Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2167 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..39f7751c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2167 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  linux/fs/exec.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+/*
+ * #!-checking implemented by tytso.
+ */
+/*
+ * Demand-loading implemented 01.12.91 - no need to read anything but
+ * the header into memory. The inode of the executable is put into
+ * "current->executable", and page faults do the actual loading. Clean.
+ *
+ * Once more I can proudly say that linux stood up to being changed: it
+ * was less than 2 hours work to get demand-loading completely implemented.
+ *
+ * Demand loading changed July 1993 by Eric Youngdale.   Use mmap instead,
+ * current->executable is only used by the procfs.  This allows a dispatch
+ * table to check for several different types  of binary formats.  We keep
+ * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
+ * formats.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
+#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/oom.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
+#include <linux/coredump.h>
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/tlb.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/task.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#include <trace/events/sched.h>
+
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+int suid_dumpable = 0;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(formats);
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
+
+void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt, int insert)
+{
+	write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+	insert ? list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats) :
+		 list_add_tail(&fmt->lh, &formats);
+	write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__register_binfmt);
+
+void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
+{
+	write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+	list_del(&fmt->lh);
+	write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_binfmt);
+
+static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
+{
+	module_put(fmt->module);
+}
+
+bool path_noexec(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ||
+	       (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USELIB
+/*
+ * Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to
+ * security reasons.
+ *
+ * Also note that we take the address to load from the file itself.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
+{
+	struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
+	struct file *file;
+	struct filename *tmp = getname(library);
+	int error = PTR_ERR(tmp);
+	static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
+		.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
+		.acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC,
+		.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
+		.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
+	};
+
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
+		goto out;
+
+	file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags);
+	putname(tmp);
+	error = PTR_ERR(file);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
+	 * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
+	 * and check again at the very end too.
+	 */
+	error = -EACCES;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
+			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
+		goto exit;
+
+	fsnotify_open(file);
+
+	error = -ENOEXEC;
+
+	read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
+		if (!fmt->load_shlib)
+			continue;
+		if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
+			continue;
+		read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+		error = fmt->load_shlib(file);
+		read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+		put_binfmt(fmt);
+		if (error != -ENOEXEC)
+			break;
+	}
+	read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+exit:
+	fput(file);
+out:
+  	return error;
+}
+#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+/*
+ * The nascent bprm->mm is not visible until exec_mmap() but it can
+ * use a lot of memory, account these pages in current->mm temporary
+ * for oom_badness()->get_mm_rss(). Once exec succeeds or fails, we
+ * change the counter back via acct_arg_size(0).
+ */
+static void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	long diff = (long)(pages - bprm->vma_pages);
+
+	if (!mm || !diff)
+		return;
+
+	bprm->vma_pages = pages;
+	add_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES, diff);
+}
+
+static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		int write)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid relying on expanding the stack down in GUP (which
+	 * does not work for STACK_GROWSUP anyway), and just do it
+	 * by hand ahead of time.
+	 */
+	if (write && pos < vma->vm_start) {
+		mmap_write_lock(mm);
+		ret = expand_downwards(vma, pos);
+		if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
+			mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		mmap_write_downgrade(mm);
+	} else
+		mmap_read_lock(mm);
+
+	/*
+	 * We are doing an exec().  'current' is the process
+	 * doing the exec and 'mm' is the new process's mm.
+	 */
+	ret = get_user_pages_remote(mm, pos, 1,
+			write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
+			&page, NULL, NULL);
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+	if (ret <= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (write)
+		acct_arg_size(bprm, vma_pages(vma));
+
+	return page;
+}
+
+static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
+{
+	put_page(page);
+}
+
+static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+}
+
+static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		struct page *page)
+{
+	flush_cache_page(bprm->vma, pos, page_to_pfn(page));
+}
+
+static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
+
+	bprm->vma = vma = vm_area_alloc(mm);
+	if (!vma)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	vma_set_anonymous(vma);
+
+	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
+		err = -EINTR;
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Place the stack at the largest stack address the architecture
+	 * supports. Later, we'll move this to an appropriate place. We don't
+	 * use STACK_TOP because that can depend on attributes which aren't
+	 * configured yet.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP);
+	vma->vm_end = STACK_TOP_MAX;
+	vma->vm_start = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE;
+	vma->vm_flags = VM_SOFTDIRTY | VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
+	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+
+	err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+	if (err)
+		goto err;
+
+	mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1;
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
+	return 0;
+err:
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+err_free:
+	bprm->vma = NULL;
+	vm_area_free(vma);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
+{
+	return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages)
+{
+}
+
+static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		int write)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE];
+	if (!page && write) {
+		page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!page)
+			return NULL;
+		bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE] = page;
+	}
+
+	return page;
+}
+
+static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
+{
+}
+
+static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
+{
+	if (bprm->page[i]) {
+		__free_page(bprm->page[i]);
+		bprm->page[i] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES; i++)
+		free_arg_page(bprm, i);
+}
+
+static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
+		struct page *page)
+{
+}
+
+static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
+{
+	return len <= bprm->p;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
+
+/*
+ * Create a new mm_struct and populate it with a temporary stack
+ * vm_area_struct.  We don't have enough context at this point to set the stack
+ * flags, permissions, and offset, so we use temporary values.  We'll update
+ * them later in setup_arg_pages().
