diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/decrypt-data.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/decrypt-data.c | 1030 |
1 files changed, 1030 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/decrypt-data.c b/g10/decrypt-data.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0046c35 --- /dev/null +++ b/g10/decrypt-data.c @@ -0,0 +1,1030 @@ +/* decrypt-data.c - Decrypt an encrypted data packet + * Copyright (C) 1998-2001, 2005-2006, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 1998-2001, 2005-2006, 2009, 2018 Werner Koch + * Copyright (C) 2020 g10 Code GmbH + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "gpg.h" +#include "../common/util.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "../common/i18n.h" +#include "../common/status.h" +#include "../common/compliance.h" + + +static int aead_decode_filter (void *opaque, int control, iobuf_t a, + byte *buf, size_t *ret_len); +static int mdc_decode_filter ( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, + byte *buf, size_t *ret_len); +static int decode_filter ( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, + byte *buf, size_t *ret_len); + +/* Our context object. */ +struct decode_filter_context_s +{ + /* Recounter (max value is 2). We need it because we do not know + * whether the iobuf or the outer control code frees this object + * first. */ + int refcount; + + /* The cipher handle. */ + gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd; + + /* The hash handle for use in MDC mode. */ + gcry_md_hd_t mdc_hash; + + /* The start IV for AEAD encryption. */ + byte startiv[16]; + + /* The holdback buffer and its used length. For AEAD we need 32+1 + * bytes but we use 48 byte. For MDC we need 22 bytes; here + * holdbacklen will either 0 or 22. */ + char holdback[48]; + unsigned int holdbacklen; + + /* Working on a partial length packet. */ + unsigned int partial : 1; + + /* EOF indicator with these true values: + * 1 = normal EOF + * 2 = premature EOF (tag or hash incomplete) + * 3 = premature EOF (general) */ + unsigned int eof_seen : 2; + + /* The actually used cipher algo for AEAD. */ + byte cipher_algo; + + /* The AEAD algo. */ + byte aead_algo; + + /* The encoded chunk byte for AEAD. */ + byte chunkbyte; + + /* The decoded CHUNKBYTE. */ + uint64_t chunksize; + + /* The chunk index for AEAD. */ + uint64_t chunkindex; + + /* The number of bytes in the current chunk. */ + uint64_t chunklen; + + /* The total count of decrypted plaintext octets. */ + uint64_t total; + + /* Remaining bytes in the packet according to the packet header. + * Not used if PARTIAL is true. */ + size_t length; +}; +typedef struct decode_filter_context_s *decode_filter_ctx_t; + + +/* Helper to release the decode context. */ +static void +release_dfx_context (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx) +{ + if (!dfx) + return; + + log_assert (dfx->refcount); + if ( !--dfx->refcount ) + { + gcry_cipher_close (dfx->cipher_hd); + dfx->cipher_hd = NULL; + gcry_md_close (dfx->mdc_hash); + dfx->mdc_hash = NULL; + xfree (dfx); + } +} + + +/* Set the nonce and the additional data for the current chunk. This + * also reset the decryption machinery so that the handle can be + * used for a new chunk. If FINAL is set the final AEAD chunk is + * processed. */ +static gpg_error_t +aead_set_nonce_and_ad (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx, int final) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char ad[21]; + unsigned char nonce[16]; + int i; + + switch (dfx->aead_algo) + { + case AEAD_ALGO_OCB: + memcpy (nonce, dfx->startiv, 15); + i = 7; + break; + + case AEAD_ALGO_EAX: + memcpy (nonce, dfx->startiv, 16); + i = 8; + break; + + default: + BUG (); + } + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 56; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 48; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 40; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 32; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 24; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 16; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex >> 8; + nonce[i++] ^= dfx->chunkindex; + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_printhex (nonce, i, "nonce:"); + err = gcry_cipher_setiv (dfx->cipher_hd, nonce, i); + if (err) + return err; + + ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD); + ad[1] = 1; + ad[2] = dfx->cipher_algo; + ad[3] = dfx->aead_algo; + ad[4] = dfx->chunkbyte; + ad[5] = dfx->chunkindex >> 56; + ad[6] = dfx->chunkindex >> 48; + ad[7] = dfx->chunkindex >> 40; + ad[8] = dfx->chunkindex >> 32; + ad[9] = dfx->chunkindex >> 24; + ad[10]= dfx->chunkindex >> 16; + ad[11]= dfx->chunkindex >> 8; + ad[12]= dfx->chunkindex; + if (final) + { + ad[13] = dfx->total >> 56; + ad[14] = dfx->total >> 48; + ad[15] = dfx->total >> 40; + ad[16] = dfx->total >> 32; + ad[17] = dfx->total >> 24; + ad[18] = dfx->total >> 16; + ad[19] = dfx->total >> 8; + ad[20] = dfx->total; + } + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_printhex (ad, final? 