Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1740 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1db4568a1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1740 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
+#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
+#include "NSSSocketControl.h"
+#include "PSMRunnable.h"
+#include "SSLServerCertVerification.h"
+#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
+#include "SharedSSLState.h"
+#include "TLSClientAuthCertSelection.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/DebugOnly.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/RandomNum.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/SSLTokensCache.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/SocketProcessChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/psm/IPCClientCertsChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/psm/PIPCClientCertsChild.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h"
+#include "nsArray.h"
+#include "nsArrayUtils.h"
+#include "nsCRT.h"
+#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsClientAuthRemember.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIClientAuthDialogs.h"
+#include "nsISocketProvider.h"
+#include "nsISocketTransport.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h"
+#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
+#include "nsNSSHelper.h"
+#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "prmem.h"
+#include "prnetdb.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "sslexp.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla::psm;
+using namespace mozilla::ipc;
+
+// #define DEBUG_SSL_VERBOSE //Enable this define to get minimal
+//  reports when doing SSL read/write
+
+// #define DUMP_BUFFER  //Enable this define along with
+//  DEBUG_SSL_VERBOSE to dump SSL
+//  read/write buffer to a log.
+//  Uses PR_LOG except on Mac where
+//  we always write out to our own
+//  file.
+
+namespace {
+
+// The NSSSocketInfo tls flags are meant to be opaque to most calling
+// applications but provide a mechanism for direct TLS manipulation when
+// experimenting with new features in the scope of a single socket. They do not
+// create a persistent ABI.
+//
+// Use of these flags creates a new 'sharedSSLState' so existing states for
+// intolerance are not carried to sockets that use these flags (and intolerance
+// they discover does not impact other normal sockets not using the flags.)
+//
+// Their current definitions are:
+//
+// bits 0-2 (mask 0x07) specify the max tls version
+//          0 means no override 1->4 are 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 4->7 unused
+// bits 3-5 (mask 0x38) specify the tls fallback limit
+//          0 means no override, values 1->4 match prefs
+// bit    6 (mask 0x40) was used to specify compat mode. Temporarily reserved.
+
+enum {
+  kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion10 = 0x01,
+  kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion11 = 0x02,
+  kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion12 = 0x03,
+  kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion13 = 0x04,
+};
+
+static uint32_t getTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion(uint32_t flags) {
+  return (flags & 0x07);
+}
+
+static uint32_t getTLSProviderFlagFallbackLimit(uint32_t flags) {
+  return (flags & 0x38) >> 3;
+}
+
+void getSiteKey(const nsACString& hostName, uint16_t port,
+                /*out*/ nsACString& key) {
+  key = hostName;
+  key.AppendLiteral(":");
+  key.AppendInt(port);
+}
+
+}  // unnamed namespace
+
+extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::Cleanup() {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+  mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Clear();
+  mInsecureFallbackSites.Clear();
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+enum Operation { reading, writing, not_reading_or_writing };
+
+int32_t checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransfered, bool wasReading,
+                       PRFileDesc* ssl_layer_fd, NSSSocketControl* socketInfo);
+
+NSSSocketControl* getSocketInfoIfRunning(PRFileDesc* fd, Operation op) {
+  if (!fd || !fd->lower || !fd->secret ||
+      fd->identity != nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerIdentity) {
+    NS_ERROR("bad file descriptor passed to getSocketInfoIfRunning");
+    PR_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR, 0);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->secret;
+
+  if (socketInfo->IsCanceled()) {
+    PRErrorCode err = socketInfo->GetErrorCode();
+    PR_SetError(err, 0);
+    if (op == reading || op == writing) {
+      // We must do TLS intolerance checks for reads and writes, for timeouts
+      // in particular.
+      (void)checkHandshake(-1, op == reading, fd, socketInfo);
+    }
+
+    // If we get here, it is probably because cert verification failed and this
+    // is the first I/O attempt since that failure.
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return socketInfo;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+static PRStatus nsSSLIOLayerConnect(PRFileDesc* fd, const PRNetAddr* addr,
+                                    PRIntervalTime timeout) {
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("[%p] connecting SSL socket\n", (void*)fd));
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  PRStatus status = fd->lower->methods->connect(fd->lower, addr, timeout);
+  if (status != PR_SUCCESS) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error,
+            ("[%p] Lower layer connect error: %d\n", (void*)fd, PR_GetError()));
+    return status;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("[%p] Connect\n", (void*)fd));
+  return status;
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::rememberTolerantAtVersion(const nsACString& hostName,
+                                                    int16_t port,
+                                                    uint16_t tolerant) {
+  nsCString key;
+  getSiteKey(hostName, port, key);
+
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+
+  IntoleranceEntry entry;
+  if (mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Get(key, &entry)) {
+    entry.AssertInvariant();
+    entry.tolerant = std::max(entry.tolerant, tolerant);
+    if (entry.intolerant != 0 && entry.intolerant <= entry.tolerant) {
+      entry.intolerant = entry.tolerant + 1;
+      entry.intoleranceReason = 0;  // lose the reason
+    }
+  } else {
+    entry.tolerant = tolerant;
+    entry.intolerant = 0;
+    entry.intoleranceReason = 0;
+  }
+
+  entry.AssertInvariant();
+
+  mTLSIntoleranceInfo.InsertOrUpdate(key, entry);
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::forgetIntolerance(const nsACString& hostName,
+                                            int16_t port) {
+  nsCString key;
+  getSiteKey(hostName, port, key);
+
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+
+  IntoleranceEntry entry;
+  if (mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Get(key, &entry)) {
+    entry.AssertInvariant();
+
+    entry.intolerant = 0;
+    entry.intoleranceReason = 0;
+
+    entry.AssertInvariant();
+    mTLSIntoleranceInfo.InsertOrUpdate(key, entry);
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::fallbackLimitReached(const nsACString& hostName,
+                                               uint16_t intolerant) {
+  if (isInsecureFallbackSite(hostName)) {
+    return intolerant <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+  }
+  return intolerant <= mVersionFallbackLimit;
+}
+
+// returns true if we should retry the handshake
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::rememberIntolerantAtVersion(
+    const nsACString& hostName, int16_t port, uint16_t minVersion,
+    uint16_t intolerant, PRErrorCode intoleranceReason) {
+  if (intolerant <= minVersion || fallbackLimitReached(hostName, intolerant)) {
+    // We can't fall back any further. Assume that intolerance isn't the issue.
+    forgetIntolerance(hostName, port);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCString key;
+  getSiteKey(hostName, port, key);
+
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+
+  IntoleranceEntry entry;
+  if (mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Get(key, &entry)) {
+    entry.AssertInvariant();
+    if (intolerant <= entry.tolerant) {
+      // We already know the server is tolerant at an equal or higher version.
