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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c | 319 |
1 files changed, 319 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..69cdaaddc --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT +/* + * Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. + */ +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include "intel_pxp.h" +#include "intel_pxp_irq.h" +#include "intel_pxp_session.h" +#include "intel_pxp_tee.h" +#include "gem/i915_gem_context.h" +#include "gt/intel_context.h" +#include "i915_drv.h" + +/** + * DOC: PXP + * + * PXP (Protected Xe Path) is a feature available in Gen12 and newer platforms. + * It allows execution and flip to display of protected (i.e. encrypted) + * objects. The SW support is enabled via the CONFIG_DRM_I915_PXP kconfig. + * + * Objects can opt-in to PXP encryption at creation time via the + * I915_GEM_CREATE_EXT_PROTECTED_CONTENT create_ext flag. For objects to be + * correctly protected they must be used in conjunction with a context created + * with the I915_CONTEXT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT flag. See the documentation + * of those two uapi flags for details and restrictions. + * + * Protected objects are tied to a pxp session; currently we only support one + * session, which i915 manages and whose index is available in the uapi + * (I915_PROTECTED_CONTENT_DEFAULT_SESSION) for use in instructions targeting + * protected objects. + * The session is invalidated by the HW when certain events occur (e.g. + * suspend/resume). When this happens, all the objects that were used with the + * session are marked as invalid and all contexts marked as using protected + * content are banned. Any further attempt at using them in an execbuf call is + * rejected, while flips are converted to black frames. + * + * Some of the PXP setup operations are performed by the Management Engine, + * which is handled by the mei driver; communication between i915 and mei is + * performed via the mei_pxp component module. + */ + +struct intel_gt *pxp_to_gt(const struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + return container_of(pxp, struct intel_gt, pxp); +} + +bool intel_pxp_is_enabled(const struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + return pxp->ce; +} + +bool intel_pxp_is_active(const struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + return pxp->arb_is_valid; +} + +/* KCR register definitions */ +#define KCR_INIT _MMIO(0x320f0) +/* Setting KCR Init bit is required after system boot */ +#define KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES REG_BIT(14) + +static void kcr_pxp_enable(struct intel_gt *gt) +{ + intel_uncore_write(gt->uncore, KCR_INIT, + _MASKED_BIT_ENABLE(KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES)); +} + +static void kcr_pxp_disable(struct intel_gt *gt) +{ + intel_uncore_write(gt->uncore, KCR_INIT, + _MASKED_BIT_DISABLE(KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES)); +} + +static int create_vcs_context(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + static struct lock_class_key pxp_lock; + struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp); + struct intel_engine_cs *engine; + struct intel_context *ce; + int i; + + /* + * Find the first VCS engine present. We're guaranteed there is one + * if we're in this function due to the check in has_pxp + */ + for (i = 0, engine = NULL; !engine; i++) + engine = gt->engine_class[VIDEO_DECODE_CLASS][i]; + + GEM_BUG_ON(!engine || engine->class != VIDEO_DECODE_CLASS); + + ce = intel_engine_create_pinned_context(engine, engine->gt->vm, SZ_4K, + I915_GEM_HWS_PXP_ADDR, + &pxp_lock, "pxp_context"); + if (IS_ERR(ce)) { + drm_err(>->i915->drm, "failed to create VCS ctx for PXP\n"); + return PTR_ERR(ce); + } + + pxp->ce = ce; + + return 0; +} + +static void destroy_vcs_context(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + intel_engine_destroy_pinned_context(fetch_and_zero(&pxp->ce)); +} + +void intel_pxp_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp); + int ret; + + if (!HAS_PXP(gt->i915)) + return; + + mutex_init(&pxp->tee_mutex); + + /* + * we'll use the completion to check if there is a termination pending, + * so we start it as completed and we reinit it when a termination + * is triggered. + */ + init_completion(&pxp->termination); + complete_all(&pxp->termination); + + mutex_init(&pxp->arb_mutex); + INIT_WORK(&pxp->session_work, intel_pxp_session_work); + + ret = create_vcs_context(pxp); + if (ret) + return; + + ret = intel_pxp_tee_component_init(pxp); + if (ret) + goto out_context; + + drm_info(>->i915->drm, "Protected Xe Path (PXP) protected content support