Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 426 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b8c5a110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * fs/crypto/hooks.c
+ *
+ * Encryption hooks for higher-level filesystem operations.
+ */
+
+#include "fscrypt_private.h"
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_file_open() - prepare to open a possibly-encrypted regular file
+ * @inode: the inode being opened
+ * @filp: the struct file being set up
+ *
+ * Currently, an encrypted regular file can only be opened if its encryption key
+ * is available; access to the raw encrypted contents is not supported.
+ * Therefore, we first set up the inode's encryption key (if not already done)
+ * and return an error if it's unavailable.
+ *
+ * We also verify that if the parent directory (from the path via which the file
+ * is being opened) is encrypted, then the inode being opened uses the same
+ * encryption policy.  This is needed as part of the enforcement that all files
+ * in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy, as a
+ * protection against certain types of offline attacks.  Note that this check is
+ * needed even when opening an *unencrypted* file, since it's forbidden to have
+ * an unencrypted file in an encrypted directory.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code
+ */
+int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct dentry *dir;
+
+	err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	dir = dget_parent(file_dentry(filp));
+	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(dir)) &&
+	    !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(d_inode(dir), inode)) {
+		fscrypt_warn(inode,
+			     "Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)",
+			     d_inode(dir)->i_ino);
+		err = -EPERM;
+	}
+	dput(dir);
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open);
+
+int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			   struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to separately check that the directory inode's key is
+	 * available, as it's implied by the dentry not being a no-key name.
+	 */
+
+	if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode))
+		return -EXDEV;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_link);
+
+int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+			     unsigned int flags)
+{
+	if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(old_dentry) ||
+	    fscrypt_is_nokey_name(new_dentry))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to separately check that the directory inodes' keys are
+	 * available, as it's implied by the dentries not being no-key names.
+	 */
+
+	if (old_dir != new_dir) {
+		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir) &&
+		    !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir,
+						   d_inode(old_dentry)))
+			return -EXDEV;
+
+		if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) &&
+		    IS_ENCRYPTED(old_dir) &&
+		    !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(old_dir,
+						   d_inode(new_dentry)))
+			return -EXDEV;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_rename);
+
+int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct fscrypt_name *fname)
+{
+	int err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, fname);
+
+	if (err && err != -ENOENT)
+		return err;
+
+	if (fname->is_nokey_name) {
+		spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
+		dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME;
+		spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup);
+
+int __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir)
+{
+	return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_readdir);
+
+int __fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
+		return fscrypt_require_key(d_inode(dentry));
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_setattr);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_prepare_setflags() - prepare to change flags with FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+ * @inode: the inode on which flags are being changed
+ * @oldflags: the old flags
+ * @flags: the new flags
+ *
+ * The caller should be holding i_rwsem for write.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno if the flags change isn't allowed or if
+ *	   another error occurs.
+ */
+int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
+			     unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * When the CASEFOLD flag is set on an encrypted directory, we must
+	 * derive the secret key needed for the dirhash.  This is only possible
+	 * if the directory uses a v2 encryption policy.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && (flags & ~oldflags & FS_CASEFOLD_FL)) {
+		err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
+		if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		mk = ci->ci_master_key;
+		down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+		if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
+			err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
+		else
+			err = -ENOKEY;
+		up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+		return err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_prepare_symlink() - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink
+ * @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created
+ * @target: plaintext symlink target
+ * @len: length of @target excluding null terminator
+ * @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target
+ * @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared
+ *
+ * This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk,
+ * stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len.  An
+ * encrypted symlink may be longer than the original.
+ *
+ * Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be
+ * unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted.  For encrypted
+ * symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the
+ * on-disk target later.  (The reason for the two-step process is that some
+ * filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the
+ * inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long,
+ * -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem
+ * occurred while setting up the encryption key.
+ */
+int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target,
+			    unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len,
+			    struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
+{
+	const union fscrypt_policy *policy;
+
+	/*
+	 * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know
+	 * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in
+	 * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory.
+	 */
+	policy = fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(dir);
+	if (policy == NULL) {
+		/* Not encrypted */
+		disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target;
+		disk_link->len = len + 1;
+		if (disk_link->len > max_len)
+			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(policy))
+		return PTR_ERR(policy);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the size of the encrypted symlink and verify it won't
+	 * exceed max_len.  Note that for historical reasons, encrypted symlink
+	 * targets are prefixed with the ciphertext length, despite this
+	 * actually being redundant with i_size.  This decreases by 2 bytes the
+	 * longest symlink target we can accept.
+	 *
+	 * We could recover 1 byte by not counting a null terminator, but
+	 * counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler
+	 * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it.
