_init(mem_ctx);
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_get_named_ccache(creds, event_ctx, lp_ctx,
+					       ccache_name, &ccc, &error_string);
+	talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, lp_ctx);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		talloc_steal(ccc, event_ctx);
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return PyCredentialCacheContainer_from_ccache_container(ccc);
+	}
+
+	PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError, error_string?error_string:"NULL");
+
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_named_ccache(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+	const char *error_string = NULL;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
+	char *newval = NULL;
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	int _obt = obt;
+	int ret;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|iO", &newval, &_obt, &py_lp_ctx))
+		return NULL;
+	obt = _obt;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ret = cli_credentials_set_ccache(creds,
+					 lp_ctx,
+					 newval, obt,
+					 &error_string);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+				error_string != NULL ? error_string : "NULL");
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_gensec_features(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	unsigned int gensec_features;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "I", &gensec_features))
+		return NULL;
+
+	cli_credentials_set_gensec_features(creds,
+					    gensec_features,
+					    CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_gensec_features(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	unsigned int gensec_features;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(creds);
+	return PyLong_FromLong(gensec_features);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_new_client_authenticator(PyObject *self,
+						   PyObject *args)
+{
+	struct netr_Authenticator auth;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *nc = NULL;
+	PyObject *ret = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+				"Failed to get credentials from python");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	nc = creds->netlogon_creds;
+	if (nc == NULL) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
+				"No netlogon credentials cannot make "
+				"client authenticator");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(nc, &auth);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
+				"Failed to create client authenticator");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ret = Py_BuildValue("{s"PYARG_BYTES_LEN"si}",
+			    "credential",
+			    (const char *) &auth.cred, sizeof(auth.cred),
+			    "timestamp", auth.timestamp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_secure_channel_type(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	unsigned int channel_type;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "I", &channel_type))
+		return NULL;
+
+	cli_credentials_set_secure_channel_type(
+		creds,
+		channel_type);
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_secure_channel_type(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	enum netr_SchannelType channel_type = SEC_CHAN_NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	channel_type = cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(creds);
+
+	return PyLong_FromLong(channel_type);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_aes256_key(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
+	PyObject *py_lp_ctx = Py_None;
+	const char *salt = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB aes_256;
+	int code;
+	PyObject *ret = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s|O", &salt, &py_lp_ctx))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+	if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
+		PyErr_NoMemory();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	lp_ctx = lpcfg_from_py_object(mem_ctx, py_lp_ctx);
+	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	code = cli_credentials_get_aes256_key(creds,
+					      mem_ctx,
+					      lp_ctx,
+					      salt,
+					      &aes_256);
+	if (code != 0) {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+				"Failed to generate AES256 key");
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ret = PyBytes_FromStringAndSize((const char *)aes_256.data,
+					aes_256.length);
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_encrypt_netr_crypt_password(PyObject *self,
+						      PyObject *args)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB data = data_blob_null;
+	struct cli_credentials    *creds  = NULL;
+	struct netr_CryptPassword *pwd    = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	PyObject *py_cp = Py_None;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O", &py_cp)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	pwd = pytalloc_get_type(py_cp, struct netr_CryptPassword);
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+		/* pytalloc_get_type sets TypeError */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	data.length = sizeof(struct netr_CryptPassword);
+	data.data   = (uint8_t *)pwd;
+	status = netlogon_creds_session_encrypt(creds->netlogon_creds, data);
+
+	PyErr_NTSTATUS_IS_ERR_RAISE(status);
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_encrypt_samr_password(PyObject *self,
+						PyObject *args)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB data = data_blob_null;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds  = NULL;
+	struct samr_Password   *pwd    = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	PyObject *py_cp = Py_None;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (creds->netlogon_creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "NetLogon credentials not set");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O", &py_cp)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!py_check_dcerpc_type(py_cp, "samba.dcerpc.samr", "Password")) {
+		/* py_check_dcerpc_type sets TypeError */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	pwd = pytalloc_get_type(py_cp, struct samr_Password);
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+		/* pytalloc_get_type sets TypeError */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	data = data_blob_const(pwd->hash, sizeof(pwd->hash));
+	status = netlogon_creds_session_encrypt(creds->netlogon_creds, data);
+
+	PyErr_NTSTATUS_IS_ERR_RAISE(status);
+
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_smb_signing(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	enum smb_signing_setting signing_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	signing_state = cli_credentials_get_smb_signing(creds);
+	return PyLong_FromLong(signing_state);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_smb_signing(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	enum smb_signing_setting signing_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i|i", &signing_state, &obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	switch (signing_state) {
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_OFF:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED:
+		break;
+	default:
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Invalid signing state value");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_smb_signing(creds, signing_state, obt);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_smb_ipc_signing(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	enum smb_signing_setting signing_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	signing_state = cli_credentials_get_smb_ipc_signing(creds);
+	return PyLong_FromLong(signing_state);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_smb_ipc_signing(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	enum smb_signing_setting signing_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i|i", &signing_state, &obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	switch (signing_state) {
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_OFF:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED:
+	case SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED:
+		break;
+	default:
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Invalid signing state value");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_set_smb_ipc_signing(creds, signing_state, obt);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_smb_encryption(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	encryption_state = cli_credentials_get_smb_encryption(creds);
+	return PyLong_FromLong(encryption_state);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_smb_encryption(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	enum smb_encryption_setting encryption_state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained obt = CRED_SPECIFIED;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i|i", &encryption_state, &obt)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	switch (encryption_state) {
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT:
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF:
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_IF_REQUIRED:
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_DESIRED:
+	case SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED:
+		break;
+	default:
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Invalid encryption state value");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	(void)cli_credentials_set_smb_encryption(creds, encryption_state, obt);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	struct cli_credentials *fast_creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	fast_creds = cli_credentials_get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(creds);
+	if (fast_creds == NULL) {
+		Py_RETURN_NONE;
+	}
+
+	return PyCredentials_from_cli_credentials(fast_creds);
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	PyObject *pyfast_creds;
+	struct cli_credentials *fast_creds = NULL;
+	int fast_armor_required = 0;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "Op", &pyfast_creds, &fast_armor_required)) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pyfast_creds == Py_None) {
+		fast_creds = NULL;
+	} else {
+		fast_creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(pyfast_creds);
+		if (fast_creds == NULL) {
+			PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	status = cli_credentials_set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(creds,
+								 fast_creds,
+								 fast_armor_required);
+
+	PyErr_NTSTATUS_IS_ERR_RAISE(status);
+	Py_RETURN_NONE;
+}
+
+static PyObject *py_creds_get_krb5_require_fast_armor(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	bool krb5_fast_armor_required;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(self);
+	if (creds == NULL) {
+		PyErr_Format(PyExc_TypeError, "Credentials expected");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	krb5_fast_armor_required = cli_credentials_get_krb5_require_fast_armor(creds);
+	return PyBool_FromLong(krb5_fast_armor_required);
+}
+
+static PyMethodDef py_creds_methods[] = {
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_username",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_username,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_username() -> username\nObtain username.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_username",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_username,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_username(name[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change username.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_principal",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_principal,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_principal() -> user@realm\nObtain user principal.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_principal",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_principal,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_principal(name[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change principal.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_password() -> password\n"
+			    "Obtain password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_ntlm_username_domain",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_ntlm_username_domain,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_ntlm_username_domain() -> (domain, username)\n"
+			    "Obtain NTLM username and domain, split up either as (DOMAIN, user) or (\"\", \"user@realm\").",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_ntlm_response",
+		.ml_meth  = PY_DISCARD_FUNC_SIG(PyCFunction,
+						py_creds_get_ntlm_response),
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS | METH_KEYWORDS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_ntlm_response"
+		            "(flags, challenge[, target_info]) -> "
+			    "(flags, lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, nt_session_key)\n"
+			    "Obtain LM or NTLM response.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_password(password[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_utf16_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_utf16_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_utf16_password(password[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_old_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_old_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_old_password() -> password\n"
+			    "Obtain old password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_old_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_old_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_old_password(password[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change old password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_old_utf16_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_old_utf16_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_old_utf16_password(password[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change old password.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_domain",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_domain,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_domain() -> domain\n"
+			    "Obtain domain name.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_domain",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_domain,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_domain(domain[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change domain name.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_realm",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_realm,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_realm() -> realm\n"
+			    "Obtain realm name.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_realm",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_realm,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_realm(realm[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Change realm name.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_bind_dn",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_bind_dn,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_bind_dn() -> bind dn\n"
+			    "Obtain bind DN.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_bind_dn",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_bind_dn,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_bind_dn(bind_dn) -> None\n"
+			    "Change bind DN.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "is_anonymous",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_is_anonymous,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_anonymous",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_anonymous,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_anonymous() -> None\n"
+			    "Use anonymous credentials.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_workstation",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_workstation,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_workstation",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_workstation,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "authentication_requested",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_authentication_requested,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "wrong_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_wrong_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.wrong_password() -> bool\n"
+			    "Indicate the returned password was incorrect.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_cmdline_callbacks",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_cmdline_callbacks,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_cmdline_callbacks() -> bool\n"
+			    "Use command-line to obtain credentials not explicitly set.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "parse_string",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_parse_string,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.parse_string(text[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Parse credentials string.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "parse_file",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_parse_file,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.parse_file(filename[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> None\n"
+			    "Parse credentials file.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_password_will_be_nt_hash",
+		.ml_meth  = py_cli_credentials_set_password_will_be_nt_hash,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_password_will_be_nt_hash(bool) -> None\n"
+			    "Alters the behaviour of S.set_password() "
+			    "to expect the NTHASH as hexstring.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_nt_hash",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_nt_hash,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_nt_hash",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_nt_hash,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc = "S.set_net_sh(samr_Password[, credentials.SPECIFIED]) -> bool\n"
+			"Change NT hash.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_kerberos_state",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_kerberos_state,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_kerberos_state",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_kerberos_state,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_krb_forwardable",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_krb_forwardable,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_conf",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_conf,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "guess",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_guess,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_machine_account",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_machine_account,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_named_ccache",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_named_ccache,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_named_ccache",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_named_ccache,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_named_ccache(krb5_ccache_name, obtained, lp) -> None\n"
+			    "Set credentials to KRB5 Credentials Cache (by name).",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_gensec_features",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_gensec_features,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_gensec_features",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_gensec_features,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_forced_sasl_mech",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_forced_sasl_mech,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_forced_sasl_mech() -> SASL mechanism\nObtain forced SASL mechanism.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_forced_sasl_mech",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_forced_sasl_mech,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_forced_sasl_mech(name) -> None\n"
+			    "Set forced SASL mechanism.",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "new_client_authenticator",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_new_client_authenticator,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.new_client_authenticator() -> Authenticator\n"
+			    "Get a new client NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR"},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_secure_channel_type",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_secure_channel_type,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_secure_channel_type",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_secure_channel_type,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_aes256_key",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_aes256_key,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_aes256_key(salt[, lp]) -> bytes\n"
+			    "Generate an AES256 key using the current password and\n"
+			    "the specified salt",
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "encrypt_netr_crypt_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_encrypt_netr_crypt_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.encrypt_netr_crypt_password(password) -> None\n"
+			    "Encrypt the supplied password using the session key and\n"
+			    "the negotiated encryption algorithm in place\n"
+			    "i.e. it overwrites the original data"},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "encrypt_samr_password",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_encrypt_samr_password,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.encrypt_samr_password(password) -> None\n"
+			    "Encrypt the supplied password using the session key and\n"
+			    "the negotiated encryption algorithm in place\n"
+			    "i.e. it overwrites the original data"
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_smb_signing",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_smb_signing,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_smb_signing",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_smb_signing,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_smb_ipc_signing",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_smb_ipc_signing,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_smb_ipc_signing",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_smb_ipc_signing,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_smb_encryption",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_smb_encryption,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_smb_encryption",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_smb_encryption,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_krb5_fast_armor_credentials() -> Credentials\n"
+			    "Get the Kerberos FAST credentials set on this credentials object"
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials,
+		.ml_flags = METH_VARARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.set_krb5_fast_armor_credentials(credentials, required) -> None\n"
+			    "Set Kerberos FAST credentials for this credentials object, and if FAST armoring must be used."
+	},
+	{
+		.ml_name  = "get_krb5_require_fast_armor",
+		.ml_meth  = py_creds_get_krb5_require_fast_armor,
+		.ml_flags = METH_NOARGS,
+		.ml_doc   = "S.get_krb5_fast_armor() -> bool\n"
+			    "Indicate if Kerberos FAST armor is required"
+	},
+	{ .ml_name = NULL }
+};
+
+static struct PyModuleDef moduledef = {
+    PyModuleDef_HEAD_INIT,
+    .m_name = "credentials",
+    .m_doc = "Credentials management.",
+    .m_size = -1,
+    .m_methods = py_creds_methods,
+};
+
+PyTypeObject PyCredentials = {
+	.tp_name = "credentials.Credentials",
+	.tp_new = py_creds_new,
+	.tp_flags = Py_TPFLAGS_DEFAULT | Py_TPFLAGS_BASETYPE,
+	.tp_methods = py_creds_methods,
+};
+
+static PyObject *py_ccache_name(PyObject *self, PyObject *unused)
+{
+	struct ccache_container *ccc = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	PyObject *py_name = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	ccc = pytalloc_get_type(self, struct ccache_container);
+
+	ret = krb5_cc_get_full_name(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+				    ccc->ccache, &name);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		py_name = PyString_FromStringOrNULL(name);
+		krb5_free_string(ccc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, name);
+	} else {
+		PyErr_SetString(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+				"Failed to get ccache name");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return py_name;
+}
+
+static PyMethodDef py_ccache_container_methods[] = {
+	{ "get_name", py_ccache_name, METH_NOARGS,
+	  "S.get_name() -> name\nObtain KRB5 credentials cache name." },
+	{0}
+};
+
+PyTypeObject PyCredentialCacheContainer = {
+	.tp_name = "credentials.CredentialCacheContainer",
+	.tp_flags = Py_TPFLAGS_DEFAULT,
+	.tp_methods = py_ccache_container_methods,
+};
+
+MODULE_INIT_FUNC(credentials)
+{
+	PyObject *m;
+	if (pytalloc_BaseObject_PyType_Ready(&PyCredentials) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (pytalloc_BaseObject_PyType_Ready(&PyCredentialCacheContainer) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	m = PyModule_Create(&moduledef);
+	if (m == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "UNINITIALISED", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_UNINITIALISED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_CONF", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_SMB_CONF));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CALLBACK", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_CALLBACK));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "GUESS_ENV", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_GUESS_ENV));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "GUESS_FILE", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_GUESS_FILE));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CALLBACK_RESULT", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SPECIFIED", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_SPECIFIED));
+
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "AUTO_USE_KERBEROS", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "DONT_USE_KERBEROS", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "MUST_USE_KERBEROS", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED));
+
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "AUTO_KRB_FORWARDABLE",  PyLong_FromLong(CRED_AUTO_KRB_FORWARDABLE));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE",    PyLong_FromLong(CRED_NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "FORCE_KRB_FORWARDABLE", PyLong_FromLong(CRED_FORCE_KRB_FORWARDABLE));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CLI_CRED_NTLM2", PyLong_FromLong(CLI_CRED_NTLM2));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH", PyLong_FromLong(CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH", PyLong_FromLong(CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH", PyLong_FromLong(CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CLI_CRED_CLEAR_AUTH", PyLong_FromLong(CLI_CRED_CLEAR_AUTH));
+
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_SIGNING_OFF", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_SIGNING_OFF));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_SIGNING_DESIRED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED));
+
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_ENCRYPTION_OFF));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_ENCRYPTION_IF_REQUIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_ENCRYPTION_IF_REQUIRED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_ENCRYPTION_DESIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_ENCRYPTION_DESIRED));
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED", PyLong_FromLong(SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED));
+
+	Py_INCREF(&PyCredentials);
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "Credentials", (PyObject *)&PyCredentials);
+	Py_INCREF(&PyCredentialCacheContainer);
+	PyModule_AddObject(m, "CredentialCacheContainer", (PyObject *)&PyCredentialCacheContainer);
+	return m;
+}
diff --git a/auth/credentials/pycredentials.h b/auth/credentials/pycredentials.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf6962c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/pycredentials.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Samba utility functions
+   Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org> 2008
+   
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+#ifndef _PYCREDENTIALS_H_
+#define _PYCREDENTIALS_H_
+
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "librpc/rpc/pyrpc_util.h"
+#include <pytalloc.h>
+
+extern PyTypeObject PyCredentials;
+extern PyTypeObject PyCredentialCacheContainer;
+#define PyCredentials_Check(py_obj)					\
+	py_check_dcerpc_type(py_obj, "samba.credentials", "Credentials")
+
+#define PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(py_obj)				\
+	(PyCredentials_Check(py_obj) ?					\
+	 pytalloc_get_type(py_obj, struct cli_credentials) : NULL)
+
+#define cli_credentials_from_py_object(py_obj)			 \
+	((py_obj == Py_None) ?					 \
+	 cli_credentials_init_anon(NULL) :			 \
+	 PyCredentials_AsCliCredentials(py_obj))
+
+#endif /*  _PYCREDENTIALS_H_ */
diff --git a/auth/credentials/samba-credentials.pc.in b/auth/credentials/samba-credentials.pc.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d25bf5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/samba-credentials.pc.in
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+libdir=@libdir@
+includedir=@includedir@
+modulesdir=${prefix}/modules/gensec
+
+Name: samba-credentials
+Description: Credentials management
+Requires: samba-util ndr
+Version: @PACKAGE_VERSION@
+Libs: @LIB_RPATH@ -L${libdir} -lsamba-credentials
+Cflags: -I${includedir}  -DHAVE_IMMEDIATE_STRUCTURES=1
diff --git a/auth/credentials/tests/bind.py b/auth/credentials/tests/bind.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ce81b73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/tests/bind.py
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+# This is unit with tests for LDAP access checks
+
+import optparse
+import sys
+import base64
+import copy
+
+sys.path.insert(0, "bin/python")
+import samba
+from samba.tests.subunitrun import SubunitOptions, TestProgram
+
+import samba.getopt as options
+
+from ldb import SCOPE_BASE, SCOPE_SUBTREE, LdbError, ERR_INVALID_CREDENTIALS
+
+from samba import gensec
+import samba.tests
+from samba.tests import delete_force
+from samba.credentials import Credentials
+
+def create_credential(lp, other):
+    c = Credentials()
+    c.guess(lp)
+    c.set_gensec_features(other.get_gensec_features())
+    return c
+
+parser = optparse.OptionParser("bind [options] <host>")
+sambaopts = options.SambaOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(sambaopts)
+
+# use command line creds if available
+credopts = options.CredentialsOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(credopts)
+subunitopts = SubunitOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(subunitopts)
+opts, args = parser.parse_args()
+
+if len(args) < 1:
+    parser.print_usage()
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+host = args[0]
+lp = sambaopts.get_loadparm()
+creds = credopts.get_credentials(lp)
+creds.set_gensec_features(creds.get_gensec_features() | gensec.FEATURE_SEAL)
+
+creds_machine = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_virtual = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user1 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user2 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user3 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user4 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user5 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user6 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+creds_user7 = create_credential(lp, creds)
+
+class BindTests(samba.tests.TestCase):
+
+    info_dc = None
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super(BindTests, self).setUp()
+        # fetch rootDSEs
+
+        self.ldb = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds, lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+
+        if self.info_dc is None:
+            res = self.ldb.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+            self.assertEqual(len(res), 1)
+            BindTests.info_dc = res[0]
+        # cache some of RootDSE props
+        self.schema_dn = self.info_dc["schemaNamingContext"][0]
+        self.domain_dn = self.info_dc["defaultNamingContext"][0]
+        self.config_dn = self.info_dc["configurationNamingContext"][0]
+        self.realm = self.info_dc["ldapServiceName"][0].split(b'@')[1].decode('utf-8')
+        self.computer_dn = "CN=centos53,CN=Computers,%s" % self.domain_dn
+        self.virtual_user_dn = "CN=frednurk@%s,CN=Computers,%s" % (self.realm, self.domain_dn)
+        self.password = "P@ssw0rd"
+        self.username = "BindTestUser"
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        delete_force(self.ldb, self.virtual_user_dn)
+        super(BindTests, self).tearDown()
+
+    def test_virtual_email_account_style_bind(self):
+        # create a user in the style often deployed for authentication
+        # of virtual email account at a hosting provider
+        #
+        # The userPrincipalName must not match the samAccountName for
+        # this test to detect when the LDAP DN is being double-parsed
+        # but must be in the user@realm style to allow the account to
+        # be created
+        try:
+            self.ldb.add_ldif("""
+dn: """ + self.virtual_user_dn + """
+cn: frednurk@""" + self.realm + """
+displayName: Fred Nurk
+sAMAccountName: frednurk@""" + self.realm + """
+userPrincipalName: frednurk@NOT.""" + self.realm + """
+countryCode: 0
+objectClass: computer
+objectClass: organizationalPerson
+objectClass: person
+objectClass: top
+objectClass: user
+""")
+        except LdbError as e:
+            (num, msg) = e.args
+            self.fail(f"Failed to create e-mail user: {msg}")
+
+        self.addCleanup(delete_force, self.ldb, self.virtual_user_dn)
+        try:
+            self.ldb.modify_ldif("""
+dn: """ + self.virtual_user_dn + """
+changetype: modify
+replace: unicodePwd
+unicodePwd:: """ + base64.b64encode(u"\"P@ssw0rd\"".encode('utf-16-le')).decode('utf8') + """
+""")
+        except LdbError as e:
+            (num, msg) = e.args
+            self.fail(f"Failed to set password on e-mail user: {msg}")
+
+        self.ldb.enable_account('distinguishedName=%s' % self.virtual_user_dn)
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the machine account
+        creds_virtual.set_bind_dn(self.virtual_user_dn)
+        creds_virtual.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_virtual.get_bind_dn())
+        try:
+            ldb_virtual = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_virtual,
+                                                    lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        except LdbError as e:
+            (num, msg) = e.args
+            if num != ERR_INVALID_CREDENTIALS:
+                raise
+            self.fail(msg)
+
+        res = ldb_virtual.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+    def test_computer_account_bind(self):
+        # create a computer acocount for the test
+        delete_force(self.ldb, self.computer_dn)
+        self.ldb.add_ldif("""
+dn: """ + self.computer_dn + """
+cn: CENTOS53
+displayName: CENTOS53$
+name: CENTOS53
+sAMAccountName: CENTOS53$
+countryCode: 0
+objectClass: computer
+objectClass: organizationalPerson
+objectClass: person
+objectClass: top
+objectClass: user
+codePage: 0
+userAccountControl: 4096
+dNSHostName: centos53.alabala.test
+operatingSystemVersion: 5.2 (3790)
+operatingSystem: Windows Server 2003
+""")
+        self.ldb.modify_ldif("""
+dn: """ + self.computer_dn + """
+changetype: modify
+replace: unicodePwd
+unicodePwd:: """ + base64.b64encode(u"\"P@ssw0rd\"".encode('utf-16-le')).decode('utf8') + """
+""")
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the machine account
+        creds_machine.set_bind_dn(self.computer_dn)
+        creds_machine.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_machine.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_machine = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_machine,
+                                                lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_machine.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+    def test_user_account_bind(self):
+        # create user
+        self.ldb.newuser(username=self.username, password=self.password)
+        ldb_res = self.ldb.search(base=self.domain_dn,
+                                  scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                                  expression="(samAccountName=%s)" % self.username,
+                                  attrs=["objectSid"])
+        self.assertEqual(len(ldb_res), 1)
+        user_dn = ldb_res[0]["dn"]
+        self.addCleanup(delete_force, self.ldb, user_dn)
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the user account in format user@realm
+        creds_user1.set_bind_dn(self.username + "@" + creds.get_realm())
+        creds_user1.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user1.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user1 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user1,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user1.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the user account in format domain\user
+        creds_user2.set_bind_dn(creds.get_domain() + "\\" + self.username)
+        creds_user2.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user2.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user2 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user2,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user2.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the user account DN
+        creds_user3.set_bind_dn(str(user_dn))
+        creds_user3.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user3.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user3 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user3,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user3.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the user account SID
+        creds_user5.set_bind_dn(self.ldb.schema_format_value("objectSid", ldb_res[0]["objectSid"][0]).decode('utf8'))
+        creds_user5.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user5.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user5 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user5,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user5.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the canonical name
+        creds_user6.set_bind_dn(user_dn.canonical_str())
+        creds_user6.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user6.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user6 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user6,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user6.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+        # do a simple bind and search with the extended canonical name
+        creds_user7.set_bind_dn(user_dn.canonical_ex_str())
+        creds_user7.set_password(self.password)
+        print("BindTest with: " + creds_user7.get_bind_dn())
+        ldb_user7 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user7,
+                                              lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        res = ldb_user7.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+    def test_user_account_bind_no_domain(self):
+        # create user
+        self.ldb.newuser(username=self.username, password=self.password)
+        ldb_res = self.ldb.search(base=self.domain_dn,
+                                  scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                                  expression="(samAccountName=%s)" % self.username)
+        self.assertEqual(len(ldb_res), 1)
+        user_dn = ldb_res[0]["dn"]
+        self.addCleanup(delete_force, self.ldb, user_dn)
+
+        creds_user4.set_username(self.username)
+        creds_user4.set_password(self.password)
+        creds_user4.set_domain('')
+        creds_user4.set_workstation('')
+        print("BindTest (no domain) with: " + self.username)
+        try:
+            ldb_user4 = samba.tests.connect_samdb(host, credentials=creds_user4,
+                                                  lp=lp, ldap_only=True)
+        except:
+            self.fail("Failed to connect without the domain set")
+
+        res = ldb_user4.search(base="", expression="", scope=SCOPE_BASE, attrs=["*"])
+
+
+TestProgram(module=__name__, opts=subunitopts)
diff --git a/auth/credentials/tests/test_creds.c b/auth/credentials/tests/test_creds.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cb2e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/tests/test_creds.c
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/*
+ * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <cmocka.h>
+
+#include "lib/replace/replace.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.c"
+
+static int setup_talloc_context(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+	*state = frame;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int teardown_talloc_context(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state;
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_init(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	const char *username = NULL;
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained dom_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	enum credentials_obtained usr_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	enum credentials_obtained pwd_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+	assert_null(creds->username);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_UNINITIALISED);
+
+	domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds);
+	assert_null(domain);
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_domain(creds, "WURST", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds);
+	assert_string_equal(domain, "WURST");
+
+	domain = cli_credentials_get_domain_and_obtained(creds,
+							 &dom_obtained);
+	assert_int_equal(dom_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_string_equal(domain, "WURST");
+
+	username = cli_credentials_get_username(creds);
+	assert_null(username);
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_username(creds, "brot", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	username = cli_credentials_get_username(creds);
+	assert_string_equal(username, "brot");
+
+	username = cli_credentials_get_username_and_obtained(creds,
+							     &usr_obtained);
+	assert_int_equal(usr_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_string_equal(username, "brot");
+
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password(creds);
+	assert_null(password);
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_password(creds, "SECRET", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password(creds);
+	assert_string_equal(password, "SECRET");
+
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password_and_obtained(creds,
+							     &pwd_obtained);
+	assert_int_equal(pwd_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_string_equal(password, "SECRET");
+
+	/* Run dump to check it works */
+	cli_credentials_dump(creds);
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_init_anonymous(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init_anon(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->domain, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_null(creds->password);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_guess(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	const char *env_user = getenv("USER");
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+
+	setenv("PASSWD", "SECRET", 1);
+	ok = cli_credentials_guess(creds, NULL);
+	assert_true(ok);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, env_user);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->password, "SECRET");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_GUESS_ENV);
+	unsetenv("PASSWD");
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_anon_guess(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init_anon(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+
+	setenv("PASSWD", "SECRET", 1);
+	ok = cli_credentials_guess(creds, NULL);
+	assert_true(ok);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_null(creds->password);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	unsetenv("PASSWD");
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_parse_string(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+
+	/* Anonymous */
+	cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, "%", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->domain, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_null(creds->password);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	/* Username + password */
+	cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, "wurst%BROT", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->domain, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "wurst");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->password, "BROT");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	/* Domain + username + password */
+	cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, "XXL\\wurst%BROT", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->domain, "XXL");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "wurst");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->password, "BROT");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	/* Principal */
+	cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, "wurst@brot.realm", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->domain, "");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->domain_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->username, "wurst@brot.realm");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->username_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->principal, "wurst@brot.realm");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->principal_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	assert_string_equal(creds->password, "BROT");
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_krb5_state(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	lp_ctx = loadparm_init_global(true);
+	assert_non_null(lp_ctx);
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state_obtained, CRED_UNINITIALISED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state, CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_conf(creds, lp_ctx);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state_obtained, CRED_SMB_CONF);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state, CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_guess(creds, lp_ctx);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state_obtained, CRED_SMB_CONF);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state, CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->ccache_obtained, CRED_GUESS_FILE);
+	assert_non_null(creds->ccache);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(creds,
+						CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED,
+						CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state, CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(creds,
+						CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED,
+						CRED_SMB_CONF);
+	assert_false(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->kerberos_state, CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED);
+
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_gensec_feature(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features_obtained, CRED_UNINITIALISED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features, 0);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_gensec_features(creds,
+						 GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN,
+						 CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_gensec_features(creds,
+						 GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL,
+						 CRED_SMB_CONF);
+	assert_false(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features_obtained, CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->gensec_features, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+}
+
+static const char *torture_get_password(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+	return talloc_strdup(creds, "SECRET");
+}
+
+static void torture_creds_password_callback(void **state)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = *state;
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	enum credentials_obtained pwd_obtained = CRED_UNINITIALISED;
+	bool ok;
+
+	creds = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
+	assert_non_null(creds);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_domain(creds, "WURST", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_username(creds, "brot", CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	assert_true(ok);
+
+	ok = cli_credentials_set_password_callback(creds, torture_get_password);
+	assert_true(ok);
+	assert_int_equal(creds->password_obtained, CRED_CALLBACK);
+
+	password = cli_credentials_get_password_and_obtained(creds,
+							     &pwd_obtained);
+	assert_int_equal(pwd_obtained, CRED_CALLBACK_RESULT);
+	assert_string_equal(password, "SECRET");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int rc;
+	const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_init),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_init_anonymous),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_guess),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_anon_guess),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_parse_string),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_krb5_state),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_gensec_feature),
+		cmocka_unit_test(torture_creds_password_callback)
+	};
+
+	if (argc == 2) {
+		cmocka_set_test_filter(argv[1]);
+	}
+	cmocka_set_message_output(CM_OUTPUT_SUBUNIT);
+
+	rc = cmocka_run_group_tests(tests,
+				    setup_talloc_context,
+				    teardown_talloc_context);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/auth/credentials/wscript_build b/auth/credentials/wscript_build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83c6e8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/credentials/wscript_build
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+
+bld.SAMBA_LIBRARY('samba-credentials',
+	source='credentials.c',
+	public_headers='credentials.h',
+	pc_files='samba-credentials.pc',
+	deps='LIBCRYPTO samba-errors events LIBCLI_AUTH samba-security CREDENTIALS_SECRETS CREDENTIALS_KRB5',
+	vnum='1.0.0'
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('CREDENTIALS_KRB5',
+	source='credentials_krb5.c',
+	deps='KERBEROS_SRV_KEYTAB KERBEROS_UTIL gssapi samba-credentials',
+	public_deps='com_err authkrb5',
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('CREDENTIALS_SECRETS',
+	source='credentials_secrets.c',
+	deps='CREDENTIALS_KRB5 CREDENTIALS_NTLM ldb SECRETS samdb-common dbwrap',
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('CREDENTIALS_NTLM',
+	source='credentials_ntlm.c',
+	deps='samba-credentials GNUTLS_HELPERS')
+
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('CREDENTIALS_CMDLINE',
+                    source='credentials_cmdline.c',
+                    deps='samba-credentials')
+
+pyrpc_util = bld.pyembed_libname('pyrpc_util')
+pytalloc_util = bld.pyembed_libname('pytalloc-util')
+pyparam_util = bld.pyembed_libname('pyparam_util')
+
+bld.SAMBA_PYTHON('pycredentials',
+    source='pycredentials.c',
+    public_deps='samba-credentials %s %s %s CREDENTIALS_CMDLINE CREDENTIALS_KRB5 CREDENTIALS_SECRETS' % (pyrpc_util, pytalloc_util, pyparam_util),
+    realname='samba/credentials.so'
+)
+
+bld.SAMBA_BINARY('test_creds',
+                 source='tests/test_creds.c',
+                 deps='cmocka samba-credentials',
+                 local_include=False,
+                 for_selftest=True)
diff --git a/auth/gensec/external.c b/auth/gensec/external.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..300ce6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/external.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   SASL/EXTERNAL authentication.
+
+   Copyright (C) Howard Chu <hyc@symas.com> 2013
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_proto.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_toplevel_proto.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/* SASL/EXTERNAL is essentially a no-op; it is only usable when the transport
+ * layer is already mutually authenticated.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_external_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx);
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_external_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+struct gensec_external_update_state {
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static struct tevent_req *gensec_external_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct tevent_context *ev,
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req;
+	struct gensec_external_update_state *state = NULL;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct gensec_external_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	state->out = data_blob_talloc(state, "", 0);
+	if (tevent_req_nomem(state->out.data, req)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_external_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+					    TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					    DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_external_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_external_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*out = state->out;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* We have no features */
+static bool gensec_external_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     uint32_t feature)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_external_ops = {
+	.name             = "sasl-EXTERNAL",
+	.sasl_name        = "EXTERNAL",
+	.client_start     = gensec_external_start,
+	.update_send      = gensec_external_update_send,
+	.update_recv      = gensec_external_update_recv,
+	.have_feature     = gensec_external_have_feature,
+	.enabled          = true,
+	.priority         = GENSEC_EXTERNAL
+};
+
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_external_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS ret;
+
+	ret = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_external_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			 gensec_external_ops.name));
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/gensec.c b/auth/gensec/gensec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26b5865
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/gensec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,856 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Generic Authentication Interface
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2006
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/network.h"
+#define TEVENT_DEPRECATED 1
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/dcerpc.h"
+#include "auth/common_auth.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+_PRIVATE_ NTSTATUS gensec_may_reset_crypto(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					   bool full_reset)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->may_reset_crypto) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->may_reset_crypto(gensec_security, full_reset);
+}
+
+/*
+  wrappers for the gensec function pointers
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->unseal_packet) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->unseal_packet(gensec_security,
+						   data, length,
+						   whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+						   sig);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->check_packet) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->check_packet(gensec_security, data, length, whole_pdu, pdu_length, sig);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->seal_packet) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->seal_packet(gensec_security, mem_ctx, data, length, whole_pdu, pdu_length, sig);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->sign_packet) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->sign_packet(gensec_security, mem_ctx, data, length, whole_pdu, pdu_length, sig);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ size_t gensec_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->sig_size) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)) {
+		if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE)) {
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->sig_size(gensec_security, data_size);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ size_t gensec_max_wrapped_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->max_wrapped_size) {
+		return (1 << 17);
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->max_wrapped_size(gensec_security);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ size_t gensec_max_input_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->max_input_size) {
+		return (1 << 17) - gensec_sig_size(gensec_security, 1 << 17);
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->max_input_size(gensec_security);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		     DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->wrap) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	return gensec_security->ops->wrap(gensec_security, mem_ctx, in, out);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		       const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		       DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->unwrap) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	return gensec_security->ops->unwrap(gensec_security, mem_ctx, in, out);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				     DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+	if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->session_key) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->session_key(gensec_security, mem_ctx, session_key);
+}
+
+const char *gensec_final_auth_type(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->final_auth_type) {
+		return gensec_security->ops->name;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->final_auth_type(gensec_security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log details of a successful GENSEC authorization to a service.
+ *
+ * Only successful authorizations are logged, as only these call gensec_session_info()
+ *
+ * The service may later refuse authorization due to an ACL.
+ *
+ */
+static void log_successful_gensec_authz_event(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					      struct auth_session_info *session_info)
+{
+	const struct tsocket_address *remote
+		= gensec_get_remote_address(gensec_security);
+	const struct tsocket_address *local
+		= gensec_get_local_address(gensec_security);
+	const char *service_description
+		= gensec_get_target_service_description(gensec_security);
+	const char *final_auth_type
+		= gensec_final_auth_type(gensec_security);
+	const char *transport_protection = NULL;
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SMB_TRANSPORT) {
+		transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SMB;
+	} else if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAPS_TRANSPORT) {
+		transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_TLS;
+	} else if (gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)) {
+		transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SEAL;
+	} else if (gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_SIGN;
+	} else {
+		transport_protection = AUTHZ_TRANSPORT_PROTECTION_NONE;
+	}
+	log_successful_authz_event(gensec_security->auth_context->msg_ctx,
+				   gensec_security->auth_context->lp_ctx,
+				   remote, local,
+				   service_description,
+				   final_auth_type,
+				   transport_protection,
+				   session_info,
+				   NULL /* client_audit_info */,
+				   NULL /* server_audit_info */);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Return the credentials of a logged on user, including session keys
+ * etc.
