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Diffstat (limited to 'g10/parse-packet.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/parse-packet.c | 3663 |
1 files changed, 3663 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fea1ac --- /dev/null +++ b/g10/parse-packet.c @@ -0,0 +1,3663 @@ +/* parse-packet.c - read packets + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, + * 2007, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch + * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "gpg.h" +#include "../common/util.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "../common/iobuf.h" +#include "filter.h" +#include "photoid.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "../common/i18n.h" +#include "../common/host2net.h" +#include "../common/mbox-util.h" + + +static int mpi_print_mode; +static int list_mode; +static estream_t listfp; + +/* A linked list of known notation names. Note that the FLAG is used + * to store the length of the name to speed up the check. */ +static strlist_t known_notations_list; + + +static int parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, + off_t * retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET + , const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l +#endif + ); +static int copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype, + unsigned long pktlen, int partial); +static void skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, + unsigned long pktlen, int partial); +static void *read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen); +static int parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen); +static int parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet); +static int parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet); +static int parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PKT_onepass_sig * ops); +static int parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * packet); +static int parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet); +static int parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet); +static int parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet); +static gpg_error_t parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, + unsigned long pktlen); +static int parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial); +static int parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int new_ctb); +static int parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial); +static gpg_error_t parse_encrypted_aead (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, + unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet, + int partial); +static int parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int new_ctb); +static int parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int partial); + +/* Read a 16-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */ +static unsigned short +read_16 (IOBUF inp) +{ + unsigned short a; + a = (unsigned short)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8; + a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + return a; +} + + +/* Read a 32-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */ +static unsigned long +read_32 (IOBUF inp) +{ + unsigned long a; + a = (unsigned long)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 24; + a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 16; + a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8; + a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + return a; +} + + +/* Read an external representation of an MPI and return the MPI. The + external format is a 16-bit unsigned value stored in network byte + order giving the number of bits for the following integer. The + integer is stored MSB first and is left padded with zero bits to + align on a byte boundary. + + The caller must set *RET_NREAD to the maximum number of bytes to + read from the pipeline INP. This function sets *RET_NREAD to be + the number of bytes actually read from the pipeline. + + If SECURE is true, the integer is stored in secure memory + (allocated using gcry_xmalloc_secure). */ +static gcry_mpi_t +mpi_read (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure) +{ + int c, c1, c2, i; + unsigned int nmax = *ret_nread; + unsigned int nbits, nbytes; + size_t nread = 0; + gcry_mpi_t a = NULL; + byte *buf = NULL; + byte *p; + + if (!nmax) + goto overflow; + + if ((c = c1 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + goto leave; + if (++nread == nmax) + goto overflow; + nbits = c << 8; + if ((c = c2 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + goto leave; + ++nread; + nbits |= c; + if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS) + { + log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits); + goto leave; + } + + nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8; + buf = secure ? gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes + 2) : gcry_xmalloc (nbytes + 2); + p = buf; + p[0] = c1; + p[1] = c2; + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) + { + if (nread == nmax) + goto overflow; + + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c == -1) + goto leave; + + p[i + 2] = c; + nread ++; + } + + if (gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buf, nread, &nread)) + a = NULL; + + *ret_nread = nread; + gcry_free(buf); + return a; + + overflow: + log_error ("mpi larger than indicated length (%u bits)\n", 8*nmax); + leave: + *ret_nread = nread; + gcry_free(buf); + return a; +} + + +/* Read an external representation (which is possibly an SOS) and + return the MPI. The external format is a 16-bit unsigned value + stored in network byte order giving information for the following + octets. + + The caller must set *RET_NREAD to the maximum number of bytes to + read from the pipeline INP. This function sets *RET_NREAD to be + the number of bytes actually read from the pipeline. + + If SECURE is true, the integer is stored in secure memory + (allocated using gcry_xmalloc_secure). */ +static gcry_mpi_t +mpi_read_detect_0_removal (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure, + u16 *r_csum_tweak) +{ + int c, c1, c2, i; + unsigned int nmax = *ret_nread; + unsigned int nbits, nbits1, nbytes; + size_t nread = 0; + gcry_mpi_t a = NULL; + byte *buf = NULL; + byte *p; + + if (!nmax) + goto overflow; + + if ((c = c1 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + goto leave; + if (++nread == nmax) + goto overflow; + nbits = c << 8; + if ((c = c2 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + goto leave; + ++nread; + nbits |= c; + if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS) + { + log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits); + goto leave; + } + + nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8; + buf = secure ? gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes + 2) : gcry_xmalloc (nbytes + 2); + p = buf; + p[0] = c1; + p[1] = c2; + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) + { + if (nread == nmax) + goto overflow; + + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c == -1) + goto leave; + + p[i + 2] = c; + + nread ++; + } + + if (gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buf, nread, &nread)) + a = NULL; + + /* Possibly, it has leading zeros. */ + if (a) + { + nbits1 = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (a); + if (nbits > nbits1) + { + *r_csum_tweak -= (nbits >> 8); + *r_csum_tweak -= (nbits & 0xff); + *r_csum_tweak += (nbits1 >> 8); + *r_csum_tweak += (nbits1 & 0xff); + } + } + + *ret_nread = nread; + gcry_free(buf); + return a; + + overflow: + log_error ("mpi larger than indicated length (%u bits)\n", 8*nmax); + leave: + *ret_nread = nread; + gcry_free(buf); + return a; +} + + +/* Register STRING as a known critical notation name. */ +void +register_known_notation (const char *string) +{ + strlist_t sl; + + if (!known_notations_list) + { + sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list, + "preferred-email-encoding@pgp.com"); + sl->flags = 32; + sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list, "pka-address@gnupg.org"); + sl->flags = 21; + } + if (!string) + return; /* Only initialized the default known notations. */ + + /* In --set-notation we use an exclamation mark to indicate a + * critical notation. As a convenience skip this here. */ + if (*string == '!') + string++; + + if (!*string || strlist_find (known_notations_list, string)) + return; /* Empty string or already registered. */ + + sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list, string); + sl->flags = strlen (string); +} + + +int +set_packet_list_mode (int mode) +{ + int old = list_mode; + list_mode = mode; + + /* We use stdout only if invoked by the --list-packets command + but switch to stderr in all other cases. This breaks the + previous behaviour but that seems to be more of a bug than + intentional. I don't believe that any application makes use of + this long standing annoying way of printing to stdout except when + doing a --list-packets. If this assumption fails, it will be easy + to add an option for the listing stream. Note that we initialize + it only once; mainly because there is code which switches + opt.list_mode back to 1 and we want to have all output to the + same stream. The MPI_PRINT_MODE will be enabled if the + corresponding debug flag is set or if we are in --list-packets + and --verbose is given. + + Using stderr is not actually very clean because it bypasses the + logging code but it is a special thing anyway. I am not sure + whether using log_stream() would be better. Perhaps we should + enable the list mode only with a special option. */ + if (!listfp) + { + if (opt.list_packets) + { + listfp = es_stdout; + if (opt.verbose) + mpi_print_mode = 1; + } + else + listfp = es_stderr; + + if (DBG_MPI) + mpi_print_mode = 1; + } + return old; +} + + +/* If OPT.VERBOSE is set, print a warning that the algorithm ALGO is + not suitable for signing and encryption. */ +static void +unknown_pubkey_warning (int algo) +{ + static byte unknown_pubkey_algos[256]; + + /* First check whether the algorithm is usable but not suitable for + encryption/signing. */ + if (pubkey_get_npkey (algo)) + { + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + { + if (!pubkey_get_nsig (algo)) + log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n", + openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "signing"); + if (!pubkey_get_nenc (algo)) + log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n", + openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "encryption"); + } + } + else + { + algo &= 0xff; + if (!unknown_pubkey_algos[algo]) + { + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info (_("can't handle public key algorithm %d\n"), algo); + unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] = 1; + } + } +} + + +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET +int +dbg_parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, + const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l) +{ + int skip, rc; + + do + { + rc = parse (ctx, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0, "parse", dbg_f, dbg_l); + } + while (skip && ! rc); + return rc; +} +#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ +int +parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int skip, rc; + + do + { + rc = parse (ctx, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0); + } + while (skip && ! rc); + return rc; +} +#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ + + +/* + * Like parse packet, but only return secret or public (sub)key + * packets. + */ +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET +int +dbg_search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, + off_t * retpos, int with_uid, + const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l) +{ + int skip, rc; + + do + { + rc = parse (ctx, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0, "search", + dbg_f, dbg_l); + } + while (skip && ! rc); + return rc; +} +#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ +int +search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, + off_t * retpos, int with_uid) +{ + int skip, rc; + + do + { + rc = parse (ctx, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0); + } + while (skip && ! rc); + return rc; +} +#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ + + +/* + * Copy all packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces. + */ +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET +int +dbg_copy_all_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l) +{ + PACKET pkt; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + int skip, rc = 0; + + if (! out) + log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n"); + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + do + { + init_packet (&pkt); + } + while (! + (rc = + parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, "copy", + dbg_f, dbg_l))); + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ +int +copy_all_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out) +{ + PACKET pkt; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + int skip, rc = 0; + + if (! out) + log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n"); + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + do + { + init_packet (&pkt); + } + while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0))); + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ + + +/* + * Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces. + * Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later + * offsets) + */ +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET +int +dbg_copy_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff, + const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l) +{ + int rc = 0; + PACKET pkt; + int skip; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + do + { + if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff) + { + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + return 0; + } + init_packet (&pkt); + } + while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, + "some", dbg_f, dbg_l))); + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ +int +copy_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff) +{ + int rc = 0; + PACKET pkt; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + int skip; + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + do + { + if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff) + { + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + return 0; + } + init_packet (&pkt); + } + while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0))); + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ + + +/* + * Skip over N packets + */ +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET +int +dbg_skip_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, unsigned n, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l) +{ + int rc = 0; + int skip; + PACKET pkt; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + for (; n && !rc; n--) + { + init_packet (&pkt); + rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1, "skip", + dbg_f, dbg_l); + } + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ +int +skip_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int n) +{ + int rc = 0; + int skip; + PACKET pkt; + struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; + + init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp); + + for (; n && !rc; n--) + { + init_packet (&pkt); + rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1); + } + + deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); + + return rc; +} +#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/ + + +/* Parse a packet and save it in *PKT. + + If OUT is not NULL and the packet is valid (its type is not 0), + then the header, the initial length field and the packet's contents + are written to OUT. In this case, the packet is not saved in *PKT. + + ONLYKEYPKTS is a simple packet filter. If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 1, + then only public subkey packets, public key packets, private subkey + packets and private key packets are parsed. The rest are skipped + (i.e., the header and the contents are read from the pipeline and + discarded). If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then in addition to the + above 4 types of packets, user id packets are also accepted. + + DO_SKIP is a more coarse grained filter. Unless ONLYKEYPKTS is set + to 2 and the packet is a user id packet, all packets are skipped. + + Finally, if a packet is invalid (it's type is 0), it is skipped. + + If a packet is skipped and SKIP is not NULL, then *SKIP is set to + 1. + + Note: ONLYKEYPKTS and DO_SKIP are only respected if OUT is NULL, + i.e., the packets are not simply being copied. + + If RETPOS is not NULL, then the position of CTX->INP (as returned by + iobuf_tell) is saved there before any data is read from CTX->INP. + */ +static int +parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t * retpos, + int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET + , const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l +#endif + ) +{ + int rc = 0; + iobuf_t inp; + int c, ctb, pkttype, lenbytes; + unsigned long pktlen; + byte hdr[8]; + int hdrlen; + int new_ctb = 0, partial = 0; + int with_uid = (onlykeypkts == 2); + off_t pos; + + *skip = 0; + inp = ctx->inp; + + again: + log_assert (!pkt->pkt.generic); + if (retpos || list_mode) + { + pos = iobuf_tell (inp); + if (retpos) + *retpos = pos; + } + else + pos = 0; /* (silence compiler warning) */ + + /* The first byte of a packet is the so-called tag. The highest bit + must be set. */ + if ((ctb = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + { + rc = -1; + goto leave; + } + hdrlen = 0; + hdr[hdrlen++] = ctb; + + if (!(ctb & 0x80)) + { + log_error ("%s: invalid packet (ctb=%02x)\n", iobuf_where (inp), ctb); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + /* Immediately following the header is the length. There are two + formats: the old format and the new format. If bit 6 (where the + least significant bit is bit 0) is set in the tag, then we are + dealing with a new format packet. Otherwise, it is an old format + packet. */ + pktlen = 0; + new_ctb = !!(ctb & 0x40); + if (new_ctb) + { + /* Get the packet's type. This is encoded in the 6 least + significant bits of the tag. */ + pkttype = ctb & 0x3f; + + /* Extract the packet's length. New format packets have 4 ways + to encode the packet length. The value of the first byte + determines the encoding and partially determines the length. + See section 4.2.2 of RFC 4880 for details. */ + if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + { + log_error ("%s: 1st length byte missing\n", iobuf_where (inp)); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + + hdr[hdrlen++] = c; + if (c < 192) + pktlen = c; + else if (c < 224) + { + pktlen = (c - 192) * 256; + if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + { + log_error ("%s: 2nd length byte missing\n", + iobuf_where (inp)); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + hdr[hdrlen++] = c; + pktlen += c + 192; + } + else if (c == 255) + { + int i; + char value[4]; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) + { + if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + { + log_error ("%s: 4 byte length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp)); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + value[i] = hdr[hdrlen++] = c; + } + + pktlen = buf32_to_ulong (value); + } + else /* Partial body length. */ + { + switch (pkttype) + { + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: + case PKT_COMPRESSED: + iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (inp, c & 0xff); + pktlen = 0; /* To indicate partial length. */ + partial = 1; + break; + + default: + log_error ("%s: partial length invalid for" + " packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + } + + } + else + /* This is an old format packet. */ + { + /* Extract the packet's type. This is encoded in bits 2-5. */ + pkttype = (ctb >> 2) & 0xf; + + /* The type of length encoding is encoded in bits 0-1 of the + tag. */ + lenbytes = ((ctb & 3) == 3) ? 0 : (1 << (ctb & 3)); + if (!lenbytes) + { + pktlen = 0; /* Don't know the value. */ + /* This isn't really partial, but we can treat it the same + in a "read until the end" sort of way. */ + partial = 1; + if (pkttype != PKT_ENCRYPTED && pkttype != PKT_PLAINTEXT + && pkttype != PKT_COMPRESSED) + { + log_error ("%s: indeterminate length for invalid" + " packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + } + else + { + for (; lenbytes; lenbytes--) + { + pktlen <<= 8; + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c == -1) + { + log_error ("%s: length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp)); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + pktlen |= hdr[hdrlen++] = c; + } + } + } + + /* Sometimes the decompressing layer enters an error state in which + it simply outputs 0xff for every byte read. If we have a stream + of 0xff bytes, then it will be detected as a new format packet + with type 63 and a 4-byte encoded length that is 4G-1. Since + packets with type 63 are private and we use them as a control + packet, which won't be 4 GB, we reject such packets as + invalid. */ + if (pkttype == 63 && pktlen == 0xFFFFFFFF) + { + /* With some probability this is caused by a problem in the + * the uncompressing layer - in some error cases it just loops + * and spits out 0xff bytes. */ + log_error ("%s: garbled packet detected\n", iobuf_where (inp)); + g10_exit (2); + } + + if (out && pkttype) + { + /* This type of copying won't work if the packet uses a partial + body length. (In other words, this only works if HDR is + actually the length.) Currently, no callers require this + functionality so we just log this as an error. */ + if (partial) + { + log_error ("parse: Can't copy partial packet. Aborting.\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + rc = iobuf_write (out, hdr, hdrlen); + if (!rc) + rc = copy_packet (inp, out, pkttype, pktlen, partial); + goto leave; + } + + if (with_uid && pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + /* If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then we never skip user id packets, + even if DO_SKIP is set. */ + ; + else if (do_skip + /* type==0 is not allowed. This is an invalid packet. */ + || !pkttype + /* When ONLYKEYPKTS is set, we don't skip keys. */ + || (onlykeypkts && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY + && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)) + { + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial); + *skip = 1; + rc = 0; + goto leave; + } + + if (DBG_PACKET) + { +#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET + log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s (%s.%s.