Adding upstream version 1:115.7.0.upstream/1%115.7.0upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 735 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/netwerk/cookie/CookieCommons.cpp b/netwerk/cookie/CookieCommons.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52b61c4e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netwerk/cookie/CookieCommons.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,735 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "Cookie.h"
+#include "CookieCommons.h"
+#include "CookieLogging.h"
+#include "CookieService.h"
+#include "mozilla/ConsoleReportCollector.h"
+#include "mozilla/ContentBlockingNotifier.h"
+#include "mozilla/ScopeExit.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
+#include "mozilla/StorageAccess.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/CookieJarSettings.h"
+#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsICookiePermission.h"
+#include "nsICookieService.h"
+#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
+#include "ThirdPartyUtil.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+
+using dom::Document;
+
+namespace net {
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::DomainMatches(Cookie* aCookie, const nsACString& aHost) {
+  // first, check for an exact host or domain cookie match, e.g. "google.com"
+  // or ".google.com"; second a subdomain match, e.g.
+  // host = "mail.google.com", cookie domain = ".google.com".
+  return aCookie->RawHost() == aHost ||
+         (aCookie->IsDomain() && StringEndsWith(aHost, aCookie->Host()));
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::PathMatches(Cookie* aCookie, const nsACString& aPath) {
+  nsCString cookiePath(aCookie->GetFilePath());
+
+  // if our cookie path is empty we can't really perform our prefix check, and
+  // also we can't check the last character of the cookie path, so we would
+  // never return a successful match.
+  if (cookiePath.IsEmpty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // if the cookie path and the request path are identical, they match.
+  if (cookiePath.Equals(aPath)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // if the cookie path is a prefix of the request path, and the last character
+  // of the cookie path is %x2F ("/"), they match.
+  bool isPrefix = StringBeginsWith(aPath, cookiePath);
+  if (isPrefix && cookiePath.Last() == '/') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // if the cookie path is a prefix of the request path, and the first character
+  // of the request path that is not included in the cookie path is a %x2F ("/")
+  // character, they match.
+  uint32_t cookiePathLen = cookiePath.Length();
+  return isPrefix && aPath[cookiePathLen] == '/';
+}
+
+// Get the base domain for aHostURI; e.g. for "www.bbc.co.uk", this would be
+// "bbc.co.uk". Only properly-formed URI's are tolerated, though a trailing
+// dot may be present. If aHostURI is an IP address, an alias such as
+// 'localhost', an eTLD such as 'co.uk', or the empty string, aBaseDomain will
+// be the exact host, and aRequireHostMatch will be true to indicate that
+// substring matches should not be performed.
+nsresult CookieCommons::GetBaseDomain(nsIEffectiveTLDService* aTLDService,
+                                      nsIURI* aHostURI, nsACString& aBaseDomain,
+                                      bool& aRequireHostMatch) {
+  // get the base domain. this will fail if the host contains a leading dot,
+  // more than one trailing dot, or is otherwise malformed.
+  nsresult rv = aTLDService->GetBaseDomain(aHostURI, 0, aBaseDomain);
+  aRequireHostMatch = rv == NS_ERROR_HOST_IS_IP_ADDRESS ||
+                      rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS;
+  if (aRequireHostMatch) {
+    // aHostURI is either an IP address, an alias such as 'localhost', an eTLD
+    // such as 'co.uk', or the empty string. use the host as a key in such
+    // cases.
+    rv = nsContentUtils::GetHostOrIPv6WithBrackets(aHostURI, aBaseDomain);
+  }
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // aHost (and thus aBaseDomain) may be the string '.'. If so, fail.
+  if (aBaseDomain.Length() == 1 && aBaseDomain.Last() == '.') {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  // block any URIs without a host that aren't file:// URIs.
+  if (aBaseDomain.IsEmpty() && !aHostURI->SchemeIs("file")) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult CookieCommons::GetBaseDomain(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                                      nsACString& aBaseDomain) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  // for historical reasons we use ascii host for file:// URLs.
+  if (aPrincipal->SchemeIs("file")) {
+    return nsContentUtils::GetHostOrIPv6WithBrackets(aPrincipal, aBaseDomain);
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = aPrincipal->GetBaseDomain(aBaseDomain);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  nsContentUtils::MaybeFixIPv6Host(aBaseDomain);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Get the base domain for aHost; e.g. for "www.bbc.co.uk", this would be
+// "bbc.co.uk". This is done differently than GetBaseDomain(mTLDService, ): it
+// is assumed that aHost is already normalized, and it may contain a leading dot
+// (indicating that it represents a domain). A trailing dot may be present.
