Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 8628 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98d732b94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,8628 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
+ * machines without emulation or binary translation.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/tboot.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/entry-kvm.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/idtentry.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/mwait.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/virtext.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "evmcs.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#ifdef MODULE
+static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_VMX, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
+#endif
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
+module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi = 1;
+module_param_named(vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled = 1;
+module_param_named(flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept = 1;
+module_param_named(ept, enable_ept, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest = 1;
+module_param_named(unrestricted_guest,
+			enable_unrestricted_guest, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits = 1;
+module_param_named(eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true;
+module_param(emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly fasteoi = 1;
+module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true;
+module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
+ * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
+ * use VMX instructions.
+ */
+static bool __read_mostly nested = 1;
+module_param(nested, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
+module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config = true;
+module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
+module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
+
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC		1
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV	2
+
+#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX     0xffffffffffffffffULL
+
+/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division.  */
+static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
+#endif
+
+extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
+module_param(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON				\
+	(KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE
+#define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+#define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+
+#define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM))
+
+#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT))
+
+/*
+ * List of MSRs that can be directly passed to the guest.
+ * In addition to these x2apic and PT MSRs are handled specially.
+ */
+static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
+	MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+	MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+	MSR_IA32_TSC,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	MSR_FS_BASE,
+	MSR_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
+#endif
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
+	MSR_CORE_C1_RES,
+	MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY,
+};
+
+/*
+ * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
+ * ple_gap:    upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
+ *             executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled.
+ *             According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles.
+ * ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute
+ *             in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for
+ *             less than 2^12 cycles
+ * Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC,
+ * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3.
+ */
+static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
+module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444);
+
+static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
+module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
+module_param(ple_window_grow, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
+module_param(ple_window_shrink, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_max        = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
+module_param(ple_window_max, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */
+int __read_mostly pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+module_param(pt_mode, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+
+/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
+static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	bool for_parse;
+} vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]	 = {"auto", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]	 = {"never", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]	 = {"cond", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]	 = {"always", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = {"EPT disabled", false},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
+};
+
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
+static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+
+/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
+static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
+static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
+		u64 msr;
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+		if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+			l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
+		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+	}
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		/*
+		 * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
+		 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
+		 */
+		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		if (!page)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
+
+		/*
+		 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
+		 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
+		 * virtualization case.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
+			memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
+			       PAGE_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (s) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
+			if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse &&
+			    sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
+				return i;
+		}
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int l1tf, ret;
+
+	l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
+	if (l1tf < 0)
+		return l1tf;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
+	 * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
+	 * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
+	 * established.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
+	mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
+		return sprintf(s, "???\n");
+
+	return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+		if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
+			vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+		return;
+
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
+	msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	/* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
+	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+		return;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
+	/*
+	 * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
+	 * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
+	 * execute VERW.
+	 */
+	if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+	   ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
+		vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
+	.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
+	.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
+};
+module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
+
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
+
+void vmx_vmexit(void);
+
+#define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...)		\
+do {					\
+	WARN_ONCE(1, fmt);		\
+	pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt);	\
+} while (0)
+
+void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault)
+{
+	if (fault)
+		kvm_spurious_fault();
+	else
+		vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmread failed: field=%lx\n", field);
+}
+
+noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%u\n",
+			field, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmclear failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
+			vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmptrld failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
+			vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n",
+			ext, vpid, gva);
+}
+
+noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n",
+			ext, eptp, gpa);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
+/*
+ * We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed
+ * when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu);
+
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vmx_vpid_lock);
+
+struct vmcs_config vmcs_config;
+struct vmx_capability vmx_capability;
+
+#define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(seg)					\
+	[VCPU_SREG_##seg] = {                                   \
+		.selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR,		\
+		.base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE,		   	\
+		.limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT,		   	\
+		.ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES,	   	\
+	}
+
+static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field {
+	unsigned selector;
+	unsigned base;
+	unsigned limit;
+	unsigned ar_bytes;
+} kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = {
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(CS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(DS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(ES),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(FS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(GS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(SS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(TR),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(LDTR),
+};
+
+static inline void vmx_segment_cache_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long host_idt_base;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
+module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444);
+
+static int hv_enable_direct_tlbflush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs;
+	struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg =
+			&to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm)->hv_pa_pg;
+	/*
+	 * Synthetic VM-Exit is not enabled in current code and so All
+	 * evmcs in singe VM shares same assist page.
+	 */
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		*p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+
+	evmcs->partition_assist_page =
+		__pa(*p_hv_pa_pg);
+	evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
+	evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void hv_reset_evmcs(void)
+{
+	struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
+
+	if (!static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should enable eVMCS if and only if all CPUs have a VP assist
+	 * page, and should reject CPU onlining if eVMCS is enabled the CPU
+	 * doesn't have a VP assist page allocated.
+	 */
+	vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(smp_processor_id());
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vp_ap))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS access later
+	 * (e.g. when we reload the module with enlightened_vmcs=0)
+	 */
+	vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
+	vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
+	vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+static void hv_reset_evmcs(void) {}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+
+/*
+ * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
+ * Refer from
+ * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp
+ */
+static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = {
+/* 323344.pdf - BA86   - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */
+0x000206E6,
+/* 323056.pdf - AAX65  - C2 - Xeon L3406 */
+/* 322814.pdf - AAT59  - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020652,
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020655,
+/* 322373.pdf - AAO95  - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */
+/* 322166.pdf - AAN92  - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */
+/*
+ * 320767.pdf - AAP86  - B1 -
+ * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile
+ */
+0x000106E5,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A0,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A1,
+/* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A4,
+ /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */
+ /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */
+ /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A5,
+ /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */
+0x000306A8,
+};
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
+{
+	u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i;
+
+	/* Clear the reserved bits */
+	eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++)
+		if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i])
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int possible_passthrough_msr_slot(u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++)
+		if (vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i] == msr)
+			return i;
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	bool r;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case 0x800 ... 0x8ff:
+		/* x2APIC MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic() */
+		return true;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		/* PT MSRs. These are handled in pt_update_intercept_for_msr() */
+	case MSR_LBR_SELECT:
+	case MSR_LBR_TOS:
+	case MSR_LBR_INFO_0 ... MSR_LBR_INFO_0 + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM ... MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_NHM_TO ... MSR_LBR_NHM_TO + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM ... MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM + 8:
+	case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
+		/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
+
+	WARN(!r, "Invalid MSR %x, please adapt vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[]", msr);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(msr);
+	if (i >= 0)
+		return &vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+				  struct vmx_uret_msr *msr, u64 data)
+{
+	unsigned int slot = msr - vmx->guest_uret_msrs;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (msr->load_into_hardware) {
+		preempt_disable();
+		ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(slot, data, msr->mask);
+		preempt_enable();
+	}
+	if (!ret)
+		msr->data = data;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+			    loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+}
+
+static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
+{
+	struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg;
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+	if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
+		return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */
+	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL;
+
+	vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
+
+	list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure all writes to loaded_vmcs, including deleting it from its
+	 * current percpu list, complete before setting loaded_vmcs->cpu to
+	 * -1, otherwise a different cpu can see loaded_vmcs->cpu == -1 first
+	 * and add loaded_vmcs to its percpu list before it's deleted from this
+	 * cpu's list. Pairs with the smp_rmb() in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs().
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
+	loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
+}
+
+void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
+
+	if (cpu != -1)
+		smp_call_function_single(cpu,
+			 __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg,
+				       unsigned field)
+{
+	bool ret;
+	u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
+		vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+	}
+	ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask;
+	vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))
+		*p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))
+		*p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 eb;
+
+	eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
+	     (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
+	/*
+	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+	 * as VMware does.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+		eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR);
+	if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
+	     (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
+	    (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
+		eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
+		eb = ~0;
+	if (!vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu))
+		eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR);
+
+	/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
+	 * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
+	 * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
+	 * specified above if L1 did not want them.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
+        else {
+		int mask = 0, match = 0;
+
+		if (enable_ept && (eb & (1u << PF_VECTOR))) {
+			/*
+			 * If EPT is enabled, #PF is currently only intercepted
+			 * if MAXPHYADDR is smaller on the guest than on the
+			 * host.  In that case we only care about present,
+			 * non-reserved faults.  For vmcs02, however, PFEC_MASK
+			 * and PFEC_MATCH are set in prepare_vmcs02_rare.
+			 */
+			mask = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
+			match = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
+		}
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, mask);
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, match);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disabling xfd interception indicates that dynamic xfeatures
+	 * might be used in the guest. Always trap #NM in this case
+	 * to save guest xfd_err timely.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
+		eb |= (1u << NM_VECTOR);
+
+	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	if (!(exec_controls_get(vmx) & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_test_msr_bitmap_write(vmx->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+
+	/*
+	 * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free
+	 * to change it directly without causing a vmexit.  In that case read
+	 * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
+{
+	vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
+		if (m->val[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
+	}
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		goto skip_guest;
+	--m->guest.nr;
+	m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+
+skip_guest:
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return;
+
+	--m->host.nr;
+	m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit,
+		unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs,
+		u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val);
+	if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER)
+		vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val);
+	vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
+				  u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
+{
+	int i, j = 0;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					GUEST_IA32_EFER,
+					HOST_IA32_EFER,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		/* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
+		 * a record).  Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
+		 * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
+		 * guest's memory.
+		 */
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
+	}
+
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (!entry_only)
+		j = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
+
+	if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) ||
+	    (j < 0 &&  m->host.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) {
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
+				"Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (i < 0) {
+		i = m->guest.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+	}
+	m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
+	m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
+
+	if (entry_only)
+		return;
+
+	if (j < 0) {
+		j = m->host.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+	}
+	m->host.val[j].index = msr;
+	m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
+}
+
+static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
+	u64 ignore_bits = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+	/*
+	 * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
+	 */
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
+	/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
+	if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
+		ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
+	 * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
+	 * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
+	    (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
+		if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
+			guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
+					      guest_efer, host_efer, false);
+		else
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(MSR_EFER);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+
+	guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
+	guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
+
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data = guest_efer;
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = ~ignore_bits;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the
+ * VMCS rather than the segment table.  KVM uses this helper to figure
+ * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry.
+ */
+static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
+{
+	struct desc_struct *table;
+	unsigned long v;
+
+	if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+		return 0;
+
+	table = get_current_gdt_ro();
+
+	if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
+		u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+		if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+			return 0;
+
+		table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector);
+	}
+	v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]);
+	return v;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool pt_can_write_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	return vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() &&
+	       !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
+}
+
+static inline bool pt_output_base_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 base)
+{
+	/* The base must be 128-byte aligned and a legal physical address. */
+	return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, base, 128);
+}
+
+static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS.
+	 * Save host state before VM entry.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM requires VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL to expose PT to the guest,
+	 * i.e. RTIT_CTL is always cleared on VM-Exit.  Restore it if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
+			unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base)
+{
+	if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) {
+		if (!(fs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->fs_sel = fs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) {
+		if (!(gs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->gs_sel = gs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base);
+		host->fs_base = fs_base;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base);
+		host->gs_base = gs_base;
+	}
+}
+
+void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+#endif
+	unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
+	u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
+	int i;
+
+	vmx->req_immediate_exit = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed
+	 * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions
+	 * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA.