%d)\n", + iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : "", + dbg_w, dbg_f, dbg_l); +#else + log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s\n", + iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen, + new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : ""); +#endif + } + + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "# off=%lu ctb=%02x tag=%d hlen=%d plen=%lu%s%s\n", + (unsigned long)pos, ctb, pkttype, hdrlen, pktlen, + partial? (new_ctb ? " partial" : " indeterminate") :"", + new_ctb? " new-ctb":""); + + /* Count it. */ + ctx->n_parsed_packets++; + + pkt->pkttype = pkttype; + rc = GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */ + switch (pkttype) + { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: + pkt->pkt.public_key = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_key); + rc = parse_key (inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: + rc = parse_symkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: + rc = parse_pubkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_SIGNATURE: + pkt->pkt.signature = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.signature); + rc = parse_signature (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.signature); + break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: + pkt->pkt.onepass_sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.onepass_sig); + rc = parse_onepass_sig (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig); + break; + case PKT_USER_ID: + rc = parse_user_id (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_ATTRIBUTE: + pkt->pkttype = pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; /* we store it in the userID */ + rc = parse_attribute (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_OLD_COMMENT: + case PKT_COMMENT: + rc = parse_comment (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt); + break; + case PKT_RING_TRUST: + { + rc = parse_ring_trust (ctx, pktlen); + if (!rc) + goto again; /* Directly read the next packet. */ + } + break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: + rc = parse_plaintext (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial); + break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: + rc = parse_compressed (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb); + break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + rc = parse_encrypted (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial); + break; + case PKT_MDC: + rc = parse_mdc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb); + break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: + rc = parse_encrypted_aead (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial); + break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: + rc = parse_gpg_control (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial); + break; + case PKT_MARKER: + rc = parse_marker (inp, pkttype, pktlen); + break; + default: + /* Unknown packet. Skip it. */ + skip_packet (inp, pkttype, pktlen, partial); + break; + } + + /* Store a shallow copy of certain packets in the context. */ + free_packet (NULL, ctx); + if (!rc && (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY + || pkttype == PKT_USER_ID + || pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE + || pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)) + { + ctx->last_pkt = *pkt; + } + + leave: + /* FIXME: We leak in case of an error (see the xmalloc's above). */ + if (!rc && iobuf_error (inp)) + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING; + + /* FIXME: We use only the error code for now to avoid problems with + callers which have not been checked to always use gpg_err_code() + when comparing error codes. */ + return rc == -1? -1 : gpg_err_code (rc); +} + + +static void +dump_hex_line (int c, int *i) +{ + if (*i && !(*i % 8)) + { + if (*i && !(*i % 24)) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\n%4d:", *i); + else + es_putc (' ', listfp); + } + if (c == -1) + es_fprintf (listfp, " EOF"); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", c); + ++*i; +} + + +/* Copy the contents of a packet from the pipeline IN to the pipeline + OUT. + + The header and length have already been read from INP and the + decoded values are given as PKGTYPE and PKTLEN. + + If the packet is a partial body length packet (RFC 4880, Section + 4.2.2.4), then iobuf_set_partial_block_modeiobuf_set_partial_block_mode + should already have been called on INP and PARTIAL should be set. + + If PARTIAL is set or PKTLEN is 0 and PKTTYPE is PKT_COMPRESSED, + copy until the first EOF is encountered on INP. + + Returns 0 on success and an error code if an error occurs. */ +static int +copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype, + unsigned long pktlen, int partial) +{ + int rc; + int n; + char buf[100]; + + if (partial) + { + while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1) + if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n))) + return rc; /* write error */ + } + else if (!pktlen && pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) + { + log_debug ("copy_packet: compressed!\n"); + /* compressed packet, copy till EOF */ + while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1) + if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n))) + return rc; /* write error */ + } + else + { + for (; pktlen; pktlen -= n) + { + n = pktlen > sizeof (buf) ? sizeof (buf) : pktlen; + n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, n); + if (n == -1) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n))) + return rc; /* write error */ + } + } + return 0; +} + + +/* Skip an unknown packet. PKTTYPE is the packet's type, PKTLEN is + the length of the packet's content and PARTIAL is whether partial + body length encoding in used (in this case PKTLEN is ignored). */ +static void +skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, int partial) +{ + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":unknown packet: type %2d, length %lu\n", + pkttype, pktlen); + if (pkttype) + { + int c, i = 0; + es_fputs ("dump:", listfp); + if (partial) + { + while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1) + dump_hex_line (c, &i); + } + else + { + for (; pktlen; pktlen--) + { + dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i); + if (c == -1) + break; + } + } + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + return; + } + } + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial); +} + + +/* Read PKTLEN bytes from INP and return them in a newly allocated + * buffer. In case of an error (including reading fewer than PKTLEN + * bytes from INP before EOF is returned), NULL is returned and an + * error message is logged. */ +static void * +read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen) +{ + int c; + byte *buf, *p; + + buf = xtrymalloc (pktlen); + if (!buf) + { + gpg_error_t err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("error reading rest of packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + return NULL; + } + for (p = buf; pktlen; pktlen--) + { + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c == -1) + { + log_error ("premature eof while reading rest of packet\n"); + xfree (buf); + return NULL; + } + *p++ = c; + } + + return buf; +} + + +/* Read a special size+body from INP. On success store an opaque MPI + with it at R_DATA. On error return an error code and store NULL at + R_DATA. Even in the error case store the number of read bytes at + R_NREAD. The caller shall pass the remaining size of the packet in + PKTLEN. */ +static gpg_error_t +read_size_body (iobuf_t inp, int pktlen, size_t *r_nread, + gcry_mpi_t *r_data) +{ + char buffer[256]; + char *tmpbuf; + int i, c, nbytes; + + *r_nread = 0; + *r_data = NULL; + + if (!pktlen) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + c = iobuf_readbyte (inp); + if (c < 0) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + pktlen--; + ++*r_nread; + nbytes = c; + if (nbytes < 2 || nbytes > 254) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + if (nbytes > pktlen) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + + buffer[0] = nbytes; + + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) + { + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c < 0) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + ++*r_nread; + buffer[1+i] = c; + } + + tmpbuf = xtrymalloc (1 + nbytes); + if (!tmpbuf) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + memcpy (tmpbuf, buffer, 1 + nbytes); + *r_data = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, tmpbuf, 8 * (1 + nbytes)); + if (!*r_data) + { + xfree (tmpbuf); + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + return 0; +} + + +/* Parse a marker packet. */ +static int +parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen) +{ + (void) pkttype; + + if (pktlen != 3) + goto fail; + + if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P') + { + pktlen--; + goto fail; + } + + if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'G') + { + pktlen--; + goto fail; + } + + if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P') + { + pktlen--; + goto fail; + } + + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":marker packet: PGP\n", listfp); + + return 0; + + fail: + log_error ("invalid marker packet\n"); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":marker packet: [invalid]\n", listfp); + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; +} + + +static int +parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet) +{ + PKT_symkey_enc *k; + int rc = 0; + int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, aead_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen; + + if (pktlen < 4) + goto too_short; + version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (version == 4) + ; + else if (version == 5) + ; + else + { + log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + if (pktlen > 200) + { /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */ + log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too large]\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (version == 5) + { + aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + } + else + aead_algo = 0; + if (pktlen < 2) + goto too_short; + s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + switch (s2kmode) + { + case 0: /* Simple S2K. */ + minlen = 0; + break; + case 1: /* Salted S2K. */ + minlen = 8; + break; + case 3: /* Iterated+salted S2K. */ + minlen = 9; + break; + default: + log_error ("unknown S2K mode %d\n", s2kmode); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown S2K mode]\n"); + goto leave; + } + if (minlen > pktlen) + { + log_error ("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + seskeylen = pktlen - minlen; + k = packet->pkt.symkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.symkey_enc + + seskeylen - 1); + k->version = version; + k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo; + k->aead_algo = aead_algo; + k->s2k.mode = s2kmode; + k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo; + if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3) + { + for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--) + k->s2k.salt[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + } + if (s2kmode == 3) + { + k->s2k.count = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + } + k->seskeylen = seskeylen; + if (k->seskeylen) + { + for (i = 0; i < seskeylen && pktlen; i++, pktlen--) + k->seskey[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + + /* What we're watching out for here is a session key decryptor + with no salt. The RFC says that using salt for this is a + MUST. */ + if (s2kmode != 1 && s2kmode != 3) + log_info (_("WARNING: potentially insecure symmetrically" + " encrypted session key\n")); + } + log_assert (!pktlen); + + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, + ":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, aead %d," + "s2k %d, hash %d", + version, cipher_algo, aead_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo); + if (seskeylen) + { + /* To compute the size of the session key we need to know + * the size of the AEAD nonce which we may not know. Thus + * we show only the size of the entire encrypted session + * key. */ + if (aead_algo) + es_fprintf (listfp, ", encrypted seskey %d bytes", seskeylen); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8); + } + es_fprintf (listfp, "\n"); + if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalt "); + es_write_hexstring (listfp, k->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL); + if (s2kmode == 3) + es_fprintf (listfp, ", count %lu (%lu)", + S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong) k->s2k.count), + (ulong) k->s2k.count); + es_fprintf (listfp, "\n"); + } + } + + leave: + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return rc; + + too_short: + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; +} + + +static int +parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet) +{ + int rc = 0; + int i, ndata; + PKT_pubkey_enc *k; + + k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc); + if (pktlen < 12) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + k->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (k->version != 2 && k->version != 3) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + k->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + k->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + k->throw_keyid = 0; /* Only used as flag for build_packet. */ + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, + ":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n", + k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong) k->keyid[0], + (ulong) k->keyid[1]); + + ndata = pubkey_get_nenc (k->pubkey_algo); + if (!ndata) + { + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunsupported algorithm %d\n", k->pubkey_algo); + unknown_pubkey_warning (k->pubkey_algo); + k->data[0] = NULL; /* No need to store the encrypted data. */ + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++) + { + if (k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && i == 1) + { + size_t n; + rc = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, k->data+i); + pktlen -= n; + } + else + { + int n = pktlen; + k->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0); + pktlen -= n; + if (!k->data[i]) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + } + if (rc) + goto leave; + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: "); + mpi_print (listfp, k->data[i], mpi_print_mode); + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + } + } + + leave: + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return rc; +} + + +/* Dump a subpacket to LISTFP. BUFFER contains the subpacket in + question and points to the type field in the subpacket header (not + the start of the header). TYPE is the subpacket's type with the + critical bit cleared. CRITICAL is the value of the CRITICAL bit. + BUFLEN is the length of the buffer and LENGTH is the length of the + subpacket according to the subpacket's header. */ +static void +dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical, + const byte * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length) +{ + const char *p = NULL; + int i; + + /* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to detect + * the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked ARR + * and add an additional notice. */ + if (type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, + "\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n" + "WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically " + "encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to " + "the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n", + type, (unsigned) length); + } + + buffer++; + length--; + + es_fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*) */ + critical ? "critical " : "", + hashed ? "hashed " : "", type, (unsigned) length); + if (length > buflen) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned) buflen); + return; + } + switch (type) + { + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED: + if (length >= 4) + es_fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s", + strtimestamp (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE: + if (length >= 4) + { + if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)) + es_fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s", + strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire"); + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE: + if (length) + es_fprintf (listfp, "%sexportable", *buffer ? "" : "not "); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST: + if (length != 2) + p = "[invalid trust subpacket]"; + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "trust signature of depth %d, value %d", buffer[0], + buffer[1]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP: + if (!length) + p = "[invalid regexp subpacket]"; + else + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "regular expression: \""); + es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, "\"", NULL); + p = "\""; + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE: + if (length) + es_fprintf (listfp, "%srevocable", *buffer ? "" : "not "); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE: + if (length >= 4) + { + if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)) + es_fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s", + strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire"); + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM: + es_fputs ("pref-sym-algos:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD: + es_fputs ("pref-aead-algos:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY: + es_fputs ("revocation key: ", listfp); + if (length < 22) + p = "[too short]"; + else + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]); + for (i = 2; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, "%02X", buffer[i]); + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: + if (length >= 8) + es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer key ID %08lX%08lX", + (ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer), + (ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer + 4)); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: + if (length >= 21) + { + char *tmp; + es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer fpr v%d ", buffer[0]); + tmp = bin2hex (buffer+1, length-1, NULL); + if (tmp) + { + es_fputs (tmp, listfp); + xfree (tmp); + } + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION: + { + es_fputs ("notation: ", listfp); + if (length < 8) + p = "[too short]"; + else + { + const byte *s = buffer; + size_t n1, n2; + + n1 = (s[4] << 8) | s[5]; + n2 = (s[6] << 8) | s[7]; + s += 8; + if (8 + n1 + n2 != length) + p = "[error]"; + else + { + es_write_sanitized (listfp, s, n1, ")", NULL); + es_putc ('=', listfp); + + if (*buffer & 0x80) + es_write_sanitized (listfp, s + n1, n2, ")", NULL); + else + p = "[not human readable]"; + } + } + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH: + es_fputs ("pref-hash-algos:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR: + es_fputs ("pref-zip-algos:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS: + es_fputs ("keyserver preferences:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS: + es_fputs ("preferred keyserver: ", listfp); + es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID: + p = "primary user ID"; + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY: + es_fputs ("policy: ", listfp); + es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS: + es_fputs ("key flags:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID: + p = "signer's user ID"; + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON: + if (length) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "revocation reason 0x%02x (", *buffer); + es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer + 1, length - 1, ")", NULL); + p = ")"; + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_ARR: + es_fputs ("Big Brother's key (ignored): ", listfp); + if (length < 22) + p = "[too short]"; + else + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]); + if (length > 2) + es_write_hexstring (listfp, buffer+2, length-2, 0, NULL); + } + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES: + es_fputs ("features:", listfp); + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", buffer[i]); + break; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE: + es_fputs ("signature: ", listfp); + if (length < 17) + p = "[too short]"; + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "v%d, class 0x%02X, algo %d, digest algo %d", + buffer[0], + buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[2] : buffer[1], + buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[15] : buffer[2], + buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[16] : buffer[3]); + break; + + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK: + es_fputs ("key-block: ", listfp); + if (length && buffer[0]) + p = "[unknown reserved octet]"; + else if (length < 50) /* 50 is an arbitrary min. length. */ + p = "[invalid subpacket]"; + else + { + /* estream_t fp; */ + /* fp = es_fopen ("a.key-block", "wb"); */ + /* log_assert (fp); */ + /* es_fwrite ( buffer+1, length-1, 1, fp); */ + /* es_fclose (fp); */ + es_fprintf (listfp, "[%u octets]", (unsigned int)length-1); + } + break; + + default: + if (type >= 100 && type <= 110) + p = "experimental / private subpacket"; + else + p = "?"; + break; + } + + es_fprintf (listfp, "%s)\n", p ? p : ""); +} + + +/* + * Returns: >= 0 use this offset into buffer + * -1 explicitly reject returning this type + * -2 subpacket too short + */ +int +parse_one_sig_subpkt (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type) +{ + switch (type) + { + case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY: + if (n < 22) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED: + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE: + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE: + if (n < 4) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS: + case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR: + case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS: + case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES: + case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP: + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE: + case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE: + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE: + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON: + if (!n) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */ + if (n < 8) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer key ID */ + if (n < 21) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION: + /* minimum length needed, and the subpacket must be well-formed + where the name length and value length all fit inside the + packet. */ + if (n < 8 + || 8 + ((buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]) + + ((buffer[6] << 8) | buffer[7]) != n) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID: + if (n != 1) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST: + if (n != 2) + break; + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK: + if (n && buffer[0]) + return -1; /* Unknown version - ignore. */ + if (n < 50) + break; /* Definitely too short to carry a key block. */ + return 0; + default: + return 0; + } + return -2; +} + + +/* Return true if we understand the critical notation. */ +static int +can_handle_critical_notation (const byte *name, size_t len) +{ + strlist_t sl; + + register_known_notation (NULL); /* Make sure it is initialized. */ + + for (sl = known_notations_list; sl; sl = sl->next) + if (sl->flags == len && !memcmp (sl->d, name, len)) + return 1; /* Known */ + + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + { + log_info(_("Unknown critical signature notation: ") ); + print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), name, len); + log_printf ("\n"); + } + + return 0; /* Unknown. */ +} + + +static int +can_handle_critical (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type) +{ + switch (type) + { + case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION: + if (n >= 8) + { + size_t notation_len = ((buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]); + if (n - 8 >= notation_len) + return can_handle_critical_notation (buffer + 8, notation_len); + } + return 0; + case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE: + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED: + case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE: + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE: + case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE: + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE: + case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY: + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */ + case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer fingerprint */ + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR: + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS: + case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID: + case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES: + case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST: + case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP: + /* Is it enough to show the policy or keyserver? */ + case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY: + case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS: + case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON: /* At least we know about it. */ + return 1; + + case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK: + if (n && !buffer[0]) + return 1; + else + return 0; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + + +const byte * +enum_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, + size_t * ret_n, int *start, int *critical) +{ + const byte *buffer; + int buflen; + int type; + int critical_dummy; + int offset; + size_t n; + int seq = 0; + int reqseq = start ? *start : 0; + + if (!critical) + critical = &critical_dummy; + + if (!pktbuf || reqseq == -1) + { + static char dummy[] = "x"; + /* Return a value different from NULL to indicate that + * there is no critical bit we do not understand. */ + return reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL ? dummy : NULL; + } + buffer = pktbuf->data; + buflen = pktbuf->len; + while (buflen) + { + n = *buffer++; + buflen--; + if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */ + { + if (buflen < 4) + goto too_short; + n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer); + buffer += 4; + buflen -= 4; + } + else if (n >= 192) /* 4 byte special encoded length header. */ + { + if (buflen < 2) + goto too_short; + n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192; + buffer++; + buflen--; + } + if (buflen < n) + goto too_short; + if (!buflen) + goto no_type_byte; + type = *buffer; + if (type & 0x80) + { + type &= 0x7f; + *critical = 1; + } + else + *critical = 0; + if (!(++seq > reqseq)) + ; + else if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL) + { + if (*critical) + { + if (n - 1 > buflen + 1) + goto too_short; + if (!can_handle_critical (buffer + 1, n - 1, type)) + { + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info (_("subpacket of type %d has " + "critical bit set\n"), type); + if (start) + *start = seq; + return NULL; /* This is an error. */ + } + } + } + else if (reqtype < 0) /* List packets. */ + dump_sig_subpkt (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, + type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n); + else if (type == reqtype) /* Found. */ + { + buffer++; + n--; + if (n > buflen) + goto too_short; + if (ret_n) + *ret_n = n; + offset = parse_one_sig_subpkt (buffer, n, type); + switch (offset) + { + case -2: + log_error ("subpacket of type %d too short\n", type); + return NULL; + case -1: + return NULL; + default: + break; + } + if (start) + *start = seq; + return buffer + offset; + } + buffer += n; + buflen -= n; + } + if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL) + /* Returning NULL means we found a subpacket with the critical bit + set that we don't grok. We've iterated over all the subpackets + and haven't found such a packet so we need to return a non-NULL + value. */ + return buffer; + + /* Critical bit we don't understand. */ + if (start) + *start = -1; + return NULL; /* End of packets; not found. */ + + too_short: + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("buffer shorter than subpacket\n"); + if (start) + *start = -1; + return NULL; + + no_type_byte: + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("type octet missing in subpacket\n"); + if (start) + *start = -1; + return NULL; +} + + +const byte * +parse_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, + size_t * ret_n) +{ + return enum_sig_subpkt (buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL); +} + + +const byte * +parse_sig_subpkt2 (PKT_signature * sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype) +{ + const byte *p; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, reqtype, NULL); + if (!p) + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, reqtype, NULL); + return p; +} + + +/* Find all revocation keys. Look in hashed area only. */ +void +parse_revkeys (PKT_signature * sig) +{ + const byte *revkey; + int seq = 0; + size_t len; + + if (sig->sig_class != 0x1F) + return; + + while ((revkey = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY, + &len, &seq, NULL))) + { + if (/* The only valid length is 22 bytes. See RFC 4880 + 5.2.3.15. */ + len == 22 + /* 0x80 bit must be set on the class. */ + && (revkey[0] & 0x80)) + { + sig->revkey = xrealloc (sig->revkey, + sizeof (struct revocation_key) * + (sig->numrevkeys + 1)); + + /* Copy the individual fields. */ + sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].class = revkey[0]; + sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].algid = revkey[1]; + memcpy (sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fpr, &revkey[2], 20); + + sig->numrevkeys++; + } + } +} + + +int +parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PKT_signature * sig) +{ + int md5_len = 0; + unsigned n; + int is_v4 = 0; + int rc = 0; + int i, ndata; + + if (pktlen < 16) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + goto leave; + } + sig->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (sig->version == 4) + is_v4 = 1; + else if (sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", + pkttype, sig->version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + if (!is_v4) + { + if (pktlen == 0) + goto underflow; + md5_len = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + } + if (pktlen == 0) + goto underflow; + sig->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (!is_v4) + { + if (pktlen < 12) + goto underflow; + sig->timestamp = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + sig->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + sig->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + } + if (pktlen < 2) + goto underflow; + sig->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + sig->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + sig->flags.exportable = 1; + sig->flags.revocable = 1; + if (is_v4) /* Read subpackets. */ + { + if (pktlen < 2) + goto underflow; + n = read_16 (inp); + pktlen -= 2; /* Length of hashed data. */ + if (pktlen < n) + goto underflow; + if (n > 10000) + { + log_error ("signature packet: hashed data too long\n"); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [hashed data too long]\n", listfp); + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + goto leave; + } + if (n) + { + sig->hashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->hashed) + n - 1); + sig->hashed->size = n; + sig->hashed->len = n; + if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->hashed->data, n) != n) + { + log_error ("premature eof while reading " + "hashed signature data\n"); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp); + rc = -1; + goto leave; + } + pktlen -= n; + } + if (pktlen < 2) + goto underflow; + n = read_16 (inp); + pktlen -= 2; /* Length of unhashed data. */ + if (pktlen < n) + goto underflow; + if (n > 10000) + { + log_error ("signature packet: unhashed data too long\n"); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [unhashed data too long]\n", listfp); + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + goto leave; + } + if (n) + { + sig->unhashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->unhashed) + n - 1); + sig->unhashed->size = n; + sig->unhashed->len = n; + if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->unhashed->data, n) != n) + { + log_error ("premature eof while reading " + "unhashed signature data\n"); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp); + rc = -1; + goto leave; + } + pktlen -= n; + } + } + + if (pktlen < 2) + goto underflow; + sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + + if (is_v4 && sig->pubkey_algo) /* Extract required information. */ + { + const byte *p; + size_t len; + + /* Set sig->flags.unknown_critical if there is a critical bit + * set for packets which we do not understand. */ + if (!parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL) + || !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL)) + sig->flags.unknown_critical = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL); + if (p) + sig->timestamp = buf32_to_u32 (p); + else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110) + && opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("signature packet without timestamp\n"); + + p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER); + if (p) + { + sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p); + sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 4); + } + else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110) + && opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n"); + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL); + if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p)) + sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p); + if (sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate <= make_timestamp ()) + sig->flags.expired = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, NULL); + if (p) + sig->flags.policy_url = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, NULL); + if (p) + sig->flags.pref_ks = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, &len); + if (p && len) + { + char *mbox; + + sig->signers_uid = try_make_printable_string (p, len, 0); + if (!sig->signers_uid) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + mbox = mailbox_from_userid (sig->signers_uid); + if (mbox) + { + xfree (sig->signers_uid); + sig->signers_uid = mbox; + } + } + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION, NULL); + if (p) + sig->flags.notation = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, NULL); + if (p) + sig->flags.key_block = 1; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, NULL); + if (p && *p == 0) + sig->flags.revocable = 0; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, &len); + if (p && len == 2) + { + sig->trust_depth = p[0]; + sig->trust_value = p[1]; + + /* Only look for a regexp if there is also a trust + subpacket. */ + sig->trust_regexp = + parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP, &len); + + /* If the regular expression is of 0 length, there is no + regular expression. */ + if (len == 0) + sig->trust_regexp = NULL; + } + + /* We accept the exportable subpacket from either the hashed or + unhashed areas as older versions of gpg put it in the + unhashed area. In theory, anyway, we should never see this + packet off of a local keyring. */ + + p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE); + if (p && *p == 0) + sig->flags.exportable = 0; + + /* Find all revocation keys. */ + if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F) + parse_revkeys (sig); + } + + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n" + "\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass 0x%02x\n" + "\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n", + sig->pubkey_algo, + (ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1], + sig->version, (ulong) sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class, + sig->digest_algo, sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]); + if (is_v4) + { + parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, NULL); + parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, NULL); + } + } + + ndata = pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo); + if (!ndata) + { + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo); + unknown_pubkey_warning (sig->pubkey_algo); + + /* We store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able + * to write it back with build_packet(). */ + if (pktlen > (5 * MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS / 8)) + { + /* We include a limit to avoid too trivial DoS attacks by + having gpg allocate too much memory. */ + log_error ("signature packet: too much data\n"); + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + } + else + { + void *tmpp; + + tmpp = read_rest (inp, pktlen); + sig->data[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, tmpp, tmpp? pktlen * 8 : 0); + pktlen = 0; + } + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++) + { + n = pktlen; + sig->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0); + pktlen -= n; + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: "); + mpi_print (listfp, sig->data[i], mpi_print_mode); + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + if (!sig->data[i]) + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + } + } + + leave: + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return rc; + + underflow: + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + + return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; +} + + +static int +parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PKT_onepass_sig * ops) +{ + int version; + int rc = 0; + + if (pktlen < 13) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (version != 3) + { + log_error ("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + ops->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + ops->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + ops->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + ops->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + ops->last = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, + ":onepass_sig packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n" + "\tversion %d, sigclass 0x%02x, digest %d, pubkey %d, " + "last=%d\n", + (ulong) ops->keyid[0], (ulong) ops->keyid[1], + version, ops->sig_class, + ops->digest_algo, ops->pubkey_algo, ops->last); + + + leave: + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return rc; +} + + +static int +parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * pkt) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + int i, version, algorithm; + unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate; + int npkey, nskey; + u32 keyid[2]; + PKT_public_key *pk; + + (void) hdr; + + pk = pkt->pkt.public_key; /* PK has been cleared. */ + + version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && version == '#') + { + /* Early versions of G10 used the old PGP comments packets; + * luckily all those comments are started by a hash. */ + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":rfc1991 comment packet: \""); + for (; pktlen; pktlen--) + { + int c; + c = iobuf_get (inp); + if (c == -1) + break; /* Ooops: shorter than indicated. */ + if (c >= ' ' && c <= 'z') + es_putc (c, listfp); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", c); + } + es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n"); + } + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return 0; + } + else if (version == 4) + { + /* The only supported version. Use an older gpg + version (i.e. gpg 1.4) to parse v3 packets. */ + } + else if (version == 2 || version == 3) + { + /* Not anymore supported since 2.1. Use an older gpg version + * (i.e. gpg 1.4) to parse v3 packets. */ + if (opt.verbose > 1 && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("packet(%d) with obsolete version %d\n", pkttype, version); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":key packet: [obsolete version %d]\n", version); + pk->version = version; + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY); + goto leave; + } + else + { + log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":key packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION); + goto leave; + } + + if (pktlen < 11) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":key packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + else if (pktlen > MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":key packet: [too larget]\n", listfp); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + timestamp = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + expiredate = 0; /* have to get it from the selfsignature */ + max_expiredate = 0; + algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":%s key packet:\n" + "\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, expires %lu\n", + pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "public" : + pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "secret" : + pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "public sub" : + pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ? "secret sub" : "??", + version, algorithm, timestamp, expiredate); + + pk->timestamp = timestamp; + pk->expiredate = expiredate; + pk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate; + pk->hdrbytes = hdrlen; + pk->version = version; + pk->flags.primary = (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY); + pk->pubkey_algo = algorithm; + + nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (algorithm); + npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (algorithm); + if (!npkey) + { + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", algorithm); + unknown_pubkey_warning (algorithm); + } + + if (!npkey) + { + /* Unknown algorithm - put data into an opaque MPI. */ + void *tmpp = read_rest (inp, pktlen); + /* Current gcry_mpi_cmp does not handle a (NULL,n>0) nicely and + * thus we avoid to create such an MPI. */ + pk->pkey[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, tmpp, tmpp? pktlen * 8 : 0); + pktlen = 0; + goto leave; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++) + { + if ( (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA && (i == 0)) + || (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA && (i == 0)) + || (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && (i == 0 || i == 2))) + { + /* Read the OID (i==1) or the KDF params (i==2). */ + size_t n; + err = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, pk->pkey+i); + pktlen -= n; + } + else + { + unsigned int n = pktlen; + pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0); + pktlen -= n; + if (!pk->pkey[i]) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + } + if (err) + goto leave; + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tpkey[%d]: ", i); + mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode); + if ((algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA + || algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA + || algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) && i==0) + { + char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); + const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0); + es_fprintf (listfp, " %s (%s)", name?name:"", curve); + xfree (curve); + } + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + } + } + if (list_mode) + keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); + + if (pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) + { + struct seckey_info *ski; + byte temp[16]; + size_t snlen = 0; + + if (pktlen < 1) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski); + if (!pk->seckey_info) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + + ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (ski->algo) + { + ski->is_protected = 1; + ski->s2k.count = 0; + if (ski->algo == 254 || ski->algo == 255) + { + if (pktlen < 3) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + ski->sha1chk = (ski->algo == 254); + ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + /* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not + erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no + way to delete such a key. */ + ski->s2k.mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + ski->s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + /* Check for the special GNU extension. */ + if (ski->s2k.mode == 101) + { + for (i = 0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--) + temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (i < 4 || memcmp (temp, "GNU", 3)) + { + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown S2K %d\n", + ski->s2k.mode); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + /* Here we know that it is a GNU extension. What + * follows is the GNU protection mode: All values + * have special meanings and they are mapped to MODE + * with a base of 1000. */ + ski->s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3]; + } + + /* Read the salt. */ + switch (ski->s2k.mode) + { + case 1: + case 3: + for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--) + temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (i < 8) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + memcpy (ski->s2k.salt, temp, 8); + break; + } + + /* Check the mode. */ + switch (ski->s2k.mode) + { + case 0: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsimple S2K"); + break; + case 1: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalted S2K"); + break; + case 3: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\titer+salt S2K"); + break; + case 1001: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-dummy S2K"); + break; + case 1002: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-divert-to-card S2K"); + break; + default: + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n", + ski->s2k.mode < 1000 ? "" : "GNU ", + ski->s2k.mode); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + /* Print some info. */ + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ", algo: %d,%s hash: %d", + ski->algo, + ski->sha1chk ? " SHA1 protection," + : " simple checksum,", ski->s2k.hash_algo); + if (ski->s2k.mode == 1 || ski->s2k.mode == 3) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ", salt: "); + es_write_hexstring (listfp, ski->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL); + } + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + + /* Read remaining protection parameters. */ + if (ski->s2k.mode == 3) + { + if (pktlen < 1) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + ski->s2k.count = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect count: %lu (%lu)\n", + (ulong)S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong)ski->s2k.count), + (ulong) ski->s2k.count); + } + else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002) + { + /* Read the serial number. */ + if (pktlen < 1) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + snlen = iobuf_get (inp); + pktlen--; + if (pktlen < snlen || snlen == (size_t)(-1)) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + } + } + else /* Old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5. */ + { + /* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not + erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no + way to delete such a key. */ + ski->s2k.mode = 0; + ski->s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n", + ski->algo, ski->s2k.hash_algo); + } + + /* It is really ugly that we don't know the size + * of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm. + * so a + * ski->ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize (ski->algo); + * won't work. The only solution I see is to hardwire it. + * NOTE: if you change the ivlen above 16, don't forget to + * enlarge temp. */ + ski->ivlen = openpgp_cipher_blocklen (ski->algo); + log_assert (ski->ivlen <= sizeof (temp)); + + if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001) + ski->ivlen = 0; + else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002) + ski->ivlen = snlen < 16 ? snlen : 16; + + if (pktlen < ski->ivlen) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++, pktlen--) + temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, + ski->s2k.mode == 1002 ? "\tserial-number: " + : "\tprotect IV: "); + for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++) + es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", temp[i]); + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + memcpy (ski->iv, temp, ski->ivlen); + } + + /* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory. + * If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key, + * we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(. + * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */ + if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 || ski->s2k.mode == 1002) + { + /* Better set some dummy stuff here. */ + pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, + xstrdup ("dummydata"), + 10 * 8); + pktlen = 0; + } + else if (ski->is_protected) + { + void *tmpp; + + if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */ + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + /* Ugly: The length is encrypted too, so we read all stuff + * up to the end of the packet into the first SKEY + * element. */ + + tmpp = read_rest (inp, pktlen); + pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, + tmpp, tmpp? pktlen * 8 : 0); + /* Mark that MPI as protected - we need this information for + importing a key. The OPAQUE flag can't be used because + we also store public EdDSA values in opaque MPIs. */ + if (pk->pkey[npkey]) + gcry_mpi_set_flag (pk->pkey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1); + pktlen = 0; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: [v4 protected]\n", npkey); + } + else + { + u16 csum_tweak = 0; + + /* Not encrypted. */ + for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++) + { + unsigned int n; + + if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */ + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + n = pktlen; + if (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) + pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read_detect_0_removal (inp, &n, 0, + &csum_tweak); + else + pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0); + pktlen -= n; + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: ", i); + mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode); + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + + if (!pk->pkey[i]) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + } + if (err) + goto leave; + + if (pktlen < 2) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + ski->csum = read_16 (inp); + ski->csum += csum_tweak; + pktlen -= 2; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", ski->csum); + } + } + + /* Note that KEYID below has been initialized above in list_mode. */ + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tkeyid: %08lX%08lX\n", + (ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1]); + + leave: + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return err; +} + + +/* Attribute subpackets have the same format as v4 signature + subpackets. This is not part of OpenPGP, but is done in several + versions of PGP nevertheless. */ +int +parse_attribute_subpkts (PKT_user_id * uid) +{ + size_t n; + int count = 0; + struct user_attribute *attribs = NULL; + const byte *buffer = uid->attrib_data; + int buflen = uid->attrib_len; + byte type; + + xfree (uid->attribs); + + while (buflen) + { + n = *buffer++; + buflen--; + if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */ + { + if (buflen < 4) + goto too_short; + n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer); + buffer += 4; + buflen -= 4; + } + else if (n >= 192) /* 2 byte special encoded length header. */ + { + if (buflen < 2) + goto too_short; + n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192; + buffer++; + buflen--; + } + if (buflen < n) + goto too_short; + + if (!n) + { + /* Too short to encode the subpacket type. */ + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("attribute subpacket too short\n"); + break; + } + + attribs = xrealloc (attribs, + (count + 1) * sizeof (struct user_attribute)); + memset (&attribs[count], 0, sizeof (struct user_attribute)); + + type = *buffer; + buffer++; + buflen--; + n--; + + attribs[count].type = type; + attribs[count].data = buffer; + attribs[count].len = n; + buffer += n; + buflen -= n; + count++; + } + + uid->attribs = attribs; + uid->numattribs = count; + return count; + + too_short: + if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings) + log_info ("buffer shorter than attribute subpacket\n"); + uid->attribs = attribs; + uid->numattribs = count; + return count; +} + + +static int +parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet) +{ + byte *p; + + /* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough + that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text + as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to + avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be + allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our + allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */ + + if (pktlen > MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: [too large]\n"); + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + } + + packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen); + packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen; + packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1; + + p = packet->pkt.user_id->name; + for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++) + *p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + *p = 0; + + if (list_mode) + { + int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len; + es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: \""); + /* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with es_write_sanitized?? */ + for (p = packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n--) + { + if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z') + es_putc (*p, listfp); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p); + } + es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n"); + } + return 0; +} + + +void +make_attribute_uidname (PKT_user_id * uid, size_t max_namelen) +{ + log_assert (max_namelen > 70); + if (uid->numattribs <= 0) + sprintf (uid->name, "[bad attribute packet of size %lu]", + uid->attrib_len); + else if (uid->numattribs > 1) + sprintf (uid->name, "[%d attributes of size %lu]", + uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len); + else + { + /* Only one attribute, so list it as the "user id" */ + + if (uid->attribs->type == ATTRIB_IMAGE) + { + u32 len; + byte type; + + if (parse_image_header (uid->attribs, &type, &len)) + sprintf (uid->name, "[%.20s image of size %lu]", + image_type_to_string (type, 1), (ulong) len); + else + sprintf (uid->name, "[invalid image]"); + } + else + sprintf (uid->name, "[unknown attribute of size %lu]", + (ulong) uid->attribs->len); + } + + uid->len = strlen (uid->name); +} + + +static int +parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet) +{ + byte *p; + + (void) pkttype; + + /* We better cap the size of an attribute packet to make DoS not too + easy. 16MB should be more then enough for one attribute packet + (ie. a photo). */ + if (pktlen > MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: [too large]\n"); + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + } + +#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71 + packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + + EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE); + packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1; + packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = xmalloc (pktlen? pktlen:1); + packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = pktlen; + + p = packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data; + for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++) + *p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + + /* Now parse out the individual attribute subpackets. This is + somewhat pointless since there is only one currently defined + attribute type (jpeg), but it is correct by the spec. */ + parse_attribute_subpkts (packet->pkt.user_id); + + make_attribute_uidname (packet->pkt.user_id, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE); + + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: %s\n", packet->pkt.user_id->name); + } + return 0; +} + + +static int +parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet) +{ + byte *p; + + /* Cap comment packet at a reasonable value to avoid an integer + overflow in the malloc below. Comment packets are actually not + anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our + private comment packet. */ + if (pktlen > MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: [too large]\n", + pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ? "OpenPGP draft " : ""); + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + } + packet->pkt.comment = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1); + packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen; + p = packet->pkt.comment->data; + for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++) + *p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + + if (list_mode) + { + int n = packet->pkt.comment->len; + es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ? + "OpenPGP draft " : ""); + for (p = packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n--) + { + if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z') + es_putc (*p, listfp); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p); + } + es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n"); + } + return 0; +} + + +/* Parse a ring trust packet RFC4880 (5.10). + * + * This parser is special in that the packet is not stored as a packet + * but its content is merged into the previous packet. */ +static gpg_error_t +parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, unsigned long pktlen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + iobuf_t inp = ctx->inp; + PKT_ring_trust rt = {0}; + int c; + int not_gpg = 0; + + if (!pktlen) + { + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n"); + err = 0; + goto leave; + } + + c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + rt.trustval = c; + if (pktlen) + { + if (!c) + { + c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + /* We require that bit 7 of the sigcache is 0 (easier + * eof handling). */ + if (!(c & 0x80)) + rt.sigcache = c; + } + else + iobuf_get_noeof (inp); /* Dummy read. */ + pktlen--; + } + + /* Next is the optional subtype. */ + if (pktlen > 3) + { + char tmp[4]; + tmp[0] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + tmp[1] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + tmp[2] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + tmp[3] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + if (!memcmp (tmp, "gpg", 3)) + rt.subtype = tmp[3]; + else + not_gpg = 1; + } + /* If it is a key or uid subtype read the remaining data. */ + if ((rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY || rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID) + && pktlen >= 6 ) + { + int i; + unsigned int namelen; + + rt.keyorg = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + rt.keyupdate = read_32 (inp); + pktlen -= 4; + namelen = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + if (namelen && pktlen) + { + rt.url = xtrymalloc (namelen + 1); + if (!rt.url) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + for (i = 0; pktlen && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++) + rt.url[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + rt.url[i] = 0; + } + } + + if (list_mode) + { + if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_SIG) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: sig flag=%02x sigcache=%02x\n", + rt.trustval, rt.sigcache); + else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID || rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY) + { + unsigned char *p; + + es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: %s upd=%lu src=%d%s", + (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID? "uid" : "key"), + (unsigned long)rt.keyupdate, + rt.keyorg, + (rt.url? " url=":"")); + if (rt.url) + { + for (p = rt.url; *p; p++) + { + if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z') + es_putc (*p, listfp); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p); + } + } + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + else if (not_gpg) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: not created by gpg\n"); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: subtype=%02x\n", + rt.subtype); + } + + /* Now transfer the data to the respective packet. Do not do this + * if SKIP_META is set. */ + if (!ctx->last_pkt.pkt.generic || ctx->skip_meta) + ; + else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_SIG + && ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) + { + PKT_signature *sig = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.signature; + + if ((rt.sigcache & 1)) + { + sig->flags.checked = 1; + sig->flags.valid = !!