+ *
+ * Only valid after a successful authentication
+ *
+ * May only be called once per authentication.  This will also make an
+ * authorization log entry, as it is already called by all the
+ * callers.
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				      struct auth_session_info **session_info)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->session_info) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+	status = gensec_security->ops->session_info(gensec_security, mem_ctx, session_info);
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) && !gensec_security->subcontext
+	    && (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NO_AUTHZ_LOG) == 0) {
+		log_successful_gensec_authz_event(gensec_security, *session_info);
+	}
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ void gensec_set_max_update_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				uint32_t max_update_size)
+{
+	gensec_security->max_update_size = max_update_size;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ size_t gensec_max_update_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->max_update_size == 0) {
+		return UINT32_MAX;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->max_update_size;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_verify_features(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	bool ok;
+
+	/*
+	 * gensec_want_feature(GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)
+	 * and
+	 * gensec_want_feature(GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)
+	 * require these flags to be available.
+	 */
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+			DEBUG(0,("Did not manage to negotiate mandatory feature "
+				 "SIGN\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL)) {
+			DEBUG(0,("Did not manage to negotiate mandatory feature "
+				 "SEAL\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+		if (!gensec_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+			DEBUG(0,("Did not manage to negotiate mandatory feature "
+				 "SIGN for SEAL\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level < DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	ok = gensec_have_feature(gensec_security,
+				 GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_ERR("backend [%s] does not support header signing! "
+			"auth_level[0x%x]\n",
+			gensec_security->ops->name,
+			gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level);
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the GENSEC state machine
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC State
+ * @param out_mem_ctx The TALLOC_CTX for *out to be allocated on
+ * @param in The request, as a DATA_BLOB
+ * @param out The reply, as an talloc()ed DATA_BLOB, on *out_mem_ctx
+ * @return Error, MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED if a reply is sent,
+ *                or NT_STATUS_OK if the user is authenticated.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_update(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
+	struct tevent_context *ev = NULL;
+	struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	if (gensec_security->subcontext) {
+		/*
+		 * gensec modules are not allowed to call the sync version.
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+	ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
+	if (ev == NULL) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: remove this hack once the backends
+	 * are fixed.
+	 */
+	tevent_loop_allow_nesting(ev);
+
+	subreq = gensec_update_send(frame, ev, gensec_security, in);
+	if (subreq == NULL) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	ok = tevent_req_poll_ntstatus(subreq, ev, &status);
+	if (!ok) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	status = gensec_update_recv(subreq, out_mem_ctx, out);
+ fail:
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return status;
+}
+
+struct gensec_update_state {
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *ops;
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static void gensec_update_cleanup(struct tevent_req *req,
+				  enum tevent_req_state req_state);
+static void gensec_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the GENSEC state machine async version
+ *
+ * @param mem_ctx The memory context for the request
+ * @param ev The event context for the request
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC State
+ * @param in The request, as a DATA_BLOB
+ *
+ * @return The request handle or NULL on no memory failure
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ struct tevent_req *gensec_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					       struct tevent_context *ev,
+					       struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					       const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+	struct gensec_update_state *state = NULL;
+	struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct gensec_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state->ops = gensec_security->ops;
+	state->gensec_security = gensec_security;
+
+	if (gensec_security->update_busy_ptr != NULL) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->child_security != NULL) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	gensec_security->update_busy_ptr = &state->gensec_security;
+	tevent_req_set_cleanup_fn(req, gensec_update_cleanup);
+
+	subreq = state->ops->update_send(state, ev, gensec_security, in);
+	if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+	tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, gensec_update_done, req);
+
+	DBG_DEBUG("%s[%p]: subreq: %p\n", state->ops->name,
+		  state->gensec_security, subreq);
+
+	return req;
+}
+
+static void gensec_update_cleanup(struct tevent_req *req,
+				  enum tevent_req_state req_state)
+{
+	struct gensec_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_update_state);
+
+	if (state->gensec_security == NULL) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (state->gensec_security->update_busy_ptr == &state->gensec_security) {
+		state->gensec_security->update_busy_ptr = NULL;
+	}
+
+	state->gensec_security = NULL;
+}
+
+static void gensec_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req =
+		tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
+		struct tevent_req);
+	struct gensec_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	const char *debug_subreq = NULL;
+
+	if (CHECK_DEBUGLVL(DBGLVL_DEBUG)) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to call tevent_req_print()
+		 * before calling the _recv function,
+		 * before tevent_req_received() was called.
+		 * in order to print the pointer value of
+		 * the subreq state.
+		 */
+		debug_subreq = tevent_req_print(state, subreq);
+	}
+
+	status = state->ops->update_recv(subreq, state, &state->out);
+	TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
+	state->status = status;
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+		NTSTATUS orig_status = status;
+		bool force_no_such_user = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * callers only expect NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
+		 */
+		if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACCOUNT_NAME)) {
+			force_no_such_user = true;
+		} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN)) {
+			force_no_such_user = true;
+		}
+
+		if (state->gensec_security->subcontext) {
+			/*
+			 * We should only map on the outer
+			 * gensec_update exchange, spnego
+			 * needs the raw status.
+			 */
+			force_no_such_user = false;
+		}
+
+		if (force_no_such_user) {
+			/*
+			 * nt_status_squash() may map
+			 * to NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE later
+			 */
+			status = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+		}
+
+		DBG_INFO("%s[%p]: %s%s%s%s%s\n",
+			 state->ops->name,
+			 state->gensec_security,
+			 NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, orig_status) ?
+			 "" : nt_errstr(orig_status),
+			 NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, orig_status) ?
+			 "" : " ",
+			 nt_errstr(status),
+			 debug_subreq ? " " : "",
+			 debug_subreq ? debug_subreq : "");
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+		return;
+	}
+	DBG_DEBUG("%s[%p]: %s %s\n", state->ops->name,
+		  state->gensec_security, nt_errstr(status),
+		  debug_subreq);
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+		tevent_req_done(req);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Because callers using the
+	 * gensec_start_mech_by_authtype() never call
+	 * gensec_want_feature(), it isn't sensible for them
+	 * to have to call gensec_have_feature() manually, and
+	 * these are not points of negotiation, but are
+	 * asserted by the client
+	 */
+	status = gensec_verify_features(state->gensec_security);
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the GENSEC state machine
+ *
+ * @param req request state
+ * @param out_mem_ctx The TALLOC_CTX for *out to be allocated on
+ * @param out The reply, as an talloc()ed DATA_BLOB, on *out_mem_ctx
+ * @return Error, MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED if a reply is sent,
+ *                or NT_STATUS_OK if the user is authenticated.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				     DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req, struct gensec_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*out = state->out;
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, out->data);
+	status = state->status;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the requirement for a certain feature on the connection
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ void gensec_want_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			 uint32_t feature)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops || !gensec_security->ops->want_feature) {
+		gensec_security->want_features |= feature;
+		return;
+	}
+	gensec_security->ops->want_feature(gensec_security, feature);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check the requirement for a certain feature on the connection
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ bool gensec_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			 uint32_t feature)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops || !gensec_security->ops->have_feature) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* We might 'have' features that we don't 'want', because the
+	 * other end demanded them, or we can't negotiate them off */
+	return gensec_security->ops->have_feature(gensec_security, feature);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTTIME gensec_expire_time(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security->ops->expire_time) {
+		return GENSEC_EXPIRE_TIME_INFINITY;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_security->ops->expire_time(gensec_security);
+}
+/**
+ * Return the credentials structure associated with a GENSEC context
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ struct cli_credentials *gensec_get_credentials(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (!gensec_security) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return gensec_security->credentials;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the target service (such as 'http' or 'host') on a GENSEC context - ensures it is talloc()ed
+ *
+ * This is used for Kerberos service principal name resolution.
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_service(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *service)
+{
+	gensec_security->target.service = talloc_strdup(gensec_security, service);
+	if (!gensec_security->target.service) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_target_service(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->target.service) {
+		return gensec_security->target.service;
+	}
+
+	return "host";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the target service (such as 'samr') on an GENSEC context - ensures it is talloc()ed.
+ *
+ * This is not the Kerberos service principal, instead this is a
+ * constant value that can be logged as part of authentication and
+ * authorization logging
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_service_description(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							const char *service)
+{
+	gensec_security->target.service_description = talloc_strdup(gensec_security, service);
+	if (!gensec_security->target.service_description) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_target_service_description(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->target.service_description) {
+		return gensec_security->target.service_description;
+	} else if (gensec_security->target.service) {
+		return gensec_security->target.service;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the target hostname (suitable for kerberos resolutation) on a GENSEC context - ensures it is talloc()ed
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_hostname(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *hostname)
+{
+	gensec_security->target.hostname = talloc_strdup(gensec_security, hostname);
+	if (hostname && !gensec_security->target.hostname) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_target_hostname(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	/* We allow the target hostname to be overridden for testing purposes */
+	if (gensec_security->settings->target_hostname) {
+		return gensec_security->settings->target_hostname;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->target.hostname) {
+		return gensec_security->target.hostname;
+	}
+
+	/* We could add use the 'set sockaddr' call, and do a reverse
+	 * lookup, but this would be both insecure (compromising the
+	 * way kerberos works) and add DNS timeouts */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set (and copy) local and peer socket addresses onto a socket
+ * context on the GENSEC context.
+ *
+ * This is so that kerberos can include these addresses in
+ * cryptographic tokens, to avoid certain attacks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the local gensec address.
+ *
+ * @param  gensec_security   The gensec security context to use.
+ *
+ * @param  remote       The local address to set.
+ *
+ * @return              On success NT_STATUS_OK is returned or an NT_STATUS
+ *                      error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_local_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		const struct tsocket_address *local)
+{
+	TALLOC_FREE(gensec_security->local_addr);
+
+	if (local == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	gensec_security->local_addr = tsocket_address_copy(local, gensec_security);
+	if (gensec_security->local_addr == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Set the remote gensec address.
+ *
+ * @param  gensec_security   The gensec security context to use.
+ *
+ * @param  remote       The remote address to set.
+ *
+ * @return              On success NT_STATUS_OK is returned or an NT_STATUS
+ *                      error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_remote_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		const struct tsocket_address *remote)
+{
+	TALLOC_FREE(gensec_security->remote_addr);
+
+	if (remote == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	gensec_security->remote_addr = tsocket_address_copy(remote, gensec_security);
+	if (gensec_security->remote_addr == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Get the local address from a gensec security context.
+ *
+ * @param  gensec_security   The security context to get the address from.
+ *
+ * @return              The address as tsocket_address which could be NULL if
+ *                      no address is set.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const struct tsocket_address *gensec_get_local_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return gensec_security->local_addr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Get the remote address from a gensec security context.
+ *
+ * @param  gensec_security   The security context to get the address from.
+ *
+ * @return              The address as tsocket_address which could be NULL if
+ *                      no address is set.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_ const struct tsocket_address *gensec_get_remote_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return gensec_security->remote_addr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the target principal (assuming it it known, say from the SPNEGO reply)
+ *  - ensures it is talloc()ed
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_principal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *principal)
+{
+	gensec_security->target.principal = talloc_strdup(gensec_security, principal);
+	if (!gensec_security->target.principal) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_target_principal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->target.principal) {
+		return gensec_security->target.principal;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/gensec.h b/auth/gensec/gensec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29d5e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/gensec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Generic Authentication Interface
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef __GENSEC_H__
+#define __GENSEC_H__
+
+#include "../lib/util/data_blob.h"
+#include "libcli/util/ntstatus.h"
+
+#define GENSEC_SASL_NAME_NTLMSSP "NTLM"
+
+#define GENSEC_OID_NTLMSSP "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10"
+#define GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO "1.3.6.1.5.5.2"
+#define GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5 "1.2.840.113554.1.2.2"
+#define GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5_OLD "1.2.840.48018.1.2.2"
+#define GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5_USER2USER "1.2.840.113554.1.2.2.3"
+
+#define GENSEC_FINAL_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5 "krb5"
+#define GENSEC_FINAL_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP "NTLMSSP"
+
+enum gensec_priority {
+	GENSEC_SPNEGO = 90,
+	GENSEC_GSSAPI = 80,
+	GENSEC_KRB5 = 70,
+	GENSEC_SCHANNEL = 60,
+	GENSEC_NTLMSSP = 50,
+	GENSEC_SASL = 20,
+	GENSEC_OTHER = 10,
+	GENSEC_EXTERNAL = 0
+};
+
+struct gensec_security;
+struct gensec_target {
+	const char *principal;
+	const char *hostname;
+	const char *service;
+	const char *service_description;
+};
+
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY	0x00000001
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN		0x00000002
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL		0x00000004
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE	0x00000008
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES	0x00000010
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_DATAGRAM_MODE	0x00000020
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER	0x00000040
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_NEW_SPNEGO	0x00000080
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_UNIX_TOKEN	0x00000100
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE	0x00000200
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE	0x00000400
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_NO_AUTHZ_LOG	0x00000800
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_SMB_TRANSPORT	0x00001000
+#define GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAPS_TRANSPORT	0x00002000
+
+#define GENSEC_EXPIRE_TIME_INFINITY (NTTIME)0x8000000000000000LL
+
+/* GENSEC mode */
+enum gensec_role
+{
+	GENSEC_SERVER,
+	GENSEC_CLIENT
+};
+
+struct auth_session_info;
+struct cli_credentials;
+struct gensec_settings;
+struct tevent_context;
+struct tevent_req;
+struct smb_krb5_context;
+struct tsocket_address;
+
+struct gensec_settings {
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	const char *target_hostname;
+
+	/* this allows callers to specify a specific set of ops that
+	 * should be used, rather than those loaded by the plugin
+	 * mechanism */
+	const struct gensec_security_ops * const *backends;
+
+	/* To fill in our own name in the NTLMSSP server */
+	const char *server_dns_domain;
+	const char *server_dns_name;
+	const char *server_netbios_domain;
+	const char *server_netbios_name;
+};
+
+struct gensec_security_ops;
+struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper;
+
+/* Change to 1, loadable modules now take a TALLOC_CTX * init() parameter. */
+#define GENSEC_INTERFACE_VERSION 1
+
+/* this structure is used by backends to determine the size of some critical types */
+struct gensec_critical_sizes;
+const struct gensec_critical_sizes *gensec_interface_version(void);
+
+/* Socket wrapper */
+
+struct gensec_security;
+struct auth4_context;
+struct auth_user_info_dc;
+
+struct loadparm_context;
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_subcontext_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				 struct gensec_security *parent,
+				 struct gensec_security **gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_client_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     struct gensec_security **gensec_security,
+			     struct gensec_settings *settings);
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_ops(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  const struct gensec_security_ops *ops);
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_sasl_list(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						 const char **sasl_names);
+void gensec_set_max_update_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				uint32_t max_update_size);
+size_t gensec_max_update_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_update(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		       TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+		       const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out);
+struct tevent_req *gensec_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				      struct tevent_context *ev,
+				      struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      const DATA_BLOB in);
+NTSTATUS gensec_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+#define GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status) ( \
+	!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) && \
+	!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED) \
+	)
+
+/**
+ * @brief Ask for features for a following authentication
+ *
+ * Typically only one specific feature bit should be passed,
+ * but it also works to ask for more features.
+ *
+ * The features must be requested before starting the
+ * gensec_update*() loop.
+ *
+ * The current exception is GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER,
+ * it can also be requested once the gensec_update*() loop
+ * returned NT_STATUS_OK.
+ *
+ * The features should not be changed during the gensec_update*()
+ * loop.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  gensec_security The context to be used
+ *
+ * @param[in]  feature         The requested feature[s].
+ *
+ */
+void gensec_want_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			 uint32_t feature);
+/**
+ * @brief Ask for one feature after the finished authentication
+ *
+ * Because the return value is bool, the caller can only
+ * ask for one feature at a time.
+ *
+ * The features must be requested after the finished
+ * gensec_update*() loop.
+ *
+ * The current exception is GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER,
+ * it can also be requested before the gensec_update*() loop,
+ * as the return value only indicates if the backend supports
+ * dcerpc header signing, not if header signing will be used
+ * between client and server. It will be used only if the caller
+ * also used gensec_want_feature(GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER).
+ *
+ * @param[in]  gensec_security The context to be used.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  feature         The requested feature.
+ *
+ * @return                     true if the feature is supported, false if not.
+ */
+bool gensec_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			 uint32_t feature);
+NTTIME gensec_expire_time(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_credentials(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, struct cli_credentials *credentials);
+/**
+ * Set the target service (such as 'http' or 'host') on a GENSEC context - ensures it is talloc()ed
+ *
+ * This is used for Kerberos service principal name resolution.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_service(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *service);
+const char *gensec_get_target_service(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_hostname(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *hostname);
+const char *gensec_get_target_hostname(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+/**
+ * Set the target service (such as 'samr') on an GENSEC context - ensures it is talloc()ed.
+ *
+ * This is not the Kerberos service principal, instead this is a
+ * constant value that can be logged as part of authentication and
+ * authorization logging
+ */
+const char *gensec_get_target_service_description(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_service_description(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					       const char *service);
+NTSTATUS gensec_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *session_key);
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_oid(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  const char *mech_oid);
+const char *gensec_get_name_by_oid(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *oid_string);
+struct cli_credentials *gensec_get_credentials(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_init(void);
+NTSTATUS gensec_register(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+		const struct gensec_security_ops *ops);
+const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_oid(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							 const char *oid_string);
+const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_sasl_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							       const char *sasl_name);
+const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_auth_type(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				uint32_t auth_type);
+const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							  const char *name);
+const struct gensec_security_ops **gensec_security_mechs(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *gensec_security_by_oid_list(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const char * const *oid_strings,
+					const char *skip);
+const char **gensec_security_oids(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  const char *skip);
+const char **gensec_security_oids_from_ops_wrapped(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *wops);
+size_t gensec_max_input_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+size_t gensec_max_wrapped_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+size_t gensec_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size);
+NTSTATUS gensec_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_authtype(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				       uint8_t auth_type, uint8_t auth_level);
+const char *gensec_get_name_by_authtype(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, uint8_t authtype);
+NTSTATUS gensec_server_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     struct gensec_settings *settings,
+			     struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+			     struct gensec_security **gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_local_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		const struct tsocket_address *local);
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_remote_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		const struct tsocket_address *remote);
+const struct tsocket_address *gensec_get_local_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+const struct tsocket_address *gensec_get_remote_address(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const char *name);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		       const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		       DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS gensec_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+		     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		     DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+bool gensec_security_ops_enabled(const struct gensec_security_ops *ops, struct gensec_security *security);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_sasl_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const char *sasl_name);
+const char **gensec_security_sasl_names(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+
+int gensec_setting_int(struct gensec_settings *settings, const char *mechanism, const char *name, int default_value);
+bool gensec_setting_bool(struct gensec_settings *settings, const char *mechanism, const char *name, bool default_value);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_set_target_principal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, const char *principal);
+const char *gensec_get_target_principal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_generate_session_info_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					  struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					  struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
+					  DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+					  const char *principal_string,
+					  const struct tsocket_address *remote_address,
+					  struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_magic_check_krb5_oid(struct gensec_security *unused,
+					const DATA_BLOB *blob);
+
+#endif /* __GENSEC_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h b/auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8efb1bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Generic Authentication Interface
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef __GENSEC_INTERNAL_H__
+#define __GENSEC_INTERNAL_H__
+
+struct gensec_security;
+
+struct gensec_security_ops {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *sasl_name;
+	bool weak_crypto;
+	uint8_t auth_type;  /* 0 if not offered on DCE-RPC */
+	const char **oid;  /* NULL if not offered by SPNEGO */
+	NTSTATUS (*client_start)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	NTSTATUS (*server_start)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	/**
+	   Determine if a packet has the right 'magic' for this mechanism
+	*/
+	NTSTATUS (*magic)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			  const DATA_BLOB *first_packet);
+	struct tevent_req *(*update_send)(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					  struct tevent_context *ev,
+					  struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					  const DATA_BLOB in);
+	NTSTATUS (*update_recv)(struct tevent_req *req,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB *out);
+	NTSTATUS (*may_reset_crypto)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     bool full_reset);
+	NTSTATUS (*seal_packet)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				DATA_BLOB *sig);
+	NTSTATUS (*sign_packet)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				DATA_BLOB *sig);
+	size_t   (*sig_size)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size);
+	size_t   (*max_input_size)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	size_t   (*max_wrapped_size)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	NTSTATUS (*check_packet)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				 const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				 const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+	NTSTATUS (*unseal_packet)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				  const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				  const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+	NTSTATUS (*wrap)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  const DATA_BLOB *in,
+				  DATA_BLOB *out);
+	NTSTATUS (*unwrap)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			   const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			   DATA_BLOB *out);
+	NTSTATUS (*session_key)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB *session_key);
+	NTSTATUS (*session_info)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				 struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+	void (*want_feature)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    uint32_t feature);
+	bool (*have_feature)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    uint32_t feature);
+	NTTIME (*expire_time)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	const char *(*final_auth_type)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+	bool enabled;
+	bool kerberos;
+	enum gensec_priority priority;
+	bool glue;
+};
+
+struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper {
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *op;
+	const char *oid;
+};
+
+struct gensec_security {
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *ops;
+	void *private_data;
+	struct cli_credentials *credentials;
+	struct gensec_target target;
+	enum gensec_role gensec_role;
+	bool subcontext;
+	uint32_t want_features;
+	uint32_t max_update_size;
+	uint8_t dcerpc_auth_level;
+	struct tsocket_address *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	struct gensec_settings *settings;
+
+	/* When we are a server, this may be filled in to provide an
+	 * NTLM authentication backend, and user lookup (such as if no
+	 * PAC is found) */
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context;
+
+	struct gensec_security *parent_security;
+	struct gensec_security *child_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is used to mark the context as being
+	 * busy in an async gensec_update_send().
+	 */
+	struct gensec_security **update_busy_ptr;
+};
+
+/* this structure is used by backends to determine the size of some critical types */
+struct gensec_critical_sizes {
+	int interface_version;
+	int sizeof_gensec_security_ops;
+	int sizeof_gensec_security;
+};
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_may_reset_crypto(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				 bool full_reset);
+
+const char *gensec_final_auth_type(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_ready(struct gensec_security *parent,
+			    struct gensec_security *child);
+void gensec_child_want_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       uint32_t feature);
+bool gensec_child_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       uint32_t feature);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				   const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				   const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				   const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				  const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				  DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				  const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				  DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			   const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			   DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			     DATA_BLOB *out);
+size_t gensec_child_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     size_t data_size);
+size_t gensec_child_max_input_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+size_t gensec_child_max_wrapped_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  DATA_BLOB *session_key);
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				   struct auth_session_info **session_info);
+NTTIME gensec_child_expire_time(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+const char *gensec_child_final_auth_type(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+#endif /* __GENSEC_H__ */
diff --git a/auth/gensec/gensec_start.c b/auth/gensec/gensec_start.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..072188a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/gensec_start.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1147 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Generic Authentication Interface
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2006
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/network.h"
+#include "tevent.h"
+#include "../lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/dcerpc.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "lib/param/param.h"
+#include "lib/param/loadparm.h"
+#include "lib/util/tsort.h"
+#include "lib/util/samba_modules.h"
+#include "lib/util/base64.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#undef strcasecmp
+
+/* the list of currently registered GENSEC backends */
+static const struct gensec_security_ops **generic_security_ops;
+static int gensec_num_backends;
+
+bool gensec_security_ops_enabled(const struct gensec_security_ops *ops, struct gensec_security *security)
+{
+	bool ok = lpcfg_parm_bool(security->settings->lp_ctx,
+				  NULL,
+				  "gensec",
+				  ops->name,
+				  ops->enabled);
+
+	if (ops->weak_crypto &&
+	    lpcfg_weak_crypto(security->settings->lp_ctx) != SAMBA_WEAK_CRYPTO_ALLOWED) {
+		ok = false;
+	}
+
+	return ok;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes we want to force only kerberos, sometimes we want to
+ * force it's avoidance.  The old list could be either
+ * gensec_security_all(), or from cli_credentials_gensec_list() (ie,
+ * an existing list we have trimmed down)
+ *
+ * The intended logic is:
+ *
+ * if we are in the default AUTO have kerberos:
+ * - take a reference to the master list
+ * otherwise
+ * - always add spnego then:
+ * - if we 'MUST' have kerberos:
+ *   only add kerberos mechs
+ * - if we 'DONT' want kerberos':
+ *   only add non-kerberos mechs
+ *
+ * Once we get things like NegoEx or moonshot, this will of course get
+ * more complex.
+ */
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops **gensec_use_kerberos_mechs(
+		TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		const struct gensec_security_ops * const *old_gensec_list,
+		enum credentials_use_kerberos use_kerberos,
+		bool keep_schannel)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **new_gensec_list;
+	int i, j, num_mechs_in;
+
+	for (num_mechs_in=0; old_gensec_list && old_gensec_list[num_mechs_in]; num_mechs_in++) {
+		/* noop */
+	}
+
+	new_gensec_list = talloc_array(mem_ctx,
+				       const struct gensec_security_ops *,
+				       num_mechs_in + 1);
+	if (!new_gensec_list) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i=0; old_gensec_list && old_gensec_list[i]; i++) {
+		bool keep = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * We want to keep SPNEGO and other backends
+		 */
+		keep = old_gensec_list[i]->glue;
+
+		if (old_gensec_list[i]->auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+			keep = keep_schannel;
+		}
+
+		switch (use_kerberos) {
+		case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED:
+			keep = true;
+			break;
+
+		case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DISABLED:
+			if (old_gensec_list[i]->kerberos == false) {
+				keep = true;
+			}
+
+			break;
+
+		case CRED_USE_KERBEROS_REQUIRED:
+			if (old_gensec_list[i]->kerberos == true) {
+				keep = true;
+			}
+
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Can't happen or invalid parameter */
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (!keep) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		new_gensec_list[j] = old_gensec_list[i];
+		j++;
+	}
+	new_gensec_list[j] = NULL;
+
+	return new_gensec_list;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_security_ops **gensec_security_mechs(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops * const *backends =
+		generic_security_ops;
+	enum credentials_use_kerberos use_kerberos = CRED_USE_KERBEROS_DESIRED;
+	bool keep_schannel = false;
+
+	if (gensec_security != NULL) {
+		struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+		creds = gensec_get_credentials(gensec_security);
+		if (creds != NULL) {
+			use_kerberos = cli_credentials_get_kerberos_state(creds);
+			if (cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds(creds) != NULL) {
+				keep_schannel = true;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Even if Kerberos is set to REQUIRED, keep the
+			 * schannel auth mechanism so that machine accounts are
+			 * able to authenticate via netlogon.
+			 */
+			if (gensec_security->gensec_role == GENSEC_SERVER) {
+				keep_schannel = true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (gensec_security->settings->backends) {
+			backends = gensec_security->settings->backends;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return gensec_use_kerberos_mechs(mem_ctx, backends,
+					 use_kerberos, keep_schannel);
+
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_oid(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				const char *oid_string)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *backend;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(gensec_security);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+				!gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i],
+											 gensec_security))
+		    continue;
+		if (backends[i]->oid) {
+			for (j=0; backends[i]->oid[j]; j++) {
+				if (backends[i]->oid[j] &&
+				    (strcmp(backends[i]->oid[j], oid_string) == 0)) {
+					backend = backends[i];
+					talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+					return backend;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_sasl_name(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				const char *sasl_name)
+{
+	int i;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *backend;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(gensec_security);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+		    !gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i], gensec_security)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (backends[i]->sasl_name
+		    && (strcmp(backends[i]->sasl_name, sasl_name) == 0)) {
+			backend = backends[i];
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return backend;
+		}
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_auth_type(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				uint32_t auth_type)
+{
+	int i;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *backend;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+
+	if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(gensec_security);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+		    !gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i], gensec_security)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (backends[i]->auth_type == auth_type) {
+			backend = backends[i];
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return backend;
+		}
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const struct gensec_security_ops *gensec_security_by_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							  const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *backend;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(gensec_security);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+				!gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i], gensec_security))
+		    continue;
+		if (backends[i]->name
+		    && (strcmp(backends[i]->name, name) == 0)) {
+			backend = backends[i];
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return backend;
+		}
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char **gensec_security_sasl_names_from_ops(
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	const struct gensec_security_ops * const *ops)
+{
+	const char **sasl_names = NULL;
+	size_t i, sasl_names_count = 0;
+
+	if (ops == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	sasl_names = talloc_array(mem_ctx, const char *, 1);
+	if (sasl_names == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; ops[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		enum gensec_role role = GENSEC_SERVER;
+		const char **tmp = NULL;
+
+		if (ops[i]->sasl_name == NULL) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (gensec_security != NULL) {
+			if (!gensec_security_ops_enabled(ops[i],
+							 gensec_security)) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			role = gensec_security->gensec_role;
+		}
+
+		switch (role) {
+		case GENSEC_CLIENT:
+			if (ops[i]->client_start == NULL) {
+				continue;
+			}
+			break;
+		case GENSEC_SERVER:
+			if (ops[i]->server_start == NULL) {
+				continue;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+
+		tmp = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx,
+				     sasl_names,
+				     const char *,
+				     sasl_names_count + 2);
+		if (tmp == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(sasl_names);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		sasl_names = tmp;
+
+		sasl_names[sasl_names_count] = ops[i]->sasl_name;
+		sasl_names_count++;
+	}
+	sasl_names[sasl_names_count] = NULL;
+
+	return sasl_names;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Get the sasl names from the gensec security context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  gensec_security The gensec security context.
+ *
+ * @param[in]  mem_ctx The memory context to allocate memory on.
+ *
+ * @return An allocated array with sasl names, NULL on error.
+ */
+_PUBLIC_
+const char **gensec_security_sasl_names(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **ops = NULL;
+
+	ops = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+
+	return gensec_security_sasl_names_from_ops(gensec_security,
+						   mem_ctx,
+						   ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a unique list of security subsystems from those specified in
+ * the list of SASL names.
+ *
+ * Use the list of enabled GENSEC mechanisms from the credentials
+ * attached to the gensec_security, and return in our preferred order.
+ */
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops **gensec_security_by_sasl_list(
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	const char **sasl_names)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends_out;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	int i, k, sasl_idx;
+	int num_backends_out = 0;
+
+	if (!sasl_names) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+
+	backends_out = talloc_array(mem_ctx, const struct gensec_security_ops *, 1);
+	if (!backends_out) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends_out[0] = NULL;
+
+	/* Find backends in our preferred order, by walking our list,
+	 * then looking in the supplied list */
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+				!gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i], gensec_security))
+		    continue;
+		for (sasl_idx = 0; sasl_names[sasl_idx]; sasl_idx++) {
+			if (!backends[i]->sasl_name ||
+			    !(strcmp(backends[i]->sasl_name,
+				     sasl_names[sasl_idx]) == 0)) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (k=0; backends_out[k]; k++) {
+				if (backends_out[k] == backends[i]) {
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (k < num_backends_out) {
+				/* already in there */
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			backends_out = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, backends_out,
+						      const struct gensec_security_ops *,
+						      num_backends_out + 2);
+			if (!backends_out) {
+				return NULL;
+			}
+
+			backends_out[num_backends_out] = backends[i];
+			num_backends_out++;
+			backends_out[num_backends_out] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	return backends_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a unique list of security subsystems from those specified in
+ * the OID list.  That is, where two OIDs refer to the same module,
+ * return that module only once.
+ *
+ * Use the list of enabled GENSEC mechanisms from the credentials
+ * attached to the gensec_security, and return in our preferred order.
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *gensec_security_by_oid_list(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const char * const *oid_strings,
+					const char *skip)
+{
+	struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *backends_out;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **backends;
+	int i, j, k, oid_idx;
+	int num_backends_out = 0;
+
+	if (!oid_strings) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	backends = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, gensec_security);
+
+	backends_out = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper, 1);
+	if (!backends_out) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	backends_out[0].op = NULL;
+	backends_out[0].oid = NULL;
+
+	/* Find backends in our preferred order, by walking our list,
+	 * then looking in the supplied list */
+	for (i=0; backends && backends[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+				!gensec_security_ops_enabled(backends[i], gensec_security))
+		    continue;
+		if (!backends[i]->oid) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		for (oid_idx = 0; oid_strings[oid_idx]; oid_idx++) {
+			if (strcmp(oid_strings[oid_idx], skip) == 0) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (j=0; backends[i]->oid[j]; j++) {
+				if (!backends[i]->oid[j] ||
+				    !(strcmp(backends[i]->oid[j],
+					    oid_strings[oid_idx]) == 0)) {
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				for (k=0; backends_out[k].op; k++) {
+					if (backends_out[k].op == backends[i]) {
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (k < num_backends_out) {
+					/* already in there */
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				backends_out = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, backends_out,
+							      struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper,
+							      num_backends_out + 2);
+				if (!backends_out) {
+					return NULL;
+				}
+
+				backends_out[num_backends_out].op = backends[i];
+				backends_out[num_backends_out].oid = backends[i]->oid[j];
+				num_backends_out++;
+				backends_out[num_backends_out].op = NULL;
+				backends_out[num_backends_out].oid = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return backends_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return OIDS from the security subsystems listed
+ */
+
+static const char **gensec_security_oids_from_ops(
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	const struct gensec_security_ops * const *ops,
+	const char *skip)
+{
+	int i;
+	int j = 0;
+	int k;
+	const char **oid_list;
+	if (!ops) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	oid_list = talloc_array(mem_ctx, const char *, 1);
+	if (!oid_list) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; ops && ops[i]; i++) {
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+			!gensec_security_ops_enabled(ops[i], gensec_security)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!ops[i]->oid) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		for (k = 0; ops[i]->oid[k]; k++) {
+			if (skip && strcmp(skip, ops[i]->oid[k])==0) {
+			} else {
+				oid_list = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, oid_list, const char *, j + 2);
+				if (!oid_list) {
+					return NULL;
+				}
+				oid_list[j] = ops[i]->oid[k];
+				j++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	oid_list[j] = NULL;
+	return oid_list;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Return OIDS from the security subsystems listed
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char **gensec_security_oids_from_ops_wrapped(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *wops)
+{
+	int i;
+	int j = 0;
+	int k;
+	const char **oid_list;
+	if (!wops) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	oid_list = talloc_array(mem_ctx, const char *, 1);
+	if (!oid_list) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; wops[i].op; i++) {
+		if (!wops[i].op->oid) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		for (k = 0; wops[i].op->oid[k]; k++) {
+			oid_list = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, oid_list, const char *, j + 2);
+			if (!oid_list) {
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			oid_list[j] = wops[i].op->oid[k];
+			j++;
+		}
+	}
+	oid_list[j] = NULL;
+	return oid_list;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Return all the security subsystems currently enabled on a GENSEC context.
+ *
+ * This is taken from a list attached to the cli_credentials, and
+ * skips the OID in 'skip'.  (Typically the SPNEGO OID)
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char **gensec_security_oids(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const char *skip)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **ops;
+
+	ops = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+
+	return gensec_security_oids_from_ops(gensec_security, mem_ctx, ops, skip);
+}
+
+static int gensec_security_destructor(struct gensec_security *gctx)
+{
+	if (gctx->parent_security != NULL) {
+		if (gctx->parent_security->child_security == gctx) {
+			gctx->parent_security->child_security = NULL;
+		}
+		gctx->parent_security = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (gctx->child_security != NULL) {
+		if (gctx->child_security->parent_security == gctx) {
+			gctx->child_security->parent_security = NULL;
+		}
+		gctx->child_security = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+  Start the GENSEC system, returning a context pointer.
+  @param mem_ctx The parent TALLOC memory context.
+  @param gensec_security Returned GENSEC context pointer.
+  @note  The mem_ctx is only a parent and may be NULL.
+  @note, the auth context is moved to be a referenced pointer of the
+  @ gensec_security return
+*/
+static NTSTATUS gensec_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     struct gensec_settings *settings,
+			     struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+			     struct gensec_security **gensec_security)
+{
+	(*gensec_security) = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct gensec_security);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*gensec_security);
+
+	(*gensec_security)->max_update_size = 0;
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(settings->lp_ctx != NULL);
+	(*gensec_security)->settings = talloc_reference(*gensec_security, settings);
+
+	/* We need to reference this, not steal, as the caller may be
+	 * python, which won't like it if we steal it's object away
+	 * from it */
+	(*gensec_security)->auth_context = talloc_reference(*gensec_security, auth_context);
+
+	talloc_set_destructor((*gensec_security), gensec_security_destructor);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC subcontext, with a copy of the properties of the parent
+ * @param mem_ctx The parent TALLOC memory context.
+ * @param parent The parent GENSEC context
+ * @param gensec_security Returned GENSEC context pointer.
