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-rw-r--r--modules/aaa/mod_auth_digest.c1983
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diff --git a/modules/aaa/mod_auth_digest.c b/modules/aaa/mod_auth_digest.c
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+++ b/modules/aaa/mod_auth_digest.c
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+/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * mod_auth_digest: MD5 digest authentication
+ *
+ * Originally by Alexei Kosut <akosut@nueva.pvt.k12.ca.us>
+ * Updated to RFC-2617 by Ronald Tschal�r <ronald@innovation.ch>
+ * based on mod_auth, by Rob McCool and Robert S. Thau
+ *
+ * This module an updated version of modules/standard/mod_digest.c
+ * It is still fairly new and problems may turn up - submit problem
+ * reports to the Apache bug-database, or send them directly to me
+ * at ronald@innovation.ch.
+ *
+ * Open Issues:
+ * - qop=auth-int (when streams and trailer support available)
+ * - nonce-format configurability
+ * - Proxy-Authorization-Info header is set by this module, but is
+ * currently ignored by mod_proxy (needs patch to mod_proxy)
+ * - The source of the secret should be run-time directive (with server
+ * scope: RSRC_CONF)
+ * - shared-mem not completely tested yet. Seems to work ok for me,
+ * but... (definitely won't work on Windoze)
+ * - Sharing a realm among multiple servers has following problems:
+ * o Server name and port can't be included in nonce-hash
+ * (we need two nonce formats, which must be configured explicitly)
+ * o Nonce-count check can't be for equal, or then nonce-count checking
+ * must be disabled. What we could do is the following:
+ * (expected < received) ? set expected = received : issue error
+ * The only problem is that it allows replay attacks when somebody
+ * captures a packet sent to one server and sends it to another
+ * one. Should we add "AuthDigestNcCheck Strict"?
+ * - expired nonces give amaya fits.
+ * - MD5-sess and auth-int are not yet implemented. An incomplete
+ * implementation has been removed and can be retrieved from svn history.
+ */
+
+#include "apr_sha1.h"
+#include "apr_base64.h"
+#include "apr_lib.h"
+#include "apr_time.h"
+#include "apr_errno.h"
+#include "apr_global_mutex.h"
+#include "apr_strings.h"
+
+#define APR_WANT_STRFUNC
+#include "apr_want.h"
+
+#include "ap_config.h"
+#include "httpd.h"
+#include "http_config.h"
+#include "http_core.h"
+#include "http_request.h"
+#include "http_log.h"
+#include "http_protocol.h"
+#include "apr_uri.h"
+#include "util_md5.h"
+#include "util_mutex.h"
+#include "apr_shm.h"
+#include "apr_rmm.h"
+#include "ap_provider.h"
+
+#include "mod_auth.h"
+
+#if APR_HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/* struct to hold the configuration info */
+
+typedef struct digest_config_struct {
+ const char *dir_name;
+ authn_provider_list *providers;
+ const char *realm;
+ apr_array_header_t *qop_list;
+ apr_sha1_ctx_t nonce_ctx;
+ apr_time_t nonce_lifetime;
+ int check_nc;
+ const char *algorithm;
+ char *uri_list;
+} digest_config_rec;
+
+
+#define DFLT_ALGORITHM "MD5"
+
+#define DFLT_NONCE_LIFE apr_time_from_sec(300)
+#define NEXTNONCE_DELTA apr_time_from_sec(30)
+
+
+#define NONCE_TIME_LEN (((sizeof(apr_time_t)+2)/3)*4)
+#define NONCE_HASH_LEN (2*APR_SHA1_DIGESTSIZE)
+#define NONCE_LEN (int )(NONCE_TIME_LEN + NONCE_HASH_LEN)
+
+#define SECRET_LEN 20
+#define RETAINED_DATA_ID "mod_auth_digest"
+
+
+/* client list definitions */
+
+typedef struct hash_entry {
+ unsigned long key; /* the key for this entry */
+ struct hash_entry *next; /* next entry in the bucket */
+ unsigned long nonce_count; /* for nonce-count checking */
+ char last_nonce[NONCE_LEN+1]; /* for one-time nonce's */
+} client_entry;
+
+static struct hash_table {
+ client_entry **table;
+ unsigned long tbl_len;
+ unsigned long num_entries;
+ unsigned long num_created;
+ unsigned long num_removed;
+ unsigned long num_renewed;
+} *client_list;
+
+
+/* struct to hold a parsed Authorization header */
+
+enum hdr_sts { NO_HEADER, NOT_DIGEST, INVALID, VALID };
+
+typedef struct digest_header_struct {
+ const char *scheme;
+ const char *realm;
+ const char *username;
+ char *nonce;
+ const char *uri;
+ const char *method;
+ const char *digest;
+ const char *algorithm;
+ const char *cnonce;
+ const char *opaque;
+ unsigned long opaque_num;
+ const char *message_qop;
+ const char *nonce_count;
+ /* the following fields are not (directly) from the header */
+ const char *raw_request_uri;
+ apr_uri_t *psd_request_uri;
+ apr_time_t nonce_time;
+ enum hdr_sts auth_hdr_sts;
+ int needed_auth;
+ const char *ha1;
+ client_entry *client;
+} digest_header_rec;
+
+
+/* (mostly) nonce stuff */
+
+typedef union time_union {
+ apr_time_t time;
+ unsigned char arr[sizeof(apr_time_t)];
+} time_rec;
+
+static unsigned char *secret;
+
+/* client-list, opaque, and one-time-nonce stuff */
+
+static apr_shm_t *client_shm = NULL;
+static apr_rmm_t *client_rmm = NULL;
+static unsigned long *opaque_cntr;
+static apr_time_t *otn_counter; /* one-time-nonce counter */
+static apr_global_mutex_t *client_lock = NULL;
+static apr_global_mutex_t *opaque_lock = NULL;
+static const char *client_mutex_type = "authdigest-client";
+static const char *opaque_mutex_type = "authdigest-opaque";
+static const char *client_shm_filename;
+
+#define DEF_SHMEM_SIZE 1000L /* ~ 12 entries */
+#define DEF_NUM_BUCKETS 15L
+#define HASH_DEPTH 5
+
+static apr_size_t shmem_size = DEF_SHMEM_SIZE;
+static unsigned long num_buckets = DEF_NUM_BUCKETS;
+
+
+module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA auth_digest_module;
+
+/*
+ * initialization code
+ */
+
+static apr_status_t cleanup_tables(void *not_used)
+{
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, NULL, APLOGNO(01756)
+ "cleaning up shared memory");
+
+ if (client_rmm) {
+ apr_rmm_destroy(client_rmm);
+ client_rmm = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (client_shm) {
+ apr_shm_destroy(client_shm);
+ client_shm = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (client_lock) {
+ apr_global_mutex_destroy(client_lock);
+ client_lock = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (opaque_lock) {
+ apr_global_mutex_destroy(opaque_lock);
+ opaque_lock = NULL;
+ }
+
+ client_list = NULL;
+
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static void log_error_and_cleanup(char *msg, apr_status_t sts, server_rec *s)
+{
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, sts, s, APLOGNO(01760)
+ "%s - all nonce-count checking and one-time nonces "
+ "disabled", msg);
+
+ cleanup_tables(NULL);
+}
+
+/* RMM helper functions that behave like single-step malloc/free. */
+
+static void *rmm_malloc(apr_rmm_t *rmm, apr_size_t size)
+{
+ apr_rmm_off_t offset = apr_rmm_malloc(rmm, size);
+
+ if (!offset) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return apr_rmm_addr_get(rmm, offset);
+}
+
+static apr_status_t rmm_free(apr_rmm_t *rmm, void *alloc)
+{
+ apr_rmm_off_t offset = apr_rmm_offset_get(rmm, alloc);
+
+ return apr_rmm_free(rmm, offset);
+}
+
+#if APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY
+
+static int initialize_tables(server_rec *s, apr_pool_t *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned long idx;
+ apr_status_t sts;
+
+ /* set up client list */
+
+ /* Create the shared memory segment */
+
+ client_shm = NULL;
+ client_rmm = NULL;
+ client_lock = NULL;
+ opaque_lock = NULL;
+ client_list = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a unique filename using our pid. This information is
+ * stashed in the global variable so the children inherit it.
