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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-08 15:18:09 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-08 15:18:09 +0000
commit0cd6f26b6b8fcec2b43398fd831f6b9e0cb977e3 (patch)
tree673eec8dca4c4cfc5125dd4447f6608e589fa6b9 /security/nss
parentAdding debian version 115.8.0esr-1~deb12u1. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-0cd6f26b6b8fcec2b43398fd831f6b9e0cb977e3.tar.xz
firefox-esr-0cd6f26b6b8fcec2b43398fd831f6b9e0cb977e3.zip
Merging upstream version 115.9.0esr.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/TAG-INFO2
-rw-r--r--security/nss/coreconf/coreconf.dep1
-rw-r--r--security/nss/doc/rst/releases/nss_3_90_2.rst56
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h3
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c300
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h41
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c29
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c16
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h4
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h4
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c7
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h4
12 files changed, 427 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/TAG-INFO b/security/nss/TAG-INFO
index a30ff41540..7dc276865a 100644
--- a/security/nss/TAG-INFO
+++ b/security/nss/TAG-INFO
@@ -1 +1 @@
-NSS_3_90_1_RTM \ No newline at end of file
+NSS_3_90_2_RTM \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/nss/coreconf/coreconf.dep b/security/nss/coreconf/coreconf.dep
index 590d1bfaee..5182f75552 100644
--- a/security/nss/coreconf/coreconf.dep
+++ b/security/nss/coreconf/coreconf.dep
@@ -10,4 +10,3 @@
*/
#error "Do not include this header file."
-
diff --git a/security/nss/doc/rst/releases/nss_3_90_2.rst b/security/nss/doc/rst/releases/nss_3_90_2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6210183540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/doc/rst/releases/nss_3_90_2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+.. _mozilla_projects_nss_nss_3_90_2_release_notes:
+
+NSS 3.90.2 release notes
+========================
+
+`Introduction <#introduction>`__
+--------------------------------
+
+.. container::
+
+ Network Security Services (NSS) 3.90.2 was released on *15th February 2024**.
+
+
+`Distribution Information <#distribution_information>`__
+--------------------------------------------------------
+
+.. container::
+
+ The HG tag is NSS_3_90_2_RTM. NSS 3.90.2 requires NSPR 4.35 or newer.
+
+ NSS 3.90.2 source distributions are available on ftp.mozilla.org for secure HTTPS download:
+
+ - Source tarballs:
+ https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_90_2_RTM/src/
+
+ Other releases are available :ref:`mozilla_projects_nss_releases`.
+
+.. _changes_in_nss_3.90.2:
+
+`Changes in NSS 3.90.2 <#changes_in_nss_3.90.2>`__
+--------------------------------------------------
+
+.. container::
+
+ - Bug 1780432 - (CVE-2023-5388) Timing attack against RSA decryption in TLS.
+ - Bug 1867408 - add a defensive check for large ssl_DefSend return values.
+
+`Compatibility <#compatibility>`__
+----------------------------------
+
+.. container::
+
+ NSS 3.90.2 shared libraries are backwards-compatible with all older NSS 3.x shared
+ libraries. A program linked with older NSS 3.x shared libraries will work with
+ this new version of the shared libraries without recompiling or
+ relinking. Furthermore, applications that restrict their use of NSS APIs to the
+ functions listed in NSS Public Functions will remain compatible with future
+ versions of the NSS shared libraries.
+
+`Feedback <#feedback>`__
+------------------------
+
+.. container::
+
+ Bugs discovered should be reported by filing a bug report on
+ `bugzilla.mozilla.org <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/enter_bug.cgi?product=NSS>`__ (product NSS).
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
index 9447a818f3..b4333fb6b4 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
@@ -204,6 +204,9 @@ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len,
void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
mp_digit *c);
+void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a,
+ mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
+ mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len);
void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_sqr_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
mp_size a_len,
mp_digit *sqrs);
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
index 2e6cd84664..7749dc710f 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
#include "mpi-priv.h"
#include "mplogic.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
#if defined(__arm__) && \
((defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_3__))
/* 16-bit thumb or ARM v3 doesn't work inlined assember version */
@@ -802,15 +804,18 @@ CLEANUP:
/* }}} */
-/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
+/* {{{ s_mp_mulg(a, b, c) */
/*
- mp_mul(a, b, c)
+ s_mp_mulg(a, b, c)
- Compute c = a * b. All parameters may be identical.