+ * @note Used by SPNEGO in particular, for the actual implementation mechanism
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_subcontext_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				 struct gensec_security *parent,
+				 struct gensec_security **gensec_security)
+{
+	if (parent->child_security != NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	(*gensec_security) = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct gensec_security);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*gensec_security);
+
+	(**gensec_security) = *parent;
+	(*gensec_security)->ops = NULL;
+	(*gensec_security)->private_data = NULL;
+	(*gensec_security)->update_busy_ptr = NULL;
+
+	(*gensec_security)->subcontext = true;
+	(*gensec_security)->want_features = parent->want_features;
+	(*gensec_security)->max_update_size = parent->max_update_size;
+	(*gensec_security)->dcerpc_auth_level = parent->dcerpc_auth_level;
+	(*gensec_security)->auth_context = talloc_reference(*gensec_security, parent->auth_context);
+	(*gensec_security)->settings = talloc_reference(*gensec_security, parent->settings);
+	(*gensec_security)->auth_context = talloc_reference(*gensec_security, parent->auth_context);
+
+	talloc_set_destructor((*gensec_security), gensec_security_destructor);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_child_ready(struct gensec_security *parent,
+				     struct gensec_security *child)
+{
+	if (parent->child_security != NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (child->parent_security != NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	parent->child_security = child;
+	child->parent_security = parent;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+  Start the GENSEC system, in client mode, returning a context pointer.
+  @param mem_ctx The parent TALLOC memory context.
+  @param gensec_security Returned GENSEC context pointer.
+  @note  The mem_ctx is only a parent and may be NULL.
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_client_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     struct gensec_security **gensec_security,
+			     struct gensec_settings *settings)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (settings == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0,("gensec_client_start: no settings given!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	status = gensec_start(mem_ctx, settings, NULL, gensec_security);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+	(*gensec_security)->gensec_role = GENSEC_CLIENT;
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+  Start the GENSEC system, in server mode, returning a context pointer.
+  @param mem_ctx The parent TALLOC memory context.
+  @param gensec_security Returned GENSEC context pointer.
+  @note  The mem_ctx is only a parent and may be NULL.
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_server_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				      struct gensec_settings *settings,
+				      struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+				      struct gensec_security **gensec_security)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (!settings) {
+		DEBUG(0,("gensec_server_start: no settings given!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	status = gensec_start(mem_ctx, settings, auth_context, gensec_security);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+	(*gensec_security)->gensec_role = GENSEC_SERVER;
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	/*
+	 * Callers sometimes just reuse a context, we should
+	 * clear the internal state before starting it again.
+	 */
+	talloc_unlink(gensec_security, gensec_security->private_data);
+	gensec_security->private_data = NULL;
+
+	if (gensec_security->child_security != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * The talloc_unlink(.., gensec_security->private_data)
+		 * should have cleared this via
+		 * gensec_security_destructor().
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->credentials) {
+		const char *forced_mech = cli_credentials_get_forced_sasl_mech(gensec_security->credentials);
+		if (forced_mech &&
+		    (gensec_security->ops->sasl_name == NULL ||
+		     strcasecmp(forced_mech, gensec_security->ops->sasl_name) != 0)) {
+			DEBUG(5, ("GENSEC mechanism %s (%s) skipped, as it "
+				  "did not match forced mechanism %s\n",
+				  gensec_security->ops->name,
+				  gensec_security->ops->sasl_name,
+				  forced_mech));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+	DEBUG(5, ("Starting GENSEC %smechanism %s\n",
+		  gensec_security->subcontext ? "sub" : "",
+		  gensec_security->ops->name));
+	switch (gensec_security->gensec_role) {
+	case GENSEC_CLIENT:
+		if (gensec_security->ops->client_start) {
+			status = gensec_security->ops->client_start(gensec_security);
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				DEBUG(gensec_security->subcontext?4:2, ("Failed to start GENSEC client mech %s: %s\n",
+					  gensec_security->ops->name, nt_errstr(status)));
+			}
+			return status;
+		}
+		break;
+	case GENSEC_SERVER:
+		if (gensec_security->ops->server_start) {
+			status = gensec_security->ops->server_start(gensec_security);
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start GENSEC server mech %s: %s\n",
+					  gensec_security->ops->name, nt_errstr(status)));
+			}
+			return status;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism with a specified mechanism structure, used in SPNEGO
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_ops(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  const struct gensec_security_ops *ops)
+{
+	gensec_security->ops = ops;
+	return gensec_start_mech(gensec_security);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism by DCERPC allocated 'auth type' number
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC context pointer.
+ * @param auth_type DCERPC auth type
+ * @param auth_level DCERPC auth level
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_authtype(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				       uint8_t auth_type, uint8_t auth_level)
+{
+	gensec_security->ops = gensec_security_by_auth_type(gensec_security, auth_type);
+	if (!gensec_security->ops) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not find GENSEC backend for auth_type=%d\n", (int)auth_type));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level = auth_level;
+	/*
+	 * We need to reset sign/seal in order to reset it.
+	 * We may got some default features inherited by the credentials
+	 */
+	gensec_security->want_features &= ~GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN;
+	gensec_security->want_features &= ~GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL;
+	gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE);
+	gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES);
+	if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) {
+		if (gensec_security->gensec_role == GENSEC_CLIENT) {
+			gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		}
+	} else if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET) {
+		/*
+		 * For connection oriented DCERPC DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET (4)
+		 * has the same behavior as DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY (5).
+		 */
+		if (gensec_security->gensec_role == GENSEC_CLIENT) {
+			gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		}
+	} else if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+		gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL);
+	} else if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT) {
+		/* Default features */
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(2,("auth_level %d not supported in DCE/RPC authentication\n",
+			 auth_level));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_start_mech(gensec_security);
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_name_by_authtype(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, uint8_t authtype)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *ops;
+	ops = gensec_security_by_auth_type(gensec_security, authtype);
+	if (ops) {
+		return ops->name;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+
+_PUBLIC_ const char *gensec_get_name_by_oid(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+											const char *oid_string)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops *ops;
+	ops = gensec_security_by_oid(gensec_security, oid_string);
+	if (ops) {
+		return ops->name;
+	}
+	return oid_string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism by OID, used in SPNEGO
+ *
+ * @note This should also be used when you wish to just start NLTMSSP (for example), as it uses a
+ *       well-known #define to hook it in.
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_oid(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  const char *mech_oid)
+{
+	SMB_ASSERT(gensec_security != NULL);
+
+	gensec_security->ops = gensec_security_by_oid(gensec_security, mech_oid);
+	if (!gensec_security->ops) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not find GENSEC backend for oid=%s\n", mech_oid));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	return gensec_start_mech(gensec_security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism by a well known SASL name
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_sasl_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const char *sasl_name)
+{
+	gensec_security->ops = gensec_security_by_sasl_name(gensec_security, sasl_name);
+	if (!gensec_security->ops) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not find GENSEC backend for sasl_name=%s\n", sasl_name));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	return gensec_start_mech(gensec_security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism with the preferred option from a SASL name list
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_sasl_list(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						 const char **sasl_names)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(gensec_security);
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **ops;
+	int i;
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	ops = gensec_security_by_sasl_list(gensec_security, mem_ctx, sasl_names);
+	if (!ops || !*ops) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not find GENSEC backend for any of sasl_name = %s\n",
+			  str_list_join(mem_ctx,
+					sasl_names, ' ')));
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	for (i=0; ops[i]; i++) {
+		nt_status = gensec_start_mech_by_ops(gensec_security, ops[i]);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start a GENSEC sub-mechanism by an internal name
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_start_mech_by_name(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const char *name)
+{
+	gensec_security->ops = gensec_security_by_name(gensec_security, name);
+	if (!gensec_security->ops) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Could not find GENSEC backend for name=%s\n", name));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	return gensec_start_mech(gensec_security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Associate a credentials structure with a GENSEC context - talloc_reference()s it to the context
+ *
+ */
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_set_credentials(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, struct cli_credentials *credentials)
+{
+	gensec_security->credentials = talloc_reference(gensec_security, credentials);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(gensec_security->credentials);
+	gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(gensec_security->credentials));
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+  register a GENSEC backend.
+
+  The 'name' can be later used by other backends to find the operations
+  structure for this backend.
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_register(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+			const struct gensec_security_ops *ops)
+{
+	if (gensec_security_by_name(NULL, ops->name) != NULL) {
+		/* its already registered! */
+		DEBUG(0,("GENSEC backend '%s' already registered\n",
+			 ops->name));
+		return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION;
+	}
+
+	generic_security_ops = talloc_realloc(ctx,
+					      generic_security_ops,
+					      const struct gensec_security_ops *,
+					      gensec_num_backends+2);
+	if (!generic_security_ops) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	generic_security_ops[gensec_num_backends] = ops;
+	gensec_num_backends++;
+	generic_security_ops[gensec_num_backends] = NULL;
+
+	DEBUG(3,("GENSEC backend '%s' registered\n",
+		 ops->name));
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+  return the GENSEC interface version, and the size of some critical types
+  This can be used by backends to either detect compilation errors, or provide
+  multiple implementations for different smbd compilation options in one module
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ const struct gensec_critical_sizes *gensec_interface_version(void)
+{
+	static const struct gensec_critical_sizes critical_sizes = {
+		GENSEC_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+		sizeof(struct gensec_security_ops),
+		sizeof(struct gensec_security),
+	};
+
+	return &critical_sizes;
+}
+
+static int sort_gensec(const struct gensec_security_ops **gs1, const struct gensec_security_ops **gs2) {
+	return (*gs2)->priority - (*gs1)->priority;
+}
+
+int gensec_setting_int(struct gensec_settings *settings, const char *mechanism, const char *name, int default_value)
+{
+	return lpcfg_parm_int(settings->lp_ctx, NULL, mechanism, name, default_value);
+}
+
+bool gensec_setting_bool(struct gensec_settings *settings, const char *mechanism, const char *name, bool default_value)
+{
+	return lpcfg_parm_bool(settings->lp_ctx, NULL, mechanism, name, default_value);
+}
+
+/*
+  initialise the GENSEC subsystem
+*/
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_init(void)
+{
+	static bool initialized = false;
+#define _MODULE_PROTO(init) extern NTSTATUS init(TALLOC_CTX *);
+#ifdef STATIC_gensec_MODULES
+	STATIC_gensec_MODULES_PROTO;
+	init_module_fn static_init[] = { STATIC_gensec_MODULES };
+#else
+	init_module_fn *static_init = NULL;
+#endif
+	init_module_fn *shared_init;
+
+	if (initialized) return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	initialized = true;
+
+	shared_init = load_samba_modules(NULL, "gensec");
+
+	run_init_functions(NULL, static_init);
+	run_init_functions(NULL, shared_init);
+
+	talloc_free(shared_init);
+
+	TYPESAFE_QSORT(generic_security_ops, gensec_num_backends, sort_gensec);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/gensec_util.c b/auth/gensec/gensec_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6b4a72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/gensec_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Generic Authentication Interface
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2006
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/common_auth.h"
+#include "../lib/util/asn1.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_generate_session_info_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					  struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					  struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
+					  DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+					  const char *principal_string,
+					  const struct tsocket_address *remote_address,
+					  struct auth_session_info **session_info)
+{
+	uint32_t session_info_flags = 0;
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_UNIX_TOKEN) {
+		session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS;
+
+	if (!pac_blob) {
+		enum server_role server_role =
+			lpcfg_server_role(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * For any domain setup (DC or member) we require having
+		 * a PAC, as the service ticket comes from an AD DC,
+		 * which will always provide a PAC, unless
+		 * UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED is configured for our
+		 * account, but that's just an invalid configuration,
+		 * the admin configured for us!
+		 *
+		 * As a legacy case, we still allow kerberos tickets from an MIT
+		 * realm, but only in standalone mode. In that mode we'll only
+		 * ever accept a kerberos authentication with a keytab file
+		 * being explicitly configured via the 'keytab method' option.
+		 */
+		if (server_role != ROLE_STANDALONE) {
+			DBG_WARNING("Unable to find PAC in ticket from %s, "
+				    "failing to allow access\n",
+				    principal_string);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_IMPERSONATION_TOKEN;
+		}
+		DBG_NOTICE("Unable to find PAC for %s, resorting to local "
+			   "user lookup\n", principal_string);
+	}
+
+	auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+
+	if ((auth_context == NULL) ||
+	    (auth_context->generate_session_info_pac == NULL)) {
+		DBG_ERR("Cannot generate a session_info without "
+			"the auth_context\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	status = auth_context->generate_session_info_pac(
+		auth_context,
+		mem_ctx,
+		smb_krb5_context,
+		pac_blob,
+		principal_string,
+		remote_address,
+		session_info_flags,
+		session_info);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+  magic check a GSS-API wrapper packet for an Kerberos OID
+*/
+static bool gensec_gssapi_check_oid(const DATA_BLOB *blob, const char *oid)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+	struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(NULL, ASN1_MAX_TREE_DEPTH);
+
+	if (!data) return false;
+
+	if (!asn1_load(data, *blob)) goto err;
+	if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_APPLICATION(0))) goto err;
+	if (!asn1_check_OID(data, oid)) goto err;
+
+	ret = !asn1_has_error(data);
+
+  err:
+
+	asn1_free(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the packet is one for the KRB5 mechanism
+ *
+ * NOTE: This is a helper that can be employed by multiple mechanisms, do
+ * not make assumptions about the private_data
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC state, unused
+ * @param in The request, as a DATA_BLOB
+ * @return Error, INVALID_PARAMETER if it's not a packet for us
+ *                or NT_STATUS_OK if the packet is ok.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_magic_check_krb5_oid(struct gensec_security *unused,
+					const DATA_BLOB *blob)
+{
+	if (gensec_gssapi_check_oid(blob, GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+}
+
+void gensec_child_want_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       uint32_t feature)
+{
+	struct gensec_security *child_security = gensec_security->child_security;
+
+	gensec_security->want_features |= feature;
+	if (child_security == NULL) {
+		return;
+	}
+	gensec_want_feature(child_security, feature);
+}
+
+bool gensec_child_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       uint32_t feature)
+{
+	struct gensec_security *child_security = gensec_security->child_security;
+
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER) {
+		/*
+		 * All mechs with sub (child) mechs need to provide DCERPC
+		 * header signing! This is required because the negotiation
+		 * of header signing is done before the authentication
+		 * is completed.
+		 */
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (child_security == NULL) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_have_feature(child_security, feature);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_unseal_packet(gensec_security->child_security,
+				    data, length,
+				    whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				    sig);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				   const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				   const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				   const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_check_packet(gensec_security->child_security,
+				   data, length,
+				   whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				   sig);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				  const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				  DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_seal_packet(gensec_security->child_security,
+				  mem_ctx,
+				  data, length,
+				  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				  sig);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				  const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				  DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_sign_packet(gensec_security->child_security,
+				  mem_ctx,
+				  data, length,
+				  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				  sig);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			   const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			   DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_wrap(gensec_security->child_security,
+			   mem_ctx, in, out);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			     DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_unwrap(gensec_security->child_security,
+			     mem_ctx, in, out);
+}
+
+size_t gensec_child_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     size_t data_size)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_sig_size(gensec_security->child_security, data_size);
+}
+
+size_t gensec_child_max_input_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_max_input_size(gensec_security->child_security);
+}
+
+size_t gensec_child_max_wrapped_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_max_wrapped_size(gensec_security->child_security);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				  DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_session_key(gensec_security->child_security,
+				  mem_ctx,
+				  session_key);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_child_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				   struct auth_session_info **session_info)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_session_info(gensec_security->child_security,
+				   mem_ctx,
+				   session_info);
+}
+
+NTTIME gensec_child_expire_time(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return GENSEC_EXPIRE_TIME_INFINITY;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_expire_time(gensec_security->child_security);
+}
+
+const char *gensec_child_final_auth_type(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->child_security == NULL) {
+		return "NONE";
+	}
+
+	return gensec_final_auth_type(gensec_security->child_security);
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/ncalrpc.c b/auth/gensec/ncalrpc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f845947
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/ncalrpc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   dcerpc ncalrpc as system operations
+
+   Copyright (C) 2014      Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+   Copyright (C) 2014      Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/dcerpc.h"
+#include "lib/param/param.h"
+#include "tsocket.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_as_system_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx);
+
+struct gensec_ncalrpc_state {
+	enum {
+		GENSEC_NCALRPC_START,
+		GENSEC_NCALRPC_MORE,
+		GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE,
+		GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR,
+	} step;
+
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_client_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_state *state;
+
+	state = talloc_zero(gensec_security,
+			    struct gensec_ncalrpc_state);
+	if (state == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	gensec_security->private_data = state;
+
+	state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_START;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_server_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_state *state;
+
+	state = talloc_zero(gensec_security,
+			    struct gensec_ncalrpc_state);
+	if (state == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	gensec_security->private_data = state;
+
+	state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_START;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+struct gensec_ncalrpc_update_state {
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_update_internal(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				const DATA_BLOB in,
+				DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+static struct tevent_req *gensec_ncalrpc_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct tevent_context *ev,
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req;
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_update_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct gensec_ncalrpc_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = gensec_ncalrpc_update_internal(gensec_security,
+						state, in,
+						&state->out);
+	state->status = status;
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_update_internal(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				const DATA_BLOB in,
+				DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct gensec_ncalrpc_state);
+	DATA_BLOB magic_req = data_blob_string_const("NCALRPC_AUTH_TOKEN");
+	DATA_BLOB magic_ok = data_blob_string_const("NCALRPC_AUTH_OK");
+	DATA_BLOB magic_fail = data_blob_string_const("NCALRPC_AUTH_FAIL");
+	char *unix_path = NULL;
+	int cmp;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (state->step >= GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	switch (gensec_security->gensec_role) {
+	case GENSEC_CLIENT:
+		switch (state->step) {
+		case GENSEC_NCALRPC_START:
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_req);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_MORE;
+			return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+
+		case GENSEC_NCALRPC_MORE:
+			cmp = data_blob_cmp(&in, &magic_ok);
+			if (cmp != 0) {
+				state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+				return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+			}
+
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+		case GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE:
+		case GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	case GENSEC_SERVER:
+		if (state->step != GENSEC_NCALRPC_START) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		cmp = data_blob_cmp(&in, &magic_req);
+		if (cmp != 0) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_fail);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		if (gensec_security->remote_addr == NULL) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_fail);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		unix_path = tsocket_address_unix_path(gensec_security->remote_addr,
+						      state);
+		if (unix_path == NULL) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_fail);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		cmp = strcmp(unix_path, AS_SYSTEM_MAGIC_PATH_TOKEN);
+		TALLOC_FREE(unix_path);
+		if (cmp != 0) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_fail);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		status = auth_system_user_info_dc(state,
+				lpcfg_netbios_name(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx),
+				&state->user_info_dc);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_fail);
+			if (out->data == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		*out = data_blob_dup_talloc(mem_ctx, magic_ok);
+		if (out->data == NULL) {
+			state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	state->step = GENSEC_NCALRPC_ERROR;
+	return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					   DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_ncalrpc_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	status = state->status;
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, state->out.data);
+	*out = state->out;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    struct auth_session_info **psession_info)
+{
+	struct gensec_ncalrpc_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct gensec_ncalrpc_state);
+	struct auth4_context *auth_ctx = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
+	uint32_t session_info_flags = 0;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (gensec_security->gensec_role != GENSEC_SERVER) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (state->step != GENSEC_NCALRPC_DONE) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_ctx == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot generate a session_info without the auth_context\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_ctx->generate_session_info == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot generate a session_info without the generate_session_info hook\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_UNIX_TOKEN) {
+		session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
+
+	status = auth_ctx->generate_session_info(
+				auth_ctx,
+				mem_ctx,
+				state->user_info_dc,
+				state->user_info_dc->info->account_name,
+				session_info_flags,
+				&session_info);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*psession_info = session_info;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* We have no features */
+static bool gensec_ncalrpc_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				 uint32_t feature)
+{
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_ncalrpc_security_ops = {
+	.name           = "ncalrpc_as_system",
+	.auth_type      = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NCALRPC_AS_SYSTEM,
+	.client_start   = gensec_ncalrpc_client_start,
+	.server_start   = gensec_ncalrpc_server_start,
+	.update_send    = gensec_ncalrpc_update_send,
+	.update_recv    = gensec_ncalrpc_update_recv,
+	.session_info   = gensec_ncalrpc_session_info,
+	.have_feature   = gensec_ncalrpc_have_feature,
+	.enabled        = true,
+	.priority       = GENSEC_EXTERNAL,
+};
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_ncalrpc_as_system_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	status = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_ncalrpc_security_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			  gensec_ncalrpc_security_ops.name));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	return status;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/schannel.c b/auth/gensec/schannel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86527fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/schannel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1181 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   dcerpc schannel operations
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_schannel.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_proto.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/schannel.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/dcerpc.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_toplevel_proto.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+struct schannel_state {
+	struct gensec_security *gensec;
+	uint64_t seq_num;
+	bool initiator;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds;
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+};
+
+#define SETUP_SEQNUM(state, buf, initiator) do { \
+	uint8_t *_buf = buf; \
+	uint32_t _seq_num_low = (state)->seq_num & UINT32_MAX; \
+	uint32_t _seq_num_high = (state)->seq_num >> 32; \
+	if (initiator) { \
+		_seq_num_high |= 0x80000000; \
+	} \
+	RSIVAL(_buf, 0, _seq_num_low); \
+	RSIVAL(_buf, 4, _seq_num_high); \
+} while(0)
+
+static struct schannel_state *netsec_create_state(
+				struct gensec_security *gensec,
+				struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
+				bool initiator)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state;
+
+	state = talloc_zero(gensec, struct schannel_state);
+	if (state == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	state->gensec = gensec;
+	state->initiator = initiator;
+	state->creds = netlogon_creds_copy(state, creds);
+	if (state->creds == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(state);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	gensec->private_data = state;
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static void netsec_offset_and_sizes(struct schannel_state *state,
+				    bool do_seal,
+				    uint32_t *_min_sig_size,
+				    uint32_t *_used_sig_size,
+				    uint32_t *_checksum_length,
+				    uint32_t *_confounder_ofs)
+{
+	uint32_t min_sig_size;
+	uint32_t used_sig_size;
+	uint32_t checksum_length;
+	uint32_t confounder_ofs;
+
+	if (state->creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		min_sig_size = 48;
+		used_sig_size = 56;
+		/*
+		 * Note: windows has a bug here and uses the old values...
+		 *
+		 * checksum_length = 32;
+		 * confounder_ofs = 48;
+		 */
+		checksum_length = 8;
+		confounder_ofs = 24;
+	} else {
+		min_sig_size = 24;
+		used_sig_size = 32;
+		checksum_length = 8;
+		confounder_ofs = 24;
+	}
+
+	if (do_seal) {
+		min_sig_size += 8;
+	}
+
+	if (_min_sig_size) {
+		*_min_sig_size = min_sig_size;
+	}
+
+	if (_used_sig_size) {
+		*_used_sig_size = used_sig_size;
+	}
+
+	if (_checksum_length) {
+		*_checksum_length = checksum_length;
+	}
+
+	if (_confounder_ofs) {
+		*_confounder_ofs = confounder_ofs;
+	}
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Encode or Decode the sequence number (which is symmetric)
+ ********************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS netsec_do_seq_num(struct schannel_state *state,
+				  const uint8_t *checksum,
+				  uint32_t checksum_length,
+				  uint8_t seq_num[8])
+{
+	if (state->creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd = NULL;
+		gnutls_datum_t key = {
+			.data = state->creds->session_key,
+			.size = sizeof(state->creds->session_key),
+		};
+		uint32_t iv_size =
+			gnutls_cipher_get_iv_size(GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB8);
+		uint8_t _iv[iv_size];
+		gnutls_datum_t iv = {
+			.data = _iv,
+			.size = iv_size,
+		};
+		int rc;
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(_iv);
+
+		memcpy(iv.data + 0, checksum, 8);
+		memcpy(iv.data + 8, checksum, 8);
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB8,
+					&key,
+					&iv);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc,
+							NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd, seq_num, 8);
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc,
+							NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		static const uint8_t zeros[4];
+		uint8_t _sequence_key[16];
+		gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd;
+		gnutls_datum_t sequence_key = {
+			.data = _sequence_key,
+			.size = sizeof(_sequence_key),
+		};
+		uint8_t digest1[16];
+		int rc;
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      state->creds->session_key,
+				      sizeof(state->creds->session_key),
+				      zeros,
+				      sizeof(zeros),
+				      digest1);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      digest1,
+				      sizeof(digest1),
+				      checksum,
+				      checksum_length,
+				      _sequence_key);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(digest1);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&sequence_key,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			ZERO_ARRAY(_sequence_key);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+					   seq_num,
+					   8);
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(_sequence_key);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+	}
+
+	state->seq_num++;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS netsec_do_seal(struct schannel_state *state,
+			       const uint8_t seq_num[8],
+			       uint8_t confounder[8],
+			       uint8_t *data, uint32_t length,
+			       bool forward)
+{
+	if (state->creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd = NULL;
+		uint8_t sess_kf0[16] = {0};
+		gnutls_datum_t key = {
+			.data = sess_kf0,
+			.size = sizeof(sess_kf0),
+		};
+		uint32_t iv_size =
+			gnutls_cipher_get_iv_size(GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB8);
+		uint8_t _iv[iv_size];
+		gnutls_datum_t iv = {
+			.data = _iv,
+			.size = iv_size,
+		};
+		uint32_t i;
+		int rc;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < key.size; i++) {
+			key.data[i] = state->creds->session_key[i] ^ 0xf0;
+		}
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(_iv);
+
+		memcpy(iv.data + 0, seq_num, 8);
+		memcpy(iv.data + 8, seq_num, 8);
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB8,
+					&key,
+					&iv);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("ERROR: gnutls_cipher_init: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		if (forward) {
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+						   confounder,
+						   8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+			}
+
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+						   data,
+						   length);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+			}
+		} else {
+
+			/*
+			 * Workaround bug present in gnutls 3.6.8:
+			 *
+			 * gnutls_cipher_decrypt() uses an optimization
+			 * internally that breaks decryption when processing
+			 * buffers with their length not being a multiple
+			 * of the blocksize.
+			 */
+
+			uint8_t tmp[16] = { 0, };
+			uint32_t tmp_dlength = MIN(length, sizeof(tmp) - 8);
+
+			memcpy(tmp, confounder, 8);
+			memcpy(tmp + 8, data, tmp_dlength);
+
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(cipher_hnd,
+						   tmp,
+						   8 + tmp_dlength);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				ZERO_STRUCT(tmp);
+				gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+			}
+
+			memcpy(confounder, tmp, 8);
+			memcpy(data, tmp + 8, tmp_dlength);
+			ZERO_STRUCT(tmp);
+
+			if (length > tmp_dlength) {
+				rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(cipher_hnd,
+							   data + tmp_dlength,
+							   length - tmp_dlength);
+				if (rc < 0) {
+					gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+					return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+	} else {
+		gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd;
+		uint8_t _sealing_key[16];
+		gnutls_datum_t sealing_key = {
+			.data = _sealing_key,
+			.size = sizeof(_sealing_key),
+		};
+		static const uint8_t zeros[4];
+		uint8_t digest2[16];
+		uint8_t sess_kf0[16];
+		int rc;
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+			sess_kf0[i] = state->creds->session_key[i] ^ 0xf0;
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      sess_kf0,
+				      sizeof(sess_kf0),
+				      zeros,
+				      4,
+				      digest2);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			ZERO_ARRAY(digest2);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      digest2,
+				      sizeof(digest2),
+				      seq_num,
+				      8,
+				      _sealing_key);
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(digest2);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&sealing_key,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			ZERO_ARRAY(_sealing_key);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+					   confounder,
+					   8);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			ZERO_ARRAY(_sealing_key);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&sealing_key,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			ZERO_ARRAY(_sealing_key);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+					   data,
+					   length);
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(_sealing_key);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Create a digest over the entire packet (including the data), and
+ MD5 it with the session key.
+ ********************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS netsec_do_sign(struct schannel_state *state,
+			       const uint8_t *confounder,
+			       const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			       uint8_t header[8],
+			       uint8_t *checksum)
+{
+	if (state->creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
+		int rc;
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
+				      GNUTLS_MAC_SHA256,
+				      state->creds->session_key,
+				      sizeof(state->creds->session_key));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		if (confounder) {
+			SSVAL(header, 0, NL_SIGN_HMAC_SHA256);
+			SSVAL(header, 2, NL_SEAL_AES128);
+			SSVAL(header, 4, 0xFFFF);
+			SSVAL(header, 6, 0x0000);
+
+			rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, header, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, confounder, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+		} else {
+			SSVAL(header, 0, NL_SIGN_HMAC_SHA256);
+			SSVAL(header, 2, NL_SEAL_NONE);
+			SSVAL(header, 4, 0xFFFF);
+			SSVAL(header, 6, 0x0000);
+
+			rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, header, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, data, length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, checksum);
+	} else {
+		uint8_t packet_digest[16];
+		static const uint8_t zeros[4];
+		gnutls_hash_hd_t hash_hnd = NULL;
+		int rc;
+
+		rc = gnutls_hash_init(&hash_hnd, GNUTLS_DIG_MD5);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, zeros, sizeof(zeros));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+		if (confounder) {
+			SSVAL(header, 0, NL_SIGN_HMAC_MD5);
+			SSVAL(header, 2, NL_SEAL_RC4);
+			SSVAL(header, 4, 0xFFFF);
+			SSVAL(header, 6, 0x0000);
+
+			rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, header, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, confounder, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+		} else {
+			SSVAL(header, 0, NL_SIGN_HMAC_MD5);
+			SSVAL(header, 2, NL_SEAL_NONE);
+			SSVAL(header, 4, 0xFFFF);
+			SSVAL(header, 6, 0x0000);
+
+			rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, header, 8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, data, length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+		gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, packet_digest);
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				      state->creds->session_key,
+				      sizeof(state->creds->session_key),
+				      packet_digest,
+				      sizeof(packet_digest),
+				      checksum);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(packet_digest);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS netsec_incoming_packet(struct schannel_state *state,
+				bool do_unseal,
+				uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	uint32_t min_sig_size = 0;
+	uint8_t header[8];
+	uint8_t checksum[32];
+	uint32_t checksum_length = sizeof(checksum_length);
+	uint8_t _confounder[8];
+	uint8_t *confounder = NULL;
+	uint32_t confounder_ofs = 0;
+	uint8_t seq_num[8];
+	bool ret;
+	const uint8_t *sign_data = NULL;
+	size_t sign_length = 0;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	netsec_offset_and_sizes(state,
+				do_unseal,
+				&min_sig_size,
+				NULL,
+				&checksum_length,
+				&confounder_ofs);
+
+	if (sig->length < min_sig_size) {
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (do_unseal) {
+		confounder = _confounder;
+		memcpy(confounder, sig->data+confounder_ofs, 8);
+	} else {
+		confounder = NULL;
+	}
+
+	SETUP_SEQNUM(state, seq_num, !state->initiator);
+
+	if (do_unseal) {
+		status = netsec_do_seal(state,
+					seq_num,
+					confounder,
+					data,
+					length,
+					false);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_seal failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (state->gensec->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER) {
+		sign_data = whole_pdu;
+		sign_length = pdu_length;
+	} else {
+		sign_data = data;
+		sign_length = length;
+	}
+
+	status = netsec_do_sign(state,
+				confounder,
+				sign_data,
+				sign_length,
+				header,
+				checksum);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_sign failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	ret = mem_equal_const_time(checksum, sig->data+16, checksum_length);
+	if (!ret) {
+		dump_data_pw("calc digest:", checksum, checksum_length);
+		dump_data_pw("wire digest:", sig->data+16, checksum_length);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	status = netsec_do_seq_num(state, checksum, checksum_length, seq_num);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_seq_num failed: %s\n",
+			    nt_errstr(status));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	ZERO_ARRAY(checksum);
+
+	ret = mem_equal_const_time(seq_num, sig->data+8, 8);
+	if (!ret) {
+		dump_data_pw("calc seq num:", seq_num, 8);
+		dump_data_pw("wire seq num:", sig->data+8, 8);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static uint32_t netsec_outgoing_sig_size(struct schannel_state *state)
+{
+	uint32_t sig_size = 0;
+
+	netsec_offset_and_sizes(state,
+				true,
+				NULL,
+				&sig_size,
+				NULL,
+				NULL);
+
+	return sig_size;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS netsec_outgoing_packet(struct schannel_state *state,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				bool do_seal,
+				uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	uint32_t min_sig_size = 0;
+	uint32_t used_sig_size = 0;
+	uint8_t header[8];
+	uint8_t checksum[32];
+	uint32_t checksum_length = sizeof(checksum_length);
+	uint8_t _confounder[8];
+	uint8_t *confounder = NULL;
+	uint32_t confounder_ofs = 0;
+	uint8_t seq_num[8];
+	const uint8_t *sign_data = NULL;
+	size_t sign_length = 0;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	netsec_offset_and_sizes(state,
+				do_seal,
+				&min_sig_size,
+				&used_sig_size,
+				&checksum_length,
+				&confounder_ofs);
+
+	SETUP_SEQNUM(state, seq_num, state->initiator);
+
+	if (do_seal) {
+		confounder = _confounder;
+		generate_random_buffer(confounder, 8);
+	} else {
+		confounder = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (state->gensec->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER) {
+		sign_data = whole_pdu;
+		sign_length = pdu_length;
+	} else {
+		sign_data = data;
+		sign_length = length;
+	}
+
+	status = netsec_do_sign(state,
+				confounder,
+				sign_data,
+				sign_length,
+				header,
+				checksum);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_sign failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (do_seal) {
+		status = netsec_do_seal(state,
+					seq_num,
+					confounder,
+					data,
+					length,
+					true);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_seal failed: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+	}
+
+	status = netsec_do_seq_num(state, checksum, checksum_length, seq_num);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("netsec_do_seq_num failed: %s\n",
+			    nt_errstr(status));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	(*sig) = data_blob_talloc_zero(mem_ctx, used_sig_size);
+
+	memcpy(sig->data, header, 8);
+	memcpy(sig->data+8, seq_num, 8);
+	memcpy(sig->data+16, checksum, checksum_length);
+
+	if (confounder) {
+		memcpy(sig->data+confounder_ofs, confounder, 8);
+	}
+
+	dump_data_pw("signature:", sig->data+ 0, 8);
+	dump_data_pw("seq_num  :", sig->data+ 8, 8);
+	dump_data_pw("digest   :", sig->data+16, checksum_length);
+	dump_data_pw("confound :", sig->data+confounder_ofs, 8);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_schannel_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx);
+
+static size_t schannel_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+
+	return netsec_outgoing_sig_size(state);
+}
+
+struct schannel_update_state {
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS schannel_update_internal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+static struct tevent_req *schannel_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					       struct tevent_context *ev,
+					       struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					       const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req;
+	struct schannel_update_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct schannel_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = schannel_update_internal(gensec_security,
+					  state, in,
+					  &state->out);
+	state->status = status;
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS schannel_update_internal(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+	struct NL_AUTH_MESSAGE bind_schannel = {
+		.Flags = 0,
+	};
+	struct NL_AUTH_MESSAGE bind_schannel_ack;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds;
+	const char *workstation;
+	const char *domain;
+
+	*out = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+
+	if (gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level < DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) {
+		switch (gensec_security->gensec_role) {
+		case GENSEC_CLIENT:
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+		case GENSEC_SERVER:
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	switch (gensec_security->gensec_role) {
+	case GENSEC_CLIENT:
+		if (state != NULL) {
+			/* we could parse the bind ack, but we don't know what it is yet */
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		creds = cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds(gensec_security->credentials);
+		if (creds == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+		}
+
+		state = netsec_create_state(gensec_security,
+					    creds, true /* initiator */);
+		if (state == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		bind_schannel.MessageType = NL_NEGOTIATE_REQUEST;
+
+		bind_schannel.Flags = NL_FLAG_OEM_NETBIOS_DOMAIN_NAME |
+				      NL_FLAG_OEM_NETBIOS_COMPUTER_NAME;
+		bind_schannel.oem_netbios_domain.a = cli_credentials_get_domain(gensec_security->credentials);
+		bind_schannel.oem_netbios_computer.a = creds->computer_name;
+
+		if (creds->secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_DNS_DOMAIN) {
+			bind_schannel.Flags |= NL_FLAG_UTF8_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME;
+			bind_schannel.utf8_dns_domain.u = cli_credentials_get_realm(gensec_security->credentials);
+
+			bind_schannel.Flags |= NL_FLAG_UTF8_NETBIOS_COMPUTER_NAME;
+			bind_schannel.utf8_netbios_computer.u = creds->computer_name;
+		}
+
+		ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(out, out_mem_ctx, &bind_schannel,
+					       (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_NL_AUTH_MESSAGE);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+			status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+			DEBUG(3, ("Could not create schannel bind: %s\n",
+				  nt_errstr(status)));
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	case GENSEC_SERVER:
+
+		if (state != NULL) {
+			/* no third leg on this protocol */
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		/* parse the schannel startup blob */
+		ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&in, out_mem_ctx, &bind_schannel,
+			(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NL_AUTH_MESSAGE);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+			status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+			DEBUG(3, ("Could not parse incoming schannel bind: %s\n",
+				  nt_errstr(status)));
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		if (bind_schannel.Flags & NL_FLAG_OEM_NETBIOS_DOMAIN_NAME) {
+			domain = bind_schannel.oem_netbios_domain.a;
+			if (strcasecmp_m(domain, lpcfg_workgroup(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx)) != 0) {
+				DEBUG(3, ("Request for schannel to incorrect domain: %s != our domain %s\n",
+					  domain, lpcfg_workgroup(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx)));
+				return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+			}
+		} else if (bind_schannel.Flags & NL_FLAG_UTF8_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME) {
+			domain = bind_schannel.utf8_dns_domain.u;
+			if (strcasecmp_m(domain, lpcfg_dnsdomain(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx)) != 0) {
+				DEBUG(3, ("Request for schannel to incorrect domain: %s != our domain %s\n",
+					  domain, lpcfg_dnsdomain(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx)));
+				return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+			}
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Request for schannel to without domain\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		if (bind_schannel.Flags & NL_FLAG_OEM_NETBIOS_COMPUTER_NAME) {
+			workstation = bind_schannel.oem_netbios_computer.a;
+		} else if (bind_schannel.Flags & NL_FLAG_UTF8_NETBIOS_COMPUTER_NAME) {
+			workstation = bind_schannel.utf8_netbios_computer.u;
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Request for schannel to without netbios workstation\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+
+		status = schannel_get_creds_state(out_mem_ctx,
+						  gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx,
+						  workstation, &creds);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DEBUG(3, ("Could not find session key for attempted schannel connection from %s: %s\n",
+				  workstation, nt_errstr(status)));
+			if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
+				return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+			}
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		state = netsec_create_state(gensec_security,
+					    creds, false /* not initiator */);
+		if (state == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		status = auth_anonymous_user_info_dc(state,
+				lpcfg_netbios_name(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx),
+				&state->user_info_dc);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		bind_schannel_ack.MessageType = NL_NEGOTIATE_RESPONSE;
+		bind_schannel_ack.Flags = 0;
+		bind_schannel_ack.Buffer.dummy = 0x6c0000; /* actually I think
+							    * this does not have
+							    * any meaning here
+							    * - gd */
+
+		ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(out, out_mem_ctx, &bind_schannel_ack,
+					       (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_NL_AUTH_MESSAGE);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+			status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+			DEBUG(3, ("Could not return schannel bind ack for client %s: %s\n",
+				  workstation, nt_errstr(status)));
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS schannel_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				     DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct schannel_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct schannel_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	status = state->status;
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, state->out.data);
+	*out = state->out;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns anonymous credentials for schannel, matching Win2k3.