+ */
+ client_shm_filename = ap_runtime_dir_relative(ctx, "authdigest_shm");
+ client_shm_filename = ap_append_pid(ctx, client_shm_filename, ".");
+
+ /* Use anonymous shm by default, fall back on name-based. */
+ sts = apr_shm_create(&client_shm, shmem_size, NULL, ctx);
+ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOTIMPL(sts)) {
+ /* For a name-based segment, remove it first in case of a
+ * previous unclean shutdown. */
+ apr_shm_remove(client_shm_filename, ctx);
+
+ /* Now create that segment */
+ sts = apr_shm_create(&client_shm, shmem_size,
+ client_shm_filename, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (APR_SUCCESS != sts) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, sts, s, APLOGNO(01762)
+ "Failed to create shared memory segment on file %s",
+ client_shm_filename);
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to initialize shm", sts, s);
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ sts = apr_rmm_init(&client_rmm,
+ NULL, /* no lock, we'll do the locking ourselves */
+ apr_shm_baseaddr_get(client_shm),
+ shmem_size, ctx);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to initialize rmm", sts, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ client_list = rmm_malloc(client_rmm, sizeof(*client_list) +
+ sizeof(client_entry *) * num_buckets);
+ if (!client_list) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to allocate shared memory", -1, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ client_list->table = (client_entry**) (client_list + 1);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < num_buckets; idx++) {
+ client_list->table[idx] = NULL;
+ }
+ client_list->tbl_len = num_buckets;
+ client_list->num_entries = 0;
+
+ sts = ap_global_mutex_create(&client_lock, NULL, client_mutex_type, NULL,
+ s, ctx, 0);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to create lock (client_lock)", sts, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+
+ /* setup opaque */
+
+ opaque_cntr = rmm_malloc(client_rmm, sizeof(*opaque_cntr));
+ if (opaque_cntr == NULL) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to allocate shared memory", -1, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ *opaque_cntr = 1UL;
+
+ sts = ap_global_mutex_create(&opaque_lock, NULL, opaque_mutex_type, NULL,
+ s, ctx, 0);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to create lock (opaque_lock)", sts, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+
+ /* setup one-time-nonce counter */
+
+ otn_counter = rmm_malloc(client_rmm, sizeof(*otn_counter));
+ if (otn_counter == NULL) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to allocate shared memory", -1, s);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ *otn_counter = 0;
+ /* no lock here */
+
+
+ /* success */
+ return OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY */
+
+static int pre_init(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp)
+{
+ apr_status_t rv;
+ void *retained;
+
+ rv = ap_mutex_register(pconf, client_mutex_type, NULL, APR_LOCK_DEFAULT, 0);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS)
+ return !OK;
+ rv = ap_mutex_register(pconf, opaque_mutex_type, NULL, APR_LOCK_DEFAULT, 0);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS)
+ return !OK;
+
+ retained = ap_retained_data_get(RETAINED_DATA_ID);
+ if (retained == NULL) {
+ retained = ap_retained_data_create(RETAINED_DATA_ID, SECRET_LEN);
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, APLOGNO(01757)
+ "generating secret for digest authentication");
+#if APR_HAS_RANDOM
+ rv = apr_generate_random_bytes(retained, SECRET_LEN);
+#else
+#error APR random number support is missing
+#endif
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, rv, NULL, APLOGNO(01758)
+ "error generating secret");
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ }
+ secret = retained;
+ return OK;
+}
+
+static int initialize_module(apr_pool_t *p, apr_pool_t *plog,
+ apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
+{
+ /* initialize_module() will be called twice, and if it's a DSO
+ * then all static data from the first call will be lost. Only
+ * set up our static data on the second call. */
+ if (ap_state_query(AP_SQ_MAIN_STATE) == AP_SQ_MS_CREATE_PRE_CONFIG)
+ return OK;
+
+#if APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY
+ /* Note: this stuff is currently fixed for the lifetime of the server,
+ * i.e. even across restarts. This means that A) any shmem-size
+ * configuration changes are ignored, and B) certain optimizations,
+ * such as only allocating the smallest necessary entry for each
+ * client, can't be done. However, the alternative is a nightmare:
+ * we can't call apr_shm_destroy on a graceful restart because there
+ * will be children using the tables, and we also don't know when the
+ * last child dies. Therefore we can never clean up the old stuff,
+ * creating a creeping memory leak.
+ */
+ if (initialize_tables(s, p) != OK) {
+ return !OK;
+ }
+#endif /* APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY */
+ return OK;
+}
+
+static void initialize_child(apr_pool_t *p, server_rec *s)
+{
+ apr_status_t sts;
+
+ if (!client_shm) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Get access to rmm in child */
+ sts = apr_rmm_attach(&client_rmm,
+ NULL,
+ apr_shm_baseaddr_get(client_shm),
+ p);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to attach to rmm", sts, s);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sts = apr_global_mutex_child_init(&client_lock,
+ apr_global_mutex_lockfile(client_lock),
+ p);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to create lock (client_lock)", sts, s);
+ return;
+ }
+ sts = apr_global_mutex_child_init(&opaque_lock,
+ apr_global_mutex_lockfile(opaque_lock),
+ p);
+ if (sts != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ log_error_and_cleanup("failed to create lock (opaque_lock)", sts, s);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * configuration code
+ */
+
+static void *create_digest_dir_config(apr_pool_t *p, char *dir)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *conf;
+
+ if (dir == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ conf = (digest_config_rec *) apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(digest_config_rec));
+ if (conf) {
+ conf->qop_list = apr_array_make(p, 2, sizeof(char *));
+ conf->nonce_lifetime = DFLT_NONCE_LIFE;
+ conf->dir_name = apr_pstrdup(p, dir);
+ conf->algorithm = DFLT_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ return conf;
+}
+
+static const char *set_realm(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config, const char *realm)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *conf = (digest_config_rec *) config;
+#ifdef AP_DEBUG
+ int i;
+
+ /* check that we got random numbers */
+ for (i = 0; i < SECRET_LEN; i++) {
+ if (secret[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ ap_assert(i < SECRET_LEN);
+#endif
+
+ /* The core already handles the realm, but it's just too convenient to
+ * grab it ourselves too and cache some setups. However, we need to
+ * let the core get at it too, which is why we decline at the end -
+ * this relies on the fact that http_core is last in the list.
