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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 16:29:51 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 16:29:51 +0000 |
commit | 6e7a315eb67cb6c113cf37e1d66c4f11a51a2b3e (patch) | |
tree | 32451fa3cdd9321fb2591fada9891b2cb70a9cd1 /grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | grub2-upstream.tar.xz grub2-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 2.06.upstream/2.06upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c')
-rw-r--r-- | grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 188 |
1 files changed, 188 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c52ec62 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + * + * UEFI Secure Boot related checkings. + */ + +#include <grub/efi/efi.h> +#include <grub/efi/pe32.h> +#include <grub/efi/sb.h> +#include <grub/env.h> +#include <grub/err.h> +#include <grub/file.h> +#include <grub/i386/linux.h> +#include <grub/kernel.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/types.h> +#include <grub/verify.h> + +static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + +/* + * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. + * + * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel, + * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot(). + */ +grub_uint8_t +grub_efi_get_secureboot (void) +{ + static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + grub_efi_status_t status; + grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0; + grub_size_t size = 0; + grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL; + grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL; + grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL; + grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN; + const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN"; + + status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid, + &size, (void **) &secboot); + + if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND) + { + secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; + goto out; + } + + if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out; + + status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid, + &size, (void **) &setupmode); + + if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out; + + if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1)) + { + secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; + goto out; + } + + /* + * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the + * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well + * honor that. + */ + status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &shim_lock_guid, + &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr); + + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ + if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) + { + secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED; + goto out; + } + + if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1) + { + secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; + goto out; + } + + secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED; + + out: + grub_free (moksbstate); + grub_free (setupmode); + grub_free (secboot); + + if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED) + secureboot_str = "Disabled"; + else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED) + secureboot_str = "Enabled"; + + grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str); + + return secureboot; +} + +static grub_err_t +shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), + enum grub_file_type type, + void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), + enum grub_verify_flags *flags) +{ + *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION; + + switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK) + { + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL: + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL: + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL: + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL: + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL: + case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE: + *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK; + + /* Fall through. */ + + default: + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +} + +static grub_err_t +shim_lock_verifier_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size) +{ + grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0); + + if (!sl) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("shim_lock protocol not found")); + + if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature")); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier = + { + .name = "shim_lock_verifier", + .init = shim_lock_verifier_init, + .write = shim_lock_verifier_write + }; + +void +grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void) +{ + struct grub_module_header *header; + grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = + grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0); + + /* shim_lock is missing, check if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock. */ + if (!sl) + { + FOR_MODULES (header) + { + if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK) + return; + } + } + + /* Secure Boot is off. Do not load shim_lock. */ + if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED) + return; + + /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */ + grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier); + + grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y"); + grub_env_export ("shim_lock"); +} |