+ *
+ */
+
+static NTSTATUS schannel_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				      struct auth_session_info **_session_info)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+	struct auth4_context *auth_ctx = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
+	uint32_t session_info_flags = 0;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (auth_ctx == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot generate a session_info without the auth_context\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_ctx->generate_session_info == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot generate a session_info without the generate_session_info hook\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_UNIX_TOKEN) {
+		session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
+
+	status = auth_ctx->generate_session_info(
+				auth_ctx,
+				mem_ctx,
+				state->user_info_dc,
+				state->user_info_dc->info->account_name,
+				session_info_flags,
+				&session_info);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*_session_info = session_info;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reduce the attack surface by ensuring schannel is not available when
+ * we are not a DC
+ */
+static NTSTATUS schannel_server_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	enum server_role server_role
+		= lpcfg_server_role(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+	switch (server_role) {
+	case ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC:
+	case ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC:
+	case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC:
+	case ROLE_IPA_DC:
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	default:
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS schannel_client_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static bool schannel_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 uint32_t feature)
+{
+	if (gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level >= DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) {
+		if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (gensec_security->dcerpc_auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+		if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+  unseal a packet
+*/
+static NTSTATUS schannel_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				       uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				       const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				       const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+
+	return netsec_incoming_packet(state, true,
+				      discard_const_p(uint8_t, data),
+				      length,
+				      whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				      sig);
+}
+
+/*
+  check the signature on a packet
+*/
+static NTSTATUS schannel_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				      const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+
+	return netsec_incoming_packet(state, false,
+				      discard_const_p(uint8_t, data),
+				      length,
+				      whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				      sig);
+}
+/*
+  seal a packet
+*/
+static NTSTATUS schannel_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				     uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				     DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+
+	return netsec_outgoing_packet(state, mem_ctx, true,
+				      data, length,
+				      whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				      sig);
+}
+
+/*
+  sign a packet
+*/
+static NTSTATUS schannel_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				     DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct schannel_state *state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct schannel_state);
+
+	return netsec_outgoing_packet(state, mem_ctx, false,
+				      discard_const_p(uint8_t, data),
+				      length,
+				      whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				      sig);
+}
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_schannel_security_ops = {
+	.name		= "schannel",
+	.auth_type	= DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL,
+	.client_start   = schannel_client_start,
+	.server_start   = schannel_server_start,
+	.update_send	= schannel_update_send,
+	.update_recv	= schannel_update_recv,
+	.seal_packet 	= schannel_seal_packet,
+	.sign_packet   	= schannel_sign_packet,
+	.check_packet	= schannel_check_packet,
+	.unseal_packet 	= schannel_unseal_packet,
+	.session_info	= schannel_session_info,
+	.sig_size	= schannel_sig_size,
+	.have_feature   = schannel_have_feature,
+	.enabled        = true,
+	.priority       = GENSEC_SCHANNEL
+};
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_schannel_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS ret;
+	ret = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_schannel_security_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			gensec_schannel_security_ops.name));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/spnego.c b/auth/gensec/spnego.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcb5a06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/spnego.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2249 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   RFC2478 Compliant SPNEGO implementation
+
+   Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com>      2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>  2004-2008
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/spnego.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "lib/util/asn1.h"
+#include "lib/util/base64.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#undef strcasecmp
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx);
+
+enum spnego_state_position {
+	SPNEGO_SERVER_START,
+	SPNEGO_CLIENT_START,
+	SPNEGO_SERVER_TARG,
+	SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG,
+	SPNEGO_FALLBACK,
+	SPNEGO_DONE
+};
+
+struct spnego_state;
+struct spnego_neg_ops;
+struct spnego_neg_state;
+
+struct spnego_neg_state {
+	const struct spnego_neg_ops *ops;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *all_sec;
+	size_t all_idx;
+	const char * const *mech_types;
+	size_t mech_idx;
+};
+
+struct spnego_neg_ops {
+	const char *name;
+	/*
+	 * The start hook does the initial processing on the incoming packet and
+	 * may starts the first possible subcontext. It indicates that
+	 * gensec_update() is required on the subcontext by returning
+	 * NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED and return something useful in
+	 * 'in_next'. Note that 'in_mem_ctx' is just passed as a hint, the
+	 * caller should treat 'in_next' as const and don't attempt to free the
+	 * content.  NT_STATUS_OK indicates the finish hook should be invoked
+	 * directly within the need of gensec_update() on the subcontext.
+	 * Every other error indicates an error that's returned to the caller.
+	 */
+	NTSTATUS (*start_fn)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+			     struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+			     struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+			     DATA_BLOB *in_next);
+	/*
+	 * The step hook processes the result of a failed gensec_update() and
+	 * can decide to ignore a failure and continue the negotiation by
+	 * setting up the next possible subcontext. It indicates that
+	 * gensec_update() is required on the subcontext by returning
+	 * NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED and return something useful in
+	 * 'in_next'. Note that 'in_mem_ctx' is just passed as a hint, the
+	 * caller should treat 'in_next' as const and don't attempt to free the
+	 * content.  NT_STATUS_OK indicates the finish hook should be invoked
+	 * directly within the need of gensec_update() on the subcontext.
+	 * Every other error indicates an error that's returned to the caller.
+	 */
+	NTSTATUS (*step_fn)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+			    struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+			    struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+			    NTSTATUS last_status,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *in_next);
+	/*
+	 * The finish hook processes the result of a successful gensec_update()
+	 * (NT_STATUS_OK or NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED). It forms the
+	 * response pdu that will be returned from the toplevel gensec_update()
+	 * together with NT_STATUS_OK or NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED. It
+	 * may also alter the state machine to prepare receiving the next pdu
+	 * from the peer.
+	 */
+	NTSTATUS (*finish_fn)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			      struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+			      struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+			      struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+			      NTSTATUS sub_status,
+			      const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+			      TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			      DATA_BLOB *out);
+};
+
+struct spnego_state {
+	enum spnego_message_type expected_packet;
+	enum spnego_state_position state_position;
+	struct gensec_security *sub_sec_security;
+	bool sub_sec_ready;
+
+	const char *neg_oid;
+
+	DATA_BLOB mech_types;
+	size_t num_targs;
+	bool downgraded;
+	bool mic_requested;
+	bool needs_mic_sign;
+	bool needs_mic_check;
+	bool may_skip_mic_check;
+	bool done_mic_check;
+
+	bool simulate_w2k;
+	bool no_optimistic;
+
+	/*
+	 * The following is used to implement
+	 * the update token fragmentation
+	 */
+	size_t in_needed;
+	DATA_BLOB in_frag;
+	size_t out_max_length;
+	DATA_BLOB out_frag;
+	NTSTATUS out_status;
+};
+
+static struct spnego_neg_state *gensec_spnego_neg_state(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+		const struct spnego_neg_ops *ops)
+{
+	struct spnego_neg_state *n = NULL;
+
+	n = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct spnego_neg_state);
+	if (n == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	n->ops = ops;
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+static void gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(struct spnego_state *spnego_state)
+{
+	spnego_state->sub_sec_ready = false;
+	TALLOC_FREE(spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state;
+
+	spnego_state = talloc_zero(gensec_security, struct spnego_state);
+	if (!spnego_state) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_INIT;
+	spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_CLIENT_START;
+	spnego_state->sub_sec_security = NULL;
+	spnego_state->sub_sec_ready = false;
+	spnego_state->mech_types = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_state->out_max_length = gensec_max_update_size(gensec_security);
+	spnego_state->out_status = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+
+	spnego_state->simulate_w2k = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+						"spnego", "simulate_w2k", false);
+	spnego_state->no_optimistic = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+							  "spnego",
+							  "client_no_optimistic",
+							  false);
+
+	gensec_security->private_data = spnego_state;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state;
+
+	spnego_state = talloc_zero(gensec_security, struct spnego_state);
+	if (!spnego_state) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_INIT;
+	spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_SERVER_START;
+	spnego_state->sub_sec_security = NULL;
+	spnego_state->sub_sec_ready = false;
+	spnego_state->mech_types = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_state->out_max_length = gensec_max_update_size(gensec_security);
+	spnego_state->out_status = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+
+	spnego_state->simulate_w2k = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+						"spnego", "simulate_w2k", false);
+
+	gensec_security->private_data = spnego_state;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/** Fallback to another GENSEC mechanism, based on magic strings 
+ *
+ * This is the 'fallback' case, where we don't get SPNEGO, and have to
+ * try all the other options (and hope they all have a magic string
+ * they check)
+*/
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_try_fallback(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, 
+						  struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+						  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						  const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	int i,j;
+	const struct gensec_security_ops **all_ops;
+
+	all_ops = gensec_security_mechs(gensec_security, mem_ctx);
+
+	for (i=0; all_ops && all_ops[i]; i++) {
+		bool is_spnego;
+		NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+		if (gensec_security != NULL &&
+		    !gensec_security_ops_enabled(all_ops[i], gensec_security))
+		{
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!all_ops[i]->oid) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		is_spnego = false;
+		for (j=0; all_ops[i]->oid[j]; j++) {
+			if (strcasecmp(GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO,all_ops[i]->oid[j]) == 0) {
+				is_spnego = true;
+			}
+		}
+		if (is_spnego) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!all_ops[i]->magic) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		nt_status = all_ops[i]->magic(gensec_security, &in);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_FALLBACK;
+
+		nt_status = gensec_subcontext_start(spnego_state, 
+						    gensec_security, 
+						    &spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+		/* select the sub context */
+		nt_status = gensec_start_mech_by_ops(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						     all_ops[i]);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+	DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse SPNEGO request\n"));
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_start(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	n->mech_idx = 0;
+	n->mech_types = gensec_security_oids(gensec_security, n,
+					     GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
+	if (n->mech_types == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("gensec_security_oids() failed\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	n->all_idx = 0;
+	n->all_sec = gensec_security_by_oid_list(gensec_security,
+						 n, n->mech_types,
+						 GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
+	if (n->all_sec == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("gensec_security_by_oid_list() failed\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	return n->ops->step_fn(gensec_security, spnego_state, n,
+			       spnego_in, NT_STATUS_OK, in_mem_ctx, in_next);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_step(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS last_status,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(last_status)) {
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *next_sec = NULL;
+		const char *next = NULL;
+		const char *principal = NULL;
+		int dbg_level = DBGLVL_WARNING;
+		NTSTATUS status = last_status;
+
+		if (cur_sec[1].op != NULL) {
+			next_sec = &cur_sec[1];
+		}
+
+		if (next_sec != NULL) {
+			next = next_sec->op->name;
+			dbg_level = DBGLVL_NOTICE;
+		}
+
+		if (gensec_security->target.principal != NULL) {
+			principal = gensec_security->target.principal;
+		} else if (gensec_security->target.service != NULL &&
+			   gensec_security->target.hostname != NULL)
+		{
+			principal = talloc_asprintf(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						    "%s/%s",
+						    gensec_security->target.service,
+						    gensec_security->target.hostname);
+		} else {
+			principal = gensec_security->target.hostname;
+		}
+
+		DBG_PREFIX(dbg_level, (
+			   "%s: creating NEG_TOKEN_INIT for %s failed "
+			   "(next[%s]): %s\n", cur_sec->op->name,
+			   principal, next, nt_errstr(status)));
+
+		if (next == NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * A hard error without a possible fallback.
+			 */
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Pretend we never started it
+		 */
+		gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+
+		/*
+		 * And try the next one...
+		 */
+		n->all_idx += 1;
+	}
+
+	for (; n->all_sec[n->all_idx].op != NULL; n->all_idx++) {
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+		NTSTATUS status;
+
+		status = gensec_subcontext_start(spnego_state,
+						 gensec_security,
+						 &spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/* select the sub context */
+		status = gensec_start_mech_by_ops(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						  cur_sec->op);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* In the client, try and produce the first (optimistic) packet */
+		if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_CLIENT_START) {
+			*in_next = data_blob_null;
+			return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+		}
+
+		*in_next = data_blob_null;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	DBG_WARNING("Failed to setup SPNEGO negTokenInit request\n");
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_finish(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS sub_status,
+					const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+					TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+	struct spnego_data spnego_out;
+	bool ok;
+
+	spnego_out.type = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_INIT;
+
+	n->mech_types = gensec_security_oids_from_ops_wrapped(n, cur_sec);
+	if (n->mech_types == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("gensec_security_oids_from_ops_wrapped() failed\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ok = spnego_write_mech_types(spnego_state,
+				     n->mech_types,
+				     &spnego_state->mech_types);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_ERR("Failed to write mechTypes\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* List the remaining mechs as options */
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechTypes = n->mech_types;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.reqFlags = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.reqFlagsPadding = 0;
+
+	if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_SERVER_START) {
+		spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechListMIC
+			= data_blob_string_const(ADS_IGNORE_PRINCIPAL);
+	} else {
+		spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechListMIC = data_blob_null;
+	}
+
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechToken = sub_out;
+
+	if (spnego_write_data(out_mem_ctx, out, &spnego_out) == -1) {
+		DBG_ERR("Failed to write NEG_TOKEN_INIT\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that 'cur_sec' is temporary memory, but
+	 * cur_sec->oid points to a const string in the
+	 * backends gensec_security_ops structure.
+	 */
+	spnego_state->neg_oid = cur_sec->oid;
+
+	/* set next state */
+	if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_SERVER_START) {
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_SERVER_START;
+		spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_INIT;
+	} else {
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG;
+		spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+static const struct spnego_neg_ops gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_ops = {
+	.name      = "create_negTokenInit",
+	.start_fn  = gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_start,
+	.step_fn   = gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_step,
+	.finish_fn = gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_finish,
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_start(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	const char *tp = NULL;
+
+	/* The server offers a list of mechanisms */
+
+	tp = spnego_in->negTokenInit.targetPrincipal;
+	if (tp != NULL && strcmp(tp, ADS_IGNORE_PRINCIPAL) != 0) {
+		DBG_INFO("Server claims it's principal name is %s\n", tp);
+		if (lpcfg_client_use_spnego_principal(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx)) {
+			gensec_set_target_principal(gensec_security, tp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	n->mech_idx = 0;
+
+	/* Do not use server mech list as it isn't protected. Instead, get all
+	 * supported mechs (excluding SPNEGO). */
+	n->mech_types = gensec_security_oids(gensec_security, n,
+					     GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
+	if (n->mech_types == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	n->all_idx = 0;
+	n->all_sec = gensec_security_by_oid_list(gensec_security,
+						 n, n->mech_types,
+						 GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
+	if (n->all_sec == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("gensec_security_by_oid_list() failed\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	return n->ops->step_fn(gensec_security, spnego_state, n,
+			       spnego_in, NT_STATUS_OK, in_mem_ctx, in_next);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_step(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS last_status,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(last_status)) {
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *next_sec = NULL;
+		const char *next = NULL;
+		const char *principal = NULL;
+		int dbg_level = DBGLVL_WARNING;
+		bool allow_fallback = false;
+		NTSTATUS status = last_status;
+
+		if (cur_sec[1].op != NULL) {
+			next_sec = &cur_sec[1];
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * it is likely that a NULL input token will
+		 * not be liked by most server mechs, but if
+		 * we are in the client, we want the first
+		 * update packet to be able to abort the use
+		 * of this mech
+		 */
+		if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_ACCOUNT_NAME) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_COMPUTER_NAME) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO))
+		{
+			allow_fallback = true;
+		}
+
+		if (allow_fallback && next_sec != NULL) {
+			next = next_sec->op->name;
+			dbg_level = DBGLVL_NOTICE;
+		}
+
+		if (gensec_security->target.principal != NULL) {
+			principal = gensec_security->target.principal;
+		} else if (gensec_security->target.service != NULL &&
+			   gensec_security->target.hostname != NULL)
+		{
+			principal = talloc_asprintf(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						    "%s/%s",
+						    gensec_security->target.service,
+						    gensec_security->target.hostname);
+		} else {
+			principal = gensec_security->target.hostname;
+		}
+
+		DBG_PREFIX(dbg_level, (
+			   "%s: creating NEG_TOKEN_INIT for %s failed "
+			   "(next[%s]): %s\n", cur_sec->op->name,
+			   principal, next, nt_errstr(status)));
+
+		if (next == NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * A hard error without a possible fallback.
+			 */
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Pretend we never started it.
+		 */
+		gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+
+		/*
+		 * And try the next one...
+		 */
+		n->all_idx += 1;
+	}
+
+	for (; n->all_sec[n->all_idx].op != NULL; n->all_idx++) {
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+		NTSTATUS status;
+
+		status = gensec_subcontext_start(spnego_state,
+						 gensec_security,
+						 &spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/* select the sub context */
+		status = gensec_start_mech_by_ops(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						  cur_sec->op);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that 'cur_sec' is temporary memory, but
+		 * cur_sec->oid points to a const string in the
+		 * backends gensec_security_ops structure.
+		 */
+		spnego_state->neg_oid = cur_sec->oid;
+
+		/*
+		 * As client we don't use an optimistic token from the server.
+		 * But try to produce one for the server.
+		 */
+		*in_next = data_blob_null;
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	DBG_WARNING("Could not find a suitable mechtype in NEG_TOKEN_INIT\n");
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_finish(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS sub_status,
+					const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+					TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct spnego_data spnego_out;
+	const char * const *mech_types = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+
+	if (n->mech_types == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("No mech_types list\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	for (mech_types = n->mech_types; *mech_types != NULL; mech_types++) {
+		int cmp = strcmp(*mech_types, spnego_state->neg_oid);
+
+		if (cmp == 0) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (*mech_types == NULL) {
+		DBG_ERR("Can't find selected sub mechanism in mech_types\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* compose reply */
+	spnego_out.type = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_INIT;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechTypes = mech_types;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.reqFlags = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.reqFlagsPadding = 0;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechListMIC = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_out.negTokenInit.mechToken = sub_out;
+
+	if (spnego_write_data(out_mem_ctx, out, &spnego_out) == -1) {
+		DBG_ERR("Failed to write SPNEGO reply to NEG_TOKEN_INIT\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	ok = spnego_write_mech_types(spnego_state,
+				     mech_types,
+				     &spnego_state->mech_types);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_ERR("failed to write mechTypes\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* set next state */
+	spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+	spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+static const struct spnego_neg_ops gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_ops = {
+	.name      = "client_negTokenInit",
+	.start_fn  = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_start,
+	.step_fn   = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_step,
+	.finish_fn = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_finish,
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_start(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	struct spnego_negTokenTarg *ta = &spnego_in->negTokenTarg;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	spnego_state->num_targs++;
+
+	if (ta->negResult == SPNEGO_REJECT) {
+		return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (ta->negResult == SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC) {
+		spnego_state->mic_requested = true;
+	}
+
+	if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+		DATA_BLOB *m = &ta->mechListMIC;
+		const DATA_BLOB *r = &ta->responseToken;
+
+		/*
+		 * Windows 2000 has a bug, it repeats the
+		 * responseToken in the mechListMIC field.
+		 */
+		if (m->length == r->length) {
+			int cmp;
+
+			cmp = memcmp(m->data, r->data, m->length);
+			if (cmp == 0) {
+				data_blob_free(m);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Server didn't like our choice of mech, and chose something else */
+	if (((ta->negResult == SPNEGO_ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE) ||
+	     (ta->negResult == SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC)) &&
+	    ta->supportedMech != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(ta->supportedMech, spnego_state->neg_oid) != 0)
+	{
+		const char *client_mech = NULL;
+		const char *client_oid = NULL;
+		const char *server_mech = NULL;
+		const char *server_oid = NULL;
+
+		client_mech = gensec_get_name_by_oid(gensec_security,
+						     spnego_state->neg_oid);
+		client_oid = spnego_state->neg_oid;
+		server_mech = gensec_get_name_by_oid(gensec_security,
+						     ta->supportedMech);
+		server_oid = ta->supportedMech;
+
+		DBG_NOTICE("client preferred mech (%s[%s]) not accepted, "
+			   "server wants: %s[%s]\n",
+			   client_mech, client_oid, server_mech, server_oid);
+
+		spnego_state->downgraded = true;
+		gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+
+		status = gensec_subcontext_start(spnego_state,
+						 gensec_security,
+						 &spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/* select the sub context */
+		status = gensec_start_mech_by_oid(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						  ta->supportedMech);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		spnego_state->neg_oid = talloc_strdup(spnego_state,
+					ta->supportedMech);
+		if (spnego_state->neg_oid == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+		if (spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+			spnego_state->needs_mic_check = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->needs_mic_check) {
+		if (ta->responseToken.length != 0) {
+			DBG_WARNING("non empty response token not expected\n");
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		if (ta->mechListMIC.length == 0
+		    && spnego_state->may_skip_mic_check) {
+			/*
+			 * In this case we don't require
+			 * a mechListMIC from the server.
+			 *
+			 * This works around bugs in the Azure
+			 * and Apple spnego implementations.
+			 *
+			 * See
+			 * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11994
+			 */
+			spnego_state->needs_mic_check = false;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		status = gensec_check_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     &ta->mechListMIC);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to verify mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_check = false;
+		spnego_state->done_mic_check = true;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (!spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+		*in_next = ta->responseToken;
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_step(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS last_status,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(last_status)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("SPNEGO(%s) login failed: %s\n",
+			    spnego_state->sub_sec_security->ops->name,
+			    nt_errstr(last_status));
+		return last_status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This should never be reached!
+	 * The step function is only called on errors!
+	 */
+	smb_panic(__location__);
+	return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_finish(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS sub_status,
+					const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+					TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	const struct spnego_negTokenTarg *ta =
+		&spnego_in->negTokenTarg;
+	DATA_BLOB mech_list_mic = data_blob_null;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct spnego_data spnego_out;
+
+	if (!spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+		/*
+		 * We're not yet ready to deal with signatures.
+		 */
+		goto client_response;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->done_mic_check) {
+		/*
+		 * We already checked the mic,
+		 * either the in last round here
+		 * in gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_finish()
+		 * or during this round in
+		 * gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_start().
+		 *
+		 * Both cases we're sure we don't have to
+		 * call gensec_sign_packet().
+		 */
+		goto client_response;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->may_skip_mic_check) {
+		/*
+		 * This can only be set during
+		 * the last round here in
+		 * gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_finish()
+		 * below. And during this round
+		 * we already passed the checks in
+		 * gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_start().
+		 *
+		 * So we need to skip to deal with
+		 * any signatures now.
+		 */
+		goto client_response;
+	}
+
+	if (!spnego_state->done_mic_check) {
+		bool have_sign = true;
+		bool new_spnego = false;
+
+		have_sign = gensec_have_feature(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		if (spnego_state->simulate_w2k) {
+			have_sign = false;
+		}
+		new_spnego = gensec_have_feature(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						 GENSEC_FEATURE_NEW_SPNEGO);
+
+		switch (ta->negResult) {
+		case SPNEGO_ACCEPT_COMPLETED:
+		case SPNEGO_NONE_RESULT:
+			if (spnego_state->num_targs == 1) {
+				/*
+				 * the first exchange doesn't require
+				 * verification
+				 */
+				new_spnego = false;
+			}
+
+			break;
+
+		case SPNEGO_ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE:
+			if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+				new_spnego = true;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (spnego_state->downgraded) {
+				/*
+				 * A downgrade should be protected if
+				 * supported
+				 */
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * The caller may just asked for
+			 * GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY, this
+			 * is only reflected in the want_features.
+			 *
+			 * As it will imply
+			 * gensec_have_features(GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)
+			 * to return true.
+			 */
+			if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+				break;
+			}
+			if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+				break;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Here we're sure our preferred mech was
+			 * selected by the server and our caller doesn't
+			 * need GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN nor
+			 * GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL support.
+			 *
+			 * In this case we don't require
+			 * a mechListMIC from the server.
+			 *
+			 * This works around bugs in the Azure
+			 * and Apple spnego implementations.
+			 *
+			 * See
+			 * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11994
+			 */
+			spnego_state->may_skip_mic_check = true;
+			break;
+
+		case SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC:
+			if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+				new_spnego = true;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (spnego_state->mic_requested) {
+			if (have_sign) {
+				new_spnego = true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (have_sign && new_spnego) {
+			spnego_state->needs_mic_check = true;
+			spnego_state->needs_mic_sign = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+		status = gensec_check_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     &ta->mechListMIC);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to verify mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_check = false;
+		spnego_state->done_mic_check = true;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->needs_mic_sign) {
+		status = gensec_sign_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					    n,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					    &mech_list_mic);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to sign mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_sign = false;
+	}
+
+ client_response:
+	if (sub_out.length == 0 && mech_list_mic.length == 0) {
+		*out = data_blob_null;
+
+		if (!spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+			/* somethings wrong here... */
+			DBG_ERR("gensec_update not ready without output\n");
+			return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		if (ta->negResult != SPNEGO_ACCEPT_COMPLETED) {
+			/* unless of course it did not accept */
+			DBG_WARNING("gensec_update ok but not accepted\n");
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		if (!spnego_state->needs_mic_check) {
+			spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_DONE;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* compose reply */
+	spnego_out.type = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.negResult = SPNEGO_NONE_RESULT;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.supportedMech = NULL;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.responseToken = sub_out;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.mechListMIC = mech_list_mic;
+
+	if (spnego_write_data(out_mem_ctx, out, &spnego_out) == -1) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Failed to write NEG_TOKEN_TARG\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	spnego_state->num_targs++;
+
+	/* set next state */
+	spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG;
+	spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+static const struct spnego_neg_ops gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_ops = {
+	.name      = "client_negTokenTarg",
+	.start_fn  = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_start,
+	.step_fn   = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_step,
+	.finish_fn = gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_finish,
+};
+
+/** create a server negTokenTarg 
+ *
+ * This is the case, where the client is the first one who sends data
+*/
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_response(struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					      TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					      NTSTATUS nt_status,
+					      const DATA_BLOB unwrapped_out,
+					      DATA_BLOB mech_list_mic,
+					      DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct spnego_data spnego_out;
+
+	/* compose reply */
+	spnego_out.type = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.responseToken = unwrapped_out;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.mechListMIC = mech_list_mic;
+	spnego_out.negTokenTarg.supportedMech = NULL;
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {	
+		spnego_out.negTokenTarg.supportedMech = spnego_state->neg_oid;
+		if (spnego_state->mic_requested) {
+			spnego_out.negTokenTarg.negResult = SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC;
+			spnego_state->mic_requested = false;
+		} else {
+			spnego_out.negTokenTarg.negResult = SPNEGO_ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
+		}
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_SERVER_TARG;
+	} else if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		if (unwrapped_out.data) {
+			spnego_out.negTokenTarg.supportedMech = spnego_state->neg_oid;
+		}
+		spnego_out.negTokenTarg.negResult = SPNEGO_ACCEPT_COMPLETED;
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_DONE;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_write_data(out_mem_ctx, out, &spnego_out) == -1) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to write SPNEGO reply to NEG_TOKEN_TARG\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	spnego_state->expected_packet = SPNEGO_NEG_TOKEN_TARG;
+	spnego_state->num_targs++;
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_start(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	bool ok;
+
+	n->mech_idx = 0;
+	n->mech_types = spnego_in->negTokenInit.mechTypes;
+	if (n->mech_types == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	n->all_idx = 0;
+	n->all_sec = gensec_security_by_oid_list(gensec_security,
+						 n, n->mech_types,
+						 GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO);
+	if (n->all_sec == NULL) {
+		DBG_WARNING("gensec_security_by_oid_list() failed\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	ok = spnego_write_mech_types(spnego_state,
+				     n->mech_types,
+				     &spnego_state->mech_types);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_ERR("Failed to write mechTypes\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	return n->ops->step_fn(gensec_security, spnego_state, n,
+			       spnego_in, NT_STATUS_OK, in_mem_ctx, in_next);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_step(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS last_status,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(last_status)) {
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec =
+			&n->all_sec[n->all_idx];
+		const char *next_mech = n->mech_types[n->mech_idx+1];
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *next_sec = NULL;
+		const char *next = NULL;
+		int dbg_level = DBGLVL_WARNING;
+		bool allow_fallback = false;
+		NTSTATUS status = last_status;
+		size_t i;
+
+		for (i = 0; next_mech != NULL && n->all_sec[i].op != NULL; i++) {
+			if (strcmp(next_mech, n->all_sec[i].oid) != 0) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			next_sec = &n->all_sec[i];
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER) ||
+		    NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO))
+		{
+			allow_fallback = true;
+		}
+
+		if (allow_fallback && next_sec != NULL) {
+			next = next_sec->op->name;
+			dbg_level = DBGLVL_NOTICE;
+		}
+
+		DBG_PREFIX(dbg_level, (
+			   "%s: parsing NEG_TOKEN_INIT content failed "
+			   "(next[%s]): %s\n", cur_sec->op->name,
+			   next, nt_errstr(status)));
+
+		if (next == NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * A hard error without a possible fallback.
+			 */
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Pretend we never started it
+		 */
+		gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+
+		/*
+		 * And try the next one, based on the clients
+		 * mech type list...
+		 */
+		n->mech_idx += 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * we always reset all_idx here, as the negotiation is
+	 * done via mech_idx!
+	 */
+	n->all_idx = 0;
+
+	for (; n->mech_types[n->mech_idx] != NULL; n->mech_idx++) {
+		const char *cur_mech = n->mech_types[n->mech_idx];
+		const struct gensec_security_ops_wrapper *cur_sec = NULL;
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		DATA_BLOB sub_in = data_blob_null;
+		size_t i;
+
+		for (i = 0; n->all_sec[i].op != NULL; i++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur_mech, n->all_sec[i].oid) != 0) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			cur_sec = &n->all_sec[i];
+			n->all_idx = i;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (cur_sec == NULL) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		status = gensec_subcontext_start(spnego_state,
+						 gensec_security,
+						 &spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/* select the sub context */
+		status = gensec_start_mech_by_ops(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						  cur_sec->op);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			/*
+			 * Pretend we never started it
+			 */
+			gensec_spnego_reset_sub_sec(spnego_state);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (n->mech_idx == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * We can use the optimistic token.
+			 */
+			sub_in = spnego_in->negTokenInit.mechToken;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Indicate the downgrade and request a
+			 * mic.
+			 */
+			spnego_state->downgraded = true;
+			spnego_state->mic_requested = true;
+		}
+
+		if (sub_in.length == 0) {
+			spnego_state->no_optimistic = true;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that 'cur_sec' is temporary memory, but
+		 * cur_sec->oid points to a const string in the
+		 * backends gensec_security_ops structure.
+		 */
+		spnego_state->neg_oid = cur_sec->oid;
+
+		/* we need some content from the mech */
+		*in_next = sub_in;
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	DBG_WARNING("Could not find a suitable mechtype in NEG_TOKEN_INIT\n");
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_finish(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS sub_status,
+					const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+					TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB mech_list_mic = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (spnego_state->simulate_w2k) {
+		/*
+		 * Windows 2000 returns the unwrapped token
+		 * also in the mech_list_mic field.
+		 *
+		 * In order to verify our client code,
+		 * we need a way to have a server with this
+		 * broken behaviour
+		 */
+		mech_list_mic = sub_out;
+	}
+
+	return gensec_spnego_server_response(spnego_state,
+					     out_mem_ctx,
+					     sub_status,
+					     sub_out,
+					     mech_list_mic,
+					     out);
+}
+
+static const struct spnego_neg_ops gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_ops = {
+	.name      = "server_negTokenInit",
+	.start_fn  = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_start,
+	.step_fn   = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_step,
+	.finish_fn = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_finish,
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_start(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	const struct spnego_negTokenTarg *ta = &spnego_in->negTokenTarg;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	spnego_state->num_targs++;
+
+	if (spnego_state->sub_sec_security == NULL) {
+		DBG_ERR("SPNEGO: Did not setup a mech in NEG_TOKEN_INIT\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->needs_mic_check) {
+		if (ta->responseToken.length != 0) {
+			DBG_WARNING("non empty response token not expected\n");
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		status = gensec_check_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     &ta->mechListMIC);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to verify mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_check = false;
+		spnego_state->done_mic_check = true;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (!spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+		*in_next = ta->responseToken;
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_step(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS last_status,
+					TALLOC_CTX *in_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *in_next)
+{
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(last_status)) {
+		DBG_NOTICE("SPNEGO(%s) login failed: %s\n",
+			   spnego_state->sub_sec_security->ops->name,
+			   nt_errstr(last_status));
+		return last_status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This should never be reached!
+	 * The step function is only called on errors!
+	 */
+	smb_panic(__location__);
+	return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_finish(
+					struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct spnego_state *spnego_state,
+					struct spnego_neg_state *n,
+					struct spnego_data *spnego_in,
+					NTSTATUS sub_status,
+					const DATA_BLOB sub_out,
+					TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	const struct spnego_negTokenTarg *ta = &spnego_in->negTokenTarg;
+	DATA_BLOB mech_list_mic = data_blob_null;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	bool have_sign = true;
+	bool new_spnego = false;
+
+	status = sub_status;
+
+	if (!spnego_state->sub_sec_ready) {
+		/*
+		 * We're not yet ready to deal with signatures.
+		 */
+		goto server_response;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->done_mic_check) {
+		/*
+		 * We already checked the mic,
+		 * either the in last round here
+		 * in gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_finish()
+		 * or during this round in
+		 * gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_start().
+		 *
+		 * Both cases we're sure we don't have to
+		 * call gensec_sign_packet().