+ */
+ conf->realm = realm;
+
+ /* we precompute the part of the nonce hash that is constant (well,
+ * the host:port would be too, but that varies for .htaccess files
+ * and directives outside a virtual host section)
+ */
+ apr_sha1_init(&conf->nonce_ctx);
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&conf->nonce_ctx, secret, SECRET_LEN);
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&conf->nonce_ctx, (const unsigned char *) realm,
+ strlen(realm));
+
+ return DECLINE_CMD;
+}
+
+static const char *add_authn_provider(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config,
+ const char *arg)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *conf = (digest_config_rec*)config;
+ authn_provider_list *newp;
+
+ newp = apr_pcalloc(cmd->pool, sizeof(authn_provider_list));
+ newp->provider_name = arg;
+
+ /* lookup and cache the actual provider now */
+ newp->provider = ap_lookup_provider(AUTHN_PROVIDER_GROUP,
+ newp->provider_name,
+ AUTHN_PROVIDER_VERSION);
+
+ if (newp->provider == NULL) {
+ /* by the time they use it, the provider should be loaded and
+ registered with us. */
+ return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool,
+ "Unknown Authn provider: %s",
+ newp->provider_name);
+ }
+
+ if (!newp->provider->get_realm_hash) {
+ /* if it doesn't provide the appropriate function, reject it */
+ return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool,
+ "The '%s' Authn provider doesn't support "
+ "Digest Authentication", newp->provider_name);
+ }
+
+ /* Add it to the list now. */
+ if (!conf->providers) {
+ conf->providers = newp;
+ }
+ else {
+ authn_provider_list *last = conf->providers;
+
+ while (last->next) {
+ last = last->next;
+ }
+ last->next = newp;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_qop(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config, const char *op)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *conf = (digest_config_rec *) config;
+
+ if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(op, "none")) {
+ apr_array_clear(conf->qop_list);
+ *(const char **)apr_array_push(conf->qop_list) = "none";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(op, "auth-int")) {
+ return "AuthDigestQop auth-int is not implemented";
+ }
+ else if (ap_cstr_casecmp(op, "auth")) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Unrecognized qop: ", op, NULL);
+ }
+
+ *(const char **)apr_array_push(conf->qop_list) = op;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_nonce_lifetime(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config,
+ const char *t)
+{
+ char *endptr;
+ long lifetime;
+
+ lifetime = strtol(t, &endptr, 10);
+ if (endptr < (t+strlen(t)) && !apr_isspace(*endptr)) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool,
+ "Invalid time in AuthDigestNonceLifetime: ",
+ t, NULL);
+ }
+
+ ((digest_config_rec *) config)->nonce_lifetime = apr_time_from_sec(lifetime);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_nonce_format(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config,
+ const char *fmt)
+{
+ return "AuthDigestNonceFormat is not implemented";
+}
+
+static const char *set_nc_check(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config, int flag)
+{
+#if !APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY
+ if (flag) {
+ return "AuthDigestNcCheck: ERROR: nonce-count checking "
+ "is not supported on platforms without shared-memory "
+ "support";
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ((digest_config_rec *) config)->check_nc = flag;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_algorithm(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config, const char *alg)
+{
+ if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(alg, "MD5-sess")) {
+ return "AuthDigestAlgorithm: ERROR: algorithm `MD5-sess' "
+ "is not implemented";
+ }
+ else if (ap_cstr_casecmp(alg, "MD5")) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid algorithm in AuthDigestAlgorithm: ", alg, NULL);
+ }
+
+ ((digest_config_rec *) config)->algorithm = alg;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_uri_list(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config, const char *uri)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *c = (digest_config_rec *) config;
+ if (c->uri_list) {
+ c->uri_list[strlen(c->uri_list)-1] = '\0';
+ c->uri_list = apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, c->uri_list, " ", uri, "\"", NULL);
+ }
+ else {
+ c->uri_list = apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, ", domain=\"", uri, "\"", NULL);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_shmem_size(cmd_parms *cmd, void *config,
+ const char *size_str)
+{
+ char *endptr;
+ long size, min;
+
+ size = strtol(size_str, &endptr, 10);
+ while (apr_isspace(*endptr)) endptr++;
+ if (*endptr == '\0' || *endptr == 'b' || *endptr == 'B') {
+ ;
+ }
+ else if (*endptr == 'k' || *endptr == 'K') {
+ size *= 1024;
+ }
+ else if (*endptr == 'm' || *endptr == 'M') {
+ size *= 1048576;
+ }
+ else {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid size in AuthDigestShmemSize: ",
+ size_str, NULL);
+ }
+
+ min = sizeof(*client_list) + sizeof(client_entry*) + sizeof(client_entry);
+ if (size < min) {
+ return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool, "size in AuthDigestShmemSize too small: "
+ "%ld < %ld", size, min);
+ }
+
+ shmem_size = size;
+ num_buckets = (size - sizeof(*client_list)) /
+ (sizeof(client_entry*) + HASH_DEPTH * sizeof(client_entry));
+ if (num_buckets == 0) {
+ num_buckets = 1;
+ }
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, cmd->server, APLOGNO(01763)
+ "Set shmem-size: %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT ", num-buckets: %ld",
+ shmem_size, num_buckets);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const command_rec digest_cmds[] =
+{
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("AuthName", set_realm, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "The authentication realm (e.g. \"Members Only\")"),
+ AP_INIT_ITERATE("AuthDigestProvider", add_authn_provider, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "specify the auth providers for a directory or location"),
+ AP_INIT_ITERATE("AuthDigestQop", set_qop, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "A list of quality-of-protection options"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("AuthDigestNonceLifetime", set_nonce_lifetime, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "Maximum lifetime of the server nonce (seconds)"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("AuthDigestNonceFormat", set_nonce_format, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "The format to use when generating the server nonce"),
+ AP_INIT_FLAG("AuthDigestNcCheck", set_nc_check, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "Whether or not to check the nonce-count sent by the client"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("AuthDigestAlgorithm", set_algorithm, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "The algorithm used for the hash calculation"),
+ AP_INIT_ITERATE("AuthDigestDomain", set_uri_list, NULL, OR_AUTHCFG,
+ "A list of URI's which belong to the same protection space as the current URI"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("AuthDigestShmemSize", set_shmem_size, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "The amount of shared memory to allocate for keeping track of clients"),
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * client list code
+ *
+ * Each client is assigned a number, which is transferred in the opaque
+ * field of the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization headers. The number
+ * is just a simple counter which is incremented for each new client.
+ * Clients can't forge this number because it is hashed up into the
+ * server nonce, and that is checked.
+ *
+ * The clients are kept in a simple hash table, which consists of an
+ * array of client_entry's, each with a linked list of entries hanging
+ * off it. The client's number modulo the size of the array gives the
+ * bucket number.