+	 */
+	if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded) {
+		vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = true;
+		for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i) {
+			if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].load_into_hardware)
+				continue;
+
+			kvm_set_user_return_msr(i,
+						vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data,
+						vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask);
+		}
+	}
+
+    	if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
+		nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set host fs and gs selectors.  Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
+	 * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
+	 */
+	host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+	savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+
+	gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu);
+	if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) {
+		current_save_fsgs();
+		fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
+		gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
+		fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+	} else {
+		savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+		savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+		fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#else
+	savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+	savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+	fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel);
+	gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
+#endif
+
+	vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+
+	if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) {
+		kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel);
+#else
+		loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel);
+#endif
+	}
+	if (host_state->fs_sel & 7)
+		loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) {
+		loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+		loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+	}
+#endif
+	invalidate_tss_limit();
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+	preempt_enable();
+	return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
+	preempt_enable();
+	vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
+}
+#endif
+
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
+			struct loaded_vmcs *buddy)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
+	struct vmcs *prev;
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+		local_irq_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure loaded_vmcs->cpu is read before adding loaded_vmcs to
+		 * this cpu's percpu list, otherwise it may not yet be deleted
+		 * from its previous cpu's percpu list.  Pairs with the
+		 * smb_wmb() in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
+		 */
+		smp_rmb();
+
+		list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
+			 &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+		local_irq_enable();
+	}
+
+	prev = per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu);
+	if (prev != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+
+		/*
+		 * No indirect branch prediction barrier needed when switching
+		 * the active VMCS within a vCPU, unless IBRS is advertised to
+		 * the vCPU.  To minimize the number of IBPBs executed, KVM
+		 * performs IBPB on nested VM-Exit (a single nested transition
+		 * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
+		 */
+		if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+	}
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
+
+		/*
+		 * Flush all EPTP/VPID contexts, the new pCPU may have stale
+		 * TLB entries from its previous association with the vCPU.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
+		 * processors.  See 22.2.4.
+		 */
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
+			    (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+			/* 22.2.3 */
+			vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+				    (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
+		}
+
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
+ * vcpu mutex is already taken.
+ */
+static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, NULL);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
+
+	vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu));
+}
+
+bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu);
+}
+
+unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+			rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+			save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags;
+			rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+		}
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	}
+	return vmx->rflags;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long old_rflags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike CR0 and CR4, RFLAGS handling requires checking if the vCPU
+	 * is an unrestricted guest in order to mark L2 as needing emulation
+	 * if L1 runs L2 as a restricted guest.
+	 */
+	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags;
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+	}
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+
+	if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
+		vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+}
+
+u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;
+
+	interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS);
+
+	if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS;
+	else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI;
+
+	if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old))
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility);
+}
+
+static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will
+	 * case a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will
+	 * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn.
+	 */
+	if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) &&
+		((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit
+	 * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if
+	 * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0
+	 */
+	if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) &&
+		!(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) &&
+		!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that
+	 * utilize encodings marked reserved will cause a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will
+	 * cause a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 1)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 2)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 3)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 4)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+					void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does
+	 * not point at the failing instruction, and even if it did, the code
+	 * stream is inaccessible.  Inject #UD instead of exiting to userspace
+	 * so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering
+	 * emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only).
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
+	unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
+	u32 instr_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
+	 * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be
+	 * set when EPT misconfig occurs.  In practice, real hardware updates
+	 * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors
+	 * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior,
+	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
+	    exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+
+		/*
+		 * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM
+		 * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the
+		 * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not
+		 * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit.  But, because
+		 * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave,
+		 * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur.
+		 *
+		 * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions
+		 * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves
+		 * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept.
+		 * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr
+		 * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot.
+		 * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on
+		 * a VM-Exit from an enclave.
+		 */
+		if (!instr_len)
+			goto rip_updated;
+
+		WARN(exit_reason.enclave_mode,
+		     "KVM: skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit");
+
+		orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		rip = orig_rip + instr_len;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		/*
+		 * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit
+		 * mode, but just finding out that we are in 64-bit mode is
+		 * quite expensive.  Only do it if there was a carry.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(((rip ^ orig_rip) >> 31) == 3) && !is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+			rip = (u32)rip;
+#endif
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip);
+	} else {
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+rip_updated:
+	/* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
+	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Recognizes a pending MTF VM-exit and records the nested state for later
+ * delivery.
+ */
+static void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per the SDM, MTF takes priority over debug-trap exceptions besides
+	 * TSS T-bit traps and ICEBP (INT1).  KVM doesn't emulate T-bit traps
+	 * or ICEBP (in the emulator proper), and skipping of ICEBP after an
+	 * intercepted #DB deliberately avoids single-step #DB and MTF updates
+	 * as ICEBP is higher priority than both.  As instruction emulation is
+	 * completed at this point (i.e. KVM is at the instruction boundary),
+	 * any #DB exception pending delivery must be a debug-trap of lower
+	 * priority than MTF.  Record the pending MTF state to be delivered in
+	 * vmx_check_nested_events().
+	 */
+	if (nested_cpu_has_mtf(vmcs12) &&
+	    (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
+	     vcpu->arch.exception.vector == DB_VECTOR) &&
+	    (!vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending ||
+	     vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.vector == DB_VECTOR)) {
+		vmx->nested.mtf_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		vmx->nested.mtf_pending = false;
+	}
+}
+
+static int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_update_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	return skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS.  We don't need to
+	 * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set,
+	 * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been
+	 * advanced.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
+			vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+	u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+	if (ex->has_error_code) {
+		/*
+		 * Despite the error code being architecturally defined as 32
+		 * bits, and the VMCS field being 32 bits, Intel CPUs and thus
+		 * VMX don't actually supporting setting bits 31:16.  Hardware
+		 * will (should) never provide a bogus error code, but AMD CPUs
+		 * do generate error codes with bits 31:16 set, and so KVM's
+		 * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values.  Drop
+		 * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that
+		 * does't really exist is preferable to killing the VM.
+		 */
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, (u16)ex->error_code);
+		intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector))
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, ex->vector, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
+
+	if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+	} else
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int msr,
+			       bool load_into_hardware)
+{
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *uret_msr;
+
+	uret_msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr);
+	if (!uret_msr)
+		return;
+
+	uret_msr->load_into_hardware = load_into_hardware;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configuring user return MSRs to automatically save, load, and restore MSRs
+ * that need to be shoved into hardware when running the guest.  Note, omitting
+ * an MSR here does _NOT_ mean it's not emulated, only that it will not be
+ * loaded into hardware when running the guest.
+ */
+static void vmx_setup_uret_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	bool load_syscall_msrs;
+
+	/*
+	 * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only
+	 * when EFER.SCE is set.
+	 */
+	load_syscall_msrs = is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) &&
+			    (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE);
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_STAR, load_syscall_msrs);
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_LSTAR, load_syscall_msrs);
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, load_syscall_msrs);
+#endif
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER, update_transition_efer(vmx));
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX,
+			   guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+			   guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
+
+	/*
+	 * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some combinations of new
+	 * kernel and old userspace.  If those guests run on a tsx=off host, do
+	 * allow guests to use TSX_CTRL, but don't change the value in hardware
+	 * so that TSX remains always disabled.
+	 */
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM));
+
+	/*
+	 * The set of MSRs to load may have changed, reload MSRs before the
+	 * next VM-Enter.
+	 */
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
+}
+
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
+		return vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING) &&
+	    nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING))
+		return vmcs12->tsc_multiplier;
+
+	return kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset);
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, multiplier);
+}
+
+/*
+ * nested_vmx_allowed() checks whether a guest should be allowed to use VMX
+ * instructions and MSRs (i.e., nested VMX). Nested VMX is disabled for
+ * all guests if the "nested" module option is off, and can also be disabled
+ * for a single guest by disabling its VMX cpuid bit.
+ */
+bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 uint64_t val)
+{
+	uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+
+	return !(val & ~valid_bits);
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!nested)
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_info->index') into 'msr_info->data'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_info->index) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_uret_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		      FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
+				    &msr_info->data))
+			return 1;
+		/*
+		 * Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have certain VMCS fields but
+		 * instead of just ignoring the features, different Hyper-V
+		 * versions are either trying to use them and fail or do some
+		 * sanity checking and refuse to boot. Filter all unsupported
+		 * features out.
+		 */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu))
+			nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index,
+							&msr_info->data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+		    (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2];
+		else
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
+		break;
+	default:
+	find_uret_msr:
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_info->index);
+		if (msr) {
+			msr_info->data = msr->data;
+			break;
+		}
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    u64 data)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return (u32)data;
+#endif
+	return (unsigned long)data;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool host_initiated)
+{
+	u64 debugctl = 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+	if ((kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) &&
+	    (host_initiated || intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu)))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI;
+
+	return debugctl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register".
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		/*
+		 * Always intercepting WRMSR could incur non-negligible
+		 * overhead given xfd might be changed frequently in
+		 * guest context switch. Disable write interception
+		 * upon the first write with a non-zero value (indicating
+		 * potential usage on dynamic xfeatures). Also update
+		 * exception bitmap to trap #NM for proper virtualization
+		 * of guest xfd_err.
+		 */
+		if (!ret && data) {
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD,
+						      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+			vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
+			vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data;
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data;
+		}
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data;
+		}
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
+		u64 invalid;
+
+		invalid = data & ~vmx_get_supported_debugctl(vcpu, msr_info->host_initiated);
+		if (invalid & (DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)) {
+			if (report_ignored_msrs)
+				vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: BTF|LBR in IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
+					    __func__, data);
+			data &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
+			invalid &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
+		}
+
+		if (invalid)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
+						VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data;
+
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, data);
+		if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu) && !to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.event &&
+		    (data & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR))
+			intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
+		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		    ((vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) ||
+		     (vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS)))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_bndcfgs = data;
+
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */
+		if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+		 * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
+		 * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu,
+					      MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+					      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_uret_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+			return 1;
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+			return 1;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+		 * in the merging.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		    get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data;
+
+		if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
+			vcpu->arch.pat = data;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		       FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED)) ||
+		    (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+		if (!vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vcpu, data) ||
+		    (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		     FEAT_CTL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
+			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+		/* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */
+		vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		/*
+		 * On real hardware, the LE hash MSRs are writable before
+		 * the firmware sets bit 0 in MSR 0x7a ("activating" SGX),
+		 * at which point SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
+		 * become writable.
+		 *
+		 * KVM does not emulate SGX activation for simplicity, so
+		 * allow writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
+		 * is unlocked.  This is technically not architectural
+		 * behavior, but it's close enough.
+		 */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+		    ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED))))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1; /* they are read-only */
+		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) ||
+			vmx->nested.vmxon)
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK)
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+		    !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+			return 1;
+		if (!pt_output_base_valid(vcpu, data))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+		    !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges)
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data;
+		else
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
+			return 1;
+		if (data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) {
+			if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
+			    (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
+				return 1;
+			if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+				return 1;
+		}
+		if (data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
+			if ((data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK) !=
+			    (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK))
+				return 1;
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DS))
+				return 1;
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DTES64))
+				return 1;
+			if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+				return 1;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+	find_uret_msr:
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_index);
+		if (msr)
+			ret = vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, data);
+		else
+			ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	/* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
+	if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+		vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	unsigned long guest_owned_bits;
+
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+
+	switch (reg) {
+	case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+		if (enable_ept)
+			ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR0:
+		guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
+
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & guest_owned_bits;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
+		/*
+		 * When intercepting CR3 loads, e.g. for shadowing paging, KVM's
+		 * CR3 is loaded into hardware, not the guest's CR3.
+		 */
+		if (!(exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
+			vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR4:
+		guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits;
+
+		vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
+		vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & guest_owned_bits;
+		break;
+	default:
+		KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static __init int cpu_has_kvm_support(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx();
+}
+
+static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
+{
+	return !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
+	       !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+}
+
+static int kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 vmxon_pointer)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: vmxon %[vmxon_pointer]\n\t"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
+			  : : [vmxon_pointer] "m"(vmxon_pointer)
+			  : : fault);
+	return 0;
+
+fault:
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "VMXON faulted, MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL (0x3a) = 0x%llx\n",
+		  rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr) ? 0xdeadbeef : msr);
+	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+	int r;
+
+	if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/*
+	 * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate
+	 * VP assist page for it.