+		 */
+		goto server_response;
+	}
+
+	have_sign = gensec_have_feature(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN);
+	if (spnego_state->simulate_w2k) {
+		have_sign = false;
+	}
+	new_spnego = gensec_have_feature(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					 GENSEC_FEATURE_NEW_SPNEGO);
+	if (ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+		new_spnego = true;
+	}
+
+	if (have_sign && new_spnego) {
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_check = true;
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_sign = true;
+	}
+
+	if (have_sign && ta->mechListMIC.length > 0) {
+		status = gensec_check_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					     spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					     &ta->mechListMIC);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to verify mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_check = false;
+		spnego_state->done_mic_check = true;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->needs_mic_sign) {
+		status = gensec_sign_packet(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					    n,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.data,
+					    spnego_state->mech_types.length,
+					    &mech_list_mic);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DBG_WARNING("failed to sign mechListMIC: %s\n",
+				    nt_errstr(status));
+			return status;
+		}
+		spnego_state->needs_mic_sign = false;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->needs_mic_check) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+ server_response:
+	return gensec_spnego_server_response(spnego_state,
+					     out_mem_ctx,
+					     status,
+					     sub_out,
+					     mech_list_mic,
+					     out);
+}
+
+static const struct spnego_neg_ops gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_ops = {
+	.name      = "server_negTokenTarg",
+	.start_fn  = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_start,
+	.step_fn   = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_step,
+	.finish_fn = gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_finish,
+};
+
+struct gensec_spnego_update_state {
+	struct tevent_context *ev;
+	struct gensec_security *gensec;
+	struct spnego_state *spnego;
+
+	DATA_BLOB full_in;
+	struct spnego_data _spnego_in;
+	struct spnego_data *spnego_in;
+
+	struct {
+		bool needed;
+		DATA_BLOB in;
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		DATA_BLOB out;
+	} sub;
+
+	struct spnego_neg_state *n;
+
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static void gensec_spnego_update_cleanup(struct tevent_req *req,
+					 enum tevent_req_state req_state)
+{
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+
+	switch (req_state) {
+	case TEVENT_REQ_USER_ERROR:
+	case TEVENT_REQ_TIMED_OUT:
+	case TEVENT_REQ_NO_MEMORY:
+		/*
+		 * A fatal error, further updates are not allowed.
+		 */
+		state->spnego->state_position = SPNEGO_DONE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_update_in(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const DATA_BLOB in, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *full_in);
+static void gensec_spnego_update_pre(struct tevent_req *req);
+static void gensec_spnego_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+static void gensec_spnego_update_post(struct tevent_req *req);
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_update_out(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 DATA_BLOB *_out);
+
+static struct tevent_req *gensec_spnego_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						    struct tevent_context *ev,
+						    struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						    const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct spnego_state);
+	struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state->ev = ev;
+	state->gensec = gensec_security;
+	state->spnego = spnego_state;
+	tevent_req_set_cleanup_fn(req, gensec_spnego_update_cleanup);
+
+	if (spnego_state->out_frag.length > 0) {
+		if (in.length > 0) {
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+
+		status = gensec_spnego_update_out(gensec_security,
+						  state, &state->out);
+		if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+
+		state->status = status;
+		tevent_req_done(req);
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	status = gensec_spnego_update_in(gensec_security, in,
+					 state, &state->full_in);
+	state->status = status;
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+		tevent_req_done(req);
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	/* Check if we got a valid SPNEGO blob... */
+
+	switch (spnego_state->state_position) {
+	case SPNEGO_FALLBACK:
+		break;
+
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG:
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_TARG:
+		if (state->full_in.length == 0) {
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+
+		FALL_THROUGH;
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_START:
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_START:
+
+		if (state->full_in.length == 0) {
+			/* create_negTokenInit later */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		len = spnego_read_data(state,
+				       state->full_in,
+				       &state->_spnego_in);
+		if (len == -1) {
+			if (spnego_state->state_position != SPNEGO_SERVER_START) {
+				DEBUG(1, ("Invalid SPNEGO request:\n"));
+				dump_data(1, state->full_in.data,
+					  state->full_in.length);
+				tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+				return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * This is the 'fallback' case, where we don't get
+			 * SPNEGO, and have to try all the other options (and
+			 * hope they all have a magic string they check)
+			 */
+			status = gensec_spnego_server_try_fallback(gensec_security,
+								   spnego_state,
+								   state,
+								   state->full_in);
+			if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+				return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * We'll continue with SPNEGO_FALLBACK below...
+			 */
+			break;
+		}
+		state->spnego_in = &state->_spnego_in;
+
+		/* OK, so it's real SPNEGO, check the packet's the one we expect */
+		if (state->spnego_in->type != spnego_state->expected_packet) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Invalid SPNEGO request: %d, expected %d\n",
+				  state->spnego_in->type,
+				  spnego_state->expected_packet));
+			dump_data(1, state->full_in.data,
+				  state->full_in.length);
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		smb_panic(__location__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	gensec_spnego_update_pre(req);
+	if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	if (state->sub.needed) {
+		struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * We may need one more roundtrip...
+		 */
+		subreq = gensec_update_send(state, state->ev,
+					    spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					    state->sub.in);
+		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+		tevent_req_set_callback(subreq,
+					gensec_spnego_update_done,
+					req);
+		state->sub.needed = false;
+		return req;
+	}
+
+	gensec_spnego_update_post(req);
+	if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	return req;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_update_in(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					const DATA_BLOB in, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					DATA_BLOB *full_in)
+{
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct spnego_state);
+	size_t expected;
+	bool ok;
+
+	*full_in = data_blob_null;
+
+	switch (spnego_state->state_position) {
+	case SPNEGO_FALLBACK:
+		*full_in = in;
+		spnego_state->in_needed = 0;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_START:
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG:
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_START:
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_TARG:
+		break;
+
+	case SPNEGO_DONE:
+	default:
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->in_needed == 0) {
+		size_t size = 0;
+		int ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * try to work out the size of the full
+		 * input token, it might be fragmented
+		 */
+		ret = asn1_peek_full_tag(in,  ASN1_APPLICATION(0), &size);
+		if ((ret != 0) && (ret != EAGAIN)) {
+			ret = asn1_peek_full_tag(in, ASN1_CONTEXT(1), &size);
+		}
+
+		if ((ret == 0) || (ret == EAGAIN)) {
+			spnego_state->in_needed = size;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * If it is not an asn1 message
+			 * just call the next layer.
+			 */
+			spnego_state->in_needed = in.length;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->in_needed > UINT16_MAX) {
+		/*
+		 * limit the incoming message to 0xFFFF
+		 * to avoid DoS attacks.
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if ((spnego_state->in_needed > 0) && (in.length == 0)) {
+		/*
+		 * If we reach this, we know we got at least
+		 * part of an asn1 message, getting 0 means
+		 * the remote peer wants us to spin.
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	expected = spnego_state->in_needed - spnego_state->in_frag.length;
+	if (in.length > expected) {
+		/*
+		 * we got more than expected
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (in.length == spnego_state->in_needed) {
+		/*
+		 * if the in.length contains the full blob
+		 * we are done.
+		 *
+		 * Note: this implies spnego_state->in_frag.length == 0,
+		 *       but we do not need to check this explicitly
+		 *       because we already know that we did not get
+		 *       more than expected.
+		 */
+		*full_in = in;
+		spnego_state->in_needed = 0;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	ok = data_blob_append(spnego_state, &spnego_state->in_frag,
+			      in.data, in.length);
+	if (!ok) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (spnego_state->in_needed > spnego_state->in_frag.length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	*full_in = spnego_state->in_frag;
+	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, full_in->data);
+	spnego_state->in_frag = data_blob_null;
+	spnego_state->in_needed = 0;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static void gensec_spnego_update_pre(struct tevent_req *req)
+{
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state = state->spnego;
+	const struct spnego_neg_ops *ops = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	state->sub.needed = false;
+	state->sub.in = data_blob_null;
+	state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	state->sub.out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_FALLBACK) {
+		state->sub.in = state->full_in;
+		state->full_in = data_blob_null;
+		state->sub.needed = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	switch (spnego_state->state_position) {
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_START:
+		if (state->spnego_in == NULL) {
+			/* client to produce negTokenInit */
+			ops = &gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_ops;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ops = &gensec_spnego_client_negTokenInit_ops;
+		break;
+
+	case SPNEGO_CLIENT_TARG:
+		ops = &gensec_spnego_client_negTokenTarg_ops;
+		break;
+
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_START:
+		if (state->spnego_in == NULL) {
+			/* server to produce negTokenInit */
+			ops = &gensec_spnego_create_negTokenInit_ops;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ops = &gensec_spnego_server_negTokenInit_ops;
+		break;
+
+	case SPNEGO_SERVER_TARG:
+		ops = &gensec_spnego_server_negTokenTarg_ops;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		smb_panic(__location__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	state->n = gensec_spnego_neg_state(state, ops);
+	if (tevent_req_nomem(state->n, req)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	status = ops->start_fn(state->gensec, spnego_state, state->n,
+			       state->spnego_in, state, &state->sub.in);
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		/*
+		 * Call finish_fn() with an empty
+		 * blob and NT_STATUS_OK.
+		 */
+		state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_CLIENT_START &&
+		   spnego_state->no_optimistic) {
+		/*
+		 * Skip optimistic token per conf.
+		 */
+		state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	} else if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_SERVER_START &&
+		   state->sub.in.length == 0 && spnego_state->no_optimistic) {
+		/*
+		 * If we didn't like the mechanism for which the client sent us
+		 * an optimistic token, or if he didn't send any, don't call
+		 * the sub mechanism just yet.
+		 */
+		state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+		spnego_state->no_optimistic = false;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED =>
+		 * we need to call gensec_update_send().
+		 */
+		state->sub.needed = true;
+	}
+}
+
+static void gensec_spnego_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req =
+		tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
+		struct tevent_req);
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state = state->spnego;
+
+	state->sub.status = gensec_update_recv(subreq, state, &state->sub.out);
+	TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(state->sub.status)) {
+		spnego_state->sub_sec_ready = true;
+	}
+
+	gensec_spnego_update_post(req);
+}
+
+static void gensec_spnego_update_post(struct tevent_req *req)
+{
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state = state->spnego;
+	const struct spnego_neg_ops *ops = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	state->sub.in = data_blob_null;
+	state->sub.needed = false;
+
+	if (spnego_state->state_position == SPNEGO_FALLBACK) {
+		status = state->sub.status;
+		spnego_state->out_frag = state->sub.out;
+		talloc_steal(spnego_state, spnego_state->out_frag.data);
+		state->sub.out = data_blob_null;
+		goto respond;
+	}
+
+	ops = state->n->ops;
+
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(state->sub.status)) {
+
+
+		/*
+		 * gensec_update_recv() returned an error,
+		 * let's see if the step_fn() want to
+		 * handle it and negotiate something else.
+		 */
+
+		status = ops->step_fn(state->gensec,
+				      spnego_state,
+				      state->n,
+				      state->spnego_in,
+				      state->sub.status,
+				      state,
+				      &state->sub.in);
+		if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		state->sub.out = data_blob_null;
+		state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			/*
+			 * Call finish_fn() with an empty
+			 * blob and NT_STATUS_OK.
+			 */
+			state->sub.status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED...
+			 */
+			state->sub.needed = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (state->sub.needed) {
+		struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * We may need one more roundtrip...
+		 */
+		subreq = gensec_update_send(state, state->ev,
+					    spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+					    state->sub.in);
+		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+			return;
+		}
+		tevent_req_set_callback(subreq,
+					gensec_spnego_update_done,
+					req);
+		state->sub.needed = false;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	status = ops->finish_fn(state->gensec,
+				spnego_state,
+				state->n,
+				state->spnego_in,
+				state->sub.status,
+				state->sub.out,
+				spnego_state,
+				&spnego_state->out_frag);
+	TALLOC_FREE(state->n);
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		bool reset_full = true;
+
+		reset_full = !spnego_state->done_mic_check;
+
+		status = gensec_may_reset_crypto(spnego_state->sub_sec_security,
+						 reset_full);
+		if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+respond:
+	spnego_state->out_status = status;
+
+	status = gensec_spnego_update_out(state->gensec,
+					  state, &state->out);
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	state->status = status;
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_update_out(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 DATA_BLOB *_out)
+{
+	struct spnego_state *spnego_state =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+		struct spnego_state);
+	DATA_BLOB out = data_blob_null;
+	bool ok;
+
+	*_out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (spnego_state->out_frag.length <= spnego_state->out_max_length) {
+		/*
+		 * Fast path, we can deliver everything
+		 */
+
+		*_out = spnego_state->out_frag;
+		if (spnego_state->out_frag.length > 0) {
+			talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, _out->data);
+			spnego_state->out_frag = data_blob_null;
+		}
+
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(spnego_state->out_status)) {
+			return spnego_state->out_status;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * We're completely done, further updates are not allowed.
+		 */
+		spnego_state->state_position = SPNEGO_DONE;
+		return gensec_child_ready(gensec_security,
+					  spnego_state->sub_sec_security);
+	}
+
+	out = spnego_state->out_frag;
+
+	/*
+	 * copy the remaining bytes
+	 */
+	spnego_state->out_frag = data_blob_talloc(spnego_state,
+					out.data + spnego_state->out_max_length,
+					out.length - spnego_state->out_max_length);
+	if (spnego_state->out_frag.data == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * truncate the buffer
+	 */
+	ok = data_blob_realloc(spnego_state, &out,
+			       spnego_state->out_max_length);
+	if (!ok) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, out.data);
+	*_out = out;
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+					  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					  DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_spnego_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_spnego_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*out = state->out;
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, state->out.data);
+	status = state->status;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static const char *gensec_spnego_oids[] = { 
+	GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO,
+	NULL 
+};
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_spnego_security_ops = {
+	.name		  = "spnego",
+	.sasl_name	  = "GSS-SPNEGO",
+	.auth_type	  = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO,
+	.oid              = gensec_spnego_oids,
+	.client_start     = gensec_spnego_client_start,
+	.server_start     = gensec_spnego_server_start,
+	.update_send	  = gensec_spnego_update_send,
+	.update_recv	  = gensec_spnego_update_recv,
+	.seal_packet	  = gensec_child_seal_packet,
+	.sign_packet	  = gensec_child_sign_packet,
+	.sig_size	  = gensec_child_sig_size,
+	.max_wrapped_size = gensec_child_max_wrapped_size,
+	.max_input_size	  = gensec_child_max_input_size,
+	.check_packet	  = gensec_child_check_packet,
+	.unseal_packet	  = gensec_child_unseal_packet,
+	.wrap             = gensec_child_wrap,
+	.unwrap           = gensec_child_unwrap,
+	.session_key	  = gensec_child_session_key,
+	.session_info     = gensec_child_session_info,
+	.want_feature     = gensec_child_want_feature,
+	.have_feature     = gensec_child_have_feature,
+	.expire_time      = gensec_child_expire_time,
+	.final_auth_type  = gensec_child_final_auth_type,
+	.enabled          = true,
+	.priority         = GENSEC_SPNEGO,
+	.glue             = true,
+};
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_spnego_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS ret;
+	ret = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_spnego_security_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			gensec_spnego_security_ops.name));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/auth/gensec/wscript_build b/auth/gensec/wscript_build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d8071d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/gensec/wscript_build
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+bld.SAMBA_LIBRARY('gensec',
+	source='gensec.c gensec_start.c gensec_util.c',
+	autoproto='gensec_toplevel_proto.h',
+	public_deps='tevent-util samba-util samba-errors auth_system_session samba-modules gensec_util asn1util',
+	private_headers='gensec.h',
+	deps='com_err',
+	private_library=True,
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_MODULE('gensec_spnego',
+	source='spnego.c',
+	subsystem='gensec',
+	init_function='gensec_spnego_init',
+	deps='asn1util samba-credentials SPNEGO_PARSE'
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_MODULE('gensec_schannel',
+	source='schannel.c',
+	subsystem='gensec',
+	init_function='gensec_schannel_init',
+	deps='COMMON_SCHANNEL NDR_SCHANNEL samba-credentials auth_session GNUTLS_HELPERS'
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_MODULE('gensec_ncalrpc',
+	source='ncalrpc.c',
+	subsystem='gensec',
+	init_function='gensec_ncalrpc_as_system_init',
+	deps='samba-util auth_session'
+	)
+
+bld.SAMBA_MODULE('gensec_external',
+	source='external.c',
+	subsystem='gensec',
+	deps='samba-debug talloc tevent tevent-util',
+	init_function='gensec_external_init'
+	)
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.c b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52c953c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   GSSAPI helper functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2008,2015
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/gssapi.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+size_t gssapi_get_sig_size(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			   const gss_OID mech,
+			   uint32_t gss_want_flags,
+			   size_t data_size)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+	size_t sig_size = 0;
+
+	if (gss_want_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG) {
+		OM_uint32 min_stat, maj_stat;
+		bool want_sealing = true;
+		int sealed = 0;
+		gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+		if (!(gss_want_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * gss_wrap_iov_length() only needs the type and length
+		 */
+		iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+		iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+		iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+		iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+		iov[1].buffer.value = NULL;
+		iov[1].buffer.length = data_size;
+
+		maj_stat = gss_wrap_iov_length(&min_stat,
+					       gssapi_context,
+					       want_sealing,
+					       GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+					       &sealed,
+					       iov, ARRAY_SIZE(iov));
+		if (maj_stat) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("gss_wrap_iov_length failed with [%s]\n",
+				  gssapi_error_string(frame,
+						      maj_stat,
+						      min_stat,
+						      mech)));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		sig_size = iov[0].buffer.length;
+	} else if (gss_want_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) {
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		uint32_t keytype;
+
+		status = gssapi_get_session_key(frame,
+						gssapi_context,
+						NULL, &keytype);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		switch (keytype) {
+		case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+		case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+		case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+		case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP:
+			sig_size = 37;
+			break;
+		default:
+			sig_size = 28;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return sig_size;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_seal_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			    const gss_OID mech,
+			    bool hdr_signing, size_t sig_size,
+			    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4];
+	int req_seal = 1;
+	int sealed = 0;
+	const uint8_t *pre_sign_ptr = NULL;
+	size_t pre_sign_len = 0;
+	const uint8_t *post_sign_ptr = NULL;
+	size_t post_sign_len = 0;
+
+	if (hdr_signing) {
+		const uint8_t *de = data + length;
+		const uint8_t *we = whole_pdu + pdu_length;
+
+		if (data < whole_pdu) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		if (de > we) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		pre_sign_len = data - whole_pdu;
+		if (pre_sign_len > 0) {
+			pre_sign_ptr = whole_pdu;
+		}
+		post_sign_len = we - de;
+		if (post_sign_len > 0) {
+			post_sign_ptr = de;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sig->length = sig_size;
+	if (sig->length == 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	sig->data = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, sig->length);
+	if (sig->data == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	iov[0].type          = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+	iov[0].buffer.length = sig->length;
+	iov[0].buffer.value  = sig->data;
+
+	if (pre_sign_ptr != NULL) {
+		iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+		iov[1].buffer.length = pre_sign_len;
+		iov[1].buffer.value = discard_const(pre_sign_ptr);
+	} else {
+		iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_EMPTY;
+		iov[1].buffer.length = 0;
+		iov[1].buffer.value = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* data is encrypted in place, which is ok */
+	iov[2].type          = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+	iov[2].buffer.length = length;
+	iov[2].buffer.value  = data;
+
+	if (post_sign_ptr != NULL) {
+		iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+		iov[3].buffer.length = post_sign_len;
+		iov[3].buffer.value = discard_const(post_sign_ptr);
+	} else {
+		iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_EMPTY;
+		iov[3].buffer.length = 0;
+		iov[3].buffer.value = NULL;
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = gss_wrap_iov(&min_stat,
+				gssapi_context,
+				req_seal,
+				GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+				&sealed,
+				iov, ARRAY_SIZE(iov));
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
+		char *error_string = gssapi_error_string(mem_ctx,
+							 maj_stat,
+							 min_stat,
+							 mech);
+		DEBUG(1, ("gss_wrap_iov failed: %s\n", error_string));
+		talloc_free(error_string);
+		data_blob_free(sig);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (req_seal == 1 && sealed == 0) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("gss_wrap_iov says data was not sealed!\n"));
+		data_blob_free(sig);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_seal_packet: sig\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_seal_packet: sealed\n", data, length);
+
+	DEBUG(10, ("Sealed %d bytes, and got %d bytes header/signature.\n",
+		   (int)iov[2].buffer.length, (int)iov[0].buffer.length));
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_unseal_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			      const gss_OID mech,
+			      bool hdr_signing,
+			      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4];
+	gss_qop_t qop_state;
+	int sealed = 0;
+	const uint8_t *pre_sign_ptr = NULL;
+	size_t pre_sign_len = 0;
+	const uint8_t *post_sign_ptr = NULL;
+	size_t post_sign_len = 0;
+
+	if (hdr_signing) {
+		const uint8_t *de = data + length;
+		const uint8_t *we = whole_pdu + pdu_length;
+
+		if (data < whole_pdu) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		if (de > we) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		pre_sign_len = data - whole_pdu;
+		if (pre_sign_len > 0) {
+			pre_sign_ptr = whole_pdu;
+		}
+		post_sign_len = we - de;
+		if (post_sign_len > 0) {
+			post_sign_ptr = de;
+		}
+	}
+
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_unseal_packet: sig\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_unseal_packet: sealed\n", data, length);
+
+	iov[0].type          = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+	iov[0].buffer.length = sig->length;
+	iov[0].buffer.value  = sig->data;
+
+	if (pre_sign_ptr != NULL) {
+		iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+		iov[1].buffer.length = pre_sign_len;
+		iov[1].buffer.value = discard_const(pre_sign_ptr);
+	} else {
+		iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_EMPTY;
+		iov[1].buffer.length = 0;
+		iov[1].buffer.value = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* data is encrypted in place, which is ok */
+	iov[2].type          = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+	iov[2].buffer.length = length;
+	iov[2].buffer.value  = data;
+
+	if (post_sign_ptr != NULL) {
+		iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+		iov[3].buffer.length = post_sign_len;
+		iov[3].buffer.value = discard_const(post_sign_ptr);
+	} else {
+		iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_EMPTY;
+		iov[3].buffer.length = 0;
+		iov[3].buffer.value = NULL;
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = gss_unwrap_iov(&min_stat,
+				  gssapi_context,
+				  &sealed,
+				  &qop_state,
+				  iov, ARRAY_SIZE(iov));
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
+		char *error_string = gssapi_error_string(NULL,
+							 maj_stat,
+							 min_stat,
+							 mech);
+		DEBUG(1, ("gss_unwrap_iov failed: %s\n", error_string));
+		talloc_free(error_string);
+
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (sealed == 0) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("gss_unwrap_iov says data was not sealed!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(10, ("Unsealed %d bytes, with %d bytes header/signature.\n",
+		   (int)iov[2].buffer.length, (int)iov[0].buffer.length));
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_sign_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			    const gss_OID mech,
+			    bool hdr_signing,
+			    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token;
+
+	if (hdr_signing) {
+		input_token.length = pdu_length;
+		input_token.value = discard_const_p(uint8_t *, whole_pdu);
+	} else {
+		input_token.length = length;
+		input_token.value = discard_const_p(uint8_t *, data);
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat,
+			       gssapi_context,
+			       GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+			       &input_token,
+			       &output_token);
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
+		char *error_string = gssapi_error_string(mem_ctx,
+							 maj_stat,
+							 min_stat,
+							 mech);
+		DEBUG(1, ("GSS GetMic failed: %s\n", error_string));
+		talloc_free(error_string);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	*sig = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, (uint8_t *)output_token.value, output_token.length);
+	gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
+	if (sig->data == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_sign_packet: sig\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_check_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			     const gss_OID mech,
+			     bool hdr_signing,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_buffer_desc input_token;
+	gss_buffer_desc input_message;
+	gss_qop_t qop_state;
+
+	dump_data_pw("gssapi_check_packet: sig\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+
+	if (hdr_signing) {
+		input_message.length = pdu_length;
+		input_message.value = discard_const(whole_pdu);
+	} else {
+		input_message.length = length;
+		input_message.value = discard_const(data);
+	}
+
+	input_token.length = sig->length;
+	input_token.value = sig->data;
+
+	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(&min_stat,
+				  gssapi_context,
+				  &input_message,
+				  &input_token,
+				  &qop_state);
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
+		char *error_string = gssapi_error_string(NULL,
+							 maj_stat,
+							 min_stat,
+							 mech);
+		DEBUG(1, ("GSS VerifyMic failed: %s\n", error_string));
+		talloc_free(error_string);
+
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.h b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f40adf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   GSSAPI helper functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2008,2015
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef AUTH_KERBEROS_GSSAPI_HELPER_H
+#define AUTH_KERBEROS_GSSAPI_HELPER_H 1
+
+size_t gssapi_get_sig_size(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			   const gss_OID mech,
+			   uint32_t gss_want_flags,
+			   size_t data_size);
+NTSTATUS gssapi_seal_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			    const gss_OID mech,
+			    bool hdr_signing, size_t sig_size,
+			    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gssapi_unseal_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			      const gss_OID mech,
+			      bool hdr_signing,
+			      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gssapi_sign_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			    const gss_OID mech,
+			    bool hdr_signing,
+			    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gssapi_check_packet(gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+			     const gss_OID mech,
+			     bool hdr_signing,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+
+#endif /* AUTH_KERBEROS_GSSAPI_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/gssapi_pac.c b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_pac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ad7873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/gssapi_pac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   kerberos authorization data (PAC) utility library
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2011
+   Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2010.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
+
+#if 0
+/* FIXME - need proper configure/waf test
+ * to determine if gss_mech_krb5 and friends
+ * exist. JRA.
+ */
+/*
+ * These are not exported by Solaris -lkrb5
+ * Maybe move to libreplace somewhere?
+ */
+static const gss_OID_desc krb5_gss_oid_array[] = {
+	/* this is the official, rfc-specified OID */
+	{ 9, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\002" },
+	/* this is the pre-RFC mech OID */
+	{ 5, "\053\005\001\005\002" },
+	/* this is the unofficial, incorrect mech OID emitted by MS */
+	{ 9, "\052\206\110\202\367\022\001\002\002" },
+	{ 0, 0 }
+};
+
+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_krb5              = krb5_gss_oid_array+0;
+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_krb5_old          = krb5_gss_oid_array+1;
+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_krb5_wrong        = krb5_gss_oid_array+2;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GSS_KRB5_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY_OID
+#define GSS_KRB5_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY_OID_LENGTH 11
+#define GSS_KRB5_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY_OID "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x05\x05"
+#endif
+
+gss_OID_desc gse_sesskey_inq_oid = {
+	GSS_KRB5_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY_OID_LENGTH,
+	discard_const(GSS_KRB5_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY_OID)
+};
+
+#ifndef GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID
+#define GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID_LENGTH 10
+#define GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID  "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04"
+#endif
+
+gss_OID_desc gse_sesskeytype_oid = {
+	GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID_LENGTH,
+	discard_const(GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID)
+};
+
+/* The Heimdal OID for getting the PAC */
+#define EXTRACT_PAC_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID_LENGTH 8
+/*					                EXTRACTION OID		   AUTHZ ID */
+#define EXTRACT_PAC_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID "\x2a\x85\x70\x2b\x0d\x03" "\x81\x00"
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_obtain_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+				gss_name_t gss_client_name,
+				DATA_BLOB *pac_blob)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	OM_uint32 gss_maj, gss_min;
+#ifdef HAVE_GSS_GET_NAME_ATTRIBUTE
+/*
+ * gss_get_name_attribute() in MIT krb5 1.10.0 can return uninitialized pac_display_buffer
+ * and later gss_release_buffer() will crash on attempting to release it.
+ *
+ * So always initialize the buffer descriptors.