+      return false;
+    }
+    if ((entry.intolerant != 0 && intolerant >= entry.intolerant)) {
+      // We already know that the server is intolerant at a lower version.
+      return true;
+    }
+  } else {
+    entry.tolerant = 0;
+  }
+
+  entry.intolerant = intolerant;
+  entry.intoleranceReason = intoleranceReason;
+  entry.AssertInvariant();
+  mTLSIntoleranceInfo.InsertOrUpdate(key, entry);
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::adjustForTLSIntolerance(
+    const nsACString& hostName, int16_t port,
+    /*in/out*/ SSLVersionRange& range) {
+  IntoleranceEntry entry;
+
+  {
+    nsCString key;
+    getSiteKey(hostName, port, key);
+
+    MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+    if (!mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Get(key, &entry)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  entry.AssertInvariant();
+
+  if (entry.intolerant != 0) {
+    // We've tried connecting at a higher range but failed, so try at the
+    // version we haven't tried yet, unless we have reached the minimum.
+    if (range.min < entry.intolerant) {
+      range.max = entry.intolerant - 1;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+PRErrorCode nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::getIntoleranceReason(
+    const nsACString& hostName, int16_t port) {
+  IntoleranceEntry entry;
+
+  {
+    nsCString key;
+    getSiteKey(hostName, port, key);
+
+    MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+    if (!mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Get(key, &entry)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  entry.AssertInvariant();
+  return entry.intoleranceReason;
+}
+
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerInitialized = false;
+PRDescIdentity nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerIdentity;
+PRDescIdentity nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity;
+PRIOMethods nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerMethods;
+PRIOMethods nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerMethods;
+
+static PRStatus nsSSLIOLayerClose(PRFileDesc* fd) {
+  if (!fd) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("[%p] Shutting down socket\n", (void*)fd));
+
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->secret;
+  MOZ_ASSERT(socketInfo, "NSSSocketControl was null for an fd");
+
+  return socketInfo->CloseSocketAndDestroy();
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_SSL_VERBOSE) && defined(DUMP_BUFFER)
+// Dumps a (potentially binary) buffer using SSM_DEBUG.  (We could have used
+// the version in ssltrace.c, but that's specifically tailored to SSLTRACE.)
+#  define DUMPBUF_LINESIZE 24
+static void nsDumpBuffer(unsigned char* buf, int len) {
+  char hexbuf[DUMPBUF_LINESIZE * 3 + 1];
+  char chrbuf[DUMPBUF_LINESIZE + 1];
+  static const char* hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+  int i = 0;
+  int l = 0;
+  char ch;
+  char* c;
+  char* h;
+  if (len == 0) return;
+  hexbuf[DUMPBUF_LINESIZE * 3] = '\0';
+  chrbuf[DUMPBUF_LINESIZE] = '\0';
+  (void)memset(hexbuf, 0x20, DUMPBUF_LINESIZE * 3);
+  (void)memset(chrbuf, 0x20, DUMPBUF_LINESIZE);
+  h = hexbuf;
+  c = chrbuf;
+
+  while (i < len) {
+    ch = buf[i];
+
+    if (l == DUMPBUF_LINESIZE) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("%s%s\n", hexbuf, chrbuf));
+      (void)memset(hexbuf, 0x20, DUMPBUF_LINESIZE * 3);
+      (void)memset(chrbuf, 0x20, DUMPBUF_LINESIZE);
+      h = hexbuf;
+      c = chrbuf;
+      l = 0;
+    }
+
+    // Convert a character to hex.
+    *h++ = hex[(ch >> 4) & 0xf];
+    *h++ = hex[ch & 0xf];
+    h++;
+
+    // Put the character (if it's printable) into the character buffer.
+    if ((ch >= 0x20) && (ch <= 0x7e)) {
+      *c++ = ch;
+    } else {
+      *c++ = '.';
+    }
+    i++;
+    l++;
+  }
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("%s%s\n", hexbuf, chrbuf));
+}
+
+#  define DEBUG_DUMP_BUFFER(buf, len) nsDumpBuffer(buf, len)
+#else
+#  define DEBUG_DUMP_BUFFER(buf, len)
+#endif
+
+namespace {
+
+uint32_t tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(PRErrorCode err) {
+  // returns a numeric code for where we track various errors in telemetry
+  // only errors that cause version fallback are tracked,
+  // so this is also used to determine which errors can cause version fallback
+  switch (err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT:
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ:
+      return 2;
+    case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT:
+      return 3;
+    case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT:
+      return 4;
+    case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT:
+      return 6;
+    case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP:
+      return 7;
+    case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION:
+      return 10;
+    case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT:
+      return 11;
+    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE:
+      return 13;
+    case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT:
+      return 14;
+    case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+      return 16;
+    case PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR:
+      return 17;
+    case SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT:
+      return 18;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+bool retryDueToTLSIntolerance(PRErrorCode err, NSSSocketControl* socketInfo) {
+  // This function is supposed to decide which error codes should
+  // be used to conclude server is TLS intolerant.
+  // Note this only happens during the initial SSL handshake.
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_tls_ech_disable_grease_on_fallback() &&
+      socketInfo->GetEchExtensionStatus() == EchExtensionStatus::kGREASE) {
+    // Don't record any intolerances if we used ECH GREASE but force a retry.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  SSLVersionRange range = socketInfo->GetTLSVersionRange();
+  nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& helpers = socketInfo->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
+
+  if (err == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION &&
+      range.min == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) {
+    socketInfo->SetSecurityState(nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_INSECURE |
+                                 nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_USES_SSL_3);
+  }
+
+  // NSS will return SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO if anti-downgrade
+  // detected the downgrade.
+  if (err == SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT ||
+      err == SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO) {
+    // This is a clear signal that we've fallen back too many versions.  Treat
+    // this as a hard failure, but forget any intolerance so that later attempts
+    // don't use this version (i.e., range.max) and trigger the error again.
+
+    // First, track the original cause of the version fallback.  This uses the
+    // same buckets as the telemetry below, except that bucket 0 will include
+    // all cases where there wasn't an original reason.
+    PRErrorCode originalReason = helpers.getIntoleranceReason(
+        socketInfo->GetHostName(), socketInfo->GetPort());
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_VERSION_FALLBACK_INAPPROPRIATE,
+                          tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(originalReason));
+
+    helpers.forgetIntolerance(socketInfo->GetHostName(), socketInfo->GetPort());
+
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // When not using a proxy we'll see a connection reset error.
+  // When using a proxy, we'll see an end of file error.
+
+  // Don't allow STARTTLS connections to fall back on connection resets or
+  // EOF.
