diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
commit | 43a97878ce14b72f0981164f87f2e35e14151312 (patch) | |
tree | 620249daf56c0258faa40cbdcf9cfba06de2a846 /third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-upstream.tar.xz firefox-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss')
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs | 320 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/err.rs | 139 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hkdf.rs | 288 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hpke.rs | 338 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/mod.rs | 67 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/p11.rs | 292 |
6 files changed, 1444 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ffb402b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/aead.rs @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +use super::err::secstatus_to_res; +use super::p11::sys::{ + self, PK11Context, PK11_AEADOp, PK11_CreateContextBySymKey, PRBool, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT, + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE, CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR, CKG_NO_GENERATE, CKM_AES_GCM, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE, +}; +use super::p11::{Item, SymKey}; +use crate::err::{Error, Res}; +use crate::hpke::Aead as AeadId; +use log::trace; +use std::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto}; +use std::mem; +use std::os::raw::c_int; + +/// All the nonces are the same length. Exploit that. +pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12; +/// The portion of the nonce that is a counter. +const COUNTER_LEN: usize = mem::size_of::<SequenceNumber>(); +/// The NSS API insists on us identifying the tag separately, which is awful. +/// All of the AEAD functions here have a tag of this length, so use a fixed offset. +const TAG_LEN: usize = 16; + +pub type SequenceNumber = u64; + +/// All the lengths used by `PK11_AEADOp` are signed. This converts to that. +fn c_int_len<T>(l: T) -> c_int +where + T: TryInto<c_int>, + T::Error: std::error::Error, +{ + l.try_into().unwrap() +} + +unsafe fn destroy_aead_context(ctx: *mut PK11Context) { + sys::PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PRBool::from(true)); +} +scoped_ptr!(Context, PK11Context, destroy_aead_context); + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Mode { + Encrypt, + Decrypt, +} + +impl Mode { + fn p11mode(self) -> CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE { + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from( + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE + | match self { + Self::Encrypt => CKA_ENCRYPT, + Self::Decrypt => CKA_DECRYPT, + }, + ) + } +} + +/// This is an AEAD instance that uses the +pub struct Aead { + mode: Mode, + ctx: Context, + nonce_base: [u8; NONCE_LEN], +} + +impl Aead { + fn mech(algorithm: AeadId) -> CK_MECHANISM_TYPE { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(match algorithm { + // The key size determines which AES variant is used. + AeadId::Aes128Gcm | AeadId::Aes256Gcm => CKM_AES_GCM, + AeadId::ChaCha20Poly1305 => CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + }) + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn import_key(algorithm: AeadId, key: &[u8]) -> Res<SymKey> { + let slot = super::p11::Slot::internal()?; + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_ImportSymKey( + *slot, + Self::mech(algorithm), + sys::PK11Origin::PK11_OriginUnwrap, + sys::CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from(sys::CKA_ENCRYPT | sys::CKA_DECRYPT), + &mut super::p11::Item::wrap(key), + std::ptr::null_mut(), + ) + }; + SymKey::from_ptr(ptr) + } + + pub fn new( + mode: Mode, + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &SymKey, + nonce_base: [u8; NONCE_LEN], + ) -> Res<Self> { + trace!( + "New AEAD: key={} nonce_base={}", + hex::encode(key.key_data()?), + hex::encode(nonce_base) + ); + + let ptr = unsafe { + PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + Self::mech(algorithm), + mode.p11mode(), + **key, + &Item::wrap(&nonce_base[..]), + ) + }; + Ok(Self { + mode, + ctx: Context::from_ptr(ptr)?, + nonce_base, + }) + } + + pub fn seal(&mut self, aad: &[u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + assert_eq!(self.mode, Mode::Encrypt); + // A copy for the nonce generator to write into. But we don't use the value. + let mut nonce = self.nonce_base; + // Ciphertext with enough space for the tag. + // Even though we give the operation a separate buffer for the tag, + // reserve the capacity on allocation. + let mut ct = vec![0; pt.len() + TAG_LEN]; + let mut ct_len: c_int = 0; + let mut tag = vec![0; TAG_LEN]; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_AEADOp( + *self.ctx, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION::from(CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR), + c_int_len(NONCE_LEN - COUNTER_LEN), // Fixed portion of the nonce. + nonce.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(nonce.len()), + aad.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(aad.len()), + ct.as_mut_ptr(), + &mut ct_len, + c_int_len(ct.len()), // signed :( + tag.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(tag.len()), + pt.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(pt.len()), + ) + })?; + ct.truncate(usize::try_from(ct_len).unwrap()); + debug_assert_eq!(ct.len(), pt.len()); + ct.append(&mut tag); + Ok(ct) + } + + pub fn open(&mut self, aad: &[u8], seq: SequenceNumber, ct: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + assert_eq!(self.mode, Mode::Decrypt); + let mut nonce = self.nonce_base; + for (i, n) in nonce.iter_mut().rev().take(COUNTER_LEN).enumerate() { + *n ^= u8::try_from((seq >> (8 * i)) & 0xff).unwrap(); + } + let mut pt = vec![0; ct.len()]; // NSS needs more space than it uses for plaintext. + let mut pt_len: c_int = 0; + let pt_expected = ct.len().checked_sub(TAG_LEN).ok_or(Error::Truncated)?; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_AEADOp( + *self.ctx, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION::from(CKG_NO_GENERATE), + c_int_len(NONCE_LEN - COUNTER_LEN), // Fixed portion of the nonce. + nonce.as_mut_ptr(), + c_int_len(nonce.len()), + aad.