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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
commit36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9 (patch)
tree105e8c98ddea1c1e4784a60a5a6410fa416be2de /security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.tar.xz
firefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.zip
Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c1820
1 files changed, 1820 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff80f573ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1820 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "plarena.h"
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "hasht.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "hasht.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "alghmac.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
+
+/* how much a crypto encrypt/decryption may expand a buffer */
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_EXPANSION 64
+
+/* template for PKCS 5 PBE Parameter. This template has been expanded
+ * based upon the additions in PKCS 12. This should eventually be moved
+ * if RSA updates PKCS 5.
+ */
+static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSPKCS5PBEParameterTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, salt) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, iteration) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSPKCS5PKCS12V2PBEParameterTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, salt) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, iteration) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+/* PKCS5 v2 */
+
+struct nsspkcs5V2PBEParameterStr {
+ SECAlgorithmID keyParams; /* parameters of the key generation */
+ SECAlgorithmID algParams; /* parameters for the encryption or mac op */
+};
+
+typedef struct nsspkcs5V2PBEParameterStr nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter;
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSPKCS5V2PBES2ParameterTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter, keyParams),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter, algParams),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSPKCS5V2PBEParameterTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter) },
+ /* this is really a choice, but since we don't understand any other
+ * choice, just inline it. */
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, salt) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, iteration) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, keyLength) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter, prfAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+SECStatus
+nsspkcs5_HashBuf(const SECHashObject *hashObj, unsigned char *dest,
+ unsigned char *src, int len)
+{
+ void *ctx;
+ unsigned int retLen;
+
+ ctx = hashObj->create();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ hashObj->begin(ctx);
+ hashObj->update(ctx, src, len);
+ hashObj->end(ctx, dest, &retLen, hashObj->length);
+ hashObj->destroy(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* generate bits using any hash
+ */
+static SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_PBKDF1(const SECHashObject *hashObj, SECItem *salt, SECItem *pwd,
+ int iter, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ SECItem *hash = NULL, *pre_hash = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ if ((salt == NULL) || (pwd == NULL) || (iter < 0)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ hash = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+ pre_hash = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+
+ if ((hash != NULL) && (pre_hash != NULL)) {
+ int i, ph_len;
+
+ ph_len = hashObj->length;
+ if ((salt->len + pwd->len) > hashObj->length) {
+ ph_len = salt->len + pwd->len;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* allocate buffers */
+ hash->len = hashObj->length;
+ hash->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(hash->len);
+ pre_hash->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(ph_len);
+
+ /* in pbeSHA1TripleDESCBC there was an allocation error that made
+ * it into the caller. We do not want to propagate those errors
+ * further, so we are doing it correctly, but reading the old method.
+ */
+ if (faulty3DES) {
+ pre_hash->len = ph_len;
+ } else {
+ pre_hash->len = salt->len + pwd->len;
+ }
+
+ /* preform hash */
+ if ((hash->data != NULL) && (pre_hash->data != NULL)) {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ /* check for 0 length password */
+ if (pwd->len > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(pre_hash->data, pwd->data, pwd->len);
+ }
+ if (salt->len > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy((pre_hash->data + pwd->len), salt->data, salt->len);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; ((i < iter) && (rv == SECSuccess)); i++) {
+ rv = nsspkcs5_HashBuf(hashObj, hash->data,
+ pre_hash->data, pre_hash->len);
+ if (rv != SECFailure) {
+ pre_hash->len = hashObj->length;
+ PORT_Memcpy(pre_hash->data, hash->data, hashObj->length);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pre_hash != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pre_hash, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (hash != NULL)) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(hash, PR_TRUE);
+ hash = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+/* this bit generation routine is described in PKCS 12 and the proposed
+ * extensions to PKCS 5. an initial hash is generated following the
+ * instructions laid out in PKCS 5. If the number of bits generated is
+ * insufficient, then the method discussed in the proposed extensions to
+ * PKCS 5 in PKCS 12 are used. This extension makes use of the HMAC
+ * function. And the P_Hash function from the TLS standard.