21 : 13, "authdata:"); + return gcry_cipher_authenticate (dfx->cipher_hd, ad, final? 21 : 13); +} + + +/* Helper to check the 16 byte tag in TAGBUF. The FINAL flag is only + * for debug messages. */ +static gpg_error_t +aead_checktag (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx, int final, const void *tagbuf) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_printhex (tagbuf, 16, "tag:"); + err = gcry_cipher_checktag (dfx->cipher_hd, tagbuf, 16); + if (err) + { + log_error ("gcry_cipher_checktag%s failed: %s\n", + final? " (final)":"", gpg_strerror (err)); + return err; + } + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("%stag is valid\n", final?"final ":""); + return 0; +} + + +/**************** + * Decrypt the data, specified by ED with the key DEK. On return + * COMPLIANCE_ERROR is set to true iff the decryption can claim that + * it was compliant in the current mode; otherwise this flag is set to + * false. + */ +int +decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek, + int *compliance_error) +{ + decode_filter_ctx_t dfx; + enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode; + unsigned int startivlen; + byte *p; + int rc=0, c, i; + byte temp[32]; + unsigned blocksize; + unsigned nprefix; + + *compliance_error = 0; + + dfx = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *dfx); + if (!dfx) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + dfx->refcount = 1; + + if ( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed ) + { + if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo)) + log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), + openpgp_cipher_algo_mode_name (dek->algo, ed->aead_algo)); + else + log_info (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo ); + dek->algo_info_printed = 1; + } + + if (ed->aead_algo) + { + rc = openpgp_aead_algo_info (ed->aead_algo, &ciphermode, &startivlen); + if (rc) + goto leave; + log_assert (startivlen <= sizeof dfx->startiv); + } + else + ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB; + + /* Check compliance. */ + if (!gnupg_cipher_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 0, dek->algo, ciphermode)) + { + log_error (_("cipher algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"), + openpgp_cipher_algo_mode_name (dek->algo,ed->aead_algo), + gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance)); + *compliance_error = 1; + if (opt.flags.require_compliance) + { + /* We fail early in this case because it does not make sense + * to first decrypt everything. */ + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO); + goto leave; + } + } + + write_status_printf (STATUS_DECRYPTION_INFO, "%d %d %d", + ed->mdc_method, dek->algo, 0); + + if (opt.show_session_key) + { + char numbuf[25]; + char *hexbuf; + + if (ed->aead_algo) + snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d.%u:", dek->algo, ed->aead_algo); + else + snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d:", dek->algo); + hexbuf = bin2hex (dek->key, dek->keylen, NULL); + if (!hexbuf) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + log_info ("session key: '%s%s'\n", numbuf, hexbuf); + write_status_strings (STATUS_SESSION_KEY, numbuf, hexbuf, NULL); + xfree (hexbuf); + } + + rc = openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo); + if (rc) + goto leave; + blocksize = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (dek->algo); + if ( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 ) + log_fatal ("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize ); + + if (ed->aead_algo) + { + if (blocksize != 16) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO); + goto leave; + } + + if (ed->chunkbyte > 56) + { + log_error ("invalid AEAD chunkbyte %u\n", ed->chunkbyte); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + /* Read the Start-IV. */ + if (ed->len) + { + for (i=0; i < startivlen && ed->len; i++, ed->len--) + { + if ((c=iobuf_get (ed->buf)) == -1) + break; + dfx->startiv[i] = c; + } + } + else + { + for (i=0; i < startivlen; i++ ) + if ( (c=iobuf_get (ed->buf)) == -1 ) + break; + else + dfx->startiv[i] = c; + } + if (i != startivlen) + { + log_error ("Start-IV in AEAD packet too short (%d/%u)\n", + i, startivlen); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); + goto