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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000 |
commit | e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc (patch) | |
tree | 68cb5ef9081156392f1dd62a00c6ccc1451b93df /epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.tar.xz wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.zip |
Adding upstream version 4.2.2.upstream/4.2.2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c | 822 |
1 files changed, 822 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..420ddcd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c @@ -0,0 +1,822 @@ +/* packet-pktc.c + * Routines for PacketCable (PKTC) Kerberized Key Management and + * PacketCable (PKTC) MTA FQDN packet disassembly + * + * References: + * [1] PacketCable 1.0 Security Specification, PKT-SP-SEC-I11-040730, July 30, + * 2004, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., http://www.PacketCable.com/ + * http://www.cablelabs.com/wp-content/uploads/specdocs/PKT-SP-SEC-I11-040730.pdf + * + * Ronnie Sahlberg 2004 + * Thomas Anders 2004 + * + * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer + * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> + * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include <epan/packet.h> +#include <epan/exceptions.h> +#include <epan/expert.h> +#include <epan/to_str.h> +#include <epan/asn1.h> +#include "packet-ber.h" +#include "packet-kerberos.h" +#include "packet-snmp.h" + +#define PKTC_PORT 1293 +#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_PORT 2246 + +void proto_register_pktc(void); +void proto_reg_handoff_pktc(void); +void proto_register_pktc_mtafqdn(void); +void proto_reg_handoff_pktc_mtafqdn(void); + +static dissector_handle_t pktc_handle; +static dissector_handle_t pktc_mtafqdn_handle; + +static int proto_pktc = -1; +static int proto_pktc_mtafqdn = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_app_spec_data = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_kmmid = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_doi = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_version_major = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_version_minor = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_server_nonce = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_server_principal = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_timestamp = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineID = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_usmUserName_len = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_usmUserName = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_ipsec_spi = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_reestablish_flag = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_ack_required_flag = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_sha1_hmac = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_grace_period = -1; + +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn = -1; +static gint hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip = -1; + +static gint ett_pktc = -1; +static gint ett_pktc_app_spec_data = -1; +static gint ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites = -1; +static gint ett_pktc_engineid = -1; +static gint ett_pktc_version = -1; + +static gint ett_pktc_mtafqdn = -1; + +static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_doi = EI_INIT; +static expert_field ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application = EI_INIT; + +#define KMMID_WAKEUP 0x01 +#define KMMID_AP_REQUEST 0x02 +#define KMMID_AP_REPLY 0x03 +#define KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC 0x04 +#define KMMID_REKEY 0x05 +#define KMMID_ERROR_REPLY 0x06 +static const value_string kmmid_types[] = { + { KMMID_WAKEUP , "Wake Up" }, + { KMMID_AP_REQUEST , "AP Request" }, + { KMMID_AP_REPLY , "AP Reply" }, + { KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC , "Security Parameter Recovered" }, + { KMMID_REKEY , "Rekey" }, + { KMMID_ERROR_REPLY , "Error Reply" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +#define DOI_IPSEC 0x01 +#define DOI_SNMPv3 0x02 +#define SNMPv3_NULL 0x20 +#define SNMPv3_DES 0x21 +#define SNMPv3_HMAC_MD5 0x21 +#define SNMPv3_HMAC_SHA1 0x22 +#define ESP_3DES 0x03 +#define ESP_RC5 0x04 +#define ESP_IDEA 0x05 +#define ESP_CAST 0x06 +#define ESP_BLOWFISH 0x07 +#define ESP_NULL 0x0b +#define ESP_AES 0x0c +#define HMAC_MD5_96 0x01 +#define HMAC_SHA1_96 0x02 + + +/* Domain of Interpretation */ +static const value_string doi_types[] = { + { DOI_IPSEC , "IPsec" }, + { DOI_SNMPv3 , "SNMPv3" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* SNMPv3 ciphersuites */ +static const value_string snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals[] = { + { SNMPv3_HMAC_MD5 , "HMAC-MD5" }, + { SNMPv3_HMAC_SHA1 , "HMAC-SHA1" }, + { 0 , NULL } +}; +static const value_string snmp_transform_id_vals[] = { + { SNMPv3_NULL , "NULL" }, /* no encryption */ + { SNMPv3_DES , "DES" }, + { 0 , NULL } +}; + +/* IPsec ciphersuites */ +static const value_string ipsec_transform_id_vals[] = { + { ESP_3DES , "3DES" }, + { ESP_RC5 , "RC5" }, + { ESP_IDEA , "IDEA" }, + { ESP_CAST , "CAST" }, + { ESP_BLOWFISH , "BLOWFISH" }, + { ESP_NULL , "NULL" }, /* no encryption, RFC 2410 */ + { ESP_AES , "AES-128" }, + { 0 , NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals[] = { + { HMAC_MD5_96 , "HMAC-MD5-96" }, /* RFC 2403 */ + { HMAC_SHA1_96 , "HMAC-SHA-1-96" }, /* RFC 2404 */ + { 0 , NULL } +}; + +/* MTA FQDN Message Types */ +#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ 0x01 +#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP 0x02 +#define PKTC_MTAFQDN_ERR 0x03 +static const value_string pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals[] = { + { PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ, "MTA FQDN Request" }, + { PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP, "MTA FQDN Reply" }, + { PKTC_MTAFQDN_ERR, "MTA FQDN Error Reply" }, + { 0 , NULL } +}; + +static int +dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi, guint8 kmmid) +{ + int old_offset=offset; + proto_tree *tree; + proto_tree *engineid_tree = NULL; + proto_item *item; + proto_item *engineid_item = NULL; + guint8 len; + + item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_pktc_app_spec_data, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); + tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_app_spec_data); + + switch(doi){ + case DOI_SNMPv3: + switch(kmmid){ + /* we don't distinguish between manager and agent engineid. + feel free to add separation for this if it is imporant enough + for you. */ + case KMMID_AP_REQUEST: + case KMMID_AP_REPLY: + /* snmpEngineID Length */ + len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len, tvb, offset, 1, len); + offset+=1; + + /* snmpEngineID */ + engineid_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineID, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA); + engineid_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(engineid_item, ett_pktc_engineid); + dissect_snmp_engineid(engineid_tree, pinfo, tvb, offset, len); + offset+=len; + + /* boots */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* time */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* usmUserName Length */ + len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_usmUserName_len, tvb, offset, 1, len); + offset+=1; + + /* usmUserName */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_usmUserName, tvb, offset, len, ENC_ASCII); + offset+=len; + + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1); + }; + break; + case DOI_IPSEC: + switch(kmmid){ + /* we don't distinguish between SPIs for inbound Security Associations + of the client (AP-REQ) vs. server (AP-REP, REKEY). Feel free to add + separation for this if it is imporant enough for you. */ + case KMMID_AP_REQUEST: + case KMMID_AP_REPLY: + case KMMID_REKEY: + /* Security Parameter Index (SPI) */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsec_spi, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1); + }; + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, tvb, offset, 1); + } + + proto_item_set_len(item, offset-old_offset); + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi) +{ + int old_offset=offset; + proto_tree *tree; + proto_item *item, *hidden_item; + guint8 len, i; + + item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); + tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites); + + /* number of ciphersuites */ + len=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (len>0) { + proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%d):", len); + } + hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len, tvb, offset, 1, len); + proto_item_set_hidden(hidden_item); + offset+=1; + + switch(doi){ + case DOI_SNMPv3: + for(i=0;i<len;i++){ + /* SNMPv3 authentication algorithm */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals, "%0x")); + offset+=1; + + /* SNMPv3 encryption transform id */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, "/%s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), snmp_transform_id_vals, "%0x")); + offset+=1; + } + break; + case DOI_IPSEC: + for(i=0;i<len;i++){ + /* IPsec authentication algorithm */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals, "%0x")); + offset+=1; + + /* IPsec encryption transform id */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_item_append_text(tree, "/%s", val_to_str(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset), ipsec_transform_id_vals, "%0x")); + offset+=1; + } + break; + default: + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, tvb, offset, 1); + } + + proto_item_set_len(item, offset-old_offset); + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_wakeup(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset) +{ + guint32 snonce; + guint string_len; + + /* Server Nonce */ + snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce); + offset+=4; + + /* Server Kerberos Principal Identifier */ + string_len=tvb_strsize(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_server_principal, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII); + offset+=string_len; + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_ap_request(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi) +{ + tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb; + guint32 snonce; + + /* AP Request kerberos blob */ + pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); + offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL); + + /* Server Nonce */ + snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce); + offset+=4; + + /* app specific data */ + offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_AP_REQUEST); + + /* list of ciphersuites */ + offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi); + + /* re-establish flag */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=1; + + /* sha-1 hmac */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_ap_reply(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi) +{ + tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb; + + /* AP Reply kerberos blob */ + pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); + offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL); + + /* app specific data */ + offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_AP_REPLY); + + /* selected ciphersuite */ + offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi); + + /* sec param lifetime */ + proto_tree_add_uint_format(tree, hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, tvb, offset, 4, + tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset), "%s: %s", + proto_registrar_get_name(hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime), + signed_time_secs_to_str(pinfo->pool, tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset))); + offset+=4; + + /* grace period */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_grace_period, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* re-establish flag */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=1; + + /* ack required flag */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_ack_required_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=1; + + /* sha-1 hmac */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_sec_param_rec(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset) +{ + /* sha-1 hmac of the subkey of the preceding AP-REP */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_rekey(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 doi) +{ + guint32 snonce; + guint string_len; + const guint8 *timestr; + char *display; + int yy, mm, dd, hh, _mm, ss; + + /* Server Nonce */ + snonce=tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_server_nonce, tvb, offset, 4, snonce); + offset+=4; + + /* Server Kerberos Principal Identifier */ + string_len=tvb_strsize(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_server_principal, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII); + offset+=string_len; + + /* Timestamp: YYMMDDhhmmssZ */ + /* They really came up with a two-digit year in late 1990s! =8o */ + timestr=display=tvb_get_string_enc(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, 13, ENC_ASCII); + if (sscanf(timestr, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ", &yy, &mm, &dd, &hh, &_mm, &ss) == 6) { + display = wmem_strdup_printf(pinfo->pool, "%02d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + yy, mm, dd, hh, _mm, ss); + } + proto_tree_add_string_format_value(tree, hf_pktc_timestamp, tvb, + offset, 13, timestr, "%s", display); + offset+=13; + + /* app specific data */ + offset=dissect_pktc_app_specific_data(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi, KMMID_REKEY); + + /* list of ciphersuites */ + offset=dissect_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, doi); + + /* sec param lifetime */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* grace period */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_grace_period, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* re-establish flag */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=1; + + /* sha-1 hmac */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_error_reply(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset) +{ + tvbuff_t *pktc_tvb; + + /* KRB_ERROR */ + pktc_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); + offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL); + + return offset; +} + +static int +dissect_pktc_mtafqdn_krbsafeuserdata(packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree) +{ + int offset=0, string_len=0; + guint8 msgtype; + guint32 bignum; + nstime_t ts; + + /* message type */ + msgtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype, tvb, offset, 1, msgtype); + offset+=1; + + col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, + val_to_str(msgtype, pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals, "MsgType %u")); + + /* enterprise */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=4; + + /* protocol version */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); + offset+=1; + + switch(msgtype) { + case PKTC_MTAFQDN_REQ: + /* MTA MAC address */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac, tvb, offset, 6, ENC_NA); + offset+=6; + + /* MTA pub key hash */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); + offset+=20; + + /* manufacturer cert revocation time */ + bignum = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + ts.secs = bignum; + if (bignum==0) { + proto_tree_add_time_format_value(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, tvb, offset, 4, + &ts, "not revoked"); + } else { + proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, tvb, offset, 4, &ts); + } + break; + + case PKTC_MTAFQDN_REP: + /* MTA FQDN */ + string_len = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) - 4; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn, tvb, offset, string_len, ENC_ASCII); + offset+=string_len; + + /* MTA IP address */ + tvb_memcpy(tvb, (guint8 *)&bignum, offset, sizeof(bignum)); + proto_tree_add_ipv4(tree, hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip, tvb, offset, 4, bignum); + + break; + } + + return offset; +} + +static kerberos_callbacks cb[] = { + { KRB_CBTAG_SAFE_USER_DATA, dissect_pktc_mtafqdn_krbsafeuserdata }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static int +dissect_pktc_mtafqdn(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_) +{ + int offset=0; + proto_tree *pktc_mtafqdn_tree; + proto_item *item; + tvbuff_t *pktc_mtafqdn_tvb; + gint8 ber_class; + bool pc; + gint32 tag; + + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PKTC"); + + item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_pktc, tvb, 0, 0, ENC_NA); + pktc_mtafqdn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc_mtafqdn); + + col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "MTA FQDN %s", + pinfo->srcport == pinfo->match_uint ? "Reply":"Request"); + + /* KRB_AP_RE[QP] */ + pktc_mtafqdn_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); + get_ber_identifier(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, 0, &ber_class, &pc, &tag); + if ((tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AP_REQ) || (tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AP_REP)) { + offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, pinfo, pktc_mtafqdn_tree, FALSE, NULL); + } else { + expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, "Unknown Kerberos application (%d), expected 10 or 11", tag); + return tvb_captured_length(tvb); + } + + /* KRB_SAFE */ + pktc_mtafqdn_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); + get_ber_identifier(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, 0, &ber_class, &pc, &tag); + if (tag == KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_KRB_SAFE) { + offset += dissect_kerberos_main(pktc_mtafqdn_tvb, pinfo, pktc_mtafqdn_tree, FALSE, cb); + } else { + expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, "Unknown Kerberos application (%d), expected 20", tag); + } + + proto_item_set_len(item, offset); + return tvb_captured_length(tvb); +} + + +static int +dissect_pktc(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_) +{ + guint8 kmmid, doi, version; + int offset=0; + proto_tree *pktc_tree, *version_tree; + proto_item *item; + + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PKTC"); + + item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_pktc, tvb, 0, 3, ENC_NA); + pktc_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_pktc); + + /* key management message id */ + kmmid=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(pktc_tree, hf_pktc_kmmid, tvb, offset, 1, kmmid); + offset+=1; + + /* domain of interpretation */ + doi=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(pktc_tree, hf_pktc_doi, tvb, offset, 1, doi); + offset+=1; + + /* version */ + version=tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + version_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(pktc_tree, tvb, offset, 1, ett_pktc_version, NULL, + "Version: %d.%d", (version>>4)&0x0f, (version)&0x0f); + proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_pktc_version_major, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_pktc_version_minor, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); + offset+=1; + + /* fill COL_INFO */ + col_add_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, + val_to_str(kmmid, kmmid_types, "Unknown KMMID %#x")); + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%s)", + val_to_str(doi, doi_types, "Unknown DOI %#x")); + + switch(kmmid){ + case KMMID_WAKEUP: + offset=dissect_pktc_wakeup(pktc_tree, tvb, offset); + break; + case KMMID_AP_REQUEST: + offset=dissect_pktc_ap_request(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi); + break; + case KMMID_AP_REPLY: + offset=dissect_pktc_ap_reply(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi); + break; + case KMMID_SEC_PARAM_REC: + offset=dissect_pktc_sec_param_rec(pktc_tree, tvb, offset); + break; + case KMMID_REKEY: + offset=dissect_pktc_rekey(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset, doi); + break; + case KMMID_ERROR_REPLY: + offset=dissect_pktc_error_reply(pinfo, pktc_tree, tvb, offset); + break; + }; + + proto_item_set_len(item, offset); + return tvb_captured_length(tvb); +} + +void +proto_register_pktc(void) +{ + static hf_register_info hf[] = { + { &hf_pktc_kmmid, { + "Key Management Message ID", "pktc.kmmid", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, + VALS(kmmid_types), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_doi, { + "Domain of Interpretation", "pktc.doi", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + VALS(doi_types), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_version_major, { + "Major version", "pktc.version.major", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0xF0, "Major version of PKTC", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_version_minor, { + "Minor version", "pktc.version.minor", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0x0F, "Minor version of PKTC", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_server_nonce, { + "Server Nonce", "pktc.server_nonce", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, + NULL, 0, "Server Nonce random number", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_server_principal, { + "Server Kerberos Principal Identifier", "pktc.server_principal", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_timestamp, { + "Timestamp", "pktc.timestamp", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, "Timestamp (UTC)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_app_spec_data, { + "Application Specific Data", "pktc.asd", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, "KMMID/DOI application specific data", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites, { + "List of Ciphersuites", "pktc.ciphers", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites_len, { + "Number of Ciphersuites", "pktc.ciphers.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpAuthenticationAlgorithm, { + "SNMPv3 Authentication Algorithm", "pktc.asd.snmp_auth_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, + VALS(snmp_authentication_algorithm_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpEncryptionTransformID, { + "SNMPv3 Encryption Transform ID", "pktc.asd.snmp_enc_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, + VALS(snmp_transform_id_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_ipsecAuthenticationAlgorithm, { + "IPsec Authentication Algorithm", "pktc.asd.ipsec_auth_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, + VALS(ipsec_authentication_algorithm_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_ipsecEncryptionTransformID, { + "IPsec Encryption Transform ID", "pktc.asd.ipsec_enc_alg", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, + VALS(ipsec_transform_id_vals), 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineID_len, { + "SNMPv3 Engine ID Length", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_id.