+ */
+static SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_PFXPBE(const SECHashObject *hashObj, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ SECItem *init_hash, unsigned int bytes_needed)
+{
+ SECItem *ret_bits = NULL;
+ int hash_size = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int hash_iter;
+ unsigned int dig_len;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ unsigned char *state = NULL;
+ unsigned int state_len;
+ HMACContext *cx = NULL;
+
+ hash_size = hashObj->length;
+ hash_iter = (bytes_needed + (unsigned int)hash_size - 1) / hash_size;
+
+ /* allocate return buffer */
+ ret_bits = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (ret_bits == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret_bits->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc((hash_iter * hash_size) + 1);
+ ret_bits->len = (hash_iter * hash_size);
+ if (ret_bits->data == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(ret_bits);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate intermediate hash buffer. 8 is for the 8 bytes of
+ * data which are added based on iteration number
+ */
+
+ if ((unsigned int)hash_size > pbe_param->salt.len) {
+ state_len = hash_size;
+ } else {
+ state_len = pbe_param->salt.len;
+ }
+ state = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(state_len);
+ if (state == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (pbe_param->salt.len > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(state, pbe_param->salt.data, pbe_param->salt.len);
+ }
+
+ cx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, init_hash->data, init_hash->len, PR_TRUE);
+ if (cx == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hash_iter; i++) {
+
+ /* generate output bits */
+ HMAC_Begin(cx);
+ HMAC_Update(cx, state, state_len);
+ HMAC_Update(cx, pbe_param->salt.data, pbe_param->salt.len);
+ rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, ret_bits->data + (i * hash_size),
+ &dig_len, hash_size);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)hash_size == dig_len);
+
+ /* generate new state */
+ HMAC_Begin(cx);
+ HMAC_Update(cx, state, state_len);
+ rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, state, &state_len, state_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ PORT_Assert(state_len == dig_len);
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (state != NULL)
+ PORT_ZFree(state, state_len);
+ HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(ret_bits, PR_TRUE);
+ ret_bits = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret_bits;
+}
+
+/* generate bits for the key and iv determination. if enough bits
+ * are not generated using PKCS 5, then we need to generate more bits
+ * based on the extension proposed in PKCS 12
+ */
+static SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_PBKDF1Extended(const SECHashObject *hashObj,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param, SECItem *pwitem, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ SECItem *hash = NULL;
+ SECItem *newHash = NULL;
+ int bytes_needed;
+ int bytes_available;
+
+ bytes_needed = pbe_param->ivLen + pbe_param->keyLen;
+ bytes_available = hashObj->length;
+
+ hash = nsspkcs5_PBKDF1(hashObj, &pbe_param->salt, pwitem,
+ pbe_param->iter, faulty3DES);
+
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (bytes_needed <= bytes_available) {
+ return hash;
+ }
+
+ newHash = nsspkcs5_PFXPBE(hashObj, pbe_param, hash, bytes_needed);
+ if (hash != newHash)
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(hash, PR_TRUE);
+ return newHash;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PBDKDF2 is PKCS #5 v2.0 it's currently not used by NSS
+ */
+static void
+do_xor(unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src, int len)
+{
+ /* use byt xor, not all platforms are happy about inaligned
+ * integer fetches */
+ while (len--) {
+ *dest = *dest ^ *src;
+ dest++;
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsspkcs5_PBKDF2_F(const SECHashObject *hashobj, SECItem *pwitem, SECItem *salt,
+ int iterations, unsigned int i, unsigned char *T)
+{
+ int j;
+ HMACContext *cx = NULL;
+ unsigned int hLen = hashobj->length;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ unsigned char *last = NULL;
+ unsigned int lastLength = salt->len + 4;
+ unsigned int lastBufLength;
+
+ cx = HMAC_Create(hashobj, pwitem->data, pwitem->len, PR_FALSE);
+ if (cx == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Memset(T, 0, hLen);
+ lastBufLength = PR_MAX(lastLength, hLen);
+ last = PORT_Alloc(lastBufLength);
+ if (last == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(last, salt->data, salt->len);
+ last[salt->len] = (i >> 24) & 0xff;
+ last[salt->len + 1] = (i >> 16) & 0xff;
+ last[salt->len + 2] = (i >> 8) & 0xff;
+ last[salt->len + 3] = i & 0xff;
+
+ /* NOTE: we need at least one iteration to return success! */
+ for (j = 0; j < iterations; j++) {
+ HMAC_Begin(cx);
+ HMAC_Update(cx, last, lastLength);
+ rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, last, &lastLength, hLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break;
+ }
+ do_xor(T, last, hLen);
+ }
+loser:
+ if (cx) {
+ HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (last) {
+ PORT_ZFree(last, lastBufLength);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_PBKDF2(const SECHashObject *hashobj, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ SECItem *pwitem)
+{
+ int iterations = pbe_param->iter;
+ int bytesNeeded = pbe_param->keyLen;
+ unsigned int dkLen = bytesNeeded;
+ unsigned int hLen = hashobj->length;
+ unsigned int nblocks = (dkLen + hLen - 1) / hLen;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned char *rp;
+ unsigned char *T = NULL;
+ SECItem *result = NULL;
+ SECItem *salt = &pbe_param->salt;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ result = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, nblocks * hLen);
+ if (result == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ T = PORT_Alloc(hLen);
+ if (T == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1, rp = result->data; i <= nblocks; i++, rp += hLen) {
+ rv = nsspkcs5_PBKDF2_F(hashobj, pwitem, salt, iterations, i, T);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(rp, T, hLen);
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (T) {
+ PORT_ZFree(T, hLen);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
+ result = NULL;
+ } else {
+ result->len = dkLen;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#define NSSPBE_ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x) + ((y)-1)) / (y)) * (y))
+#define NSSPBE_MIN(x, y) ((x) < (y) ? (x) : (y))
+/*
+ * This is the extended PBE function defined by the final PKCS #12 spec.
