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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
commit | 025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead (patch) | |
tree | fa6986b4690f991613ffb97cea1f6942427baf5d /plugins/sudoers/lookup.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | sudo-025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead.tar.xz sudo-025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead.zip |
Adding upstream version 1.9.15p5.upstream/1.9.15p5upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/sudoers/lookup.c')
-rw-r--r-- | plugins/sudoers/lookup.c | 569 |
1 files changed, 569 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/lookup.c b/plugins/sudoers/lookup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ffcb23c --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/sudoers/lookup.c @@ -0,0 +1,569 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC + * + * Copyright (c) 2004-2005, 2007-2023 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it. + * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <pwd.h> + +#include <sudoers.h> +#include <gram.h> + +static int +runas_matches_pw(struct sudoers_parse_tree *parse_tree, + const struct cmndspec *cs, const struct passwd *pw) +{ + debug_decl(runas_matches_pw, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER); + + if (cs->runasuserlist != NULL) + debug_return_int(userlist_matches(parse_tree, pw, cs->runasuserlist)); + + if (cs->runasgrouplist == NULL) { + /* No explicit runas user or group, use default. */ + if (userpw_matches(def_runas_default, pw->pw_name, pw) == ALLOW) + debug_return_int(ALLOW); + } + debug_return_int(UNSPEC); +} + +/* + * Look up the user in the sudoers parse tree for pseudo-commands like + * list, verify and kill. + */ +static unsigned int +sudoers_lookup_pseudo(struct sudo_nss_list *snl, struct sudoers_context *ctx, + time_t now, sudoers_lookup_callback_fn_t callback, void *cb_data, + int pwflag) +{ + char *saved_runchroot; + struct passwd *root_pw = NULL; + struct sudo_nss *nss; + struct cmndspec *cs; + struct privilege *priv; + struct userspec *us; + struct defaults *def; + int nopass, match = UNSPEC; + unsigned int validated = 0; + enum def_tuple pwcheck; + debug_decl(sudoers_lookup_pseudo, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER); + + pwcheck = (pwflag == -1) ? never : sudo_defs_table[pwflag].sd_un.tuple; + nopass = (pwcheck == never || pwcheck == all) ? true : false; + + if (ctx->runas.list_pw != NULL) { + root_pw = sudo_getpwuid(ROOT_UID); + if (root_pw == NULL) + sudo_warnx(U_("unknown uid %u"), ROOT_UID); + } else { + SET(validated, FLAG_NO_CHECK); + } + + /* Don't use chroot setting for pseudo-commands. */ + saved_runchroot = def_runchroot; + def_runchroot = NULL; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) { + if (nss->query(ctx, nss, ctx->user.pw) == -1) { + /* The query function should have printed an error message. */ + SET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR); + break; + } + + /* + * We have to traverse the policy forwards, not in reverse, + * to support the "pwcheck == all" case. + */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(us, &nss->parse_tree->userspecs, entries) { + const int user_match = userlist_matches(nss->parse_tree, + ctx->user.pw, &us->users); + if (user_match != ALLOW) { + if (callback != NULL && user_match == DENY) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, NULL, UNSPEC, + NULL, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, cb_data); + } + continue; + } + TAILQ_FOREACH(priv, &us->privileges, entries) { + int priv_nopass = UNSPEC; + const int host_match = hostlist_matches(nss->parse_tree, + ctx->user.pw, &priv->hostlist); + if (host_match != ALLOW) { + if (callback != NULL) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, priv, + host_match, NULL, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, cb_data); + } + continue; + } + TAILQ_FOREACH(def, &priv->defaults, entries) { + if (strcmp(def->var, "authenticate") == 0) { + priv_nopass = !def->op; + break; + } + } + TAILQ_FOREACH(cs, &priv->cmndlist, entries) { + int cmnd_match = UNSPEC; + int date_match = UNSPEC; + int runas_match = UNSPEC; + + if (pwcheck == any) { + if (cs->tags.nopasswd == true || priv_nopass == true) + nopass = true; + } else if (pwcheck == all) { + if (cs->tags.nopasswd != true && priv_nopass != true) + nopass = false; + } + + if (cs->notbefore != UNSPEC) { + date_match = now < cs->notbefore ? DENY : ALLOW; + } + if (cs->notafter != UNSPEC) { + date_match = now > cs->notafter ? DENY : ALLOW; + } + /* + * Root can list any user's privileges. + * A user may always list their own privileges. + */ + if (ctx->user.uid == 0 || ctx->runas.list_pw == NULL || + ctx->user.uid == ctx->runas.list_pw->pw_uid) { + cmnd_match = ALLOW; + runas_match = ALLOW; + } else if (date_match != DENY) { + /* + * To list another user's prilileges, the runas + * user must match the list user or root. + */ + runas_match = runas_matches_pw(nss->parse_tree, cs, + ctx->runas.list_pw); + switch (runas_match) { + case DENY: + break; + case ALLOW: + /* + * RunAs user matches list user. + * Match on command "list" or ALL. + */ + cmnd_match = cmnd_matches(nss->parse_tree, + cs->cmnd, cs->runchroot, NULL); + break; + default: + /* + * RunAs user doesn't match list user. + * Only allow listing if the user has + * "sudo ALL" for root. + */ + if (root_pw != NULL && + runas_matches_pw(nss->parse_tree, cs, + root_pw) == ALLOW) { + runas_match = ALLOW; + cmnd_match = cmnd_matches_all(nss->parse_tree, + cs->cmnd, cs->runchroot, NULL); + } + break; + } + } + if (callback != NULL) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, priv, + host_match, cs, date_match, runas_match, + cmnd_match, cb_data); + } + if (SPECIFIED(cmnd_match)) { + /* + * We take the last match but must process + * the entire policy for pwcheck == all. + */ + match = cmnd_match; + } + } + } + } + if (!sudo_nss_can_continue(nss, match)) + break; + } + if (root_pw != NULL) + sudo_pw_delref(root_pw); + if (match == ALLOW || ctx->user.uid == 0) { + /* User has an entry for this host. */ + SET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS); + } else { + /* No entry or user is not allowed to list other users. */ + SET(validated, VALIDATE_FAILURE); + } + if (pwcheck == always && def_authenticate) + SET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER); + else if (nopass == true) + def_authenticate = false; + + /* Restore original def_runchroot. */ + def_runchroot = saved_runchroot; + + debug_return_uint(validated); +} + +static int +sudoers_lookup_check(struct sudo_nss *nss, struct sudoers_context *ctx, + unsigned int *validated, struct cmnd_info *info, time_t now, + sudoers_lookup_callback_fn_t callback, void *cb_data, + struct cmndspec **matching_cs, struct defaults_list **defs) +{ + struct cmndspec *cs; + struct privilege *priv; + struct userspec *us; + struct member *matching_user; + debug_decl(sudoers_lookup_check, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER); + + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + + TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(us, &nss->parse_tree->userspecs, userspec_list, entries) { + const int user_match = userlist_matches(nss->parse_tree, ctx->user.pw, + &us->users); + if (user_match != ALLOW) { + if (callback != NULL && user_match == DENY) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, NULL, UNSPEC, NULL, + UNSPEC, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, cb_data); + } + continue; + } + CLR(*validated, FLAG_NO_USER); + TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(priv, &us->privileges, privilege_list, entries) { + const int host_match = hostlist_matches(nss->parse_tree, + ctx->user.pw, &priv->hostlist); + if (host_match == ALLOW) { + CLR(*validated, FLAG_NO_HOST); + } else { + if (callback != NULL) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, priv, host_match, + NULL, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, UNSPEC, cb_data); + } + continue; + } + TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(cs, &priv->cmndlist, cmndspec_list, entries) { + int cmnd_match = UNSPEC; + int date_match = UNSPEC; + int runas_match = UNSPEC; + + if (cs->notbefore != UNSPEC) { + date_match = now < cs->notbefore ? DENY : ALLOW; + } + if (cs->notafter != UNSPEC) { + date_match = now > cs->notafter ? DENY : ALLOW; + } + if (date_match != DENY) { + matching_user = NULL; + runas_match = runaslist_matches(nss->parse_tree, + cs->runasuserlist, cs->runasgrouplist, &matching_user, + NULL); + if (runas_match == ALLOW) { + cmnd_match = cmnd_matches(nss->parse_tree, cs->cmnd, + cs->runchroot, info); + } + } + if (callback != NULL) { + callback(nss->parse_tree, us, user_match, priv, host_match, + cs, date_match, runas_match, cmnd_match, cb_data); + } + + if (SPECIFIED(cmnd_match)) { + /* + * If user is running command as themselves, + * set ctx->runas.pw = ctx->user.pw. + * XXX - hack, want more general solution + */ + if (matching_user && matching_user->type == MYSELF) { + sudo_pw_delref(ctx->runas.pw); + sudo_pw_addref(ctx->user.pw); + ctx->runas.pw = ctx->user.pw; + } + *matching_cs = cs; + *defs = &priv->defaults; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_DEBUG|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "userspec matched @ %s:%d:%d: %s", + us->file ? us->file : "???", us->line, us->column, + cmnd_match ? "allowed" : "denied"); + debug_return_int(cmnd_match); + } + free(info->cmnd_path); + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + } + } + } + debug_return_int(UNSPEC); +} + +/* + * Apply cmndspec-specific settings including SELinux role/type, + * Solaris privs, and command tags. + */ +static bool +apply_cmndspec(struct sudoers_context *ctx, struct cmndspec *cs) +{ + debug_decl(apply_cmndspec, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER); + + if (cs != NULL) { +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + /* Set role and type if not specified on command line. */ + if (ctx->runas.role == NULL) { + if (cs->role != NULL) { + ctx->runas.role = strdup(cs->role); + if (ctx->runas.role == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + } else { + ctx->runas.role = def_role; + def_role = NULL; + } + if (ctx->runas.role != NULL) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "ctx->runas.role -> %s", ctx->runas.role); + } + } + if (ctx->runas.type == NULL) { + if (cs->type != NULL) { + ctx->runas.type = strdup(cs->type); + if (ctx->runas.type == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + } else { + ctx->runas.type = def_type; + def_type = NULL; + } + if (ctx->runas.type != NULL) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "ctx->runas.type -> %s", ctx->runas.type); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX */ +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR + /* Set AppArmor profile, if specified */ + if (cs->apparmor_profile != NULL) { + ctx->runas.apparmor_profile = strdup(cs->apparmor_profile); + if (ctx->runas.apparmor_profile == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + } else { + ctx->runas.apparmor_profile = def_apparmor_profile; + def_apparmor_profile = NULL; + } + if (ctx->runas.apparmor_profile != NULL) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "ctx->runas.apparmor_profile -> %s", ctx->runas.apparmor_profile); + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_SET + /* Set Solaris privilege sets */ + if (ctx->runas.privs == NULL) { + if (cs->privs != NULL) { + ctx->runas.privs = strdup(cs->privs); + if (ctx->runas.privs == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + } else { + ctx->runas.privs = def_privs; + def_privs = NULL; + } + if (ctx->runas.privs != NULL) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "ctx->runas.privs -> %s", ctx->runas.privs); + } + } + if (ctx->runas.limitprivs == NULL) { + if (cs->limitprivs != NULL) { + ctx->runas.limitprivs = strdup(cs->limitprivs); + if (ctx->runas.limitprivs == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + } else { + ctx->runas.limitprivs = def_limitprivs; + def_limitprivs = NULL; + } + if (ctx->runas.limitprivs != NULL) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "ctx->runas.limitprivs -> %s", ctx->runas.limitprivs); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_PRIV_SET */ + if (cs->timeout > 0) { + def_command_timeout = cs->timeout; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_command_timeout -> %d", def_command_timeout); + } + if (cs->runcwd != NULL) { + free(def_runcwd); + def_runcwd = strdup(cs->runcwd); + if (def_runcwd == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_runcwd -> %s", def_runcwd); + } + if (cs->runchroot != NULL) { + free(def_runchroot); + def_runchroot = strdup(cs->runchroot); + if (def_runchroot == NULL) { + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, + U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_bool(false); + } + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_runchroot -> %s", def_runchroot); + } + if (cs->tags.nopasswd != UNSPEC) { + def_authenticate = !cs->tags.nopasswd; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_authenticate -> %s", def_authenticate ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.noexec != UNSPEC) { + def_noexec = cs->tags.noexec; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_noexec -> %s", def_noexec ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.intercept != UNSPEC) { + def_intercept = cs->tags.intercept; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_intercept -> %s", def_intercept ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.setenv != UNSPEC) { + def_setenv = cs->tags.setenv; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_setenv -> %s", def_setenv ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.log_input != UNSPEC) { + def_log_input = cs->tags.log_input; + cb_log_input(ctx, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, cs->tags.log_input); + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_log_input -> %s", def_log_input ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.log_output != UNSPEC) { + def_log_output = cs->tags.log_output; + cb_log_output(ctx, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, cs->tags.log_output); + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_log_output -> %s", def_log_output ? "true" : "false"); + } + if (cs->tags.send_mail != UNSPEC) { + if (cs->tags.send_mail) { + def_mail_all_cmnds = true; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_mail_all_cmnds -> true"); + } else { + def_mail_all_cmnds = false; + def_mail_always = false; + def_mail_no_perms = false; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_mail_all_cmnds -> false, def_mail_always -> false, " + "def_mail_no_perms -> false"); + } + } + if (cs->tags.follow != UNSPEC) { + def_sudoedit_follow = cs->tags.follow; + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "def_sudoedit_follow -> %s", def_sudoedit_follow ? "true" : "false"); + } + } + + debug_return_bool(true); +} + +/* + * Look up the user in the sudoers parse tree and check to see if they are + * allowed to run the specified command on this host as the target user. + */ +unsigned int +sudoers_lookup(struct sudo_nss_list *snl, struct sudoers_context *ctx, + time_t now, sudoers_lookup_callback_fn_t callback, void *cb_data, + int *cmnd_status, int pwflag) +{ + struct defaults_list *defs = NULL; + struct sudoers_parse_tree *parse_tree = NULL; + struct cmndspec *cs = NULL; + struct sudo_nss *nss; + struct cmnd_info info; + unsigned int validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST; + int m, match = UNSPEC; + debug_decl(sudoers_lookup, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER); + + /* + * Special case checking the "validate", "list" and "kill" pseudo-commands. + */ + if (pwflag) { + debug_return_uint(sudoers_lookup_pseudo(snl, ctx, now, callback, + cb_data, pwflag)); + } + + /* Need to be runas user while stat'ing things. */ + if (!set_perms(ctx, PERM_RUNAS)) + debug_return_uint(validated); + + /* Query each sudoers source and check the user. */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(nss, snl, entries) { + if (nss->query(ctx, nss, ctx->user.pw) == -1) { + /* The query function should have printed an error message. */ + SET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR); + break; + } + + m = sudoers_lookup_check(nss, ctx, &validated, &info, now, callback, + cb_data, &cs, &defs); + if (SPECIFIED(m)) { + match = m; + parse_tree = nss->parse_tree; + } + + if (!sudo_nss_can_continue(nss, m)) + break; + } + if (SPECIFIED(match)) { + if (info.cmnd_path != NULL) { + /* Update cmnd, cmnd_stat, cmnd_status from matching entry. */ + free(ctx->user.cmnd); + ctx->user.cmnd = info.cmnd_path; + if (ctx->user.cmnd_stat != NULL) + *ctx->user.cmnd_stat = info.cmnd_stat; + *cmnd_status = info.status; + } + if (defs != NULL) + (void)update_defaults(ctx, parse_tree, defs, SETDEF_GENERIC, false); + if (!apply_cmndspec(ctx, cs)) + SET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR); + else if (match == ALLOW) + SET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS); + else + SET(validated, VALIDATE_FAILURE); + } + if (!restore_perms()) + SET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR); + debug_return_uint(validated); +} |