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(aad.len()), + pt.as_mut_ptr(), + &mut pt_len, + c_int_len(pt.len()), // signed :( + ct.as_ptr().add(pt_expected) as *mut _, // const cast :( + c_int_len(TAG_LEN), + ct.as_ptr(), + c_int_len(pt_expected), + ) + })?; + let len = usize::try_from(pt_len).unwrap(); + debug_assert_eq!(len, pt_expected); + pt.truncate(len); + Ok(pt) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test { + use super::super::super::hpke::Aead as AeadId; + use super::super::init; + use super::{Aead, Mode, SequenceNumber, NONCE_LEN}; + + /// Check that the first invocation of encryption matches expected values. + /// Also check decryption of the same. + fn check0( + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &[u8], + nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN], + aad: &[u8], + pt: &[u8], + ct: &[u8], + ) { + init(); + let k = Aead::import_key(algorithm, key).unwrap(); + + let mut enc = Aead::new(Mode::Encrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let ciphertext = enc.seal(aad, pt).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&ciphertext[..], ct); + + let mut dec = Aead::new(Mode::Decrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let plaintext = dec.open(aad, 0, ct).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], pt); + } + + fn decrypt( + algorithm: AeadId, + key: &[u8], + nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN], + seq: SequenceNumber, + aad: &[u8], + pt: &[u8], + ct: &[u8], + ) { + let k = Aead::import_key(algorithm, key).unwrap(); + let mut dec = Aead::new(Mode::Decrypt, algorithm, &k, *nonce).unwrap(); + let plaintext = dec.open(aad, seq, ct).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], pt); + } + + /// This tests the AEAD in QUIC in combination with the HKDF code. + /// This is an AEAD-only example. + #[test] + fn quic_retry() { + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, + 0xc8, 0x4e, + ]; + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[ + 0x08, 0x83, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x51, 0x57, 0x08, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x08, 0xf0, 0x67, 0xa5, 0x50, 0x2a, 0x42, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6b, 0x65, + 0x6e, + ]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x04, 0xa2, 0x65, 0xba, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x90, 0x58, 0xfb, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x24, + 0x96, 0xba, + ]; + check0(AeadId::Aes128Gcm, KEY, NONCE, AAD, &[], CT); + } + + #[test] + fn quic_server_initial() { + const ALG: AeadId = AeadId::Aes128Gcm; + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x53, 0x31, 0x65, 0x3c, 0x36, 0x4c, 0x88, 0xf0, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xb6, 0x06, + 0x7e, 0x37, + ]; + const NONCE_BASE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x3c, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x58, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0xa0, 0x3e, + ]; + // Note that this integrates the sequence number of 1 from the example, + // otherwise we can't use a sequence number of 0 to encrypt. + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x3c, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x58, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0xa0, 0x3f, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[ + 0xc1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0xf0, 0x67, 0xa5, 0x50, 0x2a, 0x42, 0x62, + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x40, 0x75, 0x00, 0x01, + ]; + const PT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x56, 0x03, + 0x03, 0xee, 0xfc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa1, 0xd1, 0x63, 0x2e, 0x96, 0x67, 0x78, + 0x25, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x39, 0x88, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x98, 0x25, 0xdf, 0x56, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0x43, + 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x04, 0x5a, 0x12, 0x00, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, + 0x24, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x20, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x84, 0xd0, + 0x8a, 0x60, 0x99, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xca, 0x68, 0x4d, 0x10, 0x81, 0x28, 0x7c, 0x83, + 0x4d, 0x53, 0x11, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, + 0x04, + ]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x5a, 0x48, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x99, 0x1c, 0xd2, 0x5b, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x40, 0x6a, 0x58, 0x16, + 0xb6, 0x39, 0x41, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x7a, 0x1c, 0x69, 0x79, 0x75, 0x54, 0x78, 0x0b, 0xb3, + 0x8c, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x4c, 0xf7, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0xc2, 0x49, 0x3a, 0x18, + 0x39, 0xb3, 0xdb, 0xcb, 0xa3, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x46, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x4d, 0xf3, 0x54, + 0x8e, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xc3, 0xbf, 0x9c, 0x73, 0xcc, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0xde, 0xd7, 0x4b, + 0x56, 0x2b, 0xfb, 0x19, 0xfb, 0x84, 0x02, 0x2f, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xcd, 0xd9, 0x37, 0x95, + 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x06, 0xed, 0xbb, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x89, 0x18, 0x50, 0xab, 0xbd, + 0xca, 0x3d, 0x20, 0x39, 0x8c, 0x27, 0x64, 0x56, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x58, 0x40, 0x7d, + 0xd0, 0x74, 0xee, + ]; + check0(ALG, KEY, NONCE, AAD, PT, CT); + decrypt(ALG, KEY, NONCE_BASE, 