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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000
commite4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc (patch)
tree68cb5ef9081156392f1dd62a00c6ccc1451b93df /epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadwireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.tar.xz
wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.zip
Adding upstream version 4.2.2.upstream/4.2.2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c')
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c822
1 files changed, 822 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..420ddcd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
+/* packet-pktc.c
+ * Routines for PacketCable (PKTC) Kerberized Key Management and
+ * PacketCable (PKTC) MTA FQDN packet disassembly
+ *
+ * References:
+ * [1] PacketCable 1.0 Security Specification, PKT-SP-SEC-I11-040730, July 30,
+ * 2004, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., http://www.PacketCable.com/
+ * http://www.cablelabs.com/wp-content/uploads/specdocs/PKT-SP-SEC-I11-040730.pdf
+ *
+ * Ronnie Sahlberg 2004
+ * Thomas Anders 2004
+ *
+ * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+ * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <epan/packet.h>
+#include <epan/exceptions.h>
+#include <epan/expert.h>
+#include <epan/to_str.h>
+#include <epan/asn1.h>
+#include "packet-ber.h"
+#include "packet-kerberos.h"
+#include "packet-snmp.h"
+
+#define PKTC_PORT 1293
+#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_PORT 2246
+
+void proto_register_pktc(void);
+void proto_reg_handoff_pktc(void);
+void proto_register_pktc_mtafqdn(void);
+void proto_reg_handoff_pktc_mtafqdn(void);
+
+static dissector_handle_t pktc_handle;
+static dissector_handle_t pktc_mtafqdn_handle;
+
+static int proto_pktc = -1;
+static int proto_pktc_mtafqdn = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_app_spec_data = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_kmmid = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_doi = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_version_major = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_version_minor = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_server_nonce = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_server_principal = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_timestamp = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineID = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_usmUserName_len = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_usmUserName = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_ipsec_spi = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_reestablish_flag = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_ack_required_flag = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_sha1_hmac = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_grace_period = -1;
+
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn = -1;
+static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip = -1;
+
+static gint ett_pktc = -1;
+static gint ett_pktc_app_spec_data = -1;
+static gint ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites = -1;
+static gint ett_pktc_engineid = -1;
+static gint ett_pktc_version = -1;
+
+static gint ett_pktc_mtafqdn = -1;
+
+static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_doi = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application = EI_INIT;
+
+#define KMMID_WAKEUP 0x01
+#define KMMID_AP_REQUEST 0x02
+#define KMMID_AP_REPLY 0x03
+#define KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC 0x04
+#define KMMID_REKEY 0x05
+#define KMMID_ERROR_REPLY 0x06
+static const value_string kmmid_types[] = {
+ { KMMID_WAKEUP , "Wake Up" },
+ { KMMID_AP_REQUEST , "AP Request" },
+ { KMMID_AP_REPLY , "AP Reply" },
+ { KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC , "Security Parameter Recovered" },
+ { KMMID_REKEY , "Rekey" },
+ { KMMID_ERROR_REPLY , "Error Reply" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+#define DOI_IPSEC 0x01
+#define DOI_SNMPv3 0x02
+#define SNMPv3_NULL 0x20
+#define SNMPv3_DES 0x21
+#define SNMPv3_HMAC_MD5 0x21
+#define SNMPv3_HMAC_SHA1 0x22
+#define ESP_3DES 0x03
+#define ESP_RC5 0x04
+#define ESP_IDEA 0x05
+#define ESP_CAST 0x06
+#define ESP_BLOWFISH 0x07
+#define ESP_NULL 0x0b
+#define ESP_AES 0x0c
+#define HMAC_MD5_96 0x01
+#define HMAC_SHA1_96 0x02
+
+
+/* Domain of Interpretation */
+static const value_string doi_types[] = {
+ { DOI_IPSEC , "IPsec" },
+ { DOI_SNMPv3 , "SNMPv3" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* SNMPv3 ciphersuites */
+static const value_string snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals[] = {
+ { SNMPv3_HMAC_MD5 , "HMAC-MD5" },
+ { SNMPv3_HMAC_SHA1 , "HMAC-SHA1" },
+ { 0 , NULL }
+};
+static const value_string snmp_transform_id_vals[] = {
+ { SNMPv3_NULL , "NULL" }, /* no encryption */
+ { SNMPv3_DES , "DES" },
+ { 0 , NULL }
+};
+
+/* IPsec ciphersuites */
+static const value_string ipsec_transform_id_vals[] = {
+ { ESP_3DES , "3DES" },
+ { ESP_RC5 , "RC5" },
+ { ESP_IDEA , "IDEA" },
+ { ESP_CAST , "CAST" },
+ { ESP_BLOWFISH , "BLOWFISH" },
+ { ESP_NULL , "NULL" }, /* no encryption, RFC 2410 */
+ { ESP_AES , "AES-128" },
+ { 0 , NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals[] = {
+ { HMAC_MD5_96 , "HMAC-MD5-96" }, /* RFC 2403 */
+ { HMAC_SHA1_96 , "HMAC-SHA-1-96" }, /* RFC 2404 */
+ { 0 , NULL }
+};
+
+/* MTA FQDN Message Types */
+#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ 0x01
+#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP 0x02
+#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_ERR 0x03