+// If aHost is an IP address, an alias such as 'localhost', an eTLD such as
+// 'co.uk', or the empty string, aBaseDomain will be the exact host, and a
+// leading dot will be treated as an error.
+nsresult CookieCommons::GetBaseDomainFromHost(
+    nsIEffectiveTLDService* aTLDService, const nsACString& aHost,
+    nsCString& aBaseDomain) {
+  // aHost must not be the string '.'.
+  if (aHost.Length() == 1 && aHost.Last() == '.') {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  // aHost may contain a leading dot; if so, strip it now.
+  bool domain = !aHost.IsEmpty() && aHost.First() == '.';
+
+  // get the base domain. this will fail if the host contains a leading dot,
+  // more than one trailing dot, or is otherwise malformed.
+  nsresult rv = aTLDService->GetBaseDomainFromHost(Substring(aHost, domain), 0,
+                                                   aBaseDomain);
+  if (rv == NS_ERROR_HOST_IS_IP_ADDRESS ||
+      rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
+    // aHost is either an IP address, an alias such as 'localhost', an eTLD
+    // such as 'co.uk', or the empty string. use the host as a key in such
+    // cases; however, we reject any such hosts with a leading dot, since it
+    // doesn't make sense for them to be domain cookies.
+    if (domain) {
+      return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+    }
+
+    aBaseDomain = aHost;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  return rv;
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+void NotifyRejectionToObservers(nsIURI* aHostURI, CookieOperation aOperation) {
+  if (aOperation == OPERATION_WRITE) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> os = services::GetObserverService();
+    if (os) {
+      os->NotifyObservers(aHostURI, "cookie-rejected", nullptr);
+    }
+  } else {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aOperation == OPERATION_READ);
+  }
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+// Notify observers that a cookie was rejected due to the users' prefs.
+void CookieCommons::NotifyRejected(nsIURI* aHostURI, nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                   uint32_t aRejectedReason,
+                                   CookieOperation aOperation) {
+  NotifyRejectionToObservers(aHostURI, aOperation);
+
+  ContentBlockingNotifier::OnDecision(
+      aChannel, ContentBlockingNotifier::BlockingDecision::eBlock,
+      aRejectedReason);
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::CheckPathSize(const CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  return aCookieData.path().Length() <= kMaxBytesPerPath;
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::CheckNameAndValueSize(const CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  // reject cookie if it's over the size limit, per RFC2109
+  return (aCookieData.name().Length() + aCookieData.value().Length()) <=
+         kMaxBytesPerCookie;
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::CheckName(const CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  const char illegalNameCharacters[] = {
+      0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B,
+      0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
+      0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x00};
+
+  const auto* start = aCookieData.name().BeginReading();
+  const auto* end = aCookieData.name().EndReading();
+
+  auto charFilter = [&](unsigned char c) {
+    if (StaticPrefs::network_cookie_blockUnicode() && c >= 0x80) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    return std::find(std::begin(illegalNameCharacters),
+                     std::end(illegalNameCharacters),
+                     c) != std::end(illegalNameCharacters);
+  };
+
+  return std::find_if(start, end, charFilter) == end;
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::CheckValue(const CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  // reject cookie if value contains an RFC 6265 disallowed character - see
+  // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191423
+  // NOTE: this is not the full set of characters disallowed by 6265 - notably
+  // 0x09, 0x20, 0x22, 0x2C, and 0x5C are missing from this list.