1, AAD, PT, CT); + } + + #[test] + fn quic_chacha() { + const ALG: AeadId = AeadId::ChaCha20Poly1305; + const KEY: &[u8] = &[ + 0xc6, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0xf3, 0x44, 0x1c, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0xb2, 0x18, 0x20, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x9c, + 0xaa, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x16, 0xb6, 0x54, 0x88, 0x96, 0x0a, 0x7a, 0x98, 0x49, 0x79, + 0xfb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xc8, + ]; + const NONCE_BASE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0xe0, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x74, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0xe4, 0x4a, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x44, + ]; + // Note that this integrates the sequence number of 654360564 from the example, + // otherwise we can't use a sequence number of 0 to encrypt. + const NONCE: &[u8; NONCE_LEN] = &[ + 0xe0, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x74, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x41, 0x7e, 0xb0, + ]; + const AAD: &[u8] = &[0x42, 0x00, 0xbf, 0xf4]; + const PT: &[u8] = &[0x01]; + const CT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x65, 0x5e, 0x5c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0x41, 0xf6, 0x90, 0x80, 0x57, 0x5d, 0x79, 0x99, 0xc2, + 0x5a, 0x5b, 0xfb, + ]; + check0(ALG, KEY, NONCE, AAD, PT, CT); + // Now use the real nonce and sequence number from the example. + decrypt(ALG, KEY, NONCE_BASE, 654_360_564, AAD, PT, CT); + } +} diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/err.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/err.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31529f3773 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/err.rs @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license +// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your +// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed +// except according to those terms. + +#![allow( + dead_code, + clippy::upper_case_acronyms, + clippy::module_name_repetitions +)] + +use super::{SECStatus, SECSuccess}; +use crate::err::Res; +use std::os::raw::c_char; + +include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/nspr_error.rs")); +mod codes { + #![allow(non_snake_case)] + include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/nss_secerr.rs")); +} +pub use codes::SECErrorCodes as sec; +pub mod nspr { + include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/nspr_err.rs")); +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct Error { + name: String, + code: PRErrorCode, + desc: String, +} + +impl Error { + /// Get an internal error. + pub(crate) fn internal() -> Self { + Self::from(sec::SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) + } + + /// Get the last error, as returned by `PR_GetError()`. + pub(crate) fn last() -> crate::Error { + crate::Error::from(Self::from(unsafe { PR_GetError() })) + } +} + +impl From<PRErrorCode> for Error { + fn from(code: PRErrorCode) -> Self { + let name = wrap_str_fn(|| unsafe { PR_ErrorToName(code) }, "UNKNOWN_ERROR"); + let desc = wrap_str_fn( + || unsafe { PR_ErrorToString(code, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT) }, + "...", + ); + Error { name, code, desc } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for Error {} + +impl std::fmt::Display for Error { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { + write!(f, "Error {} ({}): {}", self.name, self.code, self.desc) + } +} + +use std::ffi::CStr; + +fn wrap_str_fn<F>(f: F, dflt: &str) -> String +where + F: FnOnce() -> *const c_char, +{ + unsafe { + let p = f(); + if p.is_null() { + return dflt.to_string(); + } + CStr::from_ptr(p).to_string_lossy().into_owned() + } +} + +pub fn secstatus_to_res(rv: SECStatus) -> Res<()> { + if rv == SECSuccess { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(Error::last()) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::super::{init, SECFailure, SECSuccess}; + use super::{secstatus_to_res, PRErrorCode, PR_SetError}; + + fn set_error_code(code: PRErrorCode) { + // This code doesn't work without initializing NSS first. + init(); + unsafe { + PR_SetError(code, 0); + } + } + + #[test] + fn error_code() { + init(); + assert_eq!(166 - 0x2000, super::sec::SEC_ERROR_LIBPKIX_INTERNAL); + assert_eq!(-5998, super::nspr::PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + } + + #[test] + fn is_ok() { + assert!(secstatus_to_res(SECSuccess).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn is_err() { + set_error_code(super::sec::SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE); + let r = secstatus_to_res(SECFailure); + assert!(r.is_err()); + if let crate::Error::Crypto(e) = r.unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(e.name, "SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE"); + assert_eq!(e.code, 18 - 0x2000); + assert_eq!(e.desc, "security library: bad database."); + } else { + panic!(); + } + } + + #[test] + fn is_err_zero_code() { + set_error_code(0); + let r = secstatus_to_res(SECFailure); + assert!(r.is_err()); + if let crate::Error::Crypto(e) = r.unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(e.name, "UNKNOWN_ERROR"); + assert_eq!(e.code, 0); + } else { + panic!(); + } + } +} diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hkdf.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hkdf.