+static const value_string pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals[] = {
+ { PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ, "MTA FQDN Request" },
+ { PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP, "MTA FQDN Reply" },
+ { PKTC_MTAFQDN_ERR, "MTA FQDN Error Reply" },
+ { 0 , NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi, guint8 kmmid)
+{
+ int old_offset=offset;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ proto_tree *engineid_tree = NULL;
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_item *engineid_item = NULL;
+ guint8 len;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_pktc_app_spec_data, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_app_spec_data);
+
+ switch(doi){
+ case DOI_SNMPv3:
+ switch(kmmid){
+ /* we don't distinguish between manager and agent engineid.
+ feel free to add separation for this if it is imporant enough
+ for you. */
+ case KMMID_AP_REQUEST:
+ case KMMID_AP_REPLY:
+ /* snmpEngineID Length */
+ len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len, tvb, offset, 1, len);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* snmpEngineID */
+ engineid_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineID, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA);
+ engineid_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(engineid_item, ett_pktc_engineid);
+ dissect_snmp_engineid(engineid_tree, pinfo, tvb, offset, len);
+ offset+=len;
+
+ /* boots */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* time */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* usmUserName Length */
+ len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_usmUserName_len, tvb, offset, 1, len);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* usmUserName */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_usmUserName, tvb, offset, len, ENC_ASCII);
+ offset+=len;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1);
+ };
+ break;
+ case DOI_IPSEC:
+ switch(kmmid){
+ /* we don't distinguish between SPIs for inbound Security Associations
+ of the client (AP-REQ) vs. server (AP-REP, REKEY). Feel free to add
+ separation for this if it is imporant enough for you. */
+ case KMMID_AP_REQUEST:
+ case KMMID_AP_REPLY:
+ case KMMID_REKEY:
+ /* Security Parameter Index (SPI) */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsec_spi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1);
+ };
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, tvb, offset, 1);
+ }
+
+ proto_item_set_len(item, offset-old_offset);
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi)
+{
+ int old_offset=offset;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ proto_item *item, *hidden_item;
+ guint8 len, i;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites);
+
+ /* number of ciphersuites */
+ len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (len>0) {
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%d):", len);
+ }
+ hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len, tvb, offset, 1, len);
+ proto_item_set_hidden(hidden_item);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ switch(doi){
+ case DOI_SNMPv3:
+ for(i=0;i<len;i++){
+ /* SNMPv3 authentication algorithm */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals, "%0x"));
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* SNMPv3 encryption transform id */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, "/%s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), snmp_transform_id_vals, "%0x"));
+ offset+=1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DOI_IPSEC:
+ for(i=0;i<len;i++){
+ /* IPsec authentication algorithm */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals, "%0x"));
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* IPsec encryption transform id */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, "/%s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), ipsec_transform_id_vals, "%0x"));
+ offset+=1;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, tvb, offset, 1);
+ }
+
+ proto_item_set_len(item, offset-old_offset);
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_wakeup(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
+{
+ guint32 snonce;
+ guint string_len;
+
+ /* Server Nonce */
+ snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* Server Kerberos Principal Identifier */
+ string_len=tvb_strsize(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_server_principal, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII);
+ offset+=string_len;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_ap_request(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi)
+{
+ tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb;
+ guint32 snonce;
+
+ /* AP Request kerberos blob */
+ pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL);
+
+ /* Server Nonce */
+ snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* app specific data */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_AP_REQUEST);
+
+ /* list of ciphersuites */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+
+ /* re-establish flag */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* sha-1 hmac */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=20;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_ap_reply(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi)
+{
+ tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb;
+
+ /* AP Reply kerberos blob */
+ pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL);
+
+ /* app specific data */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_AP_REPLY);
+
+ /* selected ciphersuite */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+
