Adding debian version 6.1.76-1.debian/6.1.76-1debian

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

4 files changed, 512 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f1ba8e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 11:54:38 -0600
+Subject: arm64: add kernel config option to lock down when in Secure Boot mode
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831827
+Forwarded: no
+
+Add a kernel configuration option to lock down the kernel, to restrict
+userspace's ability to modify the running kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is
+enabled. Based on the x86 patch by Matthew Garrett.
+
+Determine the state of Secure Boot in the EFI stub and pass this to the
+kernel using the FDT.
+
+Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.10: adjust context]
+[Lukas Wunner: Forward-ported to 4.11: drop parts applied upstream]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.15 and lockdown patch set:
+ - Pass result of efi_get_secureboot() in stub through to
+   efi_set_secure_boot() in main kernel
+ - Use lockdown API and naming]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.19.3: adjust context in update_fdt()]
+[dannf: Moved init_lockdown() call after uefi_init(), fixing SB detection]
+[bwh: Drop call to init_lockdown(), as efi_set_secure_boot() now calls this]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: efi_get_secureboot() no longer takes a
+ sys_table parameter]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7: EFI initialisation from FDT was rewritten, so:
+ - Add Secure Boot mode to the parameter enumeration in fdtparams.c
+ - Add a parameter to efi_get_fdt_params() to return the Secure Boot mode
+ - Since Xen does not have a property name defined for Secure Boot mode,
+   change efi_get_fdt_prop() to handle a missing property name by clearing
+   the output variable]
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: f30f242fb131 ("efi: Rename
+arm-init to efi-init common for all arch") renamed arm-init.c to efi-init.c]
+---
+ drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c    |    5 ++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c   |   12 +++++++++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c |    6 ++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h                |    3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
+@@ -210,9 +210,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct efi_memory_map_data data;
+ 	u64 efi_system_table;
++	u32 secure_boot;
+ 
+ 	/* Grab UEFI information placed in FDT by stub */
+-	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data);
++	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data, &secure_boot);
+ 	if (!efi_system_table)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -234,6 +235,8 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(secure_boot);
++
+ 	reserve_regions();
+ 	/*
+ 	 * For memblock manipulation, the cap should come after the memblock_add().
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum {
+ 	MMSIZE,
+ 	DCSIZE,
+ 	DCVERS,
++	SBMODE,
+ 
+ 	PARAMCOUNT
+ };
+@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ static __initconst const char name[][22]
+ 	[MMSIZE] = "MemMap Size          ",
+ 	[DCSIZE] = "MemMap Desc. Size    ",
+ 	[DCVERS] = "MemMap Desc. Version ",
++	[SBMODE] = "Secure Boot Enabled  ",
+ };
+ 
+ static __initconst const struct {
+@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "",
+ 		}
+ 	}, {
+ #endif
+@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ };
+@@ -62,6 +66,11 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	int len;
+ 	u64 val;
+ 
++	if (!pname[0]) {
++		memset(var, 0, size);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, node, pname, &len);
+ 	if (!prop)
+ 		return 1;
+@@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm)
++u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm, u32 *secure_boot)
+ {
+ 	const void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
+ 	unsigned long systab;
+@@ -93,6 +102,7 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi
+ 		[MMSIZE] = { &mm->size,		sizeof(mm->size) },
+ 		[DCSIZE] = { &mm->desc_size,	sizeof(mm->desc_size) },
+ 		[DCVERS] = { &mm->desc_version,	sizeof(mm->desc_version) },
++		[SBMODE] = { secure_boot,       sizeof(*secure_boot) },
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(target) != ARRAY_SIZE(name));
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *ori
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(efi_get_secureboot());
++	status = fdt_setprop(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
++			     &fdt_val32, sizeof(fdt_val32));
++	if (status)
++		goto fdt_set_fail;
++
+ 	/* Shrink the FDT back to its minimum size: */
+ 	fdt_pack(fdt);
+ 
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -662,7 +662,8 @@ extern void efi_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t
+ extern int efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
+ extern void efi_initialize_iomem_resources(struct resource *code_resource,
+ 		struct resource *data_resource, struct resource *bss_resource);
+-extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data);
++extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data,
++			      u32 *secure_boot);
+ extern struct kobject *efi_kobj;
+ 
+ extern int efi_reboot_quirk_mode;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46698757
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 12:45:03 +0000
+Subject: [28/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit?id=a5d70c55c603233c192b375f72116a395909da28
+
+UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+flag that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
+enabled.
+
+Move the switch-statement in x86's setup_arch() that inteprets the
+secure_boot boot parameter to generic code and set the bit there.