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dcf0fabd2d --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hkdf.rs @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +use super::super::hpke::{Aead, Kdf}; +use super::p11::sys::{ + self, CKA_DERIVE, CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA, CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL, CKM_AES_GCM, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + CKM_HKDF_DATA, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, CKM_SHA256, CK_BBOOL, CK_HKDF_PARAMS, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE, CK_ULONG, +}; +use super::p11::{ParamItem, SymKey}; +use crate::err::Res; +use log::trace; +use std::convert::TryFrom; +use std::os::raw::c_int; +use std::ptr::null_mut; + +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub enum KeyMechanism { + Aead(Aead), + #[allow(dead_code)] // We don't use this one. + Hkdf, +} + +impl KeyMechanism { + fn mech(self) -> CK_MECHANISM_TYPE { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(match self { + Self::Aead(Aead::Aes128Gcm) | Self::Aead(Aead::Aes256Gcm) => CKM_AES_GCM, + Self::Aead(Aead::ChaCha20Poly1305) => CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + Self::Hkdf => CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + }) + } + + fn len(self) -> usize { + match self { + Self::Aead(a) => a.n_k(), + Self::Hkdf => 0, // Let the underlying module decide. + } + } +} + +pub struct Hkdf { + kdf: Kdf, +} + +impl Hkdf { + pub fn new(kdf: Kdf) -> Self { + Self { kdf } + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn import_ikm(ikm: &[u8]) -> Res<SymKey> { + let slot = super::p11::Slot::internal()?; + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_ImportSymKey( + *slot, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(sys::CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN), + sys::PK11Origin::PK11_OriginUnwrap, + sys::CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from(sys::CKA_SIGN), + &mut super::p11::Item::wrap(ikm), + null_mut(), + ) + }; + SymKey::from_ptr(ptr) + } + + fn mech(&self) -> CK_MECHANISM_TYPE { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(match self.kdf { + Kdf::HkdfSha256 => CKM_SHA256, + _ => unimplemented!(), + }) + } + + pub fn extract(&self, salt: &[u8], ikm: &SymKey) -> Res<SymKey> { + let salt_type = if salt.is_empty() { + CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL + } else { + CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA + }; + let mut params = CK_HKDF_PARAMS { + bExtract: CK_BBOOL::from(true), + bExpand: CK_BBOOL::from(false), + prfHashMechanism: self.mech(), + ulSaltType: CK_ULONG::from(salt_type), + pSalt: salt.as_ptr() as *mut _, // const-cast = bad API + ulSaltLen: CK_ULONG::try_from(salt.len()).unwrap(), + hSaltKey: CK_OBJECT_HANDLE::from(CK_INVALID_HANDLE), + pInfo: null_mut(), + ulInfoLen: 0, + }; + let mut params_item = ParamItem::new(&mut params); + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_Derive( + **ikm, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE), + params_item.ptr(), + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE), + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKA_DERIVE), + 0, + ) + }; + + let prk = SymKey::from_ptr(ptr)?; + trace!( + "HKDF extract: salt={} ikm={} prk={}", + hex::encode(salt), + hex::encode(ikm.key_data()?), + hex::encode(prk.key_data()?), + ); + Ok(prk) + } + + // NB: `info` must outlive the returned value. + fn expand_params(&self, info: &[u8]) -> CK_HKDF_PARAMS { + CK_HKDF_PARAMS { + bExtract: CK_BBOOL::from(false), + bExpand: CK_BBOOL::from(true), + prfHashMechanism: self.mech(), + ulSaltType: CK_ULONG::from(CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL), + pSalt: null_mut(), + ulSaltLen: 0, + hSaltKey: CK_OBJECT_HANDLE::from(CK_INVALID_HANDLE), + pInfo: info.as_ptr() as *mut _, // const-cast = bad API + ulInfoLen: CK_ULONG::try_from(info.len()).unwrap(), + } + } + + pub fn expand_key(&self, prk: &SymKey, info: &[u8], key_mech: KeyMechanism) -> Res<SymKey> { + let mut params = self.expand_params(info); + let mut params_item = ParamItem::new(&mut params); + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_Derive( + **prk, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE), + params_item.ptr(), + key_mech.mech(), + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKA_DERIVE), + c_int::try_from(key_mech.len()).unwrap(), + ) + }; + let okm = SymKey::from_ptr(ptr)?; + trace!( + "HKDF expand_key: prk={} info={} okm={}", + hex::encode(prk.key_data()?), + hex::encode(info), + hex::encode(okm.key_data()?), + ); + Ok(okm) + } + + pub fn expand_data(&self, prk: &SymKey, info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let mut params = self.expand_params(info); + let mut params_item = ParamItem::new(&mut params); + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_Derive( + **prk, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKM_HKDF_DATA), + params_item.ptr(), + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE), + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(CKA_DERIVE), + c_int::try_from(len).unwrap(), + ) + }; + let k = SymKey::from_ptr(ptr)?; + let r = Vec::from(k.key_data()?); + trace!( + "HKDF expand_data: prk={} info={} okm={}", + hex::encode(prk.key_data()?), + hex::encode(info), + hex::encode(&r), + ); + Ok(r) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test { + use super::super::super::hpke::Kdf; + use super::Hkdf; + use crate::init; + + fn sha256_example( + ikm: &[u8], + salt: &[u8], + info: &[u8], + l: usize, + expected_prk: &[u8], + expected_okm: &[u8], + ) { + init(); + let hkdf = Hkdf::new(Kdf::HkdfSha256); + let k_ikm = Hkdf::import_ikm(ikm).unwrap(); + let prk = hkdf.extract(salt, &k_ikm).unwrap(); + let prk_data = prk.key_data().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(prk_data, expected_prk); + + let out = hkdf.expand_data(&prk, info, l).