leave; + } + + dfx->cipher_algo = ed->cipher_algo; + dfx->aead_algo = ed->aead_algo; + dfx->chunkbyte = ed->chunkbyte; + dfx->chunksize = (uint64_t)1 << (dfx->chunkbyte + 6); + + if (dek->algo != dfx->cipher_algo) + log_info ("Note: different cipher algorithms used (%s/%s)\n", + openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo), + openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dfx->cipher_algo)); + + rc = openpgp_cipher_open (&dfx->cipher_hd, + dfx->cipher_algo, + ciphermode, + GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE); + if (rc) + goto leave; /* Should never happen. */ + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_printhex (dek->key, dek->keylen, "thekey:"); + rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dfx->cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY) + { + log_info (_("WARNING: message was encrypted with" + " a weak key in the symmetric cipher.\n")); + rc = 0; + } + else if (rc) + { + log_error("key setup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if (!ed->buf) + { + log_error(_("problem handling encrypted packet\n")); + goto leave; + } + + } + else /* CFB encryption. */ + { + nprefix = blocksize; + if ( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) ) + { + /* An invalid message. We can't check that during parsing + * because we may not know the used cipher then. */ + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + if ( ed->mdc_method ) + { + if (gcry_md_open (&dfx->mdc_hash, ed->mdc_method, 0 )) + BUG (); + if ( DBG_HASHING ) + gcry_md_debug (dfx->mdc_hash, "checkmdc"); + } + + rc = openpgp_cipher_open (&dfx->cipher_hd, dek->algo, + GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, + (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE + | ((ed->mdc_method || dek->algo >= 100)? + 0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC))); + if (rc) + { + /* We should never get an error here cause we already checked + * that the algorithm is available. */ + BUG(); + } + + + /* log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/ + rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dfx->cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen); + if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY ) + { + log_info (_("WARNING: message was encrypted with" + " a weak key in the symmetric cipher.\n")); + rc = 0; + } + else if (rc) + { + log_error("key setup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); + goto leave; + } + + if (!ed->buf) + { + log_error (_("problem handling encrypted packet\n")); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + gcry_cipher_setiv (dfx->cipher_hd, NULL, 0); + + if ( ed->len ) + { + for (i=0; i < (nprefix+2) && ed->len; i++, ed->len-- ) + { + if ( (c=iobuf_get(ed->buf)) == -1 ) + break; + else + temp[i] = c; + } + } + else + { + for (i=0; i < (nprefix+2); i++ ) + if ( (c=iobuf_get(ed->buf)) == -1 ) + break; + else + temp[i] = c; + } + + gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, temp, nprefix+2, NULL, 0); + gcry_cipher_sync (dfx->cipher_hd); + p = temp; + /* log_hexdump( "prefix", temp, nprefix+2 ); */ + if (dek->symmetric + && (p[nprefix-2] != p[nprefix] || p[nprefix-1] != p[nprefix+1]) ) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY); + goto leave; + } + + if ( dfx->mdc_hash ) + gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2); + } + + dfx->refcount++; + dfx->partial = !!ed->is_partial; + dfx->length = ed->len; + if (ed->aead_algo) + iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, aead_decode_filter, dfx ); + else if (ed->mdc_method) + iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, mdc_decode_filter, dfx ); + else + iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, decode_filter, dfx ); + + if (opt.unwrap_encryption) + { + char *filename = NULL; + estream_t fp; + + rc = get_output_file ("", 0, ed->buf, &filename, &fp); + if (! rc) + { + iobuf_t output = iobuf_esopen (fp, "w", 0); + armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL; + + es_setbuf (fp, NULL); + + if (opt.armor) + { + afx = new_armor_context (); + push_armor_filter (afx, output); + } + + iobuf_copy (output, ed->buf); + if ((rc = iobuf_error (ed->buf))) + log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"), + filename, gpg_strerror (rc)); + else if ((rc = iobuf_error (output))) + log_error (_("error writing '%s': %s\n"), + filename, gpg_strerror (rc)); + + iobuf_close (output); + release_armor_context (afx); + } + xfree (filename); + } + else + proc_packets (ctrl, procctx, ed->buf ); + + ed->buf = NULL; + if (dfx->eof_seen > 1 ) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + else if ( ed->mdc_method ) + { + /* We used to let parse-packet.c handle the MDC packet but this + turned out to be a problem with compressed packets: With old + style packets there is no length information available and + the decompressor uses an implicit end. However we can't know + this implicit end beforehand (:-) and thus may feed the + decompressor with more bytes than actually needed. It would + be possible to unread the extra bytes but due to our weird + iobuf system any unread is non reliable due to filters + already popped off. The easy and sane solution is to care + about the MDC packet only here and never pass it to the + packet parser. Fortunatley the OpenPGP spec requires a + strict format for the MDC packet so that we know that 22 + bytes are appended. */ + int datalen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (ed->mdc_method); + + log_assert (dfx->cipher_hd); + log_assert (dfx->mdc_hash); + gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, dfx->holdback, 22, NULL, 0); + gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, dfx->holdback, 2); + gcry_md_final (dfx->mdc_hash); + + if ( dfx->holdback[0] != '\xd3' + || dfx->holdback[1] != '\x14' + || datalen != 20 + || memcmp (gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash, 0), dfx->holdback+2, datalen)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); + /* log_printhex(dfx->holdback, 22, "MDC message:"); */ + /* log_printhex(gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash,0), datalen, "MDC calc:"); */ + } + + leave: + release_dfx_context (dfx); + return rc; +} + + +/* Fill BUFFER with up to NBYTES-OFFSET from STREAM utilizing + * information from the context DFX. Returns the new offset which is + * the number of bytes read plus the original offset. On EOF the + * respective flag in DFX is set. */ +static size_t +fill_buffer (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx, iobuf_t stream, + byte *buffer, size_t nbytes, size_t offset) +{ + size_t nread = offset; + size_t curr; + int ret; + + if (dfx->partial) + { + while (nread < nbytes) + { + curr = nbytes - nread; + + ret = iobuf_read (stream, &buffer[nread], curr); + if (ret == -1) + { + dfx->eof_seen = 1; /* Normal EOF. */ + break; + } + + nread += ret; + } + } + else + { + while (nread < nbytes && dfx->length) + { + curr = nbytes - nread; + if (curr > dfx->length) + curr = dfx->length; + + ret = iobuf_read (stream, &buffer[nread], curr); + if (ret == -1) + { + dfx->eof_seen = 3; /* Premature EOF. */ + break; + } + + nread += ret; + dfx->length -= ret; + } + if (!dfx->length) + dfx->eof_seen = 1; /* Normal EOF. */ + } + + return nread; +} + + +/* The core of the AEAD decryption. This is the underflow function of + * the aead_decode_filter. */ +static gpg_error_t +aead_underflow (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx, iobuf_t a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len) +{ + const size_t size = *ret_len; /* The allocated size of BUF. */ + gpg_error_t err; + size_t totallen = 0; /* The number of bytes to return on success or EOF. */ + size_t off = 0; /* The offset into the buffer. */ + size_t len; /* The current number of bytes in BUF+OFF. */ + + log_assert (size > 48); /* Our code requires at least this size. */ + + /* Copy the rest from the last call of this function into BUF. */ + len = dfx->holdbacklen; + dfx->holdbacklen = 0; + memcpy (buf, dfx->holdback, len); + + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("aead_underflow: size=%zu len=%zu%s%s\n", size, len, + dfx->partial? " partial":"", dfx->eof_seen? " eof":""); + + /* Read and fill up BUF. We need to watch out for an EOF so that we + * can detect the last chunk which is commonly shorter than the + * chunksize. After the last data byte from the last chunk 32 more + * bytes are expected for the last chunk's tag and the following + * final chunk's tag. To detect the EOF we need to try reading at least + * one further byte; however we try to read 16 extra bytes to avoid + * single byte reads in some lower layers. The outcome is that we + * have up to 48 extra extra octets which we will later put into the + * holdback buffer for the next invocation (which handles the EOF + * case). */ + len = fill_buffer (dfx, a, buf, size, len); + if (len < 32) + { + /* Not enough data for the last two tags. */ + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED); + goto leave; + } + if (dfx->eof_seen) + { + /* If have seen an EOF we copy only the last two auth tags into + * the holdback buffer. */ + dfx->holdbacklen = 32; + memcpy (dfx->holdback, buf+len-32, 32); + len -= 32; + } + else + { + /* If have not seen an EOF we copy the entire extra 48 bytes + * into the holdback buffer for processing at the next call of + * this function. */ + dfx->holdbacklen = len > 48? 