+ */
+static SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_PKCS12PBE(const SECHashObject *hashObject,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param, SECItem *pwitem,
+ PBEBitGenID bitGenPurpose, unsigned int bytesNeeded)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ unsigned int SLen, PLen;
+ unsigned int hashLength = hashObject->length;
+ unsigned char *S, *P;
+ SECItem *A = NULL, B, D, I;
+ SECItem *salt = &pbe_param->salt;
+ unsigned int c, i = 0;
+ unsigned int hashLen;
+ int iter;
+ unsigned char *iterBuf;
+ void *hash = NULL;
+ unsigned int bufferLength;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* how many hash object lengths are needed */
+ c = (bytesNeeded + (hashLength - 1)) / hashLength;
+
+ /* 64 if 0 < hashLength <= 32, 128 if 32 < hashLength <= 64 */
+ bufferLength = NSSPBE_ROUNDUP(hashLength * 2, 64);
+
+ /* initialize our buffers */
+ D.len = bufferLength;
+ /* B and D are the same length, use one alloc go get both */
+ D.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, D.len * 2);
+ B.len = D.len;
+ B.data = D.data + D.len;
+
+ /* if all goes well, A will be returned, so don't use our temp arena */
+ A = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, c * hashLength);
+ if (A == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ SLen = NSSPBE_ROUNDUP(salt->len, bufferLength);
+ PLen = NSSPBE_ROUNDUP(pwitem->len, bufferLength);
+ I.len = SLen + PLen;
+ I.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, I.len);
+ if (I.data == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* S & P are only used to initialize I */
+ S = I.data;
+ P = S + SLen;
+
+ PORT_Memset(D.data, (char)bitGenPurpose, D.len);
+ if (SLen) {
+ for (i = 0; i < SLen; i += salt->len) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(S + i, salt->data, NSSPBE_MIN(SLen - i, salt->len));
+ }
+ }
+ if (PLen) {
+ for (i = 0; i < PLen; i += pwitem->len) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(P + i, pwitem->data, NSSPBE_MIN(PLen - i, pwitem->len));
+ }
+ }
+
+ iterBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, hashLength);
+ if (iterBuf == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ hash = hashObject->create();
+ if (!hash) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* calculate the PBE now */
+ for (i = 0; i < c; i++) {
+ int Bidx; /* must be signed or the for loop won't terminate */
+ unsigned int k, j;
+ unsigned char *Ai = A->data + i * hashLength;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < pbe_param->iter; iter++) {
+ hashObject->begin(hash);
+
+ if (iter) {
+ hashObject->update(hash, iterBuf, hashLen);
+ } else {
+ hashObject->update(hash, D.data, D.len);
+ hashObject->update(hash, I.data, I.len);
+ }
+
+ hashObject->end(hash, iterBuf, &hashLen, hashObject->length);
+ if (hashLen != hashObject->length) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(Ai, iterBuf, hashLength);
+ for (Bidx = 0; Bidx < (int)B.len; Bidx += hashLength) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(B.data + Bidx, iterBuf, NSSPBE_MIN(B.len - Bidx, hashLength));
+ }
+
+ k = I.len / B.len;
+ for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
+ unsigned int q, carryBit;
+ unsigned char *Ij = I.data + j * B.len;
+
+ /* (Ij = Ij+B+1) */
+ for (Bidx = (B.len - 1), q = 1, carryBit = 0; Bidx >= 0; Bidx--, q = 0) {
+ q += (unsigned int)Ij[Bidx];
+ q += (unsigned int)B.data[Bidx];
+ q += carryBit;
+
+ carryBit = (q > 0xff);
+ Ij[Bidx] = (unsigned char)(q & 0xff);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+loser:
+ if (hash) {
+ hashObject->destroy(hash, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ if (A) {
+ /* if i != c, then we didn't complete the loop above and must of failed
+ * somwhere along the way */
+ if (i != c) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(A, PR_TRUE);
+ A = NULL;
+ } else {
+ A->len = bytesNeeded;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return A;
+}
+
+struct KDFCacheItemStr {
+ SECItem *hash;
+ SECItem *salt;
+ SECItem *pwItem;
+ HASH_HashType hashType;
+ int iterations;
+ int keyLen;
+};
+typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
+
+/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
+ * asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
+ * hash, iterations and salt. */
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
+static struct {
+ PZLock *lock;
+ struct {
+ KDFCacheItem common;
+ int ivLen;
+ PRBool faulty3DES;
+ } cacheKDF1;
+ struct {
+ KDFCacheItem common[KDF2_CACHE_COUNT];
+ int next;
+ } cacheKDF2;
+} PBECache;
+
+void
+sftk_PBELockInit(void)
+{
+ if (!PBECache.lock) {
+ PBECache.lock = PZ_NewLock(nssIPBECacheLock);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_clearPBECommonCacheItemsLocked(KDFCacheItem *item)
+{
+ if (item->hash) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(item->hash, PR_TRUE);
+ item->hash = NULL;
+ }
+ if (item->salt) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(item->salt, PR_TRUE);
+ item->salt = NULL;
+ }
+ if (item->pwItem) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(item->pwItem, PR_TRUE);
+ item->pwItem = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_setPBECommonCacheItemsKDFLocked(KDFCacheItem *cacheItem,
+ const SECItem *hash,
+ const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem)
+{
+ cacheItem->hash = SECITEM_DupItem(hash);
+ cacheItem->hashType = pbe_param->hashType;
+ cacheItem->iterations = pbe_param->iter;
+ cacheItem->keyLen = pbe_param->keyLen;
+ cacheItem->salt = SECITEM_DupItem(&pbe_param->salt);
+ cacheItem->pwItem = SECITEM_DupItem(pwItem);
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_setPBECacheKDF2(const SECItem *hash,
+ const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem)
+{
+ PZ_Lock(PBECache.lock);
+ KDFCacheItem *next = &PBECache.cacheKDF2.common[PBECache.cacheKDF2.next];
+
+ sftk_clearPBECommonCacheItemsLocked(next);
+
+ sftk_setPBECommonCacheItemsKDFLocked(next, hash, pbe_param, pwItem);
+ PBECache.cacheKDF2.next++;
+ if (PBECache.cacheKDF2.next >= KDF2_CACHE_COUNT) {
+ PBECache.cacheKDF2.next = 0;
+ }
+
+ PZ_Unlock(PBECache.lock);
