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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
commit2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch)
tree848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz
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Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
+#
+config IMA
+ bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
+ select SECURITYFS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
+ select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
+ select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
+ select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
+ select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT
+ help
+ The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+ Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+ values of executables and other sensitive system files,
+ as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
+ to change the contents of an important system file
+ being measured, we can tell.
+
+ If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
+ an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
+ TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
+ whether or not critical system files have been modified.
+ Read <https://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
+ to learn more about IMA.
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+if IMA
+
+config IMA_KEXEC
+ bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft boot"
+ depends on TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
+ default n
+ help
+ TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate
+ a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the
+ running kernel must be saved and restored on boot.
+
+ Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to
+ be very large.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
+ int
+ range 8 14
+ default 10
+ help
+ IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
+ that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
+ measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
+
+config IMA_LSM_RULES
+ bool
+ depends on AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+ default y
+ help
+ Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
+
+choice
+ prompt "Default template"
+ default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+ help
+ Select the default IMA measurement template.
+
+ The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a
+ hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
+ limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list
+ template permits both larger hash digests and longer
+ pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced
+ by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line.
+
+ config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+ bool "ima-ng (default)"
+ config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+ bool "ima-sig"
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
+ string
+ default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+ default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+
+choice
+ prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
+ default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+ help
+ Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
+ list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default
+ hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command
+ line 'ima_hash=' option.
+
+ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+ bool "SHA1 (default)"
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA1=y
+
+ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+ bool "SHA256"
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+
+ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+ bool "SHA512"
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y
+
+ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+ bool "WP512"
+ depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y
+
+ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
+ bool "SM3"
+ depends on CRYPTO_SM3_GENERIC=y
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
+ string
+ default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+ default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+ default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+ default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+ default "sm3" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
+
+config IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+ bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy"
+ default n
+ help
+ IMA policy can now be updated multiple times. The new rules get
+ appended to the original policy. Have in mind that the rules are
+ scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_READ_POLICY
+ bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy"
+ default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+ default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+ help
+ It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is
+ even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
+ This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE
+ bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
+ It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
+ attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
+ the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
+ and configure EVM.
+
+ For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
+ <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
+ depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
+ && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
+ based on run time secure boot flags.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ bool "IMA build time configured policy rules"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ default n
+ help
+ This option defines an IMA appraisal policy at build time, which
+ is enforced at run time without having to specify a builtin
+ policy name on the boot command line. The build time appraisal
+ policy rules persist after loading a custom policy.
+
+ Depending on the rules configured, this policy may require kernel
+ modules, firmware, the kexec kernel image, and/or the IMA policy
+ to be signed. Unsigned files might prevent the system from
+ booting or applications from working properly.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise firmware signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ This option defines a policy requiring all firmware to be signed,
+ including the regulatory.db. If both this option and
+ CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are enabled, then both signature
+ verification methods are necessary.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise kexec kernel image signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require all kexec'ed kernel images to
+ be signed and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA
+ keyring.
+
+ Kernel image signatures can not be verified by the original
+ kexec_load syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent its
+ usage.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise kernel modules signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require all kernel modules to be signed
+ and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
+ Kernel module signatures can only be verified by IMA-appraisal,
+ via the finit_module syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent
+ the usage of the init_module syscall.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise IMA policy signature"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require the IMA policy to be signed and
+ and verified by a key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+ bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+ default y
+ help
+ This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
+ (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+ bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ default n
+ help
+ Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
+ appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules.
+ The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
+ to accept such signatures.
+
+config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+ bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
+ key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
+ secondary trusted keyrings.
+
+ Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
+ IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
+ provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the
+ built-in or secondary trusted keyrings.
+
+config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all
+ revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If
+ the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and
+ an error is returned to the caller.
+
+config IMA_LOAD_X509
+ bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ File signature verification is based on the public keys
+ loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
+ X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
+ .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate
+ loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_X509_PATH
+ string "IMA X509 certificate path"
+ depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+ default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+ help
+ This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+ bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
+ depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+ default n
+ help
+ This option requires user-space init to be signed.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ bool
+ depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
+ default y
+
+config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
+ bool
+ depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default y
+
+config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
+ bool
+ depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ help
+ This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or
+ trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies.
+
+config IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE
+ bool "Disable htable to allow measurement of duplicate records"
+ default n
+ help
+ This option disables htable to allow measurement of duplicate records.
+
+endif