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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000 |
commit | 36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9 (patch) | |
tree | 105e8c98ddea1c1e4784a60a5a6410fa416be2de /third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-esr-upstream.tar.xz firefox-esr-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esrupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs')
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs | 342 |
1 files changed, 342 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs b/third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..931856f703 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/getrandom/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +// Copyright 2019 Developers of the Rand project. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or +// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license +// <LICENSE-MIT or https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your +// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed +// except according to those terms. + +//! Interface to the operating system's random number generator. +//! +//! # Supported targets +//! +//! | Target | Target Triple | Implementation +//! | ----------------- | ------------------ | -------------- +//! | Linux, Android | `*‑linux‑*` | [`getrandom`][1] system call if available, otherwise [`/dev/urandom`][2] after successfully polling `/dev/random` +//! | Windows | `*‑windows‑*` | [`BCryptGenRandom`] +//! | macOS | `*‑apple‑darwin` | [`getentropy`][3] if available, otherwise [`/dev/urandom`][4] (identical to `/dev/random`) +//! | iOS, tvOS, watchOS | `*‑apple‑ios`, `*-apple-tvos`, `*-apple-watchos` | [`SecRandomCopyBytes`] +//! | FreeBSD | `*‑freebsd` | [`getrandom`][5] if available, otherwise [`kern.arandom`][6] +//! | OpenBSD | `*‑openbsd` | [`getentropy`][7] +//! | NetBSD | `*‑netbsd` | [`getrandom`][16] if available, otherwise [`kern.arandom`][8] +//! | Dragonfly BSD | `*‑dragonfly` | [`getrandom`][9] if available, otherwise [`/dev/urandom`][10] (identical to `/dev/random`) +//! | Solaris, illumos | `*‑solaris`, `*‑illumos` | [`getrandom`][11] if available, otherwise [`/dev/random`][12] +//! | Fuchsia OS | `*‑fuchsia` | [`cprng_draw`] +//! | Redox | `*‑redox` | `/dev/urandom` +//! | Haiku | `*‑haiku` | `/dev/urandom` (identical to `/dev/random`) +//! | Hermit | `*-hermit` | [`sys_read_entropy`] +//! | SGX | `x86_64‑*‑sgx` | [`RDRAND`] +//! | VxWorks | `*‑wrs‑vxworks‑*` | `randABytes` after checking entropy pool initialization with `randSecure` +//! | ESP-IDF | `*‑espidf` | [`esp_fill_random`] +//! | Emscripten | `*‑emscripten` | [`getentropy`][13] +//! | WASI | `wasm32‑wasi` | [`random_get`] +//! | Web Browser and Node.js | `wasm*‑*‑unknown` | [`Crypto.getRandomValues`] if available, then [`crypto.randomFillSync`] if on Node.js, see [WebAssembly support] +//! | SOLID | `*-kmc-solid_*` | `SOLID_RNG_SampleRandomBytes` +//! | Nintendo 3DS | `armv6k-nintendo-3ds` | [`getrandom`][1] +//! | QNX Neutrino | `*‑nto-qnx*` | [`/dev/urandom`][14] (identical to `/dev/random`) +//! | AIX | `*-ibm-aix` | [`/dev/urandom`][15] +//! +//! There is no blanket implementation on `unix` targets that reads from +//! `/dev/urandom`. This ensures all supported targets are using the recommended +//! interface and respect maximum buffer sizes. +//! +//! Pull Requests that add support for new targets to `getrandom` are always welcome. +//! +//! ## Unsupported targets +//! +//! By default, `getrandom` will not compile on unsupported targets, but certain +//! features allow a user to select a "fallback" implementation if no supported +//! implementation exists. +//! +//! All of the below mechanisms only affect unsupported +//! targets. Supported targets will _always_ use their supported implementations. +//! This prevents a crate from overriding a secure source of randomness +//! (either accidentally or intentionally). +//! +//! ### RDRAND on x86 +//! +//! *If the `rdrand` Cargo feature is enabled*, `getrandom` will fallback to using +//! the [`RDRAND`] instruction to get randomness on `no_std` `x86`/`x86_64` +//! targets. This feature has no effect on other CPU architectures. +//! +//! ### WebAssembly support +//! +//! This crate fully supports the +//! [`wasm32-wasi`](https://github.com/CraneStation/wasi) and +//! [`wasm32-unknown-emscripten`](https://www.hellorust.com/setup/emscripten/) +//! targets. However, the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target (i.e. the target used +//! by `wasm-pack`) is not automatically +//! supported since, from the target name alone, we cannot deduce which +//! JavaScript interface is in use (or if JavaScript is available at all). +//! +//! Instead, *if the `js` Cargo feature is enabled*, this crate will assume +//! that you are building for an environment containing JavaScript, and will +//! call the appropriate methods. Both web browser (main window and Web Workers) +//! and Node.js environments are supported, invoking the methods +//! [described above](#supported-targets) using the [`wasm-bindgen`] toolchain. +//! +//! To enable the `js` Cargo feature, add the following to the `dependencies` +//! section in your `Cargo.toml` file: +//! ```toml +//! [dependencies] +//! getrandom = { version = "0.2", features = ["js"] } +//! ``` +//! +//! This can be done even if `getrandom` is not a direct dependency. Cargo +//! allows crates to enable features for indirect dependencies. +//! +//! This feature should only be enabled for binary, test, or benchmark crates. +//! Library crates should generally not enable this feature, leaving such a +//! decision to *users* of their library. Also, libraries should not introduce +//! their own `js` features *just* to enable `getrandom`'s `js` feature. +//! +//! This feature has no effect on targets other than `wasm32-unknown-unknown`. +//! +//! #### Node.js ES module support +//! +//! Node.js supports both [CommonJS modules] and [ES modules]. Due to +//! limitations in wasm-bindgen's [`module`] support, we cannot directly +//! support ES Modules running on Node.js. However, on Node v15 and later, the +//! module author can add a simple shim to support the Web Cryptography API: +//! ```js +//! import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto' +//! globalThis.crypto = webcrypto +//! ``` +//! This crate will then use the provided `webcrypto` implementation. +//! +//! ### Custom implementations +//! +//! The [`register_custom_getrandom!`] macro allows a user to mark their own +//! function as the backing implementation for [`getrandom`]. See the macro's +//! documentation for more information about writing and registering your own +//! custom implementations. +//! +//! Note that registering a custom implementation only has an effect on targets +//! that would otherwise not compile. Any supported targets (including those +//! using `rdrand` and `js` Cargo features) continue using their normal +//! implementations even if a function is registered. +//! +//! ## Early boot +//! +//! Sometimes, early in the boot process, the OS has not collected enough +//! entropy to securely seed its RNG. This is especially common on virtual +//! machines, where standard "random" events are hard to come by. +//! +//! Some operating system interfaces always block until the RNG is securely +//! seeded. This can take anywhere from a few seconds to more than a minute. +//! A few (Linux, NetBSD and Solaris) offer a choice between blocking and +//! getting an error; in these cases, we always choose to block. +//! +//! On Linux (when the `getrandom` system call is not available), reading from +//! `/dev/urandom` never blocks, even when the OS hasn't collected enough +//! entropy yet. To avoid returning low-entropy bytes, we first poll +//! `/dev/random` and only switch to `/dev/urandom` once this has succeeded. +//! +//! On OpenBSD, this kind of entropy accounting isn't available, and on +//! NetBSD, blocking on it is discouraged. On these platforms, nonblocking +//! interfaces are used, even when reliable entropy may not be available. +//! On the platforms where it is used, the reliability of entropy accounting +//! itself isn't free from controversy. This library provides randomness +//! sourced according to the platform's best practices, but each platform has +//! its own limits on the grade of randomness it can promise in environments +//! with few sources of entropy. +//! +//! ## Error handling +//! +//! We always choose failure over returning known insecure "random" bytes. In +//! general, on supported platforms, failure is highly unlikely, though not +//! impossible. If an error does occur, then it is likely that it will occur +//! on every call to `getrandom`, hence after the first successful call one +//! can be reasonably confident that no errors will occur. +//! +//! [1]: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html +//! [2]: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/urandom.4.html +//! [3]: https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/2/getentropy/ +//! [4]: https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/4/urandom/ +//! [5]: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=getrandom&manpath=FreeBSD+12.0-stable +//! [6]: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=random&sektion=4 +//! [7]: https://man.openbsd.org/getentropy.2 +//! [8]: https://man.netbsd.org/sysctl.7 +//! [9]: https://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=getrandom +//! [10]: https://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=random§ion=4 +//! [11]: https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E88353_01/html/E37841/getrandom-2.html +//! [12]: https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E86824_01/html/E54777/random-7d.html +//! [13]: https://github.com/emscripten-core/emscripten/pull/12240 +//! [14]: https://www.qnx.com/developers/docs/7.1/index.html#com.qnx.doc.neutrino.utilities/topic/r/random.html +//! [15]: https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/aix/7.3?topic=files-random-urandom-devices +//! [16]: https://man.netbsd.org/getrandom.2 +//! +//! [`BCryptGenRandom`]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom +//! [`Crypto.getRandomValues`]: https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#Crypto-method-getRandomValues +//! [`RDRAND`]: https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-digital-random-number-generator-drng-software-implementation-guide +//! [`SecRandomCopyBytes`]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1399291-secrandomcopybytes?language=objc +//! [`cprng_draw`]: https://fuchsia.dev/fuchsia-src/zircon/syscalls/cprng_draw +//! [`crypto.randomFillSync`]: https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#cryptorandomfillsyncbuffer-offset-size +//! [`esp_fill_random`]: https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/esp32/api-reference/system/random.html#_CPPv415esp_fill_randomPv6size_t +//! [`random_get`]: https://github.com/WebAssembly/WASI/blob/main/phases/snapshot/docs.md#-random_getbuf-pointeru8-buf_len-size---errno +//! [WebAssembly support]: #webassembly-support +//! [`wasm-bindgen`]: https://github.com/rustwasm/wasm-bindgen +//! [`module`]: https://rustwasm.github.io/wasm-bindgen/reference/attributes/on-js-imports/module.html +//! [CommonJS modules]: https://nodejs.org/api/modules.html +//! [ES modules]: https://nodejs.org/api/esm.html +//! [`sys_read_entropy`]: https://hermitcore.github.io/libhermit-rs/hermit/fn.sys_read_entropy.html + +#![doc( + html_logo_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/logos/rust-logo-128x128-blk.png", + html_favicon_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/favicon.ico", + html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/getrandom/0.2.9" +)] +#![no_std] +#![warn(rust_2018_idioms, unused_lifetimes, missing_docs)] +#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_cfg))] + +#[macro_use] +extern crate cfg_if; + +use crate::util::{slice_as_uninit_mut, slice_assume_init_mut}; +use core::mem::MaybeUninit; + +mod error; +mod util; +// To prevent a breaking change when targets are added, we always export the +// register_custom_getrandom macro, so old Custom RNG crates continue to build. +#[cfg(feature = "custom")] +mod custom; +#[cfg(feature = "std")] +mod error_impls; + +pub use crate::error::Error; + +// System-specific implementations. +// +// These should all provide getrandom_inner with the signature +// `fn getrandom_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error>`. +// The function MUST fully initialize `dest` when `Ok(())` is returned. +// The function MUST NOT ever write uninitialized bytes into `dest`, +// regardless of what value it returns. +cfg_if! { + if #[cfg(any(target_os = "haiku", target_os = "redox", target_os = "nto", target_os = "aix"))] { + mod util_libc; + #[path = "use_file.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux"))] { + mod util_libc; + mod use_file; + #[path = "linux_android.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "illumos", target_os = "solaris"))] { + mod util_libc; + mod use_file; + #[path = "solaris_illumos.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "netbsd"))] { + mod util_libc; + #[path = "bsd_arandom.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "dragonfly")] { + mod util_libc; + mod use_file; + #[path = "dragonfly.