+ Compute c = a * b. All parameters may be identical. if constantTime is set,
+ then the operations are done in constant time. The original is mostly
+ constant time as long as s_mpv_mul_d_add() is constant time. This is true
+ of the x86 assembler, as well as the current c code.
*/
mp_err
-mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
+s_mp_mulg(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c, int constantTime)
{
mp_digit *pb;
mp_int tmp;
@@ -846,7 +851,14 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
goto CLEANUP;
#ifdef NSS_USE_COMBA
- if ((MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
+ /* comba isn't constant time because it clamps! If we cared
+ * (we needed a constant time version of multiply that was 'faster'
+ * we could easily pass constantTime down to the comba code and
+ * get it to skip the clamp... but here are assembler versions
+ * which add comba to platforms that can't compile the normal
+ * comba's imbedded assembler which would also need to change, so
+ * for now we just skip comba when we are running constant time. */
+ if (!constantTime && (MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
if (MP_USED(a) == 4) {
s_mp_mul_comba_4(a, b, c);
goto CLEANUP;
@@ -876,13 +888,15 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
mp_digit b_i = *pb++;
/* Inner product: Digits of a */
- if (b_i)
+ if (constantTime || b_i)
s_mpv_mul_d_add(MP_DIGITS(a), useda, b_i, MP_DIGITS(c) + ib);
else
MP_DIGIT(c, ib + useda) = b_i;
}
- s_mp_clamp(c);
+ if (!constantTime) {
+ s_mp_clamp(c);
+ }
if (SIGN(a) == SIGN(b) || s_mp_cmp_d(c, 0) == MP_EQ)
SIGN(c) = ZPOS;
@@ -892,10 +906,54 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
CLEANUP:
mp_clear(&tmp);
return res;
+} /* end smp_mulg() */
+
+/* }}} */
+
+/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
+
+/*
+ mp_mul(a, b, c)
+
+ Compute c = a * b. All parameters may be identical.
+ */
+
+mp_err
+mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
+{
+ return s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 0);
} /* end mp_mul() */
/* }}} */
+/* {{{ mp_mulCT(a, b, c) */
+
+/*
+ mp_mulCT(a, b, c)
+
+ Compute c = a * b. In constant time. Parameters may not be identical.
+ NOTE: a and b may be modified.
+ */
+
+mp_err
+mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize)
+{
+ mp_err res;
+
+ /* make the multiply values fixed length so multiply
+ * doesn't leak the length. at this point all the
+ * values are blinded, but once we finish we want the
+ * output size to be hidden (so no clamping the out put) */
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(a, setSize));
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, setSize));
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, 2 * setSize));
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 1));
+CLEANUP:
+ return res;
+} /* end mp_mulCT() */
+
+/* }}} */
+
/* {{{ mp_sqr(a, sqr) */
#if MP_SQUARE
@@ -1268,6 +1326,138 @@ mp_mod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
/* }}} */
+/* {{{ s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c) */
+
+/*
+ s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c)
+
+ Compute c = (a -b) - subtract in constant time. returns borrow
+ */
+mp_digit
+s_mp_subCT_d(mp_digit a, mp_digit b, mp_digit borrow, mp_digit *ret)
+{
+ *ret = a - b - borrow;
+ return MP_CT_LTU(a, *ret) | (MP_CT_EQ(a, *ret) & borrow);
+} /* s_mp_subCT_d() */
+
+/* }}} */
+
+/* {{{ mp_subCT(a, b, ret, borrow) */
+
+/* return ret= a - b and borrow in borrow. done in constant time.
+ * b could be modified.