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
+	    !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
+
+	r = kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
+	if (r) {
+		intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		ept_sync_global();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+				 loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		__loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
+}
+
+static void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
+
+	if (cpu_vmxoff())
+		kvm_spurious_fault();
+
+	hv_reset_evmcs();
+
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * There is no X86_FEATURE for SGX yet, but anyway we need to query CPUID
+ * directly instead of going through cpu_has(), to ensure KVM is trapping
+ * ENCLS whenever it's supported in hardware.  It does not matter whether
+ * the host OS supports or has enabled SGX.
+ */
+static bool cpu_has_sgx(void)
+{
+	return cpuid_eax(0) >= 0x12 && (cpuid_eax(0x12) & BIT(0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they
+ * can't be used due to errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
+ * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32]. Work around the errata by using the
+ * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
+ */
+static bool cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
+		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP:	/* AAK155 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:	/* AAP115 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:	/* AAT100 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP:	/* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX:	/* BA97 */
+			return true;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,
+				      u32 msr, u32 *result)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
+
+	rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */
+	ctl |= vmx_msr_low;  /* bit == 1 in low word  ==> must be one  */
+
+	/* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */
+	if (ctl_min & ~ctl)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	*result = ctl;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init u64 adjust_vmx_controls64(u64 ctl_opt, u32 msr)
+{
+	u64 allowed;
+
+	rdmsrl(msr, allowed);
+
+	return  ctl_opt & allowed;
+}
+
+static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+				    struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
+	u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
+	u64 misc_msr;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * LOAD/SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS are absent because both are mandatory.
+	 * SAVE_IA32_PAT and SAVE_IA32_EFER are absent because KVM always
+	 * intercepts writes to PAT and EFER, i.e. never enables those controls.
+	 */
+	struct {
+		u32 entry_control;
+		u32 exit_control;
+	} const vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] = {
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,	VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS,		VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL,		VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL },
+	};
+
+	memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
+				&_cpu_based_exec_control))
+		return -EIO;
+	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
+		if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+					&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
+		_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+#endif
+
+	if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+
+	rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
+		&vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid);
+
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) &&
+	    vmx_cap->ept) {
+		pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n");
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+	}
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
+	    vmx_cap->vpid) {
+		pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n");
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		vmx_cap->vpid = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_sgx())
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+
+	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
+		_cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =
+			adjust_vmx_controls64(KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					      MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3);
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
+				&_vmexit_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
+				&_pin_based_exec_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
+				&_vmentry_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_pairs); i++) {
+		u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].entry_control;
+		u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].exit_control;
+
+		if (!(_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == !(_vmexit_control & x_ctrl))
+			continue;
+
+		pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit pair, entry = %x, exit = %x\n",
+			     _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl);
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		_vmentry_control &= ~n_ctrl;
+		_vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
+	}
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
+	if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
+	if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
+		return -EIO;
+#endif
+
+	/* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
+	if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, misc_msr);
+
+	vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
+	vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
+
+	vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
+
+	vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl         = _vmexit_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl        = _vmentry_control;
+	vmcs_conf->misc	= misc_msr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	struct page *pages;
+	struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+	pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, 0);
+	if (!pages)
+		return NULL;
+	vmcs = page_address(pages);
+	memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
+
+	/* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION;
+	else
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+	if (shadow)
+		vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1;
+	return vmcs;
+}
+
+void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	free_page((unsigned long)vmcs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded
+ */
+void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return;
+	loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
+	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
+	if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+		free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
+	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
+}
+
+int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false);
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+
+	loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
+	loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
+	loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
+		loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)
+				__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+			goto out_vmcs;
+		memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state));
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0,
+		sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow));
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void free_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+		vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!vmcs) {
+			free_kvm_area();
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets
+		 * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of
+		 * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.
+		 *
+		 * However, even though not explicitly documented by
+		 * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should
+		 * still be marked with revision_id reported by
+		 * physical CPU.
+		 */
+		if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+			vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg,
+		struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		/*
+		 * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according
+		 * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu
+		 * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to
+		 * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good
+		 * default value.
+		 */
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+			save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->s = 1;
+	}
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg);
+}
+
+static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if segment
+	 * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode.
+	 */
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) |
+			(vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME));
+
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+}
+
+static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	struct kvm_segment var = *save;
+
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		var.selector = var.base >> 4;
+		var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
+		var.limit = 0xffff;
+		var.g = 0;
+		var.db = 0;
+		var.present = 1;
+		var.s = 1;
+		var.l = 0;
+		var.unusable = 0;
+		var.type = 0x3;
+		var.avl = 0;
+		if (save->base & 0xf)
+			printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: segment base is not "
+					"paragraph aligned when entering "
+					"protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
+}
+
+static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should never use VM86 to virtualize Real Mode when L2 is active,
+	 * as using VM86 is unnecessary if unrestricted guest is enabled, and
+	 * if unrestricted guest is disabled, VM-Enter (from L1) with CR0.PG=0
+	 * should VM-Fail and KVM should reject userspace attempts to stuff
+	 * CR0.PG=0 when L2 is active.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Very old userspace does not call KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR before entering
+	 * vcpu. Warn the user that an update is overdue.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_vmx->tss_addr)
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR need to be "
+			     "called before entering vcpu\n");
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags;
+
+	flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+}
+
+int vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support EFER. */
+	if (!vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+		vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+	else
+		vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+#else
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(efer & EFER_LMA, vcpu->kvm))
+		return 1;
+#endif
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 guest_tr_ar;
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
+
+	guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
+	if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
+				     __func__);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
+			     (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK)
+			     | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
+	}
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * INVEPT must be issued when EPT is enabled, irrespective of VPID, as
+	 * the CPU is not required to invalidate guest-physical mappings on
+	 * VM-Entry, even if VPID is disabled.  Guest-physical mappings are
+	 * associated with the root EPT structure and not any particular VPID
+	 * (INVVPID also isn't required to invalidate guest-physical mappings).
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		ept_sync_global();
+	} else if (enable_vpid) {
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()) {
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_global();
+		} else {
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->vpid);
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->nested.vpid02);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int vmx_get_current_vpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return nested_get_vpid02(vcpu);
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	u64 root_hpa = mmu->root.hpa;
+
+	/* No flush required if the current context is invalid. */
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+		return;
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa,
+						mmu->root_role.level));
+	else
+		vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vpid_sync_vcpu_addr() is a nop if vpid==0, see the comment in
+	 * vmx_flush_tlb_guest() for an explanation of why this is ok.
+	 */
+	vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu), addr);
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vpid_sync_context() is a nop if vpid==0, e.g. if enable_vpid==0 or a
+	 * vpid couldn't be allocated for this vCPU.  VM-Enter and VM-Exit are
+	 * required to flush GVA->{G,H}PA mappings from the TLB if vpid is
+	 * disabled (VM-Enter with vpid enabled and vpid==0 is disallowed),
+	 * i.e. no explicit INVVPID is necessary.
+	 */
+	vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
+}
+
+void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_pae_paging(vcpu)))
+		return;
+
+	mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
+	mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
+	mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
+	mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
+
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+}
+
+#define CR3_EXITING_BITS (CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | \
+			  CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
+
+static bool vmx_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon)
+		return nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long hw_cr0, old_cr0_pg;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	old_cr0_pg = kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG);
+
+	hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else {
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON;
+		if (!enable_ept)
+			hw_cr0 |= X86_CR0_WP;
+
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_pmode(vcpu);
+
+		if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_rmode(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
+		if (!old_cr0_pg && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			enter_lmode(vcpu);
+		else if (old_cr0_pg && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			exit_lmode(vcpu);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure KVM has an up-to-date snapshot of the guest's CR3.  If
+		 * the below code _enables_ CR3 exiting, vmx_cache_reg() will
+		 * (correctly) stop reading vmcs.GUEST_CR3 because it thinks
+		 * KVM's CR3 is installed.
+		 */
+		if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+			vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+
+		/*
+		 * When running with EPT but not unrestricted guest, KVM must
+		 * intercept CR3 accesses when paging is _disabled_.  This is
+		 * necessary because restricted guests can't actually run with
+		 * paging disabled, and so KVM stuffs its own CR3 in order to
+		 * run the guest when identity mapped page tables.
+		 *
+		 * Do _NOT_ check the old CR0.PG, e.g. to optimize away the
+		 * update, it may be stale with respect to CR3 interception,
+		 * e.g. after nested VM-Enter.
+		 *
+		 * Lastly, honor L1's desires, i.e. intercept CR3 loads and/or
+		 * stores to forward them to L1, even if KVM does not need to
+		 * intercept them to preserve its identity mapped page tables.
+		 */
+		if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+			exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
+		} else {
+			tmp = exec_controls_get(vmx);
+			tmp &= ~CR3_EXITING_BITS;
+			tmp |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CR3_EXITING_BITS;
+			exec_controls_set(vmx, tmp);
+		}
+
+		/* Note, vmx_set_cr4() consumes the new vcpu->arch.cr0. */
+		if ((old_cr0_pg ^ cr0) & X86_CR0_PG)
+			vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+
+		/*
+		 * When !CR0_PG -> CR0_PG, vcpu->arch.cr3 becomes active, but
+		 * GUEST_CR3 is still vmx->ept_identity_map_addr if EPT + !URG.
+		 */
+		if (!(old_cr0_pg & X86_CR0_PG) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	}
+
+	/* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
+	vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_max_tdp_level(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels())
+		return 5;
+	return 4;
+}
+
+u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
+{
+	u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+
+	eptp |= (root_level == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+
+	if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
+	    (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
+		eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
+	eptp |= root_hpa;
+
+	return eptp;
+}
+
+static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+			     int root_level)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
+	unsigned long guest_cr3;
+	u64 eptp;
+
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa, root_level);
+		vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
+
+		hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
+
+		if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
+			guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
+		else if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+			guest_cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+		else /* vmcs.GUEST_CR3 is already up-to-date. */
+			update_guest_cr3 = false;
+		vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		guest_cr3 = root_hpa | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (update_guest_cr3)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
+}
+
+
+static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We operate under the default treatment of SMM, so VMX cannot be
+	 * enabled under SMM.  Note, whether or not VMXE is allowed at all,
+	 * i.e. is a reserved bit, is handled by common x86 code.
+	 */
+	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) && is_smm(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	unsigned long old_cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
+	 * is in force while we are in guest mode.  Do not let guests control
+	 * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
+	 */
+	unsigned long hw_cr4;
+
+	hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+	else
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && vmx_umip_emulated()) {
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+			hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+			!nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+		}
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR4);
+
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		if (enable_ept) {
+			if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+				hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
+			} else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
+		 * hardware.  To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
+		 * to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
+		 * mode.
+		 *
+		 * If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
+		 * with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
+		 * If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
+		 * disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
+		 */
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+			hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
+
+	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+}
+
+void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 ar;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		*var = vmx->rmode.segs[seg];
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR
+		    || var->selector == vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg))
+			return;
+		var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+		var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+		return;
+	}
+	var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+	var->limit = vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(vmx, seg);
+	var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+	ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, seg);
+	var->unusable = (ar >> 16) & 1;
+	var->type = ar & 15;
+	var->s = (ar >> 4) & 1;
+	var->dpl = (ar >> 5) & 3;
+	/*
+	 * Some userspaces do not preserve unusable property. Since usable
+	 * segment has to be present according to VMX spec we can use present
+	 * property to amend userspace bug by making unusable segment always
+	 * nonpresent. vmx_segment_access_rights() already marks nonpresent
+	 * segment as unusable.
+	 */
+	var->present = !var->unusable;
+	var->avl = (ar >> 12) & 1;
+	var->l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+	var->db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment s;
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
+		return s.base;
+	}
+	return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
+}
+
+int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
+		return 0;
+	else {
+		int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+		return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
+	}
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
+{
+	u32 ar;
+
+	ar = var->type & 15;
+	ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4;
+	ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5;
+	ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7;
+	ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12;
+	ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13;
+	ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14;
+	ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15;
+	ar |= (var->unusable || !var->present) << 16;
+
+	return ar;
+}
+
+void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
+			vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+		else if (var->s)
+			fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+
+	/*
+	 *   Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
+	 * qemu binaries.