+ */
+static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
+
+	bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc();
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!mm)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Save current stack limit for all calculations made during exec. */
+	task_lock(current->group_leader);
+	bprm->rlim_stack = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK];
+	task_unlock(current->group_leader);
+
+	err = __bprm_mm_init(bprm);
+	if (err)
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	if (mm) {
+		bprm->mm = NULL;
+		mmdrop(mm);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+struct user_arg_ptr {
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	bool is_compat;
+#endif
+	union {
+		const char __user *const __user *native;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+		const compat_uptr_t __user *compat;
+#endif
+	} ptr;
+};
+
+static const char __user *get_user_arg_ptr(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int nr)
+{
+	const char __user *native;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	if (unlikely(argv.is_compat)) {
+		compat_uptr_t compat;
+
+		if (get_user(compat, argv.ptr.compat + nr))
+			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+		return compat_ptr(compat);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (get_user(native, argv.ptr.native + nr))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+	return native;
+}
+
+/*
+ * count() counts the number of strings in array ARGV.
+ */
+static int count(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int max)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (argv.ptr.native != NULL) {
+		for (;;) {
+			const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, i);
+
+			if (!p)
+				break;
+
+			if (IS_ERR(p))
+				return -EFAULT;
+
+			if (i >= max)
+				return -E2BIG;
+			++i;
+
+			if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+				return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int count_strings_kernel(const char *const *argv)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!argv)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; argv[i]; ++i) {
+		if (i >= MAX_ARG_STRINGS)
+			return -E2BIG;
+		if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+			return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	unsigned long limit, ptr_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * Limit to 1/4 of the max stack size or 3/4 of _STK_LIM
+	 * (whichever is smaller) for the argv+env strings.
+	 * This ensures that:
+	 *  - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
+	 *  - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
+	 *    to work from.
+	 */
+	limit = _STK_LIM / 4 * 3;
+	limit = min(limit, bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur / 4);
+	/*
+	 * We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX)
+	 * of argument strings even with small stacks
+	 */
+	limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX);
+	/*
+	 * We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to
+	 * the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in
+	 * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't
+	 * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space.
+	 * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully.
+	 *
+	 * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a
+	 * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused
+	 * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking
+	 * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident.
+	 * See do_execveat_common().
+	 */
+	ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+	if (limit <= ptr_size)
+		return -E2BIG;
+	limit -= ptr_size;
+
+	bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'copy_strings()' copies argument/environment strings from the old
+ * processes's memory to the new process's stack.  The call to get_user_pages()
+ * ensures the destination page is created and not swapped out.