+ *
+ * See following links for more details:
+ * http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=658514
+ * http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?user=guest&pass=guest&id=7087
+ */
+	gss_buffer_desc pac_buffer = {
+		.value = NULL,
+		.length = 0
+	};
+	gss_buffer_desc pac_display_buffer = {
+		.value = NULL,
+		.length = 0
+	};
+	gss_buffer_desc pac_name = {
+		.value = discard_const("urn:mspac:"),
+		.length = sizeof("urn:mspac:")-1
+	};
+	int more = -1;
+	int authenticated = false;
+	int complete = false;
+
+	gss_maj = gss_get_name_attribute(
+		&gss_min, gss_client_name, &pac_name,
+		&authenticated, &complete,
+		&pac_buffer, &pac_display_buffer, &more);
+
+	if (gss_maj != 0) {
+		gss_OID oid = discard_const(gss_mech_krb5);
+		DBG_NOTICE("obtaining PAC via GSSAPI gss_get_name_attribute "
+			   "failed: %s\n", gssapi_error_string(mem_ctx,
+							       gss_maj, gss_min,
+							       oid));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	} else if (authenticated && complete) {
+		/* The PAC blob is returned directly */
+		*pac_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, pac_buffer.value,
+					    pac_buffer.length);
+
+		if (!pac_blob->data) {
+			status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		} else {
+			status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&gss_min, &pac_buffer);
+		gss_release_buffer(&gss_min, &pac_display_buffer);
+		return status;
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(0, ("obtaining PAC via GSSAPI failed: authenticated: %s, complete: %s, more: %s\n",
+			  authenticated ? "true" : "false",
+			  complete ? "true" : "false",
+			  more ? "true" : "false"));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSS_INQUIRE_SEC_CONTEXT_BY_OID)
+	gss_OID_desc pac_data_oid = {
+		.elements = discard_const(EXTRACT_PAC_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID),
+		.length = EXTRACT_PAC_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID_LENGTH
+	};
+
+	gss_buffer_set_t set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+
+	/* If we didn't have the routine to get a verified, validated
+	 * PAC (supplied only by MIT at the time of writing), then try
+	 * with the Heimdal OID (fetches the PAC directly and always
+	 * validates) */
+	gss_maj = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
+				&gss_min, gssapi_context,
+				&pac_data_oid, &set);
+
+	/* First check for the error MIT gives for an unknown OID */
+	if (gss_maj == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("unable to obtain a PAC against this GSSAPI library.  "
+			  "GSSAPI secured connections are available only with Heimdal or MIT Kerberos >= 1.8\n"));
+	} else if (gss_maj != 0) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("obtaining PAC via GSSAPI gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (Heimdal OID) failed: %s\n",
+			  gssapi_error_string(mem_ctx, gss_maj, gss_min, gss_mech_krb5)));
+	} else {
+		if (set == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid returned unknown "
+				  "data in results.\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* The PAC blob is returned directly */
+		*pac_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, set->elements[0].value,
+					    set->elements[0].length);
+		if (!pac_blob->data) {
+			status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		} else {
+			status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		gss_maj = gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+		return status;
+	}
+#else
+	DEBUG(1, ("unable to obtain a PAC against this GSSAPI library.  "
+		  "GSSAPI secured connections are available only with Heimdal or MIT Kerberos >= 1.8\n"));
+#endif
+	return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_get_session_key(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+				DATA_BLOB *session_key, 
+				uint32_t *keytype)
+{
+	OM_uint32 gss_min, gss_maj;
+	gss_buffer_set_t set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+
+	gss_maj = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
+				&gss_min, gssapi_context,
+				&gse_sesskey_inq_oid, &set);
+	if (gss_maj) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid failed [%s]\n",
+			  gssapi_error_string(mem_ctx,
+					      gss_maj,
+					      gss_min,
+					      discard_const_p(struct gss_OID_desc_struct,
+							      gss_mech_krb5))));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if ((set == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) ||
+	    (set->count == 0)) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_SUBKEY
+		krb5_keyblock *subkey;
+		gss_maj = gsskrb5_get_subkey(&gss_min,
+					     gssapi_context,
+					     &subkey);
+		if (gss_maj != 0) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("NO session key for this mech\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+		}
+		if (session_key) {
+			*session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
+							KRB5_KEY_DATA(subkey), KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(subkey));
+		}
+		if (keytype) {
+			*keytype = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(subkey);
+		}
+		krb5_free_keyblock(NULL /* should be krb5_context */, subkey);
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+#else
+		DEBUG(0, ("gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid didn't return any session key (and no alternative method available)\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (session_key) {
+		*session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, set->elements[0].value,
+						set->elements[0].length);
+	}
+
+	if (keytype) {
+		int diflen, i;
+		const uint8_t *p;
+
+		*keytype = 0;
+		if (set->count < 2) {
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_SUBKEY
+			krb5_keyblock *subkey;
+			gss_maj = gsskrb5_get_subkey(&gss_min,
+						     gssapi_context,
+						     &subkey);
+			if (gss_maj == 0) {
+				*keytype = KRB5_KEY_TYPE(subkey);
+				krb5_free_keyblock(NULL /* should be krb5_context */, subkey);
+			}
+#endif
+			gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+	
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+		} else if (memcmp(set->elements[1].value,
+				  gse_sesskeytype_oid.elements,
+				  gse_sesskeytype_oid.length) != 0) {
+			/* Perhaps a non-krb5 session key */
+			gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+		p = (const uint8_t *)set->elements[1].value + gse_sesskeytype_oid.length;
+		diflen = set->elements[1].length - gse_sesskeytype_oid.length;
+		if (diflen <= 0) {
+			gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < diflen; i++) {
+			*keytype = (*keytype << 7) | (p[i] & 0x7f);
+			if (i + 1 != diflen && (p[i] & 0x80) == 0) {
+				gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	gss_release_buffer_set(&gss_min, &set);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+char *gssapi_error_string(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			  OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat,
+			  const gss_OID mech)
+{
+	OM_uint32 disp_min_stat, disp_maj_stat;
+	gss_buffer_desc maj_error_message;
+	gss_buffer_desc min_error_message;
+	char *maj_error_string, *min_error_string;
+	OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0;
+
+	char *ret;
+
+	maj_error_message.value = NULL;
+	min_error_message.value = NULL;
+	maj_error_message.length = 0;
+	min_error_message.length = 0;
+
+	disp_maj_stat = gss_display_status(&disp_min_stat, maj_stat,
+					   GSS_C_GSS_CODE, mech,
+					   &msg_ctx, &maj_error_message);
+	if (disp_maj_stat != 0) {
+		maj_error_message.value = NULL;
+		maj_error_message.length = 0;
+	}
+	disp_maj_stat = gss_display_status(&disp_min_stat, min_stat,
+					   GSS_C_MECH_CODE, mech,
+					   &msg_ctx, &min_error_message);
+	if (disp_maj_stat != 0) {
+		min_error_message.value = NULL;
+		min_error_message.length = 0;
+	}
+
+	maj_error_string = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx,
+					  (char *)maj_error_message.value,
+					  maj_error_message.length);
+
+	min_error_string = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx,
+					  (char *)min_error_message.value,
+					  min_error_message.length);
+
+	ret = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s: %s",
+				maj_error_string, min_error_string);
+
+	talloc_free(maj_error_string);
+	talloc_free(min_error_string);
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&disp_min_stat, &maj_error_message);
+	gss_release_buffer(&disp_min_stat, &min_error_message);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c b/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae4557b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   kerberos authorization data (PAC) utility library
+   Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
+   Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2002-2003
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2004-2005
+   Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2005,2007,2008
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+#include "auth/common_auth.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
+
+krb5_error_code check_pac_checksum(DATA_BLOB pac_data,
+					  struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *sig,
+					  krb5_context context,
+					  const krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	krb5_checksum cksum;
+	krb5_keyusage usage = 0;
+	krb5_boolean checksum_valid = false;
+	krb5_data input;
+
+	switch (sig->type) {
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5:
+		/* ignores the key type */
+		break;
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_256:
+		if (KRB5_KEY_TYPE(keyblock) != ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
+			return EINVAL;
+		}
+		/* ok */
+		break;
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_128:
+		if (KRB5_KEY_TYPE(keyblock) != ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96) {
+			return EINVAL;
+		}
+		/* ok */
+		break;
+	default:
+		DEBUG(2,("check_pac_checksum: Checksum Type %"PRIu32" is not supported\n",
+			sig->type));
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CHECKSUM_IN_KRB5_CHECKSUM /* Heimdal */
+	cksum.cksumtype	= (krb5_cksumtype)sig->type;
+	cksum.checksum.length	= sig->signature.length;
+	cksum.checksum.data	= sig->signature.data;
+#else /* MIT */
+	cksum.checksum_type	= (krb5_cksumtype)sig->type;
+	cksum.length		= sig->signature.length;
+	cksum.contents		= sig->signature.data;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM /* Heimdal */
+	usage = KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM;
+#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM) /* MIT */
+	usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM;
+#else
+#error UNKNOWN_KRB5_KEYUSAGE
+#endif
+
+	input.data = (char *)pac_data.data;
+	input.length = pac_data.length;
+
+	ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
+				     keyblock,
+				     usage,
+				     &input,
+				     &cksum,
+				     &checksum_valid);
+	if (!checksum_valid) {
+		ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+	}
+	if (ret){
+		DEBUG(2,("check_pac_checksum: PAC Verification failed: %s (%d)\n",
+			error_message(ret), ret));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+* @brief Decode a blob containing a NDR encoded PAC structure
+*
+* @param mem_ctx	  - The memory context
+* @param pac_data_blob	  - The data blob containing the NDR encoded data
+* @param context	  - The Kerberos Context
+* @param service_keyblock - The Service Key used to verify the checksum
+* @param client_principal - The client principal
+* @param tgs_authtime     - The ticket timestamp
+* @param pac_data_out	  - [out] The decoded PAC
+*
+* @return - A NTSTATUS error code
+*/
+NTSTATUS kerberos_decode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     DATA_BLOB pac_data_blob,
+			     krb5_context context,
+			     const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
+			     const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
+			     krb5_const_principal client_principal,
+			     time_t tgs_authtime,
+			     struct PAC_DATA **pac_data_out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	DATA_BLOB modified_pac_blob;
+
+	NTTIME tgs_authtime_nttime;
+	int i;
+
+	struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_sig_ptr = NULL;
+	struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig_ptr = NULL;
+	struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_sig_wipe = NULL;
+	struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig_wipe = NULL;
+	struct PAC_LOGON_NAME *logon_name = NULL;
+	struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
+	struct PAC_DATA *pac_data = NULL;
+	struct PAC_DATA_RAW *pac_data_raw = NULL;
+
+	DATA_BLOB *srv_sig_blob = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB *kdc_sig_blob = NULL;
+
+	bool bool_ret;
+
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_data_out) {
+		*pac_data_out = NULL;
+	}
+
+	pac_data = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct PAC_DATA);
+	pac_data_raw = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct PAC_DATA_RAW);
+	kdc_sig_wipe = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	srv_sig_wipe = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	if (!pac_data_raw || !pac_data || !kdc_sig_wipe || !srv_sig_wipe) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&pac_data_blob, pac_data, pac_data,
+		       (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_DATA);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_data->num_buffers < 4) {
+		/* we need logon_info, service_key and kdc_key */
+		DEBUG(0,("less than 4 PAC buffers\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
+				&pac_data_blob, pac_data_raw, pac_data_raw,
+				(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_DATA_RAW);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_data_raw->num_buffers < 4) {
+		/* we need logon_info, service_key and kdc_key */
+		DEBUG(0,("less than 4 PAC buffers\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_data->num_buffers != pac_data_raw->num_buffers) {
+		/* we need logon_info, service_key and kdc_key */
+		DEBUG(0, ("misparse! PAC_DATA has %d buffers while "
+			  "PAC_DATA_RAW has %d\n", pac_data->num_buffers,
+			  pac_data_raw->num_buffers));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
+		struct PAC_BUFFER *data_buf = &pac_data->buffers[i];
+		struct PAC_BUFFER_RAW *raw_buf = &pac_data_raw->buffers[i];
+
+		if (data_buf->type != raw_buf->type) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("misparse! PAC_DATA buffer %d has type "
+				  "%d while PAC_DATA_RAW has %d\n", i,
+				  data_buf->type, raw_buf->type));
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		switch (data_buf->type) {
+		case PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO:
+			if (!data_buf->info) {
+				break;
+			}
+			logon_info = data_buf->info->logon_info.info;
+			break;
+		case PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM:
+			if (!data_buf->info) {
+				break;
+			}
+			srv_sig_ptr = &data_buf->info->srv_cksum;
+			srv_sig_blob = &raw_buf->info->remaining;
+			break;
+		case PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM:
+			if (!data_buf->info) {
+				break;
+			}
+			kdc_sig_ptr = &data_buf->info->kdc_cksum;
+			kdc_sig_blob = &raw_buf->info->remaining;
+			break;
+		case PAC_TYPE_LOGON_NAME:
+			logon_name = &data_buf->info->logon_name;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!logon_info) {
+		DEBUG(0,("PAC no logon_info\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!logon_name) {
+		DEBUG(0,("PAC no logon_name\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!srv_sig_ptr || !srv_sig_blob) {
+		DEBUG(0,("PAC no srv_key\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!kdc_sig_ptr || !kdc_sig_blob) {
+		DEBUG(0,("PAC no kdc_key\n"));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* Find and zero out the signatures,
+	 * as required by the signing algorithm */
+
+	/* We find the data blobs above,
+	 * now we parse them to get at the exact portion we should zero */
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
+			kdc_sig_blob, kdc_sig_wipe, kdc_sig_wipe,
+			(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't parse the KDC signature: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
+			srv_sig_blob, srv_sig_wipe, srv_sig_wipe,
+			(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't parse the SRV signature: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	/* Now zero the decoded structure */
+	memset(kdc_sig_wipe->signature.data,
+		'\0', kdc_sig_wipe->signature.length);
+	memset(srv_sig_wipe->signature.data,
+		'\0', srv_sig_wipe->signature.length);
+
+	/* and re-encode, back into the same place it came from */
+	ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(
+			kdc_sig_blob, pac_data_raw, kdc_sig_wipe,
+			(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't repack the KDC signature: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+	ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(
+			srv_sig_blob, pac_data_raw, srv_sig_wipe,
+			(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't repack the SRV signature: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	/* push out the whole structure, but now with zero'ed signatures */
+	ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(
+			&modified_pac_blob, pac_data_raw, pac_data_raw,
+			(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA_RAW);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+		DEBUG(0,("can't repack the RAW PAC: %s\n",
+			nt_errstr(status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (service_keyblock) {
+		/* verify by service_key */
+		ret = check_pac_checksum(modified_pac_blob, srv_sig_ptr,
+					 context,
+					 service_keyblock);
+		if (ret) {
+			DEBUG(5, ("PAC Decode: Failed to verify the service "
+				  "signature: %s\n", error_message(ret)));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+
+		if (krbtgt_keyblock) {
+			/* verify the service key checksum by krbtgt_key */
+			ret = check_pac_checksum(srv_sig_ptr->signature, kdc_sig_ptr,
+						 context, krbtgt_keyblock);
+			if (ret) {
+				DEBUG(1, ("PAC Decode: Failed to verify the KDC signature: %s\n",
+					  smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, tmp_ctx)));
+				talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+				return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (tgs_authtime) {
+		/* Convert to NT time, so as not to lose accuracy in comparison */
+		unix_to_nt_time(&tgs_authtime_nttime, tgs_authtime);
+
+		if (tgs_authtime_nttime != logon_name->logon_time) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: "
+				  "Logon time mismatch between ticket and PAC!\n"));
+			DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: PAC: %s\n",
+				  nt_time_string(tmp_ctx, logon_name->logon_time)));
+			DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: Ticket: %s\n",
+				  nt_time_string(tmp_ctx, tgs_authtime_nttime)));
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (client_principal) {
+		char *client_principal_string;
+		ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, client_principal,
+					      KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM|KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
+					      &client_principal_string);
+		if (ret) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("Could not unparse name from ticket to match with name from PAC: [%s]:%s\n",
+				  logon_name->account_name, error_message(ret)));
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		bool_ret = strcmp(client_principal_string, logon_name->account_name) == 0;
+
+		if (!bool_ret) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("Name in PAC [%s] does not match principal name "
+				  "in ticket [%s]\n",
+				  logon_name->account_name,
+				  client_principal_string));
+			SAFE_FREE(client_principal_string);
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+		SAFE_FREE(client_principal_string);
+
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(3,("Found account name from PAC: %s [%s]\n",
+		 logon_info->info3.base.account_name.string,
+		 logon_info->info3.base.full_name.string));
+
+	DEBUG(10,("Successfully validated Kerberos PAC\n"));
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		const char *s;
+		s = NDR_PRINT_STRUCT_STRING(tmp_ctx, PAC_DATA, pac_data);
+		if (s) {
+			DEBUGADD(10,("%s\n", s));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pac_data_out) {
+		*pac_data_out = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, pac_data);
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS kerberos_pac_logon_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				 DATA_BLOB blob,
+				 krb5_context context,
+				 const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
+				 const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
+				 krb5_const_principal client_principal,
+				 time_t tgs_authtime,
+				 struct PAC_LOGON_INFO **logon_info)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	struct PAC_DATA *pac_data;
+	int i;
+	nt_status = kerberos_decode_pac(mem_ctx,
+					blob,
+					context,
+					krbtgt_keyblock,
+					service_keyblock,
+					client_principal,
+					tgs_authtime,
+					&pac_data);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	*logon_info = NULL;
+	for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
+		if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		*logon_info = pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_info.info;
+	}
+	if (!*logon_info) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS auth4_context_fetch_PAC_DATA_CTR(
+				struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
+				DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+				const char *princ_name,
+				const struct tsocket_address *remote_address,
+				uint32_t session_info_flags,
+				struct auth_session_info **session_info)
+{
+	struct PAC_DATA_CTR *pac_data_ctr = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (pac_blob == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_IMPERSONATION_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	pac_data_ctr = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DATA_CTR);
+	if (pac_data_ctr == NULL) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	status = kerberos_decode_pac(pac_data_ctr,
+				     *pac_blob,
+				     NULL,
+				     NULL,
+				     NULL,
+				     NULL,
+				     0,
+				     &pac_data_ctr->pac_data);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	pac_data_ctr->pac_blob = data_blob_talloc(pac_data_ctr,
+						  pac_blob->data,
+						  pac_blob->length);
+	if (pac_data_ctr->pac_blob.length != pac_blob->length) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	*session_info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth_session_info);
+	if (*session_info == NULL) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(auth_ctx->private_data);
+	auth_ctx->private_data = talloc_move(auth_ctx, &pac_data_ctr);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+fail:
+	TALLOC_FREE(pac_data_ctr);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+struct auth4_context *auth4_context_for_PAC_DATA_CTR(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	struct auth4_context *auth_ctx = NULL;
+
+	auth_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct auth4_context);
+	if (auth_ctx == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	auth_ctx->generate_session_info_pac = auth4_context_fetch_PAC_DATA_CTR;
+
+	return auth_ctx;
+}
+
+struct PAC_DATA_CTR *auth4_context_get_PAC_DATA_CTR(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
+						    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+	struct PAC_DATA_CTR *p = NULL;
+	SMB_ASSERT(auth_ctx->generate_session_info_pac == auth4_context_fetch_PAC_DATA_CTR);
+	p = talloc_get_type_abort(auth_ctx->private_data, struct PAC_DATA_CTR);
+	auth_ctx->private_data = NULL;
+	return talloc_move(mem_ctx, &p);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h b/auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36fd60c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   kerberos authorization data (PAC) utility library
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2011
+   Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2010-2012
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#ifndef _PAC_UTILS_H
+#define _PAC_UTILS_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+
+#include "lib/krb5_wrap/krb5_samba.h"
+#include "lib/krb5_wrap/gss_samba.h"
+
+struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA;
+struct PAC_DATA;
+struct PAC_LOGON_INFO;
+
+krb5_error_code check_pac_checksum(DATA_BLOB pac_data,
+				   struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *sig,
+				   krb5_context context,
+				   const krb5_keyblock *keyblock);
+
+NTSTATUS kerberos_decode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			     DATA_BLOB pac_data_blob,
+			     krb5_context context,
+			     const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
+			     const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
+			     krb5_const_principal client_principal,
+			     time_t tgs_authtime,
+			     struct PAC_DATA **pac_data_out);
+
+NTSTATUS kerberos_pac_logon_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				 DATA_BLOB blob,
+				 krb5_context context,
+				 const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
+				 const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
+				 krb5_const_principal client_principal,
+				 time_t tgs_authtime,
+				 struct PAC_LOGON_INFO **logon_info);
+
+struct PAC_DATA;
+struct PAC_DATA_CTR {
+	DATA_BLOB pac_blob;
+	struct PAC_DATA *pac_data;
+};
+
+struct auth4_context *auth4_context_for_PAC_DATA_CTR(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+struct PAC_DATA_CTR *auth4_context_get_PAC_DATA_CTR(struct auth4_context *auth_ctx,
+						    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
+
+NTSTATUS gssapi_obtain_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+				gss_name_t gss_client_name,
+				DATA_BLOB *pac_data);
+NTSTATUS gssapi_get_session_key(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				gss_ctx_id_t gssapi_context,
+				DATA_BLOB *session_key,
+				uint32_t *keytype);
+
+/* not the best place here, need to move to a more generic gssapi
+ * wrapper later */
+char *gssapi_error_string(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			  OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat,
+			  const gss_OID mech);
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
+#endif /* _PAC_UTILS_H */
diff --git a/auth/kerberos/wscript_build b/auth/kerberos/wscript_build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf8b05c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/kerberos/wscript_build
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('KRB5_PAC',
+                    source='gssapi_pac.c kerberos_pac.c gssapi_helper.c',
+                    deps='gssapi ndr-krb5pac krb5samba')
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c b/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..329d8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ *  Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ *  Version 3.0
+ *  NTLMSSP Signing routines
+ *  Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2001
+ *  Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2003-2005
+ *
+ *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_magic(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *first_packet)
+{
+	if (ntlmssp_blob_matches_magic(first_packet)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the NTLMSSP master session key
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				    DATA_BLOB *session_key)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->expected_state != NTLMSSP_DONE) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.data) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+	*session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
+	if (!session_key->data) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+bool gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				 uint32_t feature)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN_PKT_HEADER) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_NEW_SPNEGO) {
+		if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		return ntlmssp_state->new_spnego;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp = talloc_zero(gensec_security,
+				     struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	if (!gensec_ntlmssp) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	gensec_security->private_data = gensec_ntlmssp;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_packet(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+					sig_mem_ctx,
+					data, length,
+					whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+					sig);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				     const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_check_packet(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+					 data, length,
+					 whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+					 sig);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_seal_packet(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+					sig_mem_ctx,
+					data, length,
+					whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+					sig);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+/*
+  wrappers for the ntlmssp_*() functions
+*/
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				      const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_unseal_packet(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+					  data, length,
+					  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+					  sig);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+size_t gensec_ntlmssp_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size)
+{
+	return NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			     DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+
+	return ntlmssp_wrap(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+			    out_mem_ctx,
+			    in, out);
+}
+
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			       const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			       DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+
+	return ntlmssp_unwrap(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+			      out_mem_ctx,
+			      in, out);
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp_server.c b/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab92f4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle NLTMSSP, client server side parsing
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2005
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/network.h"
+#include "lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/common_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "param/loadparm.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/**
+ * Return the credentials of a logged on user, including session keys
+ * etc.
+ *
+ * Only valid after a successful authentication
+ *
+ * May only be called once per authentication.
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				     struct auth_session_info **session_info)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	uint32_t session_info_flags = 0;
+
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_UNIX_TOKEN) {
+		session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_UNIX_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS;
+	session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_NTLM;
+
+	if (gensec_security->auth_context && gensec_security->auth_context->generate_session_info) {
+		nt_status = gensec_security->auth_context->generate_session_info(gensec_security->auth_context, mem_ctx, 
+										 gensec_ntlmssp->server_returned_info,
+										 gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->user,
+										 session_info_flags,
+										 session_info);
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot generate a session_info without the auth_context\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status);
+
+	nt_status = gensec_ntlmssp_session_key(gensec_security, *session_info,
+					       &(*session_info)->session_key);
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY)) {
+		(*session_info)->session_key = data_blob_null;
+		nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start NTLMSSP on the server side
+ *
+ */
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_server_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state;
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+	const char *netbios_name;
+	const char *netbios_domain;
+	const char *dns_name;
+	const char *dns_domain;
+	enum server_role role;
+
+	role = lpcfg_server_role(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+	nt_status = gensec_ntlmssp_start(gensec_security);
+	NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status);
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+
+	ntlmssp_state = talloc_zero(gensec_ntlmssp,
+				    struct ntlmssp_state);
+	if (!ntlmssp_state) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state = ntlmssp_state;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->role = NTLMSSP_SERVER;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response =
+		lpcfg_lanman_auth(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response &&
+	    gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+				"ntlmssp_server", "allow_lm_key", false))
+	{
+		ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = true;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego = false;
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "force_old_spnego", false)) {
+		/*
+		 * For testing Windows 2000 mode
+		 */
+		ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego = true;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags =
+		NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION;
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "128bit", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "56bit", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "keyexchange", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "alwayssign", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_server", "ntlm2", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always allow NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL.
+	 *
+	 * These will be removed if the client doesn't want them.
+	 */
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+
+
+	if (role == ROLE_STANDALONE) {
+		ntlmssp_state->server.is_standalone = true;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->server.is_standalone = false;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->settings->server_netbios_name) {
+		netbios_name = gensec_security->settings->server_netbios_name;
+	} else {
+		netbios_name = lpcfg_netbios_name(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->settings->server_netbios_domain) {
+		netbios_domain = gensec_security->settings->server_netbios_domain;
+	} else {
+		netbios_domain = lpcfg_workgroup(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->settings->server_dns_name) {
+		dns_name = gensec_security->settings->server_dns_name;
+	} else {
+		const char *dnsdomain = lpcfg_dnsdomain(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+		char *lower_netbiosname;
+
+		lower_netbiosname = strlower_talloc(ntlmssp_state, netbios_name);
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(lower_netbiosname);
+
+		/* Find out the DNS host name */
+		if (dnsdomain && dnsdomain[0] != '\0') {
+			dns_name = talloc_asprintf(ntlmssp_state, "%s.%s",
+						   lower_netbiosname,
+						   dnsdomain);
+			talloc_free(lower_netbiosname);
+			NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(dns_name);
+		} else {
+			dns_name = lower_netbiosname;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->settings->server_dns_domain) {
+		dns_domain = gensec_security->settings->server_dns_domain;
+	} else {
+		dns_domain = lpcfg_dnsdomain(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_name = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, netbios_name);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_name);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, netbios_domain);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->server.dns_name = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, dns_name);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(ntlmssp_state->server.dns_name);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->server.dns_domain = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, dns_domain);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(ntlmssp_state->server.dns_domain);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+	ntlmssp_state->conf_flags = ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..745f262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle NLTMSSP, client server side parsing
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2005
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+struct auth_session_info;
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/**
+ * Callbacks for NTLMSSP - for both client and server operating modes
+ *
+ */
+
+static const struct ntlmssp_callbacks {
+	enum ntlmssp_role role;
+	enum ntlmssp_message_type command;
+	NTSTATUS (*sync_fn)(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out);
+	struct tevent_req *(*send_fn)(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				      struct tevent_context *ev,
+				      struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      const DATA_BLOB in);
+	NTSTATUS (*recv_fn)(struct tevent_req *req,
+			    TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			    DATA_BLOB *out);
+} ntlmssp_callbacks[] = {
+	{
+		.role		= NTLMSSP_CLIENT,
+		.command	= NTLMSSP_INITIAL,
+		.sync_fn	= ntlmssp_client_initial,
+	},{
+		.role		= NTLMSSP_CLIENT,
+		.command	= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE,
+		.sync_fn	= gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache,
+	},{
+		.role		= NTLMSSP_SERVER,
+		.command	= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE,
+		.sync_fn	= gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate,
+	},{
+		.role		= NTLMSSP_CLIENT,
+		.command	= NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE,
+		.sync_fn	= ntlmssp_client_challenge,
+	},{
+		.role		= NTLMSSP_SERVER,
+		.command	= NTLMSSP_AUTH,
+		.send_fn	= ntlmssp_server_auth_send,
+		.recv_fn	= ntlmssp_server_auth_recv,
+	}
+};
+
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_update_find(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					   struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp,
+					   const DATA_BLOB input, uint32_t *idx)
+{
+	uint32_t ntlmssp_command;
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	if (gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->expected_state == NTLMSSP_DONE) {
+		/* We are strict here because other modules, which we
+		 * don't fully control (such as GSSAPI) are also
+		 * strict, but are tested less often */
+
+		DEBUG(1, ("Called NTLMSSP after state machine was 'done'\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!input.length) {
+		switch (gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->role) {
+		case NTLMSSP_CLIENT:
+			if (gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->resume_ccache) {
+				/*
+				 * make sure gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache()
+				 * will be called
+				 */
+				ntlmssp_command = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			ntlmssp_command = NTLMSSP_INITIAL;
+			break;
+		case NTLMSSP_SERVER:
+			if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_DATAGRAM_MODE) {
+				/* 'datagram' mode - no neg packet */
+				ntlmssp_command = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE;
+			} else {
+				/* This is normal in SPNEGO mech negotiation fallback */
+				DEBUG(2, ("Failed to parse NTLMSSP packet: zero length\n"));
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			DEBUG(1, ("NTLMSSP state has invalid role %d\n",
+				  gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->role));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (!msrpc_parse(gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state,
+				 &input, "Cd",
+				 "NTLMSSP",
+				 &ntlmssp_command)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse NTLMSSP packet, could not extract NTLMSSP command\n"));
+			dump_data(2, input.data, input.length);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_command != gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->expected_state) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("got NTLMSSP command %u, expected %u\n", ntlmssp_command,
+			  gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->expected_state));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ntlmssp_callbacks); i++) {
+		if (ntlmssp_callbacks[i].role == gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->role &&
+		    ntlmssp_callbacks[i].command == ntlmssp_command) {
+			*idx = i;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(1, ("failed to find NTLMSSP callback for NTLMSSP mode %u, command %u\n",
+		  gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->role, ntlmssp_command));
+
+	return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state {
+	const struct ntlmssp_callbacks *cb;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB out;
+};
+
+static void gensec_ntlmssp_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+
+static struct tevent_req *gensec_ntlmssp_update_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						     struct tevent_context *ev,
+						     struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						     const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	uint32_t i = 0;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = gensec_ntlmssp_update_find(gensec_security,
+					    gensec_ntlmssp,
+					    in, &i);
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_callbacks[i].send_fn != NULL) {
+		struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+
+		state->cb = &ntlmssp_callbacks[i];
+
+		subreq = state->cb->send_fn(state, ev,
+					    gensec_security,
+					    in);
+		if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+		}
+		tevent_req_set_callback(subreq,
+					gensec_ntlmssp_update_done,
+					req);
+		return req;
+	}
+
+	status = ntlmssp_callbacks[i].sync_fn(gensec_security,
+					      state,
+					      in, &state->out);
+	state->status = status;
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+		tevent_req_done(req);
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+}
+
+static void gensec_ntlmssp_update_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req =
+		tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
+		struct tevent_req);
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	status = state->cb->recv_fn(subreq, state, &state->out);
+	TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
+	if (GENSEC_UPDATE_IS_NTERROR(status)) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	state->status = status;
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_update_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					   DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct gensec_ntlmssp_update_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*out = state->out;
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, state->out.data);
+	status = state->status;
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_may_reset_crypto(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+						bool full_reset)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	bool reset_seqnums = full_reset;
+
+	if (!gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	status = ntlmssp_sign_reset(ntlmssp_state, reset_seqnums);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Could not reset NTLMSSP signing/sealing system (error was: %s)\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static const char *gensec_ntlmssp_final_auth_type(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	return GENSEC_FINAL_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP;
+}
+
+static const char *gensec_ntlmssp_oids[] = {
+	GENSEC_OID_NTLMSSP,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_ntlmssp_security_ops = {
+	.name		= "ntlmssp",
+	.sasl_name	= GENSEC_SASL_NAME_NTLMSSP, /* "NTLM" */
+	.auth_type	= DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP,
+	.weak_crypto    = true,
+	.oid            = gensec_ntlmssp_oids,
+	.client_start   = gensec_ntlmssp_client_start,
+	.server_start   = gensec_ntlmssp_server_start,
+	.magic 	        = gensec_ntlmssp_magic,
+	.update_send	= gensec_ntlmssp_update_send,
+	.update_recv	= gensec_ntlmssp_update_recv,
+	.may_reset_crypto= gensec_ntlmssp_may_reset_crypto,
+	.sig_size	= gensec_ntlmssp_sig_size,
+	.sign_packet	= gensec_ntlmssp_sign_packet,
+	.check_packet	= gensec_ntlmssp_check_packet,
+	.seal_packet	= gensec_ntlmssp_seal_packet,
+	.unseal_packet	= gensec_ntlmssp_unseal_packet,
+	.wrap           = gensec_ntlmssp_wrap,
+	.unwrap         = gensec_ntlmssp_unwrap,
+	.session_key	= gensec_ntlmssp_session_key,
+	.session_info   = gensec_ntlmssp_session_info,
+	.have_feature   = gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature,
+	.final_auth_type = gensec_ntlmssp_final_auth_type,
+	.enabled        = true,
+	.priority       = GENSEC_NTLMSSP
+};
+
+static const struct gensec_security_ops gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_ops = {
+	.name		= "ntlmssp_resume_ccache",
+	.weak_crypto    = true,
+	.client_start   = gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_start,
+	.update_send	= gensec_ntlmssp_update_send,
+	.update_recv	= gensec_ntlmssp_update_recv,
+	.session_key	= gensec_ntlmssp_session_key,
+	.have_feature   = gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature,
+	.enabled        = true,
+	.priority       = GENSEC_NTLMSSP
+};
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS ret;
+
+	ret = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_ntlmssp_security_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			gensec_ntlmssp_security_ops.name));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = gensec_register(ctx, &gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register '%s' gensec backend!\n",
+			gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_ops.name));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct gensec_security *gensec_find_child_by_ops(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+							const struct gensec_security_ops *ops)
+{
+	struct gensec_security *current = gensec_security;
+
+	while (current != NULL) {
+		if (current->ops == ops) {
+			return current;
+		}
+
+		current = current->child_security;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+uint32_t gensec_ntlmssp_neg_flags(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+
+	gensec_security = gensec_find_child_by_ops(gensec_security,
+					&gensec_ntlmssp_security_ops);
+	if (gensec_security == NULL) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp = talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+					       struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	return gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+}
+
+const char *gensec_ntlmssp_server_domain(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+
+	gensec_security = gensec_find_child_by_ops(gensec_security,
+					&gensec_ntlmssp_security_ops);
+	if (gensec_security == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp = talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+					       struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	return gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain;
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49f47c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   SMB parameters and setup
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1997
+   Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997
+   Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2010
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ntlmssp.h"
+
+struct auth_context;
+struct auth_serversupplied_info;
+struct tsocket_address;
+struct auth_user_info_dc;
+struct gensec_security;
+struct ntlmssp_state;
+
+/* NTLMSSP mode */
+enum ntlmssp_role
+{
+	NTLMSSP_SERVER,
+	NTLMSSP_CLIENT
+};
+
+/* NTLMSSP message types */
+enum ntlmssp_message_type
+{
+	NTLMSSP_INITIAL = 0 /* samba internal state */,
+	NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE = 1,
+	NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE = 2,
+	NTLMSSP_AUTH      = 3,
+	NTLMSSP_UNKNOWN   = 4,
+	NTLMSSP_DONE      = 5 /* samba final state */
+};
+
+#define NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY        0x00000001
+#define NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN               0x00000002
+#define NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL               0x00000004
+#define NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE		   0x00000008
+
+union ntlmssp_crypt_state;
+
+struct ntlmssp_state
+{
+	enum ntlmssp_role role;
+	uint32_t expected_state;
+
+	bool unicode;
+	bool use_ntlmv2;
+	bool use_ccache;
+	bool resume_ccache;
+	bool use_nt_response;  /* Set to 'False' to debug what happens when the NT response is omitted */
+	bool allow_lm_response;/* The LM_RESPONSE code is not very secure... */
+	bool allow_lm_key;     /* The LM_KEY code is not very secure... */
+
+	const char *user;
+	const char *domain;
+	uint8_t *nt_hash;
+	uint8_t *lm_hash;
+
+	DATA_BLOB negotiate_blob;
+	DATA_BLOB challenge_blob;
+	bool new_spnego;
+	bool force_old_spnego;
+
+	struct {
+		const char *netbios_name;
+		const char *netbios_domain;
+		struct AV_PAIR_LIST av_pair_list;
+	} client;
+
+	struct {
+		bool is_standalone;
+		const char *netbios_name;
+		const char *netbios_domain;
+		const char *dns_name;
+		const char *dns_domain;
+		NTTIME challenge_endtime;
+		struct AV_PAIR_LIST av_pair_list;
+	} server;
+
+	DATA_BLOB internal_chal; /* Random challenge as supplied to the client for NTLM authentication */
+
+	DATA_BLOB chal; /* Random challenge as input into the actual NTLM (or NTLM2) authentication */
+	DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
+	DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
+	DATA_BLOB session_key;
+
+	uint32_t conf_flags;
+	uint32_t required_flags;
+	uint32_t neg_flags; /* the current state of negotiation with the NTLMSSP partner */
+
+	bool force_wrap_seal;
+
+	union ntlmssp_crypt_state *crypt;
+};
+
+/* The following definitions come from libcli/auth/ntlmssp_sign.c  */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_check_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			      const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig) ;
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_seal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+			     uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_unseal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			       uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			       const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			       const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_wrap(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+		      TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+		      const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		      DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_unwrap(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_stae,
+			TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_reset(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			    bool reset_seqnums);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_init(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state);
+
+bool ntlmssp_blob_matches_magic(const DATA_BLOB *blob);
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c  */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx);
+
+uint32_t gensec_ntlmssp_neg_flags(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+const char *gensec_ntlmssp_server_domain(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_client.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..337aeed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1020 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle NLTMSSP, client server side parsing
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2005
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+struct auth_session_info;
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h"
+#include "../nsswitch/libwbclient/wbclient.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ Client side NTLMSSP
+*********************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Initial packet
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ * @param out_mem_ctx The DATA_BLOB *out will be allocated on this context
+ * @param in A NULL data blob (input ignored)
+ * @param out The initial negotiate request to the server, as an talloc()ed DATA_BLOB, on out_mem_ctx
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	const DATA_BLOB version_blob = ntlmssp_version_blob();
+
+	/* generate the ntlmssp negotiate packet */
+	status = msrpc_gen(out_mem_ctx,
+		  out, "CddAAb",
+		  "NTLMSSP",
+		  NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE,
+		  ntlmssp_state->neg_flags,
+		  "", /* domain */
+		  "", /* workstation */
+		  version_blob.data, version_blob.length);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("ntlmssp_client_initial: failed to generate "
+			  "ntlmssp negotiate packet\n"));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *negotiate = talloc(
+			ntlmssp_state, struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
+		if (negotiate != NULL) {
+			status = ntlmssp_pull_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(
+				out, negotiate, negotiate);
+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE,
+						negotiate);
+			}
+			TALLOC_FREE(negotiate);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob = data_blob_dup_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							     *out);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length != out->length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	uint32_t neg_flags = 0;
+	uint32_t ntlmssp_command;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	bool ok;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (in.length == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * This is compat code for older callers
+		 * which were missing the "initial_blob"/"negotiate_blob".
+		 *
+		 * That means we can't calculate the NTLMSSP_MIC
+		 * field correctly and need to force the
+		 * old_spnego behaviour.
+		 */
+		DEBUG(10, ("%s: in.length==%u force_old_spnego!\n",
+			   __func__, (unsigned int)in.length));
+		ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego = true;
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags = 0;
+		ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE;
+		return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+	}
+
+	/* parse the NTLMSSP packet */
+
+	if (in.length > UINT16_MAX) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("%s: reject large request of length %u\n",
+			__func__, (unsigned int)in.length));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	ok = msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &in, "Cdd",
+			 "NTLMSSP",
+			 &ntlmssp_command,
+			 &neg_flags);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("%s: failed to parse NTLMSSP Negotiate of length %u\n",
+			__func__, (unsigned int)in.length));
+		dump_data(2, in.data, in.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_command != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("%s: no NTLMSSP Negotiate message (length %u)\n",
+			__func__, (unsigned int)in.length));
+		dump_data(2, in.data, in.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags = neg_flags;
+	DEBUG(3, ("Imported Negotiate flags:\n"));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags(neg_flags);
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) {
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = true;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = false;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
+		gensec_security->want_features |= GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
+		gensec_security->want_features |= GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->conf_flags = ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+	ntlmssp_state->required_flags = 0;
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *negotiate = talloc(
+			ntlmssp_state, struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
+		if (negotiate != NULL) {
+			status = ntlmssp_pull_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(
+				&in, negotiate, negotiate);
+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE,
+						negotiate);
+			}
+			TALLOC_FREE(negotiate);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob = data_blob_dup_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							     in);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length != in.length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Challenge Packet.  Generate an auth packet.
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC state
+ * @param out_mem_ctx Memory context for *out
+ * @param in The server challnege, as a DATA_BLOB.  reply.data must be NULL
+ * @param out The next request (auth packet) to the server, as an allocated DATA_BLOB, on the out_mem_ctx context
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				  const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	uint32_t chal_flags, ntlmssp_command, unkn1 = 0, unkn2 = 0;
+	DATA_BLOB server_domain_blob;
+	DATA_BLOB challenge_blob;
+	DATA_BLOB target_info = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	char *server_domain;
+	const char *chal_parse_string;
+	const char *chal_parse_string_short = NULL;
+	const char *auth_gen_string;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	DATA_BLOB encrypted_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	int flags = 0;
+	const char *user = NULL, *domain = NULL, *workstation = NULL;
+	bool is_anonymous = false;
+	const DATA_BLOB version_blob = ntlmssp_version_blob();
+	const NTTIME *server_timestamp = NULL;
+	uint8_t mic_buffer[NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE] = { 0, };
+	DATA_BLOB mic_blob = data_blob_const(mic_buffer, sizeof(mic_buffer));
+	gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(out_mem_ctx);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	if (!msrpc_parse(mem_ctx,
+			 &in, "CdBd",
+			 "NTLMSSP",
+			 &ntlmssp_command,
+			 &server_domain_blob,
+			 &chal_flags)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
+		dump_data(2, in.data, in.length);
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state,
+					     chal_flags, "challenge");
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+		if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) {
+			chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
+		} else {
+			chal_parse_string = "CdUdbdd";
+			chal_parse_string_short = "CdUdb";
+		}
+		auth_gen_string = "CdBBUUUBdbb";
+	} else {
+		if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) {
+			chal_parse_string = "CdAdbddB";
+		} else {
+			chal_parse_string = "CdAdbdd";
+			chal_parse_string_short = "CdAdb";
+		}
+
+		auth_gen_string = "CdBBAAABdbb";
+	}
+
+	if (!msrpc_parse(mem_ctx,
+			 &in, chal_parse_string,
+			 "NTLMSSP",
+			 &ntlmssp_command,
+			 &server_domain,
+			 &chal_flags,
+			 &challenge_blob, 8,
+			 &unkn1, &unkn2,
+			 &target_info)) {
+
+		bool ok = false;
+
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#2)\n"));
+
+		if (chal_parse_string_short != NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * In the case where NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO
+			 * is not used, some NTLMSSP servers don't return
+			 * the unused unkn1 and unkn2 fields.
+			 * See bug:
+			 * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10016
+			 * for packet traces.
+			 * Try and parse again without them.