initialized\n"); + + return; + +out_context: + destroy_vcs_context(pxp); +} + +void intel_pxp_fini(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp)) + return; + + pxp->arb_is_valid = false; + + intel_pxp_tee_component_fini(pxp); + + destroy_vcs_context(pxp); +} + +void intel_pxp_mark_termination_in_progress(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + pxp->arb_is_valid = false; + reinit_completion(&pxp->termination); +} + +static void pxp_queue_termination(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp); + + /* + * We want to get the same effect as if we received a termination + * interrupt, so just pretend that we did. + */ + spin_lock_irq(gt->irq_lock); + intel_pxp_mark_termination_in_progress(pxp); + pxp->session_events |= PXP_TERMINATION_REQUEST; + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &pxp->session_work); + spin_unlock_irq(gt->irq_lock); +} + +static bool pxp_component_bound(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + bool bound = false; + + mutex_lock(&pxp->tee_mutex); + if (pxp->pxp_component) + bound = true; + mutex_unlock(&pxp->tee_mutex); + + return bound; +} + +/* + * the arb session is restarted from the irq work when we receive the + * termination completion interrupt + */ +int intel_pxp_start(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp)) + return -ENODEV; + + if (wait_for(pxp_component_bound(pxp), 250)) + return -ENXIO; + + mutex_lock(&pxp->arb_mutex); + + if (pxp->arb_is_valid) + goto unlock; + + pxp_queue_termination(pxp); + + if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&pxp->termination, + msecs_to_jiffies(250))) { + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + goto unlock; + } + + /* make sure the compiler doesn't optimize the double access */ + barrier(); + + if (!pxp->arb_is_valid) + ret = -EIO; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&pxp->arb_mutex); + return ret; +} + +void intel_pxp_init_hw(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + kcr_pxp_enable(pxp_to_gt(pxp)); + intel_pxp_irq_enable(pxp); +} + +void intel_pxp_fini_hw(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + kcr_pxp_disable(pxp_to_gt(pxp)); + + intel_pxp_irq_disable(pxp); +} + +int intel_pxp_key_check(struct intel_pxp *pxp, + struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj, + bool assign) +{ + if (!intel_pxp_is_active(pxp)) + return -ENODEV; + + if (!i915_gem_object_is_protected(obj)) + return -EINVAL; + + GEM_BUG_ON(!pxp->key_instance); + + /* + * If this is the first time we're using this object, it's not + * encrypted yet; it will be encrypted with the current key, so mark it + * as such. If the object is already encrypted, check instead if the + * used key is still valid. + */ + if (!obj->pxp_key_instance && assign) + obj->pxp_key_instance = pxp->key_instance; + + if (obj->pxp_key_instance != pxp->key_instance) + return -ENOEXEC; + + return 0; +} + +void intel_pxp_invalidate(struct intel_pxp *pxp) +{ + struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pxp_to_gt(pxp)->i915; + struct i915_gem_context *ctx, *cn; + + /* ban all contexts marked as protected */ + spin_lock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock); + list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, cn, &i915->gem.contexts.list, link) { + struct i915_gem_engines_iter it; + struct intel_context *ce; + + if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&ctx->ref)) + continue; + + if (likely(!i915_gem_context_uses_protected_content(ctx))) { + i915_gem_context_put(ctx); + continue; + } + + spin_unlock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock); + + /* + * By the time we get here we are either going to suspend with + * quiesced execution or the HW keys are already long gone and + * in this case it is worthless to attempt to close the context + * and wait for its execution. It will hang the GPU if it has + * not already. So, as a fast mitigation, we can ban the + * context as quick as we can. That might race with the + * execbuffer, but currently this is the best that can be done. + */ + for_each_gem_engine(ce, i915_gem_context_lock_engines(ctx), it) + intel_context_ban(ce, NULL); + i915_gem_context_unlock_engines(ctx); + + /* + * The context has been banned, no need to keep the wakeref. + * This is safe from races because the only other place this + * is touched is context_release and we're holding a ctx ref + */ + if (ctx->pxp_wakeref) { + intel_runtime_pm_put(&i915->runtime_pm, + ctx->pxp_wakeref); + ctx->pxp_wakeref = 0; + } + + spin_lock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock); + list_safe_reset_next(ctx, cn, link); + i915_gem_context_put(ctx); + } + spin_unlock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock); +} |