+	 *   IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
+	 * "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
+	 * is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
+	 * state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
+	 *    Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
+	 * tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
+	 * kvm hack.
+	 */
+	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu) && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
+		var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+	u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	*db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	*l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	u32 ar;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+	ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
+
+	if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
+		return false;
+	if (var.limit != 0xffff)
+		return false;
+	if (ar != 0xf3)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool code_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs;
+	unsigned int cs_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	cs_rpl = cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (cs.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (~cs.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_ACCESSES_MASK))
+		return false;
+	if (!cs.s)
+		return false;
+	if (cs.type & VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK) {
+		if (cs.dpl > cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (cs.dpl != cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	}
+	if (!cs.present)
+		return false;
+
+	/* TODO: Add Reserved field check, this'll require a new member in the kvm_segment_field structure */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool stack_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ss;
+	unsigned int ss_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	ss_rpl = ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (ss.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ss.type != 3 && ss.type != 7)
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.s)
+		return false;
+	if (ss.dpl != ss_rpl) /* DPL != RPL */
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool data_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	unsigned int rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	rpl = var.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (var.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (!var.s)
+		return false;
+	if (!var.present)
+		return false;
+	if (~var.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK)) {
+		if (var.dpl < rpl) /* DPL < RPL */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: Add other members to kvm_segment_field to allow checking for other access
+	 * rights flags
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool tr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment tr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	if (tr.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (tr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (tr.type != 3 && tr.type != 11) /* TODO: Check if guest is in IA32e mode */
+		return false;
+	if (!tr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool ldtr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ldtr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	if (ldtr.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ldtr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (ldtr.type != 2)
+		return false;
+	if (!ldtr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
+		 (ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
+ * not.
+ * We assume that registers are always usable
+ */
+bool __vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* real mode guest state checks */
+	if (!is_protmode(vcpu) || (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+	/* protected mode guest state checks */
+		if (!cs_ss_rpl_check(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!code_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!stack_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+		if (!tr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!ldtr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+	}
+	/* TODO:
+	 * - Add checks on RIP
+	 * - Add checks on RFLAGS
+	 */
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *ua)
+{
+	const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
+	u16 data;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if (__copy_to_user(ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
+	if (__copy_to_user(ua + TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, &data, sizeof(u16)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = ~0;
+	if (__copy_to_user(ua + RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1, &data, sizeof(u8)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+	int i, r = 0;
+	void __user *uaddr;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	/* Protect kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (likely(kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr)
+		kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr = VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
+
+	uaddr = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
+					IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+					kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr,
+					PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(uaddr)) {
+		r = PTR_ERR(uaddr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
+	for (i = 0; i < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(tmp)); i++) {
+		tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
+			_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
+		if (__copy_to_user(uaddr + i * sizeof(tmp), &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
+			r = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void seg_setup(int seg)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	unsigned int ar;
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, 0xffff);
+	ar = 0x93;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		ar |= 0x08; /* code segment */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, ar);
+}
+
+static int alloc_apic_access_page(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	void __user *hva;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	if (kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled)
+		goto out;
+	hva = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+				      APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(hva)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hva);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	page = gfn_to_page(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (is_error_page(page)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not pin the page in memory, so that memory hot-unplug
+	 * is able to migrate it.
+	 */
+	put_page(page);
+	kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled = true;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int allocate_vpid(void)
+{
+	int vpid;
+
+	if (!enable_vpid)
+		return 0;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	vpid = find_first_zero_bit(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+	if (vpid < VMX_NR_VPIDS)
+		__set_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	else
+		vpid = 0;
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	return vpid;
+}
+
+void free_vpid(int vpid)
+{
+	if (!enable_vpid || vpid == 0)
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	__clear_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+}
+
+static void vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When KVM is a nested hypervisor on top of Hyper-V and uses
+	 * 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature L0 needs to know that MSR
+	 * bitmap has changed.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) && static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
+		struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
+
+		if (evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap)
+			evmcs->hv_clean_fields &=
+				~HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP;
+	}
+
+	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+}
+
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filters change.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_R) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_R;
+	}
+
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_W) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_W;
+	}
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filter changes.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+static void vmx_reset_x2apic_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 mode)
+{
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	unsigned long read_intercept;
+	int msr;
+
+	read_intercept = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0;
+
+	for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		unsigned int read_idx = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
+		unsigned int write_idx = read_idx + (0x800 / sizeof(long));
+
+		msr_bitmap[read_idx] = read_intercept;
+		msr_bitmap[write_idx] = ~0ul;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u8 mode;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
+	    (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+	     SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
+		mode = MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
+		if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+			mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
+	} else {
+		mode = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (mode == vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode)
+		return;
+
+	vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
+
+	vmx_reset_x2apic_msrs(vcpu, mode);
+
+	/*
+	 * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
+	 * delivery is not in use.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW,
+				  !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC));
+
+	if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
+		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	}
+}
+
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
+	u32 i;
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++) {
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	void *vapic_page;
+	u32 vppr;
+	int rvi;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
+		!nested_cpu_has_vid(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) ||
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.gfn))
+		return false;
+
+	rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
+
+	vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
+	vppr = *((u32 *)(vapic_page + APIC_PROCPRI));
+
+	return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
+}
+
+static void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Redo intercept permissions for MSRs that KVM is passing through to
+	 * the guest.  Disabling interception will check the new MSR filter and
+	 * ensure that KVM enables interception if usersepace wants to filter
+	 * the MSR.  MSRs that KVM is already intercepting don't need to be
+	 * refreshed since KVM is going to intercept them regardless of what
+	 * userspace wants.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++) {
+		u32 msr = vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i];
+
+		if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read))
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+
+		if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write))
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
+	}
+
+	/* PT MSRs can be passed through iff PT is exposed to the guest. */
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     int pi_vec)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+		/*
+		 * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
+		 * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
+		 * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
+		 * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
+		 * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
+		 * re-entering the guest.
+		 *
+		 * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
+		 * possibilities emerge:
+		 *
+		 * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
+		 * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
+		 *
+		 * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
+		 * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
+		 * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
+		 * will ignore the spurious event.
+		 *
+		 * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
+		 * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
+		 * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
+		 * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
+		 * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
+		 */
+
+		if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+			apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
+	 * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
+	 * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
+		/*
+		 * If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
+		 * we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
+		 */
+		vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * This pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->mode in
+		 * vcpu_enter_guest() to guarantee the vCPU sees the event
+		 * request if triggering a posted interrupt "fails" because
+		 * vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.  The extra barrier is needed as
+		 * the smb_wmb() in kvm_make_request() only ensures everything
+		 * done before making the request is visible when the request
+		 * is visible, it doesn't ensure ordering between the store to
+		 * vcpu->requests and the load from vcpu->mode.
+		 */
+		smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+		/* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
+		kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
+ * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
+ * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
+ * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
+ * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
+ */
+static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
+	if (!r)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do.  */
+	if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
+	 * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
+	 * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
+	 * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+				  int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+
+	if (vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector)) {
+		kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode,
+					   trig_mode, vector);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the vmcs's constant host-state fields, i.e., host-state fields that
+ * will not change in the lifetime of the guest.
+ * Note that host-state that does change is set elsewhere. E.g., host-state
+ * that is set differently for each CPU is set in vmx_vcpu_load(), not here.
+ */
+void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 low32, high32;
+	unsigned long tmpl;
+	unsigned long cr0, cr3, cr4;
+
+	cr0 = read_cr0();
+	WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0);  /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the most likely value for this task's CR3 in the VMCS.
+	 * We can't use __get_current_cr3_fast() because we're not atomic.
+	 */
+	cr3 = __read_cr3();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);		/* 22.2.3  FIXME: shadow tables */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+
+	/* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);			/* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
+	 * vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(), in case userspace uses
+	 * the null selectors too (the expected case).
+	 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
+#else
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#endif
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8);  /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
+	vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
+
+	/*
+	 * SYSENTER is used for 32-bit system calls on either 32-bit or
+	 * 64-bit kernels.  It is always zero If neither is allowed, otherwise
+	 * vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs loads it with the per-CPU entry stack (and may
+	 * have already done so!).
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);   /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+		rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+}
+
+void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS &
+					  ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits;
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS;
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_PDPTR_BITS;
+	}
+	if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
+			~get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+
+	return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_vmentry_ctrl(void)
+{
+	u32 vmentry_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl;
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+				  VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
+	/*
+	 * IA32e mode, and loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically.
+	 */
+	vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
+			  VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
+			  VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		vmentry_ctrl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+
+	return vmentry_ctrl;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
+{
+	u32 vmexit_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not used by KVM and never set in vmcs01 or vmcs02, but emulated for
+	 * nested virtualization and thus allowed to be set in vmcs12.
+	 */
+	vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
+			 VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER);
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+				 VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		vmexit_ctrl &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+
+	/* Loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically */
+	return vmexit_ctrl &
+		~(VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+}
+
+static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
+		secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
+					       SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+					       SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			tertiary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
+	} else {
+		secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
+						 SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+						 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
+	}
+
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not used by KVM, but fully supported for nesting, i.e. are allowed in
+	 * vmcs12 and propagated to vmcs02 when set in vmcs12.
+	 */
+	exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
+			  CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |
+			  CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
+			  CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING);
+
+	/* INTR_WINDOW_EXITING and NMI_WINDOW_EXITING are toggled dynamically */
+	exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING |
+			  CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+
+	if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
+
+	if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING);
+	else
+		exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
+#endif
+	/* No need to intercept CR3 access or INVPLG when using EPT. */
+	if (enable_ept)
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
+	if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI virtualization if
+	 * APICv is inhibited.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
+
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an
+ * instruction in the guest.  This is usually done based on whether or not a
+ * feature has been exposed to the guest in order to correctly emulate faults.
+ */
+static inline void
+vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
+				  u32 control, bool enabled, bool exiting)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the control is for an opt-in feature, clear the control if the
+	 * feature is not exposed to the guest, i.e. not enabled.  If the
+	 * control is opt-out, i.e. an exiting control, clear the control if
+	 * the feature _is_ exposed to the guest, i.e. exiting/interception is
+	 * disabled for the associated instruction.  Note, the caller is
+	 * responsible presetting exec_control to set all supported bits.
+	 */
+	if (enabled == exiting)
+		*exec_control &= ~control;
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the nested MSR settings so that a nested VMM can/can't set
+	 * controls for features that are/aren't exposed to the guest.
+	 */
+	if (nested) {
+		if (enabled)
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= control;
+		else
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= ~control;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper macro for the common case of adjusting a secondary execution control
+ * based on a single guest CPUID bit, with a dedicated feature bit.  This also
+ * verifies that the control is actually supported by KVM and hardware.
+ */
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting) \
+({									 \
+	bool __enabled;							 \
+									 \
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) {					 \
+		__enabled = guest_cpuid_has(&(vmx)->vcpu,		 \
+					    X86_FEATURE_##feat_name);	 \
+		vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control,	 \
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name, __enabled, exiting); \
+	}								 \
+})
+
+/* More macro magic for ENABLE_/opt-in versus _EXITING/opt-out controls. */
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, ENABLE_##uname, false)
+
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, uname##_EXITING, true)
+
+static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
+
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX);
+	if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+	if (vmx->vpid == 0)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+	}
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP,
+	 * in vmx_set_cr4.  */
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
+	   (handle_vmptrld).
+	   We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
+	   a current VMCS12
+	*/
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+
+	/*
+	 * PML is enabled/disabled when dirty logging of memsmlots changes, but
+	 * it needs to be set here when dirty logging is already active, e.g.
