diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000 |
commit | e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc (patch) | |
tree | 68cb5ef9081156392f1dd62a00c6ccc1451b93df /epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.tar.xz wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.zip |
Adding upstream version 4.2.2.upstream/4.2.2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c | 8109 |
1 files changed, 8109 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..35d05677 --- /dev/null +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,8109 @@ +/* packet-isakmp.c + * Routines for the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol + * (ISAKMP) (RFC 2408) and the Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation + * for ISAKMP (RFC 2407) + * Brad Robel-Forrest <brad.robel-forrest@watchguard.com> + * + * Added routines for the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol + * (draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt) + * Shoichi Sakane <sakane@tanu.org> + * + * Added routines for RFC3947 Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE + * ronnie sahlberg + * + * 04/2009 Added routines for decryption of IKEv2 Encrypted Payload + * Naoyoshi Ueda <piyomaru3141@gmail.com> + * + * 08/2016 Added decryption using AES-GCM, AES-CCM and AES-CTR + * and verification using AES-GCM, AES-CCM + * Michal Skalski <mskalski13@gmail.com> + * + * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer + * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> + * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * References: + * IKEv2 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4306 + * IKEv2bis https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996 + * + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry (last updated 2011-11-07) + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry (last updated 2011-03-14) + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters (last updated 2011-12-19) + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include <epan/packet.h> +#include <epan/ipproto.h> +#include <epan/asn1.h> +#include <epan/reassemble.h> +#include <epan/prefs.h> +#include <epan/expert.h> +#include <epan/to_str.h> +#include <epan/conversation.h> +#include <wsutil/str_util.h> +#include "packet-x509if.h" +#include "packet-x509af.h" +#include "packet-gsm_a_common.h" +#include "packet-isakmp.h" +#include "packet-ber.h" + +#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h> +#include <epan/proto_data.h> +#include <epan/strutil.h> +#include <epan/uat.h> + +void proto_register_isakmp(void); +void proto_reg_handoff_isakmp(void); + +typedef struct _attribute_common_fields { + int all; + int format; + int type; + int length; + int value; +} attribute_common_fields; + +static int proto_isakmp = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_nat_keepalive = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_nat_hash = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv6 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv4 = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_ispi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_rspi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_typepayload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_nextpayload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_criticalpayload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_reserved2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_reserved7 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_reserved = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_datapayload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_extradata = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_version = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_mjver = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_mnver = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flags = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_e = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_c = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_a = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_i = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_v = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_flag_r = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_messageid = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_payloadlen = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_doi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_situation = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_attribute_next_payload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_situation_identity_only = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_situation_secrecy = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sa_situation_integrity = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_prop_number = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_prop_transforms = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_spisize = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_spi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_number = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_type_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_type_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_protoid = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_addr = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_fqdn = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_user_fqdn = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_subnet = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_start = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_end = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_addr = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_subnet = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_start = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_end = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_key_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_id_data_cert = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cert_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cert_x509_hash = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cert_x509_url = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_sig = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_auth_meth = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_auth_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_value = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_doi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there_ack = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_unity_load_balance = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_fortinet_network_overlay_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_accepted_dh_group = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_cpi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_transform_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_auth_lifetime = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv4 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv6 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_fqdn = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_nonce_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv4 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv6 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_lifetime = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_data = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_max_cid = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_profile = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_integ = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_icv_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_mrru = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_qcd_token_secret_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_nonce_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_send_req_msg_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_recv_req_msg_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_incoming_ipsec_sa_delta_value = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_secure_password_methods = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_signature_hash_algorithms = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_delete_doi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v2 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_delete_spi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_bytes = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_string = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cp_product = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cp_version = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cp_timestamp = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cp_reserved = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cp_features = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_major = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_minor = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_ms_nt5_isakmpoakley = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_aruba_via_auth_profile = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_release = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_build = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_number_of_ts = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_protoid = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_selector_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv4 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv4 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv6 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv6 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_fc = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_fc = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_r_ctl = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_r_ctl = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_start_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_end_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ts_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_num_spis = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_hash = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sig = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_nonce = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_backoff_timer_len = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imei = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imeisv = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_spare = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flags = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b1_police = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b2_ambulance = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b3_fire_brigade = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b4_marine_guard = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b5_mountain_rescue = -1; + +static int hf_iskamp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_number = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_group_description = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_encap_mode = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_algorithm = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_rounds = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_dict_size = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_algorithm = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_key_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sig_enco_algorithm = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_addr_preservation = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sa_direction = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_ike_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_encryption_algorithm = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_hash_algorithm = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_authentication_method = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_description = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_prime = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_one = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_two = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_a = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_b = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_prf = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_key_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_field_size = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_order = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_block_size = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike_attr_asymmetric_cryptographic_algorithm_type = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_trans_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_encr = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_prf = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_integ = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_dh = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_esn = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_trans_id_v2 = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_ike2_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_ike2_attr_key_length = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_fragments = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap_conflicts = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_multiple_tails = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_too_long_fragment = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_error = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_fragment_count = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_reassembled_in = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_reassembled_length = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_ike2_fragment_number = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_ike2_total_fragments = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_packetid = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_seq = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_last = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_key_exch_dh_group = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_key_exch_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_eap_data = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_gspm_data = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_identifier = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v2 = -1; + +static attribute_common_fields hf_isakmp_cfg_attr = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v1 = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v2 = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_address = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_netmask = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dns = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_nbns = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_address_expiry = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dhcp = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_application_version = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_ip = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_prefix = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_netmask = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dns = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_nbns = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dhcp = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_ip = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_netmask = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_supported_attributes = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_ip = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_prefix = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_interface = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_ip = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip4_address = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip6_address = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_name = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_password = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_passcode = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_message = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_challenge = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_domain = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_status = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_next_pin = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_answer = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_banner = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_def_domain = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_sak_next_payload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_reserved = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_payload_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_protocol = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sak_spi = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_sat_next_payload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_reserved = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_payload_len = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_protocol_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_protocol = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_port = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_transform_id = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_spi = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_sat_payload = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_kd_num_key_pkt = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_kd_payload = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_kdp_type = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_kdp_length = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_kdp_spi_size = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_kdp_spi = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_seq_seq = -1; + +static int hf_isakmp_enc_decrypted_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_contained_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_pad_length= -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_padding = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_data = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_iv = -1; +static int hf_isakmp_enc_icd = -1; + +static gint ett_isakmp = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_version = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_flags = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_payload = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature_asn1_data = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_fragment = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_fragments = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_sa = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_attr = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_id = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_notify_data = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_main = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_ts = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_kd = -1; +/* For decrypted IKEv2 Encrypted payload*/ +static gint ett_isakmp_decrypted_data = -1; +static gint ett_isakmp_decrypted_payloads = -1; + +static expert_field ei_isakmp_enc_iv = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_ikev2_integrity_checksum = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_enc_data_length_mult_block_size = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_enc_pad_length_big = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_bad_fragment_number = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_unknown_device_identity = EI_INIT; + +static dissector_handle_t eap_handle = NULL; +static dissector_handle_t isakmp_handle; + + +static reassembly_table isakmp_cisco_reassembly_table; +static reassembly_table isakmp_ike2_reassembly_table; + +static const fragment_items isakmp_frag_items = { + /* Fragment subtrees */ + &ett_isakmp_fragment, + &ett_isakmp_fragments, + /* Fragment fields */ + &hf_isakmp_fragments, + &hf_isakmp_fragment, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap_conflicts, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_multiple_tails, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_too_long_fragment, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_error, + &hf_isakmp_fragment_count, + /* Reassembled in field */ + &hf_isakmp_reassembled_in, + /* Reassembled length field */ + &hf_isakmp_reassembled_length, + /* Reassembled data field */ + NULL, + /* Tag */ + "Message fragments" +}; +/* IKE port number assigned by IANA */ +#define UDP_PORT_ISAKMP 500 +#define TCP_PORT_ISAKMP 500 + +/* + * Identifier Type + * RFC2407 for IKEv1 + * RFC3554 for ID_LIST + * RFC4306 for IKEv2 + * RFC4595 for ID_FC_NAME + */ +#define IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR 1 +#define IKE_ID_FQDN 2 +#define IKE_ID_USER_FQDN 3 +#define IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET 4 +#define IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR 5 +#define IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET 6 +#define IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE 7 +#define IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE 8 +#define IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN 9 +#define IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_GN 10 +#define IKE_ID_KEY_ID 11 +#define IKE_ID_LIST 12 +#define IKE_ID_FC_NAME 12 +#define IKE_ID_RFC822_ADDR 3 +/* + * Traffic Selector Type + * Not in use for IKEv1 + */ +#define IKEV2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE 7 +#define IKEV2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE 8 +#define IKEV2_TS_FC_ADDR_RANGE 9 /* RFC 4595 */ +/* + * Configuration Payload Attribute Types + * draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-05.txt for IKEv1 + * draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-xauth-06.txt and draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02.txt for XAUTH + * RFC4306 for IKEv2 + * RFC5739 for INTERNAL_IP6_LINK and INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX + * draft-gundavelli-ipsecme-3gpp-ims-options for P_CSCF_IP4_ADDRESS and P_CSCF_IP6_ADDRESS + */ +#define INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS 1 +#define INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK 2 +#define INTERNAL_IP4_DNS 3 +#define INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS 4 +#define INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY 5 +#define INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP 6 +#define APPLICATION_VERSION 7 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS 8 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK 9 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_DNS 10 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS 11 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP 12 +#define INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET 13 +#define SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES 14 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET 15 +#define MIP6_HOME_PREFIX 16 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_LINK 17 +#define INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX 18 +#define P_CSCF_IP4_ADDRESS 20 +#define P_CSCF_IP6_ADDRESS 21 +/* checkpoint configuration attributes */ +#define CHKPT_DEF_DOMAIN 16387 +#define CHKPT_MAC_ADDRESS 16388 +#define CHKPT_MARCIPAN_REASON_CODE 16389 +#define CHKPT_UNKNOWN1 16400 +#define CHKPT_UNKNOWN2 16401 +#define CHKPT_UNKNOWN3 16402 +/* XAUTH configuration attributes */ +#define XAUTH_TYPE 16520 +#define XAUTH_USER_NAME 16521 +#define XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD 16522 +#define XAUTH_PASSCODE 16523 +#define XAUTH_MESSAGE 16524 +#define XAUTH_CHALLENGE 16525 +#define XAUTH_DOMAIN 16526 +#define XAUTH_STATUS 16527 +#define XAUTH_NEXT_PIN 16528 +#define XAUTH_ANSWER 16529 +/* unity (CISCO) configuration attributes */ +#define UNITY_BANNER 28672 +#define UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD 28673 +#define UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN 28674 +#define UNITY_SPLIT_DOMAIN 28675 +#define UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE 28676 +#define UNITY_NATT_PORT 28677 +#define UNITY_SPLIT_EXCLUDE 28678 +#define UNITY_PFS 28679 +#define UNITY_FW_TYPE 28680 +#define UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS 28681 +#define UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME 28682 + +/* Payload Type +* RFC2408 / RFC3547 for IKEv1 +* RFC4306 for IKEv2 +*/ +#define PLOAD_IKE_NONE 0 +#define PLOAD_IKE_SA 1 +#define PLOAD_IKE_P 2 +#define PLOAD_IKE_T 3 +#define PLOAD_IKE_KE 4 +#define PLOAD_IKE_ID 5 +#define PLOAD_IKE_CERT 6 +#define PLOAD_IKE_CR 7 +#define PLOAD_IKE_HASH 8 +#define PLOAD_IKE_SIG 9 +#define PLOAD_IKE_NONCE 10 +#define PLOAD_IKE_N 11 +#define PLOAD_IKE_D 12 +#define PLOAD_IKE_VID 13 +#define PLOAD_IKE_A 14 +#define PLOAD_IKE_SAK 15 +#define PLOAD_IKE_SAT 16 +#define PLOAD_IKE_KD 17 +#define PLOAD_IKE_SEQ 18 +#define PLOAD_IKE_POP 19 +#define PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D 20 +#define PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA 21 +#define PLOAD_IKE_GAP 22 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_SA 33 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_KE 34 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_IDI 35 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_IDR 36 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_CERT 37 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_CERTREQ 38 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_AUTH 39 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_NONCE 40 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_N 41 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_D 42 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_V 43 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_TSI 44 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_TSR 45 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_SK 46 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_CP 47 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_EAP 48 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_GSPM 49 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_IDG 50 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_GSA 51 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_KD 52 +#define PLOAD_IKE2_SKF 53 +#define PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D13 130 +#define PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA14 131 +#define PLOAD_IKE_CISCO_FRAG 132 +/* +* IPSEC Situation Definition (RFC2407) +*/ +#define SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY 0x01 +#define SIT_SECRECY 0x02 +#define SIT_INTEGRITY 0x04 + + +static const value_string exchange_v1_type[] = { + { 0, "NONE" }, + { 1, "Base" }, + { 2, "Identity Protection (Main Mode)" }, + { 3, "Authentication Only" }, + { 4, "Aggressive" }, + { 5, "Informational" }, + { 6, "Transaction (Config Mode)" }, + { 32, "Quick Mode" }, + { 33, "New Group Mode" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string exchange_v2_type[] = { + { 34, "IKE_SA_INIT" }, + { 35, "IKE_AUTH" }, + { 36, "CREATE_CHILD_SA" }, + { 37, "INFORMATIONAL" }, + { 38, "IKE_SESSION_RESUME" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string frag_last_vals[] = { + { 0, "More fragments" }, + { 1, "Last fragment" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +/* Ex vs_proto */ +static const value_string protoid_v1_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "ISAKMP" }, + { 2, "IPSEC_AH" }, + { 3, "IPSEC_ESP" }, + { 4, "IPCOMP" }, + { 5, "GIGABEAM_RADIO" }, /* RFC4705 */ + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string protoid_v2_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "IKE" }, + { 2, "AH" }, + { 3, "ESP" }, + { 4, "FC_ESP_HEADER" }, + { 5, "FC_CT_AUTHENTICATION" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string payload_type[] = { + { PLOAD_IKE_NONE,PLOAD_IKE_NONE, "NONE / No Next Payload " }, + { PLOAD_IKE_SA,PLOAD_IKE_SA, "Security Association" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_P,PLOAD_IKE_P, "Proposal" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_T,PLOAD_IKE_T, "Transform" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_KE,PLOAD_IKE_KE, "Key Exchange" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_ID,PLOAD_IKE_ID, "Identification" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_CERT,PLOAD_IKE_CERT, "Certificate" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_CR,PLOAD_IKE_CR, "Certificate Request" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_HASH,PLOAD_IKE_HASH, "Hash" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_SIG,PLOAD_IKE_SIG, "Signature" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_NONCE,PLOAD_IKE_NONCE, "Nonce" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_N,PLOAD_IKE_N, "Notification" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_D,PLOAD_IKE_D, "Delete" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_VID,PLOAD_IKE_VID, "Vendor ID" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_A,PLOAD_IKE_A, "Attributes" }, /* draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-05.txt */ + { PLOAD_IKE_SAK,PLOAD_IKE_SAK, "SA KEK Payload" }, /* Reassigned with RFC3547; formerly: draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04 to 08 */ + { PLOAD_IKE_SAT,PLOAD_IKE_SAT, "SA TEK Payload"}, /* Reassigned with RFC3547; formerly: draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05 to 08*/ + { PLOAD_IKE_KD,PLOAD_IKE_KD, "Key Download" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_SEQ,PLOAD_IKE_SEQ, "Sequence Number" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_POP,PLOAD_IKE_POP, "Proof of Possession" }, /* According to RFC6407 deprecated */ + { PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D,PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D, "NAT-D (RFC 3947)" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA,PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA, "NAT-OA (RFC 3947)"}, + { PLOAD_IKE_GAP,PLOAD_IKE_GAP, "Group Associated Policy"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_SA,PLOAD_IKE2_SA, "Security Association"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_KE,PLOAD_IKE2_KE, "Key Exchange"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_IDI,PLOAD_IKE2_IDI, "Identification - Initiator"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_IDR,PLOAD_IKE2_IDR, "Identification - Responder"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_CERT,PLOAD_IKE2_CERT, "Certificate"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_CERTREQ,PLOAD_IKE2_CERTREQ, "Certificate Request"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_AUTH,PLOAD_IKE2_AUTH, "Authentication"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_NONCE,PLOAD_IKE2_NONCE, "Nonce"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_N,PLOAD_IKE2_N, "Notify"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_D,PLOAD_IKE2_D, "Delete"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_V,PLOAD_IKE2_V, "Vendor ID"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_TSI,PLOAD_IKE2_TSI, "Traffic Selector - Initiator"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_TSR,PLOAD_IKE2_TSR, "Traffic Selector - Responder"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_SK,PLOAD_IKE2_SK, "Encrypted and Authenticated"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_CP,PLOAD_IKE2_CP, "Configuration"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_EAP,PLOAD_IKE2_EAP, "Extensible Authentication"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_GSPM,PLOAD_IKE2_GSPM, "Generic Secure Password Method"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_IDG,PLOAD_IKE2_IDG, "Group Identification"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_GSA,PLOAD_IKE2_GSA, "Group Security Association"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_KD,PLOAD_IKE2_KD, "Key Download"}, + { PLOAD_IKE2_SKF,PLOAD_IKE2_SKF, "Encrypted and Authenticated Fragment"}, + { 54,127, "Unassigned" }, + { 128,129, "Private Use" }, + { PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D13,PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D13, "NAT-D (draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01 to 03)"}, + { PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA14,PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA14, "NAT-OA (draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01 to 03)"}, + { PLOAD_IKE_CISCO_FRAG,PLOAD_IKE_CISCO_FRAG, "Cisco-Fragmentation"}, + { 133,256, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + +/* + * ISAKMP Domain of Interpretation (DOI) + * RFC2408 for ISAKMP + * RFC2407 for IPSEC + * RFC3547 for GDOI + */ +static const value_string doi_type[] = { + { 0, "ISAKMP" }, + { 1, "IPSEC" }, + { 2, "GDOI" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +/* Transform Type */ + +#define IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE 1 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION 2 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_GROUP_DESC 3 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_ENCAP_MODE 4 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_AUTH_ALGORITHM 5 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH 6 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_ROUNDS 7 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_CMPR_DICT_SIZE 8 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_CMPR_ALGORITHM 9 +#define IPSEC_ATTR_ECN_TUNNEL 10 /* [RFC3168] */ +#define IPSEC_ATTR_EXT_SEQ_NBR 11 /* [RFC4304] */ +#define IPSEC_ATTR_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH 12 /* [RFC4359] */ +#define IPSEC_ATTR_SIG_ENCO_ALGORITHM 13 /* [RFC4359] */ +#define IPSEC_ATTR_ADDR_PRESERVATION 14 /* [RFC6407] */ +#define IPSEC_ATTR_SA_DIRECTION 15 /* [RFC6407] */ + +static const range_string ipsec_attr_type[] = { + { 1,1, "SA-Life-Type" }, + { 2,2, "SA-Life-Duration" }, + { 3,3, "Group-Description" }, + { 4,4, "Encapsulation-Mode" }, + { 5,5, "Authentication-Algorithm" }, + { 6,6, "Key-Length" }, + { 7,7, "Key-Rounds" }, + { 8,8, "Compress-Dictionary-Size" }, + { 9,9, "Compress-Private-Algorithm" }, + { 10,10, "ECN Tunnel" }, + { 11,11, "Extended (64-bit) Sequence Number" }, + { 12,12, "Authentication Key Length" }, + { 13,13, "Signature Encoding Algorithm" }, + { 14,14, "Address Preservation" }, + { 15,15, "SA Direction" }, + { 16,32000, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 32001,32767, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +#define KEY_ATTR_TEK_RSERVED 0 +#define KEY_ATTR_TEK_ALGORITHM 1 +#define KEY_ATTR_TEK_INTEGRITY 2 +#define KEY_ATTR_TEK_SRC_AUTH 3 + +static const range_string tek_key_attr_type[] = { + { 1,1, "TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY" }, + { 2,2, "TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY" }, + { 3,3, "TEK_SOURCE_AUTH_KEY" }, + { 4,137, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 128,255, "Private use" }, + { 256,32767, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +/* Transform IKE Type */ +#define IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 1 +#define IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM 2 +#define IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD 3 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION 4 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE 5 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME 6 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE 7 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO 8 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A 9 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B 10 +#define IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE 11 +#define IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION 12 +#define IKE_ATTR_PRF 13 +#define IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH 14 +#define IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE 15 +#define IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER 16 +#define IKE_ATTR_BLOCK_SIZE 17 +#define IKE_ATTR_ACAT 20 + + + +static const range_string ike_attr_type[] = { + { 1,1, "Encryption-Algorithm" }, + { 2,2, "Hash-Algorithm" }, + { 3,3, "Authentication-Method" }, + { 4,4, "Group-Description" }, + { 5,5, "Group-Type" }, + { 6,6, "Group-Prime" }, + { 7,7, "Group-Generator-One" }, + { 8,8, "Group-Generator-Two" }, + { 9,9, "Group-Curve-A" }, + { 10,10, "Group-Curve-B" }, + { 11,11, "Life-Type" }, + { 12,12, "Life-Duration" }, + { 13,13, "PRF" }, + { 14,14, "Key-Length" }, + { 15,15, "Field-Size" }, + { 16,16, "Group-Order" }, + { 17,17, "Block-Size" }, + { 18,19, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 20,20, "Asymmetric-Cryptographic-Algorithm-Type" }, + { 21,16383, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 16384,32767, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +#if 0 +static const value_string vs_v2_sttr[] = { + { 1, "SA-Life-Type" }, + { 2, "SA-Life-Duration" }, + { 3, "Group-Description" }, + { 4, "Encapsulation-Mode" }, + { 5, "Authentication-Algorithm" }, + { 6, "Key-Length" }, + { 7, "Key-Rounds" }, + { 8, "Compress-Dictionary-Size" }, + { 9, "Compress-Private-Algorithm" }, + { 10, "ECN Tunnel" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +#endif + +static const value_string vs_v1_trans_isakmp[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "KEY_IKE" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string vs_v1_trans_ah[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "RESERVED" }, + { 2, "MD5" }, + { 3, "SHA" }, + { 4, "DES" }, + { 5, "SHA2-256" }, + { 6, "SHA2-384" }, + { 7, "SHA2-512" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string vs_v1_trans_esp[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "DES-IV64" }, + { 2, "DES" }, + { 3, "3DES" }, + { 4, "RC5" }, + { 5, "IDEA" }, + { 6, "CAST" }, + { 7, "BLOWFISH" }, + { 8, "3IDEA" }, + { 9, "DES-IV32" }, + { 10, "RC4" }, + { 11, "NULL" }, + { 12, "AES" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string transform_id_ipcomp[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "OUI" }, + { 2, "DEFLATE" }, + { 3, "LZS" }, + { 4, "LZJH" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +static const value_string redirect_gateway_identity_type[] = { + { 1, "IPv4 address" }, + { 2, "IPv6 address" }, + { 3, "FQDN" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +static const value_string attr_life_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "Seconds" }, + { 2, "Kilobytes" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_encap_mode[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "Tunnel" }, + { 2, "Transport" }, + { 3, "UDP-Encapsulated-Tunnel" }, /* RFC3947 */ + { 4, "UDP-Encapsulated-Transport" }, /* RFC3947 */ + { 61440, "Check Point IPSec UDP Encapsulation" }, + { 61443, "UDP-Encapsulated-Tunnel (draft)" }, + { 61444, "UDP-Encapsulated-Transport (draft)" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_auth_algo[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "HMAC-MD5" }, + { 2, "HMAC-SHA" }, + { 3, "DES-MAC" }, + { 4, "KPDK" }, + { 5, "HMAC-SHA2-256" }, + { 6, "HMAC-SHA2-384" }, + { 7, "HMAC-SHA2-512" }, + { 8, "HMAC-RIPEMD" }, /* [RFC2857] */ + { 9, "AES-XCBC-MAC" }, /* [RFC3566] */ + { 10, "SIG-RSA" }, /* [RFC4359] */ + { 11, "AES-128-GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543][Errata1821] */ + { 12, "AES-192-GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543][Errata1821] */ + { 13, "AES-256-GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543][Errata1821] */ + +/* + Values 11-61439 are reserved to IANA. Values 61440-65535 are + for private use. +*/ + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ENC_DES_CBC 1 +#define ENC_IDEA_CBC 2 +#define ENC_BLOWFISH_CBC 3 +#define ENC_RC5_R16_B64_CBC 4 +#define ENC_3DES_CBC 5 +#define ENC_CAST_CBC 6 +#define ENC_AES_CBC 7 +#define ENC_CAMELLIA_CBC 8 +#define ENC_SM4_CBC_DEPRECATED 127 +#define ENC_SM1_CBC 128 +#define ENC_SM4_CBC 129 + +static const value_string ike_attr_enc_algo[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { ENC_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC" }, + { ENC_IDEA_CBC, "IDEA-CBC" }, + { ENC_BLOWFISH_CBC, "BLOWFISH-CBC" }, + { ENC_RC5_R16_B64_CBC, "RC5-R16-B64-CBC" }, + { ENC_3DES_CBC, "3DES-CBC" }, + { ENC_CAST_CBC, "CAST-CBC" }, + { ENC_AES_CBC, "AES-CBC" }, + { ENC_CAMELLIA_CBC, "CAMELLIA-CBC" }, + { ENC_SM4_CBC_DEPRECATED, "SM4-CBC (DEPRECATED)" }, + { ENC_SM1_CBC, "SM1-CBC" }, + { ENC_SM4_CBC, "SM4-CBC" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define HMAC_MD5 1 +#define HMAC_SHA 2 +#define HMAC_TIGER 3 +#define HMAC_SHA2_256 4 +#define HMAC_SHA2_384 5 +#define HMAC_SHA2_512 6 +#define HMAC_SM3 20 + +static const value_string ike_attr_hash_algo[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { HMAC_MD5, "MD5" }, + { HMAC_SHA, "SHA" }, + { HMAC_TIGER, "TIGER" }, + { HMAC_SHA2_256, "SHA2-256" }, + { HMAC_SHA2_384, "SHA2-384" }, + { HMAC_SHA2_512, "SHA2-512" }, + { HMAC_SM3, "SM3" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ASYMMETRIC_RSA 1 +#define ASYMMETRIC_SM2 2 + +static const value_string ike_attr_asym_algo[] = { + { ASYMMETRIC_RSA, "RSA" }, + { ASYMMETRIC_SM2, "SM2" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "Allowed" }, + { 2, "Forbidden" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "64-bit Sequence Number" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#if 0 +static const value_string transform_attr_sig_enco_algo_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5" }, + { 2, "RSASSA-PSS" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +#endif + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_addr_preservation[] = { + { 0, "Reserved" }, + { 1, "None" }, + { 2, "Source-Only" }, + { 3, "Destination-Only" }, + { 4, "Source-and-Destination" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_attr_sa_direction[] = { + { 0, "Reserved" }, + { 1, "Sender-Only" }, + { 2, "Receiver-Only" }, + { 3, "Symmetric" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ike_attr_authmeth[] = { + /* ipsec-registry.xhtml */ + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "Pre-shared key" }, + { 2, "DSS signatures" }, + { 3, "RSA signatures" }, + { 4, "Encryption with RSA" }, + { 5, "Revised encryption with RSA" }, + { 6, "Reserved (was Encryption with El-Gamal)" }, + { 7, "Reserved (was Revised encryption with El-Gamal)" }, + { 8, "Reserved (was ECDSA signatures)" }, + { 9, "ECDSA with SHA-256 on the P-256 curve" }, + { 10, "ECDSA with SHA-384 on the P-384 curve" }, + { 11, "ECDSA with SHA-512 on the P-521 curve" }, + /* draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05 */ + { 64221, "HybridInitRSA" }, + { 64222, "HybridRespRSA" }, + { 64223, "HybridInitDSS" }, + { 64224, "HybridRespDSS" }, + /* draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02 */ + { 65001, "XAUTHInitPreShared" }, + { 65002, "XAUTHRespPreShared" }, + { 65003, "XAUTHInitDSS" }, + { 65004, "XAUTHRespDSS" }, + { 65005, "XAUTHInitRSA" }, + { 65006, "XAUTHRespRSA" }, + { 65007, "XAUTHInitRSAEncryption" }, + { 65008, "XAUTHRespRSAEncryption" }, + { 65009, "XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption" }, + { 65010, "XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string dh_group[] = { + { 0, "UNDEFINED - 0" }, + { 1, "Default 768-bit MODP group" }, + { 2, "Alternate 1024-bit MODP group" }, + { 3, "EC2N group on GP[2^155] group" }, + { 4, "EC2N group on GP[2^185] group" }, + { 5, "1536 bit MODP group" }, + { 6, "EC2N group over GF[2^163]" }, + { 7, "EC2N group over GF[2^163]" }, + { 8, "EC2N group over GF[2^283]" }, + { 9, "EC2N group over GF[2^283]" }, + { 10, "EC2N group over GF[2^409]" }, + { 11, "EC2N group over GF[2^409]" }, + { 12, "EC2N group over GF[2^571]" }, + { 13, "EC2N group over GF[2^571]" }, + { 14, "2048 bit MODP group" }, + { 15, "3072 bit MODP group" }, + { 16, "4096 bit MODP group" }, + { 17, "6144 bit MODP group" }, + { 18, "8192 bit MODP group" }, + { 19, "256-bit random ECP group" }, + { 20, "384-bit random ECP group" }, + { 21, "521-bit random ECP group" }, + { 22, "1024-bit MODP Group with 160-bit Prime Order Subgroup" }, + { 23, "2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup" }, + { 24, "2048-bit MODP Group with 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup" }, + { 25, "192-bit Random ECP Group" }, + { 26, "224-bit Random ECP Group" }, + { 27, "224-bit Brainpool ECP group" }, + { 28, "256-bit Brainpool ECP group" }, + { 29, "384-bit Brainpool ECP group" }, + { 30, "512-bit Brainpool ECP group" }, + { 31, "Curve25519" }, + { 32, "Curve448" }, + { 33, "GOST3410_2012_256" }, + { 34, "GOST3410_2012_512" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ike_attr_grp_type[] = { + { 0, "UNDEFINED - 0" }, + { 1, "MODP" }, + { 2, "ECP" }, + { 3, "EC2N" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define TF_IKE2_ENCR 1 +#define TF_IKE2_PRF 2 +#define TF_IKE2_INTEG 3 +#define TF_IKE2_DH 4 +#define TF_IKE2_ESN 5 +static const range_string transform_ike2_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { TF_IKE2_ENCR,TF_IKE2_ENCR, "Encryption Algorithm (ENCR)" }, + { TF_IKE2_PRF,TF_IKE2_PRF, "Pseudo-random Function (PRF)"}, + { TF_IKE2_INTEG,TF_IKE2_INTEG,"Integrity Algorithm (INTEG)"}, + { TF_IKE2_DH,TF_IKE2_DH, "Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)"}, + { TF_IKE2_ESN,TF_IKE2_ESN, "Extended Sequence Numbers (ESN)"}, + { 6,240, "Reserved to IANA"}, + { 241,255, "Private Use"}, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; +/* For Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm), defined Transform IDs */ +static const value_string transform_ike2_encr_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "ENCR_DES_IV64" }, + { 2, "ENCR_DES" }, + { 3, "ENCR_3DES" }, + { 4, "ENCR_RC5" }, + { 5, "ENCR_IDEA" }, + { 6, "ENCR_CAST" }, + { 7, "ENCR_BLOWFISH" }, + { 8, "ENCR_3IDEA" }, + { 9, "ENCR_DES_IV32" }, + { 10, "RESERVED" }, + { 11, "ENCR_NULL" }, + { 12, "ENCR_AES_CBC" }, + { 13, "ENCR_AES_CTR" }, /* [RFC3686] */ + { 14, "ENCR_AES-CCM_8" }, /* [RFC4309] */ + { 15, "ENCR-AES-CCM_12" }, /* [RFC4309] */ + { 16, "ENCR-AES-CCM_16" }, /* [RFC4309] */ + { 17, "UNASSIGNED" }, + { 18, "AES-GCM with a 8 octet ICV" }, /* [RFC4106] */ + { 19, "AES-GCM with a 12 octet ICV" }, /* [RFC4106] */ + { 20, "AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV" }, /* [RFC4106] */ + { 21, "ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543] */ + { 22, "Reserved for IEEE P1619 XTS-AES" }, /* [Ball] */ + { 23, "ENCR_CAMELLIA_CBC" }, /* [RFC5529] */ + { 24, "ENCR_CAMELLIA_CTR" }, /* [RFC5529] */ + { 25, "ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with an 8-octet ICV" }, /* [RFC5529] */ + { 26, "ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with a 12-octet ICV" }, /* [RFC5529] */ + { 27, "ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with a 16-octet ICV" }, /* [RFC5529] */ + { 28, "ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, /* [RFC7634] */ +/* + * 29-1023 RESERVED TO IANA [RFC4306] + * 1024-65535 PRIVATE USE [RFC4306] + */ + { 0, NULL }, + }; + +/* For Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-random Function), defined Transform IDs */ +static const value_string transform_ike2_prf_type[] = { + { 0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1, "PRF_HMAC_MD5" }, + { 2, "PRF_HMAC_SHA1" }, + { 3, "PRF_HMAC_TIGER" }, + { 4, "PRF_AES128_CBC" }, + { 5, "PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256" }, /* [RFC4868] */ + { 6, "PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384" }, /* [RFC4868] */ + { 7, "PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512" }, /* [RFC4868] */ + { 8, "PRF_AES128_CMAC6" }, /* [RFC4615] */ +/* + 9-1023 RESERVED TO IANA [RFC4306] + 1024-65535 PRIVATE USE [RFC4306] +*/ + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +/* For Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm), defined Transform IDs */ +static const value_string transform_ike2_integ_type[] = { + { 0, "NONE" }, + { 1, "AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96" }, + { 2, "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" }, + { 3, "AUTH_DES_MAC" }, + { 4, "AUTH_KPDK_MD5" }, + { 5, "AUTH_AES_XCBC_96" }, + { 6, "AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128" }, /* [RFC4595] */ + { 7, "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160" }, /* [RFC4595] */ + { 8, "AUTH_AES_CMAC_96" }, /* [RFC4494] */ + { 9, "AUTH_AES_128_GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543] */ + { 10, "AUTH_AES_192_GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543] */ + { 11, "AUTH_AES_256_GMAC" }, /* [RFC4543] */ + { 12, "AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128" }, /* [RFC4868] */ + { 13, "AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192" }, /* [RFC4868] */ + { 14, "AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256" }, /* [RFC4868] */ +/* + 15-1023 RESERVED TO IANA [RFC4306] + 1024-65535 PRIVATE USE [RFC4306] +*/ + { 0, NULL }, +}; +/* For Transform Type 5 (Extended Sequence Numbers), defined Transform */ +static const value_string transform_ike2_esn_type[] = { + { 0, "No Extended Sequence Numbers" }, + { 1, "Extended Sequence Numbers" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +/* Transform IKE2 Type */ +#define IKE2_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH 14 + +static const range_string transform_ike2_attr_type[] = { + { 0,13, "Reserved" }, + { 14,14, "Key Length" }, + { 15,17, "Reserved" }, + { 18,16383, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 16384,32767, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string cert_v1_type[] = { + { 0,0, "NONE" }, + { 1,1, "PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate" }, + { 2,2, "PGP Certificate" }, + { 3,3, "DNS Signed Key" }, + { 4,4, "X.509 Certificate - Signature" }, + { 5,5, "X.509 Certificate - Key Exchange" }, + { 6,6, "Kerberos Tokens" }, + { 7,7, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL)" }, + { 8,8, "Authority Revocation List (ARL)" }, + { 9,9, "SPKI Certificate" }, + { 10,10, "X.509 Certificate - Attribute" }, + { 11,255, "RESERVED" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string cert_v2_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1,1, "PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate" }, + { 2,2, "PGP Certificate" }, + { 3,3, "DNS Signed Key" }, + { 4,4, "X.509 Certificate - Signature" }, + { 5,5, "*undefined by any document*" }, + { 6,6, "Kerberos Tokens" }, + { 7,7, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL)" }, + { 8,8, "Authority Revocation List (ARL)" }, + { 9,9, "SPKI Certificate" }, + { 10,10, "X.509 Certificate - Attribute" }, + { 11,11, "Raw RSA Key" }, + { 12,12, "Hash and URL of X.509 certificate" }, + { 13,13, "Hash and URL of X.509 bundle" }, + { 14,14, "OCSP Content" }, /* [RFC4806] */ + { 15,200, "RESERVED to IANA" }, + { 201,255, "PRIVATE USE" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +#define AUTH_METH_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 14 + +static const range_string authmeth_v2_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED TO IANA" }, + { 1,1, "RSA Digital Signature" }, + { 2,2, "Shared Key Message Integrity Code" }, + { 3,3, "DSS Digital Signature" }, + { 4,8, "RESERVED TO IANA" }, + { 9,9, "ECDSA with SHA-256 on the P-256 curve" }, /* RFC4754 */ + { 10,10, "ECDSA with SHA-384 on the P-384 curve" }, /* RFC4754 */ + { 11,11, "ECDSA with SHA-512 on the P-521 curve" }, /* RFC4754 */ + { 12,12, "Generic Secure Password Authentication Method" }, /* RFC6467 */ + { 13,13, "NULL Authentication" }, /* RFC7619 */ + { 14,14, "Digital Signature" }, /* RFC7427 */ + { 15,200, "RESERVED TO IANA" }, + { 201,255, "PRIVATE USE" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string notifmsg_v1_type[] = { + { 0,0, "<UNKNOWN>" }, + { 1,1, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE" }, + { 2,2, "DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED" }, + { 3,3, "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED" }, + { 4,4, "INVALID-COOKIE" }, + { 5,5, "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION" }, + { 6,6, "INVALID-MINOR-VERSION" }, + { 7,7, "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE" }, + { 8,8, "INVALID-FLAGS" }, + { 9,9, "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID" }, + { 10,10, "INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID" }, + { 11,11, "INVALID-SPI" }, + { 12,12, "INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID" }, + { 13,13, "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED" }, + { 14,14, "NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN" }, + { 15,15, "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX" }, + { 16,16, "PAYLOAD-MALFORMED" }, + { 17,17, "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION" }, + { 18,18, "INVALID-ID-INFORMATION" }, + { 19,19, "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING" }, + { 20,20, "INVALID-CERTIFICATE" }, + { 21,21, "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED" }, + { 22,22, "INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY" }, + { 23,23, "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION" }, + { 24,24, "AUTHENTICATION-FAILED" }, + { 25,25, "INVALID-SIGNATURE" }, + { 26,26, "ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION" }, + { 27,27, "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME" }, + { 28,28, "CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE" }, + { 29,29, "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE" }, + { 30,30, "UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS" }, + { 31,8191, "RESERVED (Future Use)" }, + { 8192,16383, "Private Use" }, + { 16384,16384,"CONNECTED" }, + { 16385,24575,"RESERVED (Future Use)" }, + { 24576,24576,"RESPONDER-LIFETIME" }, + { 24577,24577,"REPLAY-STATUS" }, + { 24578,24578,"INITIAL-CONTACT" }, + { 24579,32767,"DOI-specific codes" }, + { 32768,36135,"Private Use" }, + { 36136,36136,"R-U-THERE" }, + { 36137,36137,"R-U-THERE-ACK" }, + { 36138,40500,"Private Use" }, + { 40501,40501,"UNITY-LOAD-BALANCE" }, + { 40502,40502,"UNITY-UNKNOWN" }, + { 40503,40503,"UNITY-GROUP-HASH" }, + { 40503,40959,"Private Use" }, + { 40960,65535,"RESERVED (Future Use)" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string notifmsg_v2_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1,1, "UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD" }, + { 2,3, "RESERVED" }, + { 4,4, "INVALID_IKE_SPI" }, + { 5,5, "INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION" }, + { 6,6, "RESERVED" }, + { 7,7, "INVALID_SYNTAX" }, + { 8,8, "RESERVED" }, + { 9,9, "INVALID_MESSAGE_ID" }, + { 10,10, "RESERVED" }, + { 11,11, "INVALID_SPI" }, + { 12,13, "RESERVED" }, + { 14,14, "NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN" }, + { 15,16, "RESERVED" }, + { 17,17, "INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD" }, + { 24,24, "AUTHENTICATION_FAILED" }, + { 25,33, "RESERVED" }, + { 34,34, "SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED" }, + { 35,35, "NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS" }, + { 36,36, "INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE" }, + { 37,37, "FAILED_CP_REQUIRED" }, + { 38,38, "TS_UNACCEPTABLE" }, + { 39,39, "INVALID_SELECTORS" }, + { 40,40, "UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 41,41, "UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 42,42, "USE_ASSIGNED_HoA" }, /* RFC5026 */ + { 43,43, "TEMPORARY_FAILURE" }, /* RFC5996 */ + { 44,44, "CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND" }, /* RFC5996 */ + { 45,45, "INVALID_GROUP_ID" }, /* draft-yeung-g-ikev2 */ + { 46,46, "CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND" }, /* draft-yeung-g-ikev2 */ + { 47,8191, "RESERVED TO IANA - Error types" }, + { 8192,16383, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 16384,16384, "INITIAL_CONTACT" }, + { 16385,16385, "SET_WINDOW_SIZE" }, + { 16386,16386, "ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE" }, + { 16387,16387, "IPCOMP_SUPPORTED" }, + { 16388,16388, "NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP" }, + { 16389,16389, "NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP" }, + { 16390,16390, "COOKIE" }, + { 16391,16391, "USE_TRANSPORT_MODE" }, + { 16392,16392, "HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED" }, + { 16393,16393, "REKEY_SA" }, + { 16394,16394, "ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED" }, + { 16395,16395, "NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO" }, + { 16396,16396, "MOBIKE_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16397,16397, "ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16398,16398, "ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16399,16399, "NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16400,16400, "UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16401,16401, "COOKIE2" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16402,16402, "NO_NATS_ALLOWED" }, /* RFC4555 */ + { 16403,16403, "AUTH_LIFETIME" }, /* RFC4478 */ + { 16404,16404, "MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC4739 */ + { 16405,16405, "ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS" }, /* RFC4739 */ + { 16406,16406, "REDIRECT_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC5685 */ + { 16407,16407, "REDIRECT" }, /* RFC5685 */ + { 16408,16408, "REDIRECTED_FROM" }, /* RFC5685 */ + { 16409,16409, "TICKET_LT_OPAQUE" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 16410,16410, "TICKET_REQUEST" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 16411,16411, "TICKET_ACK" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 16412,16412, "TICKET_NACK" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 16413,16413, "TICKET_OPAQUE" }, /* RFC5723 */ + { 16414,16414, "LINK_ID" }, /* RFC5739 */ + { 16415,16415, "USE_WESP_MODE" }, /* RFC5840 */ + { 16416,16416, "ROHC_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC5857 */ + { 16417,16417, "EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION" }, /* RFC5998 */ + { 16418,16418, "CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC6023 */ + { 16419,16419, "QUICK_CRASH_DETECTION" }, /* RFC6290 */ + { 16420,16420, "IKEV2_MESSAGE_ID_SYNC_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC6311 */ + { 16421,16421, "IPSEC_REPLAY_COUNTER_SYNC_SUPPORTED" },/* RFC6311 */ + { 16422,16422, "IKEV2_MESSAGE_ID_SYNC" }, /* RFC6311 */ + { 16423,16423, "IPSEC_REPLAY_COUNTER_SYNC" }, /* RFC6311 */ + { 16424,16424, "SECURE_PASSWORD_METHODS" }, /* RFC6467 */ + { 16425,16425, "PSK_PERSIST" }, /* RFC6631 */ + { 16426,16426, "PSK_CONFIRM" }, /* RFC6631 */ + { 16427,16427, "ERX_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC6867 */ + { 16428,16428, "IFOM_CAPABILITY" }, /* [Frederic_Firmin][3GPP TS 24.303 v10.6.0 annex B.2] */ + { 16429,16429, "SENDER_REQUEST_ID" }, /* [draft-yeung-g-ikev2] */ + { 16430,16430, "IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED" }, /* RFC7383 */ + { 16431,16431, "SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS" }, /* RFC7427 */ + { 16432,40959, "RESERVED TO IANA - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 40960,65535, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +/* 3GPP private error and status types in Notify messages + * 3GPP TS 24.302 V16.0.0 (2019-03) + * 3GPP TS 24.502 V15.3.0 (2019-03) + * Note currently all private data types wil be decoded as 3GPP if that's not good enough a preference must be used + */ +static const range_string notifmsg_v2_3gpp_type[] = { + /* PRIVATE ERROR TYPES */ + { 8192,8192, "PDN_CONNECTION_REJECTION" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8193,8193, "MAX_CONNECTION_REACHED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8194,8240, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 8241,8241, "SEMANTIC_ERROR_IN_THE_TFT_OPERATION" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8242,8242, "SYNTACTICAL_ERROR_IN_THE_TFT_OPERATION" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8243,8243, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 8244,8244, "SEMANTIC_ERRORS_IN_PACKET_FILTERS" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8245,8245, "SYNTACTICAL_ERRORS_IN_PACKET_FILTERS" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 8246,8999, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 9000,9000, "NON_3GPP_ACCESS_TO_EPC_NOT_ALLOWED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 9001,9001, "USER_UNKNOWN" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 9002,9002, "NO_APN_SUBSCRIPTION" }, + { 9003,9003, "AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 9004,9005, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 9006,9006, "ILLEGAL_ME" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 9007,10499, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 10500,10500, "NETWORK_FAILURE" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 10501,11000, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 11001,11001, "RAT_TYPE_NOT_ALLOWED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 11002,11004, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 11005,11005, "IMEI_NOT_ACCEPTED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 11006,11010, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 11011,11011, "PLMN_NOT_ALLOWED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 11012,11054, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 11055,11055, "UNAUTHENTICATED_EMERGENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 11056,15499, "Private Use - Errors" }, + { 15500,15500, "CONGESTION" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 15501,16383, "Private Use - Errors" }, + /* PRIVATE STATUS TYPES */ + { 40960,40960, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 40961,40961, "REACTIVATION_REQUESTED_CAUSE" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 40962,41040, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41041,41041, "BACKOFF_TIMER" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41042,41049, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41050,41050, "PDN_TYPE_IPv4_ONLY_ALLOWED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41051,41051, "PDN_TYPE_IPv6_ONLY_ALLOWED" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41052,41100, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41101,41101, "DEVICE_IDENTITY" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41102,41111, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41112,41112, "EMERGENCY_SUPPORT" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41113,41133, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41134,41134, "EMERGENCY_CALL_NUMBERS" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41135,41287, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41288,41288, "NBIFOM_GENERIC_CONTAINER" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41289,41303, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41304,41304, "P-CSCF_RESELECTION_SUPPORT" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41305,41500, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 41501,41501, "PTI" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 41502,42010, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 42011,42011, "P-IKEV2_MULTIPLE_BEARER_PDN_CONNECTIVITY" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42012,42013, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 42014,42014, "P-EPS_QOS" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42015,42015, "P-EXTENDED_EPS_QOS" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42016,42016, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 42017,42017, "P-TFT" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42018,42019, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 42020,42020, "P-MODIFIED_BEARER" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42021,42093, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 42094,42094, "P-APN_AMBR" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42095,42095, "P-EXTENDED_APN_AMBR" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 42096,51014, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 51015,51015, "P-N1_MODE_CAPABILITY" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 51016,51114, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 51115,51115, "P-N1_MODE_INFORMATION" }, /* TS 24.302 */ + { 51116,55500, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 55501,55501, "5G_QOS_INFO" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55502,55502, "NAS_IP4_ADDRESS" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55503,55503, "NAS_IP6_ADDRESS" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55504,55504, "UP_IP4_ADDRESS" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55505,55505, "UP_IP6_ADDRESS" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55506,55506, "NAS_TCP_PORT" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55507,55507, "N3GPP_BACKOFF_TIMER" }, /* TS 24.502 */ + { 55508,61471, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 61472,61472, "Auto-Discovery Sender (Fortinet)" }, + { 61473,61473, "Auto-Discovery Receiver (Fortinet)" }, + { 61474,61519, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 61520,61520, "Network Overlay ID (Fortinet" }, + { 61521,65535, "Private Use - STATUS TYPES" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string vs_v1_cfgtype[] = { + { 0,0, "Reserved" }, + { 1,1, "ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST" }, + { 2,2, "ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY" }, + { 3,3, "ISAKMP_CFG_SET" }, + { 4,4, "ISAKMP_CFG_ACK" }, + { 5,127, "Future use" }, + { 128,256, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + + +static const range_string vs_v2_cfgtype[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1,1, "CFG_REQUEST" }, + { 2,2, "CFG_REPLY" }, + { 3,3, "CFG_SET" }, + { 4,4, "CFG_ACK" }, + { 5,127, "Future use" }, + { 128,256, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + +static const range_string vs_v1_cfgattr[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1,1, "INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS" }, + { 2,2, "INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK" }, + { 3,3, "INTERNAL_IP4_DNS" }, + { 4,4, "INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS" }, + { 5,5, "INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY" }, + { 6,6, "INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP" }, + { 7,7, "APPLICATION_VERSION" }, + { 8,8, "INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS" }, + { 9,9, "INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK" }, + { 10,10, "INTERNAL_IP6_DNS" }, + { 11,11, "INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS" }, + { 12,12, "INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP" }, + { 13,13, "INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET" }, + { 14,14, "SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES" }, + { 15,15, "INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET" }, + { 16,16383, "FUTURE USE"}, + { 16384,16386, "PRIVATE USE"}, + { 16387,16387, "CHKPT_DEF_DOMAIN" }, + { 16388,16388, "CHKPT_MAC_ADDRESS" }, + { 16389,16389, "CHKPT_MARCIPAN_REASON_CODE" }, + { 16400,16400, "CHKPT_UNKNOWN1" }, + { 16401,16401, "CHKPT_UNKNOWN2" }, + { 16402,16402, "CHKPT_UNKNOWN3" }, + { 16403,16519, "PRIVATE USE"}, + { 16520,16520, "XAUTH_TYPE" }, + { 16521,16521, "XAUTH_USER_NAME" }, + { 16522,16522, "XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD" }, + { 16523,16523, "XAUTH_PASSCODE" }, + { 16524,16524, "XAUTH_MESSAGE" }, + { 16525,16525, "XAUTH_CHALLANGE" }, + { 16526,16526, "XAUTH_DOMAIN" }, + { 16527,16527, "XAUTH_STATUS" }, + { 16528,16528, "XAUTH_NEXT_PIN" }, + { 16529,16529, "XAUTH_ANSWER" }, + { 16530,28671, "PRIVATE USE"}, + { 28672,28672, "UNITY_BANNER" }, + { 28673,28673, "UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD" }, + { 28674,28674, "UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN" }, + { 28675,28675, "UNITY_SPLIT_DOMAIN" }, + { 28676,28676, "UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE" }, + { 28677,28677, "UNITY_NATT_PORT" }, + { 28678,28678, "UNITY_SPLIT_EXCLUDE" }, + { 28679,28679, "UNITY_PFS" }, + { 28680,28680, "UNITY_FW_TYPE" }, + { 28681,28681, "UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS" }, + { 28682,28682, "UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME" }, + { 28683,32767, "PRIVATE USE"}, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + +static const range_string vs_v2_cfgattr[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { 1,1, "INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS" }, + { 2,2, "INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK" }, + { 3,3, "INTERNAL_IP4_DNS" }, + { 4,4, "INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS" }, + { 5,5, "INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY" }, /* OBSO */ + { 6,6, "INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP" }, + { 7,7, "APPLICATION_VERSION" }, + { 8,8, "INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS" }, + { 9,9, "RESERVED" }, + { 10,10, "INTERNAL_IP6_DNS" }, + { 11,11, "INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS" }, /* OBSO */ + { 12,12, "INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP" }, + { 13,13, "INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET" }, + { 14,14, "SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES" }, + { 15,15, "INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET" }, + { 16,16, "MIP6_HOME_PREFIX" }, + { 17,17, "INTERNAL_IP6_LINK" }, + { 18,18, "INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX" }, + { 19,19, "HOME_AGENT_ADDRESS" }, /* 3GPP TS 24.302 http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/24302.htm */ + { 20,20, "P_CSCF_IP4_ADDRESS" }, /* 3GPP IMS Option for IKEv2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gundavelli-ipsecme-3gpp-ims-options/ */ + { 21,21, "P_CSCF_IP6_ADDRESS" }, + { 22,22, "FTT_KAT" }, + { 23,16383, "RESERVED TO IANA"}, + { 16384,32767, "PRIVATE USE"}, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + +static const range_string cfgattr_xauth_type[] = { + { 0,0, "Generic" }, + { 1,1, "RADIUS-CHAP" }, + { 2,2, "OTP" }, + { 3,3, "S/KEY" }, + { 4,32767, "Future use" }, + { 32768,65535, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; + + +static const value_string cfgattr_xauth_status[] = { + { 0, "Fail" }, + { 1, "Success" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string cp_product[] = { + { 1, "Firewall-1" }, + { 2, "SecuRemote/SecureClient" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string cp_version[] = { + { 2,"4.1" }, + { 3,"4.1 SP-1" }, + { 4002,"4.1 (SP-2 or above)" }, + { 5000,"NG" }, + { 5001,"NG Feature Pack 1" }, + { 5002,"NG Feature Pack 2" }, + { 5003,"NG Feature Pack 3" }, + { 5004,"NG with Application Intelligence" }, + { 5005,"NG with Application Intelligence R55" }, + { 5006,"NG with Application Intelligence R56" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; +static const range_string traffic_selector_type[] = { + { 0,6, "Reserved" }, + { 7,7, "TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE" }, + { 8,8, "TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE" }, + { 9,9, "TS_FC_ADDR_RANGE" }, + { 10,240, "Future use" }, + { 241,255, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; +static const value_string ms_nt5_isakmpoakley_type[] = { + { 2, "Windows 2000" }, + { 3, "Windows XP SP1" }, + { 4, "Windows 2003 and Windows XP SP2" }, + { 5, "Windows Vista" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; +static const range_string vs_v1_id_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR,IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR, "IPV4_ADDR" }, + { IKE_ID_FQDN,IKE_ID_FQDN, "FQDN" }, + { IKE_ID_USER_FQDN,IKE_ID_USER_FQDN, "USER_FQDN" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET,IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, "IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR,IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR, "IPV6_ADDR" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET,IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET, "IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE,IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, "IPV4_ADDR_RANGE" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE,IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE, "IPV6_ADDR_RANGE" }, + { IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN,IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN, "DER_ASN1_DN" }, + { IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_GN,IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_GN, "DER_ASN1_GN" }, + { IKE_ID_KEY_ID,IKE_ID_KEY_ID, "KEY_ID" }, + { IKE_ID_LIST,IKE_ID_LIST, "KEY_LIST" }, + { 13,248, "Future use" }, + { 249,255, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; +static const range_string vs_v2_id_type[] = { + { 0,0, "RESERVED" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR,IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR, "IPV4_ADDR" }, + { IKE_ID_FQDN,IKE_ID_FQDN, "FQDN" }, + { IKE_ID_RFC822_ADDR,IKE_ID_RFC822_ADDR, "ID_RFC822_ADDR" }, + { 4,4, "Unassigned" }, + { IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR,IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR, "IPV6_ADDR" }, + { 6,8, "Unassigned" }, + { IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN,IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN, "DER_ASN1_DN" }, + { IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_GN,IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_GN, "DER_ASN1_GN" }, + { IKE_ID_KEY_ID,IKE_ID_KEY_ID, "KEY_ID" }, + { IKE_ID_FC_NAME,IKE_ID_FC_NAME, "KEY_LIST" }, + { 13,200, "Future use" }, + { 201,255, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, + }; +#define COOKIE_SIZE 8 + +typedef struct isakmp_hdr { + guint8 next_payload; + guint8 version; + guint8 exch_type; + guint8 flags; +#define E_FLAG 0x01 +#define C_FLAG 0x02 +#define A_FLAG 0x04 +#define I_FLAG 0x08 +#define V_FLAG 0x10 +#define R_FLAG 0x20 + guint32 message_id; + guint32 length; +} isakmp_hdr_t; + +static const true_false_string attribute_format = { + "Type/Value (TV)", + "Type/Length/Value (TLV)" +}; +static const true_false_string flag_e = { + "Encrypted", + "Not encrypted" +}; +static const true_false_string flag_c = { + "Commit", + "No commit" +}; +static const true_false_string flag_a = { + "Authentication", + "No authentication" +}; +static const true_false_string flag_i = { + "Initiator", + "Responder" +}; +static const true_false_string flag_v = { + "A higher version enabled", + "No higher version" +}; + + +/* ROHC Attribute Type RFC5857 */ + +#define ROHC_MAX_CID 1 +#define ROHC_PROFILE 2 +#define ROHC_INTEG 3 +#define ROHC_ICV_LEN 4 +#define ROHC_MRRU 5 + +static const range_string rohc_attr_type[] = { + { 1,1, "Maximum Context Identifier (MAX_CID)" }, + { 2,2, "ROHC Profile (ROHC_PROFILE)" }, + { 3,3, "ROHC Integrity Algorithm (ROHC_INTEG)" }, + { 4,4, "ROHC ICV Length in bytes (ROHC_ICV_LEN)" }, + { 5,5, "Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit (MRRU)" }, + { 6,16383, "Unassigned (Future use)" }, + { 16384,32767, "Private use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string signature_hash_algorithms[] = { + { 0,0, "Reserved" }, + { 1,1, "SHA1" }, + { 2,2, "SHA2-256" }, + { 3,3, "SHA2-384" }, + { 4,4, "SHA2-512" }, + { 5,5, "Identity" }, + { 6,1023, "Unassigned" }, + { 1024,65535, "Reserved for Private Use" }, + {0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string sat_protocol_ids[] = { + { 0,0, "Reserved" }, + { 1,1, "GDOI_PROTO_IPSEC_ESP" }, + { 2,2, "GDOI_PROTO_IPSEC_AH" }, + { 3,127, "Unassigned" }, + { 128, 255, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const range_string key_download_types[] = { + { 0,0, "Reserved" }, + { 1,1, "TEK" }, + { 2,2, "KEK" }, + { 3,3, "LKH" }, + { 4,4, "SID" }, + { 5,127, "Unassigned" }, + { 128, 255, "Private Use" }, + { 0,0, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string device_identity_types[] = { + { 0x01, "IMEI" }, + { 0x02, "IMEISV" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE ((int)sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) + (2 * COOKIE_SIZE)) + + +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 256 +#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN 32 + +#define PINFO_CBC_IV 1 + +#define DECR_PARAMS_INIT 0 +#define DECR_PARAMS_READY 1 +#define DECR_PARAMS_FAIL 2 + +typedef struct _ikev1_uat_data_key { + guchar *icookie; + guint icookie_len; + guchar *key; + guint key_len; +} ikev1_uat_data_key_t; + +typedef struct decrypt_data { + gboolean is_psk; + address initiator; + guint ike_encr_alg; + guint ike_encr_keylen; + guint ike_hash_alg; + gint cipher_algo; + gsize cipher_keylen; + gsize cipher_blklen; + gint digest_algo; + guint digest_len; + guint group; + gchar *gi; + guint gi_len; + gchar *gr; + guint gr_len; + guchar secret[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + guint secret_len; + GHashTable *iv_hash; + guint state; +} decrypt_data_t; + +/* IKEv1: Lookup from Initiator-SPI -> decrypt_data_t* */ +static GHashTable *isakmp_hash = NULL; + +static ikev1_uat_data_key_t* ikev1_uat_data = NULL; +static uat_t * ikev1_uat = NULL; +static guint num_ikev1_uat_data = 0; + +/* Specifications of encryption algorithms for IKEv2 decryption */ +typedef struct _ikev2_encr_alg_spec { + guint number; + /* Length of encryption key */ + guint key_len; + /* Block size of the cipher */ + guint block_len; + /* Length of initialization vector */ + guint iv_len; + /* Encryption algorithm ID to be passed to gcry_cipher_open() */ + gint gcry_alg; + /* Cipher mode to be passed to gcry_cipher_open() */ + gint gcry_mode; + + /* Salt length used in AEAD (GCM/CCM) mode. Salt value is last salt_len bytes of encr_key. + * IV for decryption is the result of concatenating salt value and iv_len bytes of iv. + * For non-AED ciphers salt_len 0 */ + guint salt_len; + /* Authenticated Encryption TAG length (ICV) - length of data taken from end of encrypted output + * used for integrity checksum, computed during decryption (for AEAD ciphers)*/ + guint icv_len; + +} ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t; + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_NULL 1 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_3DES 2 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_128 3 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_192 4 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_256 5 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_128 6 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_192 7 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_256 8 + +/* AEAD algorithms. Require gcrypt_version >= 1.6.0 if integrity verification shall be performed */ +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_16 101 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_16 102 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_16 103 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_8 104 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_8 105 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_8 106 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_12 107 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_12 108 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_12 109 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_16 111 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_16 112 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_16 113 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_8 114 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_8 115 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_8 116 + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_12 117 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_12 118 +#define IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_12 