Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

7 files changed, 1851 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a6e19d23e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config EVM
+	bool "EVM support"
+	select KEYS
+	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	default n
+	help
+	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
+	  integrity attacks.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
+	default y
+	depends on EVM
+	help
+	  Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2.
+	  if 'not selected', it is former version 1
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+	bool "Additional SMACK xattrs"
+	depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux,
+	  security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included
+	  in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined
+	  Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and
+	  security.SMACK64MMAP.
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+	bool "Add additional EVM extended attributes at runtime"
+	depends on EVM
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow userland to provide additional xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+	  When this option is enabled, root can add additional xattrs to the
+	  list used by EVM by writing them into
+	  /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs.
+
+config EVM_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring"
+	depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.
+
+	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
+	   onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.  A public key can be used to
+	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process.
+
+config EVM_X509_PATH
+	string "EVM X509 certificate path"
+	depends on EVM_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_evm.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines X509 certificate path.
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a56f5613b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM)
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
+
+evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
+evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8b8c5004
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm.h
+ */
+
+#ifndef __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+#define __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+#define EVM_INIT_HMAC	0x0001
+#define EVM_INIT_X509	0x0002
+#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES	0x0004
+#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
+
+#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509)
+#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
+		       EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+
+struct xattr_list {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *name;
+	bool enabled;
+};
+
+extern int evm_initialized;
+
+#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
+
+extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
+
+/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
+extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
+
+struct evm_digest {
+	struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+	char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+int evm_init_key(void);
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			const char *req_xattr_name,
+			const char *req_xattr_value,
+			size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, struct evm_digest *data);
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type,
+		  struct evm_digest *data);
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
+		  char *hmac_val);
+int evm_init_secfs(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9395f8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_crypto.c
+ *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
+
+#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
+
+static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
+
+static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+
+/**
+ * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
+ * @keylen: length of the key data
+ *
+ * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
+ * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
+ * keys.
+ *
+ * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
+ */
+int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -EBUSY;
+	if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
+		goto busy;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+		goto inval;
+	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
+	evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
+	pr_info("key initialized\n");
+	return 0;
+inval:
+	clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
+busy:
+	pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
+
+static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
+{
+	long rc;
+	const char *algo;
+	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
+			pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		}
+		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
+		algo = evm_hmac;
+	} else {
+		if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
+		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
+	}
+
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto alloc;
+	mutex_lock(&mutex);
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
+		       PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
+		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+		return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
+	}
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
+			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+			return ERR_PTR(rc);
+		}
+	}
+	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+alloc:
+	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	desc->tfm = *tfm;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(desc);
+		return ERR_PTR(rc);
+	}
+	return desc;
+}
+
+/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
+ * specific info.
+ *
+ * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
+ * protection.)
+ */
+static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
+			  char type, char *digest)
+{
+	struct h_misc {
+		unsigned long ino;
+		__u32 generation;
+		uid_t uid;
+		gid_t gid;
+		umode_t mode;
+	} hmac_misc;
+
+	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
+	/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
+	 * signatures
+	 */
+	if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+		hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
+		hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+	}
+	/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
+	 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
+	 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
+	 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
+	 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
+	 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
+	 * everything is signed.
+	 */
+	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
+	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
+	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
+	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
+	if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
+	    type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
+	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+
+	pr_debug("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", sizeof(struct h_misc),
+		 (int)sizeof(struct h_misc), &hmac_misc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexademical string.
+ * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.)
+ */
+static void dump_security_xattr(const char *prefix, const void *src,
+				size_t count)
+{
+#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
+	char *asciihex, *p;
+
+	p = asciihex = kmalloc(count * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!asciihex)
+		return;
+
+	p = bin2hex(p, src, count);
+	*p = 0;
+	pr_debug("%s: (%zu) %.*s\n", prefix, count, (int)count * 2, asciihex);
+	kfree(asciihex);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
+ *
+ * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
+ * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
+ * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
+ */
+static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *req_xattr_name,
+				 const char *req_xattr_value,
+				 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+				 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t xattr_size = 0;
+	char *xattr_value = NULL;
+	int error;
+	int size, user_space_size;
+	bool ima_present = false;
+
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
+	    inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc))
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
+
+	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
+	error = -ENODATA;
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		bool is_ima = false;
+
+		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+			is_ima = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated
+		 * signatures/HMACs.