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_setPBECacheKDF1(const SECItem *hash,
+ const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem,
+ PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ PZ_Lock(PBECache.lock);
+
+ sftk_clearPBECommonCacheItemsLocked(&PBECache.cacheKDF1.common);
+
+ sftk_setPBECommonCacheItemsKDFLocked(&PBECache.cacheKDF1.common,
+ hash, pbe_param, pwItem);
+ PBECache.cacheKDF1.faulty3DES = faulty3DES;
+ PBECache.cacheKDF1.ivLen = pbe_param->ivLen;
+
+ PZ_Unlock(PBECache.lock);
+}
+
+static PRBool
+sftk_comparePBECommonCacheItemLocked(const KDFCacheItem *cacheItem,
+ const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem)
+{
+ return (cacheItem->hash &&
+ cacheItem->salt &&
+ cacheItem->pwItem &&
+ pbe_param->hashType == cacheItem->hashType &&
+ pbe_param->iter == cacheItem->iterations &&
+ pbe_param->keyLen == cacheItem->keyLen &&
+ SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&pbe_param->salt, cacheItem->salt) &&
+ SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(pwItem, cacheItem->pwItem));
+}
+
+static SECItem *
+sftk_getPBECacheKDF2(const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem)
+{
+ SECItem *result = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ PZ_Lock(PBECache.lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < KDF2_CACHE_COUNT; i++) {
+ const KDFCacheItem *cacheItem = &PBECache.cacheKDF2.common[i];
+ if (sftk_comparePBECommonCacheItemLocked(cacheItem,
+ pbe_param, pwItem)) {
+ result = SECITEM_DupItem(cacheItem->hash);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(PBECache.lock);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static SECItem *
+sftk_getPBECacheKDF1(const NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param,
+ const SECItem *pwItem,
+ PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ SECItem *result = NULL;
+ const KDFCacheItem *cacheItem = &PBECache.cacheKDF1.common;
+
+ PZ_Lock(PBECache.lock);
+ if (sftk_comparePBECommonCacheItemLocked(cacheItem, pbe_param, pwItem) &&
+ PBECache.cacheKDF1.faulty3DES == faulty3DES &&
+ PBECache.cacheKDF1.ivLen == pbe_param->ivLen) {
+ result = SECITEM_DupItem(cacheItem->hash);
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(PBECache.lock);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+void
+sftk_PBELockShutdown(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (PBECache.lock) {
+ PZ_DestroyLock(PBECache.lock);
+ PBECache.lock = 0;
+ }
+ sftk_clearPBECommonCacheItemsLocked(&PBECache.cacheKDF1.common);
+ for (i = 0; i < KDF2_CACHE_COUNT; i++) {
+ sftk_clearPBECommonCacheItemsLocked(&PBECache.cacheKDF2.common[i]);
+ }
+ PBECache.cacheKDF2.next = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * generate key as per PKCS 5
+ */
+SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param, SECItem *pwitem,
+ SECItem *iv, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ SECItem *hash = NULL, *key = NULL;
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj;
+ PRBool getIV = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if ((pbe_param == NULL) || (pwitem == NULL)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ key = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, pbe_param->keyLen);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (iv && (pbe_param->ivLen) && (iv->data == NULL)) {
+ getIV = PR_TRUE;
+ iv->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(pbe_param->ivLen);
+ if (iv->data == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ iv->len = pbe_param->ivLen;
+ }
+
+ hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(pbe_param->hashType);
+ switch (pbe_param->pbeType) {
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF1:
+ hash = sftk_getPBECacheKDF1(pbe_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
+ if (!hash) {
+ hash = nsspkcs5_PBKDF1Extended(hashObj, pbe_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
+ sftk_setPBECacheKDF1(hash, pbe_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
+ }
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(hash->len >= key->len + (getIV ? iv->len : 0));
+ if (getIV) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(iv->data, hash->data + (hash->len - iv->len), iv->len);
+ }
+
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2:
+ hash = sftk_getPBECacheKDF2(pbe_param, pwitem);
+ if (!hash) {
+ hash = nsspkcs5_PBKDF2(hashObj, pbe_param, pwitem);
+ sftk_setPBECacheKDF2(hash, pbe_param, pwitem);
+ }
+ if (getIV) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(iv->data, pbe_param->ivData, iv->len);
+ }
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2:
+ if (getIV) {
+ hash = nsspkcs5_PKCS12PBE(hashObj, pbe_param, pwitem,
+ pbeBitGenCipherIV, iv->len);
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(iv->data, hash->data, iv->len);
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(hash, PR_TRUE);
+ hash = NULL;
+ }
+ hash = nsspkcs5_PKCS12PBE(hashObj, pbe_param, pwitem,
+ pbe_param->keyID, key->len);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (pbe_param->is2KeyDES) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(key->data, hash->data, (key->len * 2) / 3);
+ PORT_Memcpy(&(key->data[(key->len * 2) / 3]), key->data,
+ key->len / 3);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(key->data, hash->data, key->len);
+ }
+
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(hash, PR_TRUE);
+ return key;
+
+loser:
+ if (getIV && iv->data) {
+ PORT_ZFree(iv->data, iv->len);
+ iv->data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define MAX_IV_LENGTH 64
+/* get a random IV into the parameters */
+static SECStatus
+nsspkcs5_SetIVParam(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param, int ivLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem derIV;
+ SECItem iv;
+ SECItem *dummy = NULL;
+ unsigned char ivData[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ PORT_Assert(ivLen <= MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Because of a bug in the decode section, the IV's not are expected
+ * to be der encoded, but still need to parse as if they were der data.