+  if ((err == PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR || err == PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR) &&
+      socketInfo->GetForSTARTTLS()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t reason = tlsIntoleranceTelemetryBucket(err);
+  if (reason == 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  Telemetry::HistogramID pre;
+  Telemetry::HistogramID post;
+  switch (range.max) {
+    case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+      pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
+      post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS13_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
+      break;
+    case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+      pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
+      post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS12_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
+      break;
+    case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+      pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
+      post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS11_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
+      break;
+    case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+      pre = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_PRE;
+      post = Telemetry::SSL_TLS10_INTOLERANCE_REASON_POST;
+      break;
+    default:
+      MOZ_CRASH("impossible TLS version");
+      return false;
+  }
+
+  // The difference between _PRE and _POST represents how often we avoided
+  // TLS intolerance fallback due to remembered tolerance.
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(pre, reason);
+
+  if (!helpers.rememberIntolerantAtVersion(socketInfo->GetHostName(),
+                                           socketInfo->GetPort(), range.min,
+                                           range.max, err)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(post, reason);
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Ensure that we haven't added too many errors to fit.
+static_assert((SSL_ERROR_END_OF_LIST - SSL_ERROR_BASE) <= 256,
+              "too many SSL errors");
+static_assert((SEC_ERROR_END_OF_LIST - SEC_ERROR_BASE) <= 256,
+              "too many SEC errors");
+static_assert((PR_MAX_ERROR - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) <= 128,
+              "too many NSPR errors");
+static_assert((mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE - mozilla::pkix::END_OF_LIST) < 31,
+              "too many moz::pkix errors");
+
+static void reportHandshakeResult(int32_t bytesTransferred, bool wasReading,
+                                  PRErrorCode err,
+                                  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo) {
+  uint32_t bucket;
+
+  // A negative bytesTransferred or a 0 read are errors.
+  if (bytesTransferred > 0) {
+    bucket = 0;
+  } else if ((bytesTransferred == 0) && !wasReading) {
+    // PR_Write() is defined to never return 0, but let's make sure.
+    // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_Write.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false);
+    bucket = 671;
+  } else if (IS_SSL_ERROR(err)) {
+    bucket = err - SSL_ERROR_BASE;
+    MOZ_ASSERT(bucket > 0);  // SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER isn't used.
+  } else if (IS_SEC_ERROR(err)) {
+    bucket = (err - SEC_ERROR_BASE) + 256;
+  } else if ((err >= PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) && (err < PR_MAX_ERROR)) {
+    bucket = (err - PR_NSPR_ERROR_BASE) + 512;
+  } else if ((err >= mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) &&
+             (err < mozilla::pkix::ERROR_LIMIT)) {
+    bucket = (err - mozilla::pkix::ERROR_BASE) + 640;
+  } else {
+    bucket = 671;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t flags = socketInfo->GetProviderFlags();
+  if (!(flags & nsISocketProvider::IS_RETRY)) {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_RESULT_FIRST_TRY, bucket);
+  }
+
+  if (flags & nsISocketProvider::BE_CONSERVATIVE) {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_RESULT_CONSERVATIVE, bucket);
+  }
+
+  switch (socketInfo->GetEchExtensionStatus()) {
+    case EchExtensionStatus::kGREASE:
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_RESULT_ECH_GREASE, bucket);
+      break;
+    case EchExtensionStatus::kReal:
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_RESULT_ECH, bucket);
+      break;
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_RESULT, bucket);
+
+  if (bucket == 0) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo;
+    if (NS_FAILED(socketInfo->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(securityInfo))) ||
+        !securityInfo) {
+      return;
+    }
+    // Web Privacy Telemetry for successful connections.
+    bool success = true;
+
+    bool usedPrivateDNS = false;
+    success &= securityInfo->GetUsedPrivateDNS(&usedPrivateDNS) == NS_OK;
+
+    bool madeOCSPRequest = false;
+    success &= securityInfo->GetMadeOCSPRequests(&madeOCSPRequest) == NS_OK;
+
+    uint16_t protocolVersion = 0;
+    success &= securityInfo->GetProtocolVersion(&protocolVersion) == NS_OK;
+    bool usedTLS13 = protocolVersion == 4;
+
+    bool usedECH = false;
+    success &= securityInfo->GetIsAcceptedEch(&usedECH) == NS_OK;
+
+    // As bucket is 0 we are reporting the results of a sucessful connection
+    // and so TransportSecurityInfo should be populated. However, this isn't
+    // happening in all cases, see Bug 1789458.
+    if (success) {
+      uint8_t TLSPrivacyResult = 0;
+      TLSPrivacyResult |= usedTLS13 << 0;
+      TLSPrivacyResult |= !madeOCSPRequest << 1;
+      TLSPrivacyResult |= usedPrivateDNS << 2;
+      TLSPrivacyResult |= usedECH << 3;
+
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_PRIVACY, TLSPrivacyResult);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Check the status of the handshake. This is where PSM checks for TLS
+// intolerance and potentially sets up TLS intolerance fallback by noting the
+// intolerance, setting the NSPR error to PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR, and returning
+// -1 as the bytes transferred so that necko retries the connection.
+// Otherwise, PSM returns the bytes transferred unchanged.
+int32_t checkHandshake(int32_t bytesTransferred, bool wasReading,
+                       PRFileDesc* ssl_layer_fd, NSSSocketControl* socketInfo) {
+  const PRErrorCode originalError = PR_GetError();
+
+  // If the connection would block, return early.
+  if (bytesTransferred < 0 && originalError == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+    PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+    return bytesTransferred;
+  }
+
+  // We only need to do TLS intolerance checking for the first transfer.
+  bool handleHandshakeResultNow = socketInfo->IsHandshakePending();
+  if (!handleHandshakeResultNow) {
+    // If we've encountered an error since the handshake, ensure the socket
+    // control is cancelled, so that getSocketInfoIfRunning will correctly
+    // cause us to fail if another part of Gecko (erroneously) calls an I/O
+    // function (PR_Send/PR_Recv/etc.) again on this socket.
+    if (bytesTransferred < 0) {
+      if (!socketInfo->IsCanceled()) {
+        socketInfo->SetCanceled(originalError);
+      }
+      PR_SetError(originalError, 0);
+    }
+    return bytesTransferred;
+  }
+
+  // TLS intolerant servers only cause the first transfer to fail, so let's
+  // set the HandshakePending attribute to false so that we don't try this logic
+  // again in a subsequent transfer.
+  socketInfo->SetHandshakeNotPending();
+  // Report the result once for each handshake. Note that this does not
+  // get handshakes which are cancelled before any reads or writes
+  // happen.
+  reportHandshakeResult(bytesTransferred, wasReading, originalError,
+                        socketInfo);
+
+  // If there was no error, return early. The case where we read 0 bytes is not
+  // considered an error by NSS, but PSM interprets this as TLS intolerance, so
+  // we turn it into an error. Writes of 0 bytes are an error, because PR_Write
+  // is never supposed to return 0.