+	 * if this vCPU was created after dirty logging was enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_logging_count)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_xsaves()) {
+		/* Exposing XSAVES only when XSAVE is exposed */
+		bool xsaves_enabled =
+			boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+		vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = xsaves_enabled;
+
+		vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
+						  SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES,
+						  xsaves_enabled, false);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * RDPID is also gated by ENABLE_RDTSCP, turn on the control if either
+	 * feature is exposed to the guest.  This creates a virtualization hole
+	 * if both are supported in hardware but only one is exposed to the
+	 * guest, but letting the guest execute RDTSCP or RDPID when either one
+	 * is advertised is preferable to emulating the advertised instruction
+	 * in KVM on #UD, and obviously better than incorrectly injecting #UD.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
+		bool rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled =
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+
+		vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
+						  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP,
+						  rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled, false);
+	}
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, invpcid, INVPCID);
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdrand, RDRAND);
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdseed, RDSEED);
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG,
+				    ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false);
+
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION;
+
+	if (!kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING;
+
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+static inline int vmx_get_pid_table_order(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return get_order(kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids * sizeof(*to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->pid_table));
+}
+
+static int vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct page *pages;
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || !enable_ipiv)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (kvm_vmx->pid_table)
+		return 0;
+
+	pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
+	if (!pages)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address(pages);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(kvm);
+}
+
+#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
+
+static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap();
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
+
+	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, INVALID_GPA); /* 22.3.1.5 */
+
+	/* Control */
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+
+	exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
+		tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (enable_apicv && lapic_in_kernel(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+		vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(PID_POINTER_TABLE, __pa(kvm_vmx->pid_table));
+		vmcs_write16(LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX, kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids - 1);
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(kvm)) {
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
+		vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(kvm))
+		vmcs_write32(NOTIFY_WINDOW, kvm->arch.notify_window);
+
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0);           /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
+		vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
+
+	vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmexit_ctrl());
+
+	/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
+	vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
+
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits();
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->vpid != 0)
+		vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
+		vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
+
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+	}
+
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL);
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
+		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
+		/* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) {
+		vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
+		if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
+			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
+				     __pa(vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
+	}
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+}
+
+static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	init_vmcs(vmx);
+
+	if (nested)
+		memcpy(&vmx->nested.msrs, &vmcs_config.nested, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
+
+	vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = EVMPTR_INVALID;
+
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
+	vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
+	 * or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
+	 */
+	vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!init_event)
+		__vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+	vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;
+
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+	kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);  /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+
+	vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
+
+	vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!enable_vnmi ||
+	    vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
+		vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	uint32_t intr;
+	int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+
+	trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq, vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+	intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+	} else
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		/*
+		 * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
+		 * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
+		 * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
+		 * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
+		 * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
+		 * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
+		 */
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+	}
+
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
+			INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool masked;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+		return false;
+	masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+	return masked;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+		if (masked)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+					GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	}
+}
+
+bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi && to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
+		return true;
+
+	return (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+		(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI |
+		 GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
+}
+
+static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return !vmx_nmi_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||
+	       (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+		(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
+}
+
+static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+       /*
+        * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
+        * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
+        */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+	void __user *ret;
+
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, addr,
+				      PAGE_SIZE * 3);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ret))
+		return PTR_ERR(ret);
+
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr = addr;
+
+	return init_rmode_tss(kvm, ret);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
+{
+	switch (vec) {
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject the exception
+		 * from user space while in guest debugging mode.
+		 */
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+			return false;
+		fallthrough;
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		return !(vcpu->guest_debug &
+			(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP));
+	case DE_VECTOR:
+	case OF_VECTOR:
+	case BR_VECTOR:
+	case UD_VECTOR:
+	case DF_VECTOR:
+	case SS_VECTOR:
+	case GP_VECTOR:
+	case MF_VECTOR:
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int handle_rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  int vec, u32 err_code)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Instruction with address size override prefix opcode 0x67
+	 * Cause the #SS fault with 0 error code in VM86 mode.
+	 */
+	if (((vec == GP_VECTOR) || (vec == SS_VECTOR)) && err_code == 0) {
+		if (kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0)) {
+			if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+				vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+				return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+			}
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Forward all other exceptions that are valid in real mode.
+	 * FIXME: Breaks guest debugging in real mode, needs to be fixed with
+	 *        the required debugging infrastructure rework.
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, vec);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the host has split lock detection disabled, then #AC is
+ * unconditionally injected into the guest, which is the pre split lock
+ * detection behaviour.
+ *
+ * If the host has split lock detection enabled then #AC is
+ * only injected into the guest when:
+ *  - Guest CPL == 3 (user mode)
+ *  - Guest has #AC detection enabled in CR0
+ *  - Guest EFLAGS has AC bit set
+ */
+bool vmx_guest_inject_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3 && kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_AM) &&
+	       (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
+}
+
+static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
+	unsigned long cr2, dr6;
+	u32 vect_info;
+
+	vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
+		return 1; /* handled by handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */
+
+	/*
+	 * Queue the exception here instead of in handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
+	 * This ensures the nested_vmx check is not skipped so vmexit can
+	 * be reflected to L1 (when it intercepts #NM) before reaching this
+	 * point.
+	 */
+	if (is_nm_fault(intr_info)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, NM_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
+		return handle_ud(vcpu);
+
+	error_code = 0;
+	if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+		error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+		/*
+		 * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
+		 * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero
+		 * error code on #GP.
+		 */
+		if (error_code) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
+	 * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
+	 * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
+	 */
+	if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    !(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 4;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[3] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
+		cr2 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		if (enable_ept && !vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags) {
+			/*
+			 * EPT will cause page fault only if we need to
+			 * detect illegal GPAs.
+			 */
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
+			kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		} else
+			return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
+		return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
+
+	switch (ex_no) {
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		dr6 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
+		      (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
+			/*
+			 * If the #DB was due to ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1, skip the
+			 * instruction.  ICEBP generates a trap-like #DB, but
+			 * despite its interception control being tied to #DB,
+			 * is an instruction intercept, i.e. the VM-Exit occurs
+			 * on the ICEBP itself.  Use the inner "skip" helper to
+			 * avoid single-step #DB and MTF updates, as ICEBP is
+			 * higher priority.  Note, skipping ICEBP still clears
+			 * STI and MOVSS blocking.
+			 *
+			 * For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS
+			 * if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS
+			 * blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit
+			 * on VM-Exit due to #DB interception.  VM-Entry has a
+			 * consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending
+			 * in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot
+			 * have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV
+			 * don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction
+			 * delay when activating single-step breakpoints must
+			 * have already expired.  Note, the CPU sets/clears BS
+			 * as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types.
+			 */
+			if (is_icebp(intr_info))
+				WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+			else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&
+				 (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+				  (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)))
+				vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
+					    vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);
+
+			kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+		fallthrough;
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
+		 * user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
+		 * #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
+		 */
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
+		break;
+	case AC_VECTOR:
+		if (vmx_guest_inject_ac(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Handle split lock. Depending on detection mode this will
+		 * either warn and disable split lock detection for this
+		 * task or force SIGBUS on it.
+		 */
+		if (handle_guest_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu)))
+			return 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
+		kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
+		kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline int handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int size, in, string;
+	unsigned port;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	string = (exit_qualification & 16) != 0;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+	if (string)
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	port = exit_qualification >> 16;
+	size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
+	in = (exit_qualification & 8) != 0;
+
+	return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
+}
+
+static void
+vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
+	 */
+	hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
+	hypercall[1] = 0x01;
+	hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
+}
+
+/* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
+static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/*
+		 * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
+		 * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
+		 * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the
+		 * effective cr0 value that L1 would like to write into the
+		 * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new
+		 * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest_cr0.
+		 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
+
+		if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		return kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+	}
+}
+
+static int handle_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/* analogously to handle_set_cr0 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask);
+		if (kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else
+		return kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	WARN_ON(!(vcpu->arch.cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP));
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
+	int cr;
+	int reg;
+	int err;
+	int ret;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	cr = exit_qualification & 15;
+	reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
+	switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
+	case 0: /* mov to cr */
+		val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+
+			err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 4:
+			err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 8: {
+				u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+				u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
+				err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
+				ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+				if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+					return ret;
+				if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
+					return ret;
+				/*
+				 * TODO: we might be squashing a
+				 * KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
+				 * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
+				 */
+				vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2: /* clts */
+		KVM_BUG(1, vcpu->kvm, "Guest always owns CR0.TS");
+		return -EIO;
+	case 1: /*mov from cr*/
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+
+			val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		case 8:
+			val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case 3: /* lmsw */
+		val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~0xful) | val));
+		kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
+
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
+	       (int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int dr, dr7, reg;
+	int err = 1;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
+
+	/* First, if DR does not exist, trigger UD */
+	if (!kvm_require_dr(vcpu, dr))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) > 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+	if (dr7 & DR7_GD) {
+		/*
+		 * As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
+		 * need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
+		 * guest debugging itself.
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = DR6_BD | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr7;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, DR6_BD);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+		exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+
+		/*
+		 * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
+		 * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
+		 * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
+	if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
+		unsigned long val;
+
+		kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val);
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+		err = 0;
+	} else {
+		err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg));
+	}
+
+out:
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+
+	/*
+	 * exc_debug expects dr6 to be cleared after it runs, avoid that it sees
+	 * a stale dr6 from the guest.
+	 */
+	set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_tpr_below_threshold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_apic_update_ppr(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (likely(fasteoi)) {
+		unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		int access_type, offset;
+
+		access_type = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_TYPE;
+		offset = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_OFFSET;
+		/*
+		 * Sane guest uses MOV to write EOI, with written value
+		 * not cared. So make a short-circuit here by avoiding
+		 * heavy instruction emulation.
+		 */
+		if ((access_type == TYPE_LINEAR_APIC_INST_WRITE) &&
+		    (offset == APIC_EOI)) {
+			kvm_lapic_set_eoi(vcpu);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+	}
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_eoi_induced(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	int vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
+
+	/* EOI-induced VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
+	kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vector);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * APIC-write VM-Exit is trap-like, KVM doesn't need to advance RIP and
+	 * hardware has done any necessary aliasing, offset adjustments, etc...
+	 * for the access.  I.e. the correct value has already been  written to
+	 * the vAPIC page for the correct 16-byte chunk.  KVM needs only to
+	 * retrieve the register value and emulate the access.
+	 */
+	u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xff0;
+
+	kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	bool has_error_code = false;
+	u32 error_code = 0;
+	u16 tss_selector;
+	int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
+
+	idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
+	idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
+	type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+			vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+			kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+			if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
+			    VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+				has_error_code = true;
+				error_code =
+					vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+			}
+			fallthrough;
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+			kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	tss_selector = exit_qualification;
+
+	if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
+		WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
+	 *       Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
+	 */
+	return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
+			       type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1,
+			       reason, has_error_code, error_code);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	u64 error_code;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 * There are errata that may cause this bit to not be set:
+	 * AAK134, BY25.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
+
+	/* Is it a read fault? */
+	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a write fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+		      ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+	/* ept page table entry is present? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
+		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
+	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is
+	 * a guest page fault.  We have to emulate the instruction here, because
+	 * if the illegal address is that of a paging structure, then
+	 * EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE bit is set.  Alternatively, if supported we
+	 * would also use advanced VM-exit information for EPT violations to
+	 * reconstruct the page fault error code.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa;
+
+	if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_PF, NULL, 0))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
+	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
+	 */
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+		trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_vnmi, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx->emulation_required && !vmx->rmode.vm86_active &&
+	       (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
+}
+
+static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool intr_window_requested;
+	unsigned count = 130;
+
+	intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+				CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
+
+	while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
+		if (intr_window_requested && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+			return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+			vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+			return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, return 1 and not 0, vcpu_run() will invoke
+		 * xfer_to_guest_mode() which will create a proper return
+		 * code.