+			 */
+			ok = msrpc_parse(mem_ctx,
+				&in, chal_parse_string_short,
+				"NTLMSSP",
+				&ntlmssp_command,
+				&server_domain,
+				&chal_flags,
+				&challenge_blob, 8);
+			if (!ok) {
+				DEBUG(1, ("Failed to short parse "
+					"the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#2)\n"));
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!ok) {
+			dump_data(2, in.data, in.length);
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *challenge =
+			talloc(ntlmssp_state, struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE);
+		if (challenge != NULL) {
+			NTSTATUS status;
+			challenge->NegotiateFlags = chal_flags;
+			status = ntlmssp_pull_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(
+					&in, challenge, challenge);
+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE,
+						challenge);
+			}
+			TALLOC_FREE(challenge);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER) {
+		ntlmssp_state->server.is_standalone = true;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->server.is_standalone = false;
+	}
+	/* TODO: parse struct_blob and fill in the rest */
+	ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_name = "";
+	ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain = talloc_move(ntlmssp_state, &server_domain);
+	ntlmssp_state->server.dns_name = "";
+	ntlmssp_state->server.dns_domain = "";
+
+	if (challenge_blob.length != 8) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	is_anonymous = cli_credentials_is_anonymous(gensec_security->credentials);
+	cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(gensec_security->credentials, mem_ctx,
+						 &user, &domain);
+
+	workstation = cli_credentials_get_workstation(gensec_security->credentials);
+
+	if (user == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("User is NULL, returning INVALID_PARAMETER\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (domain == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("Domain is NULL, returning INVALID_PARAMETER\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (workstation == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("Workstation is NULL, returning INVALID_PARAMETER\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (is_anonymous) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_ANONYMOUS;
+		/*
+		 * don't use the ccache for anonymous auth
+		 */
+		ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = false;
+	}
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ccache) {
+		struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we have a password given we don't
+		 * use the ccache
+		 */
+		nt_hash = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(gensec_security->credentials,
+						      mem_ctx);
+		if (nt_hash != NULL) {
+			ZERO_STRUCTP(nt_hash);
+			TALLOC_FREE(nt_hash);
+			ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ccache) {
+		struct wbcCredentialCacheParams params;
+		struct wbcCredentialCacheInfo *info = NULL;
+		struct wbcAuthErrorInfo *error = NULL;
+		struct wbcNamedBlob auth_blobs[2];
+		const struct wbcBlob *wbc_auth_blob = NULL;
+		const struct wbcBlob *wbc_session_key = NULL;
+		wbcErr wbc_status;
+		size_t i;
+		bool new_spnego = false;
+
+		params.account_name = user;
+		params.domain_name = domain;
+		params.level = WBC_CREDENTIAL_CACHE_LEVEL_NTLMSSP;
+
+		auth_blobs[0].name = "challenge_blob";
+		auth_blobs[0].flags = 0;
+		auth_blobs[0].blob.data = in.data;
+		auth_blobs[0].blob.length = in.length;
+		auth_blobs[1].name = "negotiate_blob";
+		auth_blobs[1].flags = 0;
+		auth_blobs[1].blob.data = ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.data;
+		auth_blobs[1].blob.length = ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length;
+		params.num_blobs = ARRAY_SIZE(auth_blobs);
+		params.blobs = auth_blobs;
+
+		wbc_status = wbcCredentialCache(&params, &info, &error);
+		wbcFreeMemory(error);
+		if (!WBC_ERROR_IS_OK(wbc_status)) {
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_CREDENTIAL_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+		for (i=0; i<info->num_blobs; i++) {
+			if (strequal(info->blobs[i].name, "auth_blob")) {
+				wbc_auth_blob = &info->blobs[i].blob;
+			}
+			if (strequal(info->blobs[i].name, "session_key")) {
+				wbc_session_key = &info->blobs[i].blob;
+			}
+			if (strequal(info->blobs[i].name, "new_spnego")) {
+				new_spnego = true;
+			}
+		}
+		if ((wbc_auth_blob == NULL) || (wbc_session_key == NULL)) {
+			wbcFreeMemory(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_CREDENTIAL_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+		session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
+					       wbc_session_key->data,
+					       wbc_session_key->length);
+		if (session_key.length != wbc_session_key->length) {
+			wbcFreeMemory(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
+					wbc_auth_blob->data,
+					wbc_auth_blob->length);
+		if (out->length != wbc_auth_blob->length) {
+			wbcFreeMemory(info);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		ntlmssp_state->new_spnego = new_spnego;
+
+		wbcFreeMemory(info);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		flags |= CLI_CRED_NTLM2;
+	}
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+		flags |= CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH;
+	}
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_nt_response) {
+		flags |= CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH;
+	}
+	if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response) {
+		flags |= CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
+	}
+
+	if (target_info.length != 0 && !is_anonymous) {
+		struct AV_PAIR *pairs = NULL;
+		uint32_t count = 0;
+		enum ndr_err_code err;
+		struct AV_PAIR *timestamp = NULL;
+		struct AV_PAIR *eol = NULL;
+		uint32_t i = 0;
+		const char *service = NULL;
+		const char *hostname = NULL;
+
+		err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&target_info,
+					ntlmssp_state,
+					&ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list,
+					(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_AV_PAIR_LIST);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+			return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
+		}
+
+		count = ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.count;
+		/*
+		 * We need room for Flags, SingleHost,
+		 * ChannelBindings and Target
+		 */
+		pairs = talloc_zero_array(ntlmssp_state, struct AV_PAIR,
+					  count + 4);
+		if (pairs == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			pairs[i] = ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.pair[i];
+		}
+
+		ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list.count = count;
+		ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list.pair = pairs;
+
+		eol = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list,
+					  MsvAvEOL);
+		if (eol == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		timestamp = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list,
+						MsvAvTimestamp);
+		if (timestamp != NULL) {
+			uint32_t sign_features =
+					GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY |
+					GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN |
+					GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL;
+
+			server_timestamp = &timestamp->Value.AvTimestamp;
+
+			if (ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego) {
+				sign_features = 0;
+			}
+
+			if (gensec_security->want_features & sign_features) {
+				struct AV_PAIR *av_flags = NULL;
+
+				av_flags = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list,
+							       MsvAvFlags);
+				if (av_flags == NULL) {
+					av_flags = eol;
+					eol++;
+					count++;
+					*eol = *av_flags;
+					av_flags->AvId = MsvAvFlags;
+					av_flags->Value.AvFlags = 0;
+				}
+
+				av_flags->Value.AvFlags |= NTLMSSP_AVFLAG_MIC_IN_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE;
+				ntlmssp_state->new_spnego = true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		{
+			struct AV_PAIR *SingleHost = NULL;
+
+			SingleHost = eol;
+			eol++;
+			count++;
+			*eol = *SingleHost;
+
+			/*
+			 * This is not really used, but we want to
+			 * add some more random bytes and match
+			 * Windows.
+			 */
+			SingleHost->AvId = MsvAvSingleHost;
+			SingleHost->Value.AvSingleHost.token_info.Flags = 0;
+			SingleHost->Value.AvSingleHost.token_info.TokenIL = 0;
+			generate_random_buffer(SingleHost->Value.AvSingleHost.token_info.MachineId,
+					sizeof(SingleHost->Value.AvSingleHost.token_info.MachineId));
+			SingleHost->Value.AvSingleHost.remaining = data_blob_null;
+		}
+
+		{
+			struct AV_PAIR *ChannelBindings = NULL;
+
+			ChannelBindings = eol;
+			eol++;
+			count++;
+			*eol = *ChannelBindings;
+
+			/*
+			 * gensec doesn't support channel bindings yet,
+			 * but we want to match Windows on the wire
+			 */
+			ChannelBindings->AvId = MsvChannelBindings;
+			memset(ChannelBindings->Value.ChannelBindings, 0,
+			       sizeof(ChannelBindings->Value.ChannelBindings));
+		}
+
+		service = gensec_get_target_service(gensec_security);
+		hostname = gensec_get_target_hostname(gensec_security);
+		if (service != NULL && hostname != NULL) {
+			struct AV_PAIR *target = NULL;
+
+			target = eol;
+			eol++;
+			count++;
+			*eol = *target;
+
+			target->AvId = MsvAvTargetName;
+			target->Value.AvTargetName = talloc_asprintf(pairs, "%s/%s",
+								     service,
+								     hostname);
+			if (target->Value.AvTargetName == NULL) {
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list.count = count;
+		ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list.pair = pairs;
+
+		err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&target_info,
+					ntlmssp_state,
+					&ntlmssp_state->client.av_pair_list,
+					(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_AV_PAIR_LIST);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	nt_status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(gensec_security->credentials, mem_ctx,
+						      &flags, challenge_blob,
+						      server_timestamp, target_info,
+						      &lm_response, &nt_response,
+						      &lm_session_key, &session_key);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH)) {
+		/* LM Key is still possible, just silly, so we do not
+		 * allow it. Fortunately all LM crypto is off by
+		 * default and we require command line options to end
+		 * up here */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM2)) {
+		/* NTLM2 is incompatible... */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	}
+
+	if ((ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)
+	    && ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key && lm_session_key.length == 16) {
+		DATA_BLOB new_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+		if (lm_response.length == 24) {
+			nt_status = SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(lm_session_key.data,
+							      lm_response.data,
+							      new_session_key.data);
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+				return nt_status;
+			}
+		} else {
+			static const uint8_t zeros[24];
+			nt_status = SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(lm_session_key.data,
+                                                              zeros,
+                                                              new_session_key.data);
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+				return nt_status;
+			}
+		}
+		session_key = new_session_key;
+		dump_data_pw("LM session key\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+	}
+
+
+	/* Key exchange encryptes a new client-generated session key with
+	   the password-derived key */
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
+		/* Make up a new session key */
+		uint8_t client_session_key[16];
+		gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd;
+		gnutls_datum_t enc_session_key = {
+			.data = session_key.data,
+			.size = session_key.length,
+		};
+
+		generate_random_buffer(client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
+
+		/* Encrypt the new session key with the old one */
+		encrypted_session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							 client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
+		dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key:\n", encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length);
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&enc_session_key,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			ZERO_ARRAY(client_session_key);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+					   encrypted_session_key.data,
+					   encrypted_session_key.length);
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			ZERO_ARRAY(client_session_key);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key (enc):\n", encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length);
+
+		/* Mark the new session key as the 'real' session key */
+		session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
+		ZERO_ARRAY(client_session_key);
+	}
+
+	/* this generates the actual auth packet */
+	nt_status = msrpc_gen(mem_ctx,
+		       out, auth_gen_string,
+		       "NTLMSSP",
+		       NTLMSSP_AUTH,
+		       lm_response.data, lm_response.length,
+		       nt_response.data, nt_response.length,
+		       domain,
+		       user,
+		       workstation,
+		       encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length,
+		       ntlmssp_state->neg_flags,
+		       version_blob.data, version_blob.length,
+		       mic_blob.data, mic_blob.length);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *authenticate =
+			talloc(ntlmssp_state, struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
+		if (authenticate != NULL) {
+			NTSTATUS status;
+			authenticate->NegotiateFlags = ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+			status = ntlmssp_pull_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(
+				out, authenticate, authenticate);
+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE,
+						authenticate);
+			}
+			TALLOC_FREE(authenticate);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always include the MIC, even without:
+	 * av_flags->Value.AvFlags |= NTLMSSP_AVFLAG_MIC_IN_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE;
+	 * ntlmssp_state->new_spnego = true;
+	 *
+	 * This matches a Windows client.
+	 */
+	rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
+			      GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+			 session_key.data,
+			 MIN(session_key.length, 64));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd,
+			 ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.data,
+			 ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+		nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, in.data, in.length);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+		nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, out->data, out->length);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+		nt_status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, mic_buffer);
+
+	memcpy(out->data + NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET, mic_buffer, NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE);
+	ZERO_ARRAY(mic_buffer);
+
+	nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+done:
+	ZERO_ARRAY_LEN(ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.data,
+		       ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length);
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->session_key = session_key;
+	talloc_steal(ntlmssp_state, session_key.data);
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP: Set final flags:\n"));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
+
+	talloc_steal(out_mem_ctx, out->data);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_DONE;
+
+	if (gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_init(ntlmssp_state);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Could not setup NTLMSSP signing/sealing system (error was: %s)\n",
+				  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+			talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+	}
+
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_client_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	nt_status = gensec_ntlmssp_start(gensec_security);
+	NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status);
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+
+	ntlmssp_state = talloc_zero(gensec_ntlmssp,
+				    struct ntlmssp_state);
+	if (!ntlmssp_state) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state = ntlmssp_state;
+
+	ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->role = NTLMSSP_CLIENT;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_domain = lpcfg_workgroup(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+	ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(gensec_security->credentials);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->unicode = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "unicode", true);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->use_nt_response = \
+		gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+				    "ntlmssp_client",
+				    "send_nt_response",
+				    true);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response = lpcfg_client_lanman_auth(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response
+					      && (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "allow_lm_key", false)
+						  || gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "lm_key", false)));
+
+	ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+						"ntlmssp_client", "force_old_spnego", false);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_INITIAL;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags =
+		NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM |
+		NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION |
+		NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "128bit", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "56bit", false)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "lm_key", false)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "keyexchange", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "alwayssign", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings, "ntlmssp_client", "ntlm2", true)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	} else {
+		/* apparently we can't do ntlmv2 if we don't do ntlm2 */
+		ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = false;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+		ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_response = false;
+		ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = false;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to set this to allow a later SetPassword
+		 * via the SAMR pipe to succeed. Strange.... We could
+		 * also add  NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL here. JRA.
+		 *
+		 * Without this, Windows will not create the master key
+		 * that it thinks is only used for NTLMSSP signing and
+		 * sealing.  (It is actually pulled out and used directly)
+		 *
+		 * We don't require this here as some servers (e.g. NetAPP)
+		 * doesn't support this.
+		 */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+	}
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+
+		if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE) {
+			/*
+			 * We need to handle NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN as
+			 * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL if GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
+			 * is requested.
+			 */
+			ntlmssp_state->force_wrap_seal = true;
+		}
+	}
+	if (ntlmssp_state->force_wrap_seal) {
+		bool ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * We want also work against old Samba servers
+		 * which didn't had GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
+		 * we negotiate SEAL too. We may remove this
+		 * in a few years. As all servers should have
+		 * GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE by then.
+		 */
+		ret = gensec_setting_bool(gensec_security->settings,
+					  "ntlmssp_client",
+					  "ldap_style_send_seal",
+					  true);
+		if (ret) {
+			ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+	}
+	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+		ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = true;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+	ntlmssp_state->conf_flags = ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	status = gensec_ntlmssp_client_start(gensec_security);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	gensec_ntlmssp = talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+					       struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = false;
+	gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->resume_ccache = true;
+	gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea5d6f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   NTLMSSP ndr functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2009
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
+#include "ntlmssp_ndr.h"
+
+#define NTLMSSP_PULL_MESSAGE(type, blob, mem_ctx, r) \
+do { \
+	enum ndr_err_code __ndr_err; \
+	ZERO_STRUCTP(r); /* in order to deal with unset neg flags */\
+	__ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(blob, mem_ctx, r, \
+			(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_ ##type); \
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(__ndr_err)) { \
+		return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(__ndr_err); \
+	} \
+	if (!mem_equal_const_time(r->Signature, "NTLMSSP\0", 8)) { \
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; \
+	} \
+	return NT_STATUS_OK; \
+} while(0);
+
+#define NTLMSSP_PUSH_MESSAGE(type, blob, mem_ctx, r) \
+do { \
+	enum ndr_err_code __ndr_err; \
+	__ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, mem_ctx, r, \
+			(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_ ##type); \
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(__ndr_err)) { \
+		return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(__ndr_err); \
+	} \
+	return NT_STATUS_OK; \
+} while(0);
+
+
+/**
+ * Pull NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE struct from a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PULL_MESSAGE(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pull NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE struct from a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PULL_MESSAGE(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pull NTLMSSP AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE struct from a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PULL_MESSAGE(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Push NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE struct into a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PUSH_MESSAGE(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Push NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE struct into a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PUSH_MESSAGE(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Push NTLMSSP AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE struct into a blob
+ * @param blob The plain packet blob
+ * @param mem_ctx A talloc context
+ * @param r Pointer to a NTLMSSP AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE structure
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *r)
+{
+	NTLMSSP_PUSH_MESSAGE(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, blob, mem_ctx, r);
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e619231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   NTLMSSP ndr functions
+
+   Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2009
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *r);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *r);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_pull_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *r);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *r);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *r);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_push_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(DATA_BLOB *blob,
+					   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   const struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *r);
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d84e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*
+ *  Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ *  Version 3.0
+ *  NTLMSSP Signing routines
+ *  Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2003-2005
+ *
+ *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/* For structures internal to the NTLMSSP implementation that should not be exposed */
+
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+struct auth_session_info;
+
+struct ntlmssp_crypt_direction {
+	uint32_t seq_num;
+	uint8_t sign_key[16];
+	gnutls_cipher_hd_t seal_state;
+};
+
+union ntlmssp_crypt_state {
+	/* NTLM */
+	struct ntlmssp_crypt_direction ntlm;
+
+	/* NTLM2 */
+	struct {
+		struct ntlmssp_crypt_direction sending;
+		struct ntlmssp_crypt_direction receiving;
+	} ntlm2;
+};
+
+struct gensec_ntlmssp_context {
+	/* For GENSEC users */
+	void *server_returned_info;
+
+	/* used by both client and server implementation */
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state;
+};
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp_util.c  */
+
+void debug_ntlmssp_flags(uint32_t neg_flags);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+				  uint32_t neg_flags, const char *name);
+const DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_version_blob(void);
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp_server.c  */
+
+const char *ntlmssp_target_name(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+				uint32_t neg_flags, uint32_t *chal_flags);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_negotiate(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				  const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_auth(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			     const DATA_BLOB request, DATA_BLOB *reply);
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_client.c  */
+
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Initial packet
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ * @param out_mem_ctx The DATA_BLOB *out will be allocated on this context
+ * @param in A NULL data blob (input ignored)
+ * @param out The initial negotiate request to the server, as an talloc()ed DATA_BLOB, on out_mem_ctx
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out) ;
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Challenge Packet.  Generate an auth packet.
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC state
+ * @param out_mem_ctx Memory context for *out
+ * @param in The server challnege, as a DATA_BLOB.  reply.data must be NULL
+ * @param out The next request (auth packet) to the server, as an allocated DATA_BLOB, on the out_mem_ctx context
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				  const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out) ;
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_client_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_resume_ccache_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp_server.c  */
+
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Negotiate packet (GENSEC wrapper)
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC state
+ * @param out_mem_ctx Memory context for *out
+ * @param in The request, as a DATA_BLOB.  reply.data must be NULL
+ * @param out The reply, as an allocated DATA_BLOB, caller to free.
+ * @return Errors or MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED if (normal) a reply is required.
+ */
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 const DATA_BLOB request, DATA_BLOB *reply);
+
+struct tevent_req *ntlmssp_server_auth_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    struct tevent_context *ev,
+					    struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					    const DATA_BLOB in);
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_auth_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				  DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+
+/**
+ * Start NTLMSSP on the server side
+ *
+ */
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_server_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
+/**
+ * Return the credentials of a logged on user, including session keys
+ * etc.
+ *
+ * Only valid after a successful authentication
+ *
+ * May only be called once per authentication.
+ *
+ */
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_session_info(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				     struct auth_session_info **session_info) ;
+
+/* The following definitions come from auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c  */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_sign_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				    const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_check_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				     const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_seal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+				    uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				    const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				    DATA_BLOB *sig);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_unseal_packet(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				      uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+				      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+				      const DATA_BLOB *sig);
+size_t gensec_ntlmssp_sig_size(struct gensec_security *gensec_security, size_t data_size) ;
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_wrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			     const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			     DATA_BLOB *out);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_unwrap(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			       TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			       const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			       DATA_BLOB *out);
+
+/**
+ * Return the NTLMSSP master session key
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ */
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_magic(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *first_packet);
+bool gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				 uint32_t feature);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				    DATA_BLOB *session_key);
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security);
+
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64b9628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1160 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle NTLMSSP, server side
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2010
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <tevent.h>
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "lib/util/time_basic.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h"
+#include "auth/common_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "param/loadparm.h"
+#include "libcli/security/session.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/**
+ * Determine correct target name flags for reply, given server role
+ * and negotiated flags
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ * @param neg_flags The flags from the packet
+ * @param chal_flags The flags to be set in the reply packet
+ * @return The 'target name' string.
+ */
+
+const char *ntlmssp_target_name(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+				uint32_t neg_flags, uint32_t *chal_flags)
+{
+	if (neg_flags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET) {
+		*chal_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO;
+		*chal_flags |= NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
+		if (ntlmssp_state->server.is_standalone) {
+			*chal_flags |= NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER;
+			return ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_name;
+		} else {
+			*chal_flags |= NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN;
+			return ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain;
+		};
+	} else {
+		return "";
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the NTLMSSP Negotiate packet
+ *
+ * @param gensec_security GENSEC state
+ * @param out_mem_ctx Memory context for *out
+ * @param in The request, as a DATA_BLOB.  reply.data must be NULL
+ * @param out The reply, as an allocated DATA_BLOB, caller to free.
+ * @return Errors or MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED if (normal) a reply is required.
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					 TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+					 const DATA_BLOB request, DATA_BLOB *reply)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	DATA_BLOB struct_blob;
+	uint32_t neg_flags = 0;
+	uint32_t ntlmssp_command, chal_flags;
+	uint8_t cryptkey[8];
+	const char *target_name;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct timeval tv_now = timeval_current();
+	/*
+	 * See [MS-NLMP]
+	 *
+	 * Windows NT 4.0, windows_2000: use 30 minutes,
+	 * Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista,
+	 * Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2
+	 * use 36 hours.
+	 *
+	 * Newer systems doesn't check this, likely because the
+	 * connectionless NTLMSSP is no longer supported.
+	 *
+	 * As we expect the AUTHENTICATION_MESSAGE to arrive
+	 * directly after the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE (typically less than
+	 * as 1 second later). We use a hard timeout of 30 Minutes.
+	 *
+	 * We don't look at AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.NtChallengeResponse.TimeStamp
+	 * instead we just remember our own time.
+	 */
+	uint32_t max_lifetime = 30 * 60;
+	struct timeval tv_end = timeval_add(&tv_now, max_lifetime, 0);
+
+	/* parse the NTLMSSP packet */
+#if 0
+	file_save("ntlmssp_negotiate.dat", request.data, request.length);
+#endif
+
+	if (request.length) {
+		if (request.length > UINT16_MAX) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("ntlmssp_server_negotiate: reject large request of length %u\n",
+				(unsigned int)request.length));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		if ((request.length < 16) || !msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &request, "Cdd",
+							  "NTLMSSP",
+							  &ntlmssp_command,
+							  &neg_flags)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("ntlmssp_server_negotiate: failed to parse NTLMSSP Negotiate of length %u\n",
+				(unsigned int)request.length));
+			dump_data(2, request.data, request.length);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		debug_ntlmssp_flags(neg_flags);
+
+		if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+			struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *negotiate = talloc(
+				ntlmssp_state, struct NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
+			if (negotiate != NULL) {
+				status = ntlmssp_pull_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(
+					&request, negotiate, negotiate);
+				if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+					NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE,
+							negotiate);
+				}
+				TALLOC_FREE(negotiate);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	status = ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, neg_flags, "negotiate");
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)){
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	/* Ask our caller what challenge they would like in the packet */
+	if (auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge) {
+		status = auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(auth_context, cryptkey);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate: failed to get challenge: %s\n",
+				  nt_errstr(status)));
+			return status;
+		}
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(1, ("gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate: backend doesn't give a challenge\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	/* The flags we send back are not just the negotiated flags,
+	 * they are also 'what is in this packet'.  Therefore, we
+	 * operate on 'chal_flags' from here on
+	 */
+
+	chal_flags = ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+	ntlmssp_state->server.challenge_endtime = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_end);
+
+	/* get the right name to fill in as 'target' */
+	target_name = ntlmssp_target_name(ntlmssp_state,
+					  neg_flags, &chal_flags);
+	if (target_name == NULL)
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+	ntlmssp_state->chal = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state, cryptkey, 8);
+	ntlmssp_state->internal_chal = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							cryptkey, 8);
+
+	/* This creates the 'blob' of names that appears at the end of the packet */
+	if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) {
+		enum ndr_err_code err;
+		struct AV_PAIR *pairs = NULL;
+		uint32_t count = 5;
+
+		pairs = talloc_zero_array(ntlmssp_state, struct AV_PAIR, count + 1);
+		if (pairs == NULL) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		pairs[0].AvId			= MsvAvNbDomainName;
+		pairs[0].Value.AvNbDomainName	= target_name;
+
+		pairs[1].AvId			= MsvAvNbComputerName;
+		pairs[1].Value.AvNbComputerName	= ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_name;
+
+		pairs[2].AvId			= MsvAvDnsDomainName;
+		pairs[2].Value.AvDnsDomainName	= ntlmssp_state->server.dns_domain;
+
+		pairs[3].AvId			= MsvAvDnsComputerName;
+		pairs[3].Value.AvDnsComputerName= ntlmssp_state->server.dns_name;
+
+		if (!ntlmssp_state->force_old_spnego) {
+			pairs[4].AvId			= MsvAvTimestamp;
+			pairs[4].Value.AvTimestamp	=
+						timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now);
+			count += 1;
+
+			pairs[5].AvId			= MsvAvEOL;
+		} else {
+			pairs[4].AvId			= MsvAvEOL;
+		}
+
+		ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.count = count;
+		ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.pair = pairs;
+
+		err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&struct_blob,
+					ntlmssp_state,
+					&ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list,
+					(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_AV_PAIR_LIST);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	} else {
+		struct_blob = data_blob_null;
+	}
+
+	{
+		/* Marshal the packet in the right format, be it unicode or ASCII */
+		const char *gen_string;
+		const DATA_BLOB version_blob = ntlmssp_version_blob();
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+			gen_string = "CdUdbddBb";
+		} else {
+			gen_string = "CdAdbddBb";
+		}
+
+		status = msrpc_gen(out_mem_ctx, reply, gen_string,
+			"NTLMSSP",
+			NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE,
+			target_name,
+			chal_flags,
+			cryptkey, 8,
+			0, 0,
+			struct_blob.data, struct_blob.length,
+			version_blob.data, version_blob.length);
+
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+			struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *challenge = talloc(
+				ntlmssp_state, struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE);
+			if (challenge != NULL) {
+				challenge->NegotiateFlags = chal_flags;
+				status = ntlmssp_pull_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(
+					reply, challenge, challenge);
+				if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+					NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE,
+							challenge);
+				}
+				TALLOC_FREE(challenge);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob = data_blob_dup_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							     request);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length != request.length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->challenge_blob = data_blob_dup_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							     *reply);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->challenge_blob.length != reply->length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_AUTH;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+}
+
+struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state {
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp;
+	DATA_BLOB in;
+	struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info;
+	DATA_BLOB user_session_key;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key;
+	/* internal variables used by KEY_EXCH (client-supplied user session key */
+	DATA_BLOB encrypted_session_key;
+	bool doing_ntlm2;
+	/* internal variables used by NTLM2 */
+	uint8_t session_nonce[16];
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_preauth(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				       struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp,
+				       struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state,
+				       const DATA_BLOB request);
+static void ntlmssp_server_auth_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_postauth(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp,
+					struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state,
+					DATA_BLOB request);
+
+struct tevent_req *ntlmssp_server_auth_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    struct tevent_context *ev,
+					    struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					    const DATA_BLOB in)
+{
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp =
+		talloc_get_type_abort(gensec_security->private_data,
+				      struct gensec_ntlmssp_context);
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+	struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+	struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+				struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state->gensec_security = gensec_security;
+	state->gensec_ntlmssp = gensec_ntlmssp;
+	state->in = in;
+
+	status = ntlmssp_server_preauth(gensec_security,
+					gensec_ntlmssp,
+					state, in);
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	subreq = auth_context->check_ntlm_password_send(
+		state, ev, auth_context, state->user_info);
+	if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+	tevent_req_set_callback(subreq,	ntlmssp_server_auth_done, req);
+	return req;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Authenticate packet
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ * @param request The request, as a DATA_BLOB
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_preauth(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+				       struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp,
+				       struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state,
+				       const DATA_BLOB request)
+{
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
+	uint32_t ntlmssp_command, auth_flags;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	const unsigned int version_len = 8;
+	DATA_BLOB version_blob = data_blob_null;
+	const unsigned int mic_len = NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE;
+	DATA_BLOB mic_blob = data_blob_null;
+	const char *parse_string;
+	bool ok;
+	struct timeval endtime;
+	bool expired = false;
+
+#if 0
+	file_save("ntlmssp_auth.dat", request.data, request.length);
+#endif
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+		parse_string = "CdBBUUUBdbb";
+	} else {
+		parse_string = "CdBBAAABdbb";
+	}
+
+	/* zero these out */
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->session_key);
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->lm_resp);
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->nt_resp);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->user = NULL;
+	ntlmssp_state->domain = NULL;
+	ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name = NULL;
+
+	/* now the NTLMSSP encoded auth hashes */
+	ok = msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &request, parse_string,
+			 "NTLMSSP",
+			 &ntlmssp_command,
+			 &ntlmssp_state->lm_resp,
+			 &ntlmssp_state->nt_resp,
+			 &ntlmssp_state->domain,
+			 &ntlmssp_state->user,
+			 &ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name,
+			 &state->encrypted_session_key,
+			 &auth_flags,
+			 &version_blob, version_len,
+			 &mic_blob, mic_len);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("ntlmssp_server_auth: failed to parse NTLMSSP (nonfatal):\n"));
+		dump_data(10, request.data, request.length);
+
+		data_blob_free(&version_blob);
+		data_blob_free(&mic_blob);
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+			parse_string = "CdBBUUUBd";
+		} else {
+			parse_string = "CdBBAAABd";
+		}
+
+		ok = msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &request, parse_string,
+				 "NTLMSSP",
+				 &ntlmssp_command,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->lm_resp,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->nt_resp,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->domain,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->user,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name,
+				 &state->encrypted_session_key,
+				 &auth_flags);
+	}
+
+	if (!ok) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("ntlmssp_server_auth: failed to parse NTLMSSP (nonfatal):\n"));
+		dump_data(10, request.data, request.length);
+
+		/* zero this out */
+		data_blob_free(&state->encrypted_session_key);
+		auth_flags = 0;
+
+		/* Try again with a shorter string (Win9X truncates this packet) */
+		if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+			parse_string = "CdBBUUU";
+		} else {
+			parse_string = "CdBBAAA";
+		}
+
+		/* now the NTLMSSP encoded auth hashes */
+		if (!msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &request, parse_string,
+				 "NTLMSSP",
+				 &ntlmssp_command,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->lm_resp,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->nt_resp,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->domain,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->user,
+				 &ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("ntlmssp_server_auth: failed to parse NTLMSSP (tried both formats):\n"));
+			dump_data(2, request.data, request.length);
+
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	talloc_steal(state, state->encrypted_session_key.data);
+
+	if (auth_flags != 0) {
+		nt_status = ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state,
+						     auth_flags,
+						     "authenticate");
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)){
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+		struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *authenticate = talloc(
+			ntlmssp_state, struct AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
+		if (authenticate != NULL) {
+			NTSTATUS status;
+			authenticate->NegotiateFlags = auth_flags;
+			status = ntlmssp_pull_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(
+				&request, authenticate, authenticate);
+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE,
+						authenticate);
+			}
+			TALLOC_FREE(authenticate);
+		}
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(3,("Got user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s] len1=%lu len2=%lu\n",
+		 ntlmssp_state->user, ntlmssp_state->domain,
+		 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name,
+		 (unsigned long)ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.length,
+		 (unsigned long)ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length));
+
+#if 0
+	file_save("nthash1.dat",  &ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.data,  &ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length);
+	file_save("lmhash1.dat",  &ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data,  &ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.length);
+#endif
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length > 24) {
+		struct NTLMv2_RESPONSE v2_resp;
+		enum ndr_err_code err;
+		uint32_t i = 0;
+		uint32_t count = 0;
+		const struct AV_PAIR *flags = NULL;
+		const struct AV_PAIR *eol = NULL;
+		uint32_t av_flags = 0;
+
+		err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&ntlmssp_state->nt_resp,
+					ntlmssp_state,
+					&v2_resp,
+					(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+			nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
+			if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+				/*
+				 * Note that invalid blobs should result in
+				 * INVALID_PARAMETER, as demonstrated by
+				 * smb2.session.ntlmssp_bug14932
+				 */
+				nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+			DEBUG(1,("%s: failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE of length %zu for "
+				 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s] - %s %s\n",
+				 __func__, ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length,
+				 ntlmssp_state->user, ntlmssp_state->domain,
+				 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name,
+				 ndr_errstr(err), nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+
+		if (DEBUGLVL(10)) {
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NTLMv2_RESPONSE, &v2_resp);
+		}
+
+		eol = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
+					  MsvAvEOL);
+		if (eol == NULL) {
+			DEBUG(1,("%s: missing MsvAvEOL for "
+				 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n",
+				 __func__, ntlmssp_state->user, ntlmssp_state->domain,
+				 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		flags = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
+					    MsvAvFlags);
+		if (flags != NULL) {
+			av_flags = flags->Value.AvFlags;
+		}
+
+		if (av_flags & NTLMSSP_AVFLAG_MIC_IN_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE) {
+			if (mic_blob.length != NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE) {
+				DEBUG(1,("%s: mic_blob.length[%u] for "
+					 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n",
+					 __func__,
+					 (unsigned)mic_blob.length,
+					 ntlmssp_state->user,
+					 ntlmssp_state->domain,
+					 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+
+			if (request.length <
+			    (NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET + NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE))
+			{
+				DEBUG(1,("%s: missing MIC "
+					 "request.length[%u] for "
+					 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n",
+					 __func__,
+					 (unsigned)request.length,
+					 ntlmssp_state->user,
+					 ntlmssp_state->domain,
+					 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+
+			ntlmssp_state->new_spnego = true;
+		}
+
+		count = ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.count;
+		if (v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs.count < count) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			const struct AV_PAIR *sp =
+				&ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list.pair[i];
+			const struct AV_PAIR *cp = NULL;
+
+			if (sp->AvId == MsvAvEOL) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			cp = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
+						 sp->AvId);
+			if (cp == NULL) {
+				DEBUG(1,("%s: AvId 0x%x missing for"
+					 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] "
+					 "workstation=[%s]\n",
+					 __func__,
+					 (unsigned)sp->AvId,
+					 ntlmssp_state->user,
+					 ntlmssp_state->domain,
+					 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+
+			switch (cp->AvId) {
+#define CASE_STRING(v) case Msv ## v: do { \
+	int cmp; \
+	if (sp->Value.v == NULL) { \
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
+	} \
+	if (cp->Value.v == NULL) { \
+		DEBUG(1,("%s: invalid %s " \
+			 "got[%s] expect[%s] for " \
+			 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n", \
+			 __func__, #v, \
+			 cp->Value.v, \
+			 sp->Value.v, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->user, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->domain, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name)); \
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; \
+	} \
+	cmp = strcmp(cp->Value.v, sp->Value.v); \
+	if (cmp != 0) { \
+		DEBUG(1,("%s: invalid %s " \
+			 "got[%s] expect[%s] for " \
+			 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n", \
+			 __func__, #v, \
+			 cp->Value.v, \
+			 sp->Value.v, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->user, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->domain, \
+			 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name)); \
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; \
+	} \
+} while(0); break
+			CASE_STRING(AvNbComputerName);
+			CASE_STRING(AvNbDomainName);
+			CASE_STRING(AvDnsComputerName);
+			CASE_STRING(AvDnsDomainName);
+			CASE_STRING(AvDnsTreeName);
+			case MsvAvTimestamp:
+				if (cp->Value.AvTimestamp != sp->Value.AvTimestamp) {
+					struct timeval ct;
+					struct timeval st;
+					struct timeval_buf tmp1;
+					struct timeval_buf tmp2;
+
+					nttime_to_timeval(&ct,
+							  cp->Value.AvTimestamp);
+					nttime_to_timeval(&st,
+							  sp->Value.AvTimestamp);
+
+					DEBUG(1,("%s: invalid AvTimestamp "
+						 "got[%s] expect[%s] for "
+						 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] "
+						 "workstation=[%s]\n",
+						 __func__,
+						 timeval_str_buf(&ct, false,
+								 true, &tmp1),
+						 timeval_str_buf(&st, false,
+								 true, &tmp2),
+						 ntlmssp_state->user,
+						 ntlmssp_state->domain,
+						 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+					return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				/*
+				 * This can't happen as we control
+				 * ntlmssp_state->server.av_pair_list
+				 */
+				return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	nttime_to_timeval(&endtime, ntlmssp_state->server.challenge_endtime);
+	expired = timeval_expired(&endtime);
+	if (expired) {
+		struct timeval_buf tmp;
+		DEBUG(1,("%s: challenge invalid (expired %s) for "
+			 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n",
+			 __func__,
+			 timeval_str_buf(&endtime, false, true, &tmp),
+			 ntlmssp_state->user, ntlmssp_state->domain,
+			 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* NTLM2 uses a 'challenge' that is made of up both the server challenge, and a
+	   client challenge
+
+	   However, the NTLM2 flag may still be set for the real NTLMv2 logins, be careful.
+	*/
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length == 24 && ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.length == 24) {
+			state->doing_ntlm2 = true;
+
+			memcpy(state->session_nonce, ntlmssp_state->internal_chal.data, 8);
+			memcpy(&state->session_nonce[8], ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data, 8);
+
+			SMB_ASSERT(ntlmssp_state->internal_chal.data && ntlmssp_state->internal_chal.length == 8);
+
+			/* LM response is no longer useful */
+			data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->lm_resp);
+
+			/* We changed the effective challenge - set it */
+			if (auth_context->set_ntlm_challenge) {
+				uint8_t session_nonce_hash[16];
+				int rc;
+
+				rc = gnutls_hash_fast(GNUTLS_DIG_MD5,
+						      state->session_nonce,
+						      16,
+						      session_nonce_hash);
+				if (rc < 0) {
+					return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+				}
+
+
+				nt_status = auth_context->set_ntlm_challenge(auth_context,
+									     session_nonce_hash,
+									     "NTLMSSP callback (NTLM2)");
+				ZERO_ARRAY(session_nonce_hash);
+				if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+					DEBUG(1, ("gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate: failed to get challenge: %s\n",
+						  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+					return nt_status;
+				}
+			} else {
+				DEBUG(1, ("gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate: backend doesn't have facility for challenge to be set\n"));
+
+				return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+			}
+
+			/* LM Key is incompatible. */
+			ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	user_info = talloc_zero(state, struct auth_usersupplied_info);
+	if (!user_info) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	user_info->logon_parameters = MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT;
+	user_info->flags = 0;
+	user_info->client.account_name = ntlmssp_state->user;
+	user_info->client.domain_name = ntlmssp_state->domain;
+	user_info->workstation_name = ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name;
+	user_info->remote_host = gensec_get_remote_address(gensec_security);
+	user_info->local_host = gensec_get_local_address(gensec_security);
+	user_info->service_description
+		= gensec_get_target_service_description(gensec_security);
+
+	/*
+	 * This will just be the string "NTLMSSP" from
+	 * gensec_ntlmssp_final_auth_type, but ensures it stays in sync
+	 * with the same use in the authorization logging triggered by
+	 * gensec_session_info() later
+	 */
+	user_info->auth_description = gensec_final_auth_type(gensec_security);
+
+	user_info->password_state = AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE;
+	user_info->password.response.lanman = ntlmssp_state->lm_resp;
+	user_info->password.response.nt = ntlmssp_state->nt_resp;
+
+	state->user_info = user_info;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static void ntlmssp_server_auth_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req =
+		tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
+		struct tevent_req);
+	struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state =
+		tevent_req_data(req,
+		struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state);
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security = state->gensec_security;
+	struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp = state->gensec_ntlmssp;
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	uint8_t authoritative = 1;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password_recv(subreq,
+						gensec_ntlmssp,
+						&authoritative,
+						&gensec_ntlmssp->server_returned_info,
+						&state->user_session_key,
+						&state->lm_session_key);
+	TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_INFO("Checking NTLMSSP password for %s\\%s failed: %s\n",
+			 state->user_info->client.domain_name,
+			 state->user_info->client.account_name,
+			 nt_errstr(status));
+	}
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return;
+	}
+	talloc_steal(state, state->user_session_key.data);
+	talloc_steal(state, state->lm_session_key.data);
+
+	status = ntlmssp_server_postauth(state->gensec_security,
+					 state->gensec_ntlmssp,
+					 state, state->in);
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Next state function for the Authenticate packet
+ * (after authentication - figures out the session keys etc)
+ *
+ * @param ntlmssp_state NTLMSSP State
+ * @return Errors or NT_STATUS_OK.