+ * because we want to be compatible with existing versions of nss that
+ * have that bug, create an IV that looks like der data. That still
+ * leaves 14 bytes of entropy in the IV */
+ rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(ivData, ivLen - 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ derIV.data = NULL;
+ derIV.len = 0;
+ iv.data = ivData;
+ iv.len = ivLen - 2;
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, &derIV, &iv,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ pbe_param->ivData = derIV.data;
+ pbe_param->ivLen = derIV.len;
+ PORT_Assert(pbe_param->ivLen == ivLen);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsspkcs5_FillInParam(SECOidTag algorithm, HASH_HashType hashType,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param)
+{
+ PRBool skipType = PR_FALSE;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 5;
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 8;
+ pbe_param->hashType = hashType;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF1;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SEC_OID_RC2_CBC;
+ pbe_param->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ /* DES3 Algorithms */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_2KEY_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+ pbe_param->is2KeyDES = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_3KEY_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 24;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+ break;
+
+ /* DES Algorithms */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
+ pbe_param->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
+ goto finish_des;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
+ pbe_param->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_DES_CBC:
+ finish_des:
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 8;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SEC_OID_DES_CBC;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+ /* RC2 Algorithms */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 16;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 16;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ /* RC4 algorithms */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_128_BIT_RC4:
+ skipType = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_128_BIT_RC4:
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 16;
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC4:
+ if (!skipType) {
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+ }
+ /* fall through */
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC4:
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SEC_OID_RC4;
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBES2:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1:
+ /* everything else will be filled in by the template */
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 0; /* needs to be set by caller after return */
+ break;
+ /* AES uses PBKDF2 */
+ case SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC:
+ rv = nsspkcs5_SetIVParam(pbe_param, 16);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 16;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 128 / 8;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC:
+ rv = nsspkcs5_SetIVParam(pbe_param, 16);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 192 / 8;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC:
+ rv = nsspkcs5_SetIVParam(pbe_param, 16);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 256 / 8;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_128_KEY_WRAP:
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 128 / 8;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_192_KEY_WRAP:
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 192 / 8;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_256_KEY_WRAP:
+ pbe_param->ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_param->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_param->encAlg = algorithm;
+ pbe_param->keyLen = 256 / 8;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (pbe_param->pbeType == NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2) {
+ SECOidTag prfAlg = HASH_HMACOidFromHash(pbe_param->hashType);
+ if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(pbe_param->poolp, &pbe_param->prfAlg,
+ prfAlg, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* decode the algid and generate a PKCS 5 parameter from it
+ */
+NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *
+nsspkcs5_NewParam(SECOidTag alg, HASH_HashType hashType, SECItem *salt,
+ int iterationCount)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* allocate memory for the parameter */
+ pbe_param = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+ sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
+
+ if (pbe_param == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pbe_param->poolp = arena;
+
+ rv = nsspkcs5_FillInParam(alg, hashType, pbe_param);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pbe_param->iter = iterationCount;
+ if (salt) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pbe_param->salt, salt);
+ }
+
+ /* default key gen */
+ pbe_param->keyID = pbeBitGenCipherKey;
+
+loser:
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ pbe_param = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pbe_param;
+}
+
+/*
+ * find the hash type needed to implement a specific HMAC.
