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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
commit2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch)
tree848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz
linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c319
1 files changed, 319 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69cdaaddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/intel_pxp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include "intel_pxp.h"
+#include "intel_pxp_irq.h"
+#include "intel_pxp_session.h"
+#include "intel_pxp_tee.h"
+#include "gem/i915_gem_context.h"
+#include "gt/intel_context.h"
+#include "i915_drv.h"
+
+/**
+ * DOC: PXP
+ *
+ * PXP (Protected Xe Path) is a feature available in Gen12 and newer platforms.
+ * It allows execution and flip to display of protected (i.e. encrypted)
+ * objects. The SW support is enabled via the CONFIG_DRM_I915_PXP kconfig.
+ *
+ * Objects can opt-in to PXP encryption at creation time via the
+ * I915_GEM_CREATE_EXT_PROTECTED_CONTENT create_ext flag. For objects to be
+ * correctly protected they must be used in conjunction with a context created
+ * with the I915_CONTEXT_PARAM_PROTECTED_CONTENT flag. See the documentation
+ * of those two uapi flags for details and restrictions.
+ *
+ * Protected objects are tied to a pxp session; currently we only support one
+ * session, which i915 manages and whose index is available in the uapi
+ * (I915_PROTECTED_CONTENT_DEFAULT_SESSION) for use in instructions targeting
+ * protected objects.
+ * The session is invalidated by the HW when certain events occur (e.g.
+ * suspend/resume). When this happens, all the objects that were used with the
+ * session are marked as invalid and all contexts marked as using protected
+ * content are banned. Any further attempt at using them in an execbuf call is
+ * rejected, while flips are converted to black frames.
+ *
+ * Some of the PXP setup operations are performed by the Management Engine,
+ * which is handled by the mei driver; communication between i915 and mei is
+ * performed via the mei_pxp component module.
+ */
+
+struct intel_gt *pxp_to_gt(const struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ return container_of(pxp, struct intel_gt, pxp);
+}
+
+bool intel_pxp_is_enabled(const struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ return pxp->ce;
+}
+
+bool intel_pxp_is_active(const struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ return pxp->arb_is_valid;
+}
+
+/* KCR register definitions */
+#define KCR_INIT _MMIO(0x320f0)
+/* Setting KCR Init bit is required after system boot */
+#define KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES REG_BIT(14)
+
+static void kcr_pxp_enable(struct intel_gt *gt)
+{
+ intel_uncore_write(gt->uncore, KCR_INIT,
+ _MASKED_BIT_ENABLE(KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES));
+}
+
+static void kcr_pxp_disable(struct intel_gt *gt)
+{
+ intel_uncore_write(gt->uncore, KCR_INIT,
+ _MASKED_BIT_DISABLE(KCR_INIT_ALLOW_DISPLAY_ME_WRITES));
+}
+
+static int create_vcs_context(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ static struct lock_class_key pxp_lock;
+ struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp);
+ struct intel_engine_cs *engine;
+ struct intel_context *ce;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the first VCS engine present. We're guaranteed there is one
+ * if we're in this function due to the check in has_pxp
+ */
+ for (i = 0, engine = NULL; !engine; i++)
+ engine = gt->engine_class[VIDEO_DECODE_CLASS][i];
+
+ GEM_BUG_ON(!engine || engine->class != VIDEO_DECODE_CLASS);
+
+ ce = intel_engine_create_pinned_context(engine, engine->gt->vm, SZ_4K,
+ I915_GEM_HWS_PXP_ADDR,
+ &pxp_lock, "pxp_context");
+ if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
+ drm_err(&gt->i915->drm, "failed to create VCS ctx for PXP\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(ce);
+ }
+
+ pxp->ce = ce;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_vcs_context(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ intel_engine_destroy_pinned_context(fetch_and_zero(&pxp->ce));
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!HAS_PXP(gt->i915))
+ return;
+
+ mutex_init(&pxp->tee_mutex);
+
+ /*
+ * we'll use the completion to check if there is a termination pending,
+ * so we start it as completed and we reinit it when a termination
+ * is triggered.