+  if (bytesTransferred > 0) {
+    return bytesTransferred;
+  }
+
+  // There was some sort of error. Determine what it was and if we want to
+  // retry the connection due to TLS intolerance.
+  PRErrorCode errorToUse = originalError;
+  // Turn zero-length reads into errors and handle zero-length write errors.
+  if (bytesTransferred == 0) {
+    if (wasReading) {
+      errorToUse = PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR;
+    } else {
+      errorToUse = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    bytesTransferred = -1;
+  }
+  bool wantRetry = retryDueToTLSIntolerance(errorToUse, socketInfo);
+  // Set the error on the socket control and cancel it.
+  if (!socketInfo->IsCanceled()) {
+    socketInfo->SetCanceled(errorToUse);
+  }
+
+  if (wantRetry) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("[%p] checkHandshake: will retry with lower max TLS version",
+             ssl_layer_fd));
+    // Setting the error PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR causes necko to retry the
+    // connection.
+    PR_SetError(PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR, 0);
+  } else {
+    PR_SetError(originalError, 0);
+  }
+
+  return bytesTransferred;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+static int16_t nsSSLIOLayerPoll(PRFileDesc* fd, int16_t in_flags,
+                                int16_t* out_flags) {
+  if (!out_flags) {
+    NS_WARNING("nsSSLIOLayerPoll called with null out_flags");
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_flags = 0;
+
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo =
+      getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing);
+
+  if (!socketInfo) {
+    // If we get here, it is probably because certificate validation failed
+    // and this is the first I/O operation after the failure.
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+        ("[%p] polling SSL socket right after certificate verification failed "
+         "or NSS shutdown or SDR logout %d\n",
+         fd, (int)in_flags));
+
+    MOZ_ASSERT(in_flags & PR_POLL_EXCEPT,
+               "Caller did not poll for EXCEPT (canceled)");
+    // Since this poll method cannot return errors, we want the caller to call
+    // PR_Send/PR_Recv right away to get the error, so we tell that we are
+    // ready for whatever I/O they are asking for. (See getSocketInfoIfRunning).
+    *out_flags = in_flags | PR_POLL_EXCEPT;  // see also bug 480619
+    return in_flags;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          (socketInfo->IsWaitingForCertVerification()
+               ? "[%p] polling SSL socket during certificate verification "
+                 "using lower %d\n"
+               : "[%p] poll SSL socket using lower %d\n",
+           fd, (int)in_flags));
+
+  // We want the handshake to continue during certificate validation, so we
+  // don't need to do anything special here. libssl automatically blocks when
+  // it reaches any point that would be unsafe to send/receive something before
+  // cert validation is complete.
+  int16_t result = fd->lower->methods->poll(fd->lower, in_flags, out_flags);
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("[%p] poll SSL socket returned %d\n", (void*)fd, (int)result));
+  return result;
+}
+
+nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerHelpers(uint32_t aTlsFlags)
+    : mTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(false),
+      mTLSIntoleranceInfo(),
+      mVersionFallbackLimit(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0),
+      mutex("nsSSLIOLayerHelpers.mutex"),
+      mTlsFlags(aTlsFlags) {}
+
+// PSMAvailable and PSMAvailable64 are reachable, but they're unimplemented in
+// PSM, so we set an error and return -1.
+static int32_t PSMAvailable(PRFileDesc*) {
+  PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+static int64_t PSMAvailable64(PRFileDesc*) {
+  PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMGetsockname(PRFileDesc* fd, PRNetAddr* addr) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->getsockname(fd->lower, addr);
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMGetpeername(PRFileDesc* fd, PRNetAddr* addr) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->getpeername(fd->lower, addr);
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMGetsocketoption(PRFileDesc* fd, PRSocketOptionData* data) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->getsocketoption(fd, data);
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMSetsocketoption(PRFileDesc* fd,
+                                   const PRSocketOptionData* data) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->setsocketoption(fd, data);
+}
+
+static int32_t PSMRecv(PRFileDesc* fd, void* buf, int32_t amount, int flags,
+                       PRIntervalTime timeout) {
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, reading);
+  if (!socketInfo) return -1;
+
+  if (flags != PR_MSG_PEEK && flags != 0) {
+    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR, 0);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int32_t bytesRead =
+      fd->lower->methods->recv(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("[%p] read %d bytes\n", (void*)fd, bytesRead));
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SSL_VERBOSE
+  DEBUG_DUMP_BUFFER((unsigned char*)buf, bytesRead);
+#endif
+
+  return checkHandshake(bytesRead, true, fd, socketInfo);
+}
+
+static int32_t PSMSend(PRFileDesc* fd, const void* buf, int32_t amount,
+                       int flags, PRIntervalTime timeout) {
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, writing);
+  if (!socketInfo) return -1;
+
+  if (flags != 0) {
+    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR, 0);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SSL_VERBOSE
+  DEBUG_DUMP_BUFFER((unsigned char*)buf, amount);
+#endif
+
+  if (socketInfo->IsShortWritePending() && amount > 0) {
+    // We got "SSL short write" last time, try to flush the pending byte.
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    socketInfo->CheckShortWrittenBuffer(static_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf),
+                                        amount);
+#endif
+
+    buf = socketInfo->GetShortWritePendingByteRef();
+    amount = 1;
+
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("[%p] pushing 1 byte after SSL short write", fd));
+  }
+
+  int32_t bytesWritten =
+      fd->lower->methods->send(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+  // NSS indicates that it can't write all requested data (due to network
+  // congestion, for example) by returning either one less than the amount
+  // of data requested or 16383, if the requested amount is greater than
+  // 16384. We refer to this as a "short write". If we simply returned
+  // the amount that NSS did write, the layer above us would then call
+  // PSMSend with a very small amount of data (often 1). This is inefficient
+  // and can lead to alternating between sending large packets and very small
+  // packets. To prevent this, we alert the layer calling us that the operation
+  // would block and that it should be retried later, with the same data.
+  // When it does, we tell NSS to write the remaining byte it didn't write
+  // in the previous call. We then return the total number of bytes written,
+  // which is the number that caused the short write plus the additional byte
+  // we just wrote out.
+
+  // The 16384 value is based on libssl's maximum buffer size:
+  //    MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH - 1
+  //
+  // It's in a private header, though, filed bug 1394822 to expose it.
+  static const int32_t kShortWrite16k = 16383;
+
+  if ((amount > 1 && bytesWritten == (amount - 1)) ||
+      (amount > kShortWrite16k && bytesWritten == kShortWrite16k)) {
+    // This is indication of an "SSL short write", block to force retry.