+ * OID definitions are from pkcs 5 v2.0 and 2.1
+ */
+HASH_HashType
+HASH_FromHMACOid(SECOidTag hmac)
+{
+ switch (hmac) {
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return HASH_AlgNULL;
+}
+
+SECOidTag
+HASH_HMACOidFromHash(HASH_HashType hashType)
+{
+ switch (hashType) {
+ case HASH_AlgSHA1:
+ return SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
+ case HASH_AlgSHA256:
+ return SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
+ case HASH_AlgSHA384:
+ return SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384;
+ case HASH_AlgSHA512:
+ return SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512;
+ case HASH_AlgSHA224:
+ return SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
+ case HASH_AlgMD2:
+ case HASH_AlgMD5:
+ case HASH_AlgTOTAL:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/* decode the algid and generate a PKCS 5 parameter from it
+ */
+NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *
+nsspkcs5_AlgidToParam(SECAlgorithmID *algid)
+{
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param = NULL;
+ nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter pbev2_param;
+ SECOidTag algorithm;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ if (algid == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ algorithm = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+ if (algorithm == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pbe_param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(algorithm, HASH_AlgSHA1, NULL, 1);
+ if (pbe_param == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* decode parameter */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ switch (pbe_param->pbeType) {
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF1:
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameterTemplate, &algid->parameters);
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2:
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5PKCS12V2PBEParameterTemplate, &algid->parameters);
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2:
+ PORT_Memset(&pbev2_param, 0, sizeof(pbev2_param));
+ /* just the PBE */
+ if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5V2PBEParameterTemplate, &algid->parameters);
+ } else {
+ /* PBE data an others */
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, &pbev2_param,
+ NSSPKCS5V2PBES2ParameterTemplate, &algid->parameters);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break;
+ }
+ pbe_param->encAlg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pbev2_param.algParams);
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pbe_param->poolp, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5V2PBEParameterTemplate,
+ &pbev2_param.keyParams.parameters);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break;
+ }
+ pbe_param->keyLen = DER_GetInteger(&pbe_param->keyLength);
+ }
+ /* we we are encrypting, save any iv's */
+ if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBES2) {
+ pbe_param->ivLen = pbev2_param.algParams.parameters.len;
+ pbe_param->ivData = pbev2_param.algParams.parameters.data;
+ }
+ pbe_param->hashType =
+ HASH_FromHMACOid(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pbe_param->prfAlg));
+ if (pbe_param->hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ PORT_Memset(&pbev2_param, 0, sizeof(pbev2_param));
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ pbe_param->iter = DER_GetInteger(&pbe_param->iteration);
+ } else {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
+ pbe_param = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pbe_param;
+}
+
+/* destroy a pbe parameter. it assumes that the parameter was
+ * generated using the appropriate create function and therefor
+ * contains an arena pool.
+ */
+void
+nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param)
+{
+ if (pbe_param != NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(pbe_param->poolp, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+}
+
+/* crypto routines */
+/* perform DES encryption and decryption. these routines are called
+ * by nsspkcs5_CipherData. In the case of an error, NULL is returned.
+ */
+static SECItem *
+sec_pkcs5_des(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv, SECItem *src, PRBool triple_des,
+ PRBool encrypt)
+{
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECItem *dup_src;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ int error;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ DESContext *ctxt;
+ unsigned int pad;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (key == NULL) || (iv == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dup_src = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (dup_src == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt != PR_FALSE) {
+ void *dummy;
+
+ dummy = CBC_PadBuffer(NULL, dup_src->data,
+ dup_src->len, &dup_src->len, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dup_src->data = (unsigned char *)dummy;
+ }
+
+ dest = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, dup_src->len + MAX_CRYPTO_EXPANSION);
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ctxt = DES_CreateContext(key->data, iv->data,
+ (triple_des ? NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC : NSS_DES_CBC),
+ encrypt);
+ if (ctxt == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = (encrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt)(
+ ctxt, dest->data, &dest->len,
+ dest->len, dup_src->data, dup_src->len);
+
+ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ error = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /* remove padding */
+ if ((encrypt == PR_FALSE) && (rv == SECSuccess)) {
+ crv = sftk_CheckCBCPadding(dest->data, dest->len, DES_BLOCK_SIZE, &pad);
+ dest->len = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), dest->len - pad, dest->len);
+ PORT_SetError(PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), error, SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD));
+ }
+ DES_DestroyContext(ctxt, PR_TRUE);
+
+loser:
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dest, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ dest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (dup_src != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+/* perform aes encryption/decryption if an error occurs, NULL is returned
+ */
+static SECItem *
+sec_pkcs5_aes(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv, SECItem *src, PRBool triple_des,
+ PRBool encrypt)
+{
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECItem *dup_src;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ int error;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ AESContext *ctxt;
+ unsigned int pad;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (key == NULL) || (iv == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dup_src = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (dup_src == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt != PR_FALSE) {
+ void *dummy;
+
+ dummy = CBC_PadBuffer(NULL, dup_src->data,
+ dup_src->len, &dup_src->len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dup_src->data = (unsigned char *)dummy;
+ }
+
+ dest = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, dup_src->len + MAX_CRYPTO_EXPANSION);
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ctxt = AES_CreateContext(key->data, iv->data, NSS_AES_CBC,
+ encrypt, key->len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (ctxt == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = (encrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt)(
+ ctxt, dest->data, &dest->len,
+ dest->len, dup_src->data, dup_src->len);
+
+ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ error = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /* remove padding */
+ if ((encrypt == PR_FALSE) && (rv == SECSuccess)) {