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "fuchsia")] { + #[path = "fuchsia.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "ios", target_os = "watchos", target_os = "tvos"))] { + #[path = "apple-other.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "macos")] { + mod util_libc; + mod use_file; + #[path = "macos.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "openbsd")] { + mod util_libc; + #[path = "openbsd.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "wasi"))] { + #[path = "wasi.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "hermit")] { + #[path = "hermit.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "vxworks")] { + mod util_libc; + #[path = "vxworks.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "solid_asp3")] { + #[path = "solid.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "espidf")] { + #[path = "espidf.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(windows)] { + #[path = "windows.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(target_os = "horizon", target_arch = "arm"))] { + // We check for target_arch = "arm" because the Nintendo Switch also + // uses Horizon OS (it is aarch64). + mod util_libc; + #[path = "3ds.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(target_os = "emscripten")] { + mod util_libc; + #[path = "emscripten.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_env = "sgx"))] { + #[path = "rdrand.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(feature = "rdrand", + any(target_arch = "x86_64", target_arch = "x86")))] { + #[path = "rdrand.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(feature = "js", + any(target_arch = "wasm32", target_arch = "wasm64"), + target_os = "unknown"))] { + #[path = "js.rs"] mod imp; + } else if #[cfg(feature = "custom")] { + use custom as imp; + } else if #[cfg(all(any(target_arch = "wasm32", target_arch = "wasm64"), + target_os = "unknown"))] { + compile_error!("the wasm*-unknown-unknown targets are not supported by \ + default, you may need to enable the \"js\" feature. \ + For more information see: \ + https://docs.rs/getrandom/#webassembly-support"); + } else { + compile_error!("target is not supported, for more information see: \ + https://docs.rs/getrandom/#unsupported-targets"); + } +} + +/// Fill `dest` with random bytes from the system's preferred random number +/// source. +/// +/// This function returns an error on any failure, including partial reads. We +/// make no guarantees regarding the contents of `dest` on error. If `dest` is +/// empty, `getrandom` immediately returns success, making no calls to the +/// underlying operating system. +/// +/// Blocking is possible, at least during early boot; see module documentation. +/// +/// In general, `getrandom` will be fast enough for interactive usage, though +/// significantly slower than a user-space CSPRNG; for the latter consider +/// [`rand::thread_rng`](https://docs.rs/rand/*/rand/fn.thread_rng.html). +#[inline] +pub fn getrandom(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Error> { + // SAFETY: The `&mut MaybeUninit<_>` reference doesn't escape, and + // `getrandom_uninit` guarantees it will never de-initialize any part of + // `dest`. + getrandom_uninit(unsafe { slice_as_uninit_mut(dest) })?; + Ok(()) +} + +/// Version of the `getrandom` function which fills `dest` with random bytes +/// returns a mutable reference to those bytes. +/// +/// On successful completion this function is guaranteed to return a slice +/// which points to the same memory as `dest` and has the same length. +/// In other words, it's safe to assume that `dest` is initialized after +/// this function has returned `Ok`. +/// +/// No part of `dest` will ever be de-initialized at any point, regardless +/// of what is returned. +/// +/// # Examples +/// +/// ```ignore +/// # // We ignore this test since `uninit_array` is unstable. +/// #![feature(maybe_uninit_uninit_array)] +/// # fn main() -> Result<(), getrandom::Error> { +/// let mut buf = core::mem::MaybeUninit::uninit_array::<1024>(); +/// let buf: &mut [u8] = getrandom::getrandom_uninit(&mut buf)?; +/// # Ok(()) } +/// ``` +#[inline] +pub fn getrandom_uninit(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<&mut [u8], Error> { + if !dest.is_empty() { + imp::getrandom_inner(dest)?; + } + // SAFETY: `dest` has been fully initialized by `imp::getrandom_inner` + // since it returned `Ok`. + Ok(unsafe { slice_assume_init_mut(dest) }) +} |