+ */
+mp_err
+mp_subCT(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *ret, mp_digit *borrow)
+{
+ mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
+ mp_size i;
+ mp_err res;
+
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, used_a));
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
+ *borrow = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < used_a; i++) {
+ *borrow = s_mp_subCT_d(MP_DIGIT(a, i), MP_DIGIT(b, i), *borrow,
+ &MP_DIGIT(ret, i));
+ }
+
+ res = MP_OKAY;
+CLEANUP:
+ return res;
+} /* end mp_subCT() */
+
+/* }}} */
+
+/* {{{ mp_selectCT(cond, a, b, ret) */
+
+/*
+ * return ret= cond ? a : b; cond should be either 0 or 1
+ */
+mp_err
+mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret)
+{
+ mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
+ mp_err res;
+ mp_size i;
+
+ cond *= MP_DIGIT_MAX;
+
+ /* we currently require these to be equal on input,
+ * we could use pad to extend one of them, but that might
+ * leak data as it wouldn't be constant time */
+ if (used_a != MP_USED(b)) {
+ return MP_BADARG;
+ }
+
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
+ for (i = 0; i < used_a; i++) {
+ MP_DIGIT(ret, i) = MP_CT_SEL_DIGIT(cond, MP_DIGIT(a, i), MP_DIGIT(b, i));
+ }
+ res = MP_OKAY;
+CLEANUP:
+ return res;
+} /* end mp_selectCT() */
+
+/* {{{ mp_reduceCT(a, m, c) */
+
+/*
+ mp_reduceCT(a, m, c)
+
+ Compute c = aR^-1 (mod m) in constant time.
+ input should be in montgomery form. If input is the
+ result of a montgomery multiply then out put will be
+ in mongomery form.
+ Result will be reduced to MP_USED(m), but not be
+ clamped.
+ */
+
+mp_err
+mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c)
+{
+ mp_size used_m = MP_USED(m);
+ mp_size used_c = used_m * 2 + 1;
+ mp_digit *m_digits, *c_digits;
+ mp_size i;
+ mp_digit borrow, carry;
+ mp_err res;
+ mp_int sub;
+
+ MP_DIGITS(&sub) = 0;
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&sub, used_m));
+
+ if (a != c) {
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(a, c));
+ }
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, used_c));
+ m_digits = MP_DIGITS(m);
+ c_digits = MP_DIGITS(c);
+ for (i = 0; i < used_m; i++) {
+ mp_digit m_i = MP_DIGIT(c, i) * n0i;
+ s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(m_digits, used_m, m_i, c_digits++, used_c--);
+ }
+ s_mp_rshd(c, used_m);
+ /* MP_USED(c) should be used_m+1 with the high word being any carry
+ * from the previous multiply, save that carry and drop the high
+ * word for the substraction below */
+ carry = MP_DIGIT(c, used_m);
+ MP_DIGIT(c, used_m) = 0;
+ MP_USED(c) = used_m;
+ /* mp_subCT wants c and m to be the same size, we've already
+ * guarrenteed that in the previous statement, so mp_subCT won't actually
+ * modify m, so it's safe to recast */
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_subCT(c, (mp_int *)m, &sub, &borrow));
+
+ /* we return c-m if c >= m no borrow or there was a borrow and a carry */
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_selectCT(borrow ^ carry, c, &sub, c));
+ res = MP_OKAY;
+CLEANUP:
+ mp_clear(&sub);
+ return res;
+} /* end mp_reduceCT() */
+
+/* }}} */
+
/* {{{ mp_mod_d(a, d, c) */
/*
@@ -1384,6 +1574,37 @@ mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
/* }}} */
+/* {{{ mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c) */
+
+/*
+ mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c)
+
+ Compute c = (a * b) mod m in constant time wrt a and b. either a or b
+ should be in montgomery form and the output is native. If both a and b
+ are in montgomery form, then the output will also be in montgomery form
+ and can be recovered with an mp_reduceCT call.
+ NOTE: a and b may be modified.