+    socketInfo->SetShortWritePending(
+        bytesWritten + 1,  // The amount to return after the flush
+        *(static_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf) + bytesWritten));
+
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+        ("[%p] indicated SSL short write for %d bytes (written just %d bytes)",
+         fd, amount, bytesWritten));
+
+    bytesWritten = -1;
+    PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    socketInfo->RememberShortWrittenBuffer(
+        static_cast<const unsigned char*>(buf));
+#endif
+
+  } else if (socketInfo->IsShortWritePending() && bytesWritten == 1) {
+    // We have now flushed all pending data in the SSL socket
+    // after the indicated short write.  Tell the upper layer
+    // it has sent all its data now.
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("[%p] finished SSL short write", fd));
+
+    bytesWritten = socketInfo->ResetShortWritePending();
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("[%p] wrote %d bytes\n", fd, bytesWritten));
+
+  return checkHandshake(bytesWritten, false, fd, socketInfo);
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMBind(PRFileDesc* fd, const PRNetAddr* addr) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) return PR_FAILURE;
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->bind(fd->lower, addr);
+}
+
+static int32_t nsSSLIOLayerRead(PRFileDesc* fd, void* buf, int32_t amount) {
+  return PSMRecv(fd, buf, amount, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static int32_t nsSSLIOLayerWrite(PRFileDesc* fd, const void* buf,
+                                 int32_t amount) {
+  return PSMSend(fd, buf, amount, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static PRStatus PSMConnectcontinue(PRFileDesc* fd, int16_t out_flags) {
+  if (!getSocketInfoIfRunning(fd, not_reading_or_writing)) {
+    return PR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  return fd->lower->methods->connectcontinue(fd, out_flags);
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+class PrefObserver : public nsIObserver {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSIOBSERVER
+  explicit PrefObserver(nsSSLIOLayerHelpers* aOwner) : mOwner(aOwner) {}
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~PrefObserver() = default;
+
+ private:
+  nsSSLIOLayerHelpers* mOwner;
+};
+
+}  // unnamed namespace
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(PrefObserver, nsIObserver)
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+PrefObserver::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic,
+                      const char16_t* someData) {
+  if (nsCRT::strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID) == 0) {
+    NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 prefName(someData);
+
+    if (prefName.EqualsLiteral(
+            "security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken")) {
+      bool enabled;
+      Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken",
+                           &enabled);
+      mOwner->setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(enabled);
+    } else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.tls.version.fallback-limit")) {
+      mOwner->loadVersionFallbackLimit();
+    } else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts")) {
+      // Changes to the allowlist on the public side will update the pref.
+      // Don't propagate the changes to the private side.
+      if (mOwner->isPublic()) {
+        mOwner->initInsecureFallbackSites();
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static int32_t PlaintextRecv(PRFileDesc* fd, void* buf, int32_t amount,
+                             int flags, PRIntervalTime timeout) {
+  // The shutdownlocker is not needed here because it will already be
+  // held higher in the stack
+  NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = nullptr;
+
+  int32_t bytesRead =
+      fd->lower->methods->recv(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+  if (fd->identity == nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity)
+    socketInfo = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->secret;
+
+  if ((bytesRead > 0) && socketInfo)
+    socketInfo->AddPlaintextBytesRead(bytesRead);
+  return bytesRead;
+}
+
+nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::~nsSSLIOLayerHelpers() {
+  // mPrefObserver will only be set if this->Init was called. The GTest tests
+  // do not call Init.
+  if (mPrefObserver) {
+    Preferences::RemoveObserver(
+        mPrefObserver, "security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken");
+    Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
+                                "security.tls.version.fallback-limit");
+    Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
+                                "security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts");
+  }
+}
+
+template <typename R, R return_value, typename... Args>
+static R InvalidPRIOMethod(Args...) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("I/O method is invalid");
+  PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0);
+  return return_value;
+}
+
+nsresult nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::Init() {
+  if (!nsSSLIOLayerInitialized) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+    nsSSLIOLayerInitialized = true;
+    nsSSLIOLayerIdentity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("NSS layer");
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods = *PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.fsync =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRStatus, PR_FAILURE, PRFileDesc*>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.seek =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, int32_t, PRSeekWhence>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.seek64 =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int64_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, int64_t, PRSeekWhence>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.fileInfo =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRStatus, PR_FAILURE, PRFileDesc*, PRFileInfo*>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.fileInfo64 =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRStatus, PR_FAILURE, PRFileDesc*, PRFileInfo64*>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.writev =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, const PRIOVec*, int32_t,
+                          PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.accept =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRFileDesc*, nullptr, PRFileDesc*, PRNetAddr*,
+                          PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.listen =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRStatus, PR_FAILURE, PRFileDesc*, int>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.shutdown =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<PRStatus, PR_FAILURE, PRFileDesc*, int>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.recvfrom =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, void*, int32_t, int,
+                          PRNetAddr*, PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.sendto =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, const void*, int32_t, int,
+                          const PRNetAddr*, PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.acceptread =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, PRFileDesc**, PRNetAddr**,
+                          void*, int32_t, PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.transmitfile =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, PRFileDesc*, const void*,
+                          int32_t, PRTransmitFileFlags, PRIntervalTime>;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.sendfile =
+        InvalidPRIOMethod<int32_t, -1, PRFileDesc*, PRSendFileData*,
+                          PRTransmitFileFlags, PRIntervalTime>;
+
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.available = PSMAvailable;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.available64 = PSMAvailable64;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.getsockname = PSMGetsockname;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.getpeername = PSMGetpeername;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.getsocketoption = PSMGetsocketoption;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.setsocketoption = PSMSetsocketoption;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.recv = PSMRecv;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.send = PSMSend;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.connectcontinue = PSMConnectcontinue;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.bind = PSMBind;
+
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.connect = nsSSLIOLayerConnect;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.close = nsSSLIOLayerClose;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.write = nsSSLIOLayerWrite;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.read = nsSSLIOLayerRead;
+    nsSSLIOLayerMethods.poll = nsSSLIOLayerPoll;
+
+    nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("Plaintxext PSM layer");
+    nsSSLPlaintextLayerMethods = *PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+    nsSSLPlaintextLayerMethods.recv = PlaintextRecv;
