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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 17:20:00 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 17:20:00 +0000
commit8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44 (patch)
tree4099e8021376c7d8c05bdf8503093d80e9c7bad0 /libcli/security/dom_sid.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadsamba-8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44.tar.xz
samba-8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44.zip
Adding upstream version 2:4.20.0+dfsg.upstream/2%4.20.0+dfsg
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'libcli/security/dom_sid.c')
-rw-r--r--libcli/security/dom_sid.c582
1 files changed, 582 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libcli/security/dom_sid.c b/libcli/security/dom_sid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaece2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/security/dom_sid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Samba utility functions
+
+ Copyright (C) Stefan (metze) Metzmacher 2002-2004
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2004
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1999
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "replace.h"
+#include "lib/util/data_blob.h"
+#include "system/locale.h"
+#include "lib/util/debug.h"
+#include "lib/util/util.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/security.h"
+#include "dom_sid.h"
+#include "lib/util/smb_strtox.h"
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ Compare the auth portion of two sids.
+*****************************************************************/
+
+int dom_sid_compare_auth(const struct dom_sid *sid1,
+ const struct dom_sid *sid2)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sid1 == sid2)
+ return 0;
+ if (!sid1)
+ return -1;
+ if (!sid2)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (sid1->sid_rev_num != sid2->sid_rev_num)
+ return sid1->sid_rev_num - sid2->sid_rev_num;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ if (sid1->id_auth[i] != sid2->id_auth[i])
+ return sid1->id_auth[i] - sid2->id_auth[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ Compare two sids.
+*****************************************************************/
+
+int dom_sid_compare(const struct dom_sid *sid1, const struct dom_sid *sid2)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sid1 == sid2)
+ return 0;
+ if (!sid1)
+ return -1;
+ if (!sid2)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Compare most likely different rids, first: i.e start at end */
+ if (sid1->num_auths != sid2->num_auths)
+ return sid1->num_auths - sid2->num_auths;
+
+ for (i = sid1->num_auths-1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ if (sid1->sub_auths[i] < sid2->sub_auths[i]) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sid1->sub_auths[i] > sid2->sub_auths[i]) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dom_sid_compare_auth(sid1, sid2);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ Compare two sids.
+*****************************************************************/
+
+bool dom_sid_equal(const struct dom_sid *sid1, const struct dom_sid *sid2)
+{
+ return dom_sid_compare(sid1, sid2) == 0;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ Add a rid to the end of a sid
+*****************************************************************/
+
+bool sid_append_rid(struct dom_sid *sid, uint32_t rid)
+{
+ if (sid->num_auths < ARRAY_SIZE(sid->sub_auths)) {
+ sid->sub_auths[sid->num_auths++] = rid;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ See if 2 SIDs are in the same domain
+ this just compares the leading sub-auths
+*/
+int dom_sid_compare_domain(const struct dom_sid *sid1,
+ const struct dom_sid *sid2)
+{
+ int n, i;
+
+ n = MIN(sid1->num_auths, sid2->num_auths);
+
+ for (i = n-1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ if (sid1->sub_auths[i] < sid2->sub_auths[i]) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sid1->sub_auths[i] > sid2->sub_auths[i]) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dom_sid_compare_auth(sid1, sid2);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ Convert a string to a SID. Returns True on success, False on fail.
+ Return the first character not parsed in endp.
+*****************************************************************/
+#define AUTHORITY_MASK (~(0xffffffffffffULL))
+
+bool dom_sid_parse_endp(const char *sidstr,struct dom_sid *sidout,
+ const char **endp)
+{
+ const char *p;
+ char *q = NULL;
+ char *end = NULL;
+ uint64_t conv;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ *sidout = (struct dom_sid) {};
+
+ if ((sidstr[0] != 'S' && sidstr[0] != 's') || sidstr[1] != '-') {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the revision number. */
+ p = sidstr + 2;
+
+ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*p)) {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+
+ conv = smb_strtoul(p, &q, 10, &error, SMB_STR_STANDARD);
+ if (error != 0 || (*q != '-') || conv > UINT8_MAX || q - p > 4) {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+ sidout->sid_rev_num = (uint8_t) conv;
+ q++;
+
+ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*q)) {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+ while (q[0] == '0' && isdigit((unsigned char)q[1])) {
+ /*
+ * strtoull will think this is octal, which is not how SIDs
+ * work! So let's walk along until there are no leading zeros
+ * (or a single zero).
+ */
+ q++;
+ }
+
+ /* get identauth */
+ conv = smb_strtoull(q, &end, 0, &error, SMB_STR_STANDARD);
+ if (conv & AUTHORITY_MASK || error != 0) {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+ if (conv >= (1ULL << 48) || end - q > 15) {
+ /*
+ * This identauth looks like a big number, but resolves to a
+ * small number after rounding.
+ */
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE - the conv value is in big-endian format. */
+ sidout->id_auth[0] = (conv & 0xff0000000000ULL) >> 40;
+ sidout->id_auth[1] = (conv & 0x00ff00000000ULL) >> 32;
+ sidout->id_auth[2] = (conv & 0x0000ff000000ULL) >> 24;
+ sidout->id_auth[3] = (conv & 0x000000ff0000ULL) >> 16;
+ sidout->id_auth[4] = (conv & 0x00000000ff00ULL) >> 8;
+ sidout->id_auth[5] = (conv & 0x0000000000ffULL);
+
+ sidout->num_auths = 0;
+ q = end;
+ if (*q != '-') {
+ /* Just id_auth, no subauths */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ q++;
+
+ while (true) {
+ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*q)) {
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+ while (q[0] == '0' && isdigit((unsigned char)q[1])) {
+ /*
+ * strtoull will think this is octal, which is not how
+ * SIDs work! So let's walk along until there are no
+ * leading zeros (or a single zero).
+ */
+ q++;
+ }
+ conv = smb_strtoull(q, &end, 0, &error, SMB_STR_STANDARD);
+ if (conv > UINT32_MAX || error != 0 || end - q > 12) {
+ /*
+ * This sub-auth is greater than 4294967295,
+ * and hence invalid. Windows will treat it as
+ * 4294967295, while we prefer to refuse (old
+ * versions of Samba will wrap, arriving at
+ * another number altogether).
+ */
+ DBG_NOTICE("bad sub-auth in %s\n", sidstr);
+ goto format_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!sid_append_rid(sidout, conv)) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Too many sid auths in %s\n", sidstr));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ q = end;
+ if (*q != '-') {
+ break;
+ }
+ q += 1;
+ }
+done:
+ if (endp != NULL) {
+ *endp = q;
+ }
+ return true;
+
+format_error:
+ DEBUG(3, ("string_to_sid: SID %s is not in a valid format\n", sidstr));
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool string_to_sid(struct dom_sid *sidout, const char *sidstr)
+{
+ return dom_sid_parse(sidstr, sidout);
+}
+
+bool dom_sid_parse(const char *sidstr, struct dom_sid *ret)
+{
+ return dom_sid_parse_endp(sidstr, ret, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ convert a string to a dom_sid, returning a talloc'd dom_sid
+*/
+struct dom_sid *dom_sid_parse_talloc(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *sidstr)
+{
+ struct dom_sid *ret;
+ ret = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dom_sid);
+ if (!ret) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!dom_sid_parse(sidstr, ret)) {
+ talloc_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ convert a string to a dom_sid, returning a talloc'd dom_sid
+*/
+struct dom_sid *dom_sid_parse_length(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *sid)
+{
+ char p[sid->length+1];
+ memcpy(p, sid->data, sid->length);
+ p[sid->length] = '\0';
+ return dom_sid_parse_talloc(mem_ctx, p);
+}
+
+/*
+ copy a dom_sid structure
+*/
+struct dom_sid *dom_sid_dup(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct dom_sid *dom_sid)
+{
+ struct dom_sid *ret;
+
+ if (!dom_sid) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dom_sid);
+ if (!ret) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sid_copy(ret, dom_sid);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ add a rid to a domain dom_sid to make a full dom_sid. This function
+ returns a new sid in the supplied memory context
+*/
+struct dom_sid *dom_sid_add_rid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const struct dom_sid *domain_sid,
+ uint32_t rid)
+{
+ struct dom_sid *sid;
+
+ sid = dom_sid_dup(mem_ctx, domain_sid);
+ if (!sid) return NULL;
+
+ if (!sid_append_rid(sid, rid)) {
+ talloc_free(sid);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ Split up a SID into its domain and RID part
+*/
+NTSTATUS dom_sid_split_rid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct dom_sid *sid,
+ struct dom_sid **domain, uint32_t *rid)
+{
+ if (sid->num_auths == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (domain) {
+ if (!(*domain = dom_sid_dup(mem_ctx, sid))) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ (*domain)->num_auths -= 1;
+ }
+
+ if (rid) {
+ *rid = sid->sub_auths[sid->num_auths - 1];
+ }
+
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ return true if the 2nd sid is in the domain given by the first sid
+*/
+bool dom_sid_in_domain(const struct dom_sid *domain_sid,
+ const struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!domain_sid || !sid) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->num_auths < 2) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (domain_sid->num_auths != (sid->num_auths - 1)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ for (i = domain_sid->num_auths-1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ if (domain_sid->sub_auths[i] != sid->sub_auths[i]) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return dom_sid_compare_auth(domain_sid, sid) == 0;
+}
+
+bool dom_sid_has_account_domain(const struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->sid_rev_num != 1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->num_auths != 5) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[5] != 5) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[4] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[3] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[2] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[1] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[0] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->sub_auths[0] != 21) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool dom_sid_is_valid_account_domain(const struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ /*
+ * We expect S-1-5-21-9-8-7, but we don't
+ * allow S-1-5-21-0-0-0 as this is used
+ * for claims and compound identities.