+ *
+ * The clients are garbage collected whenever a new client is allocated
+ * but there is not enough space left in the shared memory segment. A
+ * simple semi-LRU is used for this: whenever a client entry is accessed
+ * it is moved to the beginning of the linked list in its bucket (this
+ * also makes for faster lookups for current clients). The garbage
+ * collecter then just removes the oldest entry (i.e. the one at the
+ * end of the list) in each bucket.
+ *
+ * The main advantages of the above scheme are that it's easy to implement
+ * and it keeps the hash table evenly balanced (i.e. same number of entries
+ * in each bucket). The major disadvantage is that you may be throwing
+ * entries out which are in active use. This is not tragic, as these
+ * clients will just be sent a new client id (opaque field) and nonce
+ * with a stale=true (i.e. it will just look like the nonce expired,
+ * thereby forcing an extra round trip). If the shared memory segment
+ * has enough headroom over the current client set size then this should
+ * not occur too often.
+ *
+ * To help tune the size of the shared memory segment (and see if the
+ * above algorithm is really sufficient) a set of counters is kept
+ * indicating the number of clients held, the number of garbage collected
+ * clients, and the number of erroneously purged clients. These are printed
+ * out at each garbage collection run. Note that access to the counters is
+ * not synchronized because they are just indicaters, and whether they are
+ * off by a few doesn't matter; and for the same reason no attempt is made
+ * to guarantee the num_renewed is correct in the face of clients spoofing
+ * the opaque field.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Get the client given its client number (the key). Returns the entry,
+ * or NULL if it's not found.
+ *
+ * Access to the list itself is synchronized via locks. However, access
+ * to the entry returned by get_client() is NOT synchronized. This means
+ * that there are potentially problems if a client uses multiple,
+ * simultaneous connections to access url's within the same protection
+ * space. However, these problems are not new: when using multiple
+ * connections you have no guarantee of the order the requests are
+ * processed anyway, so you have problems with the nonce-count and
+ * one-time nonces anyway.
+ */
+static client_entry *get_client(unsigned long key, const request_rec *r)
+{
+ int bucket;
+ client_entry *entry, *prev = NULL;
+
+
+ if (!key || !client_shm) return NULL;
+
+ bucket = key % client_list->tbl_len;
+ entry = client_list->table[bucket];
+
+ apr_global_mutex_lock(client_lock);
+
+ while (entry && key != entry->key) {
+ prev = entry;
+ entry = entry->next;
+ }
+
+ if (entry && prev) { /* move entry to front of list */
+ prev->next = entry->next;
+ entry->next = client_list->table[bucket];
+ client_list->table[bucket] = entry;
+ }
+
+ apr_global_mutex_unlock(client_lock);
+
+ if (entry) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(01764)
+ "get_client(): client %lu found", key);
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(01765)
+ "get_client(): client %lu not found", key);
+ }
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+
+/* A simple garbage-collecter to remove unused clients. It removes the
+ * last entry in each bucket and updates the counters. Returns the
+ * number of removed entries.
+ */
+static long gc(server_rec *s)
+{
+ client_entry *entry, *prev;
+ unsigned long num_removed = 0, idx;
+
+ /* garbage collect all last entries */
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < client_list->tbl_len; idx++) {
+ entry = client_list->table[idx];
+ prev = NULL;
+
+ if (!entry) {
+ /* This bucket is empty. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ while (entry->next) { /* find last entry */
+ prev = entry;
+ entry = entry->next;
+ }
+ if (prev) {
+ prev->next = NULL; /* cut list */
+ }
+ else {
+ client_list->table[idx] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (entry) { /* remove entry */
+ apr_status_t err;
+
+ err = rmm_free(client_rmm, entry);
+ num_removed++;
+
+ if (err) {
+ /* Nothing we can really do but log... */
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, err, s, APLOGNO(10007)
+ "Failed to free auth_digest client allocation");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* update counters and log */
+
+ client_list->num_entries -= num_removed;
+ client_list->num_removed += num_removed;
+
+ return num_removed;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Add a new client to the list. Returns the entry if successful, NULL
+ * otherwise. This triggers the garbage collection if memory is low.
+ */
+static client_entry *add_client(unsigned long key, client_entry *info,
+ server_rec *s)
+{
+ int bucket;
+ client_entry *entry;
+
+
+ if (!key || !client_shm) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ bucket = key % client_list->tbl_len;
+
+ apr_global_mutex_lock(client_lock);
+
+ /* try to allocate a new entry */
+
+ entry = rmm_malloc(client_rmm, sizeof(client_entry));
+ if (!entry) {
+ long num_removed = gc(s);
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s, APLOGNO(01766)
+ "gc'd %ld client entries. Total new clients: "
+ "%ld; Total removed clients: %ld; Total renewed clients: "
+ "%ld", num_removed,
+ client_list->num_created - client_list->num_renewed,
+ client_list->num_removed, client_list->num_renewed);
+ entry = rmm_malloc(client_rmm, sizeof(client_entry));
+ if (!entry) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s, APLOGNO(01767)
+ "unable to allocate new auth_digest client");
+ apr_global_mutex_unlock(client_lock);
+ return NULL; /* give up */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now add the entry */
+
+ memcpy(entry, info, sizeof(client_entry));
+ entry->key = key;
+ entry->next = client_list->table[bucket];
+ client_list->table[bucket] = entry;
+ client_list->num_created++;
+ client_list->num_entries++;
+
+ apr_global_mutex_unlock(client_lock);
+
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, APLOGNO(01768)
+ "allocated new client %lu", key);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Authorization header parser code
+ */
+
+/* Parse the Authorization header, if it exists */
+static int get_digest_rec(request_rec *r, digest_header_rec *resp)
+{
+ const char *auth_line;
+ apr_size_t l;
+ int vk = 0, vv = 0;
+ char *key, *value;
+
+ auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in,
+ (PROXYREQ_PROXY == r->proxyreq)
+ ? "Proxy-Authorization"
+ : "Authorization");
+ if (!auth_line) {
+ resp->auth_hdr_sts = NO_HEADER;
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ resp->scheme = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &auth_line);
+ if (ap_cstr_casecmp(resp->scheme, "Digest")) {
+ resp->auth_hdr_sts = NOT_DIGEST;
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ l = strlen(auth_line);
+
+ key = apr_palloc(r->pool, l+1);
+ value = apr_palloc(r->pool, l+1);
+
+ while (auth_line[0] != '\0') {
+
+ /* find key */
+
+ while (apr_isspace(auth_line[0])) {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+ vk = 0;
+ while (auth_line[0] != '=' && auth_line[0] != ','
+ && auth_line[0] != '\0' && !apr_isspace(auth_line[0])) {
+ key[vk++] = *auth_line++;
+ }
+ key[vk] = '\0';
+ while (apr_isspace(auth_line[0])) {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+
+ /* find value */
+
+ vv = 0;
+ if (auth_line[0] == '=') {
+ auth_line++;
+ while (apr_isspace(auth_line[0])) {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_line[0] == '\"') { /* quoted string */
+ auth_line++;
+ while (auth_line[0] != '\"' && auth_line[0] != '\0') {
+ if (auth_line[0] == '\\' && auth_line[1] != '\0') {
+ auth_line++; /* escaped char */
+ }
+ value[vv++] = *auth_line++;
+ }
+ if (auth_line[0] != '\0') {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+ }
+ else { /* token */
+ while (auth_line[0] != ',' && auth_line[0] != '\0'
+ && !apr_isspace(auth_line[0])) {
+ value[vv++] = *auth_line++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ value[vv] = '\0';
+
+ while (auth_line[0] != ',' && auth_line[0] != '\0') {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+ if (auth_line[0] != '\0') {
+ auth_line++;
+ }
+
+ if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "username"))
+ resp->username = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "realm"))
+ resp->realm = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "nonce"))
+ resp->nonce = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "uri"))
+ resp->uri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "response"))
+ resp->digest = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "algorithm"))
+ resp->algorithm = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "cnonce"))
+ resp->cnonce = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "opaque"))
+ resp->opaque = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "qop"))
+ resp->message_qop = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(key, "nc"))
+ resp->nonce_count = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, value);
+ }
+
+ if (!resp->username || !resp->realm || !resp->nonce || !resp->uri
+ || !resp->digest
+ || (resp->message_qop && (!resp->cnonce || !resp->nonce_count))) {
+ resp->auth_hdr_sts = INVALID;
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ if (resp->opaque) {
+ resp->opaque_num = (unsigned long) strtol(resp->opaque, NULL, 16);
+ }
+
+ resp->auth_hdr_sts = VALID;
+ return OK;
+}
+
+
+/* Because the browser may preemptively send auth info, incrementing the
+ * nonce-count when it does, and because the client does not get notified
+ * if the URI didn't need authentication after all, we need to be sure to
+ * update the nonce-count each time we receive an Authorization header no
+ * matter what the final outcome of the request. Furthermore this is a
+ * convenient place to get the request-uri (before any subrequests etc
+ * are initiated) and to initialize the request_config.