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&out[..], expected_okm); + } + + /// Example 1 from <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#appendix-A.1> + #[test] + fn example1() { + const IKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + ]; + const SALT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + ]; + const INFO: &[u8] = &[0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9]; + const L: usize = 42; + const PRK: &[u8] = &[ + 0x07, 0x77, 0x09, 0x36, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0x32, 0xdf, 0x0d, 0xdc, 0x3f, 0x0d, 0xc4, 0x7b, + 0xba, 0x63, 0x90, 0xb6, 0xc7, 0x3b, 0xb5, 0x0f, 0x9c, 0x31, 0x22, 0xec, 0x84, 0x4a, + 0xd7, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0xe5, + ]; + const OKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0x3c, 0xb2, 0x5f, 0x25, 0xfa, 0xac, 0xd5, 0x7a, 0x90, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x64, 0xd0, 0x36, + 0x2f, 0x2a, 0x2d, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0x90, 0xcf, 0x1a, 0x5a, 0x4c, 0x5d, 0xb0, 0x2d, 0x56, + 0xec, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xbf, 0x34, 0x00, 0x72, 0x08, 0xd5, 0xb8, 0x87, 0x18, 0x58, 0x65, + ]; + sha256_example(IKM, SALT, INFO, L, PRK, OKM); + } + + /// Example 2 from <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#appendix-A.2> + #[test] + fn example2() { + const IKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, + 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, + 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, + 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, + 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, + 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, + ]; + const SALT: &[u8] = &[ + 0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, + 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, + 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, + 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, + 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, + 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, + ]; + const INFO: &[u8] = &[ + 0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, + 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, + 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, + 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, + 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, + 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff, + ]; + const L: usize = 82; + const PRK: &[u8] = &[ + 0x06, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0x58, 0x53, 0x36, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x10, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0xeb, 0x35, + 0xb4, 0x5c, 0xef, 0x76, 0x00, 0x14, 0x90, 0x46, 0x71, 0x01, 0x4a, 0x19, 0x3f, 0x40, + 0xc1, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0x44, + ]; + const OKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x39, 0x8d, 0xc8, 0x03, 0x27, 0xa1, 0xc8, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x8c, 0x59, 0x6a, + 0x49, 0x34, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x2e, 0xda, 0x2d, 0x4e, 0xfa, 0xd8, 0xa0, 0x50, 0xcc, 0x4c, + 0x19, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x04, 0x5a, 0x99, 0xca, 0xc7, 0x82, 0x72, 0x71, 0xcb, + 0x41, 0xc6, 0x5e, 0x59, 0x0e, 0x09, 0xda, 0x32, 0x75, 0x60, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x09, 0xb8, + 0x36, 0x77, 0x93, 0xa9, 0xac, 0xa3, 0xdb, 0x71, 0xcc, 0x30, 0xc5, 0x81, 0x79, 0xec, + 0x3e, 0x87, 0xc1, 0x4c, 0x01, 0xd5, 0xc1, 0xf3, 0x43, 0x4f, 0x1d, 0x87, + ]; + sha256_example(IKM, SALT, INFO, L, PRK, OKM); + } + + /// Example 3 from <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#appendix-A.3> + #[test] + fn example3() { + const IKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + ]; + const SALT: &[u8] = &[]; + const INFO: &[u8] = &[]; + const L: usize = 42; + const PRK: &[u8] = &[ + 0x19, 0xef, 0x24, 0xa3, 0x2c, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x16, 0x7f, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1d, 0x6f, 0x64, + 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x59, 0x67, 0x76, 0xaf, 0xdb, 0x63, 0x77, 0xac, 0x43, 0x4c, 0x1c, + 0x29, 0x3c, 0xcb, 0x04, + ]; + const OKM: &[u8] = &[ + 0x8d, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x75, 0xa5, 0x63, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0x71, 0x5f, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x06, 0x3c, + 0x5a, 0x31, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0x1f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xe1, 0x87, 0x9e, 0xc3, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x5f, + 0x3c, 0x73, 0x8d, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x20, 0x13, 0x95, 0xfa, 0xa4, 0xb6, 0x1a, 0x96, 0xc8, + ]; + sha256_example(IKM, SALT, INFO, L, PRK, OKM); + } +} diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hpke.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hpke.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ddb058ce9 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/hpke.rs @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +use super::super::hpke::{Aead, Kdf, Kem}; +use super::err::{sec::SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, secstatus_to_res, Error}; +use super::p11::{sys, Item, PrivateKey, PublicKey, Slot, SymKey}; +use crate::err::Res; +use log::{log_enabled, trace}; +use std::convert::TryFrom; +use std::ops::Deref; +use std::os::raw::c_uint; +use std::ptr::{addr_of_mut, null, null_mut}; + +pub use sys::{HpkeAeadId as AeadId, HpkeKdfId as KdfId, HpkeKemId as KemId}; + +/// Configuration for `Hpke`. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub struct Config { + kem: Kem, + kdf: Kdf, + aead: Aead, +} + +impl Config { + pub fn new(kem: Kem, kdf: Kdf, aead: Aead) -> Self { + Self { kem, kdf, aead } + } + + pub fn kem(self) -> Kem { + self.kem + } + + pub fn kdf(self) -> Kdf { + self.kdf + } + + pub fn aead(self) -> Aead { + self.aead + } + + pub fn supported(self) -> bool { + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_ValidateParameters( + KemId::Type::from(u16::from(self.kem)), + KdfId::Type::from(u16::from(self.kdf)), + AeadId::Type::from(u16::from(self.aead)), + ) + }) + .is_ok() + } +} + +impl Default for Config { + fn default() -> Self { + Self { + kem: Kem::X25519Sha256, + kdf: Kdf::HkdfSha256, + aead: Aead::Aes128Gcm, + } + } +} + +pub trait Exporter { + fn export(&self, info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Res<SymKey>; +} + +unsafe fn destroy_hpke_context(cx: *mut sys::HpkeContext) { + sys::PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(cx, sys::PRBool::from(true)); +} + +scoped_ptr!(HpkeContext, sys::HpkeContext, destroy_hpke_context); + +impl HpkeContext { + fn new(config: Config) -> Res<Self> { + let ptr = unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_NewContext( + KemId::Type::from(u16::from(config.kem)), + KdfId::Type::from(u16::from(config.kdf)), + AeadId::Type::from(u16::from(config.aead)), + null_mut(), + null(), + ) + }; + Self::from_ptr(ptr) + } +} + +impl Exporter for HpkeContext { + fn export(&self, info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Res<SymKey> { + let mut out: *mut sys::PK11SymKey = null_mut(); + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_ExportSecret( + self.ptr, + &Item::wrap(info), + c_uint::try_from(len).unwrap(), + &mut out, + ) + })?; + SymKey::from_ptr(out) + } +} + +#[allow(clippy::module_name_repetitions)] +pub struct HpkeS { + context: HpkeContext, + config: Config, +} + +impl HpkeS { + /// Create a new context that uses the KEM mode for sending. + #[allow(clippy::similar_names)] + pub fn new(config: Config, pk_r: &mut PublicKey, info: &[u8]) -> Res<Self> { + let (sk_e, pk_e) = generate_key_pair(config.kem)?; + let context = HpkeContext::new(config)?; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_SetupS(*context, *pk_e, *sk_e, **pk_r, &Item::wrap(info)) + })?; + Ok(Self { context, config }) + } + + pub fn config(&self) -> Config { + self.config + } + + /// Get the encapsulated KEM secret. + pub fn enc(&self) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let v = unsafe { sys::PK11_HPKE_GetEncapPubKey(*self.context) }; + let r = unsafe { v.as_ref() }.ok_or_else(|| Error::from(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS))?; + // This is just an alias, so we can't use `Item`. + let len = usize::try_from(r.len).unwrap(); + let slc = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(r.data, len) }; + Ok(Vec::from(slc)) + } + + pub fn seal(&mut self, aad: &[u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let mut out: *mut sys::SECItem = null_mut(); + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_Seal(*self.context, &Item::wrap(aad), &Item::wrap(pt), &mut out) + })?; + let v = Item::from_ptr(out)?; + Ok(unsafe { v.into_vec() }) + } +} + +impl Exporter for HpkeS { + fn export(&self, info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Res<SymKey> { + self.context.export(info, len) + } +} + +impl Deref for HpkeS { + type Target = Config; + fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { + &self.config + } +} + +#[allow(clippy::module_name_repetitions)] +pub struct HpkeR { + context: HpkeContext, + config: Config, +} + +impl HpkeR { + /// Create a new context that uses the KEM mode for sending. + #[allow(clippy::similar_names)] + pub fn new( + config: Config, + pk_r: &PublicKey, + sk_r: &mut PrivateKey, + enc: &[u8], + info: &[u8], + ) -> Res<Self> { + let context = HpkeContext::new(config)?; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_SetupR( + *context, + **pk_r, + **sk_r, + &Item::wrap(enc), + &Item::wrap(info), + ) + })?; + Ok(Self { context, config }) + } + + pub fn config(&self) -> Config { + self.config + } + + pub fn decode_public_key(kem: Kem, k: &[u8]) -> Res<PublicKey> { + // NSS uses a context for this, but we don't want that, but a dummy one works fine. + let context = HpkeContext::new(Config { + kem, + ..Config::default() + })?; + let mut ptr: *mut sys::SECKEYPublicKey = null_mut(); + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_Deserialize( + *context, + k.as_ptr(), + c_uint::try_from(k.len()).unwrap(), + &mut ptr, + ) + })?; + PublicKey::from_ptr(ptr) + } + + pub fn open(&mut self, aad: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let mut out: *mut sys::SECItem = null_mut(); + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_Open(*self.context, &Item::wrap(aad), &Item::wrap(ct), &mut out) + })?; + let v = Item::from_ptr(out)?; + Ok(unsafe { v.into_vec() }) + } +} + +impl Exporter for HpkeR { + fn export(&self, info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Res<SymKey> { + self.context.export(info, len) + } +} + +impl Deref for HpkeR { + type Target = Config; + fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { + &self.config + } +} + +/// Generate a key pair for the identified KEM. +pub fn generate_key_pair(kem: Kem) -> Res<(PrivateKey, PublicKey)> { + assert_eq!(kem, Kem::X25519Sha256); + let slot = Slot::internal()?; + + let oid_data = unsafe { sys::SECOID_FindOIDByTag(sys::SECOidTag::SEC_OID_CURVE25519) }; + let oid = unsafe { oid_data.as_ref() }.ok_or_else(Error::internal)?; + let oid_slc = + unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(oid.oid.data, usize::try_from(oid.oid.len).unwrap()) }; + let mut params: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(oid_slc.len() + 2); + params.push(u8::try_from(sys::SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID).unwrap()); + params.push(u8::try_from(oid.oid.len).unwrap()); + params.extend_from_slice(oid_slc); + + let mut public_ptr: *mut sys::SECKEYPublicKey = null_mut(); + let mut wrapped = Item::wrap(¶ms); + + // Try to make an insensitive key so that we can read the key data for tracing. + let insensitive_secret_ptr = if log_enabled!(log::Level::Trace) { + unsafe { + sys::PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags( + *slot, + sys::CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(sys::CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN), + addr_of_mut!(wrapped).cast(), + &mut public_ptr, + sys::PK11_ATTR_SESSION | sys::PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE | sys::PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC, + sys::CK_FLAGS::from(sys::CKF_DERIVE), + sys::CK_FLAGS::from(sys::CKF_DERIVE), + null_mut(), + ) + } + } else { + null_mut() + }; + assert_eq!(insensitive_secret_ptr.is_null(), public_ptr.is_null()); + let secret_ptr = if insensitive_secret_ptr.is_null() { + unsafe { + sys::PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags( + *slot, + sys::CK_MECHANISM_TYPE::from(sys::CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN), + addr_of_mut!(wrapped).cast(), + &mut public_ptr, + sys::PK11_ATTR_SESSION | sys::PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | sys::PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE, + sys::CK_FLAGS::from(sys::CKF_DERIVE), + sys::CK_FLAGS::from(sys::CKF_DERIVE), + null_mut(), + ) + } + } else { + insensitive_secret_ptr + }; + assert_eq!(secret_ptr.is_null(), public_ptr.is_null()); + let sk = PrivateKey::from_ptr(secret_ptr)?; + let pk = PublicKey::from_ptr(public_ptr)?; + trace!("Generated key pair: sk={:?} pk={:?}", sk, pk); + Ok((sk, pk)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test { + use super::{generate_key_pair, Config, HpkeR, HpkeS}; + use crate::hpke::Aead; + use crate::init; + + const INFO: &[u8] = b"info"; + const AAD: &[u8] = b"aad"; + const PT: &[u8] = b"message"; + + #[allow(clippy::similar_names)] // for sk_x and pk_x + #[test] + fn make() { + init(); + let cfg = Config::default(); + let (mut sk_r, mut pk_r) = generate_key_pair(cfg.kem()).unwrap(); + let hpke_s = HpkeS::new(cfg, &mut pk_r, INFO).unwrap(); + let _hpke_r = HpkeR::new(cfg, &pk_r, &mut sk_r, &hpke_s.enc().unwrap(), INFO).unwrap(); + } + + #[allow(clippy::similar_names)] // for sk_x and pk_x + fn seal_open(aead: Aead) { + // Setup + init(); + let cfg = Config { + aead, + ..Config::default() + }; + assert!(cfg.supported()); + let (mut sk_r, mut pk_r) = generate_key_pair(cfg.kem()).unwrap(); + + // Send + let mut hpke_s = HpkeS::new(cfg, &mut pk_r, INFO).unwrap(); + let enc = hpke_s.enc().unwrap(); + let ct = hpke_s.seal(AAD, PT).unwrap(); + + // Receive + let mut hpke_r = HpkeR::new(cfg, &pk_r, &mut sk_r, &enc, INFO).unwrap(); + let pt = hpke_r.open(AAD, &ct).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&pt[..], PT); + } + + #[test] + fn seal_open_gcm() { + seal_open(Aead::Aes128Gcm); + } + + #[test] + fn seal_open_chacha() { + seal_open(Aead::ChaCha20Poly1305); + } +} diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/mod.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7040e18664 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license +// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your +// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed +// except according to those terms. + +mod err; +#[macro_use] +mod p11; +pub mod aead; +pub mod hkdf; +pub mod hpke; + +pub use self::p11::{random, PrivateKey, PublicKey, SymKey}; +use err::secstatus_to_res; +pub use err::Error; +use lazy_static::lazy_static; +use std::ptr::null; + +#[allow(clippy::pedantic, non_upper_case_globals, clippy::upper_case_acronyms)] +mod nss_init { + include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/nss_init.rs")); +} + +use nss_init::SECStatus; +#[allow(non_upper_case_globals)] +const SECSuccess: SECStatus = nss_init::_SECStatus_SECSuccess; +#[cfg(test)] +#[allow(non_upper_case_globals)] +const SECFailure: SECStatus = nss_init::_SECStatus_SECFailure; + +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] +enum NssLoaded { + External, + NoDb, +} + +impl Drop for NssLoaded { + fn drop(&mut self) { + if *self == Self::NoDb { + unsafe { + secstatus_to_res(nss_init::NSS_Shutdown()).expect("NSS Shutdown failed"); + } + } + } +} + +lazy_static! { + static ref INITIALIZED: NssLoaded = { + if already_initialized() { + return NssLoaded::External; + } + + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { nss_init::NSS_NoDB_Init(null()) }).expect("NSS_NoDB_Init failed"); + + NssLoaded::NoDb + }; +} + +fn already_initialized() -> bool { + unsafe { nss_init::NSS_IsInitialized() != 0 } +} + +/// Initialize NSS. This only executes the initialization routines once. +pub fn init() { + lazy_static::initialize(&INITIALIZED); +} diff --git a/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/p11.rs b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/p11.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08040ee908 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ohttp/src/nss/p11.rs @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license +// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your +// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed +// except according to those terms. + +use super::err::{secstatus_to_res, Error}; +use crate::err::Res; +use std::convert::TryFrom; +use std::marker::PhantomData; +use std::mem; +use std::os::raw::{c_int, c_uint}; +use std::ptr::null_mut; + +#[allow( + clippy::pedantic, + clippy::upper_case_acronyms, + dead_code, + deref_nullptr, + non_camel_case_types, + non_snake_case, + non_upper_case_globals +)] +pub mod sys { + include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/nss_p11.rs")); +} + +use sys::{ + PK11ObjectType, PK11SlotInfo, PK11SymKey, PK11_ExtractKeyValue, PK11_FreeSlot, PK11_FreeSymKey, + PK11_GenerateRandom, PK11_GetInternalSlot, PK11_GetKeyData, PK11_ReadRawAttribute, + PK11_ReferenceSymKey, PRBool, SECITEM_FreeItem, SECItem, SECItemType, SECKEYPrivateKey, + SECKEYPublicKey, SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey, SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey, CKA_VALUE, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE, +}; + +macro_rules! scoped_ptr { + ($scoped:ident, $target:ty, $dtor:path) => { + pub struct $scoped { + ptr: *mut $target, + } + + impl $scoped { + pub fn from_ptr(ptr: *mut $target) -> Result<Self, crate::err::Error> { + if ptr.is_null() { + Err(crate::nss::err::Error::last()) + } else { + Ok(Self { ptr }) + } + } + } + + impl std::ops::Deref for $scoped { + type Target = *mut $target; + #[must_use] + fn deref(&self) -> &*mut $target { + &self.ptr + } + } + + impl std::ops::DerefMut for $scoped { + fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut *mut $target { + &mut self.ptr + } + } + + impl Drop for $scoped { + fn drop(&mut self) { + let _ = unsafe { $dtor(self.ptr) }; + } + } + }; +} + +scoped_ptr!(PrivateKey, SECKEYPrivateKey, SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey); + +impl PrivateKey { + pub fn key_data(&self) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let mut key_item = SECItem { + type_: SECItemType::siBuffer, + data: null_mut(), + len: 0, + }; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_ReadRawAttribute( + PK11ObjectType::PK11_TypePrivKey, + (**self).cast(), + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE::from(CKA_VALUE), + &mut key_item, + ) + })?; + let slc = unsafe { + std::slice::from_raw_parts(key_item.data, usize::try_from(key_item.len).unwrap()) + }; + let key = Vec::from(slc); + // The data that `key_item` refers to needs to be freed, but we can't + // use the scoped `Item` implementation. This is OK as long as nothing + // panics between `PK11_ReadRawAttribute` succeeding and here. + unsafe { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&mut key_item, PRBool::from(false)); + } + Ok(key) + } +} +unsafe impl Send for PrivateKey {} + +impl Clone for PrivateKey { + #[must_use] + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + let ptr = unsafe { sys::SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(self.ptr) }; + assert!(!ptr.is_null()); + Self { ptr } + } +} + +impl std::fmt::Debug for PrivateKey { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { + if let Ok(b) = self.key_data() { + write!(f, "PrivateKey {}", hex::encode(b)) + } else { + write!(f, "Opaque PrivateKey") + } + } +} + +scoped_ptr!(PublicKey, SECKEYPublicKey, SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey); + +impl PublicKey { + /// Get the HPKE serialization of the public key. + pub fn key_data(&self) -> Res<Vec<u8>> { + let mut buf = vec![0; 100]; + let mut len: c_uint = 0; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + sys::PK11_HPKE_Serialize( + **self, + buf.as_mut_ptr(), + &mut len, + c_uint::try_from(buf.len()).unwrap(), + ) + })?; + buf.truncate(usize::try_from(len).unwrap()); + Ok(buf) + } +} + +unsafe impl Send for PublicKey {} + +impl Clone for PublicKey { + #[must_use] + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + let ptr = unsafe { sys::SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(self.ptr) }; + assert!(!ptr.is_null()); + Self { ptr } + } +} + +impl std::fmt::Debug for PublicKey { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { + if let Ok(b) = self.key_data() { + write!(f, "PublicKey {}", hex::encode(b)) + } else { + write!(f, "Opaque PublicKey") + } + } +} + +scoped_ptr!(Slot, PK11SlotInfo, PK11_FreeSlot); + +impl Slot { + pub(crate) fn internal() -> Res<Self> { + let p = unsafe { PK11_GetInternalSlot() }; + Slot::from_ptr(p) + } +} + +scoped_ptr!(SymKey, PK11SymKey, PK11_FreeSymKey); + +impl SymKey { + /// You really don't want to use this. + /// + /// # Errors + /// Some keys cannot be inspected in this way. + /// Also, internal errors in case of failures in NSS. + pub fn key_data(&self) -> Res<&[u8]> { + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { PK11_ExtractKeyValue(self.ptr) })?; + + let key_item = unsafe { PK11_GetKeyData(self.ptr) }; + // This is accessing a value attached to the key, so we can treat this as a borrow. + match unsafe { key_item.as_mut() } { + None => Err(Error::last()), + Some(key) => Ok(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(key.data, key.len as usize) }), + } + } +} + +impl Clone for SymKey { + #[must_use] + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + let ptr = unsafe { PK11_ReferenceSymKey(self.ptr) }; + assert!(!ptr.is_null()); + Self { ptr } + } +} + +impl std::fmt::Debug for SymKey { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { + if let Ok(b) = self.key_data() { + write!(f, "SymKey {}", hex::encode(b)) + } else { + write!(f, "Opaque SymKey") + } + } +} + +unsafe impl Send for SymKey {} + +/// Generate a randomized buffer. +#[must_use] +pub fn random(size: usize) -> Vec<u8> { + let mut buf = vec![0; size]; + secstatus_to_res(unsafe { + PK11_GenerateRandom(buf.as_mut_ptr(), c_int::try_from(buf.len()).unwrap()) + }) + .unwrap(); + buf +} + +pub(crate) struct ParamItem<'a, T: 'a> { + item: SECItem, + marker: PhantomData<&'a T>, +} + +impl<'a, T: Sized + 'a> ParamItem<'a, T> { + pub fn new(v: &'a mut T) -> Self { + let item = SECItem { + type_: SECItemType::siBuffer, + data: (v as *mut T).cast::<u8>(), + len: c_uint::try_from(mem::size_of::<T>()).unwrap(), + }; + Self { + item, + marker: PhantomData::default(), + } + } + + pub fn ptr(&mut self) -> *mut SECItem { + std::ptr::addr_of_mut!(self.item) + } +} + +unsafe fn destroy_secitem(item: *mut SECItem) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(item, PRBool::from(true)); +} +scoped_ptr!(Item, SECItem, destroy_secitem); + +impl Item { + /// Create a wrapper for a slice of this object. + /// Creating this object is technically safe, but using it is extremely dangerous. + /// Minimally, it can only be passed as a `const SECItem*` argument to functions. + pub(crate) fn wrap(buf: &[u8]) -> SECItem { + SECItem { + type_: SECItemType::siBuffer, + data: buf.as_ptr() as *mut u8, + len: c_uint::try_from(buf.len()).unwrap(), + } + } + + /// This dereferences the pointer held by the item and makes a copy of the + /// content that is referenced there. + /// + /// # Safety + /// This dereferences two pointers. It doesn't get much less safe. + pub(crate) unsafe fn into_vec(self) -> Vec<u8> { + let b = self.ptr.as_ref().unwrap(); + // Sanity check the type, as some types don't count bytes in `Item::len`. + assert_eq!(b.type_, SECItemType::siBuffer); + let slc = std::slice::from_raw_parts(b.data, usize::try_from(b.len).unwrap()); + Vec::from(slc) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test { + use super::random; + use crate::init; + + #[test] + fn randomness() { + init(); + // If this ever fails, there is either a bug, or it's time to buy a lottery ticket. + assert_ne!(random(16), random(16)); + } +} |