+ */
+static int copy_strings(int argc, struct user_arg_ptr argv,
+			struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct page *kmapped_page = NULL;
+	char *kaddr = NULL;
+	unsigned long kpos = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	while (argc-- > 0) {
+		const char __user *str;
+		int len;
+		unsigned long pos;
+
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		str = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, argc);
+		if (IS_ERR(str))
+			goto out;
+
+		len = strnlen_user(str, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
+		if (!len)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = -E2BIG;
+		if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len))
+			goto out;
+
+		/* We're going to work our way backwards. */
+		pos = bprm->p;
+		str += len;
+		bprm->p -= len;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+		if (bprm->p < bprm->argmin)
+			goto out;
+#endif
+
+		while (len > 0) {
+			int offset, bytes_to_copy;
+
+			if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+				ret = -ERESTARTNOHAND;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			cond_resched();
+
+			offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
+			if (offset == 0)
+				offset = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+			bytes_to_copy = offset;
+			if (bytes_to_copy > len)
+				bytes_to_copy = len;
+
+			offset -= bytes_to_copy;
+			pos -= bytes_to_copy;
+			str -= bytes_to_copy;
+			len -= bytes_to_copy;
+
+			if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) {
+				struct page *page;
+
+				page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1);
+				if (!page) {
+					ret = -E2BIG;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				if (kmapped_page) {
+					flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
+					kunmap_local(kaddr);
+					put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
+				}
+				kmapped_page = page;
+				kaddr = kmap_local_page(kmapped_page);
+				kpos = pos & PAGE_MASK;
+				flush_arg_page(bprm, kpos, kmapped_page);
+			}
+			if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	if (kmapped_page) {
+		flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
+		kunmap_local(kaddr);
+		put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy and argument/environment string from the kernel to the processes stack.
+ */
+int copy_string_kernel(const char *arg, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int len = strnlen(arg, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) + 1 /* terminating NUL */;
+	unsigned long pos = bprm->p;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+	if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	/* We're going to work our way backwards. */
+	arg += len;
+	bprm->p -= len;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) && bprm->p < bprm->argmin)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		unsigned int bytes_to_copy = min_t(unsigned int, len,
+				min_not_zero(offset_in_page(pos), PAGE_SIZE));
+		struct page *page;
+
+		pos -= bytes_to_copy;
+		arg -= bytes_to_copy;
+		len -= bytes_to_copy;
+
+		page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1);
+		if (!page)
+			return -E2BIG;
+		flush_arg_page(bprm, pos & PAGE_MASK, page);
+		memcpy_to_page(page, offset_in_page(pos), arg, bytes_to_copy);
+		put_arg_page(page);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_string_kernel);
+
+static int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *argv,
+			       struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	while (argc-- > 0) {
+		int ret = copy_string_kernel(argv[argc], bprm);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+			return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+
+/*
+ * During bprm_mm_init(), we create a temporary stack at STACK_TOP_MAX.  Once
+ * the binfmt code determines where the new stack should reside, we shift it to
+ * its final location.  The process proceeds as follows:
+ *
+ * 1) Use shift to calculate the new vma endpoints.
+ * 2) Extend vma to cover both the old and new ranges.  This ensures the
+ *    arguments passed to subsequent functions are consistent.
+ * 3) Move vma's page tables to the new range.
+ * 4) Free up any cleared pgd range.
+ * 5) Shrink the vma to cover only the new range.
+ */
+static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long shift)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+	unsigned long old_start = vma->vm_start;
+	unsigned long old_end = vma->vm_end;
+	unsigned long length = old_end - old_start;
+	unsigned long new_start = old_start - shift;
+	unsigned long new_end = old_end - shift;
+	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, new_start);
+	struct vm_area_struct *next;
+	struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
+	BUG_ON(new_start > new_end);
+
+	/*
+	 * ensure there are no vmas between where we want to go
+	 * and where we are
+	 */
+	if (vma != vma_next(&vmi))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end)
+	 */
+	if (vma_adjust(vma, new_start, old_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * move the page tables downwards, on failure we rely on
+	 * process cleanup to remove whatever mess we made.
+	 */
+	if (length != move_page_tables(vma, old_start,
+				       vma, new_start, length, false))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	lru_add_drain();
+	tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+	next = vma_next(&vmi);
+	if (new_end > old_start) {
+		/*
+		 * when the old and new regions overlap clear from new_end.
+		 */
+		free_pgd_range(&tlb, new_end, old_end, new_end,
+			next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * otherwise, clean from old_start; this is done to not touch
+		 * the address space in [new_end, old_start) some architectures
+		 * have constraints on va-space that make this illegal (IA64) -
+		 * for the others its just a little faster.
+		 */
+		free_pgd_range(&tlb, old_start, old_end, new_end,
+			next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING);
+	}
+	tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
+
+	/*
+	 * Shrink the vma to just the new range.  Always succeeds.
+	 */
+	vma_adjust(vma, new_start, new_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalizes the stack vm_area_struct. The flags and permissions are updated,
+ * the stack is optionally relocated, and some extra space is added.