119 + + +static ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t ikev2_encr_algs[] = { + {IKEV2_ENCR_NULL, 0, 1, 0, GCRY_CIPHER_NONE, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_3DES, 24, 8, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_3DES, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_128, 16, 16, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_192, 24, 16, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_256, 32, 16, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0, 0}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_128, 20, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 4, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_192, 28, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 4, 0}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_256, 36, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 4, 0}, + + /* GCM algorithms: key length: aes-length + 4 bytes of IV (salt), iv - 8 bytes */ + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_16, 20, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 16}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_16, 28, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 16}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_16, 36, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 16}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_8, 20, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 8}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_8, 28, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 8}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_8, 36, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 8}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_12, 20, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 12}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_12, 28, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 12}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_12, 36, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 4, 12}, + + /* CCM algorithms: key length: aes-length + 3 bytes of salt, iv - 8 bytes */ + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_16, 19, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 16}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_16, 27, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 16}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_16, 35, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 16}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_8, 19, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 8}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_8, 27, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 8}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_8, 35, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 8}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_12, 19, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 12}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_12, 27, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 12}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_12, 35, 1, 8, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 3, 12}, + + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} +}; + +/* + * Specifications of authentication algorithms for + * decryption and/or ICD (Integrity Checksum Data) checking of IKEv2 + */ +typedef struct _ikev2_auth_alg_spec { + guint number; + /* Output length of the hash algorithm */ + guint output_len; + /* Length of the hash key */ + guint key_len; + /* Actual ICD length after truncation */ + guint trunc_len; + /* Hash algorithm ID to be passed to gcry_md_open() */ + gint gcry_alg; + /* Flags to be passed to gcry_md_open() */ + guint gcry_flag; +} ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t; + +#define IKEV2_AUTH_NONE 1 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 2 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 3 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96 4 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 5 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192 6 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 7 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_96BITS 8 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_128BITS 9 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_160BITS 10 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_192BITS 11 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_256BITS 12 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_64BITS 13 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128 14 +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 15 + +static ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t ikev2_auth_algs[] = { +/*{number, output_len, key_len, trunc_len, gcry_alg, gcry_flag}*/ + {IKEV2_AUTH_NONE, 0, 0, 0, GCRY_MD_NONE, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, 16, 16, 12, GCRY_MD_MD5, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, 20, 20, 12, GCRY_MD_SHA1, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128, 16, 16, 16, GCRY_MD_MD5, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160, 20, 20, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96, 32, 32, 12, GCRY_MD_SHA256, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, 32, 32, 16, GCRY_MD_SHA256, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192, 48, 48, 24, GCRY_MD_SHA384, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256, 64, 64, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA512, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_96BITS, 0, 0, 12, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_128BITS, 0, 0, 16, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_160BITS, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_192BITS, 0, 0, 24, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_256BITS, 0, 0, 32, 0, 0}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_64BITS, 0, 0, 8, 0, 0}, + + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} +}; + +typedef struct _ikev2_decrypt_data { + guchar *encr_key; + guchar *auth_key; + ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t *encr_spec; + ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t *auth_spec; +} ikev2_decrypt_data_t; + +typedef struct _ikev2_uat_data_key { + guchar *spii; + guint spii_len; + guchar *spir; + guint spir_len; +} ikev2_uat_data_key_t; + +typedef struct _ikev2_uat_data { + ikev2_uat_data_key_t key; + guint encr_alg; + guint auth_alg; + guchar *sk_ei; + guint sk_ei_len; + guchar *sk_er; + guint sk_er_len; + guchar *sk_ai; + guint sk_ai_len; + guchar *sk_ar; + guint sk_ar_len; + ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t *encr_spec; + ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t *auth_spec; +} ikev2_uat_data_t; + +static ikev2_uat_data_t* ikev2_uat_data = NULL; +static guint num_ikev2_uat_data = 0; +static uat_t* ikev2_uat; + +/* IKEv2: (I-SPI, R-SPI) -> ikev2_uat_data_t* */ +static GHashTable *ikev2_key_hash = NULL; + +#define IKEV2_ENCR_3DES_STR "3DES [RFC2451]" +static const value_string vs_ikev2_encr_algs[] = { + {IKEV2_ENCR_3DES, IKEV2_ENCR_3DES_STR}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_128, "AES-CBC-128 [RFC3602]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_192, "AES-CBC-192 [RFC3602]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CBC_256, "AES-CBC-256 [RFC3602]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_NULL, "NULL [RFC2410]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_128, "AES-CTR-128 [RFC5930]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_192, "AES-CTR-192 [RFC5930]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CTR_256, "AES-CTR-256 [RFC5930]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_16, "AES-GCM-128 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_16, "AES-GCM-192 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_16, "AES-GCM-256 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_8, "AES-GCM-128 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_8, "AES-GCM-192 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_8, "AES-GCM-256 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_12, "AES-GCM-128 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_192_12, "AES-GCM-192 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_12, "AES-GCM-256 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_16, "AES-CCM-128 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_16, "AES-CCM-192 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_16, "AES-CCM-256 with 16 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_8, "AES-CCM-128 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_8, "AES-CCM-192 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_8, "AES-CCM-256 with 8 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_12, "AES-CCM-128 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_192_12, "AES-CCM-192 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + {IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_12, "AES-CCM-256 with 12 octet ICV [RFC5282]"}, + + {0, NULL} +}; + +#define IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96_STR "HMAC_SHA1_96 [RFC2404]" +static const value_string vs_ikev2_auth_algs[] = { + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, "HMAC_MD5_96 [RFC2403]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96_STR}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_128, "HMAC_MD5_128 [RFC4595]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160, "HMAC_SHA1_160 [RFC4595]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96, "HMAC_SHA2_256_96 [draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, "HMAC_SHA2_256_128 [RFC4868]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192, "HMAC_SHA2_384_192 [RFC4868]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256, "HMAC_SHA2_512_256 [RFC4868]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_NONE, "NONE [RFC4306]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_64BITS, "ANY 64-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_96BITS, "ANY 96-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_128BITS, "ANY 128-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_160BITS, "ANY 160-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_192BITS, "ANY 192-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {IKEV2_AUTH_ANY_256BITS, "ANY 256-bits of Authentication [No Checking]"}, + {0, NULL} +}; + +static ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t* ikev2_decrypt_find_encr_spec(guint num) { + ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t *e; + + for (e = ikev2_encr_algs; e->number != 0; e++) { + if (e->number == num) { + return e; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +static ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t* ikev2_decrypt_find_auth_spec(guint num) { + ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t *a; + + for (a = ikev2_auth_algs; a->number != 0; a++) { + if (a->number == num) { + return a; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +static gint ikev1_find_gcry_cipher_algo(guint ike_cipher, guint ike_keylen) { + switch(ike_cipher) { + case ENC_3DES_CBC: + return GCRY_CIPHER_3DES; + + case ENC_DES_CBC: + return GCRY_CIPHER_DES; + + case ENC_AES_CBC: + switch (ike_keylen) { + case 128: + return GCRY_CIPHER_AES128; + case 192: + return GCRY_CIPHER_AES192; + case 256: + return GCRY_CIPHER_AES256; + } + return GCRY_CIPHER_NONE; + } + return GCRY_CIPHER_NONE; +} + +static gint ikev1_find_gcry_md_algo(guint ike_hash) { + switch(ike_hash) { + case HMAC_MD5: + return GCRY_MD_MD5; + case HMAC_SHA: + return GCRY_MD_SHA1; + case HMAC_SHA2_256: + return GCRY_MD_SHA256; + case HMAC_SHA2_384: + return GCRY_MD_SHA384; + case HMAC_SHA2_512: + return GCRY_MD_SHA512; + } + return GCRY_MD_NONE; +} + +static gpointer +generate_iv(const gpointer b1, gsize b1_len, + const gpointer b2, gsize b2_len, + gint md_algo, gsize iv_len) { + + gcry_md_hd_t md_ctx; + gpointer iv; + + if (gcry_md_open(&md_ctx, md_algo, 0) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR) + return NULL; + + gcry_md_write(md_ctx, b1, b1_len); + gcry_md_write(md_ctx, b2, b2_len); + + iv = wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), iv_len); + memcpy(iv, gcry_md_read(md_ctx, md_algo), iv_len); + gcry_md_close(md_ctx); + + return iv; +} + +/* Get the IV previously stored for the current message ID, + * or create a new IV if the message ID was not seen before. + * The caller owns the result and does not need to copy it. + * This function may return NULL. + */ +static gpointer +get_iv(guint32 message_id, decrypt_data_t *decr) { + gpointer iv, iv1; + gsize cipher_blklen; + gpointer msgid_key; + guint32 msgid_net; + gboolean found; + + cipher_blklen = decr->cipher_blklen; + + /* Get the current IV for the given message ID, + * and remove it from the hash table without destroying it. */ + msgid_key = GINT_TO_POINTER(message_id); + found = g_hash_table_lookup_extended(decr->iv_hash, msgid_key, NULL, &iv); + if (found) { + g_hash_table_steal(decr->iv_hash, msgid_key); + return iv; + } + + /* No IV for this message ID was found; a new phase has started. + * Generate the first IV for it from its message ID and the current + * phase 1 IV. The phase 1 IV always exists in the hash table + * and is not NULL. + */ + iv1 = g_hash_table_lookup(decr->iv_hash, GINT_TO_POINTER(0)); + msgid_net = g_htonl(message_id); + iv = generate_iv(iv1, cipher_blklen, + &msgid_net, sizeof(msgid_net), + decr->digest_algo, cipher_blklen); + return iv; +} + +/* Fill in the next IV from the final ciphertext block. */ +static void +set_next_iv(const guint8 *buf, guint buf_len, guint32 message_id, decrypt_data_t *decr) { + gpointer iv; + gsize cipher_blklen; + gpointer msgid_key; + + cipher_blklen = decr->cipher_blklen; + + if (buf_len < cipher_blklen) { + iv = NULL; + } else { + iv = wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), cipher_blklen); + memcpy(iv, buf + buf_len - cipher_blklen, cipher_blklen); + } + + msgid_key = GINT_TO_POINTER(message_id); + g_hash_table_insert(decr->iv_hash, msgid_key, iv); +} + +static void +update_ivs(packet_info *pinfo, const guint8 *buf, guint buf_len, guint32 message_id, decrypt_data_t *decr) { + gpointer iv; + + /* Get the current IV and store it as per-packet data. */ + iv = get_iv(message_id, decr); + p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_isakmp, PINFO_CBC_IV, iv); + + set_next_iv(buf, buf_len, message_id, decr); +} + +static gboolean +prepare_decrypt_params(decrypt_data_t *decr) { + decr->cipher_algo = ikev1_find_gcry_cipher_algo(decr->ike_encr_alg, + decr->ike_encr_keylen); + decr->digest_algo = ikev1_find_gcry_md_algo(decr->ike_hash_alg); + + if (decr->cipher_algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE || + decr->digest_algo == GCRY_MD_NONE) + return FALSE; + + decr->cipher_keylen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(decr->cipher_algo); + decr->cipher_blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(decr->cipher_algo); + decr->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(decr->digest_algo); + + if (decr->secret_len < decr->cipher_keylen || + decr->digest_len < decr->cipher_blklen) + return FALSE; + + if (decr->gi_len == 0 || decr->gr_len == 0) + return FALSE; + + return TRUE; +} + +/* Generate phase 1 IV from DH values + * and store it into the IV hash table. */ +static gboolean +prepare_phase1_iv(decrypt_data_t *decr) { + gpointer iv; + + iv = generate_iv(decr->gi, decr->gi_len, + decr->gr, decr->gr_len, + decr->digest_algo, decr->cipher_blklen); + if (!iv) + return FALSE; + + g_hash_table_insert(decr->iv_hash, GINT_TO_POINTER(0), iv); + return TRUE; +} + +static gboolean +prepare_decrypt(decrypt_data_t *decr) { + gboolean result; + + if (!decr) + return FALSE; + + if (decr->state == DECR_PARAMS_INIT) { + /* Short-circuit evaluation is intended. */ + result = prepare_decrypt_params(decr) && + prepare_phase1_iv(decr); + decr->state = result ? DECR_PARAMS_READY : DECR_PARAMS_FAIL; + } + + return (decr->state == DECR_PARAMS_READY); +} + +static decrypt_data_t * +create_decrypt_data(void) { + decrypt_data_t *decr; + + decr = (decrypt_data_t *)g_slice_alloc(sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); + memset(decr, 0, sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); + decr->iv_hash = g_hash_table_new(NULL, NULL); + clear_address(&decr->initiator); + + return decr; +} + +static tvbuff_t * +decrypt_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, const guint8 *buf, guint buf_len, decrypt_data_t *decr) { + guint8 *decrypted_data; + gcry_cipher_hd_t decr_ctx; + tvbuff_t *encr_tvb; + gpointer iv; + gboolean error; + + if (buf_len < decr->cipher_blklen) + return NULL; + + iv = p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_isakmp, PINFO_CBC_IV); + if (!iv) + return NULL; + + if (gcry_cipher_open(&decr_ctx, decr->cipher_algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR) + return NULL; + + decrypted_data = (guint8 *)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, buf_len); + + /* Short-circuit evaluation is intended. */ + error = gcry_cipher_setiv(decr_ctx, iv, decr->cipher_blklen) || + gcry_cipher_setkey(decr_ctx, decr->secret, decr->secret_len) || + gcry_cipher_decrypt(decr_ctx, decrypted_data, buf_len, buf, buf_len); + + gcry_cipher_close(decr_ctx); + if (error) + return NULL; + + encr_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, decrypted_data, buf_len, buf_len); + + /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */ + add_new_data_source(pinfo, encr_tvb, "Decrypted IKE"); + + return encr_tvb; +} + +static proto_tree *dissect_payload_header(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, int, guint8, + guint8 *, guint16 *, proto_tree *); + +static void dissect_sa(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, packet_info *, gboolean, void*); +static void dissect_proposal(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, void*); +static void dissect_transform(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, int, void*); +static void dissect_key_exch(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, packet_info *, void*); +static void dissect_id_type(tvbuff_t *, int, int, guint8, proto_tree *, proto_item *, packet_info *); +static void dissect_id(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, packet_info *); +static void dissect_cert(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, packet_info *); +static void dissect_certreq(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, packet_info *); +static void dissect_auth(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_hash(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_sig(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_nonce(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_notif(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *, int); +static void dissect_delete(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int); +static int dissect_vid(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_config(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *, int, gboolean); +static void dissect_sa_kek(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_sa_tek(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_key_download(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *, int); +static void dissect_sequence(tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_nat_discovery(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree * ); +static void dissect_nat_original_address(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, int ); +static void dissect_ts_payload(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static tvbuff_t * dissect_enc(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, packet_info *, guint8, gboolean, void*, gboolean); +static void dissect_eap(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, packet_info *); +static void dissect_gspm(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *); +static void dissect_cisco_fragmentation(tvbuff_t *, int, int, proto_tree *, packet_info *); + +/* State of current fragmentation within a conversation */ +typedef struct ikev2_fragmentation_state_t { + guint32 message_id; + guint8 next_payload; +} ikev2_fragmentation_state_t; + +/* frame_number -> next_payload. The key will be the frame that completes the original message */ +static GHashTable *defrag_next_payload_hash = NULL; + +static void dissect_ikev2_fragmentation(tvbuff_t *, int, proto_tree *, packet_info *, guint32 message_id, guint8 next_payload, + gboolean is_request, void* decr_info); + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_0[] = { /* Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.0 */ + 0xfB, 0xF4, 0x76, 0x14, 0x98, 0x40, 0x31, 0xFA, + 0x8E, 0x3B, 0xB6, 0x19, 0x80, 0x89, 0xB2, 0x23 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_1[] = { /* Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.1 */ + 0x19, 0x52, 0xDC, 0x91, 0xAC, 0x20, 0xF6, 0x46, + 0xFB, 0x01, 0xCF, 0x42, 0xA3, 0x3A, 0xEE, 0x30 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_2[] = { /* Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.2 */ + 0xE8, 0xBF, 0xFA, 0x64, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0x2C, + 0xD1, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0x73, 0x70, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0xE5 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_1[] = { /* Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.1 */ + 0xC1, 0x11, 0x1B, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x3D, + 0x62, 0x05, 0x73, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xCB +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_2[] = { /* Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.2 */ + 0x09, 0xEC, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xBC, 0x09, 0xC7, 0x58, + 0x23, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0xBF, 0xFE, 0x56, 0x5A, 0x2E +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_0_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.0.0 */ + 0x7F, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x96, 0xE4, 0xE3, 0x18, 0xF0, + 0xB2, 0xF4, 0x94, 0x4C, 0x23, 0x84, 0xCB, 0x84 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.0 */ + 0x28, 0x36, 0xD1, 0xFD, 0x28, 0x07, 0xBC, 0x9E, + 0x5A, 0xE3, 0x07, 0x86, 0x32, 0x04, 0x51, 0xEC +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.1 */ + 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE7, 0x56, 0xA9, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x9B, + 0xAE, 0x66, 0x49, 0x80, 0x40, 0x95, 0x1A, 0xD5 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_2[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.2 */ + 0x3F, 0x23, 0x72, 0x86, 0x7E, 0x23, 0x7C, 0x1C, + 0xD8, 0x25, 0x0A, 0x75, 0x55, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x20 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.0 */ + 0x0E, 0x58, 0xD5, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xF6, 0x02, 0x00, + 0x7D, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x44, 0x36, 0x60, 0xF7, 0xEB +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.1 */ + 0xF5, 0xCE, 0x31, 0xEB, 0xC2, 0x10, 0xF4, 0x43, + 0x50, 0xCF, 0x71, 0x26, 0x5B, 0x57, 0x38, 0x0F +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.0 */ + 0xF6, 0x42, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0x27, 0x42, 0xDA, + 0xDD, 0xD5, 0x69, 0x87, 0x06, 0x8A, 0x99, 0xA0 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.1 */ + 0x7A, 0x54, 0xD3, 0xBD, 0xB3, 0xB1, 0xE6, 0xD9, + 0x23, 0x89, 0x20, 0x64, 0xBE, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x1C +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.0 */ + 0x9A, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0xB4, 0x34, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x5D, + 0x5F, 0x50, 0x6A, 0xEB, 0x26, 0x0C, 0xF2, 0x14 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.1 */ + 0x89, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x01, 0x2A, + 0xCF, 0x26, 0x33, 0x82, 0x39, 0x4D, 0x96, 0x2F +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_2_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.2.0 */ + 0x68, 0x80, 0xC7, 0xD0, 0x26, 0x09, 0x91, 0x14, + 0xE4, 0x86, 0xC5, 0x54, 0x30, 0xE7, 0xAB, 0xEE +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.0 */ + 0xB0, 0x37, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0xB5, 0x57, + 0x0F, 0x60, 0x25, 0x46, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0x8C +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.0.0 */ + 0x2B, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x97, 0xC4, 0xD1, 0x40, 0x93, + 0x00, 0x53, 0x28, 0x7F, 0x99, 0x68, 0x50, 0xB0 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.1.0 */ + 0x45, 0xE1, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x93, 0x94, 0x4C, + 0xB2, 0x02, 0x91, 0x0C, 0x59, 0xEF, 0x80, 0x6B +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.1.1 */ + 0x59, 0x25, 0x85, 0x9F, 0x73, 0x77, 0xED, 0x78, + 0x16, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0x81, 0xC0, 0x1F, 0xA5, 0x51 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL[] = { /* SSH Sentinel */ + 0x05, 0x41, 0x82, 0xA0, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0x06, + 0xF9, 0xD2, 0xCF, 0x9D, 0x24, 0x32, 0xC4, 0x82 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1[] = { /* SSH Sentinel 1.1 */ + 0xB9, 0x16, 0x23, 0xE6, 0x93, 0xCA, 0x18, 0xA5, + 0x4C, 0x6A, 0x27, 0x78, 0x55, 0x23, 0x05, 0xE8 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2[] = { /* SSH Sentinel 1.2 */ + 0x54, 0x30, 0x88, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x1A, 0x31, 0xA6, + 0xFA, 0x8F, 0x60, 0x22, 0x4E, 0x44, 0x99, 0x58 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3[] = { /* SSH Sentinel 1.3 */ + 0x7E, 0xE5, 0xCB, 0x85, 0xF7, 0x1C, 0xE2, 0x59, + 0xC9, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0x73, 0x1E, 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x52 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4[] = { /* SSH Sentinel 1.4 */ + 0x63, 0xD9, 0xA1, 0xA7, 0x00, 0x94, 0x91, 0xB5, + 0xA0, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0xEB, 0x2A, 0x82, 0x84, 0xF0 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1[] = { /* SSH Sentinel 1.4.1 */ + 0xEB, 0x4B, 0x0D, 0x96, 0x27, 0x6B, 0x4E, 0x22, + 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x62, 0x21, 0xA7, 0xB2, 0xA5, 0xE6 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_0_9_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security QuickSec 0.9.0 */ + 0x37, 0xEB, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x13, 0x61, 0x84, 0xE7, + 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x56, 0x2A, 0x77, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4A +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_0[] = { /* SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.0 */ + 0x5D, 0x72, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x55, 0x94, 0x8A, 0x96, + 0x61, 0xA7, 0xFC, 0x48, 0xFD, 0xEC, 0x7F, 0xF9 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_1[] = { /* SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.1 */ + 0x77, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0x4C, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0xD1, 0xCD, + 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x95, 0xA0, 0x5B, 0xF8, 0x25, 0x94 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_2[] = { /* SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.2 */ + 0x2C, 0xDF, 0x08, 0xE7, 0x12, 0xED, 0xE8, 0xA5, + 0x97, 0x87, 0x61, 0x26, 0x7C, 0xD1, 0x9B, 0x91 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_3[] = { /* SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.3 */ + 0x59, 0xE4, 0x54, 0xA8, 0xC2, 0xCF, 0x02, 0xA3, + 0x49, 0x59, 0x12, 0x1F, 0x18, 0x90, 0xBC, 0x87 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_00[] = { /* draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt */ + 0x6A, 0x74, 0x34, 0xC1, 0x9D, 0x7E, 0x36, 0x34, + 0x80, 0x90, 0xA0, 0x23, 0x34, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x05 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_01[] = { /* draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-01.txt */ + 0x50, 0x76, 0x0F, 0x62, 0x4C, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xC5, + 0x3E, 0xEA, 0x38, 0x6C, 0x68, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0x83 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_01[] = { /* draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01 */ + 0x27, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xDC, 0x01, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x60, + 0xEA, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x90, 0xAC, 0x27, 0xC0, 0xD0 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_02[]= { /* draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02 */ + 0x61, 0x05, 0xC4, 0x22, 0xE7, 0x68, 0x47, 0xE4, + 0x3F, 0x96, 0x84, 0x80, 0x12, 0x92, 0xAE, 0xCD +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike */ + 0x4D, 0xF3, 0x79, 0x28, 0xE9, 0xFC, 0x4F, 0xD1, + 0xB3, 0x26, 0x21, 0x70, 0xD5, 0x15, 0xC6, 0x62 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_00[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00 */ + 0x44, 0x85, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xBB, 0xCD, + 0x0B, 0xE8, 0xA8, 0x46, 0x95, 0x79, 0xDD, 0xCC +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_01[]= { /* "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01" */ + 0x16, 0xF6, 0xCA, 0x16, 0xE4, 0xA4, 0x06, 0x6D, + 0x83, 0x82, 0x1A, 0x0F, 0x0A, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x62 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 */ + 0xCD, 0x60, 0x46, 0x43, 0x35, 0xDF, 0x21, 0xF8, + 0x7C, 0xFD, 0xB2, 0xFC, 0x68, 0xB6, 0xA4, 0x48 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02n[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n */ + 0x90, 0xCB, 0x80, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xBB, 0x69, 0x6E, + 0x08, 0x63, 0x81, 0xB5, 0xEC, 0x42, 0x7B, 0x1F +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_03[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03 */ + 0x7D, 0x94, 0x19, 0xA6, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0x6F, + 0x2C, 0x17, 0x9D, 0x92, 0x15, 0x52, 0x9d, 0x56 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_04[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04 */ + 0x99, 0x09, 0xb6, 0x4e, 0xed, 0x93, 0x7c, 0x65, + 0x73, 0xde, 0x52, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x52, 0xfa, 0x6b +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_05[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05 */ + 0x80, 0xd0, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xef, 0x54, 0x56, 0x5e, + 0xe8, 0x46, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0x5c, 0xe3, 0xee +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_06[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-06 */ + 0x4d, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x13, 0x6d, 0xea, 0xfa, 0x34, + 0xc4, 0xf3, 0xea, 0x9f, 0x02, 0xec, 0x72, 0x85 +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_07[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-07 */ + 0x43, 0x9b, 0x59, 0xf8, 0xba, 0x67, 0x6c, 0x4c, + 0x77, 0x37, 0xae, 0x22, 0xea, 0xb8, 0xf5, 0x82 +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_08[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08 */ + 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x82, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x6b, 0x6f, + 0xc7, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0xa4, 0x28, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0xe8 +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_09[] = { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-09 */ + 0x42, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x6f, 0x89, 0x8d, 0x97, 0x73, + 0xa5, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x26, 0xe7, 0xdd, 0x19, 0xe1 +}; +static const guint8 VID_testing_nat_t_rfc[] = { /* Testing NAT-T RFC */ + 0xc4, 0x0f, 0xee, 0x00, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x9d, 0xdb, + 0x1f, 0xc7, 0x62, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0x7c, 0xfe, 0xa7 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_rfc3947_nat_t[] = { /* RFC 3947 Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE */ + 0x4a, 0x13, 0x1c, 0x81, 0x07, 0x03, 0x58, 0x45, + 0x5c, 0x57, 0x28, 0xf2, 0x0e, 0x95, 0x45, 0x2f +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_beaulieu_ike_xauth_02[]= { /* draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02.txt 02 or 06 ??*/ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x26, 0x89, 0xDF, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0x12, + 0x80, 0xA2, 0x24, 0xDE, 0xC3, 0x3B, 0x81, 0xE5 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_xauth[]= { /* XAUTH (truncated MD5 hash of "draft-ietf-ipsra-isakmp-xauth-06.txt") */ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x26, 0x89, 0xDF, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0x12 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_rfc3706_dpd[]= { /* RFC 3706 */ + 0xAF, 0xCA, 0xD7, 0x13, 0x68, 0xA1, 0xF1, 0xC9, + 0x6B, 0x86, 0x96, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x57, 0x01, 0x00 +}; +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_antireplay_00[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-antireplay-00.txt */ + 0x32, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x23, 0x19, 0xF2, 0xDD +}; + +static const guint8 VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_heartbeats_00[]= { /* draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt */ + 0x8D, 0xB7, 0xA4, 0x18, 0x11, 0x22, 0x16, 0x60 +}; +static const guint8 VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_1[]= { /* IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys */ + 0xBA, 0x29, 0x04, 0x99, 0xC2, 0x4E, 0x84, 0xE5, + 0x3A, 0x1D, 0x83, 0xA0, 0x5E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xC9 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_2[]= { /* IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys */ + 0x0D, 0x33, 0x61, 0x1A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x1B, 0x5E, + 0x3C, 0x9C, 0x03, 0xD2, 0xFC, 0x10, 0x7E, 0x12 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_1[]= { /* IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised) */ + + 0xAD, 0x32, 0x51, 0x04, 0x2C, 0xDC, 0x46, 0x52, + 0xC9, 0xE0, 0x73, 0x4C, 0xE5, 0xDE, 0x4C, 0x7D +}; + +static const guint8 VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_2[]= { /* IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised) */ + 0x01, 0x3F, 0x11, 0x82, 0x3F, 0x96, 0x6F, 0xA9, + 0x19, 0x00, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xBA, 0x66, 0xA8, 0x6B +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_FRAG2[]= { /* Cisco Fragmentation - md5("FRAGMENTATION") */ + 0x40, 0x48, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x6E, 0xBC, 0xE8, 0x85, + 0x25, 0xE7, 0xDE, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xD6, 0xC2, 0xD3 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_MS_VID_INITIAL_CONTACT[]= { /* Microsoft Vid-Initial-Contact */ + 0x26, 0x24, 0x4d, 0x38, 0xed, 0xdb, 0x61, 0xb3, + 0x17, 0x2a, 0x36, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0xcf, 0xb8, 0x19 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_GSS_API_1[]= { /* A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE */ + 0xB4, 0x6D, 0x89, 0x14, 0xF3, 0xAA, 0xA3, 0xF2, + 0xFE, 0xDE, 0xB7, 0xC7, 0xDB, 0x29, 0x43, 0xCA +}; + +static const guint8 VID_GSS_API_2[]= { /* A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE */ + 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x0D, 0xD0, 0xB9, 0xC3, 0x20, 0x83, + 0xCC, 0xBA, 0x25, 0xB8, 0x86, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x55 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_GSSAPI[]= { /* GSSAPI */ + 0x62, 0x1B, 0x04, 0xBB, 0x09, 0x88, 0x2A, 0xC1, + 0xE1, 0x59, 0x35, 0xFE, 0xFA, 0x24, 0xAE, 0xEE +}; + +static const guint8 VID_MS_NT5_ISAKMPOAKLEY[]= { /* MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY */ + 0x1E, 0x2B, 0x51, 0x69, 0x05, 0x99, 0x1C, 0x7D, + 0x7C, 0x96, 0xFC, 0xBF, 0xB5, 0x87, 0xE4, 0x61 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_UNITY[]= { /* CISCO-UNITY */ + 0x12, 0xF5, 0xF2, 0x8C, 0x45, 0x71, 0x68, 0xA9, + 0x70, 0x2D, 0x9F, 0xE2, 0x74, 0xCC +}; + + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_CONCENTRATOR[]= { /* CISCO-CONCENTRATOR */ + 0x1F, 0x07, 0xF7, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x65, 0x14, 0xD3, + 0xB0, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x50, 0x01, 0x00 +}; +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_FRAG[] = { /* Cisco Fragmentation */ + 0x40, 0x48, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x6E, 0xBC, 0xE8, 0x85, + 0x25, 0xE7, 0xDE, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xD6, 0xC2, 0xD3, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_FLEXVPN_SUPPORTED[] = { /* FLEXVPN-SUPPORTED */ + 0x46, 0x4c, 0x45, 0x58, 0x56, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x2d, + 0x53, 0x55, 0x50, 0x50, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x54, 0x45, + 0x44 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_DELETE_REASON[] = { /* CISCO-DELETE-REASON */ + 0x43, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x45, + 0x4c, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0x2d, 0x52, 0x45, 0x41, + 0x53, 0x4f, 0x4e +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_DYNAMIC_ROUTE[] = { /* CISCO-DYNAMIC-ROUTE */ + 0x43, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x59, + 0x4e, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x49, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x52, 0x4f, + 0x55, 0x54, 0x45 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_VPN_REV_02[] = { /* CISCO-VPN-REV-02 */ + 0x43, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x56, 0x50, 0x4e, + 0x2d, 0x52, 0x45, 0x56, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x32 +}; + +/* CISCO(COPYRIGHT)&Copyright (c) 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. */ +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_COPYRIGHT[] = { /* Cisco Copyright */ + 0x43, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x28, 0x43, 0x4f, + 0x50, 0x59, 0x52, 0x49, 0x47, 0x48, 0x54, 0x29, + 0x26, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x79, 0x72, 0x69, 0x67, + 0x68, 0x74, 0x20, 0x28, 0x63, 0x29, 0x20, 0x32, + 0x30, 0x30, 0x39, 0x20, 0x43, 0x69, 0x73, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0x53, 0x79, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, + 0x73, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x2e +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CISCO_GRE_MODE[] = { /* CISCO-GRE-MODE */ + 0x43, 0x49, 0x53, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0x47, 0x52, + 0x45, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0x4f, 0x44, 0x45 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CP_01_R65[] = { /* CryptoPro/GOST 0.1 / Check Point R65 */ + 0xF4, 0xED, 0x19, 0xE0, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xEB, 0x51, + 0x6F, 0xAA, 0xAC, 0x0E, 0xE3, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0x28, + 0x7, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x1F +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CP_10_R71[] = { /* CryptoPro/GOST 1.0 / Check Point R71 */ + 0x03, 0x10, 0x17, 0xE0, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xE3, + 0xAA, 0x69, 0x50, 0xC9, 0x99, 0x99, 0x01, 0x00 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CP_11[] = { /* CryptoPro/GOST 1.1 */ + 0x03, 0x10, 0x17, 0xE0, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xE3, + 0xAA, 0x69, 0x50, 0xC9, 0x99, 0x99, 0x01, 0x01 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_CYBERGUARD[] = { /* CyberGuard */ + 0x9A, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0xB4, 0x34, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x5D, + 0x5F, 0x50, 0x6A, 0xEB, 0x26, 0xC0, 0xF2, 0x14 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SHREWSOFT[] = { /* Shrew Soft */ + 0xf1, 0x4b, 0x94, 0xb7, 0xbf, 0xf1, 0xfe, 0xf0, + 0x27, 0x73, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x9f, 