+ crv = sftk_CheckCBCPadding(dest->data, dest->len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &pad);
+ dest->len = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), dest->len - pad, dest->len);
+ PORT_SetError(PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), error, SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD));
+ }
+ AES_DestroyContext(ctxt, PR_TRUE);
+
+loser:
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dest, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ dest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (dup_src != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+/* perform aes encryption/decryption if an error occurs, NULL is returned
+ */
+static SECItem *
+sec_pkcs5_aes_key_wrap(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv, SECItem *src, PRBool triple_des,
+ PRBool encrypt)
+{
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECItem *dup_src;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ int error;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ AESKeyWrapContext *ctxt;
+ unsigned int pad;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (key == NULL) || (iv == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dup_src = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (dup_src == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt != PR_FALSE) {
+ void *dummy;
+
+ dummy = CBC_PadBuffer(NULL, dup_src->data,
+ dup_src->len, &dup_src->len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dup_src->data = (unsigned char *)dummy;
+ }
+
+ dest = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, dup_src->len + MAX_CRYPTO_EXPANSION);
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ctxt = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(key->data, iv->data, encrypt,
+ key->len);
+
+ if (ctxt == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = (encrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt)(
+ ctxt, dest->data, &dest->len,
+ dest->len, dup_src->data, dup_src->len);
+
+ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ error = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /* remove padding */
+ if ((encrypt == PR_FALSE) && (rv == SECSuccess)) {
+ crv = sftk_CheckCBCPadding(dest->data, dest->len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &pad);
+ dest->len = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), dest->len - pad, dest->len);
+ PORT_SetError(PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), error, SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD));
+ }
+ AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext(ctxt, PR_TRUE);
+
+loser:
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dest, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ dest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (dup_src != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+/* perform rc2 encryption/decryption if an error occurs, NULL is returned
+ */
+static SECItem *
+sec_pkcs5_rc2(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv, SECItem *src, PRBool dummy,
+ PRBool encrypt)
+{
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECItem *dup_src;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ int pad;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (key == NULL) || (iv == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dup_src = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (dup_src == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt != PR_FALSE) {
+ void *v;
+
+ v = CBC_PadBuffer(NULL, dup_src->data,
+ dup_src->len, &dup_src->len, 8 /* RC2_BLOCK_SIZE */);
+ if (v == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dup_src->data = (unsigned char *)v;
+ }
+
+ dest = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(dup_src->len + 64);
+ if (dest->data != NULL) {
+ RC2Context *ctxt;
+
+ ctxt = RC2_CreateContext(key->data, key->len, iv->data,
+ NSS_RC2_CBC, key->len);
+
+ if (ctxt != NULL) {
+ rv = (encrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt)(
+ ctxt, dest->data, &dest->len,
+ dup_src->len + 64, dup_src->data, dup_src->len);
+
+ /* assumes 8 byte blocks -- remove padding */
+ if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (encrypt != PR_TRUE)) {
+ pad = dest->data[dest->len - 1];
+ if ((pad > 0) && (pad <= 8)) {
+ if (dest->data[dest->len - pad] != pad) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ dest->len -= pad;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (dest != NULL)) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dest, PR_TRUE);
+ dest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (dup_src != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dup_src, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2 */
+
+/* perform rc4 encryption and decryption */
+static SECItem *
+sec_pkcs5_rc4(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv, SECItem *src, PRBool dummy_op,
+ PRBool encrypt)
+{
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (key == NULL) || (iv == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dest = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(unsigned char) *
+ (src->len + 64));
+ if (dest->data != NULL) {
+ RC4Context *ctxt;
+
+ ctxt = RC4_CreateContext(key->data, key->len);
+ if (ctxt) {
+ rv = (encrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt)(
+ ctxt, dest->data, &dest->len,
+ src->len + 64, src->data, src->len);
+ RC4_DestroyContext(ctxt, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (dest)) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(dest, PR_TRUE);
+ dest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+/* function pointer template for crypto functions */
+typedef SECItem *(*pkcs5_crypto_func)(SECItem *key, SECItem *iv,
+ SECItem *src, PRBool op1, PRBool op2);
+
+/* performs the cipher operation on the src and returns the result.
+ * if an error occurs, NULL is returned.
+ *
+ * a null length password is allowed. this corresponds to encrypting
+ * the data with ust the salt.
+ */
+/* change this to use PKCS 11? */
+SECItem *
+nsspkcs5_CipherData(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param, SECItem *pwitem,
+ SECItem *src, PRBool encrypt, PRBool *update)
+{
+ SECItem *key = NULL, iv;
+ SECItem *dest = NULL;
+ PRBool tripleDES = PR_TRUE;
+ pkcs5_crypto_func cryptof;
+
+ iv.data = NULL;
+
+ if (update) {
+ *update = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if ((pwitem == NULL) || (src == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* get key, and iv */
+ key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pbe_param, pwitem, &iv, PR_FALSE);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (pbe_param->encAlg) {
+ /* PKCS 5 v2 only */
+ case SEC_OID_AES_128_KEY_WRAP:
+ case SEC_OID_AES_192_KEY_WRAP:
+ case SEC_OID_AES_256_KEY_WRAP:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_aes_key_wrap;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC:
+ case SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC:
+ case SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_aes;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_des;
+ tripleDES = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_des;
+ tripleDES = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+ case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_rc2;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SEC_OID_RC4:
+ cryptof = sec_pkcs5_rc4;
+ break;
+ default:
+ cryptof = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (cryptof == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ dest = (*cryptof)(key, &iv, src, tripleDES, encrypt);
+ /*
+ * it's possible for some keys and keydb's to claim to
+ * be triple des when they're really des. In this case
+ * we simply try des. If des works we set the update flag
+ * so the key db knows it needs to update all it's entries.