+  const char illegalCharacters[] = {
+      0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C,
+      0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+      0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0x7F, 0x00};
+
+  const auto* start = aCookieData.value().BeginReading();
+  const auto* end = aCookieData.value().EndReading();
+
+  auto charFilter = [&](unsigned char c) {
+    if (StaticPrefs::network_cookie_blockUnicode() && c >= 0x80) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    return std::find(std::begin(illegalCharacters), std::end(illegalCharacters),
+                     c) != std::end(illegalCharacters);
+  };
+
+  return std::find_if(start, end, charFilter) == end;
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::CheckCookiePermission(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                          CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    // No channel, let's assume this is a system-principal request.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICookieJarSettings> cookieJarSettings;
+  nsresult rv =
+      loadInfo->GetCookieJarSettings(getter_AddRefs(cookieJarSettings));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsIScriptSecurityManager* ssm =
+      nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(ssm);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> channelPrincipal;
+  rv = ssm->GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelPrincipal));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return CheckCookiePermission(channelPrincipal, cookieJarSettings,
+                               aCookieData);
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::CheckCookiePermission(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsICookieJarSettings* aCookieJarSettings,
+    CookieStruct& aCookieData) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aCookieJarSettings);
+
+  if (!aPrincipal->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t cookiePermission = nsICookiePermission::ACCESS_DEFAULT;
+  nsresult rv =
+      aCookieJarSettings->CookiePermission(aPrincipal, &cookiePermission);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (cookiePermission == nsICookiePermission::ACCESS_ALLOW) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (cookiePermission == nsICookiePermission::ACCESS_SESSION) {
+    aCookieData.isSession() = true;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (cookiePermission == nsICookiePermission::ACCESS_DENY) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+CookieStatus CookieStatusForWindow(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow,
+                                   nsIURI* aDocumentURI) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aWindow);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocumentURI);
+
+  ThirdPartyUtil* thirdPartyUtil = ThirdPartyUtil::GetInstance();
+  if (thirdPartyUtil) {
+    bool isThirdParty = true;
+
+    nsresult rv = thirdPartyUtil->IsThirdPartyWindow(
+        aWindow->GetOuterWindow(), aDocumentURI, &isThirdParty);
+    NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "Third-party window check failed.");
+
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !isThirdParty) {
+      return STATUS_ACCEPTED;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::network_cookie_thirdparty_sessionOnly()) {
+    return STATUS_ACCEPT_SESSION;
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::network_cookie_thirdparty_nonsecureSessionOnly() &&
+      !nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(aDocumentURI)) {
+    return STATUS_ACCEPT_SESSION;
+  }
+
+  return STATUS_ACCEPTED;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+// static
+already_AddRefed<Cookie> CookieCommons::CreateCookieFromDocument(
+    Document* aDocument, const nsACString& aCookieString,
+    int64_t currentTimeInUsec, nsIEffectiveTLDService* aTLDService,
+    mozIThirdPartyUtil* aThirdPartyUtil,
+    std::function<bool(const nsACString&, const OriginAttributes&)>&&
+        aHasExistingCookiesLambda,
+    nsIURI** aDocumentURI, nsACString& aBaseDomain, OriginAttributes& aAttrs) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> storagePrincipal =
+      aDocument->EffectiveCookiePrincipal();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(storagePrincipal);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> principalURI;
+  auto* basePrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(aDocument->NodePrincipal());
+  basePrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(principalURI));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!principalURI)) {
+    // Document's principal is not a content or null (may be system), so
+    // can't set cookies
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (!CookieCommons::IsSchemeSupported(principalURI)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString baseDomain;
+  bool requireHostMatch = false;
+  nsresult rv = CookieCommons::GetBaseDomain(aTLDService, principalURI,
+                                             baseDomain, requireHostMatch);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsPIDOMWindowInner* innerWindow = aDocument->GetInnerWindow();
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!innerWindow)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Check if limit-foreign is required.
+  uint32_t dummyRejectedReason = 0;
+  if (aDocument->CookieJarSettings()->GetLimitForeignContexts() &&
+      !aHasExistingCookiesLambda(baseDomain,
+                                 storagePrincipal->OriginAttributesRef()) &&
+      !ShouldAllowAccessFor(innerWindow, principalURI, &dummyRejectedReason)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  bool isForeignAndNotAddon = false;
+  if (!BasePrincipal::Cast(aDocument->NodePrincipal())->AddonPolicy()) {
+    rv = aThirdPartyUtil->IsThirdPartyWindow(
+        innerWindow->GetOuterWindow(), principalURI, &isForeignAndNotAddon);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      isForeignAndNotAddon = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If we are here, we have been already accepted by the anti-tracking.
+  // We just need to check if we have to be in session-only mode.
+  CookieStatus cookieStatus = CookieStatusForWindow(innerWindow, principalURI);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(cookieStatus == STATUS_ACCEPTED ||
+             cookieStatus == STATUS_ACCEPT_SESSION);
+
+  // Console report takes care of the correct reporting at the exit of this
+  // method.