+ */
+
+mp_err
+mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i,
+ mp_int *c)
+{
+ mp_err res;
+
+ ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && m != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
+
+ if ((res = mp_mulCT(a, b, c, MP_USED(m))) != MP_OKAY)
+ return res;
+
+ if ((res = mp_reduceCT(c, m, n0i, c)) != MP_OKAY)
+ return res;
+
+ return MP_OKAY;
+}
+
+/* }}} */
+
/* {{{ mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) */
#if MP_SQUARE
@@ -3941,14 +4162,62 @@ s_mp_mul(mp_int *a, const mp_int *b)
a1b0 = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX); \
a1b0 += a0b1; \
Phi += a1b0 >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT; \
- if (a1b0 < a0b1) \
- Phi += MP_HALF_RADIX; \
+ Phi += (MP_CT_LTU(a1b0, a0b1)) << MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT; \
a1b0 <<= MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT; \
Plo += a1b0; \
- if (Plo < a1b0) \
- ++Phi; \
+ Phi += MP_CT_LTU(Plo, a1b0); \
+ }
+#endif
+
+/* Constant time version of s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop.
+ * Presently, this is only used by the Constant time Montgomery arithmetic code. */
+/* c += a * b */
+void
+s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
+ mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len)
+{
+#if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
+ mp_digit d = 0;
+
+ c_len -= a_len;
+ /* Inner product: Digits of a */
+ while (a_len--) {
+ mp_word w = ((mp_word)b * *a++) + *c + d;
+ *c++ = ACCUM(w);
+ d = CARRYOUT(w);
+ }
+
+ /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
+ while (c_len--) {
+ mp_word w = (mp_word)*c + d;
+ *c++ = ACCUM(w);
+ d = CARRYOUT(w);
+ }
+#else
+ mp_digit carry = 0;
+ c_len -= a_len;
+ while (a_len--) {
+ mp_digit a_i = *a++;
+ mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
+ MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
+
+ a0b0 += carry;
+ a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
+ a0b0 += a_i = *c;
+ a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, a_i);
+
+ *c++ = a0b0;
+ carry = a1b1;
+ }
+ /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
+ while (c_len--) {
+ mp_digit c_i = *c;
+ carry += c_i;
+ *c++ = carry;
+ carry = MP_CT_LTU(carry, c_i);
}
#endif
+}
#if !defined(MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY)
/* c = a * b */
@@ -3974,8 +4243,7 @@ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b, mp_digit *c)
MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
a0b0 += carry;
- if (a0b0 < carry)
- ++a1b1;
+ a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
*c++ = a0b0;
carry = a1b1;
}
@@ -4007,11 +4275,9 @@ s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
a0b0 += carry;
- if (a0b0 < carry)
- ++a1b1;
+ a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
a0b0 += a_i = *c;
- if (a0b0 < a_i)
- ++a1b1;
+ a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, a_i);
*c++ = a0b0;
carry = a1b1;
}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
index 4ba9b6a4bf..dd129db0d6 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
@@ -150,6 +150,38 @@ typedef int mp_sword;
/* This defines the maximum I/O base (minimum is 2) */
#define MP_MAX_RADIX 64
+/* Constant Time Macros on mp_digits */
+#define MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(x) ((mp_digit)((mp_digit)(x) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT - 1)))
+#define MP_CT_TRUE ((mp_digit)1)
+#define MP_CT_FALSE ((mp_digit)0)
+
+/* basic zero and non zero tests */
+#define MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(x) (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
+#define MP_CT_ZERO(x) (MP_CT_TRUE ^ MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
+
+/* basic constant-time helper macro for equalities and inequalities.
