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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
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Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+GDS - Gather Data Sampling
+==========================
+
+Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
+
+Problem
+-------
+When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
+are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
+instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
+architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
+destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
+infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
+attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
+
+The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
+registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
+vulnerable.
+
+Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
+are possible.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
+permission boundaries:
+
+ Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
+ Userspace can infer kernel data
+ Guests can infer data from hosts
+ Guest can infer guest from other guests
+ Users can infer data from other users
+
+Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
+lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
+
+The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure
+that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
+allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
+attack, and re-enable it.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
+bits:
+
+ ================================ === ============================
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability
+ and mitigation support.
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation
+ 0 by default.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
+ to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
+ Can't be cleared once set.
+ ================================ === ============================
+
+GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
+"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
+
+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
+However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that
+does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
+support will break.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
+to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
+use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
+where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
+
+GDS System Information
+------------------------
+The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected Processor not vulnerable.
+ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
+ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+ mitigation.
+ Mitigation: AVX disabled,
+ no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
+ mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
+ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+ effect.
+ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+ effect and cannot be disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is
+ affected but with no way to know if host
+ processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+GDS Default mitigation
+----------------------
+The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
+default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.