+ *
+ * Note that this must be called after mod_proxy had its go so that
+ * r->proxyreq is set correctly.
+ */
+static int parse_hdr_and_update_nc(request_rec *r)
+{
+ digest_header_rec *resp;
+ int res;
+
+ if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
+ return DECLINED;
+ }
+
+ resp = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, sizeof(digest_header_rec));
+ resp->raw_request_uri = r->unparsed_uri;
+ resp->psd_request_uri = &r->parsed_uri;
+ resp->needed_auth = 0;
+ resp->method = r->method;
+ ap_set_module_config(r->request_config, &auth_digest_module, resp);
+
+ res = get_digest_rec(r, resp);
+ resp->client = get_client(resp->opaque_num, r);
+ if (res == OK && resp->client) {
+ resp->client->nonce_count++;
+ }
+
+ return DECLINED;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Nonce generation code
+ */
+
+/* The hash part of the nonce is a SHA-1 hash of the time, realm, server host
+ * and port, opaque, and our secret.
+ */
+static void gen_nonce_hash(char *hash, const char *timestr, const char *opaque,
+ const server_rec *server,
+ const digest_config_rec *conf)
+{
+ unsigned char sha1[APR_SHA1_DIGESTSIZE];
+ apr_sha1_ctx_t ctx;
+
+ memcpy(&ctx, &conf->nonce_ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ /*
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&ctx, (const unsigned char *) server->server_hostname,
+ strlen(server->server_hostname));
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&ctx, (const unsigned char *) &server->port,
+ sizeof(server->port));
+ */
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&ctx, (const unsigned char *) timestr, strlen(timestr));
+ if (opaque) {
+ apr_sha1_update_binary(&ctx, (const unsigned char *) opaque,
+ strlen(opaque));
+ }
+ apr_sha1_final(sha1, &ctx);
+
+ ap_bin2hex(sha1, APR_SHA1_DIGESTSIZE, hash);
+}
+
+
+/* The nonce has the format b64(time)+hash .
+ */
+static const char *gen_nonce(apr_pool_t *p, apr_time_t now, const char *opaque,
+ const server_rec *server,
+ const digest_config_rec *conf)
+{
+ char *nonce = apr_palloc(p, NONCE_LEN+1);
+ time_rec t;
+
+ if (conf->nonce_lifetime != 0) {
+ t.time = now;
+ }
+ else if (otn_counter) {
+ /* this counter is not synch'd, because it doesn't really matter
+ * if it counts exactly.
+ */
+ t.time = (*otn_counter)++;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* XXX: WHAT IS THIS CONSTANT? */
+ t.time = 42;
+ }
+ apr_base64_encode_binary(nonce, t.arr, sizeof(t.arr));
+ gen_nonce_hash(nonce+NONCE_TIME_LEN, nonce, opaque, server, conf);
+
+ return nonce;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Opaque and hash-table management
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Generate a new client entry, add it to the list, and return the
+ * entry. Returns NULL if failed.
+ */
+static client_entry *gen_client(const request_rec *r)
+{
+ unsigned long op;
+ client_entry new_entry = { 0, NULL, 0, "" }, *entry;
+
+ if (!opaque_cntr) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ apr_global_mutex_lock(opaque_lock);
+ op = (*opaque_cntr)++;
+ apr_global_mutex_unlock(opaque_lock);
+
+ if (!(entry = add_client(op, &new_entry, r->server))) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01769)
+ "failed to allocate client entry - ignoring client");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Authorization challenge generation code (for WWW-Authenticate)
+ */
+
+static const char *ltox(apr_pool_t *p, unsigned long num)
+{
+ if (num != 0) {
+ return apr_psprintf(p, "%lx", num);
+ }
+ else {
+ return "";
+ }
+}
+
+static void note_digest_auth_failure(request_rec *r,
+ const digest_config_rec *conf,
+ digest_header_rec *resp, int stale)
+{
+ const char *qop, *opaque, *opaque_param, *domain, *nonce;
+
+ /* Setup qop */
+ if (apr_is_empty_array(conf->qop_list)) {
+ qop = ", qop=\"auth\"";
+ }
+ else if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(*(const char **)(conf->qop_list->elts), "none")) {
+ qop = "";
+ }
+ else {
+ qop = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ", qop=\"",
+ apr_array_pstrcat(r->pool, conf->qop_list, ','),
+ "\"",
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ /* Setup opaque */
+
+ if (resp->opaque == NULL) {
+ /* new client */
+ if ((conf->check_nc || conf->nonce_lifetime == 0)
+ && (resp->client = gen_client(r)) != NULL) {
+ opaque = ltox(r->pool, resp->client->key);
+ }
+ else {
+ opaque = ""; /* opaque not needed */
+ }
+ }
+ else if (resp->client == NULL) {
+ /* client info was gc'd */
+ resp->client = gen_client(r);
+ if (resp->client != NULL) {
+ opaque = ltox(r->pool, resp->client->key);
+ stale = 1;
+ client_list->num_renewed++;
+ }
+ else {
+ opaque = ""; /* ??? */
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ opaque = resp->opaque;
+ /* we're generating a new nonce, so reset the nonce-count */
+ resp->client->nonce_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (opaque[0]) {
+ opaque_param = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ", opaque=\"", opaque, "\"", NULL);
+ }
+ else {
+ opaque_param = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Setup nonce */
+
+ nonce = gen_nonce(r->pool, r->request_time, opaque, r->server, conf);
+ if (resp->client && conf->nonce_lifetime == 0) {
+ memcpy(resp->client->last_nonce, nonce, NONCE_LEN+1);
+ }
+
+ /* setup domain attribute. We want to send this attribute wherever
+ * possible so that the client won't send the Authorization header
+ * unnecessarily (it's usually > 200 bytes!).
+ */
+
+
+ /* don't send domain
+ * - for proxy requests
+ * - if it's not specified
+ */
+ if (r->proxyreq || !conf->uri_list) {
+ domain = NULL;
+ }
+ else {
+ domain = conf->uri_list;
+ }
+
+ apr_table_mergen(r->err_headers_out,
+ (PROXYREQ_PROXY == r->proxyreq)
+ ? "Proxy-Authenticate" : "WWW-Authenticate",
+ apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Digest realm=\"%s\", "
+ "nonce=\"%s\", algorithm=%s%s%s%s%s",
+ ap_auth_name(r), nonce, conf->algorithm,
+ opaque_param ? opaque_param : "",
+ domain ? domain : "",
+ stale ? ", stale=true" : "", qop));
+
+}
+
+static int hook_note_digest_auth_failure(request_rec *r, const char *auth_type)
+{
+ request_rec *mainreq;
+ digest_header_rec *resp;
+ digest_config_rec *conf;
+
+ if (ap_cstr_casecmp(auth_type, "Digest"))
+ return DECLINED;
+
+ /* get the client response and mark */
+
+ mainreq = r;
+ while (mainreq->main != NULL) {
+ mainreq = mainreq->main;
+ }
+ while (mainreq->prev != NULL) {
+ mainreq = mainreq->prev;
+ }
+ resp = (digest_header_rec *) ap_get_module_config(mainreq->request_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+ resp->needed_auth = 1;
+
+
+ /* get our conf */
+
+ conf = (digest_config_rec *) ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Authorization header verification code
+ */
+
+static authn_status get_hash(request_rec *r, const char *user,
+ digest_config_rec *conf, const char **rethash)
+{
+ authn_status auth_result;
+ char *password;
+ authn_provider_list *current_provider;
+
+ current_provider = conf->providers;
+ do {
+ const authn_provider *provider;
+
+ /* For now, if a provider isn't set, we'll be nice and use the file
+ * provider.
+ */
+ if (!current_provider) {
+ provider = ap_lookup_provider(AUTHN_PROVIDER_GROUP,
+ AUTHN_DEFAULT_PROVIDER,
+ AUTHN_PROVIDER_VERSION);
+
+ if (!provider || !provider->get_realm_hash) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01770)
+ "No Authn provider configured");
+ auth_result = AUTH_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, AUTHN_PROVIDER_NAME_NOTE, AUTHN_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
+ }
+ else {
+ provider = current_provider->provider;
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, AUTHN_PROVIDER_NAME_NOTE, current_provider->provider_name);
+ }
+
+
+ /* We expect the password to be md5 hash of user:realm:password */
+ auth_result = provider->get_realm_hash(r, user, conf->realm,
+ &password);
+
+ apr_table_unset(r->notes, AUTHN_PROVIDER_NAME_NOTE);
+
+ /* Something occurred. Stop checking. */
+ if (auth_result != AUTH_USER_NOT_FOUND) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* If we're not really configured for providers, stop now. */
+ if (!conf->providers) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ current_provider = current_provider->next;
+ } while (current_provider);
+
+ if (auth_result == AUTH_USER_FOUND) {
+ *rethash = password;
+ }
+
+ return auth_result;
+}
+
+static int check_nc(const request_rec *r, const digest_header_rec *resp,
+ const digest_config_rec *conf)
+{
+ unsigned long nc;
+ const char *snc = resp->nonce_count;
+ char *endptr;
+
+ if (conf->check_nc && !client_shm) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but just in case... */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01771)
+ "cannot check nonce count without shared memory");
+ return OK;
+ }
+
+ if (!conf->check_nc || !client_shm) {
+ return OK;
+ }
+
+ if (!apr_is_empty_array(conf->qop_list) &&
+ !ap_cstr_casecmp(*(const char **)(conf->qop_list->elts), "none")) {
+ /* qop is none, client must not send a nonce count */
+ if (snc != NULL) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01772)
+ "invalid nc %s received - no nonce count allowed when qop=none",
+ snc);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ /* qop is none, cannot check nonce count */
+ return OK;
+ }
+
+ nc = strtol(snc, &endptr, 16);
+ if (endptr < (snc+strlen(snc)) && !apr_isspace(*endptr)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01773)
+ "invalid nc %s received - not a number", snc);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ if (!resp->client) {
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ if (nc != resp->client->nonce_count) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01774)
+ "Warning, possible replay attack: nonce-count "
+ "check failed: %lu != %lu", nc,
+ resp->client->nonce_count);
+ return !OK;
+ }
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+static int check_nonce(request_rec *r, digest_header_rec *resp,
+ const digest_config_rec *conf)
+{
+ apr_time_t dt;
+ time_rec nonce_time;
+ char tmp, hash[NONCE_HASH_LEN+1];
+
+ /* Since the time part of the nonce is a base64 encoding of an
+ * apr_time_t (8 bytes), it should end with a '=', fail early otherwise.