+ * The case can only happen on decrypted of a
+ * SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBD.
+ */
+ if ((pbe_param->encAlg == SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC) &&
+ (dest == NULL) && (encrypt == PR_FALSE)) {
+ dest = (*cryptof)(key, &iv, src, PR_FALSE, encrypt);
+ if (update && (dest != NULL))
+ *update = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (iv.data != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&iv, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+/* creates a algorithm ID containing the PBE algorithm and appropriate
+ * parameters. the required parameter is the algorithm. if salt is
+ * not specified, it is generated randomly. if IV is specified, it overrides
+ * the PKCS 5 generation of the IV.
+ *
+ * the returned SECAlgorithmID should be destroyed using
+ * SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID
+ */
+SECAlgorithmID *
+nsspkcs5_CreateAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena, SECOidTag algorithm,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param)
+{
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid, *ret_algid = NULL;
+ SECItem der_param;
+ nsspkcs5V2PBEParameter pkcs5v2_param;
+
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ void *dummy = NULL;
+
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ der_param.data = NULL;
+ der_param.len = 0;
+
+ /* generate the algorithm id */
+ algid = (SECAlgorithmID *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID));
+ if (algid == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (pbe_param->iteration.data == NULL) {
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(pbe_param->poolp, &pbe_param->iteration,
+ pbe_param->iter);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ switch (pbe_param->pbeType) {
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF1:
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &der_param, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameterTemplate);
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2:
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &der_param, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5PKCS12V2PBEParameterTemplate);
+ break;
+ case NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2:
+ if (pbe_param->keyLength.data == NULL) {
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(pbe_param->poolp,
+ &pbe_param->keyLength, pbe_param->keyLen);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Memset(&pkcs5v2_param, 0, sizeof(pkcs5v2_param));
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &der_param, pbe_param,
+ NSSPKCS5V2PBEParameterTemplate);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ dummy = NULL;
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pkcs5v2_param.keyParams,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, &der_param);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break;
+ }
+ der_param.data = pbe_param->ivData;
+ der_param.len = pbe_param->ivLen;
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pkcs5v2_param.algParams,
+ pbe_param->encAlg, pbe_param->ivLen ? &der_param : NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ dummy = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ der_param.data = NULL;
+ der_param.len = 0;
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &der_param, &pkcs5v2_param,
+ NSSPKCS5V2PBES2ParameterTemplate);
+ /* If the algorithm was set to some encryption oid, set it
+ * to PBES2 */
+ if ((algorithm != SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) &&
+ (algorithm != SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1)) {
+ algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBES2;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, algid, algorithm, &der_param);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ret_algid = (SECAlgorithmID *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECAlgorithmID));
+ if (ret_algid == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(NULL, ret_algid, algid);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(ret_algid, PR_TRUE);
+ ret_algid = NULL;
+ }
+
+loser:
+
+ return ret_algid;
+}
+
+#define TEST_KEY "pbkdf test key"
+SECStatus
+sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
+{
+ SECItem *result;
+ SECItem inKey;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter pbe_params;
+ unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
+ unsigned char keyLen = 64;
+ char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
+ static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
+ 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
+ 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
+ 0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
+ 0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
+ 0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
+ 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
+ 0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
+ 0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
+ };
+
+ sftk_PBELockInit();
+
+ inKey.data = (unsigned char *)inKeyData;
+ inKey.len = sizeof(TEST_KEY) - 1;
+
+ pbe_params.salt.data = (unsigned char *)saltData;
+ pbe_params.salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
+ /* the interation and keyLength are used as intermediate
+ * values when decoding the Algorithm ID, set them for completeness,
+ * but they are not used */
+ pbe_params.iteration.data = &iteration_count;
+ pbe_params.iteration.len = 1;
+ pbe_params.keyLength.data = &keyLen;
+ pbe_params.keyLength.len = 1;
+ /* pkcs5v2 stores the key in the AlgorithmID, so we don't need to
+ * generate it here */
+ pbe_params.ivLen = 0;
+ pbe_params.ivData = NULL;
+ /* keyID is only used by pkcs12 extensions to pkcs5v1 */
+ pbe_params.keyID = pbeBitGenCipherKey;
+ /* Algorithm is used by the decryption code after get get our key */
+ pbe_params.encAlg = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
+ /* these are the fields actually used in nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV
+ * for NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2 */
+ pbe_params.iter = iteration_count;
+ pbe_params.keyLen = keyLen;
+ pbe_params.hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ pbe_params.pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PBKDF2;
+ pbe_params.is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
+
+ result = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(&pbe_params, &inKey, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ if ((result == NULL) || (result->len != sizeof(pbkdf_known_answer)) ||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(result->data, pbkdf_known_answer, sizeof(pbkdf_known_answer)) != 0)) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}