+ */
+ init_completion(&pxp->termination);
+ complete_all(&pxp->termination);
+
+ mutex_init(&pxp->arb_mutex);
+ INIT_WORK(&pxp->session_work, intel_pxp_session_work);
+
+ ret = create_vcs_context(pxp);
+ if (ret)
+ return;
+
+ ret = intel_pxp_tee_component_init(pxp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_context;
+
+ drm_info(&gt->i915->drm, "Protected Xe Path (PXP) protected content support initialized\n");
+
+ return;
+
+out_context:
+ destroy_vcs_context(pxp);
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_fini(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp))
+ return;
+
+ pxp->arb_is_valid = false;
+
+ intel_pxp_tee_component_fini(pxp);
+
+ destroy_vcs_context(pxp);
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_mark_termination_in_progress(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ pxp->arb_is_valid = false;
+ reinit_completion(&pxp->termination);
+}
+
+static void pxp_queue_termination(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ struct intel_gt *gt = pxp_to_gt(pxp);
+
+ /*
+ * We want to get the same effect as if we received a termination
+ * interrupt, so just pretend that we did.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irq(gt->irq_lock);
+ intel_pxp_mark_termination_in_progress(pxp);
+ pxp->session_events |= PXP_TERMINATION_REQUEST;
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &pxp->session_work);
+ spin_unlock_irq(gt->irq_lock);
+}
+
+static bool pxp_component_bound(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ bool bound = false;
+
+ mutex_lock(&pxp->tee_mutex);
+ if (pxp->pxp_component)
+ bound = true;
+ mutex_unlock(&pxp->tee_mutex);
+
+ return bound;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the arb session is restarted from the irq work when we receive the
+ * termination completion interrupt
+ */
+int intel_pxp_start(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!intel_pxp_is_enabled(pxp))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (wait_for(pxp_component_bound(pxp), 250))
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ mutex_lock(&pxp->arb_mutex);
+
+ if (pxp->arb_is_valid)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ pxp_queue_termination(pxp);
+
+ if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&pxp->termination,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(250))) {
+ ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure the compiler doesn't optimize the double access */
+ barrier();
+
+ if (!pxp->arb_is_valid)
+ ret = -EIO;
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&pxp->arb_mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_init_hw(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ kcr_pxp_enable(pxp_to_gt(pxp));
+ intel_pxp_irq_enable(pxp);
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_fini_hw(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ kcr_pxp_disable(pxp_to_gt(pxp));
+
+ intel_pxp_irq_disable(pxp);
+}
+
+int intel_pxp_key_check(struct intel_pxp *pxp,
+ struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
+ bool assign)
+{
+ if (!intel_pxp_is_active(pxp))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!i915_gem_object_is_protected(obj))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ GEM_BUG_ON(!pxp->key_instance);
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the first time we're using this object, it's not
+ * encrypted yet; it will be encrypted with the current key, so mark it
+ * as such. If the object is already encrypted, check instead if the
+ * used key is still valid.
+ */
+ if (!obj->pxp_key_instance && assign)
+ obj->pxp_key_instance = pxp->key_instance;
+
+ if (obj->pxp_key_instance != pxp->key_instance)
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void intel_pxp_invalidate(struct intel_pxp *pxp)
+{
+ struct drm_i915_private *i915 = pxp_to_gt(pxp)->i915;
+ struct i915_gem_context *ctx, *cn;
+
+ /* ban all contexts marked as protected */
+ spin_lock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, cn, &i915->gem.contexts.list, link) {
+ struct i915_gem_engines_iter it;
+ struct intel_context *ce;
+
+ if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&ctx->ref))
+ continue;
+
+ if (likely(!i915_gem_context_uses_protected_content(ctx))) {
+ i915_gem_context_put(ctx);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock);
+
+ /*
+ * By the time we get here we are either going to suspend with
+ * quiesced execution or the HW keys are already long gone and
+ * in this case it is worthless to attempt to close the context
+ * and wait for its execution. It will hang the GPU if it has
+ * not already. So, as a fast mitigation, we can ban the
+ * context as quick as we can. That might race with the
+ * execbuffer, but currently this is the best that can be done.
+ */
+ for_each_gem_engine(ce, i915_gem_context_lock_engines(ctx), it)
+ intel_context_ban(ce, NULL);
+ i915_gem_context_unlock_engines(ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * The context has been banned, no need to keep the wakeref.
+ * This is safe from races because the only other place this
+ * is touched is context_release and we're holding a ctx ref
+ */
+ if (ctx->pxp_wakeref) {
+ intel_runtime_pm_put(&i915->runtime_pm,
+ ctx->pxp_wakeref);
+ ctx->pxp_wakeref = 0;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock);
+ list_safe_reset_next(ctx, cn, link);
+ i915_gem_context_put(ctx);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&i915->gem.contexts.lock);
+}