+ */
+int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+		    unsigned long stack_top,
+		    int executable_stack)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	unsigned long stack_shift;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
+	struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
+	unsigned long vm_flags;
+	unsigned long stack_base;
+	unsigned long stack_size;
+	unsigned long stack_expand;
+	unsigned long rlim_stack;
+	struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+	/* Limit stack size */
+	stack_base = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_max;
+
+	stack_base = calc_max_stack_size(stack_base);
+
+	/* Add space for stack randomization. */
+	stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
+	if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base);
+
+	stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base;
+	mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift;
+	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift;
+#else
+	stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top);
+	stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top);
+
+	if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) ||
+	    unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top;
+
+	bprm->p -= stack_shift;
+	mm->arg_start = bprm->p;
+#endif
+
+	if (bprm->loader)
+		bprm->loader -= stack_shift;
+	bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
+
+	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
+	 * EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone
+	 * (arch default) otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X))
+		vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
+	else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
+		vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
+	vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
+	vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
+
+	tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+	ret = mprotect_fixup(&tlb, vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
+			vm_flags);
+	tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	BUG_ON(prev != vma);
+
+	if (unlikely(vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+		pr_warn_once("process '%pD4' started with executable stack\n",
+			     bprm->file);
+	}
+
+	/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
+	if (stack_shift) {
+		ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* mprotect_fixup is overkill to remove the temporary stack flags */
+	vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
+
+	stack_expand = 131072UL; /* randomly 32*4k (or 2*64k) pages */
+	stack_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+	/*
+	 * Align this down to a page boundary as expand_stack
+	 * will align it up.
+	 */
+	rlim_stack = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur & PAGE_MASK;
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+	if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
+		stack_base = vma->vm_start + rlim_stack;
+	else
+		stack_base = vma->vm_end + stack_expand;
+#else
+	if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
+		stack_base = vma->vm_end - rlim_stack;
+	else
+		stack_base = vma->vm_start - stack_expand;
+#endif
+	current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
+	ret = expand_stack_locked(vma, stack_base);
+	if (ret)
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+out_unlock:
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages);
+
+#else
+
+/*
+ * Transfer the program arguments and environment from the holding pages
+ * onto the stack. The provided stack pointer is adjusted accordingly.
+ */
+int transfer_args_to_stack(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   unsigned long *sp_location)
+{
+	unsigned long index, stop, sp;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	stop = bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	sp = *sp_location;
+
+	for (index = MAX_ARG_PAGES - 1; index >= stop; index--) {
+		unsigned int offset = index == stop ? bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK : 0;
+		char *src = kmap_local_page(bprm->page[index]) + offset;
+		sp -= PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+		if (copy_to_user((void *) sp, src, PAGE_SIZE - offset) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+		kunmap_local(src);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	*sp_location = sp;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(transfer_args_to_stack);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
+
+static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int err;
+	struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
+		.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
+		.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
+		.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
+		.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
+	};
+
+	if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+		open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+	if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+		open_exec_flags.lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+
+	file = do_filp_open(fd, name, &open_exec_flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
+	 * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
+	 * and check again at the very end too.
+	 */
+	err = -EACCES;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
+			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
+		goto exit;
+
+	err = deny_write_access(file);
+	if (err)
+		goto exit;
+
+	if (name->name[0] != '\0')
+		fsnotify_open(file);
+
+out:
+	return file;
+
+exit:
+	fput(file);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
+{
+	struct filename *filename = getname_kernel(name);
+	struct file *f = ERR_CAST(filename);
+
+	if (!IS_ERR(filename)) {
+		f = do_open_execat(AT_FDCWD, filename, 0);
+		putname(filename);
+	}
+	return f;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC)
+ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
+	if (res > 0)
+		flush_icache_user_range(addr, addr + len);
+	return res;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct.
+ * On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock
+ * held for writing.
+ */
+static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
+	tsk = current;
+	old_mm = current->mm;
+	exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
+	if (old_mm)
+		sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
+
+	ret = down_write_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (old_mm) {
+		/*
+		 * If there is a pending fatal signal perhaps a signal
+		 * whose default action is to create a coredump get
+		 * out and die instead of going through with the exec.