0xed, 0xed, 0x26 +}; +static const guint8 VID_STRONGSWAN[] = { /* strongSwan */ + 0x88, 0x2f, 0xe5, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x0d, 0xbc, + 0x22, 0x51, 0x61, 0x3b, 0x2e, 0xbe, 0x5b, 0xeb +}; +static const guint8 VID_KAME_RACOON[] = { /* KAME/racoon */ + 0x70, 0x03, 0xcb, 0xc1, 0x09, 0x7d, 0xbe, 0x9c, + 0x26, 0x00, 0xba, 0x69, 0x83, 0xbc, 0x8b, 0x35 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_IPSEC_TOOLS[] = { /* IPsec-Tools */ + 0x20, 0xa3, 0x62, 0x2c, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x7c, 0xe3, + 0x7b, 0xee, 0x3c, 0xa4, 0x84, 0x42, 0x52, 0x76 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_1[] = { /* Netscreen-1 */ + 0x29, 0x9e, 0xe8, 0x28, 0x9f, 0x40, 0xa8, 0x97, + 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x86, 0x87, 0xe2, 0xe7, 0x22, 0x6b, + 0x53, 0x2c, 0x3b, 0x76 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_2[] = { /* Netscreen-2 */ + 0x3a, 0x15, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x63, 0x58, + 0x2e, 0x3a, 0xc8, 0x2d, 0x1c, 0x64, 0xcb, 0xe3, + 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x79, 0xe7 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_3[] = { /* Netscreen-3 */ + 0x47, 0xd2, 0xb1, 0x26, 0xbf, 0xcd, 0x83, 0x48, + 0x97, 0x60, 0xe2, 0xcf, 0x8c, 0x5d, 0x4d, 0x5a, + 0x03, 0x49, 0x7c, 0x15 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_4[] = { /* Netscreen-4 */ + 0x4a, 0x43, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x43, 0xe0, 0x2b, 0x84, + 0xc8, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x96, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0x9e, 0xbe, + 0x77, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xcc +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_5[] = { /* Netscreen-5 */ + 0x64, 0x40, 0x5f, 0x46, 0xf0, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x60, + 0xa2, 0x3b, 0xe1, 0x16, 0xa1, 0x97, 0x50, 0x58, + 0xe6, 0x9e, 0x83, 0x87 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_6[] = { /* Netscreen-6 */ + 0x69, 0x93, 0x69, 0x22, 0x87, 0x41, 0xc6, 0xd4, + 0xca, 0x09, 0x4c, 0x93, 0xe2, 0x42, 0xc9, 0xde, + 0x19, 0xe7, 0xb7, 0xc6 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_7[] = { /* Netscreen-7 */ + 0x8c, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xcf, 0x62, 0xa0, 0xef, 0x1b, + 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xab, 0xd1, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xa6, 0x98, + 0x66, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x6a +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_8[] = { /* Netscreen-8 */ + 0x92, 0xd2, 0x7a, 0x9e, 0xcb, 0x31, 0xd9, 0x92, + 0x46, 0x98, 0x6d, 0x34, 0x53, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xd5, + 0x7a, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x61 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_9[] = { /* Netscreen-9 */ + 0x9b, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x27, 0x5a, 0x7d, + 0x6f, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x1c, 0x58, 0x31, 0x11, 0xb0, + 0x9e, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xa0 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_10[] = { /* Netscreen-10 */ + 0xbf, 0x03, 0x74, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x46, 0xc9, + 0x04, 0xf1, 0xf3, 0x54, 0x7d, 0xe2, 0x4f, 0x78, + 0x47, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x12 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_11[] = { /* Netscreen-11 */ + 0xc2, 0xe8, 0x05, 0x00, 0xf4, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xbf, + 0x5d, 0xaa, 0xee, 0xd3, 0xbb, 0x59, 0xab, 0xae, + 0xee, 0x56, 0xc6, 0x52 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_12[] = { /* Netscreen-12 */ + 0xc8, 0x66, 0x0a, 0x62, 0xb0, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x61, + 0x30, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x16, 0x08, 0xd3, 0x2a, 0x6a, + 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x9f +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_13[] = { /* Netscreen-13 */ + 0xf8, 0x85, 0xda, 0x40, 0xb1, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0xab, + 0xd1, 0x76, 0x55, 0xec, 0x5b, 0xbe, 0xc0, 0xf2, + 0x1f, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x2e +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_14[] = { /* Netscreen-14 */ + 0x2a, 0x2b, 0xca, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0x91, 0xb4, + 0x26, 0x10, 0x78, 0x07, 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x72, 0x49, + 0x56, 0x9d, 0x6f, 0xd3 +}; +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_15[] = { /* Netscreen-15 */ + 0x16, 0x6f, 0x93, 0x2d, 0x55, 0xeb, 0x64, 0xd8, + 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x13, 0xf0, + 0xd0, 0xfd, 0x84, 0x51 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_NETSCREEN_16[] = { /* Netscreen-16 */ + 0xa3, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0x05, 0xca, 0x1a, 0xc0, 0xb3, + 0xd2, 0xf2, 0x4e, 0x9e, 0x82, 0xbf, 0xcb, 0xff, + 0x9c, 0x9e, 0x52, 0xb5 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_ZYWALL[] = { /* ZYWALL */ + 0x62, 0x50, 0x27, 0x74, 0x9d, 0x5a, 0xb9, 0x7f, + 0x56, 0x16, 0xc1, 0x60, 0x27, 0x65, 0xcf, 0x48, + 0x0a, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0x0b +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SIDEWINDER[] = { /* SIDEWINDER */ + 0x84, 0x04, 0xad, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0x57, 0x60, + 0xb2, 0xca, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xff, 0x53, 0x7b +}; + +static const guint8 VID_SONICWALL[] = { /* SonicWALL */ + 0x40, 0x4B, 0xF4, 0x39, 0x52, 0x2C, 0xA3, 0xF6 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY[] = { /* Heartbeat Notify */ + 0x48 ,0x65, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x42, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x74, 0x5f, 0x4e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x79 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_DWR[] = { /* DWR: Delete with reason */ + 0x2D, 0x79, 0x22, 0xC6, 0xB3, 0x01, 0xD9, 0xB0, + 0xE1, 0x34, 0x27, 0x39, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0xBB, 0xD5 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_ARUBA_RAP[] = { /* Remote AP (Aruba Networks) */ + 0xca, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x4b, 0xa8, 0x03, 0x00, + 0x17, 0xdc, 0x10, 0x23, 0xa4, 0xfd, 0xe2, 0x04, + 0x1f, 0x9f, 0x74, 0x63 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_ARUBA_CONTROLLER[] = { /* Controller (Aruba Networks) */ + 0x3c, 0x8e, 0x70, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0xd7, 0x4a, + 0xdd, 0x53, 0xe4, 0x10, 0x09, 0x15, 0xdc, 0x2e, + 0x4b, 0xb5, 0x12, 0x74 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_ARUBA_VIA_CLIENT[] = { /* VIA Client (Aruba Networks) */ + 0x88, 0xf0, 0xe3, 0x14, 0x9b, 0x3f, 0xa4, 0x8b, + 0x05, 0xaa, 0x7f, 0x68, 0x5f, 0x0b, 0x76, 0x6b, + 0xe1, 0x86, 0xcc, 0xb8 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_ARUBA_VIA_AUTH_PROFILE[] = { /* VIA Auth Profile (Aruba Networks) */ + 0x56, 0x49, 0x41, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x20, 0x50, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x65, + 0x20, 0x3a, 0x20 +}; + +/* + * MS-IKEE Internet Key Exchange Protocol Extensions (v20080212).pdf + * Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 +*/ +static const guint8 VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_CGA1[] = { /* IKE CGA Version 1 */ + 0xe3, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x6a, 0x76, 0x37, 0x9f, 0xe7, + 0x07, 0x22, 0x82, 0x31, 0xe5, 0xce, 0x86, 0x52 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_MS_NDC[] = { /* MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable */ + 0xfb, 0x1d, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xb7, 0xea, + 0x16, 0xb7, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x08, 0x55, 0xf1, 0x20 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_FORTIGATE[] = { /* Fortigate (Fortinet) */ + 0x82, 0x99, 0x03, 0x17, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x60, 0x82, + 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x21, 0xDE +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_FORTICLIENT_CONNECT[] = { /* Forticlient Connect license (Fortinet) */ + 0x4C, 0x53, 0x42, 0x7B, 0x6D, 0x46, 0x5D, 0x1B, + 0x33, 0x7B, 0xB7, 0x55, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x7F, 0xEF +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_ENDPOINT_CONTROL[] = { /* Endpoint Control (Fortinet) */ + 0xB4, 0xF0, 0x1C, 0xA9, 0x51, 0xE9, 0xDA, 0x8D, + 0x0B, 0xAF, 0xBB, 0xD3, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x04, 0x4E +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_RECEIVER[] = { /* Auto-Discovery Receiver (Fortinet) */ + 0xCA, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0xBB, 0x12, 0xEA, 0xB6, 0xC5, + 0x8C, 0x57, 0x06, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0x65, 0x37, 0x86 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_SENDER[] = { /* Auto-Discovery Sender (Fortinet) */ + 0x9B, 0x15, 0xE6, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0x34, + 0x26, 0x66, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xA5, 0x02, 0x2E, 0x60 +}; + +static const guint8 VID_FORTINET_EXCHANGE_INTERFACE_IP[] = { /* Exchange Interface IP (Fortinet) */ + 0xA5, 0x8F, 0xEC, 0x50, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x7B, 0x21, + 0xE8, 0xB4, 0x99, 0xE3, 0x36, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xE6 +}; + +static const bytes_string vendor_id[] = { + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_0), "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_1), "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_2, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_1_2), "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.2" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_1), "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_2, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_1_2_2), "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.2" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_0_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_0_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.0.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_1), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_2, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_2_1_2), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.2" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_3_0_1), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_0_1), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_1_1), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_2_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_4_2_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.2.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_0_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.0.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_0), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.1.0" }, + { VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_IPSEC_EXPRESS_5_1_1), "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 5.1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL), "SSH Sentinel" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1), "SSH Sentinel 1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2), "SSH Sentinel 1.2" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3), "SSH Sentinel 1.3" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4), "SSH Sentinel 1.4" }, + { VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1), "SSH Sentinel 1.4.1" }, + { VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_0_9_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_0_9_0), "SSH Communications Security QuickSec 0.9.0" }, + { VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_0, sizeof(VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_0), "SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.0" }, + { VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_1, sizeof(VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_1), "SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.1" }, + { VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_2, sizeof(VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_2), "SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.2" }, + { VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_3, sizeof(VID_SSH_QUICKSEC_1_1_3), "SSH Communications Security QuickSec 1.1.3" }, + { VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_00, sizeof(VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_00), "draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt" }, + { VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_01, sizeof(VID_draft_huttunen_ipsec_esp_in_udp_01), "draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-01.txt (ESPThruNAT)" }, + { VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_01, sizeof(VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_01), "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01" }, + { VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_02, sizeof(VID_draft_stenberg_ipsec_nat_traversal_02), "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_00, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_00), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_01, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_01), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02n, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_02n), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\\n" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_03, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_03), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_04, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_04), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_05, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_05), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_06, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_06), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-06" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_07, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_07), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-07" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_08, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_08), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_09, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_nat_t_ike_09), "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-09" }, + { VID_testing_nat_t_rfc, sizeof(VID_testing_nat_t_rfc), "Testing NAT-T RFC" }, + { VID_rfc3947_nat_t, sizeof(VID_rfc3947_nat_t), "RFC 3947 Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE" }, + { VID_draft_beaulieu_ike_xauth_02, sizeof(VID_draft_beaulieu_ike_xauth_02), "draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02.txt" }, + { VID_xauth, sizeof(VID_xauth), "XAUTH" }, + { VID_rfc3706_dpd, sizeof(VID_rfc3706_dpd), "RFC 3706 DPD (Dead Peer Detection)" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_antireplay_00, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_antireplay_00), "draft-ietf-ipsec-antireplay-00.txt" }, + { VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_heartbeats_00, sizeof(VID_draft_ietf_ipsec_heartbeats_00), "draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt" }, + { VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_1, sizeof(VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_1), "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys" }, + { VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_2, sizeof(VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_2), "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys" }, + { VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_1, sizeof(VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_1), "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised)" }, + { VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_2, sizeof(VID_IKE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE_REV_2), "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised)" }, + { VID_CISCO_FRAG2, sizeof(VID_CISCO_FRAG2), "Cisco Fragmentation" }, + { VID_CISCO_FLEXVPN_SUPPORTED, sizeof(VID_CISCO_FLEXVPN_SUPPORTED), "Cisco FlexVPN Supported" }, + { VID_CISCO_DELETE_REASON, sizeof(VID_CISCO_DELETE_REASON), "Cisco Delete Reason Supported"}, + { VID_CISCO_DYNAMIC_ROUTE, sizeof(VID_CISCO_DYNAMIC_ROUTE), "Cisco Dynamic Route Supported"}, + { VID_CISCO_VPN_REV_02, sizeof(VID_CISCO_VPN_REV_02), "Cisco VPN Revision 2"}, + { VID_CISCO_COPYRIGHT, sizeof(VID_CISCO_COPYRIGHT), "Cisco Copyright"}, + { VID_CISCO_GRE_MODE, sizeof(VID_CISCO_GRE_MODE), "Cisco GRE Mode Supported"}, + { VID_MS_VID_INITIAL_CONTACT, sizeof(VID_MS_VID_INITIAL_CONTACT), "Microsoft Vid-Initial-Contact" }, + { VID_GSS_API_1, sizeof(VID_GSS_API_1), "A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE" }, + { VID_GSS_API_2, sizeof(VID_GSS_API_2), "A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE" }, + { VID_GSSAPI, sizeof(VID_GSSAPI), "GSSAPI" }, + { VID_MS_NT5_ISAKMPOAKLEY, sizeof(VID_MS_NT5_ISAKMPOAKLEY), "MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY" }, + { VID_CISCO_UNITY, sizeof(VID_CISCO_UNITY), "CISCO-UNITY" }, + { VID_CISCO_CONCENTRATOR, sizeof(VID_CISCO_CONCENTRATOR), "CISCO-CONCENTRATOR" }, + { VID_CISCO_FRAG, sizeof(VID_CISCO_FRAG), "Cisco Fragmentation" }, + { VID_CP_01_R65, sizeof(VID_CP_01_R65), "CryptoPro/GOST 0.1 / Check Point R65" }, + { VID_CP_10_R71, sizeof(VID_CP_10_R71), "CryptoPro/GOST 1.0 / Check Point R71" }, + { VID_CP_11, sizeof(VID_CP_11), "CryptoPro/GOST 1.1" }, + { VID_CYBERGUARD, sizeof(VID_CYBERGUARD), "CyberGuard" }, + { VID_SHREWSOFT, sizeof(VID_SHREWSOFT), "Shrew Soft" }, + { VID_STRONGSWAN, sizeof(VID_STRONGSWAN), "strongSwan" }, + { VID_KAME_RACOON, sizeof(VID_KAME_RACOON), "KAME/racoon" }, + { VID_IPSEC_TOOLS, sizeof(VID_IPSEC_TOOLS), "IPSec-Tools" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_1, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_1), "Netscreen-1" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_2, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_2), "Netscreen-2" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_3, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_3), "Netscreen-3" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_4, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_4), "Netscreen-4" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_5, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_5), "Netscreen-5" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_6, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_6), "Netscreen-6" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_7, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_7), "Netscreen-7" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_8, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_8), "Netscreen-8" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_9, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_9), "Netscreen-9" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_10, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_10), "Netscreen-10" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_11, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_11), "Netscreen-11" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_12, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_12), "Netscreen-12" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_13, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_13), "Netscreen-13" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_14, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_14), "Netscreen-14" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_15, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_15), "Netscreen-15" }, + { VID_NETSCREEN_16, sizeof(VID_NETSCREEN_16), "Netscreen-16" }, + { VID_ZYWALL, sizeof(VID_ZYWALL), "ZYWALL" }, + { VID_SIDEWINDER, sizeof(VID_SIDEWINDER), "SIDEWINDER" }, + { VID_SONICWALL, sizeof(VID_SONICWALL), "SonicWALL" }, + { VID_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY, sizeof(VID_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY), "Heartbeat Notify" }, + { VID_DWR, sizeof(VID_DWR), "DWR: Delete with reason" }, + { VID_ARUBA_RAP, sizeof(VID_ARUBA_RAP), "Remote AP (Aruba Networks)" }, + { VID_ARUBA_CONTROLLER, sizeof(VID_ARUBA_CONTROLLER), "Controller (Aruba Networks)" }, + { VID_ARUBA_VIA_CLIENT, sizeof(VID_ARUBA_VIA_CLIENT), "VIA Client (Aruba Networks)" }, + { VID_ARUBA_VIA_AUTH_PROFILE, sizeof(VID_ARUBA_VIA_AUTH_PROFILE), "VIA Auth Profile (Aruba Networks)" }, + { VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_CGA1, sizeof(VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_CGA1), "IKE CGA Version 1" }, + { VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_MS_NDC, sizeof(VID_MS_IKEE_20080212_MS_NDC), "MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable" }, + { VID_FORTINET_FORTIGATE, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_FORTIGATE), "Fortigate (Fortinet)" }, + { VID_FORTINET_FORTICLIENT_CONNECT, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_FORTICLIENT_CONNECT), "Forticlient connect license (Fortinet)" }, + { VID_FORTINET_ENDPOINT_CONTROL, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_ENDPOINT_CONTROL), "Endpoint Control (Fortinet)" }, + { VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_RECEIVER, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_RECEIVER), "Auto-Discovery Receiver (Fortinet)" }, + { VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_SENDER, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_AUTODISCOVERY_SENDER), "Auto-Discovery Sender (Fortinet)" }, + { VID_FORTINET_EXCHANGE_INTERFACE_IP, sizeof(VID_FORTINET_EXCHANGE_INTERFACE_IP), "Exchange Interface IP (Fortinet)" }, + { 0, 0, NULL } +}; + + + +static void +dissect_payloads(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, + int isakmp_version, guint8 initial_payload, int offset, int length, + packet_info *pinfo, guint32 message_id, gboolean is_request, void* decr_data) +{ + guint8 payload, next_payload; + guint16 payload_length; + proto_tree * ntree; + + for (payload = initial_payload; length > 0; payload = next_payload) { + if (payload == PLOAD_IKE_NONE) { + /* + * What? There's more stuff in this chunk of data, but the + * previous payload had a "next payload" type of None? + */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_extradata, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + } + + ntree = dissect_payload_header(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, isakmp_version, payload, &next_payload, &payload_length, tree); + if (payload_length >= 4) { /* XXX = > 4? */ + tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4); + switch(payload){ + case PLOAD_IKE_SA: + case PLOAD_IKE2_SA: + dissect_sa(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, pinfo, is_request, decr_data); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_P: + dissect_proposal(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, decr_data ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_KE: + case PLOAD_IKE2_KE: + dissect_key_exch(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, pinfo, decr_data ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_ID: + case PLOAD_IKE2_IDI: + case PLOAD_IKE2_IDR: + dissect_id(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, pinfo ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_CERT: + case PLOAD_IKE2_CERT: + dissect_cert(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, pinfo ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_CR: + case PLOAD_IKE2_CERTREQ: + dissect_certreq(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, pinfo ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_HASH: + dissect_hash(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_SIG: + dissect_sig(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_NONCE: + case PLOAD_IKE2_NONCE: + dissect_nonce(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_N: + case PLOAD_IKE2_N: + dissect_notif(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_D: + case PLOAD_IKE2_D: + dissect_delete(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_VID: + case PLOAD_IKE2_V: + dissect_vid(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_A: + case PLOAD_IKE2_CP: + dissect_config(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, is_request); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_SAK: + dissect_sa_kek(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_SAT: + dissect_sa_tek(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_KD: + dissect_key_download(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_SEQ: + dissect_sequence(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_AUTH: + dissect_auth(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_TSI: + case PLOAD_IKE2_TSR: + dissect_ts_payload(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_SK: + if(isakmp_version == 2) + dissect_enc(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, pinfo, next_payload, is_request, decr_data, TRUE); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_EAP: + dissect_eap(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, pinfo ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_GSPM: + dissect_gspm(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D: + case PLOAD_IKE_NAT_D13: + dissect_nat_discovery(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA: + case PLOAD_IKE_NAT_OA14: + dissect_nat_original_address(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_CISCO_FRAG: + dissect_cisco_fragmentation(tvb, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, pinfo ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE2_SKF: + if (isakmp_version == 2) { + /* N.B. not passing in length as must be the last payload in the message */ + dissect_ikev2_fragmentation(tvb, offset + 4, ntree, pinfo, message_id, next_payload, is_request, decr_data ); + } + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_datapayload, tvb, offset + 4, payload_length-4, ENC_NA); + break; + } + } + else if (payload_length > length) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(ntree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, 0, 0, + "Payload (bogus, length is %u, greater than remaining length %d", + payload_length, length); + return; + } + else { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(ntree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, 0, 0, + "Payload (bogus, length is %u, must be at least 4)", + payload_length); + payload_length = 4; + } + + offset += payload_length; + length -= payload_length; + } +} + +void +isakmp_dissect_payloads(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, + guint8 initial_payload, int offset, int length, + packet_info *pinfo) +{ + dissect_payloads(tvb, tree, isakmp_version, initial_payload, offset, length, + pinfo, 0, FALSE, NULL); +} + +static int +dissect_isakmp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_) +{ + int offset = 0, len; + isakmp_hdr_t hdr; + proto_item *ti, *vers_item, *ti_root; + proto_tree *isakmp_tree = NULL, *vers_tree; + int isakmp_version; + void* decr_data = NULL; + guint8 flags; + guint8 i_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE], *ic_key; + decrypt_data_t *decr = NULL; + tvbuff_t *decr_tvb; + proto_tree *decr_tree; + address null_addr; + + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "ISAKMP"); + col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); + + /* Some simple heuristics to catch non-isakmp packets */ + if (tvb_reported_length(tvb)== 1 && tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) !=0xff) + return 0; + else if (tvb_reported_length(tvb) < ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE) + return 0; + else if (tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE-4) < ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE) + return 0; + + ti_root = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_isakmp, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); + isakmp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_root, ett_isakmp); + + /* RFC3948 2.3 NAT Keepalive packet: + * 1 byte payload with the value 0xff. + */ + if ( (tvb_reported_length(tvb)== 1) && (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) == 0xff) ){ + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "NAT Keepalive"); + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_nat_keepalive, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + return 1; + } + + hdr.length = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset + ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE - 4); + hdr.exch_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, COOKIE_SIZE + COOKIE_SIZE + 1 + 1); + hdr.version = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, COOKIE_SIZE + COOKIE_SIZE + 1); + isakmp_version = hi_nibble(hdr.version); /* save the version */ + hdr.flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, COOKIE_SIZE + COOKIE_SIZE + 1 + 1 + 1); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + clear_address(&null_addr); + + tvb_memcpy(tvb, i_cookie, offset, COOKIE_SIZE); + decr = (decrypt_data_t*) g_hash_table_lookup(isakmp_hash, i_cookie); + + if (! decr) { + ic_key = (guint8 *)g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); + memcpy(ic_key, i_cookie, COOKIE_SIZE); + decr = create_decrypt_data(); + g_hash_table_insert(isakmp_hash, ic_key, decr); + } + + if (addresses_equal(&decr->initiator, &null_addr)) { + /* XXX - We assume that we're seeing the second packet in an exchange here. + * Is there a way to verify this? */ + copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &decr->initiator, &pinfo->src); + } + + decr_data = decr; + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + ikev2_uat_data_key_t hash_key; + ikev2_uat_data_t *ike_sa_data; + ikev2_decrypt_data_t *ikev2_dec_data; + guchar spii[COOKIE_SIZE], spir[COOKIE_SIZE]; + + tvb_memcpy(tvb, spii, offset, COOKIE_SIZE); + tvb_memcpy(tvb, spir, offset + COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE); + hash_key.spii = spii; + hash_key.spir = spir; + hash_key.spii_len = COOKIE_SIZE; + hash_key.spir_len = COOKIE_SIZE; + + ike_sa_data = (ikev2_uat_data_t *)g_hash_table_lookup(ikev2_key_hash, &hash_key); + if (ike_sa_data) { + guint8 initiator_flag; + initiator_flag = hdr.flags & I_FLAG; + ikev2_dec_data = wmem_new(pinfo->pool, ikev2_decrypt_data_t); + ikev2_dec_data->encr_key = initiator_flag ? ike_sa_data->sk_ei : ike_sa_data->sk_er; + ikev2_dec_data->auth_key = initiator_flag ? ike_sa_data->sk_ai : ike_sa_data->sk_ar; + ikev2_dec_data->encr_spec = ike_sa_data->encr_spec; + ikev2_dec_data->auth_spec = ike_sa_data->auth_spec; + + decr_data = ikev2_dec_data; + } + } + + { + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_ispi, tvb, offset, COOKIE_SIZE, ENC_NA); + offset += COOKIE_SIZE; + + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_rspi, tvb, offset, COOKIE_SIZE, ENC_NA); + offset += COOKIE_SIZE; + + hdr.next_payload = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_nextpayload, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 1; + + vers_item = proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_version, tvb, offset, + 1, hdr.version, "%u.%u", + hi_nibble(hdr.version), lo_nibble(hdr.version)); + vers_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(vers_item, ett_isakmp_version); + proto_tree_add_item(vers_tree, hf_isakmp_mjver, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(vers_tree, hf_isakmp_mnver, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + if(isakmp_version == 1) { + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,val_to_str(hdr.exch_type, exchange_v1_type, "Unknown %d")); + } else if (isakmp_version == 2){ + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,val_to_str(hdr.exch_type, exchange_v2_type, "Unknown %d")); + } + offset += 1; + + { + proto_item * fti; + proto_tree * ftree; + + fti = proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_flags, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + ftree = proto_item_add_subtree(fti, ett_isakmp_flags); + flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_e, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_c, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_a, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_i, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_v, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(ftree, hf_isakmp_flag_r, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + proto_item_append_text(fti, " (%s, %s, %s)", + tfs_get_string(flags & I_FLAG, &flag_i), + tfs_get_string(flags & V_FLAG, &flag_v), + tfs_get_string(flags & R_FLAG, &tfs_response_request)); + } + offset += 1; + } + + hdr.message_id = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_messageid, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + + /* Add some summary to the Info column */ + if (isakmp_version == 2) { + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " MID=%02u %s %s", + hdr.message_id, + tfs_get_string(flags & I_FLAG, &flag_i), + tfs_get_string(flags & R_FLAG, &tfs_response_request)); + } + + if (hdr.length < ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE) { + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_length, tvb, offset, 4, + hdr.length, "(bogus, length is %u, should be at least %lu)", + hdr.length, (unsigned long)ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE); + return tvb_captured_length(tvb); + } + + len = hdr.length - ISAKMP_HDR_SIZE; + + if (len < 0) { + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_length, tvb, offset, 4, + hdr.length, "(bogus, length is %u, which is too large)", + hdr.length); + return tvb_captured_length(tvb); + } + tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, len); + proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_length, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + + if (isakmp_version == 1 && (hdr.flags & E_FLAG)) { + /* Encrypted flag set (v1 only), so decrypt before dissecting payloads */ + if (len) { + ti = proto_tree_add_item(isakmp_tree, hf_isakmp_enc_data, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%d byte%s)", len, plurality(len, "", "s")); + + /* Collect initialization vectors during first pass. */ + if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) + if (prepare_decrypt(decr)) + update_ivs(pinfo, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, len), len, hdr.message_id, decr); + decr_tvb = decrypt_payload(tvb, pinfo, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, len), len, decr); + if (decr_tvb) { + decr_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_isakmp); + dissect_payloads(decr_tvb, decr_tree, isakmp_version, + hdr.next_payload, 0, tvb_reported_length(decr_tvb), pinfo, hdr.message_id, !(flags & R_FLAG), decr_data); + } + } + } else { + dissect_payloads(tvb, isakmp_tree, isakmp_version, hdr.next_payload, + offset, len, pinfo, hdr.message_id, !(flags & R_FLAG), decr_data); + } + + offset += len; + } + + proto_item_set_end(ti_root, tvb, offset); + + return offset; +} + + +static proto_tree * +dissect_payload_header(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, + int isakmp_version, guint8 payload, guint8 *next_payload_p, + guint16 *payload_length_p, proto_tree *tree) +{ + guint8 next_payload; + guint16 payload_length; + proto_item * ti; + proto_tree * ntree; + + if (length < 4) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, offset, length, + "Not enough room in payload for all transforms"); + *next_payload_p = 0; + *payload_length_p = 0; + return NULL; + } + next_payload = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + payload_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + + ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_typepayload, tvb, offset, payload_length, payload); + + ntree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_isakmp_payload); + + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_nextpayload, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + /* The critical flag only applies to IKEv2 payloads but not proposals and transforms. */ + if (isakmp_version == 1 || payload == PLOAD_IKE_P || payload == PLOAD_IKE_T) { + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_NA); + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_criticalpayload, tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_reserved7, tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_payloadlen, tvb, offset + 2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + *next_payload_p = next_payload; + *payload_length_p = payload_length; + return ntree; +} + +static void +dissect_sa(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, packet_info *pinfo, gboolean is_request, void* decr_data) +{ + guint32 doi; + guint16 saattr; + proto_item *sti; + proto_tree *stree; + proto_tree *currtree; + + /* make a copy of current tree working position which we will use while dissecting other payloads*/ + currtree = tree; + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + doi = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_doi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 4; + length -= 4; + + switch(doi) { + case 1: { + /* IPSEC */ + if (length < 4) { + proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation, tvb, offset, length, + NULL, + "%s (length is %u, should be >= 4)", + tvb_bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, length), length); + return; + } + sti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA); + stree = proto_item_add_subtree(sti, ett_isakmp_sa); + + proto_tree_add_item(stree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation_identity_only, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(stree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation_secrecy, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(stree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation_integrity, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 4; + length -= 4; + + dissect_payloads(tvb, tree, isakmp_version, PLOAD_IKE_P, offset, + length, pinfo, 0, is_request, decr_data); + break; + } + case 2: { + /* add GDOI specific changes here for RFC 6407*/ + if (length < 8) { /* situation + next payload + reserved2*/ + proto_tree_add_bytes_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation, tvb, offset, length, + NULL, + "%s (length is %u, should be >= 8)", + tvb_bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, length), length); + return; + } + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA); /* must be always 0 as per RFC 6407 no further decoding required*/ + saattr = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+4); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_attribute_next_payload, tvb, offset+4, 2, ENC_NA); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved2 , tvb, offset+6, 2, ENC_NA); + + offset += 8; + length -= 8; + + /* possible attribute values here 15(SAK),16(SAT),18(GAP)*/ + switch(saattr) { + case PLOAD_IKE_SAK: + dissect_sa_kek(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, currtree ); + break; + case PLOAD_IKE_SAT: + dissect_sa_tek(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, currtree); + break; + } + break; + } + default: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sa_situation, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + } + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + dissect_payloads(tvb, tree, isakmp_version, PLOAD_IKE_P, offset, + length, pinfo, 0, is_request, decr_data); + } +} + +static void +dissect_proposal(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, void* decr_data) +{ + guint8 protocol_id; + guint8 spi_size; + guint8 num_transforms; + guint8 next_payload; + guint16 payload_length; + proto_tree * ntree; + guint8 proposal_num; + + proposal_num = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + proto_item_append_text(tree, " # %d", proposal_num); + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_prop_number, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + protocol_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + spi_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_spisize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + num_transforms = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_prop_transforms, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + if (spi_size) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_spi, tvb, offset, spi_size, ENC_NA); + + offset += spi_size; + length -= spi_size; + } + + while (num_transforms > 0) { + ntree = dissect_payload_header(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, isakmp_version, + PLOAD_IKE_T, &next_payload, &payload_length, tree); + if (length < payload_length) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, offset + 4, length, + "Payload (bogus, length is %u, greater than remaining length %d", payload_length, length); + break; + } else if (payload_length < 4) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, offset + 4, length, + "Payload (bogus, length is %u, must be at least 4)", payload_length); + break; + } + dissect_transform(tvb, pinfo, offset + 4, payload_length - 4, ntree, isakmp_version, protocol_id, decr_data); + + offset += payload_length; + length -= payload_length; + num_transforms--; + + } +} + +/** Dissect an attribute header, which is common to all attributes. + * + * @param [in] tvb The tv buffer of the current data. + * @param [in] tree The tree to append the attribute subtree to. + * @param [in] offset The start of the data in tvb. + * @param [in] hf_attr A struct of indices pointing to attribute header field descriptions. + * @param [in] attr_typenames The table for translation of the attribute type id to a name. + * @param [out] headerlen The length of the attribute header, excluding the value. + * @param [out] value_len The length of the attribute value. + * @param [out] attr_type The attribute type, as read from the attribute header. + * @param [out] attr_item The root item created for this attribute. + * @param [out] subtree The subtree created for this attribute. + */ +static void +dissect_attribute_header(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, int offset, + attribute_common_fields hf_attr, const range_string *attr_typenames, + guint *headerlen, guint *value_len, guint *attr_type, + proto_item **attr_item, proto_tree **subtree) +{ + guint attr_type_format; + gboolean has_len; + const gchar *attr_typename; + + attr_type_format = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + has_len = !