+ /* sec param lifetime */
+ proto_tree_add_uint_format(tree, hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, tvb, offset, 4,
+ tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset), "%s: %s",
+ proto_registrar_get_name(hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime),
+ signed_time_secs_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset)));
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* grace period */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_grace_period, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* re-establish flag */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* ack required flag */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ack_required_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* sha-1 hmac */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=20;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_sec_param_rec(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
+{
+ /* sha-1 hmac of the subkey of the preceding AP-REP */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=20;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_rekey(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi)
+{
+ guint32 snonce;
+ guint string_len;
+ const guint8 *timestr;
+ char *display;
+ int yy, mm, dd, hh, _mm, ss;
+
+ /* Server Nonce */
+ snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* Server Kerberos Principal Identifier */
+ string_len=tvb_strsize(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_server_principal, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII);
+ offset+=string_len;
+
+ /* Timestamp: YYMMDDhhmmssZ */
+ /* They really came up with a two-digit year in late 1990s! =8o */
+ timestr=display=tvb_get_string_enc(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, 13, ENC_ASCII);
+ if (sscanf(timestr, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ", &yy, &mm, &dd, &hh, &_mm, &ss) == 6) {
+ display = wmem_strdup_printf(pinfo->pool, "%02d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
+ yy, mm, dd, hh, _mm, ss);
+ }
+ proto_tree_add_string_format_value(tree, hf_pktc_timestamp, tvb,
+ offset, 13, timestr, "%s", display);
+ offset+=13;
+
+ /* app specific data */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_REKEY);
+
+ /* list of ciphersuites */
+ offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+
+ /* sec param lifetime */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* grace period */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_grace_period, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* re-establish flag */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* sha-1 hmac */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=20;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_error_reply(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
+{
+ tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb;
+
+ /* KRB_ERROR */
+ pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_mtafqdn_krbsafeuserdata(packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree)
+{
+ int offset=0, string_len=0;
+ guint8 msgtype;
+ guint32 bignum;
+ nstime_t ts;
+
+ /* message type */
+ msgtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype, tvb, offset, 1, msgtype);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ val_to_str(msgtype, pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals, "MsgType %u"));
+
+ /* enterprise */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* protocol version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ switch(msgtype) {
+ case PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ:
+ /* MTA MAC address */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac, tvb, offset, 6, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=6;
+
+ /* MTA pub key hash */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset+=20;
+
+ /* manufacturer cert revocation time */
+ bignum = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ ts.secs = bignum;
+ if (bignum==0) {
+ proto_tree_add_time_format_value(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, tvb, offset, 4,
+ &ts, "not revoked");
+ } else {
+ proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, tvb, offset, 4, &ts);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP:
+ /* MTA FQDN */
+ string_len = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) - 4;
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII);
+ offset+=string_len;
+
+ /* MTA IP address */
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, (guint8 *)&bignum, offset, sizeof(bignum));
+ proto_tree_add_ipv4(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip, tvb, offset, 4, bignum);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static kerberos_callbacks cb[] = {
+ { KRB_CBTAG_SAFE_USER_DATA, dissect_pktc_mtafqdn_krbsafeuserdata },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc_mtafqdn(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_)
+{
+ int offset=0;
+ proto_tree *pktc_mtafqdn_tree;
+ proto_item *item;
+ tvbuff_t *pktc_mtafqdn_tvb;
+ gint8 ber_class;
+ bool pc;
+ gint32 tag;
+
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PKTC");
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_pktc, tvb, 0, 0, ENC_NA);
+ pktc_mtafqdn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_mtafqdn);
+
+ col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "MTA FQDN %s",
+ pinfo->srcport == pinfo->match_uint ? "Reply":"Request");
+
+ /* KRB_AP_RE[QP] */
+ pktc_mtafqdn_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ get_ber_identifier(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, 0, &ber_class, &pc, &tag);