+		 */
+		ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm);
+		if (ret) {
+			up_write(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	task_lock(tsk);
+	membarrier_exec_mmap(mm);
+
+	local_irq_disable();
+	active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
+	tsk->active_mm = mm;
+	tsk->mm = mm;
+	/*
+	 * This prevents preemption while active_mm is being loaded and
+	 * it and mm are being updated, which could cause problems for
+	 * lazy tlb mm refcounting when these are updated by context
+	 * switches. Not all architectures can handle irqs off over
+	 * activate_mm yet.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM))
+		local_irq_enable();
+	activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM))
+		local_irq_enable();
+	lru_gen_add_mm(mm);
+	task_unlock(tsk);
+	lru_gen_use_mm(mm);
+	if (old_mm) {
+		mmap_read_unlock(old_mm);
+		BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
+		setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
+		mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
+		mmput(old_mm);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	mmdrop(active_mm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
+	struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
+	spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
+
+	if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
+		goto no_thread_group;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill all other threads in the thread group.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irq(lock);
+	if ((sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) || sig->group_exec_task) {
+		/*
+		 * Another group action in progress, just
+		 * return so that the signal is processed.
+		 */
+		spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+
+	sig->group_exec_task = tsk;
+	sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk);
+	if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
+		sig->notify_count--;
+
+	while (sig->notify_count) {
+		__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
+		spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+		schedule();
+		if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk))
+			goto killed;
+		spin_lock_irq(lock);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to
+	 * do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive,
+	 * and to assume its PID:
+	 */
+	if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
+		struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader;
+
+		for (;;) {
+			cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
+			write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+			/*
+			 * Do this under tasklist_lock to ensure that
+			 * exit_notify() can't miss ->group_exec_task
+			 */
+			sig->notify_count = -1;
+			if (likely(leader->exit_state))
+				break;
+			__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
+			write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+			cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
+			schedule();
+			if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk))
+				goto killed;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The only record we have of the real-time age of a
+		 * process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time.
+		 * All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct
+		 * from sister threads now dead.  But in this non-leader
+		 * exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread,
+		 * whose birth marks the true age of this process now.
+		 * When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we
+		 * also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
+		 */
+		tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
+		tsk->start_boottime = leader->start_boottime;
+
+		BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
+		/*
+		 * An exec() starts a new thread group with the
+		 * TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
+		 * two threads with a switched PID, and release
+		 * the former thread group leader:
+		 */
+
+		/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
+		 * The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
+		 */
+		exchange_tids(tsk, leader);
+		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID);
+		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
+		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
+
+		list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks);
+		list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling);
+
+		tsk->group_leader = tsk;
+		leader->group_leader = tsk;
+
+		tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
+		leader->exit_signal = -1;
+
+		BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE);
+		leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently,
+		 * the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees
+		 * the tracer won't block again waiting for this thread.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(leader->ptrace))
+			__wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent);
+		write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+		cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
+
+		release_task(leader);
+	}
+
+	sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
+	sig->notify_count = 0;
+
+no_thread_group:
+	/* we have changed execution domain */
+	tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
+
+	BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk));
+	return 0;
+
+killed:
+	/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
+	sig->notify_count = 0;
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+	return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
+ * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
+ * disturbing other processes.  (Other processes might share the signal
+ * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
+ */
+static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me)
+{
+	struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand;
+
+	if (refcount_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
+		struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
+		/*
+		 * This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
+		 * but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one.
+		 */
+		newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newsighand)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		refcount_set(&newsighand->count, 1);
+
+		write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+		spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock);
+		memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action,
+		       sizeof(newsighand->action));
+		rcu_assign_pointer(me->sighand, newsighand);
+		spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock);
+		write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+		__cleanup_sighand(oldsighand);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char *__get_task_comm(char *buf, size_t buf_size, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	task_lock(tsk);
+	/* Always NUL terminated and zero-padded */
+	strscpy_pad(buf, tsk->comm, buf_size);
+	task_unlock(tsk);
+	return buf;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__get_task_comm);
+
+/*
+ * These functions flushes out all traces of the currently running executable
+ * so that a new one can be started
+ */
+
+void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec)
+{
+	task_lock(tsk);
+	trace_task_rename(tsk, buf);
+	strscpy_pad(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
+	task_unlock(tsk);
+	perf_event_comm(tsk, exec);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
+ * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
+ * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
+ * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
+ */
+int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
+{
+	struct task_struct *me = current;
+	int retval;
+
+	/* Once we are committed compute the creds */
+	retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
+	 */
+	bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
+	 */
+	retval = de_thread(me);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
+	 */
+	io_uring_task_cancel();
+
+	/* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
+	retval = unshare_files();
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
+	 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
+	 * to be lockless.