(attr_type_format & 0x8000); + *attr_type = attr_type_format & 0x7fff; + + if (has_len) { + /* Type/Length/Value format */ + *headerlen = 4; + *value_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + } else { + /* Type/Value format */ + *headerlen = 2; + *value_len = 2; + } + + *attr_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_attr.all, tvb, offset, *headerlen + *value_len, ENC_NA); + attr_typename = rval_to_str(*attr_type, attr_typenames, "Unknown Attribute Type (%02d)"); + proto_item_append_text(*attr_item, " (t=%d,l=%d): %s", *attr_type, *value_len, attr_typename); + + *subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(*attr_item, ett_isakmp_attr); + proto_tree_add_item(*subtree, hf_attr.format, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_uint(*subtree, hf_attr.type, tvb, offset, 2, *attr_type); + + if (has_len) + proto_tree_add_item(*subtree, hf_attr.length, tvb, offset + 2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + if (*value_len > 0) + proto_tree_add_item(*subtree, hf_attr.value, tvb, offset + *headerlen, *value_len, ENC_NA); +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_rohc_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr, rohc_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case ROHC_MAX_CID: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_max_cid, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case ROHC_PROFILE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_profile, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case ROHC_INTEG: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_integ, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case ROHC_ICV_LEN: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_icv_len, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case ROHC_MRRU: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_mrru, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +/* Dissect life duration, which is variable-length. Note that this function + * handles both/either the security association life duration as defined in + * section 4.5 of RFC2407 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2407), as well as the + * life duration according to the attribute classes table in Appendix A of + * RFC2409: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2409#page-33 */ +static void +dissect_life_duration(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, proto_item *ti, int hf_uint32, int hf_uint64, int hf_bytes, int offset, guint len) +{ + switch (len) { + case 0: + break; + case 1: { + guint8 val; + val = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_uint32, tvb, offset, len, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %u", val); + break; + } + case 2: { + guint16 val; + val = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_uint32, tvb, offset, len, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %u", val); + break; + } + case 3: { + guint32 val; + val = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_uint32, tvb, offset, len, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %u", val); + break; + } + case 4: { + guint32 val; + val = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_uint32, tvb, offset, len, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %u", val); + break; + } + case 5: { + guint64 val; + val = tvb_get_ntoh40(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint64_format_value(tree, hf_uint64, tvb, offset, len, val, "%" PRIu64, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %" PRIu64, val); + break; + } + case 6: { + guint64 val; + val = tvb_get_ntoh48(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint64_format_value(tree, hf_uint64, tvb, offset, len, val, "%" PRIu64, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %" PRIu64, val); + break; + } + case 7: { + guint64 val; + val = tvb_get_ntoh56(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint64_format_value(tree, hf_uint64, tvb, offset, len, val, "%" PRIu64, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %" PRIu64, val); + break; + } + case 8: { + guint64 val; + val = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset); + + proto_tree_add_uint64_format_value(tree, hf_uint64, tvb, offset, len, val, "%" PRIu64, val); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %" PRIu64, val); + break; + } + default: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_bytes, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(ti, ": %" PRIx64 " ...", tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset)); + break; + } +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_ipsec_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr, ipsec_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), attr_life_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: + dissect_life_duration(tvb, attr_tree, attr_item, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes, offset, value_len); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_GROUP_DESC: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_group_description, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), dh_group, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_ENCAP_MODE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_encap_mode, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_encap_mode, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_AUTH_ALGORITHM: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_algorithm, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_auth_algo, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_length, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %d", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_ROUNDS: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_rounds, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %d", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_CMPR_DICT_SIZE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_dict_size, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_CMPR_ALGORITHM: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_algorithm, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_ECN_TUNNEL: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_EXT_SEQ_NBR: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_key_length, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %d", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_SIG_ENCO_ALGORITHM: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sig_enco_algorithm, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + + case IPSEC_ATTR_ADDR_PRESERVATION: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_addr_preservation, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_addr_preservation, "Unknown %d")); + break; + + case IPSEC_ATTR_SA_DIRECTION: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sa_direction, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ipsec_attr_sa_direction, "Unknown %d")); + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr, ipsec_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), attr_life_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IPSEC_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: + dissect_life_duration(tvb, attr_tree, attr_item, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes, offset, value_len); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_ike_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset, decrypt_data_t *decr) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_ike_attr, ike_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_encryption_algorithm, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ike_attr_enc_algo, "Unknown %d")); + if (decr) decr->ike_encr_alg = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_hash_algorithm, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ike_attr_hash_algo, "Unknown %d")); + if (decr) decr->ike_hash_alg = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_authentication_method, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ike_attr_authmeth, "Unknown %d")); + if (decr) decr->is_psk = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) == 0x01 ? TRUE : FALSE; + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_description, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), dh_group, "Unknown %d")); + if (decr) decr->group = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ike_attr_grp_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_prime, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_one, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_two, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_a, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_b, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), attr_life_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: + dissect_life_duration(tvb, attr_tree, attr_item, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes, offset, value_len); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_PRF: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_prf, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_key_length, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %d", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); + if (decr) decr->ike_encr_keylen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_field_size, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_order, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_BLOCK_SIZE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_block_size, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_ACAT: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike_attr_asymmetric_cryptographic_algorithm_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), ike_attr_asym_algo, "Unknown %d")); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_resp_lifetime_ike_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr, ike_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), attr_life_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION: + dissect_life_duration(tvb, attr_tree, attr_item, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64, hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes, offset, value_len); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_ike2_transform_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_ike2_attr, transform_ike2_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + switch(attr_type) { + case IKE2_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH: + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_ike2_attr_key_length, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %d", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +static void +dissect_transform(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, int protocol_id, void* decr_data) +{ + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + guint8 transform_id; + guint8 transform_num; + decrypt_data_t *decr = (decrypt_data_t *)decr_data; + int offset_end = 0; + offset_end = offset + length; + + transform_num = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_item_append_text(tree," # %d",transform_num); + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_number, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + transform_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + switch (protocol_id) { + case 1: /* ISAKMP */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id, tvb, offset, 1, + transform_id, "%s (%u)", + val_to_str_const(transform_id, vs_v1_trans_isakmp, "UNKNOWN-TRANS-TYPE"), transform_id); + break; + case 2: /* AH */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id, tvb, offset, 1, + transform_id, "%s (%u)", + val_to_str_const(transform_id, vs_v1_trans_ah, "UNKNOWN-AH-TRANS-TYPE"), transform_id); + break; + case 3: /* ESP */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id, tvb, offset, 1, + transform_id, "%s (%u)", + val_to_str_const(transform_id, vs_v1_trans_esp, "UNKNOWN-ESP-TRANS-TYPE"), transform_id); + break; + case 4: /* IPCOMP */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id, tvb, offset, 1, + transform_id, "%s (%u)", + val_to_str_const(transform_id, transform_id_ipcomp, "UNKNOWN-IPCOMP-TRANS-TYPE"), transform_id); + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + } + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA); + offset += 2; + + if (protocol_id == 1 && transform_id == 1) { + if (decr) { + /* Allow detection of missing IKE transform attributes: + * Make sure their values are not carried over from another transform + * dissected previously. */ + decr->ike_encr_alg = 0; + decr->ike_encr_keylen = 0; + decr->ike_hash_alg = 0; + } + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_ike_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, decr); + } + } + else { + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_ipsec_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset); + } + } + } + else if(isakmp_version == 2) + { + guint8 transform_type; + int offset_end = 0; + offset_end = offset + length; + + transform_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + + switch(transform_type){ + case TF_IKE2_ENCR: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_encr, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case TF_IKE2_PRF: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_prf, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case TF_IKE2_INTEG: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_integ, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case TF_IKE2_DH: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_dh, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case TF_IKE2_ESN: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_esn, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_trans_id_v2, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + } + offset += 2; + + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_ike2_transform_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset); + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_key_exch(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, + packet_info* pinfo, void* decr_data) +{ + if (isakmp_version == 2) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_key_exch_dh_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + length -= 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA); + offset += 2; + length -= 2; + } + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_key_exch_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + + if (isakmp_version == 1 && decr_data) { + decrypt_data_t *decr = (decrypt_data_t *)decr_data; + + if (decr->gi_len == 0 && addresses_equal(&decr->initiator, &pinfo->src)) { + decr->gi = (gchar *)g_malloc(length); + tvb_memcpy(tvb, decr->gi, offset, length); + decr->gi_len = length; + } else if (decr->gr_len == 0 && !addresses_equal(&decr->initiator, &pinfo->src)) { + decr->gr = (gchar *)g_malloc(length); + tvb_memcpy(tvb, decr->gr, offset, length); + decr->gr_len = length; + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_id_type(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, guint8 id_type, proto_tree *idtree, proto_item *idit, packet_info *pinfo ) +{ + const guint8 *str; + asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + + switch (id_type) { + case IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_addr, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s", tvb_ip_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset)); + break; + case IKE_ID_FQDN: + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_fqdn, tvb, offset, length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s", str); + break; + case IKE_ID_USER_FQDN: + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_user_fqdn, tvb, offset, length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s", str); + break; + case IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_addr, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_subnet, tvb, offset+4, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s/%s", tvb_ip_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset), tvb_ip_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset+4)); + break; + case IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_start, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_end, tvb, offset+4, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s/%s", tvb_ip_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset), tvb_ip_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset+4)); + break; + case IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_addr, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s", tvb_ip6_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset)); + break; + case IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_addr, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_subnet, tvb, offset+16, 16, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s/%s", tvb_ip6_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset), tvb_ip6_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset+16)); + break; + case IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_start, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_end, tvb, offset+16, 16, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s/%s", tvb_ip6_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset), tvb_ip6_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset+16)); + break; + case IKE_ID_KEY_ID: + proto_tree_add_item(idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_key_id, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case IKE_ID_DER_ASN1_DN: + dissect_x509if_Name(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, idtree, hf_isakmp_id_data_cert); + break; + default: + proto_item_append_text(idit, "%s", tvb_bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb,offset,length)); + break; + } +} + +static void +dissect_id(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, packet_info *pinfo ) +{ + guint8 id_type; + guint8 protocol_id; + guint16 port; + proto_item *idit; + proto_tree *idtree; + + id_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_type_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_type_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + protocol_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (protocol_id == 0) + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_id_protoid, tvb, offset, 1, + protocol_id, "Unused"); + else + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_protoid, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + port = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + if (port == 0) + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, + port, "Unused"); + else + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 2; + length -= 2; + + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_NA); + offset += 3; + length -= 3; + } + + /* + * It shows strings of all types though some of types are not + * supported in IKEv2 specification actually. + */ + idit = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + idtree = proto_item_add_subtree(idit, ett_isakmp_id); + dissect_id_type(tvb, offset, length, id_type, idtree, idit, pinfo); +} + +static void +dissect_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, packet_info *pinfo ) +{ + guint8 cert_type; + asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_isakmp_cert_data); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + switch(cert_type){ + case 12:{ + proto_item *ti_url; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cert_x509_hash, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset += 20; + length -= 20; + + ti_url = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cert_x509_url, tvb, offset, length, ENC_ASCII); + proto_item_set_url(ti_url); + } + break; + default: + dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_isakmp_cert_data); + break; + } + } + +} + +static void +dissect_certreq(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, packet_info *pinfo ) +{ + guint8 cert_type; + asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + if (length == 0) + return; + + switch(cert_type){ + case 4: + dissect_x509if_Name(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_sig); + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v1, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + } + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + /* this is a list of 20 byte SHA-1 hashes */ + while (length > 0) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v2, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + length-=20; + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_auth(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + guint32 auth_meth; + guint32 asn1_len; + proto_item * ti; + proto_tree * subtree; + proto_tree * asn1tree; + + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_auth_meth, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &auth_meth); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_NA); + offset += 3; + length -= 3; + + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_auth_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + + if (auth_meth == AUTH_METH_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) { + subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature); + + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(subtree, hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &asn1_len); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + /* cast ok, since length was parsed out of one unsigned byte into guint32 */ + if ( (asn1_len > 0) && ((int)asn1_len < length) ) { + + ti = proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_data, tvb, offset, asn1_len, ENC_NA); + asn1tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature_asn1_data); + dissect_unknown_ber(pinfo, tvb, offset, asn1tree); + + offset += asn1_len; + length -= asn1_len; + + proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_value, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_hash(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *ntree) +{ + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_hash, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); +} + +static void +dissect_sig(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *ntree) +{ + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sig, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); +} + +static void +dissect_nonce(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *ntree) +{ + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_nonce, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); +} + +static void +dissect_cisco_fragmentation(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo) +{ + guint8 seq; /* Packet sequence number, starting from 1 */ + guint8 last; + proto_tree *ptree; + ptree = proto_tree_get_parent(tree); + if (length < 4) + return; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_packetid, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + seq = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_seq, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + last = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_last, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + /*length-=4;*/ + + /* Start Reassembly stuff for Cisco IKE fragmentation */ + { + gboolean save_fragmented; + tvbuff_t *defrag_isakmp_tvb; + fragment_head *frag_msg; + + save_fragmented = pinfo->fragmented; + pinfo->fragmented = TRUE; + frag_msg = fragment_add_seq_check(&isakmp_cisco_reassembly_table, tvb, offset, + pinfo, + 12345, /*FIXME: Fragmented packet id, guint16, somehow get CKY here */ + NULL, + seq-1, /* fragment sequence number, starting from 0 */ + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset), /* fragment length - to the end */ + !last); /* More fragments? */ + defrag_isakmp_tvb = process_reassembled_data(tvb, offset, pinfo, + "Reassembled ISAKMP", frag_msg, + &isakmp_frag_items, /* groups and items, using same as Cisco */ + NULL, ptree); + + if (last && defrag_isakmp_tvb) { /* take it all */ + dissect_isakmp(defrag_isakmp_tvb, pinfo, ptree, NULL); + } + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, + " (%sMessage fragment %u%s)", + (last && frag_msg ? "Reassembled + " : ""), + seq, (last ? " - last" : "")); + pinfo->fragmented = save_fragmented; + } + /* End Reassembly stuff for Cisco IKE fragmentation */ + +} + +/* This is RFC7383 reassembly. */ +static void +dissect_ikev2_fragmentation(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, proto_tree *tree, + packet_info *pinfo, guint message_id, guint8 next_payload, gboolean is_request, void* decr_info) +{ + guint16 fragment_number, total_fragments; + gboolean message_next_payload_set = FALSE; + guint8 message_next_payload = 0; + gint iv_len, icd_len; + gint iv_offset; + gint icd_offset; + ikev2_decrypt_data_t *key_info; + + /* Fragment Number */ + fragment_number = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + total_fragments = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ike2_fragment_number, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + if (fragment_number == 0) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_bad_fragment_number, tvb, 0, 0, + "Fragment number must not be zero"); + } + else if (fragment_number > total_fragments) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_bad_fragment_number, tvb, 0, 0, + "Fragment number (%u) must not be greater than total fragments (%u)", + fragment_number, total_fragments); + } + + /* During the first pass, store in the conversation the next_payload */ + if (!pinfo->fd->visited && (fragment_number == 1)) { + /* Create/update conversation with message_id -> next_payload */ + conversation_t* p_conv = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); + ikev2_fragmentation_state_t *p_state = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), ikev2_fragmentation_state_t); + p_state->message_id = message_id; + p_state->next_payload = next_payload; + + /* Store the state with the conversation */ + conversation_add_proto_data(p_conv, proto_isakmp, (void*)p_state); + } + + /* Total fragments */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ike2_total_fragments, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + if (total_fragments == 0) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_bad_fragment_number, tvb, 0, 0, + "Total fragments must not be zero"); + } + + /* Show fragment summary in Info column */ + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (fragment %u/%u)", fragment_number, total_fragments); + + offset += 2; + + /* If this is the last fragment, need to know what the payload type for the reassembled message is, + which was included in the first fragment */ + if (fragment_number == total_fragments) { + if (!pinfo->fd->visited) { + /* On first pass, get it from the conversation info */ + conversation_t *p_conv = find_conversation_pinfo(pinfo, 0); + if (p_conv != NULL) { + ikev2_fragmentation_state_t *p_state = (ikev2_fragmentation_state_t*)conversation_get_proto_data(p_conv, proto_isakmp); + if (p_state != NULL) { + if (p_state->message_id == message_id) { + message_next_payload = p_state->next_payload; + message_next_payload_set = TRUE; + + /* Store in table for this frame for future passes */ + g_hash_table_insert(defrag_next_payload_hash, GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->num), GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)message_next_payload)); + } + } + } + } + else { + /* On later passes, look up in hash table by frame number */ + message_next_payload = (guint8)GPOINTER_TO_UINT(g_hash_table_lookup(defrag_next_payload_hash, GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->num))); + if (message_next_payload != 0) { + message_next_payload_set = TRUE; + } + } + } + + /* Can only know lengths of following fields if we have the key information */ + if (decr_info) { + key_info = (ikev2_decrypt_data_t*)(decr_info); + iv_len = key_info->encr_spec->iv_len; + icd_len = key_info->auth_spec->trunc_len; + } + else { + /* Can't show any more info. */ + return; + } + + /* Initialization Vector */ + iv_offset = offset; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_iv, tvb, offset, iv_len, ENC_NA); + offset += iv_len; + + icd_offset = offset + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) - icd_len; + + /* Encryption data */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_data, tvb, offset, icd_offset-offset, ENC_NA); + + /* Can only check how much padding there is after decrypting... */ + + /* Start Reassembly stuff for IKE2 fragmentation */ + { + gboolean save_fragmented; + tvbuff_t *defrag_decrypted_isakmp_tvb; + tvbuff_t *isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb; + fragment_head *frag_msg; + guint8 padding_length; + guint16 fragment_length; + + /* Decrypt but don't dissect this encrypted payload. */ + isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb = dissect_enc(tvb, iv_offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, iv_offset), tree, pinfo, + 0, /* Payload type won't be used in this call, and may not know yet */ + is_request, + decr_info, + FALSE /* Don't dissect decrypted tvb as not a completed payload */ + ); + + /* Save pinfo->fragmented, will later restore it */ + save_fragmented = pinfo->fragmented; + pinfo->fragmented = TRUE; + + /* Remove padding length + any padding bytes from reassembled payload */ + padding_length = tvb_get_guint8(isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb, tvb_reported_length(isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb)-1); + fragment_length = tvb_reported_length(isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb) - 1 - padding_length; + + /* Adding decrypted tvb into reassembly table here */ + frag_msg = fragment_add_seq_check(&isakmp_ike2_reassembly_table, + isakmp_decrypted_fragment_tvb, + 0, /* offset */ + pinfo, + message_id, /* message_id from top-level header */ + NULL, /* data? */ + fragment_number-1, /* fragment sequence number, starting from 0 */ + fragment_length, /* fragment - (padding_length + padding) */ + fragment_number < total_fragments); /* More fragments? */ + + defrag_decrypted_isakmp_tvb = process_reassembled_data(tvb, offset, pinfo, + "Reassembled IKE2 ISAKMP", + frag_msg, + &isakmp_frag_items, /* Tree IDs & items - using same ones as Cisco. */ + NULL, tree); + + if (defrag_decrypted_isakmp_tvb && key_info && message_next_payload_set) { + /* Completely reassembled - already decrypted - dissect reassembled payload if know next payload type */ + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (reassembled)"); + dissect_payloads(defrag_decrypted_isakmp_tvb, tree, + 2, /* Could store with next_payload, but wouldn't be here otherwise.. */ + message_next_payload, + 0, tvb_reported_length(defrag_decrypted_isakmp_tvb), + pinfo, message_id, is_request, decr_info); + } + /* Restore this flag */ + pinfo->fragmented = save_fragmented; + } + /* End Reassembly stuff for IKE2 fragmentation */ +} + +static void +dissect_notif(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version) +{ + guint32 doi = 0; + guint8 protocol_id; + guint8 spi_size; + guint16 msgtype; + proto_item *data_item; + proto_tree *data_tree; + int offset_end = 0; + offset_end = offset + length; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + doi = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_doi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + length -= 4; + } + + protocol_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + spi_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_spisize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + msgtype = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v1, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + if ((msgtype < 8192) || (msgtype > 16383 && msgtype < 40959 )) { + /* Standard error and status types */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v2, tvb, offset, 2, msgtype, "%s (%u)", + rval_to_str_const(msgtype, notifmsg_v2_type, "Unknown"), msgtype); + proto_item_append_text(tree, " - %s", + rval_to_str_const(msgtype, + notifmsg_v2_type, + "Unknown")); + } else { + /* Private error and status types */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v2, tvb, offset, 2, msgtype, "%s (%u)", + rval_to_str_const(msgtype, notifmsg_v2_3gpp_type, "Unknown"), msgtype); + proto_item_append_text(tree, " - %s", + rval_to_str_const(msgtype, + notifmsg_v2_3gpp_type, + "Unknown")); + } + } + offset += 2; + length -= 2; + + if (spi_size) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_spi, tvb, offset, spi_size, ENC_NA); + offset += spi_size; + length -= spi_size; + } + + /* Notification Data */ + + data_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + data_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(data_item, ett_isakmp_notify_data); + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + switch (msgtype) { + case 24576: /* RESPONDER LIFETIME */ + if (protocol_id == 1) { + /* Phase 1 */ + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_resp_lifetime_ike_attribute(tvb, pinfo, data_tree, offset); + } + } else if (protocol_id > 1 && doi == 1) { + /* Phase 2, IPsec DOI */ + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attribute(tvb, pinfo, data_tree, offset); + } + } + break; + case 36136: /* DPD ARE YOU THERE */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 36137: /* DPD ARE YOU THERE ACK */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there_ack, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 40501: /* UNITY Load Balance */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_unity_load_balance, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + switch(msgtype){ + case 17: /* INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_accepted_dh_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 16387: /* IPCOMP_SUPPORTED */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_cpi, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_transform_id, tvb, offset+2, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 16403: /* AUTH_LIFETIME" */ + { + guint32 hours; + guint32 minutes; + guint32 seconds; + guint32 durations_seconds; + + durations_seconds = tvb_get_guint32(tvb, offset, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + hours = durations_seconds / 3600; + minutes = (durations_seconds % 3600) / 60; + seconds = (durations_seconds % 3600) % 60; + + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_auth_lifetime, tvb, offset, length, durations_seconds, + "%u seconds (%u hour(s) %02u minute(s) %02u second(s))", durations_seconds, hours, minutes, seconds); + break; + } + case 16407: /* REDIRECT */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_len, tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + switch(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset)){ /* Ident Type ? */ + case 1: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv4, tvb, offset+2, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 2: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv6, tvb, offset+2, 16, ENC_NA); + break; + case 3: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_fqdn, tvb, offset+2, tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset+1), ENC_ASCII); + break; + default : + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident, tvb, offset+2, tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset+1), ENC_NA); + break; + } + length -= tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1) + 2; + offset += tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1) + 2; + if(length) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_nonce_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + } + break; + case 16408: /* REDIRECT_FROM */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_len, tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + switch(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset)){ /* Ident Type ? */ + case 1: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv4, tvb, offset+2, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 2: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv6, tvb, offset+2, 16, ENC_NA); + break; + default : + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident, tvb, offset+2, tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset+1), ENC_NA); + break; + } + break; + case 16409: /* TICKET_LT_OPAQUE */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_lifetime, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + length -= 4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case 16413: /* TICKET_OPAQUE */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case 16416: /* ROHC_SUPPORTED */ + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_rohc_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset); + } + break; + case 16419: /* QUICK_CRASH_DETECTION */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_qcd_token_secret_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case 16422: /* IKEV2_MESSAGE_ID_SYNC */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_nonce_data, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_send_req_msg_id, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_recv_req_msg_id, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case 16423: /* IPSEC_REPLAY_COUNTER_SYNC */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_incoming_ipsec_sa_delta_value, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case 16424: /* SECURE_PASSWORD_METHODS */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_secure_password_methods, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + break; + case 16431: /*SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS*/ + while(offset < offset_end) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_signature_hash_algorithms, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + } + break; + case 41041: + /* private status 3GPP BACKOFF_TIMER*/ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_backoff_timer_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset++; + de_gc_timer3(tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, 1, NULL, 0); + break; + case 41101: /* DEVICE_IDENTITY */ + if(length>=3) { + guint64 octet; + guint32 bit_offset; + + /* As specified in 3GPP TS 24.302 (Section 8.2.9.2) */ + /* Payload Octet 5,6 - Identity length */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + bit_offset = offset<<3; + bit_offset += 6; + + /* Payload Octet 7 - Identity type */ + proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_type, tvb, bit_offset, 2, &octet, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 1; + length -= 3; + + if(length==0) { + break; + } + + /* Payload Octet 8-n - Identity value */ + switch (octet) { + case 1: + /* IMEI */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imei, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BCD_DIGITS_0_9); + break; + case 2: + /* IMEISV */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imeisv, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BCD_DIGITS_0_9); + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_unknown_device_identity, tvb, offset, length); + break; + } + } + break; + case 41134: + /* private status 3GPP EMERGENCY_CALL_NUMBERS*/ + /* If Notify Data is not empty/missing */ + if(length>0) + { + /* As specified in 3GPP TS 23.302 (Section 8.1.2.3) and TS 24.008 (Section 10.5.3.13) */ + proto_tree *em_call_num_tree; + + /* Main Payload Subtree */ + em_call_num_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_main, NULL, "Emergency Call Numbers"); + + /* Payload Octet 5 - Length of IE Contents */ + proto_tree_add_item(em_call_num_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + /* Subtree for actual values */ + proto_tree *current_emergency_call_number_tree; + + while(offset<offset_end){ + guint8 current_em_num_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset)+1; //Total length including octets 3 and 4 for proper highlighting + + /* Subtree for elements*/ + current_emergency_call_number_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(em_call_num_tree, tvb, offset, current_em_num_len, ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element, NULL, "Emergency Number"); + + /*IE Octet 3 Number of octets used to encode the Emergency Service Category Value and the Number digits. */ + proto_tree_add_item(current_emergency_call_number_tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element_len,tvb,offset,1,ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + /*IE Octet 4 |Spare=0|Spare=0|Spare=0|Emergency Service Category Value| + * Bits 1 to 5 are coded as bits 1 to 5 of octet 3 of the Service Category + * information element as specified in subclause 10.5.4.33. (TS 24.008) + */ + static int * const isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flags[] = { + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_spare, + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b5_mountain_rescue, + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b4_marine_guard, + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b3_fire_brigade, + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b2_ambulance, + &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b1_police, + NULL + }; + proto_tree_add_bitmask_with_flags(current_emergency_call_number_tree, tvb, offset, hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flags, + ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element, isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flags,ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, BMT_NO_FALSE | BMT_NO_INT | BMT_NO_TFS); + offset += 1; + + /*IE Octet 5 to j | Digit_N+1 | Digit_N | */ + current_em_num_len -= 2; //Not counting octets 3 and 4 + proto_tree_add_item(current_emergency_call_number_tree, hf_iskamp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_number, tvb, offset, current_em_num_len, ENC_BCD_DIGITS_0_9); + offset += current_em_num_len; //moving to the next number in the list + } + } + break; + case 61520: /* Network Overlay ID (Fortinet) */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_notify_data_fortinet_network_overlay_id, tvb, offset, length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_delete(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version) +{ + guint8 spi_size; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_delete_doi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + length -= 4; + } + + + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + spi_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_spisize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + length -= 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_num_spis, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + length -= 2; + + if (spi_size > 0) { + while (length > 0) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_delete_spi, tvb, offset, spi_size, ENC_NA); + offset+=spi_size; + length-=spi_size; + } + } +} + + +static int +dissect_vid(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + const guint8 * pVID; + const char * vendorstring; + + pVID = tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, length); + + vendorstring = bytesprefix_to_str(pVID, (size_t)length, vendor_id, "Unknown Vendor ID"); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_bytes, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + proto_tree_add_string(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_string, tvb, offset, length, vendorstring); + proto_item_append_text(tree," : %s", vendorstring); + + /* very old CryptPro/GOST (Check Point R65) VID */ + if (length >= 24 && memcmp(pVID, VID_CP_01_R65, 20) == 0) + { + offset += 20; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cp_product, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset +=4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cp_version, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset +=4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cp_timestamp, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset +=4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cp_reserved, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset +=4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cp_features, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset +=4; + } + + /* Cisco Unity VID */ + if (length >= 14 && memcmp(pVID, VID_CISCO_UNITY, 14) == 0) + { + offset += 14; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_major, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, " %u", tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset)); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_minor, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, ".%u", tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset)); + offset += 1; + } + + /* VID_MS_NT5_ISAKMPOAKLEY */ + if (length >= 16 && memcmp(pVID, VID_MS_NT5_ISAKMPOAKLEY, 16) == 0) + { + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_ms_nt5_isakmpoakley, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + + /* VID_ARUBA_VIA_AUTH_PROFILE */ + if (length >= 19 && memcmp(pVID, VID_ARUBA_VIA_AUTH_PROFILE, 19) == 0) + { + offset += 19; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_aruba_via_auth_profile, tvb, offset, length-19, ENC_ASCII); + offset += 4; + } + + /* VID_FORTIGATE (Fortinet) */ + if (length >= 12 && memcmp(pVID, VID_FORTINET_FORTIGATE, 12) == 0) + { + offset += 12; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_release, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_build, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); + offset += 2; + } + return offset; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_config_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset, int isakmp_version, gboolean is_request) +{ + const range_string *vs_cfgattr; + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + guint i; + const guint8* str; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + vs_cfgattr = vs_v1_cfgattr; + hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.type = hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v1; + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + vs_cfgattr = vs_v2_cfgattr; + hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.type = hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v2; + } else { + /* Fail gracefully in case of an unsupported isakmp_version. */ + return 4; + } + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_cfg_attr, vs_cfgattr, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + offset += headerlen; + + if (value_len == 0) + { + /* Don't complain about zero length if part of a config request - values will be assigned and included in the response message */ + if (!is_request) { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + } + return headerlen; + } + + switch (attr_type) { + case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS: /* 1 */ + if (value_len % 4 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 4; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_address, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK: /* 2 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_netmask, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS: /* 3 */ + if (value_len % 4 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 4; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dns, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS: /* 4 */ + if (value_len % 4 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 4; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_nbns, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY: /* 5 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_address_expiry, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + case INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP: /* 6 */ + if (value_len % 4 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 4; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dhcp, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case APPLICATION_VERSION: /* 7 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_application_version, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS: /* 8 */ + if (value_len % 17 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 17; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_ip, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_prefix, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK: /* 9 Only in IKEv1 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_netmask, tvb, offset, 18, ENC_NA); + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_DNS: /* 10 */ + if (value_len % 16 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 16; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dns, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS: /* 11 */ + if (value_len % 16 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 16; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_nbns, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP: /* 12 */ + if (value_len % 16 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 16; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dhcp, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET: /* 13 */ + if (value_len % 8 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 8; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_ip, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_netmask, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES: /* 14 */ + if (value_len % 2 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 2; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_supported_attributes, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET: /* 15 */ + if (value_len % 17 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 17; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_ip, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_prefix, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + } + } + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_LINK: /* 17 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_interface, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 8; + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_id, tvb, offset, value_len - 8, ENC_NA); + break; + case INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX: /* 18 */ + if (value_len % 17 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 17; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_ip, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + } + } + break; + case P_CSCF_IP4_ADDRESS: /* 20 */ + if (value_len % 4 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 4; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip4_address, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + } + } + break; + case P_CSCF_IP6_ADDRESS: /* 21 */ + if (value_len % 16 == 0) + { + for (i = 0; i < value_len / 16; i++) + { + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip6_address, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + } + } + break; + case XAUTH_TYPE: /* 16520 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_type, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", rval_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), cfgattr_xauth_type, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case XAUTH_USER_NAME: /* 16521 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_name, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD: /* 16522 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_password, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_PASSCODE: /* 16523 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_passcode, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_MESSAGE: /* 16524 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_message, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_CHALLENGE: /* 16525 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_challenge, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_DOMAIN: /* 16526 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_domain, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_STATUS: /* 16527 */ + proto_tree_add_item(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_status, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset), cfgattr_xauth_status, "Unknown %d")); + break; + case XAUTH_NEXT_PIN: /* 16528 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_next_pin, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case XAUTH_ANSWER: /* 16527 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_answer, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + + case UNITY_BANNER: /* 28672 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_banner, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; + case UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN: /* 28674 */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_string(attr_tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_def_domain, tvb, offset, value_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA, pinfo->pool, &str); + proto_item_append_text(attr_item, ": %s", str); + break; +/* TODO: Support other UNITY Attributes ! */ + default: + /* No Default Action */ + break; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +static void +dissect_config(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version, gboolean is_request) +{ + int offset_end = 0; + offset_end = offset + length; + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v1,tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_identifier, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + } else if (isakmp_version == 2) { + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v2,tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_NA); + offset += 3; + + } else { + /* Skip attribute dissection for unknown IKE versions. */ + return; + } + + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_config_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, isakmp_version, is_request); + } +} + +static void +dissect_sa_kek(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + int payload_end = 0; + guint32 src_id_length, dst_id_length; + + guint8 next_payload; + guint16 payload_length; + + next_payload = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + payload_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + + payload_end = offset + payload_length; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_next_payload, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_reserved, tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_payload_len, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_protocol, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &src_id_length); + offset += 1; + if (src_id_length > 0) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_data, tvb, offset, src_id_length, ENC_NA); + offset += src_id_length; + } + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &dst_id_length); + offset += 1; + if (dst_id_length > 0) { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_data, tvb, offset, dst_id_length, ENC_NA); + offset += dst_id_length; + } + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_sak_spi, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA); + offset += 4; + while (offset < payload_end) { + offset += dissect_ipsec_attribute(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset); + } + if(PLOAD_IKE_SAT == next_payload) + { + dissect_sa_tek(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, tree); + } + /* GAP payload could also be here*/ +} + +static void +dissect_sa_tek(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + int offset_end = 0, payload_end=0; + guint32 protocol_id, src_id_length, dst_id_length; + offset_end = offset + length; + guint8 next_payload, id_type; + guint16 payload_length; + proto_item * ti; + proto_item * ntree; + proto_item * idit; + proto_tree * idtree; + + next_payload = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + payload_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + + payload_end = offset + payload_length; + + ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_typepayload, tvb, offset, payload_length, PLOAD_IKE_SAT); + + ntree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_isakmp_payload); + + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_next_payload, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_reserved, tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_payload_len, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + + offset += 4; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_protocol_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &protocol_id); + offset += 1; + if (protocol_id == 1 || protocol_id == 2) { + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_protocol, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + id_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &src_id_length); + offset += 2; + if (src_id_length > 0) { + idit = proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_data, tvb, offset, src_id_length, ENC_NA); + idtree = proto_item_add_subtree(idit, ett_isakmp_id); + dissect_id_type(tvb, offset, src_id_length, id_type, idtree, idit, pinfo); + offset += src_id_length; + } + id_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &dst_id_length); + offset += 2; + if (dst_id_length > 0) { + idit = proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_data, tvb, offset, dst_id_length, ENC_NA); + idtree = proto_item_add_subtree(idit, ett_isakmp_id); + dissect_id_type(tvb, offset, dst_id_length, id_type, idtree, idit, pinfo); + offset += dst_id_length; + } + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_transform_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_spi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA); + offset += 4; + while (offset < payload_end) { + offset += dissect_ipsec_attribute(tvb, pinfo, ntree, offset); + } + if(PLOAD_IKE_SAT == next_payload) + { + dissect_sa_tek(tvb, pinfo, offset, length, tree); + } + } else { + proto_tree_add_item(ntree, hf_isakmp_sat_payload, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, ENC_NA); + } + +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes consumed by this attribute. */ +static int +dissect_tek_key_attribute(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset) +{ + guint headerlen, value_len, attr_type; + proto_item *attr_item; + proto_tree *attr_tree; + + dissect_attribute_header(tvb, tree, offset, + hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr, tek_key_attr_type, + &headerlen, &value_len, &attr_type, + &attr_item, &attr_tree); + + if (value_len == 0) + { + expert_add_info(pinfo, attr_item, &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty); + return headerlen; + } + + return headerlen + value_len; +} + +static void +dissect_key_download(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version) +{ + int offset_end = 0, payload_end=0; + guint32 num_key_pkt, kdp_length, kdp_spi_size; + proto_item *kd_item; + proto_tree *payload_tree; + offset_end = offset + length; + + if (isakmp_version == 1) { + + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_isakmp_kd_num_key_pkt, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &num_key_pkt); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA); + offset += 2; + while ((num_key_pkt > 0) && (offset_end > offset)) { + kd_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_kd_payload, tvb, offset, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2), ENC_NA); + payload_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(kd_item, ett_isakmp_kd); + proto_tree_add_item(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_kdp_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_kdp_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &kdp_length); + payload_end = offset + kdp_length -2; + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_kdp_spi_size, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &kdp_spi_size); + offset += 1; + if (kdp_spi_size > 0) { + proto_tree_add_item(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_kdp_spi, tvb, offset, kdp_spi_size, ENC_NA); + offset += kdp_spi_size; + } + while (offset < payload_end) { + offset += dissect_tek_key_attribute(tvb, pinfo, payload_tree, offset); + } + num_key_pkt -= 1; + } + + } else { + /* TODO: For IKEv2: currently only draft status: draft-yeung-g-ikev2-15 */ + /* Skip dissection for unknown IKE versions. */ + return; + } +} + +static void +dissect_sequence(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + if (length != 4) { + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, tvb, 0, 0, + "Payload (bogus, length is %u, should be 4", length); + return; + } + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_seq_seq, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); +} + +static void +dissect_nat_discovery(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree ) +{ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_nat_hash, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); +} + +static void +dissect_nat_original_address(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length _U_, proto_tree *tree, int isakmp_version) +{ + guint8 id_type; + + id_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (isakmp_version == 1) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_type_v1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + }else if (isakmp_version == 2) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_id_type_v2, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + } + offset += 1; + + offset += 3; /* reserved */ + + switch (id_type) { + + case IKE_ID_IPV4_ADDR: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv4, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + + case IKE_ID_IPV6_ADDR: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv6, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +static int +dissect_ts(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, proto_tree *payload_tree) +{ + guint8 tstype, protocol_id; + guint16 len; + proto_item *ts_item; + proto_tree *tree; + const gchar *ts_typename; + + len = tvb_get_guint16(tvb, offset + 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + if (len < 4) + return 4; + + ts_item = proto_tree_add_item(payload_tree, hf_isakmp_ts_data, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA); + tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ts_item, ett_isakmp_ts); + + tstype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + ts_typename = rval_to_str(tstype, traffic_selector_type, "Unknown Type (%d)"); + proto_item_append_text(ts_item, ": %s", ts_typename); + + offset += 1; + + switch (tstype) { + case IKEV2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE: + protocol_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (protocol_id == 0) + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_protoid, tvb, offset,1, + protocol_id, "Unused"); + else + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_protoid, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_selector_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv4, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 4; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv4, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + + case IKEV2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE: + protocol_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (protocol_id == 0) + proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_protoid, tvb, offset,1, + protocol_id, "Unused"); + else + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_protoid, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_selector_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv6, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + offset += 16; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv6, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); + break; + + case IKEV2_TS_FC_ADDR_RANGE: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_selector_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_fc, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 3; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_fc, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 3; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_r_ctl, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_r_ctl, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_start_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_end_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + break; + } + + return len; +} + +static void +dissect_ts_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + guint8 num; + int offset_end = offset + length; + + num = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_item_append_text(tree," # %d", num); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_ts_number_of_ts, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_reserved, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_NA); + offset += 3; + + while (offset < offset_end) { + offset += dissect_ts(tvb, offset, tree); + } +} + +/* For IKEv2, decrypt payload if necessary and dissect using inner_payload */ +/* For RFC 7383 reassembly, only need decrypted payload, so don't set dissect_payload_now .*/ +/* TODO: rename? */ +static tvbuff_t* +dissect_enc(tvbuff_t *tvb, + int offset, + int length, + proto_tree *tree, + packet_info *pinfo, + guint8 inner_payload, + gboolean is_request, + void* decr_info, + gboolean dissect_payload_now) +{ + ikev2_decrypt_data_t *key_info = NULL; + gint iv_len, encr_data_len, icd_len, decr_data_len, md_len, icv_len, encr_key_len, encr_iv_len; + guint8 pad_len; + guchar *iv = NULL, *encr_data = NULL, *decr_data = NULL, *entire_message = NULL, *md = NULL, *encr_iv = NULL; + gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd; + gcry_md_hd_t md_hd; + gcry_error_t err = 0; + proto_item *item = NULL, *icd_item = NULL, *encr_data_item = NULL, *padlen_item = NULL, *iv_item = NULL; + tvbuff_t *decr_tvb = NULL; + gint payloads_len; + proto_tree *decr_tree = NULL, *decr_payloads_tree = NULL; + guchar *aa_data = NULL, *icv_data = NULL; + gint aad_len = 0; + + if (decr_info) { + /* Need decryption details to know field lengths. */ + key_info = (ikev2_decrypt_data_t*)(decr_info); + + /* Check if encr/auth specs are set properly (if for some case not, wireshark would crash) */ + if (!key_info->encr_spec || !key_info->auth_spec) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2: decryption/integrity specs not set-up properly: encr_spec: %p, auth_spec: %p", + (void *)key_info->encr_spec, (void*)key_info->auth_spec); + } + + iv_len = key_info->encr_spec->iv_len; + icv_len = key_info->encr_spec->icv_len; + icd_len = icv_len ? icv_len : (gint)key_info->auth_spec->trunc_len; + encr_data_len = length - iv_len - icd_len; + encr_key_len = key_info->encr_spec->key_len; + encr_iv_len = iv_len; + + /* + * Zero or negative length of encrypted data shows that the user specified + * wrong encryption algorithm and/or authentication algorithm. + */ + if (encr_data_len <= 0) { + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_isakmp_enc_iv, tvb, offset, length); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Add the IV to the tree and store it in a packet scope buffer for later decryption + * if the specified encryption algorithm uses IV. + */ + if (iv_len) { + if (dissect_payload_now) { + iv_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_iv, tvb, offset, iv_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(iv_item, " (%d bytes)", iv_len); + } + iv = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, iv_len); + encr_iv = iv; + + offset += iv_len; + } + + /* + * Add the encrypted portion to the tree and store it in a packet scope buffer for later decryption. + */ + if (dissect_payload_now) { + encr_data_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_data, tvb, offset, encr_data_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, " (%d bytes)",encr_data_len); + proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, " <%s>", val_to_str(key_info->encr_spec->number, vs_ikev2_encr_algs, "Unknown cipher: %d")); + } + encr_data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, encr_data_len); + offset += encr_data_len; + + /* + * Add the ICD (Integrity Checksum Data) to the tree before decryption to ensure + * the ICD be displayed even if the decryption fails. + */ + if (icd_len) { + icd_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_icd, tvb, offset, icd_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, " (%d bytes)",icd_len); + + /* + * Recalculate ICD value if the specified authentication algorithm allows it. + */ + if (icv_len) { + /* For GCM/CCM algorithms ICD is computed during decryption. + Must save offset and length of authenticated additional data (whole ISAKMP header + without iv and encrypted data) and ICV for later verification */ + aad_len = offset - iv_len - encr_data_len; + aa_data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, 0, aad_len); + icv_data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, icv_len); + } else + if (key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg) { + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, " <%s>", val_to_str(key_info->auth_spec->number, vs_ikev2_auth_algs, "Unknown mac algo: %d")); + err = gcry_md_open(&md_hd, key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg, key_info->auth_spec->gcry_flag); + if (err) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 hashing error: algorithm %d: gcry_md_open failed: %s", + key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + err = gcry_md_setkey(md_hd, key_info->auth_key, key_info->auth_spec->key_len); + if (err) { + gcry_md_close(md_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 hashing error: algorithm %s, key length %u: gcry_md_setkey failed: %s", + gcry_md_algo_name(key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg), key_info->auth_spec->key_len, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + + /* Calculate hash over the bytes from the beginning of the ISAKMP header to the right before the ICD. */ + entire_message = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, 0, offset); + gcry_md_write(md_hd, entire_message, offset); + md = gcry_md_read(md_hd, 0); + md_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg); + if (md_len < icd_len) { + gcry_md_close(md_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 hashing error: algorithm %s: gcry_md_get_algo_dlen returned %d which is smaller than icd length %d", + gcry_md_algo_name(key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg), md_len, icd_len); + } + if (tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, md, icd_len) == 0) { + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, "[correct]"); + } else { + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, "[incorrect, should be %s]", bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, md, icd_len)); + expert_add_info(pinfo, icd_item, &ei_isakmp_ikev2_integrity_checksum); + } + gcry_md_close(md_hd); + } else { + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, "[not validated]"); + } + } + + /* + * Confirm encrypted data length is multiple of block size. + */ + if (encr_data_len % key_info->encr_spec->block_len != 0) { + proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, "[Invalid length, should be a multiple of block size (%u)]", + key_info->encr_spec->block_len); + expert_add_info(pinfo, encr_data_item, &ei_isakmp_enc_data_length_mult_block_size); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Allocate buffer for decrypted data. + */ + decr_data = (guchar*)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, encr_data_len); + decr_data_len = encr_data_len; + + /* + * If the cipher is NULL, just copy the encrypted data to the decrypted data buffer. + * And otherwise perform decryption with libgcrypt. + */ + if (key_info->encr_spec->number == IKEV2_ENCR_NULL) { + memcpy(decr_data, encr_data, decr_data_len); + } else { + err = gcry_cipher_open(&cipher_hd, key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode, 0); + if (err) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d, mode %d: gcry_cipher_open failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + + /* Handling CTR mode and AEAD ciphers */ + if( key_info->encr_spec->salt_len ) { + int encr_iv_offset = 0; + encr_key_len = key_info->encr_spec->key_len - key_info->encr_spec->salt_len; + encr_iv_len = key_info->encr_spec->salt_len + iv_len; + if (key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) { + encr_iv_len = (int)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg); + if ((key_info->encr_spec->number >= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_16 && key_info->encr_spec->number <= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_12)) + encr_iv_offset = 1; + } + + if (encr_key_len < 0 || encr_iv_len < encr_iv_offset + (int)key_info->encr_spec->salt_len + iv_len) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d, key length %d, salt length %d, input iv length %d, cipher iv length: %d: invalid length(s) of cipher parameters", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, encr_key_len, key_info->encr_spec->salt_len, iv_len, encr_iv_len); + } + + encr_iv = (guchar *)wmem_alloc0(pinfo->pool, encr_iv_len); + memcpy( encr_iv + encr_iv_offset, key_info->encr_key + encr_key_len, key_info->encr_spec->salt_len ); + if(iv) { + memcpy( encr_iv + encr_iv_offset + key_info->encr_spec->salt_len, iv, iv_len ); + } + if (key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) { + encr_iv[encr_iv_len-1] = 1; + /* fallback for gcrypt not having AEAD ciphers */ + if ((key_info->encr_spec->number >= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_128_16 && key_info->encr_spec->number <= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_GCM_256_12)) + encr_iv[encr_iv_len-1]++; + if ((key_info->encr_spec->number >= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_128_16 && key_info->encr_spec->number <= IKEV2_ENCR_AES_CCM_256_12)) + encr_iv[0] = (guchar)(encr_iv_len - 2 - key_info->encr_spec->salt_len - iv_len); + } + } + + err = gcry_cipher_setkey(cipher_hd, key_info->encr_key, encr_key_len); + if (err) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d, key length %d: gcry_cipher_setkey failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, encr_key_len, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + if (key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + err = gcry_cipher_setctr(cipher_hd, encr_iv, encr_iv_len); + else + err = gcry_cipher_setiv(cipher_hd, encr_iv, encr_iv_len); + if (err) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d, iv length %d: gcry_cipher_setiv/gcry_cipher_setctr failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, encr_iv_len, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + + if (key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM) { + guint64 ccm_lengths[3]; + ccm_lengths[0] = encr_data_len; + ccm_lengths[1] = aad_len; + ccm_lengths[2] = icv_len; + + err = gcry_cipher_ctl(cipher_hd, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, ccm_lengths, sizeof(ccm_lengths)); + if (err) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d: gcry_cipher_ctl(GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS) failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + } + + if (aad_len) { + err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(cipher_hd, aa_data, aad_len); + if (err) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d: gcry_cipher_authenticate failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + } + + err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(cipher_hd, decr_data, decr_data_len, encr_data, encr_data_len); + if (err) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d: gcry_cipher_decrypt failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + + if (icv_len) { + /* gcry_cipher_checktag() doesn't work on 1.6.x version well - requires all of 16 bytes + * of ICV, so it won't work with 12 and 8 bytes of ICV. + * For 1.7.x version of libgcrypt we could use it safely. But for libgcrypt-1.6.x + * we need to read tag from library and compare manually. Using that way we can also show + * correct value if it is not valid. + * CCM mode is not affected, but requires to pass icv_len to cry_cipher_gettag(). + * + * Unfortunately gcrypt_cipher_gettag() have nothing similar to gcry_md_read(), + * so we need copy data to buffer here. + * Here, depending on cgrypt version gcm length shall be given differently: + * - in 1.7.x length can be of any aproved length (4,8,12,13,14,15,16 bytes), + * - in 1.6.x length must be equal of cipher block length. Aaargh... :-( + * We use accepted for both versions length of block size for GCM (16 bytes). + * For CCM length given must be the same as given to gcry_cipher_ctl(GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS) + * + * XXX: We now require libgcrypt 1.8.0, so presumably this could + * be updated? + */ + guchar *tag; + gint tag_len = icv_len; + if (key_info->encr_spec->gcry_mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM) + tag_len = (int)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg); + + if (tag_len < icv_len) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d: gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen returned %d which is smaller than icv length %d", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, tag_len, icv_len); + } + + tag = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, tag_len); + err = gcry_cipher_gettag(cipher_hd, tag, tag_len); + if (err) { + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("IKEv2 decryption error: algorithm %d: gcry_cipher_gettag failed: %s", + key_info->encr_spec->gcry_alg, gcry_strerror(err)); + } + else if (memcmp(tag, icv_data, icv_len) == 0) + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, "[correct]"); + else { + proto_item_append_text(icd_item, "[incorrect, should be %s]", bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, tag, icv_len)); + expert_add_info(pinfo, icd_item, &ei_isakmp_ikev2_integrity_checksum); + } + } + + gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); + } + + decr_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, decr_data, decr_data_len, decr_data_len); + add_new_data_source(pinfo, decr_tvb, "Decrypted