+		 */
+		if (__xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					    ple_window_grow,
+					    ple_window_max);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					      ple_window_shrink,
+					      ple_window);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
+ * exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
+ */
+static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		grow_ple_window(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Intel sdm vol3 ch-25.1.3 says: The "PAUSE-loop exiting"
+	 * VM-execution control is ignored if CPL > 0. OTOH, KVM
+	 * never set PAUSE_EXITING and just set PLE if supported,
+	 * so the vcpu must be CPL=0 if it gets a PAUSE exit.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	unsigned long type;
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct {
+		u64 pcid;
+		u64 gla;
+	} operand;
+	int gpr_index;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);
+	type = kvm_register_read(vcpu, gpr_index);
+
+	/* According to the Intel instruction reference, the memory operand
+	 * is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==all)
+	 */
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
+				vmx_instruction_info, false,
+				sizeof(operand), &gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
+}
+
+static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+
+	trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
+	 * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static fastpath_t handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmx->req_immediate_exit &&
+	    !unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled)) {
+		kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
+	}
+
+	return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
+static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When nested=0, all VMX instruction VM Exits filter here.  The handlers
+ * are overwritten by nested_vmx_setup() when nested=1.
+ */
+static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * SGX virtualization is disabled.  There is no software enable bit for
+	 * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent
+	 * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware).
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */
+
+static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Hardware may or may not set the BUS_LOCK_DETECTED flag on BUS_LOCK
+	 * VM-Exits. Unconditionally set the flag here and leave the handling to
+	 * vmx_handle_exit().
+	 */
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_notify(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	bool context_invalid = exit_qual & NOTIFY_VM_CONTEXT_INVALID;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.notify_window_exits;
+
+	/*
+	 * Notify VM exit happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vnmi && (exit_qual & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+			      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER ||
+	    context_invalid) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY;
+		vcpu->run->notify.flags = context_invalid ?
+					  KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID : 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
+ * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
+ * to be done to userspace and return 0.
+ */
+static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI]           = handle_exception_nmi,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT]      = handle_external_interrupt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT]            = handle_triple_fault,
+	[EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW]	      = handle_nmi_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION]          = handle_io,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS]               = handle_cr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS]               = handle_dr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CPUID]                   = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ]                = kvm_emulate_rdmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE]               = kvm_emulate_wrmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW]        = handle_interrupt_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_HLT]                     = kvm_emulate_halt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVD]		      = kvm_emulate_invd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVLPG]		      = handle_invlpg,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDPMC]                   = kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCALL]                  = kvm_emulate_hypercall,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMON]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD]     = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS]             = handle_apic_access,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE]              = handle_apic_write,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED]             = handle_apic_eoi_induced,
+	[EXIT_REASON_WBINVD]                  = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_XSETBV]                  = kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH]             = handle_task_switch,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY]      = handle_machine_check,
+	[EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION]	      = handle_ept_violation,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG]           = handle_ept_misconfig,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION]       = handle_pause,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION]	      = kvm_emulate_mwait,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG]       = handle_monitor_trap,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION]     = kvm_emulate_monitor,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVEPT]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVVPID]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDRAND]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDSEED]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL]		      = handle_pml_full,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]	      = handle_preemption_timer,
+	[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]		      = handle_encls,
+	[EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK]                = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
+	[EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY]		      = handle_notify,
+};
+
+static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
+	ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+
+static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+			      u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
+			      u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	*reason = vmx->exit_reason.full;
+	*info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	if (!(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
+		*info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+		*intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+		if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))
+			*error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+		else
+			*error_code = 0;
+	} else {
+		*info2 = 0;
+		*intr_info = 0;
+		*error_code = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx->pml_pg) {
+		__free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
+		vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 *pml_buf;
+	u16 pml_idx;
+
+	pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
+
+	/* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
+	if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
+		return;
+
+	/* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
+	if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
+		pml_idx = 0;
+	else
+		pml_idx++;
+
+	pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
+	for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
+		u64 gpa;
+
+		gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
+		WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+
+	/* reset PML index */
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
+{
+	pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read16(sel),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
+{
+	pr_err("%s                           limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read32(limit),
+	       vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_msrs(char *name, struct vmx_msrs *m)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry *e;
+
+	pr_err("MSR %s:\n", name);
+	for (i = 0, e = m->val; i < m->nr; ++i, ++e)
+		pr_err("  %2d: msr=0x%08x value=0x%016llx\n", i, e->index, e->value);
+}
+
+void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
+	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
+	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
+	unsigned long cr4;
+	int efer_slot;
+
+	if (!dump_invalid_vmcs) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_intel.dump_invalid_vmcs=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
+	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
+	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		secondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	else
+		secondary_exec_control = 0;
+
+	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
+		tertiary_exec_control = vmcs_read64(TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	else
+		tertiary_exec_control = 0;
+
+	pr_err("VMCS %p, last attempted VM-entry on CPU %d\n",
+	       vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
+	pr_err("*** Guest State ***\n");
+	pr_err("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),
+	       vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept()) {
+		pr_err("PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));
+		pr_err("PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));
+	}
+	pr_err("RSP = 0x%016lx  RIP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));
+	pr_err("RFLAGS=0x%08lx         DR7 = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	vmx_dump_sel("CS:  ", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("DS:  ", GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("SS:  ", GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("ES:  ", GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("FS:  ", GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("GS:  ", GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("GDTR:", GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
+	efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
+	else if (efer_slot >= 0)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (autoload)\n",
+		       vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[efer_slot].value);
+	else if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
+		       vcpu->arch.efer | (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
+	else
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
+		       vcpu->arch.efer & ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));
+	pr_err("DebugCtl = 0x%016llx  DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
+		pr_err("BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));
+	pr_err("Interruptibility = %08x  ActivityState = %08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+		pr_err("InterruptStatus = %04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("guest autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.guest);
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("guest autostore", &vmx->msr_autostore.guest);
+
+	pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
+	pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx  RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
+	pr_err("CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\n",
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));
+	pr_err("FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
+	pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
+	pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER));
+	if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("host autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.host);
+
+	pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
+	pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
+	       cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
+	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
+	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
+	pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
+	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
+	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
+	pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
+		pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
+	if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
+			u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+			pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status & 0xff);
+		}
+		pr_cont("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
+			pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
+		pr_cont("virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
+	}
+	if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
+		pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
+	if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
+		pr_err("EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+		pr_err("PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\n",
+		       vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
+		pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The guest has exited.  See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
+ * assistance.
+ */
+static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	u16 exit_handler_index;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
+	 * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
+	 * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
+	 * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
+	 * flushed already.  Note, PML is never enabled in hardware while
+	 * running L2.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should never reach this point with a pending nested VM-Enter.
+	 * More specifically, short-circuiting VM-Entry to emulate L2 due to
+	 * invalid guest state should never happen as that means KVM knowingly
+	 * allowed a nested VM-Enter with an invalid vmcs12.  More below.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * PML is never enabled when running L2, bail immediately if a
+		 * PML full exit occurs as something is horribly wrong.
+		 */
+		if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL)
+			goto unexpected_vmexit;
+
+		/*
+		 * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory
+		 * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC
+		 * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host
+		 * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any
+		 * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write
+		 * protection).
+		 *
+		 * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from
+		 * getting out of sync with dirty tracking.
+		 */
+		nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Synthesize a triple fault if L2 state is invalid.  In normal
+		 * operation, nested VM-Enter rejects any attempt to enter L2
+		 * with invalid state.  However, those checks are skipped if
+		 * state is being stuffed via RSM or KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE.  If
+		 * L2 state is invalid, it means either L1 modified SMRAM state
+		 * or userspace provided bad state.  Synthesize TRIPLE_FAULT as
+		 * doing so is architecturally allowed in the RSM case, and is
+		 * the least awful solution for the userspace case without
+		 * risking false positives.
+		 */
+		if (vmx->emulation_required) {
+			nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT, 0, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating.  L2 is handled above. */
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
+		dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= exit_reason.full;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note:
+	 * Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
+	 * delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
+	 * The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
+	 * will cause infinite loop.
+	 */
+	if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    (exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY)) {
+		int ndata = 3;
+
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason.full;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
+		if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+			vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] =
+				vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+		}
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = ndata;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
+		if (!vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		} else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
+			   vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+			/*
+			 * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
+			 * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
+			 * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
+			 * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
+			 */
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
+			       "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
+			       __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
+		goto unexpected_vmexit;
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+		return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
+		return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+		return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
+		return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
+		return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
+#endif
+
+	exit_handler_index = array_index_nospec((u16)exit_reason.basic,
+						kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers);
+	if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index])
+		goto unexpected_vmexit;
+
+	return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index](vcpu);
+
+unexpected_vmexit:
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
+		    exit_reason.full);
+	dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+	vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+	int ret = __vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_fastpath);
+
+	/*
+	 * Exit to user space when bus lock detected to inform that there is
+	 * a bus lock in guest.
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected) {
+		if (ret > 0)
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+
+		vcpu->run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
+ * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
+ *
+ * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
+ * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
+ * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
+ * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
+ * there is no point in doing so.
+ */
+static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code is only executed when the flush mode is 'cond' or
+	 * 'always'
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
+		bool flush_l1d;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
+		 * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
+		 * VMEXIT handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
+		vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
+		 * the interrupt handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+		kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+
+		if (!flush_l1d)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	asm volatile(
+		/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$4096, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cpuid\n\t"
+		/* Now fill the cache */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lfill_cache:\n"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$64, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lfill_cache\n\t"
+		"lfence\n"
+		:: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
+		    [size] "r" (size)
+		: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	int tpr_threshold;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		return;
+
+	tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr;
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = tpr_threshold;
+	else
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 sec_exec_control;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled &&
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+		return;
+
+	/* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	sec_exec_control = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+	sec_exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+			      SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
+
+	switch (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu)) {
+	case LAPIC_MODE_INVALID:
+		WARN_ONCE(true, "Invalid local APIC state");
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED:
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC:
+		if (flexpriority_enabled) {
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+
+			/*
+			 * Flush the TLB, reloading the APIC access page will
+			 * only do so if its physical address has changed, but
+			 * the guest may have inserted a non-APIC mapping into
+			 * the TLB while the APIC access page was disabled.
+			 */
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC:
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+		break;
+	}
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, sec_exec_control);
+
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	/* Defer reload until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!(secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
+	    SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
+		return;
+
+	page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (is_error_page(page))
+		return;
+
+	vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, page_to_phys(page));
+	vmx_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
+	 * will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
+	 */
+	put_page(page);
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (max_isr == -1)
+		max_isr = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = status >> 8;
+	if (max_isr != old) {
+		status &= 0xff;
+		status |= max_isr << 8;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (vector == -1)
+		vector = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = (u8)status & 0xff;
+	if ((u8)vector != old) {
+		status &= ~0xff;
+		status |= (u8)vector;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
+	 * vmcs12 virtual-interrupt-delivery enabled.
+	 * However, it can be enabled only when L1 also
+	 * intercepts external-interrupts and in that case
+	 * we should not update vmcs02 RVI but instead intercept
+	 * interrupt. Therefore, do nothing when running L2.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
+}
+
+static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int max_irr;
+	bool got_posted_interrupt;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_apicv, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
+		pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+		/*
+		 * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
+		 * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
+		 */
+		smp_mb__after_atomic();
+		got_posted_interrupt =
+			kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+	} else {
+		max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
+		got_posted_interrupt = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Newly recognized interrupts are injected via either virtual interrupt
+	 * delivery (RVI) or KVM_REQ_EVENT.  Virtual interrupt delivery is
+	 * disabled in two cases:
+	 *
+	 * 1) If L2 is running and the vCPU has a new pending interrupt.  If L1
+	 * wants to exit on interrupts, KVM_REQ_EVENT is needed to synthesize a
+	 * VM-Exit to L1.  If L1 doesn't want to exit, the interrupt is injected
+	 * into L2, but KVM doesn't use virtual interrupt delivery to inject
+	 * interrupts into L2, and so KVM_REQ_EVENT is again needed.