48 : len; + memcpy (dfx->holdback, buf+len-dfx->holdbacklen, dfx->holdbacklen); + len -= dfx->holdbacklen; + } + /* log_printhex (dfx->holdback, dfx->holdbacklen, "holdback:"); */ + + /* Decrypt the buffer. This first requires a loop to handle the + * case when a chunk ends within the buffer. */ + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("decrypt: chunklen=%ju total=%ju size=%zu len=%zu%s\n", + dfx->chunklen, dfx->total, size, len, + dfx->eof_seen? " eof":""); + + while (len && dfx->chunklen + len >= dfx->chunksize) + { + size_t n = dfx->chunksize - dfx->chunklen; + byte tagbuf[16]; + + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("chunksize will be reached: n=%zu\n", n); + + if (!dfx->chunklen) + { + /* First data for this chunk - prepare. */ + err = aead_set_nonce_and_ad (dfx, 0); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + /* log_printhex (buf, n, "ciph:"); */ + gcry_cipher_final (dfx->cipher_hd); + err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, buf+off, n, NULL, 0); + if (err) + { + log_error ("gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (1): %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + /* log_printhex (buf, n, "plai:"); */ + totallen += n; + dfx->chunklen += n; + dfx->total += n; + off += n; + len -= n; + + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("ndecrypted: %zu (nchunk=%ju) bytes left: %zu at off=%zu\n", + totallen, dfx->chunklen, len, off); + + /* Check the tag. */ + if (len < 16) + { + /* The tag is not entirely in the buffer. Read the rest of + * the tag from the holdback buffer. Then shift the holdback + * buffer and fill it up again. */ + memcpy (tagbuf, buf+off, len); + memcpy (tagbuf + len, dfx->holdback, 16 - len); + dfx->holdbacklen -= 16-len; + memmove (dfx->holdback, dfx->holdback + (16-len), dfx->holdbacklen); + + if (dfx->eof_seen) + { + /* We should have the last chunk's tag in TAGBUF and the + * final tag in HOLDBACKBUF. */ + if (len || dfx->holdbacklen != 16) + { + /* Not enough data for the last two tags. */ + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED); + goto leave; + } + } + else + { + len = 0; + dfx->holdbacklen = fill_buffer (dfx, a, dfx->holdback, 48, + dfx->holdbacklen); + if (dfx->holdbacklen < 32) + { + /* Not enough data for the last two tags. */ + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED); + goto leave; + } + } + } + else /* We already have the full tag. */ + { + memcpy (tagbuf, buf+off, 16); + /* Remove that tag from the output. */ + memmove (buf + off, buf + off + 16, len - 16); + len -= 16; + } + err = aead_checktag (dfx, 0, tagbuf); + if (err) + goto leave; + dfx->chunklen = 0; + dfx->chunkindex++; + + continue; + } + + /* The bulk decryption of our buffer. */ + if (len) + { + if (!dfx->chunklen) + { + /* First data for this chunk - prepare. */ + err = aead_set_nonce_and_ad (dfx, 0); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + if (dfx->eof_seen) + { + /* This is the last block of the last chunk. Its length may + * not be a multiple of the block length. */ + gcry_cipher_final (dfx->cipher_hd); + } + err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, buf + off, len, NULL, 0); + if (err) + { + log_error ("gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (2): %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + totallen += len; + dfx->chunklen += len; + dfx->total += len; + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("ndecrypted: %zu (nchunk=%ju)\n", totallen, dfx->chunklen); + } + + if (dfx->eof_seen) + { + + if (dfx->chunklen) + { + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("eof seen: holdback has the last and final tag\n"); + log_assert (dfx->holdbacklen >= 32); + err = aead_checktag (dfx, 0, dfx->holdback); + if (err) + goto leave; + dfx->chunklen = 0; + dfx->chunkindex++; + off = 16; + } + else + { + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("eof seen: holdback has the final tag\n"); + log_assert (dfx->holdbacklen >= 16); + off = 0; + } + + /* Check the final chunk. */ + err = aead_set_nonce_and_ad (dfx, 1); + if (err) + goto leave; + gcry_cipher_final (dfx->cipher_hd); + /* Decrypt an empty string (using HOLDBACK as a dummy). */ + err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, dfx->holdback, 0, NULL, 0); + if (err) + { + log_error ("gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (final): %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + err = aead_checktag (dfx, 1, dfx->holdback+off); + if (err) + goto