+		 */
+		if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
+		    && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
+			error = 0;
+			crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
+					     req_xattr_value_len);
+			if (is_ima)
+				ima_present = true;
+
+			if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
+				pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
+					 req_xattr_value_len,
+					 (int)req_xattr_value_len,
+					 req_xattr_value);
+			else
+				dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
+						    req_xattr_value,
+						    req_xattr_value_len);
+			continue;
+		}
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr->name,
+					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (size < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		user_space_size = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry,
+					       xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (user_space_size != size)
+			pr_debug("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n",
+				 dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size,
+				 user_space_size);
+		error = 0;
+		xattr_size = size;
+		crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
+		if (is_ima)
+			ima_present = true;
+
+		if (xattr_size < 64)
+			pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]", xattr->name, xattr_size,
+				 (int)xattr_size, xattr_value);
+		else
+			dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value,
+					    xattr_size);
+	}
+	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
+
+	/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
+		error = -EPERM;
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	kfree(desc);
+	return error;
+}
+
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+		  struct evm_digest *data)
+{
+	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+				    req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
+}
+
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+		  char type, struct evm_digest *data)
+{
+	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+				     req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
+}
+
+static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Do this the hard way */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			return 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		rc = 1;
+	else
+		rc = 0;
+
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
+ *
+ * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
+ */
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_digest data;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
+	 * is of an immutable type
+	 */
+	rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+			   xattr_value_len, &data);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
+					   XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+					   &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
+					   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
+	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+		rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+		  char *hmac_val)
+{
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
+		pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
+	}
+
+	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
+	kfree(desc);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
+ */
+int evm_init_key(void)
+{
+	struct key *evm_key;
+	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
+	int rc;
+
+	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
+	ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
+
+	rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
+
+	/* burn the original key contents */
+	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
+	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
+	key_put(evm_key);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a338f1944
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,919 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_main.c
+ *	implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
+ *	evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+int evm_initialized;
+
+static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
+	"no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
+int evm_hmac_attrs;
+
+static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+	 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE)
+	},
+	{
+	 .name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+	 .enabled = true
+	},
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+
+static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init;
+static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
+{
+	if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
+		evm_fixmode = 1;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
+
+static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+{
+	int i, xattrs;
+
+	xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
+
+	pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
+	for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
+		pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name,
+			!evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ?
+			" (disabled)" : "");
+		list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
+			      &evm_config_xattrnames);
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+	evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
+#endif
+	pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+}
+
+static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
+{
+	return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification
+ * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key
+ * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the
+ * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the
+ * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid.
+ */
+static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
+{
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int error;
+	int count = 0;
+
+	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (error < 0) {
+			if (error == -ENODATA)
+				continue;
+			return error;
+		}
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
+ *
+ * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
+ * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
+ *
+ * For performance:
+ * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
+ *   HMAC.)
+ * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
+ *
+ * Returns integrity status
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *xattr_name,
+					     char *xattr_value,
+					     size_t xattr_value_len,
+					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	struct evm_digest digest;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
+
+	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
+		     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
+		return iint->evm_status;
+
+	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
+
+	/* first need to know the sig type */
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
+			if (rc > 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+			else if (rc == 0)
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+		} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	xattr_len = rc;
+
+	/* check value type */
+	switch (xattr_data->type) {
+	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, &digest);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
+				   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+		evm_immutable = 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		/* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
+		if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
+		digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
+		rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
+					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
+					digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
+		if (!rc) {
+			inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+				if (iint)
+					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
+				evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
+			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+				   !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
+				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
+				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+						    xattr_value,
+						    xattr_value_len);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
+		else if (evm_immutable)
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE;
+		else
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+	}
+	pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length,
+		  digest.digest);
+out:
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = evm_status;
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return evm_status;
+}
+
+static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
+				      bool all_xattrs)
+{
+	int namelen;
+	int found = 0;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
+		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
+			    xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
+			    strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
+}
+
+int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name)
+{
+	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values
+ * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs
+ * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values
+ * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format)
+ *
+ * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a
+ * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL,
+ * just return the total size.
+ *
+ * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
+			      int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt)
+{
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+	int rc, size, total_size = 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    xattr->name, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA)
+			continue;
+		else if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case 'n':
+			size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (total_size)
+					*(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|';
+
+				memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			size = sizeof(u32);
+			if (buffer) {
+				if (canonical_fmt)
+					rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc);
+
+				*(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			size = rc;
+			if (buffer) {
+				rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry,
+					d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name,
+					buffer + total_size,
+					buffer_size - total_size);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					return rc;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		total_size += size;
+	}
+
+	return total_size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
+ * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ * @iint: inode integrity metadata
+ *
+ * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
+ * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
+ * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
+ *
+ * Returns the xattr integrity status.
+ *
+ * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
+ * is executed.
+ */
+enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      const char *xattr_name,
+				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
+				      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	if (!iint) {
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (!iint)
+			return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len, iint);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
+
+/*
+ * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
+ * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
+ */
+static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
+		return INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+				const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+	umode_t mode;
+	struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for
+	 * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the
+	 * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate
+	 * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL
+	 * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that
+	 * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters
+	 * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all
+	 * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs.
+	 *
+	 * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX
+	 * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is
+	 * guaranteed to have.
+	 */
+	acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode),
+				  xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl))
+		return 1;
+
+	acl_res = acl;
+	/*
+	 * Passing mnt_userns is necessary to correctly determine the GID in
+	 * an idmapped mount, as the GID is used to clear the setgid bit in
+	 * the inode mode.