+  }
+
+  loadVersionFallbackLimit();
+
+  // non main thread helpers will need to use defaults
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    bool enabled = false;
+    Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken",
+                         &enabled);
+    setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(enabled);
+
+    initInsecureFallbackSites();
+
+    mPrefObserver = new PrefObserver(this);
+    Preferences::AddStrongObserver(
+        mPrefObserver, "security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken");
+    Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
+                                   "security.tls.version.fallback-limit");
+    Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
+                                   "security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts");
+  } else {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(mTlsFlags, "Only per socket version can ignore prefs");
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::loadVersionFallbackLimit() {
+  // see nsNSSComponent::SetEnabledTLSVersions for pref handling rules
+  uint32_t limit = 3;  // TLS 1.2
+
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    limit = Preferences::GetUint("security.tls.version.fallback-limit",
+                                 3);  // 3 = TLS 1.2
+  }
+
+  // set fallback limit if it is set in the tls flags
+  uint32_t tlsFlagsFallbackLimit = getTLSProviderFlagFallbackLimit(mTlsFlags);
+
+  if (tlsFlagsFallbackLimit) {
+    limit = tlsFlagsFallbackLimit;
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("loadVersionFallbackLimit overriden by tlsFlags %d\n", limit));
+  }
+
+  SSLVersionRange defaults = {SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
+                              SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2};
+  SSLVersionRange filledInRange;
+  nsNSSComponent::FillTLSVersionRange(filledInRange, limit, limit, defaults);
+  if (filledInRange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+    filledInRange.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+  }
+
+  mVersionFallbackLimit = filledInRange.max;
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::clearStoredData() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  initInsecureFallbackSites();
+
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+  mTLSIntoleranceInfo.Clear();
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::setInsecureFallbackSites(const nsCString& str) {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+
+  mInsecureFallbackSites.Clear();
+
+  for (const nsACString& host : nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(str, ',').ToRange()) {
+    if (!host.IsEmpty()) {
+      mInsecureFallbackSites.PutEntry(host);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::initInsecureFallbackSites() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  nsAutoCString insecureFallbackHosts;
+  Preferences::GetCString("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts",
+                          insecureFallbackHosts);
+  setInsecureFallbackSites(insecureFallbackHosts);
+}
+
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::isPublic() const {
+  return this == &PublicSSLState()->IOLayerHelpers();
+}
+
+class FallbackPrefRemover final : public Runnable {
+ public:
+  explicit FallbackPrefRemover(const nsACString& aHost)
+      : mozilla::Runnable("FallbackPrefRemover"), mHost(aHost) {}
+  NS_IMETHOD Run() override;
+
+ private:
+  nsCString mHost;
+};
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+FallbackPrefRemover::Run() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  nsAutoCString oldValue;
+  Preferences::GetCString("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts", oldValue);
+  nsCString newValue;
+  for (const nsACString& host :
+       nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(oldValue, ',').ToRange()) {
+    if (host.Equals(mHost)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!newValue.IsEmpty()) {
+      newValue.Append(',');
+    }
+    newValue.Append(host);
+  }
+  Preferences::SetCString("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts", newValue);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::removeInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname,
+                                                     uint16_t port) {
+  forgetIntolerance(hostname, port);
+  {
+    MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+    if (!mInsecureFallbackSites.Contains(hostname)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    mInsecureFallbackSites.RemoveEntry(hostname);
+  }
+  if (!isPublic()) {
+    return;
+  }
+  RefPtr<Runnable> runnable = new FallbackPrefRemover(hostname);
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    runnable->Run();
+  } else {
+    NS_DispatchToMainThread(runnable);
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::isInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname) {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+  return mInsecureFallbackSites.Contains(hostname);
+}
+
+void nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(bool broken) {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+  mTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken = broken;
+}
+
+bool nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken() {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mutex);
+  return mTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken;
+}
+
+nsresult nsSSLIOLayerNewSocket(int32_t family, const char* host, int32_t port,
+                               nsIProxyInfo* proxy,
+                               const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                               PRFileDesc** fd,
+                               nsITLSSocketControl** tlsSocketControl,
+                               bool forSTARTTLS, uint32_t flags,
+                               uint32_t tlsFlags) {
+  PRFileDesc* sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(family);
+  if (!sock) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      nsSSLIOLayerAddToSocket(family, host, port, proxy, originAttributes, sock,
+                              tlsSocketControl, forSTARTTLS, flags, tlsFlags);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    PR_Close(sock);
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  *fd = sock;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc* nsSSLIOLayerImportFD(PRFileDesc* fd,
+                                        NSSSocketControl* infoObject,
+                                        const char* host, bool haveHTTPSProxy) {
+  PRFileDesc* sslSock = SSL_ImportFD(nullptr, fd);
+  if (!sslSock) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("NSS: Error importing socket");
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(sslSock, (nsIInterfaceRequestor*)infoObject);
+  SSL_HandshakeCallback(sslSock, HandshakeCallback, infoObject);
+  SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(sslSock, CanFalseStartCallback, infoObject);
+
+  // Disable this hook if we connect anonymously. See bug 466080.
+  uint32_t flags = 0;
+  infoObject->GetProviderFlags(&flags);
+  // Provide the client cert to HTTPS proxy no matter if it is anonymous.
+  if (flags & nsISocketProvider::ANONYMOUS_CONNECT && !haveHTTPSProxy &&
+      !(flags & nsISocketProvider::ANONYMOUS_CONNECT_ALLOW_CLIENT_CERT)) {
+    SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(sslSock, nullptr, infoObject);
+  } else {
+    SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(sslSock, SSLGetClientAuthDataHook, infoObject);
+  }
+
+  if (SECSuccess !=
+      SSL_AuthCertificateHook(sslSock, AuthCertificateHook, infoObject)) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Failed to configure AuthCertificateHook");
+    goto loser;
+  }
+
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_SetURL(sslSock, host)) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("SSL_SetURL failed");
+    goto loser;
+  }
+
+  return sslSock;
+loser:
+  if (sslSock) {
+    PR_Close(sslSock);
+  }
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// Please change getSignatureName in nsNSSCallbacks.cpp when changing the list
+// here. See NOTE at SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet call site.
+static const SSLSignatureScheme sEnabledSignatureSchemes[] = {
+    ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+    ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+    ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+#if !defined(EARLY_BETA_OR_EARLIER)
+    ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1,
+#endif
+    ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+};
+
+static nsresult nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions(PRFileDesc* fd, bool forSTARTTLS,
+                                       bool haveProxy, const char* host,
+                                       int32_t port,
+                                       NSSSocketControl* infoObject) {
+  if (forSTARTTLS || haveProxy) {
+    if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_SECURITY, false)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  SSLVersionRange range;
+  if (SSL_VersionRangeGet(fd, &range) != SECSuccess) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // Set TLS 1.3 compat mode.