+	 *
+	 * 2) If APICv is disabled for this vCPU, assigned devices may still
+	 * attempt to post interrupts.  The posted interrupt vector will cause
+	 * a VM-Exit and the subsequent entry will call sync_pir_to_irr.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
+	else if (got_posted_interrupt)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return max_irr;
+}
+
+static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
+}
+
+static void vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+	memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
+}
+
+void vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
+
+static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					unsigned long entry)
+{
+	bool is_nmi = entry == (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
+
+	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, is_nmi ? KVM_HANDLING_NMI : KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
+	vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(entry);
+	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
+	 * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
+	 * has chance to consume it.
+	 *
+	 * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
+	 * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
+	 * support xfd at all.
+	 *
+	 * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
+	 * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
+	 *
+	 * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+}
+
+static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
+	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+	/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
+		handle_nm_fault_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu);
+	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+	/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_nmi(intr_info))
+		handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu, nmi_entry);
+}
+
+static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+	unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
+	    "KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
+		return;
+
+	handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, gate_offset(desc));
+	vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}
+
+static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
+	else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+		handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		/*
+		 * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
+		 * real mode.
+		 */
+		return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		return nested;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+		/* This is AMD only.  */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exit_intr_info;
+	bool unblock_nmi;
+	u8 vector;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	if (enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+			return;
+
+		exit_intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
+		unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
+		vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
+		 * a guest IRET fault.
+		 * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
+		 *  If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
+		 *   information field.
+		 *  If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
+		 */
+		if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
+		    vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
+				!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
+				  & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	} else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
+			ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
+					      vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
+}
+
+static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				      int instr_len_field,
+				      int error_code_field)
+{
+	u8 vector;
+	int type;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	if (!idtv_info_valid)
+		return;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Clear bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if a NMI
+		 * delivery faulted.
+		 */
+		vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		fallthrough;
+	case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+			u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+		} else
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		fallthrough;
+	case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
+				  VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
+				  vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+				  VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
+}
+
+static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	int i, nr_msrs;
+	struct perf_guest_switch_msr *msrs;
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask = 0;
+	if (pmu->pebs_enable & pmu->global_ctrl)
+		intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(pmu);
+
+	/* Note, nr_msrs may be garbage if perf_guest_get_msrs() returns NULL. */
+	msrs = perf_guest_get_msrs(&nr_msrs, (void *)pmu);
+	if (!msrs)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++)
+		if (msrs[i].host == msrs[i].guest)
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
+		else
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
+					msrs[i].host, false);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 tscl;
+	u32 delta_tsc;
+
+	if (vmx->req_immediate_exit) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, 0);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc != -1) {
+		tscl = rdtsc();
+		if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc > tscl)
+			/* set_hv_timer ensures the delta fits in 32-bits */
+			delta_tsc = (u32)((vmx->hv_deadline_tsc - tscl) >>
+				cpu_preemption_timer_multi);
+		else
+			delta_tsc = 0;
+
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, -1);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = true;
+	}
+}
+
+void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
+{
+	if (unlikely(host_rsp != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp)) {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp = host_rsp;
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_RSP, host_rsp);
+	}
+}
+
+void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+					unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		return;
+
+	if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL)
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+	 *
+	 * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+	 * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+	 * whether the guest/host values differ.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+	    vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
+
+	barrier_nospec();
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+		return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
+		return handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	default:
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+					unsigned long flags)
+{
+	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
+		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+	vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != native_read_cr2())
+		native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
+
+	vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+				   flags);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
+
+	vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
+	guest_state_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr3, cr4;
+
+	/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
+	 * start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state.  Synthesize a
+	 * consistency check VM-Exit due to invalid guest state and bail.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vmx->emulation_required)) {
+		vmx->fail = 0;
+
+		vmx->exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+		vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1;
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1);
+		vmx->exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2);
+		vmx->exit_intr_info = 0;
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We did this in prepare_switch_to_guest, because it needs to
+	 * be within srcu_read_lock.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync);
+
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Refresh vmcs.HOST_CR3 if necessary.  This must be done immediately
+	 * prior to VM-Enter, as the kernel may load a new ASID (PCID) any time
+	 * it switches back to the current->mm, which can occur in KVM context
+	 * when switching to a temporary mm to patch kernel code, e.g. if KVM
+	 * toggles a static key while handling a VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
+	if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+	}
+
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+	}
+
+	/* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+
+	/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
+	 * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
+	 * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
+	 * exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
+	 * case. */
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
+		vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	pt_guest_enter(vmx);
+
+	atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
+	if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+		vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(vcpu);
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer)
+		vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+	/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
+	vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
+
+	/* All fields are clean at this point */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
+		current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
+			HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
+
+		current_evmcs->hv_vp_id = kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
+	if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
+		update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
+	 * a reasonable value ourselves.
+	 *
+	 * We can't defer this to vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() since that
+	 * function may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and
+	 * restore segments around it, nullifying its effect.
+	 */
+	loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
+	loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
+#endif
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+	pt_guest_exit(vmx);
+
+	kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Track VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME that have made past guest state
+		 * checking.
+		 */
+		if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+		    !vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)
+			++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
+
+		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	}
+
+	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+	}
+
+	vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+	if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+
+	if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+		vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
+
+	trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
+
+	vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
+	vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	return vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (enable_pml)
+		vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *tsx_ctrl;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	int i, err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0);
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
+
+	/*
+	 * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
+	 * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
+	 * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
+	 * for the guest), etc.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!vmx->pml_pg)
+			goto free_vpid;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i)
+		vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = -1ull;
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		/*
+		 * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID interception.
+		 * Keep the host value unchanged to avoid changing CPUID bits
+		 * under the host kernel's feet.
+		 */
+		tsx_ctrl = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+		if (tsx_ctrl)
+			tsx_ctrl->mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+	}
+
+	err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto free_pml;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use Hyper-V 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature when KVM runs as a
+	 * nested (L1) hypervisor and Hyper-V in L0 supports it. Enable the
+	 * feature only for vmcs01, KVM currently isn't equipped to realize any
+	 * performance benefits from enabling it for vmcs02.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) && static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
+	    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
+		struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
+
+		evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* The MSR bitmap starts with all ones */
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+#endif
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+	}
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
+
+	if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu)) {
+		err = alloc_apic_access_page(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		err = init_rmode_identity_map(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu))
+		WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
+			   __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
+
+	return 0;
+
+free_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+free_pml:
+	vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+free_vpid:
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	return err;
+}
+
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+
+static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!ple_gap)
+		kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+			/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+			/*
+			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
+			 * insecure environment.
+			 */
+			if (sched_smt_active())
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
+			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			/* Flush is enforced */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
+{
+	struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
+	struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
+
+	if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
+	    !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
+		pr_err("kvm: VMX is disabled on CPU %d\n", smp_processor_id());
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf, vmx_cap.ept);
+	if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config)) != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: CPU %d feature inconsistency!\n",
+				smp_processor_id());
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+	u8 cache;
+
+	/* We wanted to honor guest CD/MTRR/PAT, but doing so could result in
+	 * memory aliases with conflicting memory types and sometimes MCEs.
+	 * We have to be careful as to what are honored and when.
+	 *
+	 * For MMIO, guest CD/MTRR are ignored.  The EPT memory type is set to
+	 * UC.  The effective memory type is UC or WC depending on guest PAT.
+	 * This was historically the source of MCEs and we want to be
+	 * conservative.
+	 *
+	 * When there is no need to deal with noncoherent DMA (e.g., no VT-d
+	 * or VT-d has snoop control), guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all ignored.  The
+	 * EPT memory type is set to WB.  The effective memory type is forced
+	 * WB.
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, we trust guest.  Guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all honored.  The
+	 * EPT memory type is used to emulate guest CD/MTRR.
+	 */
+
+	if (is_mmio)
+		return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+		return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+
+	if (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_CD)) {
+		if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+		else
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+
+		return (cache << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 new_ctl)
+{
+	/*
+	 * These bits in the secondary execution controls field
+	 * are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
+	 * architecture and the guest's CPUID.  Do not touch the
+	 * dynamic bits.
+	 */
+	u32 mask =
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	u32 cur_ctl = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, (new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 according to CPUID. Only set bits
+ * (indicating "allowed-1") if they are supported in the guest's CPUID.
+ */
+static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1 = 0xffffffff;
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 = X86_CR4_PCE;
+
+#define cr4_fixed1_update(_cr4_mask, _reg, _cpuid_mask) do {		\
+	if (entry && (entry->_reg & (_cpuid_mask)))			\
+		vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 |= (_cr4_mask);	\
+} while (0)
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VME,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PVI,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_TSD,        edx, feature_bit(TSC));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_DE,         edx, feature_bit(DE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PSE,        edx, feature_bit(PSE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PAE,        edx, feature_bit(PAE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_MCE,        edx, feature_bit(MCE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PGE,        edx, feature_bit(PGE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSFXSR,     edx, feature_bit(FXSR));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT, edx, feature_bit(XMM));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(VMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(SMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PCIDE,      ecx, feature_bit(PCID));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE,    ecx, feature_bit(XSAVE));
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE,   ebx, feature_bit(FSGSBASE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMEP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMEP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMAP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMAP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE,        ecx, feature_bit(PKU));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP,       ecx, feature_bit(UMIP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57,       ecx, feature_bit(LA57));
+
+#undef cr4_fixed1_update
+}
+
+static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
+		best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x14, i);
+		if (!best)
+			return;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EAX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->eax;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EBX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ebx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_ECX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ecx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EDX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->edx;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the number of configurable Address Ranges for filtering */
+	vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_num_address_ranges);
+
+	/* Initialize and clear the no dependency bits */
+	vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask = ~(RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN | RTIT_CTL_OS |
+			RTIT_CTL_USR | RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN | RTIT_CTL_DISRETC |
+			RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[0]=1 CR3Filter can be set otherwise
+	 * will inject an #GP
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_CR3EN;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[1]=1 CYCEn, CycThresh and
+	 * PSBFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC |
+				RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH | RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[3]=1 MTCEn and MTCFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN |
+					      RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[4]=1 FUPonPTW and PTWEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_ptwrite))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW |
+							RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[5]=1 PwrEvEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_power_event_trace))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[0]=1 ToPA can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_topa_output))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_TOPA;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[3]=1 FabricEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_output_subsys))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN;
+
+	/* unmask address range configure area */
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++)
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* xsaves_enabled is recomputed in vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(). */
+	vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = false;
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
+						vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			  FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+		nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
+		update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+		if (msr) {
+			bool enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+			vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, MSR_TYPE_R,
+					  !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD));
+
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
+	/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 perf_cap = PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES;
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr lbr;
+	u64 host_perf_cap = 0;
+
+	if (!enable_pmu)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, host_perf_cap);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR)) {
+		x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr);
+		if (lbr.nr)
+			perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
+		perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK;
+		if ((perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) < 4)
+			perf_cap &= ~PERF_CAP_PEBS_BASELINE;
+	}
+
+	return perf_cap;
+}
+
+static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+	kvm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	/* CPUID 0x1 */
+	if (nested)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+
+	/* CPUID 0x7 */
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_invpcid())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
+	if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DS);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_pmu)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
+	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
+
+	if (!enable_sgx) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
+
+	/* CPUID 0xD.1 */
+	kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+	/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x7 (RDPID) */
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
+}
+
+static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct x86_instruction_info *info)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned short port;
+	bool intercept;
+	int size;
+
+	if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+	    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+		port = info->src_val;
+		size = info->dst_bytes;
+	} else {
+		port = info->dst_val;
+		size = info->src_bytes;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 0, IO instruction
+	 * VM-exits depend on the 'unconditional IO exiting' VM-execution
+	 * control.