+ */
+ if (strlen(resp->nonce) != NONCE_LEN
+ || resp->nonce[NONCE_TIME_LEN - 1] != '=') {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01775)
+ "invalid nonce '%s' received - length is not %d "
+ "or time encoding is incorrect",
+ resp->nonce, NONCE_LEN);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 1);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ tmp = resp->nonce[NONCE_TIME_LEN];
+ resp->nonce[NONCE_TIME_LEN] = '\0';
+ apr_base64_decode_binary(nonce_time.arr, resp->nonce);
+ gen_nonce_hash(hash, resp->nonce, resp->opaque, r->server, conf);
+ resp->nonce[NONCE_TIME_LEN] = tmp;
+ resp->nonce_time = nonce_time.time;
+
+ if (strcmp(hash, resp->nonce+NONCE_TIME_LEN)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01776)
+ "invalid nonce %s received - hash is not %s",
+ resp->nonce, hash);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 1);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ dt = r->request_time - nonce_time.time;
+ if (conf->nonce_lifetime > 0 && dt < 0) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01777)
+ "invalid nonce %s received - user attempted "
+ "time travel", resp->nonce);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 1);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (conf->nonce_lifetime > 0) {
+ if (dt > conf->nonce_lifetime) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0,r, APLOGNO(01778)
+ "user %s: nonce expired (%.2f seconds old "
+ "- max lifetime %.2f) - sending new nonce",
+ r->user, (double)apr_time_sec(dt),
+ (double)apr_time_sec(conf->nonce_lifetime));
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 1);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (conf->nonce_lifetime == 0 && resp->client) {
+ if (memcmp(resp->client->last_nonce, resp->nonce, NONCE_LEN)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(01779)
+ "user %s: one-time-nonce mismatch - sending "
+ "new nonce", r->user);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 1);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* else (lifetime < 0) => never expires */
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+/* The actual MD5 code... whee */
+
+/* RFC-2069 */
+static const char *old_digest(const request_rec *r,
+ const digest_header_rec *resp)
+{
+ const char *ha2;
+
+ ha2 = ap_md5(r->pool, (unsigned char *)apr_pstrcat(r->pool, resp->method, ":",
+ resp->uri, NULL));
+ return ap_md5(r->pool,
+ (unsigned char *)apr_pstrcat(r->pool, resp->ha1, ":",
+ resp->nonce, ":", ha2, NULL));
+}
+
+/* RFC-2617 */
+static const char *new_digest(const request_rec *r,
+ digest_header_rec *resp)
+{
+ const char *ha1, *ha2, *a2;
+
+ ha1 = resp->ha1;
+
+ a2 = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, resp->method, ":", resp->uri, NULL);
+ ha2 = ap_md5(r->pool, (const unsigned char *)a2);
+
+ return ap_md5(r->pool,
+ (unsigned char *)apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ha1, ":", resp->nonce,
+ ":", resp->nonce_count, ":",
+ resp->cnonce, ":",
+ resp->message_qop, ":", ha2,
+ NULL));
+}
+
+static void copy_uri_components(apr_uri_t *dst,
+ apr_uri_t *src, request_rec *r) {
+ if (src->scheme && src->scheme[0] != '\0') {
+ dst->scheme = src->scheme;
+ }
+ else {
+ dst->scheme = (char *) "http";
+ }
+
+ if (src->hostname && src->hostname[0] != '\0') {
+ dst->hostname = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, src->hostname);
+ ap_unescape_url(dst->hostname);
+ }
+ else {
+ dst->hostname = (char *) ap_get_server_name(r);
+ }
+
+ if (src->port_str && src->port_str[0] != '\0') {
+ dst->port = src->port;
+ }
+ else {
+ dst->port = ap_get_server_port(r);
+ }
+
+ if (src->path && src->path[0] != '\0') {
+ dst->path = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, src->path);
+ ap_unescape_url(dst->path);
+ }
+ else {
+ dst->path = src->path;
+ }
+
+ if (src->query && src->query[0] != '\0') {
+ dst->query = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, src->query);
+ ap_unescape_url(dst->query);
+ }
+ else {
+ dst->query = src->query;
+ }
+
+ dst->hostinfo = src->hostinfo;
+}
+
+/* These functions return 0 if client is OK, and proper error status
+ * if not... either HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, if we made a check, and it failed, or
+ * HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, if things are so totally confused that we
+ * couldn't figure out how to tell if the client is authorized or not.
+ *
+ * If they return DECLINED, and all other modules also decline, that's
+ * treated by the server core as a configuration error, logged and
+ * reported as such.
+ */
+
+/* Determine user ID, and check if the attributes are correct, if it
+ * really is that user, if the nonce is correct, etc.
+ */
+
+static int authenticate_digest_user(request_rec *r)
+{
+ digest_config_rec *conf;
+ digest_header_rec *resp;
+ request_rec *mainreq;
+ const char *t;
+ int res;
+ authn_status return_code;
+
+ /* do we require Digest auth for this URI? */
+
+ if (!(t = ap_auth_type(r)) || ap_cstr_casecmp(t, "Digest")) {
+ return DECLINED;
+ }
+
+ if (!ap_auth_name(r)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01780)
+ "need AuthName: %s", r->uri);
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+
+ /* get the client response and mark */
+
+ mainreq = r;
+ while (mainreq->main != NULL) {
+ mainreq = mainreq->main;
+ }
+ while (mainreq->prev != NULL) {
+ mainreq = mainreq->prev;
+ }
+ resp = (digest_header_rec *) ap_get_module_config(mainreq->request_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+ resp->needed_auth = 1;
+
+
+ /* get our conf */
+
+ conf = (digest_config_rec *) ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+
+
+ /* check for existence and syntax of Auth header */
+
+ if (resp->auth_hdr_sts != VALID) {
+ if (resp->auth_hdr_sts == NOT_DIGEST) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01781)
+ "client used wrong authentication scheme `%s': %s",
+ resp->scheme, r->uri);
+ }
+ else if (resp->auth_hdr_sts == INVALID) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01782)
+ "missing user, realm, nonce, uri, digest, "
+ "cnonce, or nonce_count in authorization header: %s",
+ r->uri);
+ }
+ /* else (resp->auth_hdr_sts == NO_HEADER) */
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ r->user = (char *) resp->username;
+ r->ap_auth_type = (char *) "Digest";
+
+ /* check the auth attributes */
+
+ if (strcmp(resp->uri, resp->raw_request_uri)) {
+ /* Hmm, the simple match didn't work (probably a proxy modified the
+ * request-uri), so lets do a more sophisticated match
+ */
+ apr_uri_t r_uri, d_uri;
+
+ copy_uri_components(&r_uri, resp->psd_request_uri, r);
+ if (apr_uri_parse(r->pool, resp->uri, &d_uri) != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01783)
+ "invalid uri <%s> in Authorization header",
+ resp->uri);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+
+ if (d_uri.hostname) {
+ ap_unescape_url(d_uri.hostname);
+ }
+ if (d_uri.path) {
+ ap_unescape_url(d_uri.path);
+ }
+
+ if (d_uri.query) {
+ ap_unescape_url(d_uri.query);
+ }
+ else if (r_uri.query) {
+ /* MSIE compatibility hack. MSIE has some RFC issues - doesn't
+ * include the query string in the uri Authorization component
+ * or when computing the response component. the second part
+ * works out ok, since we can hash the header and get the same
+ * result. however, the uri from the request line won't match
+ * the uri Authorization component since the header lacks the
+ * query string, leaving us incompatible with a (broken) MSIE.
+ *
+ * the workaround is to fake a query string match if in the proper
+ * environment - BrowserMatch MSIE, for example. the cool thing
+ * is that if MSIE ever fixes itself the simple match ought to
+ * work and this code won't be reached anyway, even if the
+ * environment is set.
+ */
+
+ if (apr_table_get(r->subprocess_env,
+ "AuthDigestEnableQueryStringHack")) {
+
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(01784)
+ "applying AuthDigestEnableQueryStringHack "
+ "to uri <%s>", resp->raw_request_uri);
+
+ d_uri.query = r_uri.query;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r->method_number == M_CONNECT) {
+ if (!r_uri.hostinfo || strcmp(resp->uri, r_uri.hostinfo)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01785)
+ "uri mismatch - <%s> does not match "
+ "request-uri <%s>", resp->uri, r_uri.hostinfo);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (
+ /* check hostname matches, if present */
+ (d_uri.hostname && d_uri.hostname[0] != '\0'
+ && strcasecmp(d_uri.hostname, r_uri.hostname))
+ /* check port matches, if present */
+ || (d_uri.port_str && d_uri.port != r_uri.port)
+ /* check that server-port is default port if no port present */
+ || (d_uri.hostname && d_uri.hostname[0] != '\0'
+ && !d_uri.port_str && r_uri.port != ap_default_port(r))
+ /* check that path matches */
+ || (d_uri.path != r_uri.path
+ /* either exact match */
+ && (!d_uri.path || !r_uri.path
+ || strcmp(d_uri.path, r_uri.path))
+ /* or '*' matches empty path in scheme://host */
+ && !(d_uri.path && !r_uri.path && resp->psd_request_uri->hostname
+ && d_uri.path[0] == '*' && d_uri.path[1] == '\0'))
+ /* check that query matches */
+ || (d_uri.query != r_uri.query
+ && (!d_uri.query || !r_uri.query
+ || strcmp(d_uri.query, r_uri.query)))
+ ) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01786)
+ "uri mismatch - <%s> does not match "
+ "request-uri <%s>", resp->uri, resp->raw_request_uri);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (resp->opaque && resp->opaque_num == 0) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01787)
+ "received invalid opaque - got `%s'",
+ resp->opaque);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (!conf->realm) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02533)
+ "realm mismatch - got `%s' but no realm specified",
+ resp->realm);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (!resp->realm || strcmp(resp->realm, conf->realm)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01788)
+ "realm mismatch - got `%s' but expected `%s'",
+ resp->realm, conf->realm);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (resp->algorithm != NULL
+ && ap_cstr_casecmp(resp->algorithm, "MD5")) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01789)
+ "unknown algorithm `%s' received: %s",
+ resp->algorithm, r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ return_code = get_hash(r, r->user, conf, &resp->ha1);
+
+ if (return_code == AUTH_USER_NOT_FOUND) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01790)
+ "user `%s' in realm `%s' not found: %s",
+ r->user, conf->realm, r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ else if (return_code == AUTH_USER_FOUND) {
+ /* we have a password, so continue */
+ }
+ else if (return_code == AUTH_DENIED) {
+ /* authentication denied in the provider before attempting a match */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01791)
+ "user `%s' in realm `%s' denied by provider: %s",
+ r->user, conf->realm, r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* AUTH_GENERAL_ERROR (or worse)
+ * We'll assume that the module has already said what its error
+ * was in the logs.
+ */
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (resp->message_qop == NULL) {
+ /* old (rfc-2069) style digest */
+ if (strcmp(resp->digest, old_digest(r, resp))) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01792)
+ "user %s: password mismatch: %s", r->user,
+ r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ const char *exp_digest;
+ int match = 0, idx;
+ const char **tmp = (const char **)(conf->qop_list->elts);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < conf->qop_list->nelts; idx++) {
+ if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(*tmp, resp->message_qop)) {
+ match = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ++tmp;
+ }
+
+ if (!match
+ && !(apr_is_empty_array(conf->qop_list)
+ && !ap_cstr_casecmp(resp->message_qop, "auth"))) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01793)
+ "invalid qop `%s' received: %s",
+ resp->message_qop, r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ exp_digest = new_digest(r, resp);
+ if (!exp_digest) {
+ /* we failed to allocate a client struct */
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(resp->digest, exp_digest)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01794)
+ "user %s: password mismatch: %s", r->user,
+ r->uri);
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (check_nc(r, resp, conf) != OK) {
+ note_digest_auth_failure(r, conf, resp, 0);
+ return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: this check is done last so that a "stale=true" can be
+ generated if the nonce is old */
+ if ((res = check_nonce(r, resp, conf))) {
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorization-Info header code
+ */
+
+static int add_auth_info(request_rec *r)
+{
+ const digest_config_rec *conf =
+ (digest_config_rec *) ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+ digest_header_rec *resp =
+ (digest_header_rec *) ap_get_module_config(r->request_config,
+ &auth_digest_module);
+ const char *ai = NULL, *nextnonce = "";
+
+ if (resp == NULL || !resp->needed_auth || conf == NULL) {
+ return OK;
+ }
+
+ /* 2069-style entity-digest is not supported (it's too hard, and
+ * there are no clients which support 2069 but not 2617). */
+
+ /* setup nextnonce
+ */
+ if (conf->nonce_lifetime > 0) {
+ /* send nextnonce if current nonce will expire in less than 30 secs */
+ if ((r->request_time - resp->nonce_time) > (conf->nonce_lifetime-NEXTNONCE_DELTA)) {
+ nextnonce = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ", nextnonce=\"",
+ gen_nonce(r->pool, r->request_time,
+ resp->opaque, r->server, conf),
+ "\"", NULL);
+ if (resp->client)
+ resp->client->nonce_count = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (conf->nonce_lifetime == 0 && resp->client) {
+ const char *nonce = gen_nonce(r->pool, 0, resp->opaque, r->server,
+ conf);
+ nextnonce = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ", nextnonce=\"", nonce, "\"", NULL);
+ memcpy(resp->client->last_nonce, nonce, NONCE_LEN+1);
+ }
+ /* else nonce never expires, hence no nextnonce */
+
+
+ /* do rfc-2069 digest
+ */
+ if (!apr_is_empty_array(conf->qop_list) &&
+ !ap_cstr_casecmp(*(const char **)(conf->qop_list->elts), "none")
+ && resp->message_qop == NULL) {
+ /* use only RFC-2069 format */
+ ai = nextnonce;
+ }
+ else {
+ const char *resp_dig, *ha1, *a2, *ha2;
+
+ /* calculate rspauth attribute
+ */
+ ha1 = resp->ha1;
+
+ a2 = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ":", resp->uri, NULL);
+ ha2 = ap_md5(r->pool, (const unsigned char *)a2);
+
+ resp_dig = ap_md5(r->pool,
+ (unsigned char *)apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ha1, ":",
+ resp->nonce, ":",
+ resp->nonce_count, ":",
+ resp->cnonce, ":",
+ resp->message_qop ?
+ resp->message_qop : "",
+ ":", ha2, NULL));
+
+ /* assemble Authentication-Info header
+ */
+ ai = apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
+ "rspauth=\"", resp_dig, "\"",
+ nextnonce,
+ resp->cnonce ? ", cnonce=\"" : "",
+ resp->cnonce
+ ? ap_escape_quotes(r->pool, resp->cnonce)
+ : "",
+ resp->cnonce ? "\"" : "",
+ resp->nonce_count ? ", nc=" : "",
+ resp->nonce_count ? resp->nonce_count : "",
+ resp->message_qop ? ", qop=" : "",
+ resp->message_qop ? resp->message_qop : "",
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (ai && ai[0]) {
+ apr_table_mergen(r->headers_out,
+ (PROXYREQ_PROXY == r->proxyreq)
+ ? "Proxy-Authentication-Info"
+ : "Authentication-Info",
+ ai);
+ }
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+static void register_hooks(apr_pool_t *p)
+{
+ static const char * const cfgPost[]={ "http_core.c", NULL };
+ static const char * const parsePre[]={ "mod_proxy.c", NULL };
+
+ ap_hook_pre_config(pre_init, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_post_config(initialize_module, NULL, cfgPost, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_child_init(initialize_child, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_post_read_request(parse_hdr_and_update_nc, parsePre, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_check_authn(authenticate_digest_user, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE,
+ AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_PER_CONF);
+
+ ap_hook_fixups(add_auth_info, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_note_auth_failure(hook_note_digest_auth_failure, NULL, NULL,
+ APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE_MODULE(auth_digest) =
+{
+ STANDARD20_MODULE_STUFF,
+ create_digest_dir_config, /* dir config creater */
+ NULL, /* dir merger --- default is to override */
+ NULL, /* server config */
+ NULL, /* merge server config */
+ digest_cmds, /* command table */
+ register_hooks /* register hooks */
+};
+