Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 733 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d0ac2648c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1
+/*
+ *
+ *   Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2.  See MS-NLMP
+ *   for more detailed information
+ *
+ *   Copyright (C) International Business Machines  Corp., 2005,2013
+ *   Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "cifspdu.h"
+#include "cifsglob.h"
+#include "cifs_debug.h"
+#include "cifs_unicode.h"
+#include "cifsproto.h"
+#include "ntlmssp.h"
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include "../common/arc4.h"
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+
+int __cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature,
+			struct shash_desc *shash)
+{
+	int i;
+	int rc;
+	struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
+	int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
+
+	/* iov[0] is actual data and not the rfc1002 length for SMB2+ */
+	if (!is_smb1(server)) {
+		if (iov[0].iov_len <= 4)
+			return -EIO;
+		i = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (n_vec < 2 || iov[0].iov_len != 4)
+			return -EIO;
+		i = 1; /* skip rfc1002 length */
+	}
+
+	for (; i < n_vec; i++) {
+		if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash,
+					 iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* now hash over the rq_pages array */
+	for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
+		void *kaddr;
+		unsigned int len, offset;
+
+		rqst_page_get_length(rqst, i, &len, &offset);
+
+		kaddr = (char *) kmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]) + offset;
+
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, kaddr, len);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+				 __func__);
+			kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, signature);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
+ * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
+ * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
+ * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
+ * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
+ */
+static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!rqst->rq_iov || !signature || !server)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = cifs_alloc_hash("md5", &server->secmech.md5);
+	if (rc)
+		return -1;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(server->secmech.md5);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(server->secmech.md5,
+		server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return __cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, signature, server->secmech.md5);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char smb_signature[20];
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+	if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
+	    rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	spin_lock(&server->srv_lock);
+	if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
+	    server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) {
+		spin_unlock(&server->srv_lock);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&server->srv_lock);
+
+	if (!server->session_estab) {
+		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+				cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+	*pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
+	++server->sequence_number;
+
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
+	if (rc)
+		memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
+{
+	struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
+				 .rq_nvec = n_vec };
+
+	return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		  __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+	struct kvec iov[2];
+
+	iov[0].iov_base = cifs_pdu;
+	iov[0].iov_len = 4;
+	iov[1].iov_base = (char *)cifs_pdu + 4;
+	iov[1].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
+
+	return cifs_sign_smbv(iov, 2, server,
+			      pexpected_response_sequence_number);
+}
+
+int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			  struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+			  __u32 expected_sequence_number)
+{
+	unsigned int rc;
+	char server_response_sig[8];
+	char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+	if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
+	    rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!server->session_estab)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
+		struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB =
+			(struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu;
+		if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but
+	   server does not send one? BB */
+
+	/* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL "  */
+	if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
+			 cifs_pdu->Command);
+
+	/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
+		its signature against what the server sent */
+	memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8);
+
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+					cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+	cifs_server_lock(server);
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
+	cifs_server_unlock(server);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+/*	cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ",
+		      what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */
+
+	if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8))
+		return -EACCES;
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
+ * Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
+ * and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
+ * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
+ */
+static int
+build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
+	unsigned char *blobptr;
+	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+	if (!ses->domainName) {
+		ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ses->domainName)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+	/*
+	 * The length of this blob is two times the size of a
+	 * structure (av pair) which holds name/size
+	 * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
+	 * unicode length of a netbios domain name
+	 */
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
+	ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
+	ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+
+	/*
+	 * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
+	 * is sufficient as part of the temp
+	 */
+	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
+	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
+	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
+ * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
+ * We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used
+ * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already
+ * specified on the command line.