+ if ((tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AP_REQ) || (tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AP_REP)) {
+ offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, pinfo, pktc_mtafqdn_tree, FALSE, NULL);
+ } else {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, "Unknown Kerberos application (%d), expected 10 or 11", tag);
+ return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
+ }
+
+ /* KRB_SAFE */
+ pktc_mtafqdn_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ get_ber_identifier(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, 0, &ber_class, &pc, &tag);
+ if (tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_KRB_SAFE) {
+ offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, pinfo, pktc_mtafqdn_tree, FALSE, cb);
+ } else {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, "Unknown Kerberos application (%d), expected 20", tag);
+ }
+
+ proto_item_set_len(item, offset);
+ return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
+}
+
+
+static int
+dissect_pktc(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_)
+{
+ guint8 kmmid, doi, version;
+ int offset=0;
+ proto_tree *pktc_tree, *version_tree;
+ proto_item *item;
+
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PKTC");
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_pktc, tvb, 0, 3, ENC_NA);
+ pktc_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc);
+
+ /* key management message id */
+ kmmid=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(pktc_tree, hf_pktc_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1, kmmid);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* domain of interpretation */
+ doi=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(pktc_tree, hf_pktc_doi, tvb, offset, 1, doi);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* version */
+ version=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ version_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(pktc_tree, tvb, offset, 1, ett_pktc_version, NULL,
+ "Version: %d.%d", (version>>4)&0x0f, (version)&0x0f);
+ proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_pktc_version_major, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_pktc_version_minor, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=1;
+
+ /* fill COL_INFO */
+ col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ val_to_str(kmmid, kmmid_types, "Unknown KMMID %#x"));
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%s)",
+ val_to_str(doi, doi_types, "Unknown DOI %#x"));
+
+ switch(kmmid){
+ case KMMID_WAKEUP:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_wakeup(pktc_tree, tvb, offset);
+ break;
+ case KMMID_AP_REQUEST:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_ap_request(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+ break;
+ case KMMID_AP_REPLY:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_ap_reply(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+ break;
+ case KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_sec_param_rec(pktc_tree, tvb, offset);
+ break;
+ case KMMID_REKEY:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_rekey(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi);
+ break;
+ case KMMID_ERROR_REPLY:
+ offset=dissect_pktc_error_reply(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset);
+ break;
+ };
+
+ proto_item_set_len(item, offset);
+ return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
+}
+
+void
+proto_register_pktc(void)
+{
+ static hf_register_info hf[] = {
+ { &hf_pktc_kmmid, {
+ "Key Management Message ID", "pktc.kmmid", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(kmmid_types), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_doi, {
+ "Domain of Interpretation", "pktc.doi", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ VALS(doi_types), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_version_major, {
+ "Major version", "pktc.version.major", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0xF0, "Major version of PKTC", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_version_minor, {
+ "Minor version", "pktc.version.minor", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0x0F, "Minor version of PKTC", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_server_nonce, {
+ "Server Nonce", "pktc.server_nonce", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, "Server Nonce random number", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_server_principal, {
+ "Server Kerberos Principal Identifier", "pktc.server_principal", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_timestamp, {
+ "Timestamp", "pktc.timestamp", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "Timestamp (UTC)", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_app_spec_data, {
+ "Application Specific Data", "pktc.asd", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "KMMID/DOI application specific data", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites, {
+ "List of Ciphersuites", "pktc.ciphers", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len, {
+ "Number of Ciphersuites", "pktc.ciphers.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm, {
+ "SNMPv3 Authentication Algorithm", "pktc.asd.snmp_auth_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID, {
+ "SNMPv3 Encryption Transform ID", "pktc.asd.snmp_enc_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(snmp_transform_id_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm, {
+ "IPsec Authentication Algorithm", "pktc.asd.ipsec_auth_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID, {
