Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1118 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..20f742b55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1118 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2022 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+
+#include "ieee80211_i.h"
+#include "michael.h"
+#include "tkip.h"
+#include "aes_ccm.h"
+#include "aes_cmac.h"
+#include "aes_gmac.h"
+#include "aes_gcm.h"
+#include "wpa.h"
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	u8 *data, *key, *mic;
+	size_t data_len;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int tail;
+
+	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
+	    skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (skb->len < hdrlen)
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
+		/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
+		info->control.hw_key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
+	     ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
+	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+				     IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) {
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
+	if (!info->control.hw_key)
+		tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
+		 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
+		 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
+		 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+
+	if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) {
+		/* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */
+		memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
+	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
+	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
+		mic[0]++;
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	u8 *data, *key = NULL;
+	size_t data_len;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	/*
+	 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
+	 * than data frames.
+	 */
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
+	 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
+	 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
+	 * MIC failure report.
+	 */
+	if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
+			goto mic_fail_no_key;
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
+		    rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
+			goto update_iv;
+
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
+	 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
+	 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
+	 */
+	if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
+	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
+		/*
+		 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
+		 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
+		 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
+		 * frames in the BSS.
+		 */
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
+		goto mic_fail;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
+	key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
+	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
+	if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
+		goto mic_fail;
+
+	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+
+update_iv:
+	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+mic_fail:
+	rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
+
+mic_fail_no_key:
+	/*
+	 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
+	 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
+	 * the key is set.
+	 */
+	cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
+				     is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
+				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
+				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
+				     rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
+				     NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+}
+
+static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	int len, tail;
+	u64 pn;
+	u8 *pos;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Increase IV for the frame */
+	pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+	pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Add room for ICV */
+	skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx,
+					   key, skb, pos, len);
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
+	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	/*
+	 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
+	 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
+	 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
+	 */
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
+		hwaccel = 1;
+
+	res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx,
+					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
+					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
+					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
+					  &rx->tkip.iv32,
+					  &rx->tkip.iv16);
+	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	/* Trim ICV */
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
+		skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	/* Remove IV */
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate AAD for CCMP/GCMP, returning qos_tid since we
+ * need that in CCMP also for b_0.
+ */
+static u8 ccmp_gcmp_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+	__le16 mask_fc;
+	int a4_included, mgmt;
+	u8 qos_tid;
+	u16 len_a = 22;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
+	 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData, Order (if Qos Data); set Protected
+	 */
+	mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
+	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
+	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
+				IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
+	if (!mgmt)
+		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
+	mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
+
+	a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (a4_included)
+		len_a += 6;
+
+	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) {
+		qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
+		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_ORDER);
+		len_a += 2;
+	} else {
+		qos_tid = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
+	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
+	put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
+	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
+	memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+
+	/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
+	aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
+	aad[23] = 0;
+
+	if (a4_included) {
+		memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
+		aad[30] = qos_tid;
+		aad[31] = 0;
+	} else {
+		memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
+		aad[24] = qos_tid;
+	}
+
+	return qos_tid;
+}
+
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	u8 qos_tid = ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+	 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+	 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+	 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+	 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+	 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+	 */
+	b_0[0] = 0x1;
+
+	/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
+	 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
+	 */
+	b_0[1] = qos_tid | (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) << 4);
+	memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+}
+
+static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
+{
+	hdr[0] = pn[5];
+	hdr[1] = pn[4];
+	hdr[2] = 0;
+	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
+	hdr[4] = pn[3];
+	hdr[5] = pn[2];
+	hdr[6] = pn[1];
+	hdr[7] = pn[0];
+}
+
+
+static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
+{
+	pn[0] = hdr[7];
+	pn[1] = hdr[6];
+	pn[2] = hdr[5];
+	pn[3] = hdr[4];
+	pn[4] = hdr[1];
+	pn[5] = hdr[0];
+}
+
+
+static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			    unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int hdrlen, len, tail;
+	u8 *pos;
+	u8 pn[6];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
+	u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
+	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
+	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
+		/*
+		 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
+		 * header or MIC fields
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = mic_len;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	pn[5] = pn64;
+	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+
+	ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+	return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+					 skb_put(skb, mic_len));
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
+			      unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