+	 */
+	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &acl_res);
+
+	posix_acl_release(acl);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (inode->i_mode != mode)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: requested xattr
+ * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
+ * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
+ *
+ * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			    const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	char *xattr_data = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
+		return evm_xattr_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name,
+					    xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
+				0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (rc == xattr_value_len)
+		rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc);
+	else
+		rc = 1;
+
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ *
+ * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
+ * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
+ *
+ * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
+ * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
+ * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
+ * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
+ */
+static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
+		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
+			return 0;
+		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+			return 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+		if (evm_hmac_disabled())
+			return 0;
+
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+		if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+		    || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+			return 0;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+				    dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+				    "update_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	}
+out:
+	/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
+	if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	    evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+	 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+			      xattr_value_len))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS &&
+	    evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
+	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ *
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
+ */
+int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+		       size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!xattr_value_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+		    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
+ * the current value is valid.
+ */
+int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the
+ * EVM status.
+ *
+ * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_key_loaded())
+		return false;
+
+	/* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */
+	if (!xattr_name)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) &&
+	    strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
+ * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
+ * i_mutex lock.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
+ *
+ * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+
+	if (!i_uid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
+	    !i_gid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
+	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
+ *
+ * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
+ * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
+ */
+int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	/* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
+	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
+		return 0;
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	/*
+	 * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
+	 * are immutable and can never be updated.
+	 */
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
+	    (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
+	     evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
+	    !evm_attr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, attr))
+		return 0;
+
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
+ *
+ * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
+ * changes.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
+		return;
+
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+		return;
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
+		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
+ */
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
+				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+{
+	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
+	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+		return 0;
+
+	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!xattr_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
+	evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
+	evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(xattr_data);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	if (!rc)
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int __init init_evm(void)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+	evm_init_config();
+
+	error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	error = evm_init_secfs();
+	if (error < 0) {
+		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+error:
+	if (error != 0) {
+		if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
+			list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
+				list_del(pos);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37275800c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+
+int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr)
+{
+	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
+
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a9db7dfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: evm_secfs.c
+ *	- Used to signal when key is on keyring
+ *	- Get the key and enable EVM
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "evm.h"
+
+static struct dentry *evm_dir;
+static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;
+static struct dentry *evm_symlink;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+static struct dentry *evm_xattrs;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(xattr_list_mutex);
+static int evm_xattrs_locked;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE));
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring.
+ * - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring
+ * - create list of hmac protected extended attributes
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Reject invalid values */
+	if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't allow a request to enable metadata writes if
+	 * an HMAC key is loaded.
+	 */
+	if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
+	    (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
+		ret = evm_init_key();
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return ret;
+		/* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */
+		i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE;
+	}
+
+	evm_initialized |= i;
+
+	/* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key
+	 * is loaded
+	 */
+	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+		evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
+	.read		= evm_read_key,
+	.write		= evm_write_key,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+/**
+ * evm_read_xattrs - read() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *temp;
+	int offset = 0;
+	ssize_t rc, size = 0;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	if (rc)
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		size += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+	}
+
+	temp = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!temp) {
+		mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (!xattr->enabled)
+			continue;
+
+		sprintf(temp + offset, "%s\n", xattr->name);
+		offset += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	kfree(temp);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_write_xattrs - write() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int len, err;
+	struct xattr_list *xattr, *tmp;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct iattr newattrs;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_xattrs_locked)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (count > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
+	if (!ab && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUDIT))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!xattr) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	xattr->enabled = true;
+	xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name);
+		xattr->name = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Remove any trailing newline */
+	len = strlen(xattr->name);
+	if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n')
+		xattr->name[len-1] = '\0';
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
+		evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
+		newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
+		newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
+		inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
+		inode_lock(inode);
+		err = simple_setattr(&init_user_ns, evm_xattrs, &newattrs);
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+		if (!err)
+			err = count;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+		    XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+	 * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+	 * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+	 * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+	 * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+	 * and evm_protected_xattr().
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+		if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
+			err = -EEXIST;
+			if (!tmp->enabled) {
+				tmp->enabled = true;
+				err = count;
+			}
+			mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&xattr->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);
+	mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	return count;
+out:
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", (err < 0) ? err : 0);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	if (xattr) {
+		kfree(xattr->name);
+		kfree(xattr);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations evm_xattr_ops = {
+	.read		= evm_read_xattrs,
+	.write		= evm_write_xattrs,
+};
+
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+	evm_xattrs = securityfs_create_file("evm_xattrs", 0660, evm_dir, NULL,
+					    &evm_xattr_ops);
+	if (!evm_xattrs || IS_ERR(evm_xattrs))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	evm_dir = securityfs_create_dir("evm", integrity_dir);
+	if (!evm_dir || IS_ERR(evm_dir))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", 0660,
+					      evm_dir, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
+	if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm)) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	evm_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("evm", NULL,
+						"integrity/evm/evm", NULL);
+	if (!evm_symlink || IS_ERR(evm_symlink)) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (evm_init_xattrs() != 0) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	securityfs_remove(evm_symlink);
+	securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
+	securityfs_remove(evm_dir);
+	return error;
+}