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-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c1993
1 files changed, 1993 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9820b3809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1993 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL;
+static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL;
+vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
+
+/*
+ * Security Information (SECINFO) data structure needed by a few SGX
+ * instructions (eg. ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EMODPE]) holds meta-data
+ * about an enclave page. &enum sgx_secinfo_page_state specifies the
+ * secinfo flags used for page state.
+ */
+enum sgx_secinfo_page_state {
+ SGX_SECINFO_PENDING = (1 << 3),
+ SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED = (1 << 4),
+ SGX_SECINFO_PR = (1 << 5),
+};
+
+struct vdso_symtab {
+ Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab;
+ const char *elf_symstrtab;
+ Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab;
+};
+
+static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr)
+{
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++)
+ if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC)
+ return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++)
+ if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag)
+ return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab)
+{
+ Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr);
+
+ symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH);
+ if (!symtab->elf_hashtab)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline int sgx2_supported(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+ return eax & 0x2;
+}
+
+static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name)
+{
+ unsigned long h = 0, high;
+
+ while (*name) {
+ h = (h << 4) + *name++;
+ high = h & 0xf0000000;
+
+ if (high)
+ h ^= high >> 24;
+
+ h &= ~high;
+ }
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
+{
+ Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0];
+ Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2];
+ Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum];
+ Elf64_Sym *sym;
+ Elf64_Word i;
+
+ for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF;
+ i = chaintab[i]) {
+ sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i];
+ if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name]))
+ return sym;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+ return seg->offset;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
+ * data segment.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_data_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+ return seg->offset;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+FIXTURE(enclave) {
+ struct encl encl;
+ struct sgx_enclave_run run;
+};
+
+static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl,
+ struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+ Elf64_Sym *sgx_enter_enclave_sym = NULL;
+ struct vdso_symtab symtab;
+ struct encl_segment *seg;
+ char maps_line[256];
+ FILE *maps_file;
+ unsigned int i;
+ void *addr;
+
+ if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size)) {
+ encl_delete(encl);
+ TH_LOG("Failed to load the test enclave.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!encl_measure(encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!encl_build(encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * An enclave consumer only must do this.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ addr = mmap((void *)encl->encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
+ seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl->fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+ if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get vDSO base address */
+ addr = (void *)getauxval(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR);
+ if (!addr)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab))
+ goto err;
+
+ sgx_enter_enclave_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave");
+ if (!sgx_enter_enclave_sym)
+ goto err;
+
+ vdso_sgx_enter_enclave = addr + sgx_enter_enclave_sym->st_value;
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ TH_LOG("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x", seg->offset, seg->size, seg->prot);
+ }
+
+ maps_file = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (maps_file != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(maps_line, sizeof(maps_line), maps_file) != NULL) {
+ maps_line[strlen(maps_line) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ if (strstr(maps_line, "/dev/sgx_enclave"))
+ TH_LOG("%s", maps_line);
+ }
+
+ fclose(maps_file);
+ }
+
+ TH_LOG("Failed to initialize the test enclave.");
+
+ encl_delete(encl);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(enclave)
+{
+ encl_delete(&self->encl);
+}
+
+#define ENCL_CALL(op, run, clobbered) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ if ((clobbered)) \
+ ret = vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)(op), 0, 0, \
+ EENTER, 0, 0, (run)); \
+ else \
+ ret = sgx_enter_enclave((void *)(op), NULL, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL, \
+ (run)); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define EXPECT_EEXIT(run) \
+ do { \
+ EXPECT_EQ((run)->function, EEXIT); \
+ if ((run)->function != EEXIT) \
+ TH_LOG("0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%016llx", (run)->exception_vector, \
+ (run)->exception_error_code, (run)->exception_addr); \
+ } while (0)
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
+ * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
+ * metric.
+ */
+static unsigned long sgx_calc_section_metric(unsigned int low,
+ unsigned int high)
+{
+ return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
+ ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sum total available physical SGX memory across all EPC sections
+ *
+ * Return: total available physical SGX memory available on system
+ */
+static unsigned long get_total_epc_mem(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ unsigned long total_size = 0;
+ unsigned int type;
+ int section = 0;
+
+ while (true) {
+ __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, section + SGX_CPUID_EPC, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+ type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK;
+ if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID)
+ break;
+
+ if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION)
+ break;
+
+ total_size += sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
+
+ section++;
+ }
+
+ return total_size;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+ unsigned long total_mem;
+
+ total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+ ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+ struct encl_segment *heap;
+ unsigned long total_mem;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /*
+ * Create enclave with additional heap that is as big as all
+ * available physical SGX memory.