+ * The inequalities will produce incorrect results if
+ * abs(a-b) >= MP_DIGIT_SIZE/2. This can be avoided if unsigned values stay
+ * within the range 0-MP_DIGIT_MAX/2. */
+#define MP_CT_EQ(a, b) MP_CT_ZERO(((a) ^ (b)))
+#define MP_CT_NE(a, b) MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(((a) ^ (b)))
+#define MP_CT_GT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((b) - (a))
+#define MP_CT_LT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a) - (b))
+#define MP_CT_GE(a, b) (MP_CT_TRUE ^ MP_CT_LT(a, b))
+#define MP_CT_LE(a, b) (MP_CT_TRUE ^ MP_CT_GT(a, b))
+
+/* use constant time result to select a boolean value
+ * or an mp digit depending on the args */
+#define MP_CT_SEL(m, l, r) ((r) ^ ((m) & ((r) ^ (l))))
+#define MP_CT_SELB(m, l, r) MP_CT_SEL(m, l, r) /* mask, l and r are booleans */
+#define MP_CT_SEL_DIGIT(m, l, r) MP_CT_SEL(m, l, r) /*mask, l, and r are mp_digit */
+
+/* full inequalities that work with full mp_digit values */
+#define MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a, b, c, d) \
+ MP_CT_SELB(MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a) ^ (b)), \
+ (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(d)), c)
+#define MP_CT_LTU(a, b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a, b, MP_CT_LT(a, b), b)
+
typedef struct {
mp_sign sign; /* sign of this quantity */
mp_size alloc; /* how many digits allocated */
@@ -190,7 +222,9 @@ mp_err mp_neg(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
/* Full arithmetic */
mp_err mp_add(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
mp_err mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+mp_err mp_subCT(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_digit *borrow);
mp_err mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+mp_err mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize);
#if MP_SQUARE
mp_err mp_sqr(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
#else
@@ -217,6 +251,12 @@ mp_err mp_exptmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
mp_err mp_exptmod_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
#endif /* MP_MODARITH */
+/* montgomery math */
+mp_err mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont);
+mp_digit mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N);
+mp_err mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *ct);
+mp_err mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c);
+
/* Comparisons */
int mp_cmp_z(const mp_int *a);
int mp_cmp_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d);
@@ -224,6 +264,7 @@ int mp_cmp(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
int mp_cmp_mag(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
int mp_isodd(const mp_int *a);
int mp_iseven(const mp_int *a);
+mp_err mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret);
/* Number theoretic */
mp_err mp_gcd(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
index 36ae51b352..d7a9958672 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
@@ -129,20 +129,27 @@ CLEANUP:
}
#endif
-STATIC
mp_err
-s_mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, mp_mont_modulus *mmm, mp_int *xMont)
+mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont)
{
mp_err res;
/* xMont = x * R mod N where N is modulus */
- MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(&mmm->N))); /* xMont = x << b */
- MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, &mmm->N, 0, xMont)); /* mod N */
+ if (x != xMont) {
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
+ }
+ MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(N))); /* xMont = x << b */
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, N, 0, xMont)); /* mod N */
CLEANUP:
return res;
}
+mp_digit
+mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N)
+{
+ return 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(N, 0));
+}
+
#ifdef MP_USING_MONT_MULF
/* the floating point multiply is already cache safe,
@@ -198,7 +205,7 @@ mp_exptmod_f(const mp_int *montBase,
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum1, 3 * nLen + 2));
mp_set(&accum1, 1);
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(&accum1, nLen));
oddPowSize = 2 * nLen + 1;
@@ -478,7 +485,7 @@ mp_exptmod_i(const mp_int *montBase,
/* set accumulator to montgomery residue of 1 */
mp_set(&accum1, 1);
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
pa1 = &accum1;
pa2 = &accum2;
@@ -867,7 +874,7 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase,
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[2], 3 * nLen + 2));
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[3], 3 * nLen + 2));
mp_set(&accum[0], 1);
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum[0], mmm, &accum[0]));
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum[0], &(mmm->N), &accum[0]));
MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum[1]));
SQR(montBase, &accum[2]);
MUL_NOWEAVE(montBase, &accum[2], &accum[3]);
@@ -886,7 +893,7 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase,
} else {
if (first_window == 0) {
mp_set(&accum1, 1);
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
} else {
/* assert first_window == 1? */
MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum1));
