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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-06-12 03:50:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-06-12 03:50:45 +0000
commitefeb864cb547a2cbf96dc0053a8bdb4d9190b364 (patch)
treec0b83368f18be983fcc763200c4c24d633244588 /src/basic/fd-util.c
parentReleasing progress-linux version 255.5-1~progress7.99u1. (diff)
downloadsystemd-efeb864cb547a2cbf96dc0053a8bdb4d9190b364.tar.xz
systemd-efeb864cb547a2cbf96dc0053a8bdb4d9190b364.zip
Merging upstream version 256.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/basic/fd-util.c')
-rw-r--r--src/basic/fd-util.c200
1 files changed, 173 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/src/basic/fd-util.c b/src/basic/fd-util.c
index 542acca..da4ee63 100644
--- a/src/basic/fd-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/fd-util.c
@@ -167,7 +167,23 @@ int fd_nonblock(int fd, bool nonblock) {
if (nflags == flags)
return 0;
- return RET_NERRNO(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, nflags));
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, nflags) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int stdio_disable_nonblock(void) {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* stdin/stdout/stderr really should have O_NONBLOCK, which would confuse apps if left on, as
+ * write()s might unexpectedly fail with EAGAIN. */
+
+ RET_GATHER(ret, fd_nonblock(STDIN_FILENO, false));
+ RET_GATHER(ret, fd_nonblock(STDOUT_FILENO, false));
+ RET_GATHER(ret, fd_nonblock(STDERR_FILENO, false));
+
+ return ret;
}
int fd_cloexec(int fd, bool cloexec) {
@@ -451,6 +467,53 @@ int close_all_fds(const int except[], size_t n_except) {
return r;
}
+int pack_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) {
+ if (n_fds <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Shifts around the fds in the provided array such that they
+ * all end up packed next to each-other, in order, starting
+ * from SD_LISTEN_FDS_START. This must be called after close_all_fds();
+ * it is likely to freeze up otherwise. You should probably use safe_fork_full
+ * with FORK_CLOSE_ALL_FDS|FORK_PACK_FDS set, to ensure that this is done correctly.
+ * The fds array is modified in place with the new FD numbers. */
+
+ assert(fds);
+
+ for (int start = 0;;) {
+ int restart_from = -1;
+
+ for (int i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) {
+ int nfd;
+
+ /* Already at right index? */
+ if (fds[i] == i + 3)
+ continue;
+
+ nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3);
+ if (nfd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ safe_close(fds[i]);
+ fds[i] = nfd;
+
+ /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
+ * let's remember that and try again from here */
+ if (nfd != i + 3 && restart_from < 0)
+ restart_from = i;
+ }
+
+ if (restart_from < 0)
+ break;
+
+ start = restart_from;
+ }
+
+ assert(fds[0] == 3);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int same_fd(int a, int b) {
struct stat sta, stb;
pid_t pid;
@@ -809,6 +872,46 @@ int fd_reopen(int fd, int flags) {
return new_fd;
}
+int fd_reopen_propagate_append_and_position(int fd, int flags) {
+ /* Invokes fd_reopen(fd, flags), but propagates O_APPEND if set on original fd, and also tries to
+ * keep current file position.
+ *
+ * You should use this if the original fd potentially is O_APPEND, otherwise we get rather
+ * "unexpected" behavior. Unless you intentionally want to overwrite pre-existing data, and have
+ * your output overwritten by the next user.
+ *
+ * Use case: "systemd-run --pty >> some-log".
+ *
+ * The "keep position" part is obviously nonsense for the O_APPEND case, but should reduce surprises
+ * if someone carefully pre-positioned the passed in original input or non-append output FDs. */
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(!(flags & (O_APPEND|O_DIRECTORY)));
+
+ int existing_flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+ if (existing_flags < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ int new_fd = fd_reopen(fd, flags | (existing_flags & O_APPEND));
+ if (new_fd < 0)
+ return new_fd;
+
+ /* Try to adjust the offset, but ignore errors. */
+ off_t p = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_CUR);
+ if (p > 0) {
+ off_t new_p = lseek(new_fd, p, SEEK_SET);
+ if (new_p < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(errno,
+ "Failed to propagate file position for re-opened fd %d, ignoring: %m",
+ fd);
+ else if (new_p != p)
+ log_debug("Failed to propagate file position for re-opened fd %d (%lld != %lld), ignoring.",
+ fd, (long long) new_p, (long long) p);
+ }
+
+ return new_fd;
+}
+
int fd_reopen_condition(
int fd,
int flags,
@@ -853,6 +956,38 @@ int fd_is_opath(int fd) {
return FLAGS_SET(r, O_PATH);
}
+int fd_verify_safe_flags_full(int fd, int extra_flags) {
+ int flags, unexpected_flags;
+
+ /* Check if an extrinsic fd is safe to work on (by a privileged service). This ensures that clients
+ * can't trick a privileged service into giving access to a file the client doesn't already have
+ * access to (especially via something like O_PATH).
+ *
+ * O_NOFOLLOW: For some reason the kernel will return this flag from fcntl(); it doesn't go away
+ * immediately after open(). It should have no effect whatsoever to an already-opened FD,
+ * and since we refuse O_PATH it should be safe.