+
+Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
+[rperier: Forward-ported to 5.5:
+ - Use pr_warn()
+ - Adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7:
+ - Use the next available bit in efi.flags
+ - Adjust context]
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           | 14 +----------
+ drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile     |  1 +
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h               | 16 ++++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1205,19 +1205,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+-		switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+ 
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP)		+= fake_m
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL)	+= efibc.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST)			+= test/
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER)	+= dev-path-parser.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= secureboot.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES)		+= apple-properties.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE)		+= rci2-table.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE)	+= embedded-firmware.o
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++
++/* Core kernel secure boot support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
++ */
++
++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
++
++#include <linux/efi.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/printk.h>
++
++/*
++ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
++ */
++void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
++{
++	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
++		switch (mode) {
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
++			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
++			break;
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
++			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
++			break;
++		default:
++			pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n",
++				mode);
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++}
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -849,6 +849,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console
+ #define EFI_MEM_ATTR		10	/* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+ #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE	11	/* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
+ #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS	12	/* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		13	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
++
++enum efi_secureboot_mode {
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
++};
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ /*
+@@ -873,6 +881,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ 	return (efi.runtime_supported_mask & mask) == mask;
+ }
+ extern void efi_find_mirror(void);
++extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
+ #else
+ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
+ {
+@@ -892,6 +901,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void efi_find_mirror(void) {}
++static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {}
+ #endif
+ 
+ extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
+@@ -1107,13 +1117,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(
+ extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+ extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
+ 
+-enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+-};
+-
+ static inline
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
+ {
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ec425871
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 11:54:28 +0100
+Subject: efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
+
+Based on an earlier patch by David Howells, who wrote the following
+description:
+
+> UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
+> only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
+> require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
+> that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
+> modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: After fixing https://bugs.debian.org/956197 the
+help text for LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT needs to be adjusted to
+mention that lockdown is triggered in integrity mode]
+Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           |    4 ++--
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c |    3 +++
+ include/linux/security.h          |    6 ++++++
+ security/lockdown/Kconfig         |   15 +++++++++++++++
+ security/lockdown/lockdown.c      |    2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: debian-kernel/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ debian-kernel/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -979,6 +979,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ 		efi_init();
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
++
+ 	dmi_setup();
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -1130,8 +1132,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+-
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+ 	acpi_table_upgrade();
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/efi.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/printk.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
+@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi
+ 			break;
+ 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++			lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot",
++					 LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
++#endif
+ 			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+Index: debian-kernel/include/linux/security.h
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/include/linux/security.h
++++ debian-kernel/include/linux/security.h
+@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct i
+ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
+ #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
+@@ -1291,6 +1292,11 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(e
+ {
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++static inline int
++lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++{
++	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
+Index: debian-kernel/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/security/lockdown/Kconfig
++++ debian-kernel/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTI
+ 	 disabled.
+ 
+ endchoice
++
++config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++	bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
++	default n
++	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
++	depends on EFI
++	select SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
++	help
++	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
++	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Secure boot mode may
++	  be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
++	  not indicated by the boot parameters.
++
++	  Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being
++	  triggered in integrity mode if EFI Secure Boot is set.
+Index: debian-kernel/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
++++ debian-kernel/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdo
+ /*
+  * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+  */
+-static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+ {
+ 	if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
+ 		return -EPERM;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c718e7e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 15:54:24 +0100
+Subject: mtd: phram,slram: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20190830154720.eekfjt6c4jzvlbfz@decadent.org.uk/
+
+These drivers allow mapping arbitrary memory ranges as MTD devices.
+This should be disabled to preserve the kernel's integrity when it is
+locked down.
+
+* Add the HWPARAM flag to the module parameters
+* When slram is built-in, it uses __setup() to read kernel parameters,
+  so add an explicit check security_locked_down() check
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Joern Engel <joern@lazybastard.org>
+Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
+---
+ drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 6 +++++-
+ drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
+@@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ static int phram_param_call(const char *
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-module_param_call(phram, phram_param_call, NULL, NULL, 0200);
++static const struct kernel_param_ops phram_param_ops = {
++	.set = phram_param_call
++};
++__module_param_call(MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX, phram, &phram_param_ops, NULL,
++		    0200, -1, KERNEL_PARAM_FL_HWPARAM | hwparam_iomem);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(phram, "Memory region to map. \"phram=<name>,<start>,<length>[,<erasesize>]\"");
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_OF
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ioctl.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/io.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/mtd/mtd.h>
+ 
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ typedef struct slram_mtd_list {
+ #ifdef MODULE
+ static char *map[SLRAM_MAX_DEVICES_PARAMS];
+ 
+-module_param_array(map, charp, NULL, 0);
++module_param_hw_array(map, charp, iomem, NULL, 0);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(map, "List of memory regions to map. \"map=<name>, <start>, <length / end>\"");
+ #else
+ static char *map;
+@@ -281,11 +282,17 @@ static int __init init_slram(void)
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ 	char *devstart;
+ 	char *devlength;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	if (!map) {
+ 		E("slram: not enough parameters.\n");
+ 		return(-EINVAL);
+ 	}
++
++	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
+ 	while (map) {
+ 		devname = devstart = devlength = NULL;
+