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE, PR_TRUE)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error,
+            ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: Setting compat mode failed\n", fd));
+  }
+
+  // setting TLS max version
+  uint32_t versionFlags =
+      getTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion(infoObject->GetProviderTlsFlags());
+  if (versionFlags) {
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+        ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: version flags %d\n", fd, versionFlags));
+    if (versionFlags == kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion10) {
+      range.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+    } else if (versionFlags == kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion11) {
+      range.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+    } else if (versionFlags == kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion12) {
+      range.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+    } else if (versionFlags == kTLSProviderFlagMaxVersion13) {
+      range.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+    } else {
+      MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error,
+              ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: unknown version flags %d\n", fd,
+               versionFlags));
+    }
+  }
+
+  if ((infoObject->GetProviderFlags() & nsISocketProvider::BE_CONSERVATIVE) &&
+      (range.max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: range.max limited to 1.2 due to "
+             "BE_CONSERVATIVE flag\n",
+             fd));
+    range.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t maxEnabledVersion = range.max;
+  infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers().adjustForTLSIntolerance(
+      infoObject->GetHostName(), infoObject->GetPort(), range);
+  MOZ_LOG(
+      gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+      ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: using TLS version range (0x%04x,0x%04x)\n",
+       fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(range.min),
+       static_cast<unsigned int>(range.max)));
+
+  // If the user has set their minimum version to something higher than what
+  // we've now set the maximum to, this will result in an inconsistent version
+  // range unless we fix it up. This will override their preference, but we only
+  // do this for sites critical to the operation of the browser (e.g. update
+  // servers) and telemetry experiments.
+  if (range.min > range.max) {
+    range.min = range.max;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(fd, &range) != SECSuccess) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  infoObject->SetTLSVersionRange(range);
+
+  // when adjustForTLSIntolerance tweaks the maximum version downward,
+  // we tell the server using this SCSV so they can detect a downgrade attack
+  if (range.max < maxEnabledVersion) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: enabling TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n", fd));
+    // Some servers will choke if we send the fallback SCSV with TLS 1.2.
+    if (range.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+      if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV, true)) {
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+      }
+    }
+    // tell NSS the max enabled version to make anti-downgrade effective
+    if (SECSuccess != SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion(fd, maxEnabledVersion)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Enable ECH GREASE if suitable. Has no impact if 'real' ECH is being used.
+  if (range.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+      !(infoObject->GetProviderFlags() & (nsISocketProvider::BE_CONSERVATIVE |
+                                          nsISocketTransport::DONT_TRY_ECH)) &&
+      StaticPrefs::security_tls_ech_grease_probability()) {
+    if ((RandomUint64().valueOr(0) % 100) >=
+        100 - StaticPrefs::security_tls_ech_grease_probability()) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("[%p] nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions: enabling TLS ECH Grease\n", fd));
+      if (SECSuccess != SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, PR_TRUE)) {
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+      }
+      // ECH Padding can be between 1 and 255
+      if (SECSuccess !=
+          SSL_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(
+              fd, std::clamp(StaticPrefs::security_tls_ech_grease_size(), 1U,
+                             255U))) {
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+      }
+      infoObject->UpdateEchExtensionStatus(EchExtensionStatus::kGREASE);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Include a modest set of named groups.
+  // Please change getKeaGroupName in nsNSSCallbacks.cpp when changing the list
+  // here.
+  const SSLNamedGroup namedGroups[] = {
+      ssl_grp_ec_curve25519, ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1, ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1,
+      ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1,  ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048,   ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072};
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_NamedGroupConfig(fd, namedGroups,
+                                         mozilla::ArrayLength(namedGroups))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  // This ensures that we send key shares for X25519 and P-256 in TLS 1.3, so
+  // that servers are less likely to use HelloRetryRequest.
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(fd, 1)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // NOTE: Should this list ever include ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha* (or should
+  // it become possible to enable this scheme via a pref), it is required
+  // to test that a Delegated Credential containing a small-modulus RSA-PSS SPKI
+  // is properly rejected. NSS will not advertise PKCS1 or RSAE schemes (which
+  // the |ssl_sig_rsa_pss_*| defines alias, meaning we will not currently accept
+  // any RSA DC.
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(
+                        fd, sEnabledSignatureSchemes,
+                        mozilla::ArrayLength(sEnabledSignatureSchemes))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  bool enabled = infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPStaplingEnabled();
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, enabled)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  bool sctsEnabled = infoObject->SharedState().IsSignedCertTimestampsEnabled();
+  if (SECSuccess !=
+      SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS, sctsEnabled)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, true)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+#if defined(__arm__) && not defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO)
+  unsigned int enabledCiphers = 0;
+  std::vector<uint16_t> ciphers(SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers());
+
+  // Returns only the enabled (reflecting prefs) ciphers, ordered
+  // by their occurence in
+  // https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/file/a75ea4cdacd95282c6c245ebb849c25e84ccd908/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c#l87
+  if (SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet(fd, ciphers.data(), &enabledCiphers) !=
+      SECSuccess) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // On ARM, prefer (TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) over AES when hardware
+  // support for AES isn't available. However, it may be disabled. If enabled,
+  // it will either be element [0] or [1]*. If [0], we're done. If [1], swap it
+  // with [0] (TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256).
+  // *(assuming the compile-time order remains unchanged)
+  if (enabledCiphers > 1) {
+    if (ciphers[0] != TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 &&
+        ciphers[1] == TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) {
+      std::swap(ciphers[0], ciphers[1]);
+
+      if (SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet(fd, ciphers.data(), enabledCiphers) !=
+          SECSuccess) {
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  // Set the Peer ID so that SSL proxy connections work properly and to
+  // separate anonymous and/or private browsing connections.