+	 */
+	retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
+	would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+	if (bprm->have_execfd)
+		would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
+
+	/*
+	 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
+	 */
+	acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
+	retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	bprm->mm = NULL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
+	spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
+	posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
+	exit_itimers(me);
+	flush_itimer_signals();
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Make the signal table private.
+	 */
+	retval = unshare_sighand(me);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
+					PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
+	flush_thread();
+	me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
+
+	clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
+
+	/*
+	 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
+	 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
+	 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
+	 * undergoing exec(2).
+	 */
+	do_close_on_exec(me->files);
+
+	if (bprm->secureexec) {
+		/* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
+		me->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
+		 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
+		 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
+		 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
+		 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+		 */
+		if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
+			bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
+	}
+
+	me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+	 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+	 * bprm->secureexec instead.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+	    !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+	      gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+	else
+		set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
+	perf_event_exec();
+	__set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
+
+	/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
+	   group */
+	WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
+	flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
+
+	retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * install the new credentials for this executable
+	 */
+	security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+
+	commit_creds(bprm->cred);
+	bprm->cred = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable monitoring for regular users
+	 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
+	 * wait until new credentials are committed
+	 * by commit_creds() above
+	 */
+	if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+		perf_event_exit_task(me);
+	/*
+	 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
+	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
+	 */
+	security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+
+	/* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
+	if (bprm->have_execfd) {
+		retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
+		if (retval < 0)
+			goto out_unlock;
+		fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
+		bprm->executable = NULL;
+		bprm->execfd = retval;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_unlock:
+	up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
+	if (!bprm->cred)
+		mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+out:
+	return retval;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
+
+void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file);
+	if (inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_READ) < 0) {
+		struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns;
+		bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
+
+		/* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */
+		user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns;
+		while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
+		       !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, mnt_userns, inode))
+			user_ns = user_ns->parent;
+
+		if (old != user_ns) {
+			bprm->mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+			put_user_ns(old);
+		}
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
+
+void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
+{
+	/* Setup things that can depend upon the personality */
+	struct task_struct *me = current;
+
+	arch_pick_mmap_layout(me->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack);
+
+	arch_setup_new_exec();
+
+	/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
+	 * depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
+	 * some architectures like powerpc
+	 */
+	me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+	up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
+
+/* Runs immediately before start_thread() takes over. */
+void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* Store any stack rlimit changes before starting thread. */
+	task_lock(current->group_leader);
+	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK] = bprm->rlim_stack;
+	task_unlock(current->group_leader);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
+
+/*
+ * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
+ * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
+ * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred
+ * and unlock.
+ */
+static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+
+	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
+	if (likely(bprm->cred))
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	if (bprm->mm) {
+		acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
+		mmput(bprm->mm);
+	}
+	free_arg_pages(bprm);
+	if (bprm->cred) {
+		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+		abort_creds(bprm->cred);
+	}
+	if (bprm->file) {
+		allow_write_access(bprm->file);
+		fput(bprm->file);
+	}
+	if (bprm->executable)
+		fput(bprm->executable);
+	/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */
+	if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
+		kfree(bprm->interp);
+	kfree(bprm->fdpath);
+	kfree(bprm);
+}
+
+static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename)
+{
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	int retval = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!bprm)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') {
+		bprm->filename = filename->name;
+	} else {
+		if (filename->name[0] == '\0')
+			bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d", fd);
+		else
+			bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d/%s",
+						  fd, filename->name);
+		if (!bprm->fdpath)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		bprm->filename = bprm->fdpath;
+	}
+	bprm->interp = bprm->filename;
+
+	retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out_free;
+	return bprm;
+
+out_free:
+	free_bprm(bprm);
+out:
+	return ERR_PTR(retval);
+}
+
+int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */
+	if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
+		kfree(bprm->interp);
+	bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!bprm->interp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
+
+/*
+ * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
+ * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
+ *   PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
+ */
+static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
+	unsigned n_fs;
+
+	if (p->ptrace)
+		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
+
+	/*
+	 * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to
+	 * mess up.