(rt.sigcache & 2); + } + } + else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID + && (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID + || ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)) + { + PKT_user_id *uid = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.user_id; + + uid->keyorg = rt.keyorg; + uid->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate; + uid->updateurl = rt.url; + rt.url = NULL; + } + else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY + && (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)) + { + PKT_public_key *pk = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.public_key; + + pk->keyorg = rt.keyorg; + pk->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate; + pk->updateurl = rt.url; + rt.url = NULL; + } + + err = 0; + + leave: + xfree (rt.url); + free_packet (NULL, ctx); /* This sets ctx->last_pkt to NULL. */ + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return err; +} + + +static int +parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial) +{ + int rc = 0; + int mode, namelen; + PKT_plaintext *pt; + byte *p; + int c, i; + + if (!partial && pktlen < 6) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong) pktlen); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":literal data packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (pktlen) + pktlen--; + namelen = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (pktlen) + pktlen--; + /* Note that namelen will never exceed 255 bytes. */ + pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext = + xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen - 1); + pt->new_ctb = new_ctb; + pt->mode = mode; + pt->namelen = namelen; + pt->is_partial = partial; + if (pktlen) + { + for (i = 0; pktlen > 4 && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++) + pt->name[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) + if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1) + break; + else + pt->name[i] = c; + } + /* Fill up NAME so that a check with valgrind won't complain about + * reading from uninitalized memory. This case may be triggred by + * corrupted packets. */ + for (; i < namelen; i++) + pt->name[i] = 0; + + pt->timestamp = read_32 (inp); + if (pktlen) + pktlen -= 4; + pt->len = pktlen; + pt->buf = inp; + + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":literal data packet:\n" + "\tmode %c (%X), created %lu, name=\"", + mode >= ' ' && mode < 'z' ? mode : '?', mode, + (ulong) pt->timestamp); + for (p = pt->name, i = 0; i < namelen; p++, i++) + { + if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z') + es_putc (*p, listfp); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p); + } + es_fprintf (listfp, "\",\n\traw data: "); + if (partial) + es_fprintf (listfp, "unknown length\n"); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "%lu bytes\n", (ulong) pt->len); + } + + leave: + return rc; +} + + +static int +parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb) +{ + PKT_compressed *zd; + + /* PKTLEN is here 0, but data follows (this should be the last + object in a file or the compress algorithm should know the + length). */ + (void) pkttype; + (void) pktlen; + + zd = pkt->pkt.compressed = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.compressed); + zd->algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + zd->len = 0; /* not used */ + zd->new_ctb = new_ctb; + zd->buf = inp; + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":compressed packet: algo=%d\n", zd->algorithm); + return 0; +} + + +static int +parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial) +{ + int rc = 0; + PKT_encrypted *ed; + unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen; + + ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted); + /* ed->len is set below. */ + ed->extralen = 0; /* Unknown here; only used in build_packet. */ + ed->buf = NULL; + ed->new_ctb = new_ctb; + ed->is_partial = partial; + ed->aead_algo = 0; + ed->cipher_algo = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */ + ed->chunkbyte = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */ + if (pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC) + { + /* Fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks. */ + int version; + + version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (orig_pktlen) + pktlen--; + if (version != 1) + { + log_error ("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n", + version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + /*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */ + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; + } + else + ed->mdc_method = 0; + + /* A basic sanity check. We need at least an 8 byte IV plus the 2 + detection bytes. Note that we don't known the algorithm and thus + we may only check against the minimum blocksize. */ + if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10) + { + /* Actually this is blocksize+2. */ + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET; + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial); + goto leave; + } + + /* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data (i.e. without + the MDC version number but with the IV etc.). This value is + required during decryption. */ + ed->len = pktlen; + + if (list_mode) + { + if (orig_pktlen) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n", + orig_pktlen); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n"); + if (ed->mdc_method) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tmdc_method: %d\n", ed->mdc_method); + } + + ed->buf = inp; + + leave: + return rc; +} + + +/* Note, that this code is not anymore used in real life because the + MDC checking is now done right after the decryption in + decrypt_data. */ +static int +parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb) +{ + int rc = 0; + PKT_mdc *mdc; + byte *p; + + (void) pkttype; + + mdc = pkt->pkt.mdc = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.mdc); + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen); + if (!new_ctb || pktlen != 20) + { + log_error ("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + p = mdc->hash; + for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++) + *p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + + leave: + return rc; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +parse_encrypted_aead (iobuf_t inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET *pkt, int partial) +{ + int rc = 0; + PKT_encrypted *ed; + unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen; + int version; + + ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xtrymalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted); + if (!ed) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + ed->len = 0; + ed->extralen = 0; /* (only used in build_packet.) */ + ed->buf = NULL; + ed->new_ctb = 1; /* (packet number requires a new CTB anyway.) */ + ed->is_partial = partial; + ed->mdc_method = 0; + /* A basic sanity check. We need one version byte, one algo byte, + * one aead algo byte, one chunkbyte, at least 15 byte IV. */ + if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 19) + { + log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [too short]\n", listfp); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial); + goto leave; + } + + version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (orig_pktlen) + pktlen--; + if (version != 1) + { + log_error ("aead encrypted packet with unknown version %d\n", + version); + if (list_mode) + es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp); + /*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */ + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + goto leave; + } + + ed->cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (orig_pktlen) + pktlen--; + ed->aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (orig_pktlen) + pktlen--; + ed->chunkbyte = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + if (orig_pktlen) + pktlen--; + + /* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data. We read the + * rest during decryption. */ + ed->len = pktlen; + + if (list_mode) + { + es_fprintf (listfp, ":aead encrypted packet: cipher=%u aead=%u cb=%u\n", + ed->cipher_algo, ed->aead_algo, ed->chunkbyte); + if (orig_pktlen) + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: %lu\n", orig_pktlen); + else + es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: unknown\n"); + } + + ed->buf = inp; + + leave: + return rc; +} + + +/* + * This packet is internally generated by us (in armor.c) to transfer + * some information to the lower layer. To make sure that this packet + * is really a GPG faked one and not one coming from outside, we + * first check that there is a unique tag in it. + * + * The format of such a control packet is: + * n byte session marker + * 1 byte control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx + * m byte control data + */ +static int +parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, + PACKET * packet, int partial) +{ + byte *p; + const byte *sesmark; + size_t sesmarklen; + int i; + + (void) pkttype; + + if (list_mode) + es_fprintf (listfp, ":packet 63: length %lu ", pktlen); + + sesmark = get_session_marker (&sesmarklen); + if (pktlen < sesmarklen + 1) /* 1 is for the control bytes */ + goto skipit; + for (i = 0; i < sesmarklen; i++, pktlen--) + { + if (sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof (inp)) + goto skipit; + } + if (pktlen > 4096) + goto skipit; /* Definitely too large. We skip it to avoid an + overflow in the malloc. */ + if (list_mode) + es_fputs ("- gpg control packet", listfp); + + packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control + + pktlen - 1); + packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + pktlen--; + packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = pktlen; + p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data; + for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++) + *p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp); + + return 0; + + skipit: + if (list_mode) + { + int c; + + i = 0; + es_fprintf (listfp, "- private (rest length %lu)\n", pktlen); + if (partial) + { + while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1) + dump_hex_line (c, &i); + } + else + { + for (; pktlen; pktlen--) + { + dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i); + if (c == -1) + break; + } + } + es_putc ('\n', listfp); + } + iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); +} + + +/* Create a GPG control packet to be used internally as a placeholder. */ +PACKET * +create_gpg_control (ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte * data, size_t datalen) +{ + PACKET *packet; + byte *p; + + packet = xmalloc (sizeof *packet); + init_packet (packet); + packet->pkttype = PKT_GPG_CONTROL; + packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control + + datalen - 1); + packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = type; + packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = datalen; + p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data; + for (; datalen; datalen--, p++) + *p = *data++; + + return packet; +} |