+ * If this function returns without any error but without fetching
+ * domain name, authentication may fail against some server but
+ * may not fail against other (those who are not very particular
+ * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
+ */
+static int
+find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	unsigned int attrsize;
+	unsigned int type;
+	unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	unsigned char *blobptr;
+	unsigned char *blobend;
+	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+	if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
+		return 0;
+
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
+
+	while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
+		attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+		type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
+			break;
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
+		attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
+		if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
+			break;
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
+			if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
+				break;
+			if (!ses->domainName) {
+				ses->domainName =
+					kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!ses->domainName)
+						return -ENOMEM;
+				cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
+					(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
+					nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr  value */
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
+ * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
+ * We parse that blob here to find the server given timestamp
+ * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (or local current time as
+ * default in case of failure)
+ */
+static __le64
+find_timestamp(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+	unsigned int attrsize;
+	unsigned int type;
+	unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	unsigned char *blobptr;
+	unsigned char *blobend;
+	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+	struct timespec64 ts;
+
+	if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
+		return 0;
+
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
+
+	while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
+		attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+		type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
+			break;
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
+		attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
+		if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
+			break;
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_TIMESTAMP) {
+			if (attrsize == sizeof(u64))
+				return *((__le64 *)blobptr);
+		}
+		blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
+	}
+
+	ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts);
+	return cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(ts));
+}
+
+static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
+			    const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	int len;
+	char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
+	__le16 *user;
+	wchar_t *domain;
+	wchar_t *server;
+
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate md4 hash of password */
+	E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5->tfm, nt_hash,
+				CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
+	len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
+	user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (user == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (len) {
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
+		UniStrupr(user);
+	} else {
+		memset(user, '\0', 2);
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+				(char *)user, 2 * len);
+	kfree(user);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
+	if (ses->domainName) {
+		len = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+		domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (domain == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
+				      nls_cp);
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+					(char *)domain, 2 * len);
+		kfree(domain);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* We use ses->ip_addr if no domain name available */
+		len = strlen(ses->ip_addr);
+
+		server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (server == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->ip_addr, len,
+					nls_cp);
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+					(char *)server, 2 * len);
+		kfree(server);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+					ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+	    (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	unsigned int hash_len;
+
+	/* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
+	hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
+		offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
+
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5->tfm,
+				 ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	else
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+				 ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+				ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int baselen;
+	unsigned int tilen;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
+	char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+	unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
+	__le64 rsp_timestamp;
+
+	if (nls_cp == NULL) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s called with nls_cp==NULL\n", __func__);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
+		if (!ses->domainName) {
+			if (ses->domainAuto) {
+				rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
+				if (rc) {
+					cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
+						 rc);
+					goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+				}
+			} else {
+				ses->domainName = kstrdup("", GFP_KERNEL);
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
+			goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Must be within 5 minutes of the server (or in range +/-2h
+	 * in case of Mac OS X), so simply carry over server timestamp
+	 * (as Windows 7 does)
+	 */
+	rsp_timestamp = find_timestamp(ses);
+
+	baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+	tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
+	tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
+
+	ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+	ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
+
+	ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+			(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
+	ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
+	ntlmv2->time = rsp_timestamp;
+
+	get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
+	ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
+
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
+
+	cifs_server_lock(ses->server);
+
+	rc = cifs_alloc_hash("hmac(md5)", &ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	if (rc) {
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
+	rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
+	rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5->tfm,
+		ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+		ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
+		CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+		ses->auth_key.response);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+unlock:
+	cifs_server_unlock(ses->server);
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
+	kfree_sensitive(tiblob);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int
+calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+	unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */
+	struct arc4_ctx *ctx_arc4;
+
+	if (fips_enabled)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+	ctx_arc4 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx_arc4), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx_arc4) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not allocate arc4 context\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	cifs_arc4_setkey(ctx_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	cifs_arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, sec_key,
+			CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+
+	/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	/* and make len as that of session key only */
+	ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	memzero_explicit(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx_arc4);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+	cifs_free_hash(&server->secmech.aes_cmac);
+	cifs_free_hash(&server->secmech.hmacsha256);
+	cifs_free_hash(&server->secmech.md5);
+	cifs_free_hash(&server->secmech.sha512);
+	cifs_free_hash(&server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+
+	if (server->secmech.enc) {
+		crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.enc);
+		server->secmech.enc = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.dec) {
+		crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.dec);
+		server->secmech.dec = NULL;
+	}
+}