+	 */
+	if (!__fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(policy, len,
+					    max_len - sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data),
+					    &disk_link->len))
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	disk_link->len += sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data);
+
+	disk_link->name = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_symlink);
+
+int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target,
+			      unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct qstr iname = QSTR_INIT(target, len);
+	struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd;
+	unsigned int ciphertext_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have already set up the new
+	 * symlink inode's encryption key.  We don't wait until now to do it,
+	 * since we may be in a filesystem transaction now.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (disk_link->name) {
+		/* filesystem-provided buffer */
+		sd = (struct fscrypt_symlink_data *)disk_link->name;
+	} else {
+		sd = kmalloc(disk_link->len, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!sd)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	ciphertext_len = disk_link->len - sizeof(*sd);
+	sd->len = cpu_to_le16(ciphertext_len);
+
+	err = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(inode, &iname, sd->encrypted_path,
+				    ciphertext_len);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_sd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Null-terminating the ciphertext doesn't make sense, but we still
+	 * count the null terminator in the length, so we might as well
+	 * initialize it just in case the filesystem writes it out.
+	 */
+	sd->encrypted_path[ciphertext_len] = '\0';
+
+	/* Cache the plaintext symlink target for later use by get_link() */
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	inode->i_link = kmemdup(target, len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!inode->i_link)
+		goto err_free_sd;
+
+	if (!disk_link->name)
+		disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)sd;
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_sd:
+	if (!disk_link->name)
+		kfree(sd);
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_encrypt_symlink);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_get_symlink() - get the target of an encrypted symlink
+ * @inode: the symlink inode
+ * @caddr: the on-disk contents of the symlink
+ * @max_size: size of @caddr buffer
+ * @done: if successful, will be set up to free the returned target if needed
+ *
+ * If the symlink's encryption key is available, we decrypt its target.
+ * Otherwise, we encode its target for presentation.
+ *
+ * This may sleep, so the filesystem must have dropped out of RCU mode already.
+ *
+ * Return: the presentable symlink target or an ERR_PTR()
+ */
+const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr,
+				unsigned int max_size,
+				struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	const struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd;
+	struct fscrypt_str cstr, pstr;
+	bool has_key;
+	int err;
+
+	/* This is for encrypted symlinks only */
+	if (WARN_ON(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* If the decrypted target is already cached, just return it. */
+	pstr.name = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link);
+	if (pstr.name)
+		return pstr.name;
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to set up the symlink's encryption key, but we can continue
+	 * regardless of whether the key is available or not.
+	 */
+	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, false);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+	has_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * For historical reasons, encrypted symlink targets are prefixed with
+	 * the ciphertext length, even though this is redundant with i_size.
+	 */
+
+	if (max_size < sizeof(*sd))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
+	sd = caddr;
+	cstr.name = (unsigned char *)sd->encrypted_path;
+	cstr.len = le16_to_cpu(sd->len);
+
+	if (cstr.len == 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
+
+	if (cstr.len + sizeof(*sd) - 1 > max_size)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
+
+	err = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(cstr.len, &pstr);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, 0, 0, &cstr, &pstr);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_kfree;
+
+	err = -EUCLEAN;
+	if (pstr.name[0] == '\0')
+		goto err_kfree;
+
+	pstr.name[pstr.len] = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Cache decrypted symlink targets in i_link for later use.  Don't cache
+	 * symlink targets encoded without the key, since those become outdated
+	 * once the key is added.  This pairs with the READ_ONCE() above and in
+	 * the VFS path lookup code.
+	 */
+	if (!has_key ||
+	    cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_link, NULL, pstr.name) != NULL)
+		set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, pstr.name);
+
+	return pstr.name;
+
+err_kfree:
+	kfree(pstr.name);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_get_symlink);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_symlink_getattr() - set the correct st_size for encrypted symlinks
+ * @path: the path for the encrypted symlink being queried
+ * @stat: the struct being filled with the symlink's attributes
+ *
+ * Override st_size of encrypted symlinks to be the length of the decrypted
+ * symlink target (or the no-key encoded symlink target, if the key is
+ * unavailable) rather than the length of the encrypted symlink target.  This is
+ * necessary for st_size to match the symlink target that userspace actually
+ * sees.  POSIX requires this, and some userspace programs depend on it.
+ *
+ * This requires reading the symlink target from disk if needed, setting up the
+ * inode's encryption key if possible, and then decrypting or encoding the
+ * symlink target.  This makes lstat() more heavyweight than is normally the
+ * case.  However, decrypted symlink targets will be cached in ->i_link, so
+ * usually the symlink won't have to be read and decrypted again later if/when
+ * it is actually followed, readlink() is called, or lstat() is called again.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int fscrypt_symlink_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	const char *link;
+	DEFINE_DELAYED_CALL(done);
+
+	/*
+	 * To get the symlink target that userspace will see (whether it's the
+	 * decrypted target or the no-key encoded target), we can just get it in
+	 * the same way the VFS does during path resolution and readlink().
+	 */
+	link = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link);
+	if (!link) {
+		link = inode->i_op->get_link(dentry, inode, &done);
+		if (IS_ERR(link))
+			return PTR_ERR(link);
+	}
+	stat->size = strlen(link);
+	do_delayed_call(&done);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_symlink_getattr);