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
+		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
+
+	t = p;
+	n_fs = 1;
+	spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	while_each_thread(p, t) {
+		if (t->fs == p->fs)
+			n_fs++;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (p->fs->users > n_fs)
+		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
+	else
+		p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
+}
+
+static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+{
+	/* Handle suid and sgid on files */
+	struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	unsigned int mode;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
+		return;
+
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
+		return;
+
+	mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode);
+	if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))
+		return;
+
+	mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file);
+
+	/* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */
+	inode_lock(inode);
+
+	/* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */
+	mode = inode->i_mode;
+	uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+	gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+	inode_unlock(inode);
+
+	/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||
+		 !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))
+		return;
+
+	if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->cred->euid = uid;
+	}
+
+	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->cred->egid = gid;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary.
+ */
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* Compute creds based on which file? */
+	struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file;
+
+	bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file);
+	return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
+ * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes
+ *
+ * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).
+ */
+static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	loff_t pos = 0;
+
+	memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
+	return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p
+ * points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after
+ * the first '\0' encountered.
+ */
+int remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long offset;
+	char *kaddr;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (!bprm->argc)
+		return 0;
+
+	do {
+		offset = bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		page = get_arg_page(bprm, bprm->p, 0);
+		if (!page) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		kaddr = kmap_local_page(page);
+
+		for (; offset < PAGE_SIZE && kaddr[offset];
+				offset++, bprm->p++)
+			;
+
+		kunmap_local(kaddr);
+		put_arg_page(page);
+	} while (offset == PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	bprm->p++;
+	bprm->argc--;
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
+
+#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
+/*
+ * cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
+ */
+static int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
+	struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		return retval;
+
+	retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	retval = -ENOENT;
+ retry:
+	read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
+		if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
+			continue;
+		read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+
+		retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
+
+		read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+		put_binfmt(fmt);
+		if (bprm->point_of_no_return || (retval != -ENOEXEC)) {
+			read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+			return retval;
+		}
+	}
+	read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+
+	if (need_retry) {
+		if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
+		    printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
+			return retval;
+		if (request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2)) < 0)
+			return retval;
+		need_retry = false;
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
+	int ret, depth;
+
+	/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
+	old_pid = current->pid;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
+	for (depth = 0;; depth++) {
+		struct file *exec;
+		if (depth > 5)
+			return -ELOOP;
+
+		ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		if (!bprm->interpreter)
+			break;
+
+		exec = bprm->file;
+		bprm->file = bprm->interpreter;
+		bprm->interpreter = NULL;
+
+		allow_write_access(exec);
+		if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) {
+			if (bprm->executable) {
+				fput(exec);
+				return -ENOEXEC;
+			}
+			bprm->executable = exec;
+		} else
+			fput(exec);
+	}
+
+	audit_bprm(bprm);
+	trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
+	ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
+	proc_exec_connector(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_execve() executes a new program.
+ */
+static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+		       int fd, struct filename *filename, int flags)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = prepare_bprm_creds(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
+	current->in_execve = 1;
+
+	file = do_open_execat(fd, filename, flags);
+	retval = PTR_ERR(file);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		goto out_unmark;
+
+	sched_exec();
+
+	bprm->file = file;
+	/*
+	 * Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be
+	 * inaccessible after exec.  This allows the code in exec to
+	 * choose to fail when the executable is not mmaped into the
+	 * interpreter and an open file descriptor is not passed to
+	 * the interpreter.  This makes for a better user experience
+	 * than having the interpreter start and then immediately fail
+	 * when it finds the executable is inaccessible.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->fdpath && get_close_on_exec(fd))
+		bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE;
+
+	/* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */
+	retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* execve succeeded */
+	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+	current->in_execve = 0;
+	rseq_execve(current);
+	acct_update_integrals(current);
+	task_numa_free(current, false);
+	return retval;
+
+out:
+	/*
+	 * If past the point of no return ensure the code never
+	 * returns to the userspace process.  Use an existing fatal
+	 * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with
+	 * SIGSEGV.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current))
+		force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
+
+out_unmark:
+	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+	current->in_execve = 0;
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+			      struct user_arg_ptr argv,
+			      struct user_arg_ptr envp,
+			      int flags)
+{
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+	int retval;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(filename))
+		return PTR_ERR(filename);
+
+	/*
+	 * We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from
+	 * set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs
+	 * don't check setuid() return code.  Here we additionally recheck
+	 * whether NPROC limit is still exceeded.
