diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/passdb/secrets.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source3/passdb/secrets.c | 546 |
1 files changed, 546 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bbc21a --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 + Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information + such as the local SID and machine trust password */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "system/filesys.h" +#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_secrets.h" +#include "secrets.h" +#include "dbwrap/dbwrap.h" +#include "dbwrap/dbwrap_open.h" +#include "../libcli/security/security.h" +#include "util_tdb.h" +#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB + +static struct db_context *db_ctx; + +/* open up the secrets database with specified private_dir path */ +bool secrets_init_path(const char *private_dir) +{ + char *fname = NULL; + TALLOC_CTX *frame; + + if (db_ctx != NULL) { + return True; + } + + if (private_dir == NULL) { + return False; + } + + frame = talloc_stackframe(); + fname = talloc_asprintf(frame, "%s/secrets.tdb", private_dir); + if (fname == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(frame); + return False; + } + + db_ctx = db_open(NULL, fname, 0, + TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600, + DBWRAP_LOCK_ORDER_1, DBWRAP_FLAG_NONE); + + if (db_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); + TALLOC_FREE(frame); + return False; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(frame); + return True; +} + +/* open up the secrets database */ +bool secrets_init(void) +{ + return secrets_init_path(lp_private_dir()); +} + +struct db_context *secrets_db_ctx(void) +{ + if (!secrets_init()) { + return NULL; + } + + return db_ctx; +} + +/* + * close secrets.tdb + */ +void secrets_shutdown(void) +{ + TALLOC_FREE(db_ctx); +} + +/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result + if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there + */ +void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) +{ + TDB_DATA dbuf; + void *result; + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!secrets_init()) { + return NULL; + } + + status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, talloc_tos(), string_tdb_data(key), + &dbuf); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return NULL; + } + + result = smb_memdup(dbuf.dptr, dbuf.dsize); + if (result == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + /* + * secrets_fetch() is a generic code and may be used for sensitive data, + * so clear the local dbuf.dptr memory via BURN_PTR_SIZE(). + * The future plan is to convert secrets_fetch() to talloc. + * That would improve performance via: + * - avoid smb_memdup() above, instead directly return dbuf.dptr + * - BURN_PTR_SIZE() will be done not here but in the caller and only + * if the caller asks for sensitive data. + */ + BURN_PTR_SIZE(dbuf.dptr, dbuf.dsize); + TALLOC_FREE(dbuf.dptr); + + if (size) { + *size = dbuf.dsize; + } + + return result; +} + +/* store a secrets entry + */ +bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!secrets_init()) { + return false; + } + + status = dbwrap_trans_store(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key), + make_tdb_data((const uint8_t *)data, size), + TDB_REPLACE); + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); +} + +bool secrets_store_creds(struct cli_credentials *creds) +{ + const char *p = NULL; + bool ok; + + p = cli_credentials_get_username(creds); + if (p == NULL) { + return false; + } + + ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, p, strlen(p) + 1); + if (!ok) { + DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth user name\n"); + return false; + } + + + p = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds); + if (p == NULL) { + return false; + } + + ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, p, strlen(p) + 1); + if (!ok) { + DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth domain name\n"); + return false; + } + + + p = cli_credentials_get_password(creds); + if (p == NULL) { + return false; + } + + ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, p, strlen(p) + 1); + if (!ok) { + DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth password\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + + +/* delete a secets database entry + */ +bool secrets_delete_entry(const char *key) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + if (!secrets_init()) { + return false; + } + + status = dbwrap_trans_delete(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key)); + + return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); +} + +/* + * Deletes the key if it exists. + */ +bool secrets_delete(const char *key) +{ + bool exists; + + if (!secrets_init()) { + return false; + } + + exists = dbwrap_exists(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key)); + if (!exists) { + return true; + } + + return secrets_delete_entry(key); +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password + * + * @param domain trusted domain name + * + * @return stored password's key + **/ +static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + char *keystr; + + keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", + SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, + domain); + SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); + return keystr; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get account password to trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, + struct dom_sid *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) +{ + struct TRUSTED_DOM_PASS pass; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + + /* unpacking structures */ + DATA_BLOB blob; + + /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ + if (!(blob.data = (uint8_t *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), + &blob.length))) { + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* unpack trusted domain password */ + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, talloc_tos(), &pass, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_TRUSTED_DOM_PASS); + + /* This blob is NOT talloc based! */ + BURN_FREE(blob.data, blob.length); + + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + return false; + } + + if (pass.pass != NULL) { + talloc_keep_secret(discard_const_p(char, pass.pass)); + } + + /* the trust's password */ + if (pwd) { + *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass); + if (!*pwd) { + return False; + } + } + + /* last change time */ + if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time; + + /* domain sid */ + if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); + + return True; +} + +/** + * Routine to store the password for trusted domain + * + * @param domain remote domain name + * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship + * @param sid remote domain sid + * + * @return true if succeeded + **/ + +bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, + const struct dom_sid *sid) +{ + bool ret; + + /* packing structures */ + DATA_BLOB blob; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + struct TRUSTED_DOM_PASS pass; + ZERO_STRUCT(pass); + + pass.uni_name = domain; + pass.uni_name_len = strlen(domain)+1; + + /* last change time */ + pass.mod_time = time(NULL); + + /* password of the trust */ + pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd); + pass.pass = pwd; + + /* domain sid */ + sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid); + + ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blob, talloc_tos(), &pass, + (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_TRUSTED_DOM_PASS); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + return false; + } + + ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), blob.data, blob.length); + + /* This blob is talloc based. */ + data_blob_clear_free(&blob); + + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the password for trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete_entry(trustdom_keystr(domain)); +} + +bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + bool ret; + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(key); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + + *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn()); + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) { + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + return false; + } + + *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + SAFE_FREE(key); + + if (*pw == NULL || size == 0 || (*pw)[size-1] != '\0') { + DBG_ERR("No valid password for %s\n", *dn); + BURN_FREE_STR(*pw); + SAFE_FREE(*dn); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. +*******************************************************************************/ + +bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) +{ + fstring key; + + if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) + return False; + + if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) + return False; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb +*******************************************************************************/ +bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) +{ + fstring key; + struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; + size_t size = 0; + uint32_t i; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); + + keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (keyfile == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { + BURN_FREE(keyfile, sizeof(*keyfile)); + return False; + } + + i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); + + if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { + BURN_FREE(keyfile, sizeof(*keyfile)); + return False; + } + + *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; + + result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); + + BURN_FREE(keyfile, sizeof(*keyfile)); + + return True; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or + authenticated connections. + + We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the + RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional + restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local + Security Policy. + + Caller to free() result in domain, username, password +*******************************************************************************/ +void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) +{ + *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); + *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); + *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); + + if (*username && **username) { + + if (!*domain || !**domain) { + SAFE_FREE(*domain); + *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); + } + + if (!*password || !**password) { + BURN_FREE_STR(*password); + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + } + + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", + *domain, *username)); + + } else { + DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n")); + SAFE_FREE(*username); + SAFE_FREE(*domain); + BURN_FREE_STR(*password); + *username = smb_xstrdup(""); + *domain = smb_xstrdup(""); + *password = smb_xstrdup(""); + } +} + +bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret) +{ + char *tdbkey = NULL; + bool ret; + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Find the ldap password. +******************************************************************/ + +char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key) +{ + char *secret = NULL; + char *tdbkey = NULL; + + if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Parameters\n")); + return NULL; + } + + if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n")); + return NULL; + } + + secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL); + SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); + + return secret; +} + |