+  nsAutoCString peerId;
+  infoObject->GetPeerId(peerId);
+  if (SECSuccess != SSL_SetSockPeerID(fd, peerId.get())) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t flags = infoObject->GetProviderFlags();
+  if (flags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE) {
+    if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS, false) ||
+        SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(fd, SSL_NO_CACHE, true)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+SECStatus StoreResumptionToken(PRFileDesc* fd, const PRUint8* resumptionToken,
+                               unsigned int len, void* ctx) {
+  PRIntn val;
+  if (SSL_OptionGet(fd, SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS, &val) != SECSuccess ||
+      val == 0) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)ctx;
+  if (!infoObject) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString peerId;
+  infoObject->GetPeerId(peerId);
+  if (NS_FAILED(
+          net::SSLTokensCache::Put(peerId, resumptionToken, len, infoObject))) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+nsresult nsSSLIOLayerAddToSocket(int32_t family, const char* host, int32_t port,
+                                 nsIProxyInfo* proxy,
+                                 const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                                 PRFileDesc* fd,
+                                 nsITLSSocketControl** tlsSocketControl,
+                                 bool forSTARTTLS, uint32_t providerFlags,
+                                 uint32_t providerTlsFlags) {
+  PRFileDesc* layer = nullptr;
+  PRFileDesc* plaintextLayer = nullptr;
+  nsresult rv;
+  PRStatus stat;
+
+  SharedSSLState* sharedState = nullptr;
+  RefPtr<SharedSSLState> allocatedState;
+  if (providerTlsFlags) {
+    allocatedState = new SharedSSLState(providerTlsFlags);
+    sharedState = allocatedState.get();
+  } else {
+    bool isPrivate = providerFlags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE ||
+                     originAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId !=
+                         OriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId;
+    sharedState = isPrivate ? PrivateSSLState() : PublicSSLState();
+  }
+
+  NSSSocketControl* infoObject =
+      new NSSSocketControl(nsDependentCString(host), port, *sharedState,
+                           providerFlags, providerTlsFlags);
+  if (!infoObject) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+
+  NS_ADDREF(infoObject);
+  infoObject->SetForSTARTTLS(forSTARTTLS);
+  infoObject->SetOriginAttributes(originAttributes);
+  if (allocatedState) {
+    infoObject->SetSharedOwningReference(allocatedState);
+  }
+
+  bool haveProxy = false;
+  bool haveHTTPSProxy = false;
+  if (proxy) {
+    nsAutoCString proxyHost;
+    proxy->GetHost(proxyHost);
+    haveProxy = !proxyHost.IsEmpty();
+    nsAutoCString type;
+    haveHTTPSProxy = haveProxy && NS_SUCCEEDED(proxy->GetType(type)) &&
+                     type.EqualsLiteral("https");
+  }
+
+  // A plaintext observer shim is inserted so we can observe some protocol
+  // details without modifying nss
+  plaintextLayer =
+      PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity,
+                           &nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerMethods);
+  if (plaintextLayer) {
+    plaintextLayer->secret = (PRFilePrivate*)infoObject;
+    stat = PR_PushIOLayer(fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, plaintextLayer);
+    if (stat == PR_FAILURE) {
+      plaintextLayer->dtor(plaintextLayer);
+      plaintextLayer = nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  PRFileDesc* sslSock =
+      nsSSLIOLayerImportFD(fd, infoObject, host, haveHTTPSProxy);
+  if (!sslSock) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("NSS: Error importing socket");
+    goto loser;
+  }
+
+  infoObject->SetFileDescPtr(sslSock);
+
+  rv = nsSSLIOLayerSetOptions(sslSock, forSTARTTLS, haveProxy, host, port,
+                              infoObject);
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) goto loser;
+
+  // Now, layer ourselves on top of the SSL socket...
+  layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerIdentity,
+                               &nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerMethods);
+  if (!layer) goto loser;
+
+  layer->secret = (PRFilePrivate*)infoObject;
+  stat = PR_PushIOLayer(sslSock, PR_GetLayersIdentity(sslSock), layer);
+
+  if (stat == PR_FAILURE) {
+    goto loser;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("[%p] Socket set up", (void*)sslSock));
+  *tlsSocketControl = do_AddRef(infoObject).take();
+
+  // We are going use a clear connection first //
+  if (forSTARTTLS || haveProxy) {
+    infoObject->SetHandshakeNotPending();
+  }
+
+  infoObject->SharedState().NoteSocketCreated();
+
+  rv = infoObject->SetResumptionTokenFromExternalCache();
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback(sslSock, &StoreResumptionToken, infoObject);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+loser:
+  NS_IF_RELEASE(infoObject);
+  if (layer) {
+    layer->dtor(layer);
+  }
+  if (plaintextLayer) {
+    // Note that PR_*IOLayer operations may modify the stack of fds, so a
+    // previously-valid pointer may no longer point to what we think it points
+    // to after calling PR_PopIOLayer. We must operate on the pointer returned
+    // by PR_PopIOLayer.
+    plaintextLayer =
+        PR_PopIOLayer(fd, nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity);
+    plaintextLayer->dtor(plaintextLayer);
+  }
+  return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<IPCClientCertsChild> GetIPCClientCertsActor() {
+  PBackgroundChild* backgroundActor =
+      BackgroundChild::GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread();
+  if (!backgroundActor) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  RefPtr<PIPCClientCertsChild> actor =
+      SingleManagedOrNull(backgroundActor->ManagedPIPCClientCertsChild());
+  if (!actor) {
+    actor = backgroundActor->SendPIPCClientCertsConstructor(
+        new IPCClientCertsChild());
+    if (!actor) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  return actor.forget().downcast<IPCClientCertsChild>();
+}
+
+extern "C" {
+
+const uint8_t kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeCert = 1;
+const uint8_t kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeRSAKey = 2;
+const uint8_t kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeECKey = 3;
+
+// This function is provided to the IPC client certs module so it can cause the
+// parent process to find certificates and keys and send identifying
+// information about them over IPC.
+void DoFindObjects(FindObjectsCallback cb, void* ctx) {
+  RefPtr<IPCClientCertsChild> ipcClientCertsActor(GetIPCClientCertsActor());
+  if (!ipcClientCertsActor) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsTArray<IPCClientCertObject> objects;
+  if (!ipcClientCertsActor->SendFindObjects(&objects)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  for (const auto& object : objects) {
+    switch (object.type()) {
+      case IPCClientCertObject::TECKey:
+        cb(kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeECKey, object.get_ECKey().params().Length(),
+           object.get_ECKey().params().Elements(),
+           object.get_ECKey().cert().Length(),
+           object.get_ECKey().cert().Elements(), object.get_ECKey().slotType(),
+           ctx);
+        break;
+      case IPCClientCertObject::TRSAKey:
+        cb(kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeRSAKey,
+           object.get_RSAKey().modulus().Length(),
+           object.get_RSAKey().modulus().Elements(),
+           object.get_RSAKey().cert().Length(),
+           object.get_RSAKey().cert().Elements(),
+           object.get_RSAKey().slotType(), ctx);
+        break;
+      case IPCClientCertObject::TCertificate:
+        cb(kIPCClientCertsObjectTypeCert,
+           object.get_Certificate().der().Length(),
+           object.get_Certificate().der().Elements(), 0, nullptr,
+           object.get_Certificate().slotType(), ctx);
+        break;
+      default:
+        MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled IPCClientCertObject type");
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// This function is provided to the IPC client certs module so it can cause the
+// parent process to sign the given data using the key corresponding to the
+// given certificate, using the given parameters.
+void DoSign(size_t cert_len, const uint8_t* cert, size_t data_len,
+            const uint8_t* data, size_t params_len, const uint8_t* params,
+            SignCallback cb, void* ctx) {
+  RefPtr<IPCClientCertsChild> ipcClientCertsActor(GetIPCClientCertsActor());
+  if (!ipcClientCertsActor) {
+    return;
+  }
+  ByteArray certBytes(nsTArray<uint8_t>(cert, cert_len));
+  ByteArray dataBytes(nsTArray<uint8_t>(data, data_len));
+  ByteArray paramsBytes(nsTArray<uint8_t>(params, params_len));
+  ByteArray signature;
+  if (!ipcClientCertsActor->SendSign(certBytes, dataBytes, paramsBytes,
+                                     &signature)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  cb(signature.data().Length(), signature.data().Elements(), ctx);
+}
+}  // extern "C"