+ */
+
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_postauth(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
+					struct gensec_ntlmssp_context *gensec_ntlmssp,
+					struct ntlmssp_server_auth_state *state,
+					DATA_BLOB request)
+{
+	struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state = gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state;
+	struct auth4_context *auth_context = gensec_security->auth_context;
+	DATA_BLOB user_session_key = state->user_session_key;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_session_key = state->lm_session_key;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+	DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(state->user_info);
+
+	if (lpcfg_map_to_guest(gensec_security->settings->lp_ctx) != NEVER_MAP_TO_GUEST
+	    && auth_context->generate_session_info != NULL)
+	{
+		NTSTATUS tmp_status;
+
+		/*
+		 * We need to check if the auth is anonymous or mapped to guest
+		 */
+		tmp_status = auth_context->generate_session_info(auth_context, state,
+								 gensec_ntlmssp->server_returned_info,
+								 gensec_ntlmssp->ntlmssp_state->user,
+								 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES,
+								 &session_info);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(tmp_status)) {
+			/*
+			 * We don't care about failures,
+			 * the worst result is that we try MIC checking
+			 * for a map to guest authentication.
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (session_info != NULL) {
+		if (security_session_user_level(session_info, NULL) < SECURITY_USER) {
+			/*
+			 * Anonymous and GUEST are not secure anyway.
+			 * avoid new_spnego and MIC checking.
+			 */
+			ntlmssp_state->new_spnego = false;
+			ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+			ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+		}
+		TALLOC_FREE(session_info);
+	}
+
+	dump_data_pw("NT session key:\n", user_session_key.data, user_session_key.length);
+	dump_data_pw("LM first-8:\n", lm_session_key.data, lm_session_key.length);
+
+	/* Handle the different session key derivation for NTLM2 */
+	if (state->doing_ntlm2) {
+		if (user_session_key.data && user_session_key.length == 16) {
+			int rc;
+
+			session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+						       NULL, 16);
+
+			rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+					      user_session_key.data,
+					      user_session_key.length,
+					      state->session_nonce,
+					      sizeof(state->session_nonce),
+					      session_key.data);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+
+			DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Created NTLM2 session key.\n"));
+			dump_data_pw("NTLM2 session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Failed to create NTLM2 session key.\n"));
+			session_key = data_blob_null;
+		}
+	} else if ((ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)
+		/* Ensure we can never get here on NTLMv2 */
+		&& (ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length == 0 || ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length == 24)) {
+
+		if (lm_session_key.data && lm_session_key.length >= 8) {
+			if (ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data && ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.length == 24) {
+				session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+							       NULL, 16);
+				if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+					return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+				}
+				nt_status = SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(lm_session_key.data,
+								      ntlmssp_state->lm_resp.data,
+								      session_key.data);
+				if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+					return nt_status;
+				}
+				DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Created NTLM session key.\n"));
+			} else {
+				static const uint8_t zeros[24] = {0, };
+				session_key = data_blob_talloc(
+					ntlmssp_state, NULL, 16);
+				if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+					return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+				}
+				nt_status = SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(zeros, zeros,
+								      session_key.data);
+				if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+					return nt_status;
+				}
+				DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Created NTLM session key.\n"));
+			}
+			dump_data_pw("LM session key:\n", session_key.data,
+				     session_key.length);
+		} else {
+			/* LM Key not selected */
+			ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+
+			DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Failed to create NTLM session key.\n"));
+			session_key = data_blob_null;
+		}
+
+	} else if (user_session_key.data) {
+		session_key = user_session_key;
+		DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Using unmodified nt session key.\n"));
+		dump_data_pw("unmodified session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+
+		/* LM Key not selected */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+
+	} else if (lm_session_key.data) {
+		/* Very weird to have LM key, but no user session key, but anyway.. */
+		session_key = lm_session_key;
+		DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Using unmodified lm session key.\n"));
+		dump_data_pw("unmodified session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
+
+		/* LM Key not selected */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_server_auth: Failed to create unmodified session key.\n"));
+		session_key = data_blob_null;
+
+		/* LM Key not selected */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	/* With KEY_EXCH, the client supplies the proposed session key,
+	   but encrypts it with the long-term key */
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
+		if (!state->encrypted_session_key.data
+		    || state->encrypted_session_key.length != 16) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Client-supplied KEY_EXCH session key was of invalid length (%u)!\n",
+				  (unsigned)state->encrypted_session_key.length));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		} else if (!session_key.data || session_key.length != 16) {
+			DEBUG(5, ("server session key is invalid (len == %u), cannot do KEY_EXCH!\n",
+				  (unsigned int)session_key.length));
+			ntlmssp_state->session_key = session_key;
+			talloc_steal(ntlmssp_state, session_key.data);
+		} else {
+			gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd;
+			gnutls_datum_t enc_session_key = {
+				.data = session_key.data,
+				.size = session_key.length,
+			};
+			int rc;
+
+			dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key (enc):\n",
+				     state->encrypted_session_key.data,
+				     state->encrypted_session_key.length);
+
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
+						GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+						&enc_session_key,
+						NULL);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(cipher_hnd,
+						   state->encrypted_session_key.data,
+						   state->encrypted_session_key.length);
+			gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+
+			ntlmssp_state->session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state,
+								      state->encrypted_session_key.data,
+								      state->encrypted_session_key.length);
+			dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key:\n",
+				     state->encrypted_session_key.data,
+				     state->encrypted_session_key.length);
+		}
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->session_key = session_key;
+		talloc_steal(ntlmssp_state, session_key.data);
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->new_spnego) {
+		gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
+		uint8_t mic_buffer[NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE] = { 0, };
+		bool cmp;
+		int rc;
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
+				 GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+				 ntlmssp_state->session_key.data,
+				 MIN(ntlmssp_state->session_key.length, 64));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd,
+				 ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.data,
+				 ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob.length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd,
+				  ntlmssp_state->challenge_blob.data,
+				  ntlmssp_state->challenge_blob.length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		/* checked were we set ntlmssp_state->new_spnego */
+		SMB_ASSERT(request.length >
+			   (NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET + NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE));
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, request.data, NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, mic_buffer, NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd,
+				 request.data + (NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET + NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE),
+				 request.length - (NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET + NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, mic_buffer);
+
+		cmp = mem_equal_const_time(request.data + NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET,
+					   mic_buffer, NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE);
+		if (!cmp) {
+			DEBUG(1,("%s: invalid NTLMSSP_MIC for "
+				 "user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s]\n",
+				 __func__,
+				 ntlmssp_state->user,
+				 ntlmssp_state->domain,
+				 ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name));
+			dump_data(11, request.data + NTLMSSP_MIC_OFFSET,
+				  NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE);
+			dump_data(11, mic_buffer,
+				  NTLMSSP_MIC_SIZE);
+		}
+
+		ZERO_ARRAY(mic_buffer);
+
+		if (!cmp) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+	}
+
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->negotiate_blob);
+	data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->challenge_blob);
+
+	if (gensec_ntlmssp_have_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN)) {
+		if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE) {
+			/*
+			 * We need to handle NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN as
+			 * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL if GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
+			 * is requested.
+			 */
+			ntlmssp_state->force_wrap_seal = true;
+		}
+		nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_init(ntlmssp_state);
+	}
+
+	data_blob_clear_free(&ntlmssp_state->internal_chal);
+	data_blob_clear_free(&ntlmssp_state->chal);
+	data_blob_clear_free(&ntlmssp_state->lm_resp);
+	data_blob_clear_free(&ntlmssp_state->nt_resp);
+
+	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_DONE;
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_auth_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
+				  TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+				  DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*out = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_sign.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..404129a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,893 @@
+/*
+ *  Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ *  Version 3.0
+ *  NTLMSSP Signing routines
+ *  Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2003-2005
+ *
+ *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "../auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+#define CLI_SIGN "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant"
+#define CLI_SEAL "session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant"
+#define SRV_SIGN "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant"
+#define SRV_SEAL "session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant"
+
+/**
+ * Some notes on the NTLM2 code:
+ *
+ * NTLM2 is a AEAD system.  This means that the data encrypted is not
+ * all the data that is signed.  In DCE-RPC case, the headers of the
+ * DCE-RPC packets are also signed.  This prevents some of the
+ * fun-and-games one might have by changing them.
+ *
+ */
+
+static void dump_arc4_state(const char *description,
+			    gnutls_cipher_hd_t *state)
+{
+	DBG_DEBUG("%s\n", description);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS calc_ntlmv2_key(uint8_t subkey[16],
+				DATA_BLOB session_key,
+				const char *constant)
+{
+	gnutls_hash_hd_t hash_hnd = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = gnutls_hash_init(&hash_hnd, GNUTLS_DIG_MD5);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+	}
+	rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, session_key.data, session_key.length);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+		return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+	}
+	rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, constant, strlen(constant) + 1);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
+		return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+	}
+	gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, subkey);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+enum ntlmssp_direction {
+	NTLMSSP_SEND,
+	NTLMSSP_RECEIVE
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+					      TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+					      const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+					      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+					      enum ntlmssp_direction direction,
+					      DATA_BLOB *sig, bool encrypt_sig)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
+		uint8_t digest[16];
+		uint8_t seq_num[4];
+
+		*sig = data_blob_talloc(sig_mem_ctx, NULL, NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+		if (!sig->data) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+
+		switch (direction) {
+		case NTLMSSP_SEND:
+			DEBUG(100,("ntlmssp_make_packet_signature: SEND seq = %u, len = %u, pdu_len = %u\n",
+				ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seq_num,
+				(unsigned int)length,
+				(unsigned int)pdu_length));
+
+			SIVAL(seq_num, 0, ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seq_num);
+			ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seq_num++;
+
+			rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
+					      GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+					      ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.sign_key,
+					      16);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+			break;
+		case NTLMSSP_RECEIVE:
+
+			DEBUG(100,("ntlmssp_make_packet_signature: RECV seq = %u, len = %u, pdu_len = %u\n",
+				ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seq_num,
+				(unsigned int)length,
+				(unsigned int)pdu_length));
+
+			SIVAL(seq_num, 0, ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seq_num);
+			ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seq_num++;
+
+			rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
+					      GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
+					      ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.sign_key,
+					      16);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+
+		dump_data_pw("pdu data ", whole_pdu, pdu_length);
+
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, seq_num, sizeof(seq_num));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, whole_pdu, pdu_length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, digest);
+
+		if (encrypt_sig && (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)) {
+			switch (direction) {
+			case NTLMSSP_SEND:
+				rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state,
+							   digest,
+							   8);
+				break;
+			case NTLMSSP_RECEIVE:
+				rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state,
+							   digest,
+							   8);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt for NTLMv2 EXCH "
+					"%s packet signature failed: %s\n",
+					direction == NTLMSSP_SEND ?
+						"send" : "receive",
+					gnutls_strerror(rc));
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+		}
+
+		SIVAL(sig->data, 0, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION);
+		memcpy(sig->data + 4, digest, 8);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(digest);
+		memcpy(sig->data + 12, seq_num, 4);
+		ZERO_ARRAY(seq_num);
+
+		dump_data_pw("ntlmssp v2 sig ", sig->data, sig->length);
+
+	} else {
+		uint32_t crc;
+
+		crc = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
+		crc = crc32(crc, data, length);
+
+		status = msrpc_gen(sig_mem_ctx,
+			       sig, "dddd",
+			       NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc,
+			       ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seq_num);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seq_num++;
+
+		dump_arc4_state("ntlmssp hash: \n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state);
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state,
+					   sig->data + 4,
+					   sig->length - 4);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt for NTLM packet "
+				"signature failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+			     const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+	if (!(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Signing not negotiated - cannot sign packet!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot check sign packet\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(ntlmssp_state,
+						  sig_mem_ctx,
+						  data, length,
+						  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+						  NTLMSSP_SEND, sig, true);
+
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check the signature of an incoming packet
+ * @note caller *must* check that the signature is the size it expects
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_check_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			      const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			      const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			      const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB local_sig;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+	if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot check packet signature\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (sig->length < 8) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP packet check failed due to short signature (%lu bytes)!\n",
+			  (unsigned long)sig->length));
+	}
+
+	tmp_ctx = talloc_new(ntlmssp_state);
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(ntlmssp_state,
+						  tmp_ctx,
+						  data, length,
+						  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+						  NTLMSSP_RECEIVE,
+						  &local_sig, true);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("NTLMSSP packet sig creation failed with %s\n",
+			 nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		if (local_sig.length != sig->length ||
+		    !mem_equal_const_time(local_sig.data, sig->data, sig->length)) {
+			DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG NTLM2: wanted signature of\n"));
+			dump_data(5, local_sig.data, local_sig.length);
+
+			DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG: got signature of\n"));
+			dump_data(5, sig->data, sig->length);
+
+			DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP NTLM2 packet check failed due to invalid signature!\n"));
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (local_sig.length != sig->length ||
+		    !mem_equal_const_time(local_sig.data + 8, sig->data + 8, sig->length - 8)) {
+			DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG NTLM1: wanted signature of\n"));
+			dump_data(5, local_sig.data, local_sig.length);
+
+			DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG: got signature of\n"));
+			dump_data(5, sig->data, sig->length);
+
+			DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP NTLM1 packet check failed due to invalid signature!\n"));
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+	dump_data_pw("checked ntlmssp signature\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+	DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_check_packet: NTLMSSP signature OK !\n"));
+
+	talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_seal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			     TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
+			     uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			     const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			     DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL)) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Sealing not negotiated - cannot seal packet!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Sealing not negotiated - cannot seal packet!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot seal packet\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_seal_data: seal\n"));
+	dump_data_pw("ntlmssp clear data\n", data, length);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		NTSTATUS nt_status;
+		/*
+		 * The order of these two operations matters - we
+		 * must first seal the packet, then seal the
+		 * sequence number - this is because the
+		 * send_seal_hash is not constant, but is rather
+		 * updated with each iteration
+		 */
+		nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(ntlmssp_state,
+							  sig_mem_ctx,
+							  data, length,
+							  whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+							  NTLMSSP_SEND,
+							  sig, false);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			return nt_status;
+		}
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state,
+					   data,
+					   length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt ntlmv2 sealing the data "
+				"failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
+			rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state,
+						    sig->data + 4,
+						    8);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt ntlmv2 sealing "
+					"the EXCH signature data failed: %s\n",
+					gnutls_strerror(rc));
+				return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		uint32_t crc;
+
+		crc = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
+		crc = crc32(crc, data, length);
+
+		status = msrpc_gen(sig_mem_ctx,
+			       sig, "dddd",
+			       NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc,
+			       ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seq_num);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The order of these two operations matters - we
+		 * must first seal the packet, then seal the
+		 * sequence number - this is because the ntlmv1_arc4_state
+		 * is not constant, but is rather updated with
+		 * each iteration
+		 */
+		dump_arc4_state("ntlmv1 arc4 state:\n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state);
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state,
+					   data,
+					   length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt ntlmv1 sealing data"
+				"failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		dump_arc4_state("ntlmv1 arc4 state:\n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state);
+
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_encrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state,
+					    sig->data + 4,
+					    sig->length - 4);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_encrypt ntlmv1 sealing signing "
+				"data failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seq_num++;
+	}
+	dump_data_pw("ntlmssp signature\n", sig->data, sig->length);
+	dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unseal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
+ *
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_unseal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			       uint8_t *data, size_t length,
+			       const uint8_t *whole_pdu, size_t pdu_length,
+			       const DATA_BLOB *sig)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot unseal packet\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_unseal_packet: seal\n"));
+	dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		/* First unseal the data. */
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state,
+					   data,
+					   length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_decrypt ntlmv2 unsealing the "
+				"data failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("ntlmv2 clear data\n", data, length);
+	} else {
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state,
+					   data,
+					   length);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_decrypt ntlmv1 unsealing the "
+				"data failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("ntlmv1 clear data\n", data, length);
+	}
+
+	status = ntlmssp_check_packet(ntlmssp_state,
+				      data, length,
+				      whole_pdu, pdu_length,
+				      sig);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1,("NTLMSSP packet check for unseal failed due to invalid signature on %llu bytes of input:\n",
+			 (unsigned long long)length));
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_wrap(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+		      TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+		      const DATA_BLOB *in,
+		      DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	DATA_BLOB sig;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
+		if (in->length + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE < in->length) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, NULL, in->length + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+		if (!out->data) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		memcpy(out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE, in->data, in->length);
+
+	        nt_status = ntlmssp_seal_packet(ntlmssp_state, out_mem_ctx,
+						out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						&sig);
+
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			memcpy(out->data, sig.data, NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+			talloc_free(sig.data);
+		}
+		return nt_status;
+
+	} else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
+		if (in->length + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE < in->length) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, NULL, in->length + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+		if (!out->data) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		memcpy(out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE, in->data, in->length);
+
+	        nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_packet(ntlmssp_state, out_mem_ctx,
+						out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						out->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE,
+						&sig);
+
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			memcpy(out->data, sig.data, NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+			talloc_free(sig.data);
+		}
+		return nt_status;
+	} else {
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, in->data, in->length);
+		if (!out->data) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_unwrap(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+			const DATA_BLOB *in,
+			DATA_BLOB *out)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB sig;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
+		if (in->length < NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		sig.data = in->data;
+		sig.length = NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
+
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, in->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE, in->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+
+	        return ntlmssp_unseal_packet(ntlmssp_state,
+					     out->data, out->length,
+					     out->data, out->length,
+					     &sig);
+
+	} else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
+		if (in->length < NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		sig.data = in->data;
+		sig.length = NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
+
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, in->data + NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE, in->length - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE);
+
+		return ntlmssp_check_packet(ntlmssp_state,
+					    out->data, out->length,
+					    out->data, out->length,
+					    &sig);
+	} else {
+		*out = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, in->data, in->length);
+		if (!out->data) {
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+   Initialise the state for NTLMSSP signing.
+*/
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_reset(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			    bool reset_seqnums)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - Initialising with flags:\n"));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->crypt == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->force_wrap_seal &&
+	    (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN))
+	{
+		/*
+		 * We need to handle NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN as
+		 * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL if GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
+		 * is requested.
+		 *
+		 * The negotiation of flags (and authentication)
+		 * is completed when ntlmssp_sign_init() is called
+		 * so we can safely pretent NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
+		 * was negotiated.
+		 */
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		DATA_BLOB weak_session_key = ntlmssp_state->session_key;
+		const char *send_sign_const;
+		const char *send_seal_const;
+		const char *recv_sign_const;
+		const char *recv_seal_const;
+		uint8_t send_seal_key[16] = {0};
+		gnutls_datum_t send_seal_blob = {
+			.data = send_seal_key,
+			.size = sizeof(send_seal_key),
+		};
+		uint8_t recv_seal_key[16] = {0};
+		gnutls_datum_t recv_seal_blob = {
+			.data = recv_seal_key,
+			.size = sizeof(recv_seal_key),
+		};
+		NTSTATUS status;
+
+		switch (ntlmssp_state->role) {
+		case NTLMSSP_CLIENT:
+			send_sign_const = CLI_SIGN;
+			send_seal_const = CLI_SEAL;
+			recv_sign_const = SRV_SIGN;
+			recv_seal_const = SRV_SEAL;
+			break;
+		case NTLMSSP_SERVER:
+			send_sign_const = SRV_SIGN;
+			send_seal_const = SRV_SEAL;
+			recv_sign_const = CLI_SIGN;
+			recv_seal_const = CLI_SEAL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Weaken NTLMSSP keys to cope with down-level
+		 * clients, servers and export restrictions.
+		 *
+		 * We probably should have some parameters to
+		 * control this, once we get NTLM2 working.
+		 *
+		 * Key weakening was not performed on the master key
+		 * for NTLM2, but must be done on the encryption subkeys only.
+		 */
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128) {
+			/* nothing to do */
+		} else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56) {
+			weak_session_key.length = 7;
+		} else { /* forty bits */
+			weak_session_key.length = 5;
+		}
+
+		dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP weakend master key:\n",
+			     weak_session_key.data,
+			     weak_session_key.length);
+
+		/* SEND: sign key */
+		status = calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.sign_key,
+					 ntlmssp_state->session_key, send_sign_const);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP send sign key:\n",
+			     ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.sign_key, 16);
+
+		/* SEND: seal ARCFOUR pad */
+		status = calc_ntlmv2_key(send_seal_key,
+					 weak_session_key,
+					 send_seal_const);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP send seal key:\n",
+			     send_seal_key,
+			     sizeof(send_seal_key));
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state != NULL) {
+			gnutls_cipher_deinit(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&send_seal_blob,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_init failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		dump_arc4_state("NTLMSSP send seal arc4 state:\n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seal_state);
+
+		/* SEND: seq num */
+		if (reset_seqnums) {
+			ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.sending.seq_num = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* RECV: sign key */
+		status = calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.sign_key,
+					 ntlmssp_state->session_key, recv_sign_const);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP recv sign key:\n",
+			     ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.sign_key, 16);
+
+		/* RECV: seal ARCFOUR pad */
+		status = calc_ntlmv2_key(recv_seal_key,
+					 weak_session_key,
+					 recv_seal_const);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP recv seal key:\n",
+			     recv_seal_key,
+			     sizeof(recv_seal_key));
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state != NULL) {
+			gnutls_cipher_deinit(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&recv_seal_blob,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_init failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		dump_arc4_state("NTLMSSP recv seal arc4 state:\n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state);
+
+		/* RECV: seq num */
+		if (reset_seqnums) {
+			ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm2.receiving.seq_num = 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		gnutls_datum_t seal_session_key = {
+			.data = ntlmssp_state->session_key.data,
+			.size = ntlmssp_state->session_key.length,
+		};
+		bool do_weak = false;
+
+		DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - using NTLM1\n"));
+
+		/*
+		 * Key weakening not performed on the master key for NTLM2
+		 * and does not occur for NTLM1. Therefore we only need
+		 * to do this for the LM_KEY.
+		 */
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY) {
+			do_weak = true;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Nothing to weaken.
+		 * We certainly don't want to 'extend' the length...
+		 */
+		if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length < 16) {
+			/* TODO: is this really correct? */
+			do_weak = false;
+		}
+
+		if (do_weak) {
+			uint8_t weak_session_key[8];
+
+			memcpy(weak_session_key, seal_session_key.data, 8);
+			seal_session_key = (gnutls_datum_t) {
+				.data = weak_session_key,
+				.size = sizeof(weak_session_key),
+			};
+
+			/*
+			 * LM key doesn't support 128 bit crypto, so this is
+			 * the best we can do. If you negotiate 128 bit, but
+			 * not 56, you end up with 40 bit...
+			 */
+			if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56) {
+				weak_session_key[7] = 0xa0;
+			} else { /* forty bits */
+				weak_session_key[5] = 0xe5;
+				weak_session_key[6] = 0x38;
+				weak_session_key[7] = 0xb0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state != NULL) {
+			gnutls_cipher_deinit(ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state);
+		}
+		rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state,
+					GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
+					&seal_session_key,
+					NULL);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("gnutls_cipher_init failed: %s\n",
+				gnutls_strerror(rc));
+			return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED);
+		}
+
+		dump_arc4_state("NTLMv1 arc4 state:\n",
+				&ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seal_state);
+
+		if (reset_seqnums) {
+			ntlmssp_state->crypt->ntlm.seq_num = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static int ntlmssp_crypt_free_gnutls_cipher_state(union ntlmssp_crypt_state *c)
+{
+	if (c->ntlm2.sending.seal_state != NULL) {
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(c->ntlm2.sending.seal_state);
+		c->ntlm2.sending.seal_state = NULL;
+	}
+	if (c->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state != NULL) {
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(c->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state);
+		c->ntlm2.receiving.seal_state = NULL;
+	}
+	if (c->ntlm.seal_state != NULL) {
+		gnutls_cipher_deinit(c->ntlm.seal_state);
+		c->ntlm.seal_state = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_init(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state)
+{
+	if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length < 8) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot initialise signing\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
+	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->crypt = talloc_zero(ntlmssp_state,
+					   union ntlmssp_crypt_state);
+	if (ntlmssp_state->crypt == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+	talloc_set_destructor(ntlmssp_state->crypt,
+			      ntlmssp_crypt_free_gnutls_cipher_state);
+
+	return ntlmssp_sign_reset(ntlmssp_state, true);
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_util.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f3b474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 3.0
+   handle NLTMSSP, server side
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell      2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2003
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005 (Updated from gensec).
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+static void debug_ntlmssp_flags_raw(int level, uint32_t flags)
+{
+#define _PRINT_FLAG_LINE(v) do { \
+	if (flags & (v)) { \
+		DEBUGADD(level, ("  " #v "\n")); \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NETWARE);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_ANONYMOUS);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_THIS_IS_LOCAL_CALL);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SHARE);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION_KEY);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH);
+	_PRINT_FLAG_LINE(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Print out the NTLMSSP flags for debugging
+ * @param neg_flags The flags from the packet
+ */
+void debug_ntlmssp_flags(uint32_t neg_flags)
+{
+	DEBUG(3,("Got NTLMSSP neg_flags=0x%08x\n", neg_flags));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags_raw(4, neg_flags);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+				  uint32_t flags, const char *name)
+{
+	uint32_t missing_flags = ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+		/*
+		 * Using NTLMv2 as a client implies
+		 * using NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2
+		 * (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY)
+		 *
+		 * Note that 'use_ntlmv2' is only set
+		 * true in the client case.
+		 *
+		 * Even if the server has a bug and does not announce
+		 * it, we need to assume it's present.
+		 *
+		 * Note that we also have the flag
+		 * in ntlmssp_state->required_flags,
+		 * see gensec_ntlmssp_client_start().
+		 *
+		 * See bug #12862.
+		 */
+		flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	}
+
+	if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = true;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2 (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY)
+	 * has priority over NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY
+	 */
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
+	}
+
+	missing_flags &= ~ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+	if (missing_flags != 0) {
+		HRESULT hres = HRES_SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
+		NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS(HRES_ERROR_V(hres));
+		DEBUG(1, ("%s: Got %s flags[0x%08x] "
+			  "- possible downgrade detected! "
+			  "missing_flags[0x%08x] - %s\n",
+			  __func__, name,
+			  (unsigned)flags,
+			  (unsigned)missing_flags,
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		debug_ntlmssp_flags_raw(1, missing_flags);
+		DEBUGADD(4, ("neg_flags[0x%08x]\n",
+			     (unsigned)ntlmssp_state->neg_flags));
+		debug_ntlmssp_flags_raw(4, ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Does this blob looks like it could be NTLMSSP? */
+bool ntlmssp_blob_matches_magic(const DATA_BLOB *blob)
+{
+	if (blob->length > 8 && memcmp("NTLMSSP\0", blob->data, 8) == 0) {
+		return true;
+	} else {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+const DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_version_blob(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This is a simplified version of
+	 *
+	 * enum ndr_err_code err;
+	 * struct ntlmssp_VERSION vers;
+	 *
+	 * ZERO_STRUCT(vers);
+	 * vers.ProductMajorVersion = NTLMSSP_WINDOWS_MAJOR_VERSION_6;
+	 * vers.ProductMinorVersion = NTLMSSP_WINDOWS_MINOR_VERSION_1;
+	 * vers.ProductBuild = 0;
+	 * vers.NTLMRevisionCurrent = NTLMSSP_REVISION_W2K3;
+	 *
+	 * err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&version_blob,
+	 * 			ntlmssp_state,
+	 * 			&vers,
+	 * 			(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_ntlmssp_VERSION);
+	 *
+	 * if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+	 * 	data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
+	 * 	return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	 * }
+	 */
+	static const uint8_t version_buffer[8] = {
+		NTLMSSP_WINDOWS_MAJOR_VERSION_6,
+		NTLMSSP_WINDOWS_MINOR_VERSION_1,
+		0x00, 0x00, /* product build */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* reserved */
+		NTLMSSP_REVISION_W2K3
+	};
+
+	return data_blob_const(version_buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(version_buffer));
+}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/wscript_build b/auth/ntlmssp/wscript_build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20836ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/wscript_build
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('NTLMSSP_COMMON',
+                    source='''gensec_ntlmssp.c
+		    ntlmssp.c
+		    ntlmssp_util.c
+		    ntlmssp_ndr.c
+		    ntlmssp_client.c
+		    ntlmssp_server.c
+		    ntlmssp_sign.c
+		    gensec_ntlmssp_server.c''',
+                    deps='''
+		         samba-util
+			 NDR_NTLMSSP
+			 MSRPC_PARSE
+			 NTLM_CHECK
+			 samba-credentials
+			 wbclient
+			 z
+			 GNUTLS_HELPERS
+			 ''')
+
+bld.SAMBA_MODULE('gensec_ntlmssp',
+	source='''''',
+	subsystem='gensec',
+	init_function='gensec_ntlmssp_init',
+	deps='NTLMSSP_COMMON',
+	internal_module=True
+	)
diff --git a/auth/wbc_auth_util.c b/auth/wbc_auth_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83b22ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/wbc_auth_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Authentication utility functions
+   Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2010
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "nsswitch/libwbclient/wbclient.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+static NTSTATUS wbcsids_to_samr_RidWithAttributeArray(
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				struct samr_RidWithAttributeArray *groups,
+				const struct dom_sid *domain_sid,
+				const struct wbcSidWithAttr *sids,
+				size_t num_sids)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j = 0;
+	bool ok;
+
+	groups->rids = talloc_array(mem_ctx,
+				    struct samr_RidWithAttribute, num_sids);
+	if (!groups->rids) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* a wbcDomainSid is the same as a dom_sid */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_sids; i++) {
+		ok = sid_peek_check_rid(domain_sid,
+					(const struct dom_sid *)&sids[i].sid,
+					&groups->rids[j].rid);
+		if (!ok) continue;
+
+		groups->rids[j].attributes = SE_GROUP_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+		j++;
+	}
+
+	groups->count = j;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS wbcsids_to_netr_SidAttrArray(
+				const struct dom_sid *domain_sid,
+				const struct wbcSidWithAttr *sids,
+				size_t num_sids,
+				TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				struct netr_SidAttr **_info3_sids,
+				uint32_t *info3_num_sids)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j = 0;
+	struct netr_SidAttr *info3_sids;
+
+	info3_sids = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct netr_SidAttr, num_sids);
+	if (info3_sids == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* a wbcDomainSid is the same as a dom_sid */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_sids; i++) {
+		const struct dom_sid *sid;
+
+		sid = (const struct dom_sid *)&sids[i].sid;
+
+		if (dom_sid_in_domain(domain_sid, sid)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		info3_sids[j].sid = dom_sid_dup(info3_sids, sid);
+		if (info3_sids[j].sid == NULL) {
+			talloc_free(info3_sids);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		info3_sids[j].attributes = SE_GROUP_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+		j++;
+	}
+
+	*info3_num_sids = j;
+	*_info3_sids = info3_sids;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+#undef RET_NOMEM
+
+#define RET_NOMEM(ptr) do { \
+	if (!ptr) { \
+		TALLOC_FREE(info6); \
+		return NULL; \
+	} } while(0)
+
+struct netr_SamInfo6 *wbcAuthUserInfo_to_netr_SamInfo6(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const struct wbcAuthUserInfo *info)
+{
+	struct netr_SamInfo6 *info6;
+	struct dom_sid user_sid;
+	struct dom_sid group_sid;
+	struct dom_sid domain_sid;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	bool ok;
+
+	memcpy(&user_sid, &info->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX].sid, sizeof(user_sid));
+	memcpy(&group_sid, &info->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX].sid, sizeof(group_sid));
+
+	info6 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo6);
+	if (!info6) return NULL;
+
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.logon_time, info->logon_time);
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.logoff_time, info->logoff_time);
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.kickoff_time, info->kickoff_time);
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.last_password_change, info->pass_last_set_time);
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.allow_password_change,
+			info->pass_can_change_time);
+	unix_to_nt_time(&info6->base.force_password_change,
+			info->pass_must_change_time);
+
+	if (info->account_name) {
+		info6->base.account_name.string	=
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->account_name);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.account_name.string);
+	}
+	if (info->user_principal) {
+		info6->principal_name.string	=
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->user_principal);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->principal_name.string);
+	}
+	if (info->full_name) {
+		info6->base.full_name.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->full_name);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.full_name.string);
+	}
+	if (info->domain_name) {
+		info6->base.logon_domain.string	=
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->domain_name);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.logon_domain.string);
+	}
+	if (info->dns_domain_name) {
+		info6->dns_domainname.string	=
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->dns_domain_name);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->dns_domainname.string);
+	}
+	if (info->logon_script) {
+		info6->base.logon_script.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->logon_script);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.logon_script.string);
+	}
+	if (info->profile_path) {
+		info6->base.profile_path.string	=
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->profile_path);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.profile_path.string);
+	}
+	if (info->home_directory) {
+		info6->base.home_directory.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->home_directory);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.home_directory.string);
+	}
+	if (info->home_drive) {
+		info6->base.home_drive.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->home_drive);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.home_drive.string);
+	}
+
+	info6->base.logon_count	= info->logon_count;
+	info6->base.bad_password_count = info->bad_password_count;
+
+	sid_copy(&domain_sid, &user_sid);
+	sid_split_rid(&domain_sid, &info6->base.rid);
+
+	ok = sid_peek_check_rid(&domain_sid, &group_sid,
+				&info6->base.primary_gid);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("The primary group sid domain does not"
+			  "match user sid domain for user: %s\n",
+			  info->account_name));
+		TALLOC_FREE(info6);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = wbcsids_to_samr_RidWithAttributeArray(info6,
+						       &info6->base.groups,
+						       &domain_sid,
+						       &info->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX],
+						       info->num_sids - 1);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(info6);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	status = wbcsids_to_netr_SidAttrArray(&domain_sid,
+					      &info->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX],
+					      info->num_sids - 1,
+					      info6,
+					      &info6->sids,
+					      &info6->sidcount);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(info6);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	info6->base.user_flags = info->user_flags;
+	memcpy(info6->base.key.key, info->user_session_key, 16);
+
+	if (info->logon_server) {
+		info6->base.logon_server.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->logon_server);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.logon_server.string);
+	}
+	if (info->domain_name) {
+		info6->base.logon_domain.string =
+				talloc_strdup(info6, info->domain_name);
+		RET_NOMEM(info6->base.logon_domain.string);
+	}
+
+	info6->base.domain_sid = dom_sid_dup(info6, &domain_sid);
+	RET_NOMEM(info6->base.domain_sid);
+
+	memcpy(info6->base.LMSessKey.key, info->lm_session_key, 8);
+	info6->base.acct_flags = info->acct_flags;
+
+	return info6;
+}
diff --git a/auth/wscript_build b/auth/wscript_build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33cbed0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/wscript_build
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+
+bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('authn_policy',
+                  source='authn_policy.c',
+                  deps='samba-util')
+
+bld.SAMBA_LIBRARY('common_auth',
+                  source='''auth_sam_reply.c
+                            wbc_auth_util.c
+                            auth_log.c
+                            auth_util.c''',
+                  deps='''talloc
+                          samba-security
+                          samba-util
+                          util_str_escape
+                          LIBTSOCKET
+                          audit_logging
+                          jansson
+                          MESSAGING_SEND
+                          server_id_db
+                          ndr-samba''',
+                  private_library=True)
+
+bld.RECURSE('gensec')
+bld.RECURSE('ntlmssp')
+bld.RECURSE('credentials')