leave; + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + } + + leave: + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("aead_underflow: returning %zu (%s)\n", + totallen, gpg_strerror (err)); + + /* In case of an auth error we map the error code to the same as + * used by the MDC decryption. */ + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); + + /* In case of an error we better wipe out the buffer than to convey + * partly decrypted data. */ + if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF) + memset (buf, 0, size); + + *ret_len = totallen; + + return err; +} + + +/* The IOBUF filter used to decrypt AEAD encrypted data. */ +static int +aead_decode_filter (void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, + byte *buf, size_t *ret_len) +{ + decode_filter_ctx_t dfx = opaque; + int rc = 0; + + if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && dfx->eof_seen ) + { + *ret_len = 0; + rc = -1; + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) + { + log_assert (a); + + rc = aead_underflow (dfx, a, buf, ret_len); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF) + rc = -1; /* We need to use the old convention in the filter. */ + + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) + { + release_dfx_context (dfx); + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) + { + mem2str (buf, "aead_decode_filter", *ret_len); + } + + return rc; +} + + +static int +mdc_decode_filter (void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, + byte *buf, size_t *ret_len) +{ + decode_filter_ctx_t dfx = opaque; + size_t n, size = *ret_len; + int rc = 0; + + /* Note: We need to distinguish between a partial and a fixed length + packet. The first is the usual case as created by GPG. However + for short messages the format degrades to a fixed length packet + and other implementations might use fixed length as well. Only + looking for the EOF on fixed data works only if the encrypted + packet is not followed by other data. This used to be a long + standing bug which was fixed on 2009-10-02. */ + + if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && dfx->eof_seen ) + { + *ret_len = 0; + rc = -1; + } + else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) + { + log_assert (a); + log_assert (size > 44); /* Our code requires at least this size. */ + + /* Get at least 22 bytes and put it ahead in the buffer. */ + n = fill_buffer (dfx, a, buf, 44, 22); + if (n == 44) + { + /* We have enough stuff - flush the deferred stuff. */ + if ( !dfx->holdbacklen ) /* First time. */ + { + memcpy (buf, buf+22, 22); + n = 22; + } + else + { + memcpy (buf, dfx->holdback, 22); + } + /* Fill up the buffer. */ + n = fill_buffer (dfx, a, buf, size, n); + + /* Move the trailing 22 bytes back to the holdback buffer. We + have at least 44 bytes thus a memmove is not needed. */ + n -= 22; + memcpy (dfx->holdback, buf+n, 22 ); + dfx->holdbacklen = 22; + } + else if ( !dfx->holdbacklen ) /* EOF seen but empty holdback buffer. */ + { + /* This is bad because it means an incomplete hash. */ + n -= 22; + memcpy (buf, buf+22, n ); + dfx->eof_seen = 2; /* EOF with incomplete hash. */ + } + else /* EOF seen (i.e. read less than 22 bytes). */ + { + memcpy (buf, dfx->holdback, 22 ); + n -= 22; + memcpy (dfx->holdback, buf+n, 22 ); + dfx->eof_seen = 1; /* Normal EOF. */ + } + + if ( n ) + { + if ( dfx->cipher_hd ) + gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0); + if ( dfx->mdc_hash ) + gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, buf, n); + } + else + { + log_assert ( dfx->eof_seen ); + rc = -1; /* Return EOF. */ + } + *ret_len = n; + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) + { + release_dfx_context (dfx); + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) + { + mem2str (buf, "mdc_decode_filter", *ret_len); + } + return rc; +} + + +static int +decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len) +{ + decode_filter_ctx_t fc = opaque; + size_t size = *ret_len; + size_t n; + int rc = 0; + + + if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && fc->eof_seen ) + { + *ret_len = 0; + rc = -1; + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) + { + log_assert (a); + + n = fill_buffer (fc, a, buf, size, 0); + if (n) + { + if (fc->cipher_hd) + gcry_cipher_decrypt (fc->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0); + } + else + { + if (!fc->eof_seen) + fc->eof_seen = 1; + rc = -1; /* Return EOF. */ + } + *ret_len = n; + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) + { + release_dfx_context (fc); + } + else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) + { + mem2str (buf, "decode_filter", *ret_len); + } + return rc; +} |