+ "IPsec Encryption Transform ID", "pktc.asd.ipsec_enc_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(ipsec_transform_id_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len, {
+ "SNMPv3 Engine ID Length", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_id.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of SNMPv3 Engine ID", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineID, {
+ "SNMPv3 Engine ID", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_id", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots, {
+ "SNMPv3 Engine Boots", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_boots", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime, {
+ "SNMPv3 Engine Time", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_time", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "SNMPv3 Engine ID Time", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_usmUserName_len, {
+ "SNMPv3 USM User Name Length", "pktc.asd.snmp_usm_username.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of SNMPv3 USM User Name", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_usmUserName, {
+ "SNMPv3 USM User Name", "pktc.asd.snmp_usm_username", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_ipsec_spi, {
+ "IPsec Security Parameter Index", "pktc.asd.ipsec_spi", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, "Security Parameter Index for inbound Security Association (IPsec)", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, {
+ "Re-establish Flag", "pktc.reestablish", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_ack_required_flag, {
+ "ACK Required Flag", "pktc.ack_required", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, {
+ "Security Parameter Lifetime", "pktc.spl", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Lifetime in seconds of security parameter", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, {
+ "SHA-1 HMAC", "pktc.sha1_hmac", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_grace_period, {
+ "Grace Period", "pktc.grace_period", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Grace Period in seconds", HFILL }},
+ };
+ static gint *ett[] = {
+ &ett_pktc,
+ &ett_pktc_app_spec_data,
+ &ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites,
+ &ett_pktc_engineid,
+ &ett_pktc_version,
+ };
+
+ proto_pktc = proto_register_protocol("PacketCable", "PKTC", "pktc");
+ proto_register_field_array(proto_pktc, hf, array_length(hf));
+ proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
+
+ pktc_handle = register_dissector("pktc", dissect_pktc, proto_pktc);
+}
+
+void
+proto_reg_handoff_pktc(void)
+{
+ dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", PKTC_PORT, pktc_handle);
+}
+
+
+void
+proto_register_pktc_mtafqdn(void)
+{
+ static hf_register_info hf[] = {
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype, {
+ "Message Type", "pktc.mtafqdn.msgtype", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ VALS(pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals), 0, "MTA FQDN Message Type", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise, {
+ "Enterprise Number", "pktc.mtafqdn.enterprise", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version, {
+ "Protocol Version", "pktc.mtafqdn.version", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "MTA FQDN Protocol Version", HFILL }},
+ /* MTA FQDN REQ */
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac, {
+ "MTA MAC address", "pktc.mtafqdn.mac", FT_ETHER, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash, {
+ "MTA Public Key Hash", "pktc.mtafqdn.pub_key_hash", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "MTA Public Key Hash (SHA-1)", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, {
+ "Manufacturer Cert Revocation Time", "pktc.mtafqdn.manu_cert_revoked", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL,
+ NULL, 0, "Manufacturer Cert Revocation Time (UTC) or 0 if not revoked", HFILL }},
+ /* MTA FQDN REP */
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn, {
+ "MTA FQDN", "pktc.mtafqdn.fqdn", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip, {
+ "MTA IP Address", "pktc.mtafqdn.ip", FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "MTA IP Address (all zeros if not supplied)", HFILL }},
+ };
+ static gint *ett[] = {
+ &ett_pktc_mtafqdn,
+ };
+
+ static ei_register_info ei[] = {
+ { &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_kmmid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown KMMID", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_doi", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown DOI", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_kerberos_application", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown Kerberos application", EXPFILL }},
+ };
+
+ expert_module_t* expert_pktc;
+
+ proto_pktc_mtafqdn = proto_register_protocol("PacketCable MTA FQDN", "PKTC MTA FQDN", "pktc.mtafqdn");
+
+ proto_register_field_array(proto_pktc_mtafqdn, hf, array_length(hf));
+ proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
+ expert_pktc = expert_register_protocol(proto_pktc_mtafqdn);
+ expert_register_field_array(expert_pktc, ei, array_length(ei));
+
+ pktc_mtafqdn_handle = register_dissector("pktc.mtafqdn", dissect_pktc_mtafqdn, proto_pktc_mtafqdn);
+}
+
+void
+proto_reg_handoff_pktc_mtafqdn(void)
+{
+ dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", PKTC_MTAFQDN_PORT, pktc_mtafqdn_handle);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
+ *
+ * Local variables:
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 8
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ *
+ * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
+ * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
+ */