+	 */
+	if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
+	    is_rlimit_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
+		retval = -EAGAIN;
+		goto out_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* We're below the limit (still or again), so we don't want to make
+	 * further execve() calls fail. */
+	current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
+
+	bprm = alloc_bprm(fd, filename);
+	if (IS_ERR(bprm)) {
+		retval = PTR_ERR(bprm);
+		goto out_ret;
+	}
+
+	retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
+	if (retval == 0)
+		pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n",
+			     current->comm, bprm->filename);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->argc = retval;
+
+	retval = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->envc = retval;
+
+	retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->exec = bprm->p;
+
+	retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/*
+	 * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to
+	 * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing
+	 * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also
+	 * bprm_stack_limits().
+	 */
+	if (bprm->argc == 0) {
+		retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm);
+		if (retval < 0)
+			goto out_free;
+		bprm->argc = 1;
+	}
+
+	retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags);
+out_free:
+	free_bprm(bprm);
+
+out_ret:
+	putname(filename);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename,
+		  const char *const *argv, const char *const *envp)
+{
+	struct filename *filename;
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+	int fd = AT_FDCWD;
+	int retval;
+
+	/* It is non-sense for kernel threads to call execve */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	filename = getname_kernel(kernel_filename);
+	if (IS_ERR(filename))
+		return PTR_ERR(filename);
+
+	bprm = alloc_bprm(fd, filename);
+	if (IS_ERR(bprm)) {
+		retval = PTR_ERR(bprm);
+		goto out_ret;
+	}
+
+	retval = count_strings_kernel(argv);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0))
+		retval = -EINVAL;
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->argc = retval;
+
+	retval = count_strings_kernel(envp);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->envc = retval;
+
+	retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+	bprm->exec = bprm->p;
+
+	retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->envc, envp, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, 0);
+out_free:
+	free_bprm(bprm);
+out_ret:
+	putname(filename);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int do_execve(struct filename *filename,
+	const char __user *const __user *__argv,
+	const char __user *const __user *__envp)
+{
+	struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
+	struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
+	return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0);
+}
+
+static int do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+		const char __user *const __user *__argv,
+		const char __user *const __user *__envp,
+		int flags)
+{
+	struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
+	struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
+
+	return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static int compat_do_execve(struct filename *filename,
+	const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv,
+	const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp)
+{
+	struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
+		.is_compat = true,
+		.ptr.compat = __argv,
+	};
+	struct user_arg_ptr envp = {
+		.is_compat = true,
+		.ptr.compat = __envp,
+	};
+	return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0);
+}
+
+static int compat_do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+			      const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv,
+			      const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp,
+			      int flags)
+{
+	struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
+		.is_compat = true,
+		.ptr.compat = __argv,
+	};
+	struct user_arg_ptr envp = {
+		.is_compat = true,
+		.ptr.compat = __envp,
+	};
+	return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+
+	if (mm->binfmt)
+		module_put(mm->binfmt->module);
+
+	mm->binfmt = new;
+	if (new)
+		__module_get(new->module);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
+
+/*
+ * set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags.
+ */
+void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT))
+		return;
+
+	set_mask_bits(&mm->flags, MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK, value);
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve,
+		const char __user *, filename,
+		const char __user *const __user *, argv,
+		const char __user *const __user *, envp)
+{
+	return do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp);
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat,
+		int, fd, const char __user *, filename,
+		const char __user *const __user *, argv,
+		const char __user *const __user *, envp,
+		int, flags)
+{
+	return do_execveat(fd,
+			   getname_uflags(filename, flags),
+			   argv, envp, flags);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename,
+	const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv,
+	const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp)
+{
+	return compat_do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp);
+}
+
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd,
+		       const char __user *, filename,
+		       const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv,
+		       const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp,
+		       int,  flags)
+{
+	return compat_do_execveat(fd,
+				  getname_uflags(filename, flags),
+				  argv, envp, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int error = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+	if (!error)
+		validate_coredump_safety();
+	return error;
+}
+
+static struct ctl_table fs_exec_sysctls[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "suid_dumpable",
+		.data		= &suid_dumpable,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump,
+		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2		= SYSCTL_TWO,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static int __init init_fs_exec_sysctls(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("fs", fs_exec_sysctls);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(init_fs_exec_sysctls);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */