diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/75_37-OpenSSL-when-preloading-creds-do-the-server-certs-be.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/75_37-OpenSSL-when-preloading-creds-do-the-server-certs-be.patch | 232 |
1 files changed, 232 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/75_37-OpenSSL-when-preloading-creds-do-the-server-certs-be.patch b/debian/patches/75_37-OpenSSL-when-preloading-creds-do-the-server-certs-be.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e21065 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/75_37-OpenSSL-when-preloading-creds-do-the-server-certs-be.patch @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +From 7f65a63b60c6ea86db683ac00e221939f3bb1d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@wizmail.org> +Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:26:30 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OpenSSL: when preloading creds do the server certs before + the OCSP proofs so that the latter can ve verified before loading + +--- + src/tls-openssl.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- + 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/tls-openssl.c +index 68ad6f15b..fdf0d92b2 100644 +--- a/src/tls-openssl.c ++++ b/src/tls-openssl.c +@@ -441,14 +441,16 @@ exim_openssl_state_st state_server = {.is_server = TRUE}; + static int + setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, + uschar ** errstr ); + + /* Callbacks */ + #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); ++static void x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(const STACK_OF(X509) * sk); ++static void x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store); + #endif + + + + /* Daemon-called, before every connection, key create/rotate */ + #ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME + static void tk_init(void); +@@ -1307,15 +1309,14 @@ ocsp_load_response(exim_openssl_state_st * state, const uschar * filename, + { + BIO * bio; + OCSP_RESPONSE * resp; + OCSP_BASICRESP * basic_response; + OCSP_SINGLERESP * single_response; + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd; + STACK_OF(X509) * sk; +-unsigned long verify_flags; + int status, reason, i; + + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file (%s) '%s'\n", is_pem ? "PEM" : "DER", filename); + + if (!filename || !*filename) return; + +@@ -1372,28 +1373,28 @@ if ((status = OCSP_response_status(resp)) != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) + if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp))) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n"); + goto bad; + } + +-sk = state->verify_stack; +-verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */ ++sk = state->verify_stack; /* set by setup_certs() / chain_from_pem_file() */ + + /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags? + OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT + OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */ + +-/* This does a full verify on the OCSP proof before we load it for serving +-up; possibly overkill - just date-checks might be nice enough. ++/* This does a partial verify (only the signer link, not the whole chain-to-CA) ++on the OCSP proof before we load it for serving up; possibly overkill - ++just date-checks might be nice enough. + + OCSP_basic_verify takes a "store" arg, but does not +-use it for the chain verification, which is all we do +-when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set. The content from the wire +-"basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all that is used. ++use it for the chain verification, when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set. ++The content from the wire "basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all ++that is used. + + We have a stack, loaded in setup_certs() if tls_verify_certificates + was a file (not a directory, or "system"). It is unfortunate we + cannot used the connection context store, as that would neatly + handle the "system" case too, but there seems to be no library + function for getting a stack from a store. + [ In OpenSSL 1.1 - ? X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) ? ] +@@ -1402,15 +1403,15 @@ SNI handling. + + Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not + be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) - + But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback. + And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the + library does it for us anyway? */ + +-if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, verify_flags)) < 0) ++if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, OCSP_NOVERIFY)) < 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + { + ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring)); + debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring); + } + goto bad; +@@ -1747,61 +1748,18 @@ if (opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_eccurve)) + if (init_ecdh(ctx, &dummy_errstr)) + state_server.lib_state.ecdh = TRUE; + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading ECDH curve for server\n"); + + #if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) +-/* If we can, preload the server-side cert, key and ocsp */ +- +-if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_certificate) +-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +- && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_ocsp_file) +-#endif +- && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_privatekey)) +- { +- /* Set watches on the filenames. The implementation does de-duplication +- so we can just blindly do them all. */ +- +- if ( tls_set_watch(tls_certificate, TRUE) +-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +- && tls_set_watch(tls_ocsp_file, TRUE) +-#endif +- && tls_set_watch(tls_privatekey, TRUE)) +- { +- state_server.certificate = tls_certificate; +- state_server.privatekey = tls_privatekey; +-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +- state_server.u_ocsp.server.file = tls_ocsp_file; +-#endif +- +- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading server certs\n"); +- if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK) +- state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; +- } +- } +-else if ( !tls_certificate && !tls_privatekey +-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +- && !tls_ocsp_file +-#endif +- ) +- { /* Generate & preload a selfsigned cert. No files to watch. */ +- if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK) +- { +- state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; +- lifetime = f.running_in_test_harness ? 2 : 60 * 60; /* 1 hour */ +- } +- } +-else +- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading server certs\n"); +- +- + /* If we can, preload the Authorities for checking client certs against. + Actual choice to do verify is made (tls_{,try_}verify_hosts) +-at TLS conn startup */ ++at TLS conn startup. ++Do this before the server ocsp so that its info can verify the ocsp. */ + + if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_verify_certificates) + && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_crl)) + { + /* Watch the default dir also as they are always included */ + + if ( tls_set_watch(CUS X509_get_default_cert_file(), FALSE) +@@ -1809,18 +1767,63 @@ if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_verify_certificates) + && tls_set_watch(tls_crl, FALSE)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading CA bundle for server\n"); + + if (setup_certs(ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, &dummy_errstr) + == OK) + state_server.lib_state.cabundle = TRUE; +- } ++ ++ /* If we can, preload the server-side cert, key and ocsp */ ++ ++ if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_certificate) ++# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP ++ && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_ocsp_file) ++# endif ++ && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_privatekey)) ++ { ++ /* Set watches on the filenames. The implementation does de-duplication ++ so we can just blindly do them all. */ ++ ++ if ( tls_set_watch(tls_certificate, TRUE) ++# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP ++ && tls_set_watch(tls_ocsp_file, TRUE) ++# endif ++ && tls_set_watch(tls_privatekey, TRUE)) ++ { ++ state_server.certificate = tls_certificate; ++ state_server.privatekey = tls_privatekey; ++#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP ++ state_server.u_ocsp.server.file = tls_ocsp_file; ++# endif ++ ++ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading server certs\n"); ++ if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK) ++ state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; ++ } ++ } ++ else if ( !tls_certificate && !tls_privatekey ++# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP ++ && !tls_ocsp_file ++# endif ++ ) ++ { /* Generate & preload a selfsigned cert. No files to watch. */ ++ if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK) ++ { ++ state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; ++ lifetime = f.running_in_test_harness ? 2 : 60 * 60; /* 1 hour */ ++ } ++ } ++ else ++ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading server certs\n"); ++ } + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CA bundle for server\n"); ++ ++ + #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY */ + + + /* If we can, preload the ciphers control string */ + + if (opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_require_ciphers)) + { +-- +2.35.1 + |