+ */
+ total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+ ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+ TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...",
+ total_mem);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ heap = &self->encl.segment_tbl[self->encl.nr_segments - 1];
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ /* Trim entire heap. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+ modt_ioc.length = heap->size;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ TH_LOG("Changing type of %zd bytes to trimmed may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, heap->size);
+
+ /* EACCEPT all removed pages. */
+ addr = self->encl.encl_base + heap->offset;
+
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ TH_LOG("Entering enclave to run EACCEPT for each page of %zd bytes may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ for (i = 0; i < heap->size; i += 4096) {
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = addr + i;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT);
+ }
+
+ /* Complete page removal. */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+ remove_ioc.length = heap->size;
+
+ TH_LOG("Removing %zd bytes from enclave may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, heap->size);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+static int test_handler(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, long ursp, long r8, long r9,
+ struct sgx_enclave_run *run)
+{
+ run->user_data = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso_and_user_function)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ self->run.user_handler = (__u64)test_handler;
+ self->run.user_data = 0xdeadbeef;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity check that it is possible to enter either of the two hardcoded TCS
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_entry)
+{
+ struct encl_op_header op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ op.type = ENCL_OP_NOP;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Move to the next TCS. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Second page of .data segment is used to test changing PTE permissions.
+ * This spans the local encl_buffer within the test enclave.
+ *
+ * 1) Start with a sanity check: a value is written to the target page within
+ * the enclave and read back to ensure target page can be written to.
+ * 2) Change PTE permissions (RW -> RO) of target page within enclave.
+ * 3) Repeat (1) - this time expecting a regular #PF communicated via the
+ * vDSO.
+ * 4) Change PTE permissions of target page within enclave back to be RW.
+ * 5) Repeat (1) by resuming enclave, now expected to be possible to write to
+ * and read from target page within enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) +
+ PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check to ensure it is possible to write to page that will
+ * have its permissions manipulated.
+ */
+
+ /* Write MAGIC to page */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that it is the
+ * value previously written (MAGIC).
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Change PTE permissions of target page within the enclave */
+ ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("mprotect");
+
+ /*
+ * PTE permissions of target page changed to read-only, EPCM
+ * permissions unchanged (EPCM permissions are RW), attempt to
+ * write to the page, expecting a regular #PF.
+ */
+
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Change PTE permissions back to enable enclave to write to the
+ * target page and resume enclave - do not expect any exceptions this
+ * time.
+ */
+ ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("mprotect");
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0,
+ 0, ERESUME, 0, 0, &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions ioc;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+ * commands.
+ */
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* ret == -1 */
+ if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+ else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and
+ * should be prevented by the kernel.
+ */
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl);
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enclave page permission test.
+ *
+ * Modify and restore enclave page's EPCM (enclave) permissions from
+ * outside enclave (ENCLS[EMODPR] via kernel) as well as from within
+ * enclave (via ENCLU[EMODPE]). Check for page fault if
+ * VMA allows access but EPCM permissions do not.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions restrict_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ struct encl_op_emodpe emodpe_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+ * commands.
+ */
+ memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+ &restrict_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* ret == -1 */
+ if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+ else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will have its permissions changed is the second data
+ * page in the .data segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer
+ * within the enclave.
+ *
+ * At start of test @data_start should have EPCM as well as PTE and
+ * VMA permissions of RW.
+ */
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before making
+ * any changes to page permissions.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that
+ * page is writable.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Change EPCM permissions to read-only. Kernel still considers
+ * the page writable.
+ */
+ memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+ restrict_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ restrict_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ restrict_ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+ &restrict_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * EPCM permissions changed from kernel, need to EACCEPT from enclave.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PR;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * EPCM permissions of page is now read-only, expect #PF
+ * on EPCM when attempting to write to page from within enclave.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Received AEX but cannot return to enclave at same entrypoint,
+ * need different TCS from where EPCM permission can be made writable
+ * again.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave at new TCS to change EPCM permissions to be
+ * writable again and thus fix the page fault that triggered the
+ * AEX.