+ *
+ * RAW_O_LARGEFILE: glibc secretly sets this and neglects to hide it from us if we call fcntl.
+ * See comment in missing_fcntl.h for more details about this.
+ *
+ * If 'extra_flags' is specified as non-zero the included flags are also allowed.
+ */
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+ if (flags < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ unexpected_flags = flags & ~(O_ACCMODE|O_NOFOLLOW|RAW_O_LARGEFILE|extra_flags);
+ if (unexpected_flags != 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTEIO),
+ "Unexpected flags set for extrinsic fd: 0%o",
+ (unsigned) unexpected_flags);
+
+ return flags & (O_ACCMODE | extra_flags); /* return the flags variable, but remove the noise */
+}
+
int read_nr_open(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *nr_open = NULL;
int r;
@@ -899,10 +1034,7 @@ int fd_get_diskseq(int fd, uint64_t *ret) {
}
int path_is_root_at(int dir_fd, const char *path) {
- STRUCT_NEW_STATX_DEFINE(st);
- STRUCT_NEW_STATX_DEFINE(pst);
- _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
- int r;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, pfd = -EBADF;
assert(dir_fd >= 0 || dir_fd == AT_FDCWD);
@@ -914,60 +1046,74 @@ int path_is_root_at(int dir_fd, const char *path) {
dir_fd = fd;
}
- r = statx_fallback(dir_fd, ".", 0, STATX_TYPE|STATX_INO|STATX_MNT_ID, &st.sx);
- if (r == -ENOTDIR)
- return false;
+ pfd = openat(dir_fd, "..", O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (pfd < 0)
+ return errno == ENOTDIR ? false : -errno;
+
+ /* Even if the parent directory has the same inode, the fd may not point to the root directory "/",
+ * and we also need to check that the mount ids are the same. Otherwise, a construct like the
+ * following could be used to trick us:
+ *
+ * $ mkdir /tmp/x /tmp/x/y
+ * $ mount --bind /tmp/x /tmp/x/y
+ */
+
+ return fds_are_same_mount(dir_fd, pfd);
+}
+
+int fds_are_same_mount(int fd1, int fd2) {
+ STRUCT_NEW_STATX_DEFINE(st1);
+ STRUCT_NEW_STATX_DEFINE(st2);
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd1 >= 0);
+ assert(fd2 >= 0);
+
+ r = statx_fallback(fd1, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH, STATX_TYPE|STATX_INO|STATX_MNT_ID, &st1.sx);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = statx_fallback(dir_fd, "..", 0, STATX_TYPE|STATX_INO|STATX_MNT_ID, &pst.sx);
+ r = statx_fallback(fd2, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH, STATX_TYPE|STATX_INO|STATX_MNT_ID, &st2.sx);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* First, compare inode. If these are different, the fd does not point to the root directory "/". */
- if (!statx_inode_same(&st.sx, &pst.sx))
+ if (!statx_inode_same(&st1.sx, &st2.sx))
return false;
- /* Even if the parent directory has the same inode, the fd may not point to the root directory "/",
- * and we also need to check that the mount ids are the same. Otherwise, a construct like the
- * following could be used to trick us:
- *
- * $ mkdir /tmp/x /tmp/x/y
- * $ mount --bind /tmp/x /tmp/x/y
- *
- * Note, statx() does not provide the mount ID and path_get_mnt_id_at() does not work when an old
+ /* Note, statx() does not provide the mount ID and path_get_mnt_id_at() does not work when an old
* kernel is used. In that case, let's assume that we do not have such spurious mount points in an
* early boot stage, and silently skip the following check. */
- if (!FLAGS_SET(st.nsx.stx_mask, STATX_MNT_ID)) {
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(st1.nsx.stx_mask, STATX_MNT_ID)) {
int mntid;
- r = path_get_mnt_id_at_fallback(dir_fd, "", &mntid);
+ r = path_get_mnt_id_at_fallback(fd1, "", &mntid);
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
return true; /* skip the mount ID check */
if (r < 0)
return r;
assert(mntid >= 0);
- st.nsx.stx_mnt_id = mntid;
- st.nsx.stx_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID;
+ st1.nsx.stx_mnt_id = mntid;
+ st1.nsx.stx_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID;
}
- if (!FLAGS_SET(pst.nsx.stx_mask, STATX_MNT_ID)) {
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(st2.nsx.stx_mask, STATX_MNT_ID)) {
int mntid;
- r = path_get_mnt_id_at_fallback(dir_fd, "..", &mntid);
+ r = path_get_mnt_id_at_fallback(fd2, "", &mntid);
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
return true; /* skip the mount ID check */
if (r < 0)
return r;
assert(mntid >= 0);
- pst.nsx.stx_mnt_id = mntid;
- pst.nsx.stx_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID;
+ st2.nsx.stx_mnt_id = mntid;
+ st2.nsx.stx_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID;
}
- return statx_mount_same(&st.nsx, &pst.nsx);
+ return statx_mount_same(&st1.nsx, &st2.nsx);
}
const char *accmode_to_string(int flags) {