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "Length of SNMPv3 Engine ID", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineID, { + "SNMPv3 Engine ID", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_id", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineBoots, { + "SNMPv3 Engine Boots", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_boots", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_snmpEngineTime, { + "SNMPv3 Engine Time", "pktc.asd.snmp_engine_time", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "SNMPv3 Engine ID Time", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_usmUserName_len, { + "SNMPv3 USM User Name Length", "pktc.asd.snmp_usm_username.len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "Length of SNMPv3 USM User Name", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_usmUserName, { + "SNMPv3 USM User Name", "pktc.asd.snmp_usm_username", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_ipsec_spi, { + "IPsec Security Parameter Index", "pktc.asd.ipsec_spi", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, + NULL, 0, "Security Parameter Index for inbound Security Association (IPsec)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_reestablish_flag, { + "Re-establish Flag", "pktc.reestablish", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_ack_required_flag, { + "ACK Required Flag", "pktc.ack_required", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_sec_param_lifetime, { + "Security Parameter Lifetime", "pktc.spl", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "Lifetime in seconds of security parameter", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_sha1_hmac, { + "SHA-1 HMAC", "pktc.sha1_hmac", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_grace_period, { + "Grace Period", "pktc.grace_period", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "Grace Period in seconds", HFILL }}, + }; + static gint *ett[] = { + &ett_pktc, + &ett_pktc_app_spec_data, + &ett_pktc_list_of_ciphersuites, + &ett_pktc_engineid, + &ett_pktc_version, + }; + + proto_pktc = proto_register_protocol("PacketCable", "PKTC", "pktc"); + proto_register_field_array(proto_pktc, hf, array_length(hf)); + proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); + + pktc_handle = register_dissector("pktc", dissect_pktc, proto_pktc); +} + +void +proto_reg_handoff_pktc(void) +{ + dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", PKTC_PORT, pktc_handle); +} + + +void +proto_register_pktc_mtafqdn(void) +{ + static hf_register_info hf[] = { + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype, { + "Message Type", "pktc.mtafqdn.msgtype", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + VALS(pktc_mtafqdn_msgtype_vals), 0, "MTA FQDN Message Type", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_enterprise, { + "Enterprise Number", "pktc.mtafqdn.enterprise", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_version, { + "Protocol Version", "pktc.mtafqdn.version", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, + NULL, 0, "MTA FQDN Protocol Version", HFILL }}, + /* MTA FQDN REQ */ + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_mac, { + "MTA MAC address", "pktc.mtafqdn.mac", FT_ETHER, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_pub_key_hash, { + "MTA Public Key Hash", "pktc.mtafqdn.pub_key_hash", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, "MTA Public Key Hash (SHA-1)", HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_manu_cert_revoked, { + "Manufacturer Cert Revocation Time", "pktc.mtafqdn.manu_cert_revoked", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, + NULL, 0, "Manufacturer Cert Revocation Time (UTC) or 0 if not revoked", HFILL }}, + /* MTA FQDN REP */ + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_fqdn, { + "MTA FQDN", "pktc.mtafqdn.fqdn", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }}, + { &hf_pktc_mtafqdn_ip, { + "MTA IP Address", "pktc.mtafqdn.ip", FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, + NULL, 0, "MTA IP Address (all zeros if not supplied)", HFILL }}, + }; + static gint *ett[] = { + &ett_pktc_mtafqdn, + }; + + static ei_register_info ei[] = { + { &ei_pktc_unknown_kmmid, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_kmmid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown KMMID", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_pktc_unknown_doi, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_doi", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown DOI", EXPFILL }}, + { &ei_pktc_unknown_kerberos_application, { "pktc.mtafqdn.unknown_kerberos_application", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Unknown Kerberos application", EXPFILL }}, + }; + + expert_module_t* expert_pktc; + + proto_pktc_mtafqdn = proto_register_protocol("PacketCable MTA FQDN", "PKTC MTA FQDN", "pktc.mtafqdn"); + + proto_register_field_array(proto_pktc_mtafqdn, hf, array_length(hf)); + proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); + expert_pktc = expert_register_protocol(proto_pktc_mtafqdn); + expert_register_field_array(expert_pktc, ei, array_length(ei)); + + pktc_mtafqdn_handle = register_dissector("pktc.mtafqdn", dissect_pktc_mtafqdn, proto_pktc_mtafqdn); +} + +void +proto_reg_handoff_pktc_mtafqdn(void) +{ + dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", PKTC_MTAFQDN_PORT, pktc_mtafqdn_handle); +} + +/* + * Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html + * + * Local variables: + * c-basic-offset: 4 + * tab-width: 8 + * indent-tabs-mode: nil + * End: + * + * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab: + * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true: + */ |