+			      unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+	int data_len;
+	int queue;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
+	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
+			mic_len = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
+	hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
+
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
+	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
+		int res;
+
+		ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+
+		queue = rx->security_idx;
+
+		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
+			     IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (res < 0 ||
+		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
+			key->u.ccmp.replays++;
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+			ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+
+			if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+				    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
+				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
+				    data_len,
+				    skb->data + skb->len - mic_len))
+				return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	}
+
+	/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
+	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+	j_0[13] = 0;
+	j_0[14] = 0;
+	j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
+
+	ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad);
+}
+
+static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
+{
+	hdr[0] = pn[5];
+	hdr[1] = pn[4];
+	hdr[2] = 0;
+	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
+	hdr[4] = pn[3];
+	hdr[5] = pn[2];
+	hdr[6] = pn[1];
+	hdr[7] = pn[0];
+}
+
+static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
+{
+	pn[0] = hdr[7];
+	pn[1] = hdr[6];
+	pn[2] = hdr[5];
+	pn[3] = hdr[4];
+	pn[4] = hdr[1];
+	pn[5] = hdr[0];
+}
+
+static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int hdrlen, len, tail;
+	u8 *pos;
+	u8 pn[6];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
+	u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
+	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
+	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
+		/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
+		 * header or MIC fields
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
+				    IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	pn[5] = pn64;
+	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+
+	gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
+	gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
+	return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
+					 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
+	int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
+	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
+			mic_len = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
+	hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
+
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
+	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
+		int res;
+
+		gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+
+		queue = rx->security_idx;
+
+		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
+			     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (res < 0 ||
+		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
+			key->u.gcmp.replays++;
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+			gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
+
+			if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
+				    key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
+				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
+				    data_len,
+				    skb->data + skb->len -
+				    IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
+				return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	}
+
+	/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
+	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
+{
+	__le16 mask_fc;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+
+	/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
+
+	/* FC type/subtype */
+	/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
+	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
+	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
+				IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
+	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
+	/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
+	memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+}
+
+
+static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
+{
+	*d++ = pn;
+	*d++ = pn >> 8;
+	*d++ = pn >> 16;
+	*d++ = pn >> 24;
+	*d++ = pn >> 32;
+	*d = pn >> 40;
+}
+
+static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
+{
+	*d++ = s[5];
+	*d++ = s[4];
+	*d++ = s[3];
+	*d++ = s[2];
+	*d++ = s[1];
+	*d = s[0];
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
+	u8 aad[20];
+	u64 pn64;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
+
+	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE))
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
+	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
+	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
+	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* PN = PN + 1 */
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	/*
+	 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
+	 */
+	ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
+			   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	u8 aad[20];
+	u64 pn64;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
+
+	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
+	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
+	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
+	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* PN = PN + 1 */
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
+
+	bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	/* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
+	 */
+	ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
+			       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
+	u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* management frames are already linear */
+
+	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
+		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
+	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
+
+	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
+		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+		bip_aad(skb, aad);
+		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
+				   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
+		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
+			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
+
+	/* Remove MMIE */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* management frames are already linear */
+
+	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
+		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
+	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
+
+	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
+		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+		bip_aad(skb, aad);
+		ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
+				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
+		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
+			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
+
+	/* Remove MMIE */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
+
+	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
+	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
+	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
+	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* PN = PN + 1 */
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
+
+	bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
+	if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
+			       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* management frames are already linear */
+
+	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
+		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
+	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
+
+	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
+		key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+		bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+		memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+		memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
+
+		mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!mic)
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
+				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
+				       mic) < 0 ||
+		    crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
+			key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
+			kfree(mic);
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		}
+		kfree(mic);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
+
+	/* Remove MMIE */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}