Data"); + item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_decrypted_data, decr_tvb, 0, decr_data_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(item, " (%d byte%s)", decr_data_len, plurality(decr_data_len, "", "s")); + + /* Move the ICD item to the bottom of the tree. */ + if (icd_item) { + proto_tree_move_item(tree, item, icd_item); + } + decr_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_isakmp_decrypted_data); + + pad_len = tvb_get_guint8(decr_tvb, decr_data_len - 1); + payloads_len = decr_data_len - 1 - pad_len; + + if (payloads_len > 0) { + item = proto_tree_add_item(decr_tree, hf_isakmp_enc_contained_data, decr_tvb, 0, payloads_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(item, " (%d byte%s)", payloads_len, plurality(payloads_len, "", "s")); + decr_payloads_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_isakmp_decrypted_payloads); + } + + padlen_item = proto_tree_add_item(decr_tree, hf_isakmp_enc_pad_length, decr_tvb, payloads_len + pad_len, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + if (pad_len > 0) { + if (payloads_len < 0) { + proto_item_append_text(padlen_item, " [too long]"); + expert_add_info(pinfo, padlen_item, &ei_isakmp_enc_pad_length_big); + } else { + item = proto_tree_add_item(decr_tree, hf_isakmp_enc_padding, decr_tvb, payloads_len, pad_len, ENC_NA); + proto_item_append_text(item, " (%d byte%s)", pad_len, plurality(pad_len, "", "s")); + proto_tree_move_item(decr_tree, item, padlen_item); + } + } + + /* + * We dissect the inner payloads at last in order to ensure displaying Padding, Pad Length and ICD + * even if the dissection fails. This may occur when the user specify wrong encryption key. + */ + if (dissect_payload_now) { + dissect_payloads(decr_tvb, decr_payloads_tree, 2, inner_payload, 0, payloads_len, pinfo, 0, is_request, decr_info); + } + }else{ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_iv, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_data, tvb, offset+4 , length, ENC_NA); + } + return decr_tvb; +} + +static void +dissect_eap(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo) +{ + tvbuff_t *eap_tvb; + + eap_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, offset, length); + if ((eap_tvb != NULL)&& eap_handle != NULL){ + call_dissector(eap_handle, eap_tvb, pinfo, tree); + }else{ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_eap_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + } +} + +static void +dissect_gspm(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length, proto_tree *tree) +{ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_gspm_data, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); + +} + +/* + * Protocol initialization + */ + +static guint +isakmp_hash_func(gconstpointer c) { + const guint8 *i_cookie = (const guint8 *) c; + guint val = 0, keychunk, i; + + /* XOR our icookie down to the size of a guint */ + for (i = 0; i < COOKIE_SIZE - (COOKIE_SIZE % (guint)sizeof(keychunk)); i += (guint)sizeof(keychunk)) { + memcpy(&keychunk, &i_cookie[i], sizeof(keychunk)); + val ^= keychunk; + } + + return val; +} + +static gint +isakmp_equal_func(gconstpointer ic1, gconstpointer ic2) { + + if (memcmp(ic1, ic2, COOKIE_SIZE) == 0) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static guint ikev2_key_hash_func(gconstpointer k) { + const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key = (const ikev2_uat_data_key_t*)k; + guint hash, *key_segs; + size_t key_segcount, i; + + hash = 0; + + /* + * XOR our icookie down to the size of a guint. + * + * The cast to guint suppresses a warning 64-bit-to-32-bit narrowing + * from some buggy C compilers (I'm looking at *you*, + * i686-apple-darwin11-llvm-gcc-4.2 (GCC) 4.2.1 + * (Based on Apple Inc. build 5658) (LLVM build 2336.11.00).) + */ + key_segcount = key->spii_len / (guint)sizeof(guint); + key_segs = (guint *)key->spii; + for (i = 0; i < key_segcount; i++) { + hash ^= key_segs[i]; + } + key_segcount = key->spir_len / (guint)sizeof(guint); + key_segs = (guint *)key->spir; + for (i = 0; i < key_segcount; i++) { + hash ^= key_segs[i]; + } + + return hash; +} + +static gint ikev2_key_equal_func(gconstpointer k1, gconstpointer k2) { + const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key1 = (const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *)k1; + const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key2 = (const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *)k2; + if (key1->spii_len != key2->spii_len) return 0; + if (key1->spir_len != key2->spir_len) return 0; + if (memcmp(key1->spii, key2->spii, key1->spii_len) != 0) return 0; + if (memcmp(key1->spir, key2->spir, key1->spir_len) != 0) return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static void +free_cookie_key(gpointer key_arg) +{ + guint8 *ic_key = (guint8 *)key_arg; + + g_slice_free1(COOKIE_SIZE, ic_key); +} + +static void +free_cookie_value(gpointer value) +{ + decrypt_data_t *decr = (decrypt_data_t *)value; + + g_free(decr->gi); + g_free(decr->gr); + g_hash_table_destroy(decr->iv_hash); + g_slice_free1(sizeof(decrypt_data_t), decr); +} + +static void +isakmp_init_protocol(void) { + guint i; + decrypt_data_t *decr; + guint8 *ic_key; + isakmp_hash = g_hash_table_new_full(isakmp_hash_func, isakmp_equal_func, + free_cookie_key, free_cookie_value); + + for (i = 0; i < num_ikev1_uat_data; i++) { + ic_key = (guint8 *)g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); + memcpy(ic_key, ikev1_uat_data[i].icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); + + decr = create_decrypt_data(); + memcpy(decr->secret, ikev1_uat_data[i].key, ikev1_uat_data[i].key_len); + decr->secret_len = ikev1_uat_data[i].key_len; + + g_hash_table_insert(isakmp_hash, ic_key, decr); + } + ikev2_key_hash = g_hash_table_new(ikev2_key_hash_func, ikev2_key_equal_func); + for (i = 0; i < num_ikev2_uat_data; i++) { + g_hash_table_insert(ikev2_key_hash, &(ikev2_uat_data[i].key), &(ikev2_uat_data[i])); + /* Need find references to algorithms (as UAT table editing looses data not stored in file) */ + ikev2_uat_data[i].encr_spec = ikev2_decrypt_find_encr_spec(ikev2_uat_data[i].encr_alg); + ikev2_uat_data[i].auth_spec = ikev2_decrypt_find_auth_spec(ikev2_uat_data[i].auth_alg); + } + defrag_next_payload_hash = g_hash_table_new(g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal); +} + +static void +isakmp_cleanup_protocol(void) { + g_hash_table_destroy(isakmp_hash); + g_hash_table_destroy(ikev2_key_hash); + g_hash_table_destroy(defrag_next_payload_hash); +} + +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev1_users, icookie, ikev1_uat_data_key_t, icookie, icookie_len) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev1_users, key, ikev1_uat_data_key_t, key, key_len) + +static bool ikev1_uat_data_update_cb(void* p, char** err) { + ikev1_uat_data_key_t *ud = (ikev1_uat_data_key_t *)p; + + if (ud->icookie_len != COOKIE_SIZE) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of Initiator's COOKIE must be %d octets (%d hex characters).", COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE * 2); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->key_len == 0) { + *err = g_strdup("Must have Encryption key."); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->key_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of Encryption key limited to %d octets (%d hex characters).", MAX_KEY_SIZE, MAX_KEY_SIZE * 2); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static void* +ikev1_uat_data_copy_cb(void *dest, const void *source, size_t len _U_) +{ + const ikev1_uat_data_key_t* o = (const ikev1_uat_data_key_t*)source; + ikev1_uat_data_key_t* d = (ikev1_uat_data_key_t*)dest; + + d->icookie = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->icookie, o->icookie_len); + d->icookie_len = o->icookie_len; + d->key = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->key, o->key_len); + d->key_len = o->key_len; + + return dest; +} + +static void +ikev1_uat_data_free_cb(void *r) +{ + ikev1_uat_data_key_t *rec = (ikev1_uat_data_key_t *)r; + g_free(rec->icookie); + g_free(rec->key); +} + +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, spii, ikev2_uat_data_t, key.spii, key.spii_len) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, spir, ikev2_uat_data_t, key.spir, key.spir_len) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, sk_ei, ikev2_uat_data_t, sk_ei, sk_ei_len) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, sk_er, ikev2_uat_data_t, sk_er, sk_er_len) +UAT_VS_DEF(ikev2_users, encr_alg, ikev2_uat_data_t, guint, IKEV2_ENCR_3DES, IKEV2_ENCR_3DES_STR) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, sk_ai, ikev2_uat_data_t, sk_ai, sk_ai_len) +UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, sk_ar, ikev2_uat_data_t, sk_ar, sk_ar_len) +UAT_VS_DEF(ikev2_users, auth_alg, ikev2_uat_data_t, guint, IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96_STR) + +static void* +ikev2_uat_data_copy_cb(void *dest, const void *source, size_t len _U_) +{ + const ikev2_uat_data_t* o = (const ikev2_uat_data_t*)source; + ikev2_uat_data_t* d = (ikev2_uat_data_t*)dest; + + d->key.spii = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->key.spii, o->key.spii_len); + d->key.spii_len = o->key.spii_len; + + d->key.spir = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->key.spir, o->key.spir_len); + d->key.spir_len = o->key.spir_len; + + d->encr_alg = o->encr_alg; + d->auth_alg = o->auth_alg; + + d->sk_ei = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->sk_ei, o->sk_ei_len); + d->sk_ei_len = o->sk_ei_len; + + d->sk_er = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->sk_er, o->sk_er_len); + d->sk_er_len = o->sk_er_len; + + d->sk_ai = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->sk_ai, o->sk_ai_len); + d->sk_ai_len = o->sk_ai_len; + + d->sk_ar = (guchar *)g_memdup2(o->sk_ar, o->sk_ar_len); + d->sk_ar_len = o->sk_ar_len; + + d->encr_spec = (ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t *)g_memdup2(o->encr_spec, sizeof(ikev2_encr_alg_spec_t)); + d->auth_spec = (ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t *)g_memdup2(o->auth_spec, sizeof(ikev2_auth_alg_spec_t)); + + return dest; +} + +static bool ikev2_uat_data_update_cb(void* p, char** err) { + ikev2_uat_data_t *ud = (ikev2_uat_data_t *)p; + + if (ud->key.spii_len != COOKIE_SIZE) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of Initiator's SPI must be %d octets (%d hex characters).", COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE * 2); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->key.spir_len != COOKIE_SIZE) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of Responder's SPI must be %d octets (%d hex characters).", COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE * 2); + return FALSE; + } + + if ((ud->encr_spec = ikev2_decrypt_find_encr_spec(ud->encr_alg)) == NULL) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("Couldn't get IKEv2 encryption algorithm spec."); + } + + if ((ud->auth_spec = ikev2_decrypt_find_auth_spec(ud->auth_alg)) == NULL) { + REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("Couldn't get IKEv2 authentication algorithm spec."); + } + + if (ud->encr_spec->icv_len && ud->auth_spec->number != IKEV2_AUTH_NONE) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Selected encryption_algorithm %s requires selecting NONE integrity algorithm.", + val_to_str(ud->encr_spec->number, vs_ikev2_encr_algs, "other-%d")); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->sk_ei_len != ud->encr_spec->key_len) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of SK_ei (%u octets) does not match the key length (%u octets) of the selected encryption algorithm.", + ud->sk_ei_len, ud->encr_spec->key_len); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->sk_er_len != ud->encr_spec->key_len) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of SK_er (%u octets) does not match the key length (%u octets) of the selected encryption algorithm.", + ud->sk_er_len, ud->encr_spec->key_len); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->sk_ai_len != ud->auth_spec->key_len) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of SK_ai (%u octets) does not match the key length (%u octets) of the selected integrity algorithm.", + ud->sk_ai_len, ud->auth_spec->key_len); + return FALSE; + } + + if (ud->sk_ar_len != ud->auth_spec->key_len) { + *err = ws_strdup_printf("Length of SK_ar (%u octets) does not match the key length (%u octets) of the selected integrity algorithm.", + ud->sk_ar_len, ud->auth_spec->key_len); + return FALSE; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static void +ikev2_uat_data_free_cb(void *r) +{ + ikev2_uat_data_t *rec = (ikev2_uat_data_t *)r; + g_free(rec->key.spii); + g_free(rec->key.spir); + g_free(rec->sk_ei); + g_free(rec->sk_er); + g_free(rec->sk_ai); + g_free(rec->sk_ar); +} + +void +proto_register_isakmp(void) +{ + module_t *isakmp_module; + static hf_register_info hf[] = { + { &hf_isakmp_ispi, + { "Initiator SPI", "isakmp.ispi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Initiator SPI", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_rspi, + { "Responder SPI", "isakmp.rspi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Responder SPI", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_typepayload, + { "Payload", "isakmp.typepayload", + FT_UINT8,BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(payload_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Payload Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_nextpayload, + { "Next payload", "isakmp.nextpayload", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(payload_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Next Payload", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_criticalpayload, + { "Critical Bit", "isakmp.criticalpayload", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8,TFS(&tfs_critical_not_critical), 0x80, + "IKEv2 Critical Payload", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_reserved7, + { "Reserved", "isakmp.reserved7", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x7F, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_reserved, + { "Reserved", "isakmp.reserved", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_extradata, + { "Extra data", "isakmp.extradata", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Extra data ??????", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_datapayload, + { "Data Payload", "isakmp.datapayload", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Data Payload (not dissect)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_version, + { "Version", "isakmp.version", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Version (major + minor)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_mjver, + { "MjVer", "isakmp.mjver", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0xF0, + "ISAKMP MjVer", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_mnver, + { "MnVer", "isakmp.mnver", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0F, + "ISAKMP MnVer", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v1, + { "Exchange type", "isakmp.exchangetype", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(exchange_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Exchange Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_exchangetype_v2, + { "Exchange type", "isakmp.exchangetype", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(exchange_v2_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Exchange Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flags, + { "Flags", "isakmp.flags", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Flags", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_e, + { "Encryption", "isakmp.flag_e", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&flag_e), E_FLAG, + "Encryption Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_c, + { "Commit", "isakmp.flag_c", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&flag_c), C_FLAG, + "Commit Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_a, + { "Authentication", "isakmp.flag_a", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&flag_a), A_FLAG, + "Authentication Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_i, + { "Initiator", "isakmp.flag_i", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&flag_i), I_FLAG, + "Initiator Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_v, + { "Version", "isakmp.flag_v", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&flag_v), V_FLAG, + "Version Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_flag_r, + { "Response", "isakmp.flag_r", + FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&tfs_response_request), R_FLAG, + "Response Bit", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_messageid, + { "Message ID", "isakmp.messageid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Message ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_length, + { "Length", "isakmp.length", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_payloadlen, + { "Payload length", "isakmp.payloadlength", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Payload Length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_doi, + { "Domain of interpretation", "isakmp.sa.doi", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(doi_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Domain of Interpretation", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_situation, + { "Situation", "isakmp.sa.situation", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP SA Situation", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_attribute_next_payload, + { "SA Attribute Next Payload", "isakmp.sa.next_attribute_payload", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Payloads that define specific security association attributes for the KEK and/or TEKs", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_reserved2, + { "Reserved2", "isakmp.reserved2", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_situation_identity_only, + { "Identity Only", "isakmp.sa.situation.identity_only", + FT_BOOLEAN, 32, NULL, SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY, + "The type specifies that the SA will be identified by source identity information present in an associated Identification Payload", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_situation_secrecy, + { "Secrecy", "isakmp.sa.situation.secrecy", + FT_BOOLEAN, 32, NULL, SIT_SECRECY, + "The type specifies that the SA is being negotiated in an environment that requires labeled secrecy.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sa_situation_integrity, + { "Integrity", "isakmp.sa.situation.integrity", + FT_BOOLEAN, 32, NULL, SIT_INTEGRITY, + "The type specifies that the SA is being negotiated in an environment that requires labeled integrity", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v1, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.prop.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Proposal Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_prop_protoid_v2, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.prop.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Proposal Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_prop_number, + { "Proposal number", "isakmp.prop.number", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Proposal Number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_spisize, + { "SPI Size", "isakmp.spisize", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_spi, + { "SPI", "isakmp.spi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_prop_transforms, + { "Proposal transforms", "isakmp.prop.transforms", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Proposal Transforms", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_number, + { "Transform number", "isakmp.trans.number", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Transform Number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_id, + { "Transform ID", "isakmp.trans.id", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Transform ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_type_v1, + { "ID type", "isakmp.id.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_id_type), 0x0, + "IKEv1 ID Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_type_v2, + { "ID type", "isakmp.id.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v2_id_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 ID Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_protoid, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.id.protoid", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ipproto_val_ext, 0x0, + "ISAKMP ID Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_port, + { "Port", "isakmp.id.port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP ID Port", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data, + { "Identification Data:", "isakmp.id.data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP ID Data", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_addr, + { "ID_IPV4_ADDR", "isakmp.id.data.ipv4_addr", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies a single four (4) octet IPv4 address", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_fqdn, + { "ID_FQDN", "isakmp.id.data.fqdn", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies a fully-qualified domain name string", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_user_fqdn, + { "ID_FQDN", "isakmp.id.data.user_fqdn", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies a fully-qualified username string", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_subnet, + { "ID_IPV4_SUBNET", "isakmp.id.data.ipv4_subnet", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The second is an IPv4 network mask", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_start, + { "ID_IPV4_RANGE (Start)", "isakmp.id.data.ipv4_range_start", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The first value is the beginning IPv4 address (inclusive)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv4_range_end, + { "ID_IPV4_RANGE (End)", "isakmp.id.data.ipv4_range_end", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The second value is the ending IPv4 address (inclusive)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_addr, + { "ID_IPV6_ADDR", "isakmp.id.data.ipv6_addr", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies a single sixteen (16) octet IPv6 address", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_subnet, + { "ID_IPV6A_ADDR_SUBNET", "isakmp.id.data.ipv6_subnet", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies a range of IPv6 addresses represented by two sixteen (16) octet values", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_start, + { "ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE (Start)", "isakmp.id.data.ipv6_range_start", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The first value is the beginning IPv6 address (inclusive)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_ipv6_range_end, + { "ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE (End)", "isakmp.id.data.ipv6_range_end", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "the second value is the ending IPv6 address (inclusive)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_key_id, + { "ID_KEY_ID", "isakmp.id.data.key_id", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The type specifies an opaque byte stream which may be used to pass vendor-specific information necessary to identify which pre-shared key should be used to authenticate Aggressive mode negotiations", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_id_data_cert, + { "ID_DER_ASN1_DN", "isakmp.id.data.der_asn1_dn", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v1, + { "Certificate Encoding", "isakmp.cert.encoding", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(cert_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Certificate Encoding", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cert_encoding_v2, + { "Certificate Encoding", "isakmp.cert.encoding", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(cert_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Certificate Encoding", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cert_data, + { "Certificate Data", "isakmp.cert.data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Certificate Data", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cert_x509_hash, + { "Hash", "isakmp.cert.x509.hash", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cert_x509_url, + { "URL", "isakmp.cert.x509.url", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v1, + { "Certificate Type", "isakmp.certreq.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(cert_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Certificate Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_certreq_type_v2, + { "Certificate Type", "isakmp.certreq.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(cert_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Certificate Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_auth_meth, + { "Authentication Method", "isakmp.auth.method", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(authmeth_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Authentication Method", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_auth_data, + { "Authentication Data", "isakmp.auth.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "IKEv2 Authentication Data", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_len, + { "ASN.1 Length", "isakmp.auth.data.sig.asn1.len", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "IKEv2 Authentication Data Digital Signature ASN.1 Length", HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_asn1_data, + { "ASN.1 Data", "isakmp.auth.data.sig.asn1.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "IKEv2 Authentication Data Digital Signature ASN.1 Data", HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_auth_digital_sig_value, + { "Signature Value", "isakmp.auth.data.sig.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "IKEv2 Authentication Data Digital Signature Value", HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_doi, + { "Domain of interpretation", "isakmp.notify.doi", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(doi_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Notify Domain of Interpretation", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v1, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.notify.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Notify Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_protoid_v2, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.notify.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Notify Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v1, + { "Notify Message Type", "isakmp.notify.msgtype", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(notifmsg_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Notify Message Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_msgtype_v2, + { "Notify Message Type", "isakmp.notify.msgtype", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(notifmsg_v2_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Notify Message Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data, + { "Notification DATA", "isakmp.notify.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there, + { "DPD ARE-YOU-THERE sequence", "isakmp.notify.data.dpd.are_you_there", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_dpd_are_you_there_ack, + { "DPD ARE-YOU-THERE-ACK sequence", "isakmp.notify.data.dpd.are_you_there_ack", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_unity_load_balance, + { "UNITY LOAD BALANCE", "isakmp.notify.data.unity.load_balance", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_fortinet_network_overlay_id, + { "Network Overlay ID", "isakmp.notify.data.fortinet.network_overlay_id", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_accepted_dh_group, + { "Accepted DH group number", "isakmp.notify.data.accepted_dh_group", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(dh_group), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_cpi, + { "IPCOMP CPI", "isakmp.notify.data.ipcomp.cpi", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ipcomp_transform_id, + { "IPCOMP Transform ID", "isakmp.notify.data.ipcomp.transform_id", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_id_ipcomp), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_auth_lifetime, + { "Authentication Lifetime", "isakmp.notify.data.auth_lifetime", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_type, + { "Gateway Identity Type", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.gw_ident.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(redirect_gateway_identity_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_gw_ident_len, + { "Gateway Identity Length", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.gw_ident.len", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv4, + { "New Responder Gateway Identity (IPv4)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.new_resp_gw_ident.ipv4", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_ipv6, + { "New Responder Gateway Identity (IPv6)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.new_resp_gw_ident.ipv6", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident_fqdn, + { "New Responder Gateway Identity (FQDN)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.new_resp_gw_ident.fqdn", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_new_resp_gw_ident, + { "New Responder Gateway Identity (DATA)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.new_resp_gw_ident.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_nonce_data, + { "Redirect Nonce Data", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.nonce_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv4, + { "Original Responder Gateway Identity (IPv4)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.org_resp_gw_ident.ipv4", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident_ipv6, + { "Original Responder Gateway Identity (IPv6)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.org_resp_gw_ident.ipv6", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_redirect_org_resp_gw_ident, + { "Original Responder Gateway Identity (DATA)", "isakmp.notify.data.redirect.org_resp_gw_ident.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_lifetime, + { "TICKET OPAQUE Lifetime", "isakmp.notify.data.ticket_opaque.lifetime", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "The Lifetime field contains a relative time value, the number of seconds until the ticket expires (encoded as an unsigned integer).", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ticket_data, + { "TICKET OPAQUE Data", "isakmp.notify.data.ticket_opaque.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* ROHC Attributes Type */ + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr.all, + { "ROHC Attribute Type", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr.type, + { "ROHC Attribute Type", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(rohc_attr_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr.format, + { "ROHC Format", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_max_cid, + { "Maximum Context Identifier", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.max_cid", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_profile, + { "ROHC Profile", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.profile", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_integ, + { "ROHC Integrity Algorithm", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.integ", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_ike2_integ_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_icv_len, + { "ROHC ICV Length in bytes", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.icv_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "In bytes", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_rohc_attr_mrru, + { "MRRU", "isakmp.notify.data.rohc.attr.mrru", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_qcd_token_secret_data, + { "Token Secret Data", "isakmp.notify.data.qcd.token_secret_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_nonce_data, + { "Nonce Data", "isakmp.notify.data.ha.nonce_data", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "Random nonce data, the data should be identical in the synchronization request and response", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_send_req_msg_id, + { "EXPECTED SEND REQ MESSAGE ID", "isakmp.notify.data.ha.expected_send_req_message_id", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "Indicate the Message ID it will use in the next request that it will send to the other protocol peer", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_expected_recv_req_msg_id, + { "EXPECTED RECV REQ MESSAGE ID", "isakmp.notify.data.ha.expected_recv_req_message_id", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "Indicate the Message ID it is expecting in the next request to be received from the other protocol peer", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_ha_incoming_ipsec_sa_delta_value, + { "Incoming IPsec SA delta value", "isakmp.notify.data.ha.incoming_ipsec_sa_delta_value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The sender requests that the peer should increment all the Child SA Replay Counters for the sender's incomingtraffic by this value", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_secure_password_methods, + { "Secure Password Methods", "isakmp.notify.data.secure_password_methods", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_signature_hash_algorithms, + { "Supported Signature Hash Algorithm", "isakmp.notify.data.signature_hash_algorithms", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(signature_hash_algorithms), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_delete_doi, + { "Domain of interpretation", "isakmp.delete.doi", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(doi_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Delete Domain of Interpretation", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v1, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.delete.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v1_type), 0x0, + "ISAKMP Delete Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_delete_protoid_v2, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.delete.protoid", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(protoid_v2_type), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Delete Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_delete_spi, + { "Delete SPI", "isakmp.delete.spi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Identifies the specific security association(s) to delete", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_bytes, + { "Vendor ID", "isakmp.vid_bytes", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_string, + { "Vendor ID", "isakmp.vid_string", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cp_product, + { "Checkpoint Product", "isakmp.vid.cp.product", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(cp_product), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cp_version, + { "Checkpoint Version", "isakmp.vid.cp.version", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(cp_version), 0x0, + "Encoded Version number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cp_timestamp, + { "Checkpoint Timestamp", "isakmp.vid.cp.timestamp", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Timestamp (NGX only; always zero in 4.1 or NG)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cp_reserved, + { "Checkpoint Reserved", "isakmp.vid.cp.reserved", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cp_features, + { "Checkpoint Features", "isakmp.vid.cp.features", + FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_major, + { "CISCO-UNITY Major version", "isakmp.vid.cisco_unity.major", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_vid_cisco_unity_minor, + { "CISCO-UNITY Minor version", "isakmp.vid.cisco_unity.minor", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_vid_ms_nt5_isakmpoakley, + { "MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY", "isakmp.vid.ms_nt5_isakmpoakley", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(ms_nt5_isakmpoakley_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_vid_aruba_via_auth_profile, + { "Auth Profile", "isakmp.vid.aruba_via_auth_profile", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Aruba Networks Auth Profile for VIA Client", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_release, + { "Release", "isakmp.vid.fortinet.fortigate.release", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Release of Fortigate", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_vid_fortinet_fortigate_build, + { "Build", "isakmp.vid.fortinet.fortigate.build", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Build of Fortigate", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_ts_number_of_ts, + { "Number of Traffic Selectors", "isakmp.ts.number", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_type, + { "Traffic Selector Type", "isakmp.ts.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(traffic_selector_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_protoid, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.ts.protoid", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ipproto_val_ext, 0x0, + "IKEv2 Traffic Selector Protocol ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_selector_length, + { "Selector Length", "isakmp.ts.selector_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_port, + { "Start Port", "isakmp.ts.start_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_port, + { "End Port", "isakmp.ts.end_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv4, + { "Starting Addr", "isakmp.ts.start_ipv4", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv4, + { "Ending Addr", "isakmp.ts.end_ipv4", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_ipv6, + { "Starting Addr", "isakmp.ts.start_ipv6", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_ipv6, + { "Ending Addr", "isakmp.ts.end_ipv6", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_addr_fc, + { "Starting Addr", "isakmp.ts.start_fc", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_addr_fc, + { "Ending Addr", "isakmp.ts.end_fc", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_r_ctl, + { "Starting R_CTL", "isakmp.ts.start_r_ctl", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_r_ctl, + { "Ending R_CTL", "isakmp.ts.end_r_ctl", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_start_type, + { "Starting Type", "isakmp.ts.start_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_end_type, + { "Ending Type", "isakmp.ts.end_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ts_data, + { "Traffic Selector", "isakmp.ts.data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "An individual traffic selector", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_num_spis, + { "Number of SPIs", "isakmp.spinum", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP Number of SPIs", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_hash, + { "Hash DATA", "isakmp.hash", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sig, + { "Signature DATA", "isakmp.sig", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_nonce, + { "Nonce DATA", "isakmp.nonce", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_fragment_number, + { "Fragment Number", "isakmp.frag.number", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP fragment number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_total_fragments, + { "Total Fragments", "isakmp.frag.total", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP total number of fragments", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_packetid, + { "Frag ID", "isakmp.frag.packetid", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP fragment packet-id", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_seq, + { "Frag seq", "isakmp.frag.seq", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "ISAKMP fragment number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cisco_frag_last, + { "Frag last", "isakmp.frag.last", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(frag_last_vals), 0x0, + "ISAKMP last fragment", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_fragments, + {"Message fragments", "isakmp.fragments", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment, + {"Message fragment", "isakmp.fragment", + FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap, + {"Message fragment overlap", "isakmp.fragment.overlap", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_overlap_conflicts, + {"Message fragment overlapping with conflicting data", + "isakmp.fragment.overlap.conflicts", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_multiple_tails, + {"Message has multiple tail fragments", + "isakmp.fragment.multiple_tails", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_too_long_fragment, + {"Message fragment too long", "isakmp.fragment.too_long_fragment", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_error, + {"Message defragmentation error", "isakmp.fragment.error", + FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_fragment_count, + {"Message fragment count", "isakmp.fragment.count", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_reassembled_in, + {"Reassembled in", "isakmp.reassembled.in", + FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_reassembled_length, + {"Reassembled ISAKMP length", "isakmp.reassembled.length", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_sig, + { "Certificate Authority Signature", "isakmp.ike.certreq.authority.sig", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v1, + { "Certificate Authority Data", "isakmp.ike.certreq.authority", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_certreq_authority_v2, + { "Certificate Authority Data", "isakmp.ike.certreq.authority", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "SHA-1 hash of the Certificate Authority", HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_nat_keepalive, + { "NAT Keepalive", "isakmp.ike.nat_keepalive", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "NAT Keepalive packet", HFILL } }, + { &hf_isakmp_nat_hash, + { "HASH of the address and port", "isakmp.ike.nat_hash", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv4, + { "NAT Original IPv4 Address", "isakmp.ike.nat_original_address_ipv4", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_nat_original_address_ipv6, + { "NAT Original IPv6 Address", "isakmp.ike.nat_original_address_ipv6", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /*tek key download type (ISAKMP phase 2 GDOI)*/ + { &hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr.all, + { "Key download Tek Attribute", "isakmp.key_download.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.key_download.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "key_download Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.key_download.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "key_download Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.key_download.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "key_download Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_tek_key_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.key_download.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "key_download Attribute value", HFILL }}, + /* IPsec SA Attributes (ISAKMP Phase 2) */ + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr.all, + { "IPsec Attribute", "isakmp.ipsec.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(ipsec_attr_type), 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "IPsec Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute value", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_type, + { "Life Type", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.life_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(attr_life_type), 0x00, + "The unit (seconds or kilobytes) of the associated Life Duration attribute.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.life_duration", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.life_duration64", + FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.life_duration_bytes", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_group_description, + { "Group Description", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.group_description", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(dh_group), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_encap_mode, + { "Encapsulation Mode", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.encap_mode", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_encap_mode), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_algorithm, + { "Authentication Algorithm", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.auth_algorithm", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_auth_algo), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_length, + { "Key Length", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_key_rounds, + { "Key Rounds", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.key_rounds", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_dict_size, + { "Compress Dictionary Size", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.cmpr_dict_size", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_cmpr_algorithm, + { "Compress Private Algorithm", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.cmpr_algorithm", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel, + { "ECN Tunnel", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.ecn_tunnel", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_ecn_tunnel), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr, + { "Extended (64-bit) Sequence Number", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.ext_seq_nbr", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_ext_seq_nbr), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_auth_key_length, + { "Authentication Key Length", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.auth_key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sig_enco_algorithm, + { "Signature Encoding Algorithm", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.sig_enco_algorithm", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_addr_preservation, + { "Address Preservation", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.addr_preservation", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_addr_preservation), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ipsec_attr_sa_direction, + { "SA Direction", "isakmp.ipsec.attr.sa_direction", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ipsec_attr_sa_direction), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* Responder Lifetime Notification for IPsec SA */ + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr.all, + { "IPsec Attribute", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(ipsec_attr_type), 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "IPsec Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IPsec Attribute value", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_type, + { "Life Type", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.life_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(attr_life_type), 0x00, + "The unit (seconds or kilobytes) of the associated Life Duration attribute.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint32, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.life_duration", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_uint64, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.life_duration64", + FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ipsec_attr_life_duration_bytes, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ipsec.attr.life_duration_bytes", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* IKEv1 SA Attributes (ISAKMP SA, Phase 1) */ + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr.all, + { "IKE Attribute", "isakmp.ike.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.ike.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(ike_attr_type), 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.ike.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "IKEv1 Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.ike.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.ike.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute value", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_encryption_algorithm, + { "Encryption Algorithm", "isakmp.ike.attr.encryption_algorithm", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ike_attr_enc_algo), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_hash_algorithm, + { "HASH Algorithm", "isakmp.ike.attr.hash_algorithm", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ike_attr_hash_algo), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_authentication_method, + { "Authentication Method", "isakmp.ike.attr.authentication_method", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ike_attr_authmeth), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_description, + { "Group Description", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_description", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(dh_group), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_type, + { "Group Type", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ike_attr_grp_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_prime, + { "Group Prime", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_prime", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_one, + { "Group Generator One", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_generator_one", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_generator_two, + { "Group Generator Two", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_generator_two", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_a, + { "Group Curve A", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_curve_a", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_curve_b, + { "Group Curve B", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_curve_b", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_type, + { "Life Type", "isakmp.ike.attr.life_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(attr_life_type), 0x00, + "The unit (seconds or kilobytes) of the associated Life Duration attribute.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ike.attr.life_duration", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ike.attr.life_duration64", + FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.ike.attr.life_duration_bytes", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_prf, + { "PRF", "isakmp.ike.attr.prf", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_key_length, + { "Key Length", "isakmp.ike.attr.key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_field_size, + { "Field Size", "isakmp.ike.attr.field_size", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_group_order, + { "Group Order", "isakmp.ike.attr.group_order", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_block_size, + { "Block Size", "isakmp.ike.attr.block_size", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike_attr_asymmetric_cryptographic_algorithm_type, + { "Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm Type", "isakmp.ike.attr.asymmetric_cryptographic_algorithm_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ike_attr_asym_algo), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* Responder Lifetime Notification for IKEv1 SA */ + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr.all, + { "IKE Attribute", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(ike_attr_type), 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "IKEv1 Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv1 Attribute value", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_type, + { "Life Type", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.life_type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(attr_life_type), 0x00, + "The unit (seconds or kilobytes) of the associated Life Duration attribute.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint32, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.life_duration", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_uint64, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.life_duration64", + FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_resp_lifetime_ike_attr_life_duration_bytes, + { "Life Duration", "isakmp.notify.data.resp_lifetime.ike.attr.life_duration_bytes", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* IKEv2 Transform */ + { &hf_isakmp_trans_type, + { "Transform Type", "isakmp.tf.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(transform_ike2_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_trans_encr, + { "Transform ID (ENCR)", "isakmp.tf.id.encr", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_ike2_encr_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_prf, + { "Transform ID (PRF)", "isakmp.tf.id.prf", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_ike2_prf_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_integ, + { "Transform ID (INTEG)", "isakmp.tf.id.integ", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_ike2_integ_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_dh, + { "Transform ID (D-H)", "isakmp.tf.id.dh", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(dh_group), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_esn, + { "Transform ID (ESN)", "isakmp.tf.id.esn", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(transform_ike2_esn_type), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_trans_id_v2, + { "Transform ID", "isakmp.tf.id", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* IKEv2 Transform Attributes */ + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr.all, + { "Transform Attribute", "isakmp.ike2.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv2 Transform Attribute", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr.type, + { "Type", "isakmp.ike2.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(transform_ike2_attr_type), 0x00, + "IKEv2 Transform Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.ike2.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "IKEv2 Transform Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.ike2.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv2 Transform Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.ike2.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "IKEv2 Transform Attribute value", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_ike2_attr_key_length, + { "Key Length", "isakmp.ike2.attr.key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + + { &hf_isakmp_key_exch_dh_group, + { "DH Group #", "isakmp.key_exchange.dh_group", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(dh_group), 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_key_exch_data, + { "Key Exchange Data", "isakmp.key_exchange.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_eap_data, + { "EAP Message", "isakmp.eap.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_gspm_data, + { "GSPM", "isakmp.gspm.data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "Generic Secure Password Method", HFILL }}, + + /* Config Payload */ + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v1, + { "Type", "isakmp.cfg.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_cfgtype), 0x0, + "IKEv1 Config Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_identifier, + { "Identifier", "isakmp.cfg.identifier", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "IKEv1 Config Identifier", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_type_v2, + { "Type", "isakmp.cfg.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v2_cfgtype), 0x0, + "IKEv2 Config Type", HFILL }}, + + /* Config Attributes */ + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.all, + { "Config Attribute", "isakmp.cfg.attr", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v1, + { "Type", "isakmp.cfg.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_cfgattr), 0x00, + "IKEv1 Config Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_type_v2, + { "Type", "isakmp.cfg.attr.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v2_cfgattr), 0x00, + "IKEv2 Config Attribute type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.format, + { "Format", "isakmp.cfg.attr.format", + FT_BOOLEAN, 16, TFS(&attribute_format), 0x8000, + "Config Attribute format", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.length, + { "Length", "isakmp.cfg.attr.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "Config Attribute length", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr.value, + { "Value", "isakmp.cfg.attr.value", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "Config Attribute value", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_address, + { "INTERNAL IP4 ADDRESS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_address", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv4 address on the internal network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_netmask, + { "INTERNAL IP4 NETMASK", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_netmask", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NETMASK, NULL, 0x00, + "The internal network's netmask", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dns, + { "INTERNAL IP4 DNS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_dns", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv4 address of a DNS server within the network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_nbns, + { "INTERNAL IP4 NBNS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_nbns", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv4 address of a NetBios Name Server (WINS) within the network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_address_expiry, + { "INTERNAL ADDRESS EXPIRY (Secs)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_address_expiry", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "Specifies the number of seconds that the host can use the internal IP address", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_dhcp, + { "INTERNAL IP4 DHCP", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_dhcp", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "the host to send any internal DHCP requests to the address", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_application_version, + { "APPLICATION VERSION", "isakmp.cfg.attr.application_version", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The version or application information of the IPsec host", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_ip, + { "INTERNAL IP6 ADDRESS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_address", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv6 address on the internal network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_address_prefix, + { "INTERNAL IP6 ADDRESS (PREFIX)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_address.prefix", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_netmask, + { "INTERNAL IP6 NETMASK", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_netmask", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The internal network's netmask", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dns, + { "INTERNAL IP6 DNS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_dns", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv6 address of a DNS server within the network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_nbns, + { "INTERNAL IP6 NBNS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_nbns", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv6 address of a NetBios Name Server (WINS) within the network", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_dhcp, + { "INTERNAL IP6 DHCP", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_dhcp", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The host to send any internal DHCP requests to the address", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_ip, + { "INTERNAL IP4 SUBNET (IP)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_subnet_ip", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The protected sub-networks that this edge-device protects (IP)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip4_subnet_netmask, + { "INTERNAL IP4 SUBNET (NETMASK)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip4_subnet_netmask", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NETMASK, NULL, 0x00, + "The protected sub-networks that this edge-device protects (IP)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_supported_attributes, + { "SUPPORTED ATTRIBUTES", "isakmp.cfg.attr.supported_attributes", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_ip, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET (IP)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_subnet_ip", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_subnet_prefix, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET (PREFIX)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_subnet_prefix", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_interface, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_LINK (Link-Local Interface ID)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_link_interface", + FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "The Interface ID used for link-local address (by the party that sent this attribute)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_link_id, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_LINK (IKEv2 Link ID)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_link_id", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The Link ID is selected by the VPN gateway and is treated as an opaque octet string by the client.", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_ip, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX (IP)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_prefix_ip", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv6 prefix assigned to the virtual link", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_internal_ip6_prefix_length, + { "INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX (Length)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.internal_ip6_prefix_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, + "The length of the prefix in bits (usually 64)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip4_address, + { "P_CSCF_IP4_ADDRESS (IP)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.p_cscf_ip4_address", + FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv4 address of the P-CSCF server", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_p_cscf_ip6_address, + { "P_CSCF_IP6_ADDRESS (IP)", "isakmp.cfg.attr.p_cscf_ip6_address", + FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "An IPv6 address of the P-CSCF server", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_type, + { "XAUTH TYPE", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.type", + FT_UINT16, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(cfgattr_xauth_type), 0x00, + "The type of extended authentication requested", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_name, + { "XAUTH USER NAME", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.user_name", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The user name", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_user_password, + { "XAUTH USER PASSWORD", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.user_password", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The user's password", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_passcode, + { "XAUTH PASSCODE", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.passcode", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "A token card's passcode", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_message, + { "XAUTH MESSAGE", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.message", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "A textual message from an edge device to an IPSec host", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_challenge, + { "XAUTH CHALLENGE", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.challenge", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "A challenge string sent from the edge device to the IPSec host for it to include in its calculation of a password", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_domain, + { "XAUTH DOMAIN", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.domain", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "The domain to be authenticated in", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_status, + { "XAUTH STATUS", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.status", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(cfgattr_xauth_status), 0x00, + "A variable that is used to denote authentication success or failure", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_next_pin, + { "XAUTH TYPE", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.next_pin", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "A variable which is used when the edge device is requesting that the user choose a new pin number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_xauth_answer, + { "XAUTH ANSWER", "isakmp.cfg.attr.xauth.answer", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "A variable length ASCII string used to send input to the edge device", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_banner, + { "UNITY BANNER", "isakmp.cfg.attr.unity.banner", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + "Banner", HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_cfg_attr_unity_def_domain, + { "UNITY DEF DOMAIN", "isakmp.cfg.attr.unity.def_domain", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* SA KEK Payload */ + { &hf_isakmp_sak_next_payload, + { "Next Payload", "isakmp.sak.nextpayload", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_reserved, + { "Reserved", "isakmp.sak.reserved", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_payload_len , + { "Payload length", "isakmp.sak.payload_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_protocol, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.sak.protoid", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ipproto_val_ext, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_type, + { "SRC ID Type", "isakmp.sak.src_id_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_id_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_port, + { "SRC ID Port", "isakmp.sak.src_id_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_length, + { "SRC ID Data Length", "isakmp.sak.src_id_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_src_id_data, + { "SRC ID Data", "isakmp.sak.src_id_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_type, + { "DST ID Type", "isakmp.sak.dst_id_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_id_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_port, + { "DST ID Port", "isakmp.sak.dst_id_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_length, + { "DST ID Data Length", "isakmp.sak.dst_id_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_dst_id_data, + { "DST ID Data", "isakmp.sak.dst_id_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sak_spi, + { "SPI", "isakmp.sak.spi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* SA TEK Payload */ + { &hf_isakmp_sat_next_payload, + { "Next Payload", "isakmp.sat.nextpayload", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_reserved, + { "Reserved", "isakmp.sat.reserved", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_payload_len , + { "Payload length", "isakmp.sat.payload_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_protocol_id, + { "Protocol ID", "isakmp.sat.protocol_id", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(sat_protocol_ids), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_protocol, + { "Internet Protocol", "isakmp.sat.protocol", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ipproto_val_ext, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_type, + { "SRC ID Type", "isakmp.sat.src_id_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_id_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_port, + { "SRC ID Port", "isakmp.sat.src_id_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_length, + { "SRC ID Data Length", "isakmp.sat.src_id_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_src_id_data, + { "SRC ID Data", "isakmp.sat.src_id_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_type, + { "DST ID Type", "isakmp.sat.dst_id_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(vs_v1_id_type), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_port, + { "DST ID Port", "isakmp.sat.dst_id_port", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_length, + { "DST ID Data Length", "isakmp.sat.dst_id_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_dst_id_data, + { "DST ID Data", "isakmp.sat.dst_id_data", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_transform_id, + { "Transform ID", "isakmp.sat.transform_id", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_spi, + { "SPI", "isakmp.sat.spi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_sat_payload, + { "TEK Payload", "isakmp.sat.payload", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + /* Key Download Payload */ + { &hf_isakmp_kd_num_key_pkt, + { "Number of Key Packets", "isakmp.kd.num_pkt", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_kd_payload, + { "Key Download Payload", "isakmp.kd.payload", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_kdp_type, + { "Type", "isakmp.kd.payload.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_RANGE_STRING | BASE_DEC, RVALS(key_download_types), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_kdp_length, + { "Length", "isakmp.kd.payload.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_kdp_spi_size, + { "SPI Size", "isakmp.kd.payload.spi_size", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_kdp_spi, + { "SPI", "isakmp.kd.payload.spi", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + /* Sequence Payload */ + { &hf_isakmp_seq_seq, + { "Sequence Number", "isakmp.seq.seq", + FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_enc_decrypted_data, + { "Decrypted Data", "isakmp.enc.decrypted", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_contained_data, + { "Contained Data", "isakmp.enc.contained", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_padding, + { "Padding", "isakmp.enc.padding", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_pad_length, + { "Pad Length", "isakmp.enc.pad_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_data, + { "Encrypted Data", "isakmp.enc.data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_iv, + { "Initialization Vector", "isakmp.enc.iv", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_enc_icd, + { "Integrity Checksum Data", "isakmp.enc.icd", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_backoff_timer_len, + { "Length", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.backoff_timer_len", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_len, + { "Identity Length", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.device_identity_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_type, + { "Identity Type", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.device_identity_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(device_identity_types), 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imei, + { "IMEI", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.device_identity_imei", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_device_identity_imeisv, + { "IMEISV", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.device_identity_imeisv", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_len, + { "Total Length", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_len", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_spare, + { "Spare", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_spare", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0xE0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element_len, + { "Length", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_element_len", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flags, + { "Service Category Value", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_flags", + FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }}, + + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b1_police, + { "Police", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_flag_b1_police", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x01, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b2_ambulance, + { "Ambulance", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_flag_b2_ambulance", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x02, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b3_fire_brigade, + { "Fire Brigade", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_flag_b3_fire_brigade", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x04, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b4_marine_guard, + { "Marine Guard", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_b4_marine_guard", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x08, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_flag_b5_mountain_rescue, + { "Mountain Rescue", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_numbers_flag_b5_mountain_rescue", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x10, + NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_iskamp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_number, + { "Emergency Number", "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.emergency_call_number", + FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + NULL, HFILL }} + }; + + + static gint *ett[] = { + &ett_isakmp, + &ett_isakmp_version, + &ett_isakmp_flags, + &ett_isakmp_payload, + &ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature, + &ett_isakmp_payload_digital_signature_asn1_data, + &ett_isakmp_fragment, + &ett_isakmp_fragments, + &ett_isakmp_sa, + &ett_isakmp_attr, + &ett_isakmp_id, + &ett_isakmp_notify_data, + &ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_main, + &ett_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_emergency_call_numbers_element, + &ett_isakmp_ts, + &ett_isakmp_kd, + &ett_isakmp_decrypted_data, + &ett_isakmp_decrypted_payloads + }; + + static ei_register_info ei[] = { + { &ei_isakmp_enc_iv, { "isakmp.enc.iv.not_enough_data", PI_MALFORMED, PI_WARN, "Not enough data in IKEv2 Encrypted payload", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_ikev2_integrity_checksum, { "isakmp.ikev2.integrity_checksum", PI_CHECKSUM, PI_WARN, "IKEv2 Integrity Checksum Data is incorrect", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_enc_data_length_mult_block_size, { "isakmp.enc_data_length_mult_block_size", PI_MALFORMED, PI_WARN, "Encrypted data length isn't a multiple of block size", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_enc_pad_length_big, { "isakmp.enc.pad_length.big", PI_MALFORMED, PI_WARN, "Pad length is too big", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_attribute_value_empty, { "isakmp.attribute_value_empty", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_NOTE, "Attribute value is empty", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_payload_bad_length, { "isakmp.payloadlength.invalid", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Invalid payload length", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_bad_fragment_number, { "isakmp.fragment_number.invalid", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Invalid fragment numbering", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_isakmp_notify_data_3gpp_unknown_device_identity, { "isakmp.notify.priv.3gpp.unknown_device_identity", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Type of device identity not known", EXPFILL }}, + }; + + expert_module_t* expert_isakmp; + + static uat_field_t ikev1_uat_flds[] = { + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev1_users, icookie, "Initiator's COOKIE", "Initiator's COOKIE"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev1_users, key, "Encryption Key", "Encryption Key"), + UAT_END_FIELDS + }; + + static uat_field_t ikev2_uat_flds[] = { + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, spii, "Initiator's SPI", "Initiator's SPI value of the IKE_SA"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, spir, "Responder's SPI", "Responder's SPI value of the IKE_SA"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, sk_ei, "SK_ei", "Key used to encrypt/decrypt IKEv2 packets from initiator to responder"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, sk_er, "SK_er", "Key used to encrypt/decrypt IKEv2 packets from responder to initiator"), + UAT_FLD_VS(ikev2_users, encr_alg, "Encryption algorithm", vs_ikev2_encr_algs, "Encryption algorithm of IKE_SA"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, sk_ai, "SK_ai", "Key used to calculate Integrity Checksum Data for IKEv2 packets from initiator to responder"), + UAT_FLD_BUFFER(ikev2_users, sk_ar, "SK_ar", "Key used to calculate Integrity Checksum Data for IKEv2 packets from responder to initiator"), + UAT_FLD_VS(ikev2_users, auth_alg, "Integrity algorithm", vs_ikev2_auth_algs, "Integrity algorithm of IKE_SA"), + UAT_END_FIELDS + }; + + proto_isakmp = proto_register_protocol("Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol", + "ISAKMP", "isakmp"); + proto_register_field_array(proto_isakmp, hf, array_length(hf)); + proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); + expert_isakmp = expert_register_protocol(proto_isakmp); + expert_register_field_array(expert_isakmp, ei, array_length(ei)); + register_init_routine(&isakmp_init_protocol); + register_cleanup_routine(&isakmp_cleanup_protocol); + reassembly_table_register(&isakmp_cisco_reassembly_table, + &addresses_reassembly_table_functions); + reassembly_table_register(&isakmp_ike2_reassembly_table, + &addresses_reassembly_table_functions); + + isakmp_handle = register_dissector("isakmp", dissect_isakmp, proto_isakmp); + + isakmp_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_isakmp, NULL); + ikev1_uat = uat_new("IKEv1 Decryption Table", + sizeof(ikev1_uat_data_key_t), + "ikev1_decryption_table", + TRUE, + &ikev1_uat_data, + &num_ikev1_uat_data, + UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ + "ChIKEv1DecryptionSection", + ikev1_uat_data_copy_cb, + ikev1_uat_data_update_cb, + ikev1_uat_data_free_cb, + NULL, + NULL, + ikev1_uat_flds); + + prefs_register_uat_preference(isakmp_module, + "ikev1_decryption_table", + "IKEv1 Decryption Table", + "Table of IKE_SA security parameters for decryption of IKEv1 packets", + ikev1_uat); + + ikev2_uat = uat_new("IKEv2 Decryption Table", + sizeof(ikev2_uat_data_t), + "ikev2_decryption_table", + TRUE, + &ikev2_uat_data, + &num_ikev2_uat_data, + UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ + "ChIKEv2DecryptionSection", + ikev2_uat_data_copy_cb, + ikev2_uat_data_update_cb, + ikev2_uat_data_free_cb, + NULL, + NULL, + ikev2_uat_flds); + + prefs_register_uat_preference(isakmp_module, + "ikev2_decryption_table", + "IKEv2 Decryption Table", + "Table of IKE_SA security parameters for decryption of IKEv2 packets", + ikev2_uat); +} + +void +proto_reg_handoff_isakmp(void) +{ + eap_handle = find_dissector_add_dependency("eap", proto_isakmp); + dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", UDP_PORT_ISAKMP, isakmp_handle); + dissector_add_uint_with_preference("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_ISAKMP, isakmp_handle); +} + +/* + * Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html + * + * Local variables: + * c-basic-offset: 2 + * tab-width: 8 + * indent-tabs-mode: nil + * End: + * + * vi: set shiftwidth=2 tabstop=8 expandtab: + * :indentSize=2:tabSize=8:noTabs=true: + */ |