+ */
+
+ emodpe_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ emodpe_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W;
+ emodpe_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EMODPE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&emodpe_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to return to main TCS to resume execution at faulting
+ * instruction, PTE should continue to allow writing to the page.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Wrong page permissions that caused original fault has
+ * now been fixed via EPCM permissions.
+ * Resume execution in main TCS to re-attempt the memory access.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+ ERESUME, 0, 0,
+ &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to
+ * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added
+ * during enclave creation.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ void *addr;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!sgx2_supported())
+ SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes
+ * and test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New
+ * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing
+ * mappings.
+ * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+ * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+ * by existing enclave pages.
+ */
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave.
+ * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave.
+ * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the
+ * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the
+ * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible
+ * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the
+ * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set,
+ * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) {
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+ ERESUME, 0, 0,
+ &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a
+ * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ void *addr;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!sgx2_supported())
+ SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+ * test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic
+ * EPC page.
+ *
+ * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+ * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+ * by existing enclave pages.
+ */
+
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+ self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again
+ * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+ self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+ self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) {
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to
+ * write to it.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases:
+ * Phase 1:
+ * Create a new TCS, consisting out of three new pages (stack page with regular
+ * page type, SSA page with regular page type, and TCS page with TCS page
+ * type) in an initialized enclave and run a simple workload within it.
+ * Phase 2:
+ * Remove the three pages added in phase 1, add a new regular page at the
+ * same address that previously hosted the TCS page and verify that it can
+ * be modified.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create)
+{
+ struct encl_op_init_tcs_page init_tcs_page_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_buf_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_buf_op;
+ void *addr, *tcs, *stack_end, *ssa;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ uint64_t val_64;
+ int errno_save;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl,
+ _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Add three regular pages via EAUG: one will be the TCS stack, one
+ * will be the TCS SSA, and one will be the new TCS. The stack and
+ * SSA will remain as regular pages, the TCS page will need its
+ * type changed after populated with needed data.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+ * test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + 3 * PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * mmap() three pages at end of existing enclave to be used for the
+ * three new pages.
+ */
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, 3 * PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+ self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ stack_end = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ tcs = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ssa = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Run EACCEPT on each new page to trigger the
+ * EACCEPT->(#PF)->EAUG->EACCEPT(again without a #PF) flow.
+ */
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+ self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+ self->run.exception_addr == (unsigned long)stack_end) {
+ munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Three new pages added to enclave. Now populate the TCS page with
+ * needed data. This should be done from within enclave. Provide
+ * the function that will do the actual data population with needed
+ * data.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * New TCS will use the "encl_dyn_entry" entrypoint that expects
+ * stack to begin in page before TCS page.
+ */
+ val_64 = encl_get_entry(&self->encl, "encl_dyn_entry");
+ EXPECT_NE(val_64, 0);
+
+ init_tcs_page_op.tcs_page = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ init_tcs_page_op.ssa = (unsigned long)total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ init_tcs_page_op.entry = val_64;
+ init_tcs_page_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&init_tcs_page_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Change TCS page type to TCS. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /* EACCEPT new TCS page from enclave. */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Run workload from new TCS. */
+ self->run.tcs = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+ /*
+ * Simple workload to write to data buffer and read value back.
+ */
+ put_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_buf_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_buf_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_buf_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Phase 2 of test:
+ * Remove pages associated with new TCS, create a regular page
+ * where TCS page used to be and verify it can be used as a regular
+ * page.
+ */
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = total_size;
+ modt_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+ * EACCEPT for each of three removed pages.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal. */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = total_size;
+ remove_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and access location where TCS #3 was to
+ * trigger dynamic add of regular page at that location.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * New page should be accessible from within enclave - write to it.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run
+ * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal
+ * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail
+ * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /* Skip EACCEPT */
+
+ /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with
+ * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * Read from page that was just removed.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+ * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+ * expected.
+ */
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with
+ * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt
+ * to removed page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */
+
+ /*
+ * Read from page that was just removed.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+ * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+ * expected.
+ */
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+ * EACCEPT for removed page.
+ */
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN