Adding upstream version 2.2.40.upstream/2.2.40upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 581 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f94b93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+/* passphrase.c -  Get a passphrase
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+#include <locale.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET
+#include <langinfo.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "gpg.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "../common/ttyio.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "../common/i18n.h"
+#include "../common/status.h"
+#include "call-agent.h"
+#include "../common/shareddefs.h"
+
+static char *fd_passwd = NULL;
+static char *next_pw = NULL;
+static char *last_pw = NULL;
+
+
+
+/* Pack an s2k iteration count into the form specified in 2440.  If
+   we're in between valid values, round up.  With value 0 return the
+   old default.  */
+unsigned char
+encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  unsigned char c=0;
+  unsigned char result;
+  unsigned int count;
+
+  if (!iterations)
+    {
+      unsigned long mycnt;
+
+      /* Ask the gpg-agent for a useful iteration count.  */
+      err = agent_get_s2k_count (&mycnt);
+      if (err || mycnt < 65536)
+        {
+          /* Don't print an error if an older agent is used.  */
+          if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER)
+            log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
+          /* Default to 65536 which we used up to 2.0.13.  */
+          return 96;
+        }
+      else if (mycnt >= 65011712)
+        return 255; /* Largest possible value.  */
+      else
+        return encode_s2k_iterations ((int)mycnt);
+    }
+
+  if (iterations <= 1024)
+    return 0;  /* Command line arg compatibility.  */
+
+  if (iterations >= 65011712)
+    return 255;
+
+  /* Need count to be in the range 16-31 */
+  for (count=iterations>>6; count>=32; count>>=1)
+    c++;
+
+  result = (c<<4)|(count-16);
+
+  if (S2K_DECODE_COUNT(result) < iterations)
+    result++;
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+
+int
+have_static_passphrase()
+{
+  return (!!fd_passwd
+          && (opt.batch || opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK));
+}
+
+/* Return a static passphrase.  The returned value is only valid as
+   long as no other passphrase related function is called.  NULL may
+   be returned if no passphrase has been set; better use
+   have_static_passphrase first.  */
+const char *
+get_static_passphrase (void)
+{
+  return fd_passwd;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Set the passphrase to be used for the next query and only for the next
+ * one.
+ */
+void
+set_next_passphrase( const char *s )
+{
+  xfree(next_pw);
+  next_pw = NULL;
+  if ( s )
+    {
+      next_pw = xmalloc_secure( strlen(s)+1 );
+      strcpy (next_pw, s );
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Get the last passphrase used in passphrase_to_dek.
+ * Note: This removes the passphrase from this modules and
+ * the caller must free the result.  May return NULL:
+ */
+char *
+get_last_passphrase()
+{
+  char *p = last_pw;
+  last_pw = NULL;
+  return p;
+}
+
+/* Here's an interesting question: since this passphrase was passed in
+   on the command line, is there really any point in using secure
+   memory for it?  I'm going with 'yes', since it doesn't hurt, and
+   might help in some small way (swapping). */
+
+void
+set_passphrase_from_string(const char *pass)
+{
+  xfree (fd_passwd);
+  fd_passwd = xmalloc_secure(strlen(pass)+1);
+  strcpy (fd_passwd, pass);
+}
+
+
+void
+read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
+{
+  int i, len;
+  char *pw;
+
+  if (! gnupg_fd_valid (fd))
+    log_fatal ("passphrase-fd is invalid: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+
+  if ( !opt.batch && opt.pinentry_mode != PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
+    { /* Not used but we have to do a dummy read, so that it won't end
+         up at the begin of the message if the quite usual trick to
+         prepend the passphtrase to the message is used. */
+      char buf[1];
+
+      while (!(read (fd, buf, 1) != 1 || *buf == '\n' ))
+        ;
+      *buf = 0;
+      return;
+    }
+
+  for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
+    {
+      if (i >= len-1 )
+        {
+          char *pw2 = pw;
+          len += 100;
+          pw = xmalloc_secure( len );
+          if( pw2 )
+            {
+              memcpy(pw, pw2, i );
+              xfree (pw2);
+            }
+          else
+            i=0;
+	}
+      if (read( fd, pw+i, 1) != 1 || pw[i] == '\n' )
+        break;
+    }
+  pw[i] = 0;
+  if (!opt.batch && opt.pinentry_mode != PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
+    tty_printf("\b\b\b   \n" );
+
+  xfree ( fd_passwd );
+  fd_passwd = pw;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Ask the GPG Agent for the passphrase.
+ * If NOCACHE is set the symmetric passpharse caching will not be used.
+ *
+ * If REPEAT is positive, a new passphrase is requested and the agent
+ * shall require REPEAT times repetitions of the entered passphrase.
+ * This is used for symmetric encryption.
+ *
+ * Note that TRYAGAIN_TEXT must not be translated.  If CANCELED is not
+ * NULL, the function does set it to 1 if the user canceled the
+ * operation.  If CACHEID is not NULL, it will be used as the cacheID
+ * for the gpg-agent; if is NULL and a key fingerprint can be
+ * computed, this will be used as the cacheid.
+ *
+ * For FLAGS see passphrase_to_dek;
+ */
+static char *
+passphrase_get (int newsymkey, int nocache, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
+                const char *tryagain_text, unsigned int flags, int *canceled)
+{
+  int rc;
+  char *pw = NULL;
+  char *orig_codeset;
+  const char *my_cacheid;
+  const char *desc;
+
+  if (canceled)
+    *canceled = 0;
+
+  orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
+
+  if (!nocache && cacheid)
+    my_cacheid = cacheid;
+  else
+    my_cacheid = NULL;
+
+  if (tryagain_text)
+    tryagain_text = _(tryagain_text);
+
+  if ((flags & GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT))
+    desc = _("Please enter the passphrase for decryption.");
+  else
+    desc = _("Enter passphrase\n");
+
+  /* Here we have:
+   * REPEAT is set in create mode and if opt.passphrase_repeat is set.
+   * (Thus it is not a clean indication that we want a new passphrase).
+   * NOCACHE is set in create mode or if --no-symkey-cache is used.
+   * CACHEID is only set if caching shall be used.
+   * NEWSYMKEY has been added latter to make it clear that a new key
+   * is requested.  The whole chain of API is a bit too complex since
+   * we we stripped things out over time; however, there is no time
+   * for a full state analysis and thus this new parameter.
+   */
+  rc = agent_get_passphrase (my_cacheid, tryagain_text, NULL,
+                             desc,
+                             newsymkey, repeat, nocache, &pw);
+
+  i18n_switchback (orig_codeset);
+
+
+  if (!rc)
+    ;
+  else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
+            || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
+    {
+      log_info (_("cancelled by user\n") );
+      if (canceled)
+        *canceled = 1;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+      /* Due to limitations in the API of the upper layers they
+         consider an error as no passphrase entered.  This works in
+         most cases but not during key creation where this should
+         definitely not happen and let it continue without requiring a
+         passphrase.  Given that now all the upper layers handle a
+         cancel correctly, we simply set the cancel flag now for all
+         errors from the agent.  */
+      if (canceled)
+        *canceled = 1;
+
+      write_status_errcode ("get_passphrase", rc);
+    }
+
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      xfree (pw);
+      pw = NULL;
+    }
+  return pw;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Clear the cached passphrase with CACHEID.
+ */
+void
+passphrase_clear_cache (const char *cacheid)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  rc = agent_clear_passphrase (cacheid);
+  if (rc)
+    log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+}
+
+
+/* Return a new DEK object using the string-to-key specifier S2K.
+ * Returns NULL if the user canceled the passphrase entry and if
+ * CANCELED is not NULL, sets it to true.
+ *
+ * If CREATE is true a new passphrase sll be created.  If NOCACHE is
+ * true the symmetric key caching will not be used.
+ *
+ * FLAG bits are:
+ *   GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT := for symmetric decryption
+ */
+DEK *
+passphrase_to_dek (int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k,
+                   int create, int nocache,
+                   const char *tryagain_text, unsigned int flags,
+                   int *canceled)
+{
+  char *pw = NULL;
+  DEK *dek;
+  STRING2KEY help_s2k;
+  int dummy_canceled;
+  char s2k_cacheidbuf[1+16+1];
+  char *s2k_cacheid = NULL;
+
+  if (!canceled)
+    canceled = &dummy_canceled;
+  *canceled = 0;
+
+  if (opt.no_symkey_cache)
+    nocache = 1;  /* Force no symmetric key caching.  */
+
+  if ( !s2k )
+    {
+      log_assert (create && !nocache);
+      /* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
+       * Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
+      memset (&help_s2k, 0, sizeof (help_s2k));
+      s2k = &help_s2k;
+      s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+    }
+
+  /* Create a new salt or what else to be filled into the s2k for a
+     new key.  */
+  if (create && (s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3))
+    {
+      gcry_randomize (s2k->salt, 8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+      if ( s2k->mode == 3 )
+        {
+          /* We delay the encoding until it is really needed.  This is
+             if we are going to dynamically calibrate it, we need to
+             call out to gpg-agent and that should not be done during
+             option processing in main().  */
+          if (!opt.s2k_count)
+            opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (0);
+          s2k->count = opt.s2k_count;
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* If we do not have a passphrase available in NEXT_PW and status
+     information are request, we print them now. */
+  if ( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() )
+    {
+      char buf[50];
+
+      snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%d %d %d",
+                cipher_algo, s2k->mode, s2k->hash_algo );
+      write_status_text ( STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM, buf );
+    }
+
+  if ( next_pw )
+    {
+      /* Simply return the passphrase we already have in NEXT_PW. */
+      pw = next_pw;
+      next_pw = NULL;
+    }
+  else if ( have_static_passphrase () )
+    {
+      /* Return the passphrase we have stored in FD_PASSWD. */
+      pw = xmalloc_secure ( strlen(fd_passwd)+1 );
+      strcpy ( pw, fd_passwd );
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!nocache && (s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3))
+	{
+	  memset (s2k_cacheidbuf, 0, sizeof s2k_cacheidbuf);
+	  *s2k_cacheidbuf = 'S';
+	  bin2hex (s2k->salt, 8, s2k_cacheidbuf + 1);
+	  s2k_cacheid = s2k_cacheidbuf;
+	}
+
+      if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
+        {
+          char buf[32];
+
+          snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%u", 100);
+          write_status_text (STATUS_INQUIRE_MAXLEN, buf);
+        }
+
+      /* Divert to the gpg-agent. */
+      pw = passphrase_get (create, create && nocache, s2k_cacheid,
+                           create? opt.passphrase_repeat : 0,
+                           tryagain_text, flags, canceled);
+      if (*canceled)
+        {
+          xfree (pw);
+	  write_status( STATUS_CANCELED_BY_USER );
+          return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+  if ( !pw || !*pw )
+    write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
+
+  /* Hash the passphrase and store it in a newly allocated DEK object.
+     Keep a copy of the passphrase in LAST_PW for use by
+     get_last_passphrase(). */
+  dek = xmalloc_secure_clear ( sizeof *dek );
+  dek->algo = cipher_algo;
+  if ( (!pw || !*pw) && create)
+    dek->keylen = 0;
+  else
+    {
+      gpg_error_t err;
+
+      dek->keylen = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo);
+      if (!(dek->keylen > 0 && dek->keylen <= DIM(dek->key)))
+        BUG ();
+      err = gcry_kdf_derive (pw, strlen (pw),
+                             s2k->mode == 3? GCRY_KDF_ITERSALTED_S2K :
+                             s2k->mode == 1? GCRY_KDF_SALTED_S2K :
+                             /* */           GCRY_KDF_SIMPLE_S2K,
+                             s2k->hash_algo, s2k->salt, 8,
+                             S2K_DECODE_COUNT(s2k->count),
+                             dek->keylen, dek->key);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          log_error ("gcry_kdf_derive failed: %s", gpg_strerror (err));
+          xfree (pw);
+          xfree (dek);
+	  write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
+          return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+  if (s2k_cacheid)
+    memcpy (dek->s2k_cacheid, s2k_cacheid, sizeof dek->s2k_cacheid);
+  xfree(last_pw);
+  last_pw = pw;
+  return dek;
+}
+
+
+/* Emit the USERID_HINT and the NEED_PASSPHRASE status messages.
+   MAINKEYID may be NULL. */
+void
+emit_status_need_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                             u32 *keyid, u32 *mainkeyid, int pubkey_algo)
+{
+  char buf[50];
+  char *us;
+
+  us = get_long_user_id_string (ctrl, keyid);
+  write_status_text (STATUS_USERID_HINT, us);
+  xfree (us);
+
+  snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %08lX%08lX %d 0",
+            (ulong)keyid[0],
+            (ulong)keyid[1],
+            (ulong)(mainkeyid? mainkeyid[0]:keyid[0]),
+            (ulong)(mainkeyid? mainkeyid[1]:keyid[1]),
+            pubkey_algo);
+
+  write_status_text (STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE, buf);
+}
+
+
+/* Return an allocated utf-8 string describing the key PK.  If ESCAPED
+   is true spaces and control characters are percent or plus escaped.
+   MODE describes the use of the key description; use one of the
+   FORMAT_KEYDESC_ macros. */
+char *
+gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
+{
+  char *uid;
+  size_t uidlen;
+  const char *algo_name;
+  const char *timestr;
+  char *orig_codeset;
+  char *maink;
+  char *desc;
+  const char *prompt;
+  const char *trailer = "";
+  int is_subkey;
+
+  is_subkey = (pk->main_keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]
+               && pk->keyid[0] != pk->main_keyid[0]
+               && pk->keyid[1] != pk->main_keyid[1]);
+  algo_name = openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo);
+  timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
+  uid = get_user_id (ctrl, is_subkey? pk->main_keyid:pk->keyid, &uidlen, NULL);
+
+  orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
+
+  if (is_subkey)
+    maink = xtryasprintf (_(" (main key ID %s)"), keystr (pk->main_keyid));
+  else
+    maink = NULL;
+
+  switch (mode)
+    {
+    case FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL:
+      prompt = _("Please enter the passphrase to unlock the"
+                 " OpenPGP secret key:");
+      break;
+    case FORMAT_KEYDESC_IMPORT:
+      prompt = _("Please enter the passphrase to import the"
+                 " OpenPGP secret key:");
+      break;
+    case FORMAT_KEYDESC_EXPORT:
+      if (is_subkey)
+        prompt = _("Please enter the passphrase to export the"
+                   " OpenPGP secret subkey:");
+      else
+        prompt = _("Please enter the passphrase to export the"
+                   " OpenPGP secret key:");
+      break;
+    case FORMAT_KEYDESC_DELKEY:
+      if (is_subkey)
+        prompt = _("Do you really want to permanently delete the"
+                   " OpenPGP secret subkey key:");
+      else
+        prompt = _("Do you really want to permanently delete the"
+                   " OpenPGP secret key:");
+      trailer = "?";
+      break;
+    default:
+      prompt = "?";
+      break;
+    }
+
+  desc = xtryasprintf (_("%s\n"
+                         "\"%.*s\"\n"
+                         "%u-bit %s key, ID %s,\n"
+                         "created %s%s.\n%s"),
+                       prompt,
+                       (int)uidlen, uid,
+                       nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name,
+                       keystr (pk->keyid), timestr,
+                       maink?maink:"", trailer);
+  xfree (maink);
+  xfree (uid);
+
+  i18n_switchback (orig_codeset);
+
+  if (escaped)
+    {
+      char *tmp = percent_plus_escape (desc);
+      xfree (desc);
+      desc = tmp;
+    }
+
+  return desc;
+}