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, IO instruction VM-exits are controlled by the IO bitmaps.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+		intercept = nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
+					   CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+	else
+		intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+
+	/* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
+	return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			       enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	switch (info->intercept) {
+	/*
+	 * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
+	 * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
+	 * Note, RDPID is hidden behind ENABLE_RDTSCP.
+	 */
+	case x86_intercept_rdpid:
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)) {
+			exception->vector = UD_VECTOR;
+			exception->error_code_valid = false;
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case x86_intercept_in:
+	case x86_intercept_ins:
+	case x86_intercept_out:
+	case x86_intercept_outs:
+		return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
+
+	case x86_intercept_lgdt:
+	case x86_intercept_lidt:
+	case x86_intercept_lldt:
+	case x86_intercept_ltr:
+	case x86_intercept_sgdt:
+	case x86_intercept_sidt:
+	case x86_intercept_sldt:
+	case x86_intercept_str:
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
+			return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+		/* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
+		break;
+
+	case x86_intercept_pause:
+		/*
+		 * PAUSE is a single-byte NOP with a REPE prefix, i.e. collides
+		 * with vanilla NOPs in the emulator.  Apply the interception
+		 * check only to actual PAUSE instructions.  Don't check
+		 * PAUSE-loop-exiting, software can't expect a given PAUSE to
+		 * exit, i.e. KVM is within its rights to allow L2 to execute
+		 * the PAUSE.
+		 */
+		if ((info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX) ||
+		    !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING))
+			return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+		break;
+
+	/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/* (a << shift) / divisor, return 1 if overflow otherwise 0 */
+static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
+				  u64 divisor, u64 *result)
+{
+	u64 low = a << shift, high = a >> (64 - shift);
+
+	/* To avoid the overflow on divq */
+	if (high >= divisor)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Low hold the result, high hold rem which is discarded */
+	asm("divq %2\n\t" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
+	    "rm" (divisor), "0" (low), "1" (high));
+	*result = low;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+			    bool *expired)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	tscl = rdtsc();
+	guest_tscl = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, tscl);
+	delta_tsc = max(guest_deadline_tsc, guest_tscl) - guest_tscl;
+	lapic_timer_advance_cycles = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu,
+						    ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
+
+	if (delta_tsc > lapic_timer_advance_cycles)
+		delta_tsc -= lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	else
+		delta_tsc = 0;
+
+	/* Convert to host delta tsc if tsc scaling is enabled */
+	if (vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio &&
+	    delta_tsc && u64_shl_div_u64(delta_tsc,
+				kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
+				vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio, &delta_tsc))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the delta tsc can't fit in the 32 bit after the multi shift,
+	 * we can't use the preemption timer.
+	 * It's possible that it fits on later vmentries, but checking
+	 * on every vmentry is costly so we just use an hrtimer.
+	 */
+	if (delta_tsc >> (cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = tscl + delta_tsc;
+	*expired = !delta_tsc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, cpu_dirty_logging_count can be changed concurrent with this
+	 * code, but in that case another update request will be made and so
+	 * the guest will never run with a stale PML value.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_logging_count)
+		secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
+	else
+		secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+	else
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+}
+
+static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return !is_smm(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Implement custom flows for forcing the vCPU out/in of L2 on
+	 * SMI and RSM.  Using the common VM-Exit + VM-Enter routines is wrong
+	 * SMI and RSM only modify state that is saved and restored via SMRAM.
+	 * E.g. most MSRs are left untouched, but many are modified by VM-Exit
+	 * and VM-Enter, and thus L2's values may be corrupted on SMI+RSM.
+	 */
+	vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
+
+	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
+		vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
+		vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
+		ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+		vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway.  */
+}
+
+static bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct hrtimer *timer = &to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer;
+
+		if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(timer) == 1)
+			hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(NULL);
+
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	free_kvm_area();
+}
+
+static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason)
+{
+	ulong supported = BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE) |
+			  BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |
+			  BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV) |
+			  BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ) |
+			  BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED) |
+			  BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED);
+
+	return supported & BIT(reason);
+}
+
+static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
+	.name = "kvm_intel",
+
+	.hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
+
+	.hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
+	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
+	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+
+	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
+	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
+
+	.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
+	.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
+	.vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
+	.vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+
+	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+	.vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+
+	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
+	.get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
+	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
+	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
+	.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
+	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+	.is_valid_cr0 = vmx_is_valid_cr0,
+	.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+	.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
+	.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
+	.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
+	.get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
+	.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
+	.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
+	.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+	.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
+	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+	.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
+	.get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
+	.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
+	.get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
+
+	.flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
+	.flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
+	.flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
+	.flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
+
+	.vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
+	.vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+	.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+	.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
+	.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
+	.set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
+	.get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
+	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+	.inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
+	.inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+	.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
+	.cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
+	.interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
+	.nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
+	.get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
+	.set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
+	.enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
+	.enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
+	.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+	.load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+	.apicv_pre_state_restore = vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore,
+	.check_apicv_inhibit_reasons = vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+	.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
+	.hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
+	.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+	.sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
+	.deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
+	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
+
+	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
+	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+	.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+
+	.get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+
+	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+
+	.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
+
+	.get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+	.get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+	.write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
+	.write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+
+	.load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+
+	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+
+	.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+
+	.sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+
+	.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
+	.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+
+	.nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
+
+	.pi_update_irte = vmx_pi_update_irte,
+	.pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
+	.cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+#endif
+
+	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+
+	.smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
+	.enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
+	.leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
+	.enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
+
+	.can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
+	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
+
+	.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
+	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
+
+	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+};
+
+static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kvm_get_running_vcpu();
+
+	/* '0' on failure so that the !PT case can use a RET0 static call. */
+	if (!vcpu || !kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu);
+	__set_bit(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI_BIT,
+		  (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.pmu.global_status);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static __init void vmx_setup_user_return_msrs(void)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm
+	 * will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest
+	 * CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To
+	 * support this emulation, MSR_STAR is included in the list for i386,
+	 * but is never loaded into hardware.  MSR_CSTAR is also never loaded
+	 * into hardware and is here purely for emulation purposes.
+	 */
+	const u32 vmx_uret_msrs_list[] = {
+	#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR,
+	#endif
+		MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR,
+		MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
+	};
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list) != MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list); ++i)
+		kvm_add_user_return_msr(vmx_uret_msrs_list[i]);
+}
+
+static void __init vmx_setup_me_spte_mask(void)
+{
+	u64 me_mask = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() returns shadow_phys_bits.  Use
+	 * the former to avoid exposing shadow_phys_bits.
+	 *
+	 * On pre-MKTME system, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits equals to
+	 * shadow_phys_bits.  On MKTME and/or TDX capable systems,
+	 * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits holds the actual physical address
+	 * w/o the KeyID bits, and shadow_phys_bits equals to MAXPHYADDR
+	 * reported by CPUID.  Those bits between are KeyID bits.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits != kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits())
+		me_mask = rsvd_bits(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
+			kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() - 1);
+	/*
+	 * Unlike SME, host kernel doesn't support setting up any
+	 * MKTME KeyID on Intel platforms.  No memory encryption
+	 * bits should be included into the SPTE.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(0, me_mask);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata;
+
+static __init int hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int r;
+
+	store_idt(&dt);
+	host_idt_base = dt.address;
+
+	vmx_setup_user_return_msrs();
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config, &vmx_capability) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		pr_warn_once("kvm: VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
+			     "does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, host_bndcfgs);
+		WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "KVM: BNDCFGS in host will be lost");
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_mpx())
+		kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
+					     XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
+	    !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
+		enable_vpid = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_invept_global())
+		enable_ept = 0;
+
+	/* NX support is required for shadow paging. */
+	if (!enable_ept && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("kvm: NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_ept_ad_bits = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
+		flexpriority_enabled = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
+		enable_vnmi = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		enable_sgx = false;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
+	 * page upon invalidation.  No need to do anything if not
+	 * using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
+	 */
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled)
+		vmx_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
+		vmx_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
+	    && enable_ept) {
+		vmx_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
+		vmx_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
+				hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
+		ple_gap = 0;
+		ple_window = 0;
+		ple_window_grow = 0;
+		ple_window_max = 0;
+		ple_window_shrink = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
+		enable_apicv = 0;
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv())
+		enable_ipiv = false;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling())
+		kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
+
+	kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
+	kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
+	kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit = cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection();
+	kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit = cpu_has_notify_vmexit();
+
+	set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
+				      cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
+	 * bits to shadow_zero_check.
+	 */
+	vmx_setup_me_spte_mask();
+
+	kvm_configure_mmu(enable_ept, 0, vmx_get_max_tdp_level(),
+			  ept_caps_to_lpage_level(vmx_capability.ept));
+
+	/*
+	 * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
+	 * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
+		enable_pml = 0;
+
+	if (!enable_pml)
+		vmx_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		enable_preemption_timer = false;
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer) {
+		u64 use_timer_freq = 5000ULL * 1000 * 1000;
+
+		cpu_preemption_timer_multi =
+			vmcs_config.misc & VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE_MASK;
+
+		if (tsc_khz)
+			use_timer_freq = (u64)tsc_khz * 1000;
+		use_timer_freq >>= cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM "disables" the preemption timer by setting it to its max
+		 * value.  Don't use the timer if it might cause spurious exits
+		 * at a rate faster than 0.1 Hz (of uninterrupted guest time).
+		 */
+		if (use_timer_freq > 0xffffffffu / 10)
+			enable_preemption_timer = false;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
+		vmx_x86_ops.set_hv_timer = NULL;
+		vmx_x86_ops.cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
+		vmx_x86_ops.request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
+	}
+
+	kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_LMCE_P;
+	kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_CMCI_P;
+
+	if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_SYSTEM && pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!enable_ept || !enable_pmu || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
+		pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr;
+	else
+		vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL;
+
+	setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();
+
+	if (nested) {
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config, vmx_capability.ept);
+
+		r = nested_vmx_hardware_setup(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	vmx_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	r = alloc_kvm_area();
+	if (r && nested)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(pi_wakeup_handler);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata = {
+	.cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
+	.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
+	.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
+	.hardware_setup = hardware_setup,
+	.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
+
+	.runtime_ops = &vmx_x86_ops,
+	.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
+};
+
+static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
+{
+	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
+		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+}
+
+static void __vmx_exit(void)
+{
+	allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
+
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
+	synchronize_rcu();
+
+	vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
+}
+
+static void vmx_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_exit();
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+
+	__vmx_exit();
+}
+module_exit(vmx_exit);
+
+static int __init vmx_init(void)
+{
+	int r, cpu;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	/*
+	 * Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
+	 * to support eVMCS v1 or above. We can also disable eVMCS support
+	 * with module parameter.
+	 */
+	if (enlightened_vmcs &&
+	    ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
+	    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
+	    KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
+
+		/* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
+				enlightened_vmcs = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (enlightened_vmcs) {
+			pr_info("KVM: vmx: using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
+			static_branch_enable(&enable_evmcs);
+		}
+
+		if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
+			vmx_x86_ops.enable_direct_tlbflush
+				= hv_enable_direct_tlbflush;
+
+	} else {
+		enlightened_vmcs = false;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vmx_init_ops);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be called after common x86 init so enable_ept is properly set
+	 * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
+	 * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
+	 * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
+	 * mitigation mode.
+	 */
+	r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_l1d_flush;
+
+	vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+
+		pi_init_cpu(cpu);
+	}
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
+			   crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
+
+	vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
+
+	/*
+	 * Shadow paging doesn't have a (further) performance penalty
+	 * from GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR so enable it
+	 * by default
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+	 * exposed to userspace!
+	 */
+	r = kvm_init(&vmx_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
+		     __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_kvm_init;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+	__vmx_exit();
+err_l1d_flush:
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+	return r;
+}
+module_init(vmx_init);