+ *
+ * With this structure:
+ *
+ * struct dom_sid {
+ * uint8_t sid_rev_num;
+ * int8_t num_auths; [range(0,15)]
+ * uint8_t id_auth[6];
+ * uint32_t sub_auths[15];
+ * }
+ *
+ * S-1-5-21-9-8-7 looks like this:
+ * {1, 4, {0,0,0,0,0,5}, {21,9,8,7,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}};
+ */
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->sid_rev_num != 1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->num_auths != 4) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[5] != 5) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[4] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[3] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[2] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[1] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->id_auth[0] != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->sub_auths[0] != 21) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->sub_auths[1] == 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->sub_auths[2] == 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sid->sub_auths[3] == 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ Convert a dom_sid to a string, printing into a buffer. Return the
+ string length. If it overflows, return the string length that would
+ result (buflen needs to be +1 for the terminating 0).
+*/
+static int dom_sid_string_buf(const struct dom_sid *sid, char *buf, int buflen)
+{
+ int i, ofs, ret;
+ uint64_t ia;
+
+ if (!sid) {
+ return strlcpy(buf, "(NULL SID)", buflen);
+ }
+
+ ia = ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[5]) +
+ ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[4] << 8 ) +
+ ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[3] << 16) +
+ ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[2] << 24) +
+ ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[1] << 32) +
+ ((uint64_t)sid->id_auth[0] << 40);
+
+ ret = snprintf(buf, buflen, "S-%"PRIu8"-", sid->sid_rev_num);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ofs = ret;
+
+ if (ia >= UINT32_MAX) {
+ ret = snprintf(buf+ofs, MAX(buflen-ofs, 0), "0x%"PRIx64, ia);
+ } else {
+ ret = snprintf(buf+ofs, MAX(buflen-ofs, 0), "%"PRIu64, ia);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ofs += ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sid->num_auths; i++) {
+ ret = snprintf(
+ buf+ofs,
+ MAX(buflen-ofs, 0),
+ "-%"PRIu32,
+ sid->sub_auths[i]);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ofs += ret;
+ }
+ return ofs;
+}
+
+/*
+ convert a dom_sid to a string
+*/
+char *dom_sid_string(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ char buf[DOM_SID_STR_BUFLEN];
+ char *result;
+ int len;
+
+ len = dom_sid_string_buf(sid, buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if ((len < 0) || (len+1 > sizeof(buf))) {
+ return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "(SID ERR)");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid calling strlen (via talloc_strdup), we already have
+ * the length
+ */
+ result = (char *)talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, buf, len+1);
+ if (result == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * beautify the talloc_report output
+ */
+ talloc_set_name_const(result, result);
+ return result;
+}
+
+char *dom_sid_str_buf(const struct dom_sid *sid, struct dom_sid_buf *dst)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = dom_sid_string_buf(sid, dst->buf, sizeof(dst->buf));
+ if ((ret < 0) || (ret >= sizeof(dst->buf))) {
+ strlcpy(dst->buf, "(INVALID SID)", sizeof(dst->buf));
+ }
+ return dst->buf;
+}