@@ -1057,9 +1064,9 @@ mp_exptmod(const mp_int *inBase, const mp_int *exponent,
/* compute n0', given n0, n0' = -(n0 ** -1) mod MP_RADIX
** where n0 = least significant mp_digit of N, the modulus.
*/
- mmm.n0prime = 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(modulus, 0));
+ mmm.n0prime = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(modulus);
- MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(base, &mmm, &montBase));
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(base, modulus, &montBase));
bits_in_exponent = mpl_significant_bits(exponent);
#ifdef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c
index 4dac957902..52fd8b69fb 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct RSABlindingParamsStr {
SECItem modulus; /* list element "key" */
blindingParams *free, *bp; /* Blinding parameters queue */
blindingParams array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE];
+ /* precalculate montegomery reduction value */
+ mp_digit n0i; /* n0i = -( n & MP_DIGIT) ** -1 mod mp_RADIX */
};
typedef struct RSABlindingParamsStr RSABlindingParams;
@@ -1210,6 +1212,8 @@ generate_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *f, mp_int *g, mp_int *n,
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, f));
/* g = k**-1 mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, n, g));
+ /* g in montgomery form.. */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_mont(g, n, g));
cleanup:
if (kb)
PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
@@ -1246,13 +1250,16 @@ init_blinding_params(RSABlindingParams *rsabp, RSAPrivateKey *key,
rsabp->bp = NULL;
rsabp->free = bp;
+ /* precalculate montgomery reduction parameter */
+ rsabp->n0i = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(n);
+
/* List elements are keyed using the modulus */
return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
}
static SECStatus
get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
- mp_int *f, mp_int *g)
+ mp_int *f, mp_int *g, mp_digit *n0i)
{
RSABlindingParams *rsabp = NULL;
blindingParams *bpUnlinked = NULL;
@@ -1312,6 +1319,7 @@ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
/* We've found (or created) the RSAblindingParams struct for this key.
* Now, search its list of ready blinding params for a usable one.
*/
+ *n0i = rsabp->n0i;
while (0 != (bp = rsabp->bp)) {
#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
/* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */
@@ -1426,6 +1434,7 @@ cleanup:
if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
}
+ *n0i = 0;
return SECFailure;
}
@@ -1445,6 +1454,7 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
mp_err err;
mp_int n, c, m;
mp_int f, g;
+ mp_digit n0i;
if (!key || !output || !input) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
@@ -1476,7 +1486,7 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
** blinding factor
*/
if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
- CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g));
+ CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g, &n0i));
/* c' = c*f mod n */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c));
}
@@ -1497,7 +1507,7 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
*/
if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
/* m = m'*g mod n */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&m, &g, &n, &m));
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmontmodCT(&m, &g, &n, n0i, &m));
}
err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen);
if (err >= 0)
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h b/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
index f0d8e871bb..ebdaa2dc79 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@
* The format of the version string should be
* "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <ECC>][ <Beta>]"
*/
-#define NSS_VERSION "3.90.1" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED
+#define NSS_VERSION "3.90.2" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED
#define NSS_VMAJOR 3
#define NSS_VMINOR 90
-#define NSS_VPATCH 1
+#define NSS_VPATCH 2
#define NSS_VBUILD 0
#define NSS_BETA PR_FALSE
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h b/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h
index b90bf9d251..2d41d536c6 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@
* The format of the version string should be
* "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <ECC>][ <Beta>]"
*/
-#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.90.1" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING
+#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.90.2" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING
#define SOFTOKEN_VMAJOR 3
#define SOFTOKEN_VMINOR 90
-#define SOFTOKEN_VPATCH 1
+#define SOFTOKEN_VPATCH 2
#define SOFTOKEN_VBUILD 0
#define SOFTOKEN_BETA PR_FALSE
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
index 4a05637039..522e4f4114 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
@@ -488,7 +488,12 @@ ssl_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss)
if (rv < 0) {
return rv;
}
- ss->pendingBuf.len -= rv;
+ if (rv > ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* This shouldn't happen */
+ ss->pendingBuf.len = 0;
+ } else {
+ ss->pendingBuf.len -= rv;
+ }
if (ss->pendingBuf.len > 0 && rv > 0) {
/* UGH !! This shifts the whole buffer down by copying it */
PORT_Memmove(ss->pendingBuf.buf, ss->pendingBuf.buf + rv,
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h b/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h
index f6089b8b5c..0ae3fde52d 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h
@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@
* The format of the version string should be
* "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <Beta>]"
*/
-#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.90.1"
+#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.90.2"
#define NSSUTIL_VMAJOR 3
#define NSSUTIL_VMINOR 90
-#define NSSUTIL_VPATCH 1
+#define NSSUTIL_VPATCH 2
#define NSSUTIL_VBUILD 0
#define NSSUTIL_BETA PR_FALSE