1 files changed, 178 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/sample/openssl_hostname_validation.c b/ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/sample/openssl_hostname_validation.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4036ccbaab
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+++ b/ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/sample/openssl_hostname_validation.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* Obtained from: https://github.com/iSECPartners/ssl-conservatory */
+
+/*
+Copyright (C) 2012, iSEC Partners.
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
+this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
+the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
+use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
+of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
+so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions to perform basic hostname validation using OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * Please read "everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-openssl.pdf" before
+ * attempting to use this code. This whitepaper describes how the code works,
+ * how it should be used, and what its limitations are.
+ *
+ * Author:  Alban Diquet
+ * License: See LICENSE
+ *
+ */
+
+// Get rid of OSX 10.7 and greater deprecation warnings.
+#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "openssl_hostname_validation.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+
+#define HOSTNAME_MAX_SIZE 255
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || \
+	(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data ASN1_STRING_data
+#endif
+
+/**
+* Tries to find a match for hostname in the certificate's Common Name field.
+*
+* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
+* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
+* Returns MalformedCertificate if the Common Name had a NUL character embedded in it.
+* Returns Error if the Common Name could not be extracted.
+*/
+static HostnameValidationResult matches_common_name(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
+        int common_name_loc = -1;
+        X509_NAME_ENTRY *common_name_entry = NULL;
+        ASN1_STRING *common_name_asn1 = NULL;
+        const char *common_name_str = NULL;
+
+        // Find the position of the CN field in the Subject field of the certificate
+        common_name_loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name((X509 *) server_cert), NID_commonName, -1);
+        if (common_name_loc < 0) {
+                return Error;
+        }
+
+        // Extract the CN field
+        common_name_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_get_subject_name((X509 *) server_cert), common_name_loc);
+        if (common_name_entry == NULL) {
+                return Error;
+        }
+
+        // Convert the CN field to a C string
+        common_name_asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(common_name_entry);
+        if (common_name_asn1 == NULL) {
+                return Error;
+        }
+        common_name_str = (char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(common_name_asn1);
+
+        // Make sure there isn't an embedded NUL character in the CN
+        if ((size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(common_name_asn1) != strlen(common_name_str)) {
+                return MalformedCertificate;
+        }
+
+        // Compare expected hostname with the CN
+        if (Curl_cert_hostcheck(common_name_str, hostname) == CURL_HOST_MATCH) {
+                return MatchFound;
+        }
+        else {
+                return MatchNotFound;
+        }
+}
+
+
+/**
+* Tries to find a match for hostname in the certificate's Subject Alternative Name extension.
+*
+* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
+* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
+* Returns MalformedCertificate if any of the hostnames had a NUL character embedded in it.
+* Returns NoSANPresent if the SAN extension was not present in the certificate.
+*/
+static HostnameValidationResult matches_subject_alternative_name(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
+        HostnameValidationResult result = MatchNotFound;
+        int i;
+        int san_names_nb = -1;
+        STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *san_names = NULL;
+
+        // Try to extract the names within the SAN extension from the certificate
+        san_names = X509_get_ext_d2i((X509 *) server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+        if (san_names == NULL) {
+                return NoSANPresent;
+        }
+        san_names_nb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san_names);
+
+        // Check each name within the extension
+        for (i=0; i<san_names_nb; i++) {
+                const GENERAL_NAME *current_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(san_names, i);
+
+                if (current_name->type == GEN_DNS) {
+                        // Current name is a DNS name, let's check it
+                        const char *dns_name = (char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current_name->d.dNSName);
+
+                        // Make sure there isn't an embedded NUL character in the DNS name
+                        if ((size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(current_name->d.dNSName) != strlen(dns_name)) {
+                                result = MalformedCertificate;
+                                break;
+                        }
+                        else { // Compare expected hostname with the DNS name
+                                if (Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_name, hostname)
+                                    == CURL_HOST_MATCH) {
+                                        result = MatchFound;
+                                        break;
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+        sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(san_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+
+        return result;
+}
+
+
+/**
+* Validates the server's identity by looking for the expected hostname in the
+* server's certificate. As described in RFC 6125, it first tries to find a match
+* in the Subject Alternative Name extension. If the extension is not present in
+* the certificate, it checks the Common Name instead.
+*
+* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
+* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
+* Returns MalformedCertificate if any of the hostnames had a NUL character embedded in it.
+* Returns Error if there was an error.
+*/
+HostnameValidationResult validate_hostname(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
+        HostnameValidationResult result;
+
+        if((hostname == NULL) || (server_cert == NULL))
+                return Error;
+
+        // First try the Subject Alternative Names extension
+        result = matches_subject_alternative_name(hostname, server_cert);
+        if (result == NoSANPresent) {
+                // Extension was not found: try the Common Name
+                result = matches_common_name(hostname, server_cert);
+        }
+
+        return result;
+}