+  RefPtr<ConsoleReportCollector> crc = new ConsoleReportCollector();
+  auto scopeExit = MakeScopeExit([&] { crc->FlushConsoleReports(aDocument); });
+
+  nsCString cookieString(aCookieString);
+
+  CookieStruct cookieData;
+  MOZ_ASSERT(cookieData.creationTime() == 0, "Must be initialized to 0");
+  bool canSetCookie = false;
+  CookieService::CanSetCookie(principalURI, baseDomain, cookieData,
+                              requireHostMatch, cookieStatus, cookieString,
+                              false, isForeignAndNotAddon, crc, canSetCookie);
+
+  if (!canSetCookie) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // check permissions from site permission list.
+  if (!CookieCommons::CheckCookiePermission(aDocument->NodePrincipal(),
+                                            aDocument->CookieJarSettings(),
+                                            cookieData)) {
+    NotifyRejectionToObservers(principalURI, OPERATION_WRITE);
+    ContentBlockingNotifier::OnDecision(
+        innerWindow, ContentBlockingNotifier::BlockingDecision::eBlock,
+        nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_COOKIES_BLOCKED_BY_PERMISSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<Cookie> cookie =
+      Cookie::Create(cookieData, storagePrincipal->OriginAttributesRef());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(cookie);
+
+  cookie->SetLastAccessed(currentTimeInUsec);
+  cookie->SetCreationTime(
+      Cookie::GenerateUniqueCreationTime(currentTimeInUsec));
+
+  aBaseDomain = baseDomain;
+  aAttrs = storagePrincipal->OriginAttributesRef();
+  principalURI.forget(aDocumentURI);
+
+  return cookie.forget();
+}
+
+// static
+already_AddRefed<nsICookieJarSettings> CookieCommons::GetCookieJarSettings(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICookieJarSettings> cookieJarSettings;
+  bool shouldResistFingerprinting =
+      nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting(aChannel);
+  if (aChannel) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+    nsresult rv =
+        loadInfo->GetCookieJarSettings(getter_AddRefs(cookieJarSettings));
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      cookieJarSettings =
+          CookieJarSettings::GetBlockingAll(shouldResistFingerprinting);
+    }
+  } else {
+    cookieJarSettings = CookieJarSettings::Create(CookieJarSettings::eRegular,
+                                                  shouldResistFingerprinting);
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(cookieJarSettings);
+  return cookieJarSettings.forget();
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::ShouldIncludeCrossSiteCookieForDocument(Cookie* aCookie) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aCookie);
+
+  int32_t sameSiteAttr = 0;
+  aCookie->GetSameSite(&sameSiteAttr);
+
+  return sameSiteAttr == nsICookie::SAMESITE_NONE;
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::IsSafeTopLevelNav(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInterceptionInfo> interceptionInfo = loadInfo->InterceptionInfo();
+  if ((loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+           ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+       loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+           ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) &&
+      !interceptionInfo) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (interceptionInfo &&
+      interceptionInfo->GetExtContentPolicyType() !=
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      interceptionInfo->GetExtContentPolicyType() !=
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD &&
+      interceptionInfo->GetExtContentPolicyType() !=
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return NS_IsSafeMethodNav(aChannel);
+}
+
+// This function determines if two schemes are equal in the context of
+// "Schemeful SameSite cookies".
+//
+// Two schemes are considered equal:
+//   - if the "network.cookie.sameSite.schemeful" pref is set to false.
+// OR
+//   - if one of the schemes is not http or https.
+// OR
+//   - if both schemes are equal AND both are either http or https.
+bool IsSameSiteSchemeEqual(const nsACString& aFirstScheme,
+                           const nsACString& aSecondScheme) {
+  if (!StaticPrefs::network_cookie_sameSite_schemeful()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  auto isSchemeHttpOrHttps = [](const nsACString& scheme) -> bool {
+    return scheme.EqualsLiteral("http") || scheme.EqualsLiteral("https");
+  };
+
+  if (!isSchemeHttpOrHttps(aFirstScheme) ||
+      !isSchemeHttpOrHttps(aSecondScheme)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return aFirstScheme.Equals(aSecondScheme);
+}
+
+bool CookieCommons::IsSameSiteForeign(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIURI* aHostURI,
+                                      bool* aHadCrossSiteRedirects) {
+  *aHadCrossSiteRedirects = false;
+
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  // Do not treat loads triggered by web extensions as foreign
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInterceptionInfo> interceptionInfo = loadInfo->InterceptionInfo();
+
+  RefPtr<BasePrincipal> triggeringPrincipal;
+  ExtContentPolicy contentPolicyType;
+  if (interceptionInfo && interceptionInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) {
+    triggeringPrincipal =
+        BasePrincipal::Cast(interceptionInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+    contentPolicyType = interceptionInfo->GetExtContentPolicyType();
+  } else {
+    triggeringPrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+    contentPolicyType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+    if (triggeringPrincipal->AddonPolicy() &&
+        triggeringPrincipal->AddonAllowsLoad(channelURI)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry>>& redirectChain(
+      interceptionInfo && interceptionInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()
+          ? interceptionInfo->RedirectChain()
+          : loadInfo->RedirectChain());
+
+  nsAutoCString hostScheme, otherScheme;
+  aHostURI->GetScheme(hostScheme);
+
+  bool isForeign = true;
+  nsresult rv;
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+      contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) {
+    // for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT we query the hostURI from the
+    // triggeringPrincipal which returns the URI of the document that caused the
+    // navigation.
+    rv = triggeringPrincipal->IsThirdPartyChannel(aChannel, &isForeign);
+
+    triggeringPrincipal->GetScheme(otherScheme);
+  } else {
+    // If the load is caused by FetchEvent.request or NavigationPreload request,
+    // check the original InterceptedHttpChannel is a third-party channel or
+    // not.
+    if (interceptionInfo && interceptionInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) {
+      isForeign = interceptionInfo->FromThirdParty();
+      if (isForeign) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
+        do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID);
+    if (!thirdPartyUtil) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    rv = thirdPartyUtil->IsThirdPartyChannel(aChannel, aHostURI, &isForeign);
+
+    channelURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
+  }
+  // if we are dealing with a cross origin request, we can return here
+  // because we already know the request is 'foreign'.
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isForeign) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!IsSameSiteSchemeEqual(otherScheme, hostScheme)) {
+    // If the two schemes are not of the same http(s) scheme then we
+    // consider the request as foreign.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // for loads of TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT we have to perform an additional test,
+  // because a cross-origin iframe might perform a navigation to a same-origin
+  // iframe which would send same-site cookies. Hence, if the iframe navigation
+  // was triggered by a cross-origin triggeringPrincipal, we treat the load as
+  // foreign.
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    rv = triggeringPrincipal->IsThirdPartyChannel(aChannel, &isForeign);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isForeign) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // for the purpose of same-site cookies we have to treat any cross-origin
+  // redirects as foreign. E.g. cross-site to same-site redirect is a problem
+  // with regards to CSRF.
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : redirectChain) {
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+    if (redirectPrincipal) {
+      rv = redirectPrincipal->IsThirdPartyChannel(aChannel, &isForeign);
+      // if at any point we encounter a cross-origin redirect we can return.
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isForeign) {
+        *aHadCrossSiteRedirects = isForeign;
+        return true;
+      }
+
+      nsAutoCString redirectScheme;
+      redirectPrincipal->GetScheme(redirectScheme);
+      if (!IsSameSiteSchemeEqual(redirectScheme, hostScheme)) {
+        // If the two schemes are not of the same http(s) scheme then we
+        // consider the request as foreign.
+        *aHadCrossSiteRedirects = true;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return isForeign;
+}
+
+// static
+nsICookie::schemeType CookieCommons::URIToSchemeType(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aURI);
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return nsICookie::SCHEME_UNSET;
+  }
+
+  return SchemeToSchemeType(scheme);
+}
+
+// static
+nsICookie::schemeType CookieCommons::PrincipalToSchemeType(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aPrincipal->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return nsICookie::SCHEME_UNSET;
+  }
+
+  return SchemeToSchemeType(scheme);
+}
+
+// static
+nsICookie::schemeType CookieCommons::SchemeToSchemeType(
+    const nsACString& aScheme) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(IsSchemeSupported(aScheme));
+
+  if (aScheme.Equals("https")) {
+    return nsICookie::SCHEME_HTTPS;
+  }
+
+  if (aScheme.Equals("http")) {
+    return nsICookie::SCHEME_HTTP;
+  }
+
+  if (aScheme.Equals("file")) {
+    return nsICookie::SCHEME_FILE;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_CRASH("Unsupported scheme type");
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::IsSchemeSupported(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aPrincipal->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return IsSchemeSupported(scheme);
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::IsSchemeSupported(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aURI);
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return IsSchemeSupported(scheme);
+}
+
+// static
+bool CookieCommons::IsSchemeSupported(const nsACString& aScheme) {
+  return aScheme.Equals("https") || aScheme.Equals("http") ||
+         aScheme.Equals("file");
+}
+
+}  // namespace net
+}  // namespace mozilla