1 files changed, 395 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4155273d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This code is used on x86_64 to create page table identity mappings on
+ * demand by building up a new set of page tables (or appending to the
+ * existing ones), and then switching over to them when ready.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2016  Yinghai Lu
+ * Copyright (C)      2016  Kees Cook
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Since we're dealing with identity mappings, physical and virtual
+ * addresses are the same, so override these defines which are ultimately
+ * used by the headers in misc.h.
+ */
+#define __pa(x)  ((unsigned long)(x))
+#define __va(x)  ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)))
+
+/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+
+#include "error.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
+#include <asm/trap_pf.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/init.h>
+/* Use the static base for this part of the boot process */
+#undef __PAGE_OFFSET
+#define __PAGE_OFFSET __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE
+#include "../../mm/ident_map.c"
+
+#define _SETUP
+#include <asm/setup.h>	/* For COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
+#undef _SETUP
+
+extern unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void);
+
+/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+
+/* Used to track our page table allocation area. */
+struct alloc_pgt_data {
+	unsigned char *pgt_buf;
+	unsigned long pgt_buf_size;
+	unsigned long pgt_buf_offset;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Allocates space for a page table entry, using struct alloc_pgt_data
+ * above. Besides the local callers, this is used as the allocation
+ * callback in mapping_info below.
+ */
+static void *alloc_pgt_page(void *context)
+{
+	struct alloc_pgt_data *pages = (struct alloc_pgt_data *)context;
+	unsigned char *entry;
+
+	/* Validate there is space available for a new page. */
+	if (pages->pgt_buf_offset >= pages->pgt_buf_size) {
+		debug_putstr("out of pgt_buf in " __FILE__ "!?\n");
+		debug_putaddr(pages->pgt_buf_offset);
+		debug_putaddr(pages->pgt_buf_size);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Consumed more tables than expected? */
+	if (pages->pgt_buf_offset == BOOT_PGT_SIZE_WARN) {
+		debug_putstr("pgt_buf running low in " __FILE__ "\n");
+		debug_putstr("Need to raise BOOT_PGT_SIZE?\n");
+		debug_putaddr(pages->pgt_buf_offset);
+		debug_putaddr(pages->pgt_buf_size);
+	}
+
+	entry = pages->pgt_buf + pages->pgt_buf_offset;
+	pages->pgt_buf_offset += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
+/* Used to track our allocated page tables. */
+static struct alloc_pgt_data pgt_data;
+
+/* The top level page table entry pointer. */
+static unsigned long top_level_pgt;
+
+phys_addr_t physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
+
+/*
+ * Mapping information structure passed to kernel_ident_mapping_init().
+ * Due to relocation, pointers must be assigned at run time not build time.
+ */
+static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
+
+/*
+ * Adds the specified range to the identity mappings.
+ */
+void kernel_add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Align boundary to 2M. */
+	start = round_down(start, PMD_SIZE);
+	end = round_up(end, PMD_SIZE);
+	if (start >= end)
+		return;
+
+	/* Build the mapping. */
+	ret = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&mapping_info, (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt, start, end);
+	if (ret)
+		error("Error: kernel_ident_mapping_init() failed\n");
+}
+
+/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
+void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode)
+{
+	unsigned long cmdline;
+	struct setup_data *sd;
+
+	/* Exclude the encryption mask from __PHYSICAL_MASK */
+	physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
+
+	/* Init mapping_info with run-time function/buffer pointers. */
+	mapping_info.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page;
+	mapping_info.context = &pgt_data;
+	mapping_info.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC | sme_me_mask;
+	mapping_info.kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * It should be impossible for this not to already be true,
+	 * but since calling this a second time would rewind the other
+	 * counters, let's just make sure this is reset too.
+	 */
+	pgt_data.pgt_buf_offset = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we came here via startup_32(), cr3 will be _pgtable already
+	 * and we must append to the existing area instead of entirely
+	 * overwriting it.
+	 *
+	 * With 5-level paging, we use '_pgtable' to allocate the p4d page table,
+	 * the top-level page table is allocated separately.
+	 *
+	 * p4d_offset(top_level_pgt, 0) would cover both the 4- and 5-level
+	 * cases. On 4-level paging it's equal to 'top_level_pgt'.
+	 */
+	top_level_pgt = read_cr3_pa();
+	if (p4d_offset((pgd_t *)top_level_pgt, 0) == (p4d_t *)_pgtable) {
+		pgt_data.pgt_buf = _pgtable + BOOT_INIT_PGT_SIZE;
+		pgt_data.pgt_buf_size = BOOT_PGT_SIZE - BOOT_INIT_PGT_SIZE;
+		memset(pgt_data.pgt_buf, 0, pgt_data.pgt_buf_size);
+	} else {
+		pgt_data.pgt_buf = _pgtable;
+		pgt_data.pgt_buf_size = BOOT_PGT_SIZE;
+		memset(pgt_data.pgt_buf, 0, pgt_data.pgt_buf_size);
+		top_level_pgt = (unsigned long)alloc_pgt_page(&pgt_data);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * New page-table is set up - map the kernel image, boot_params and the
+	 * command line. The uncompressed kernel requires boot_params and the
+	 * command line to be mapped in the identity mapping. Map them
+	 * explicitly here in case the compressed kernel does not touch them,
+	 * or does not touch all the pages covering them.
+	 */
+	kernel_add_identity_map((unsigned long)_head, (unsigned long)_end);
+	boot_params = rmode;
+	kernel_add_identity_map((unsigned long)boot_params, (unsigned long)(boot_params + 1));
+	cmdline = get_cmd_line_ptr();
+	kernel_add_identity_map(cmdline, cmdline + COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Also map the setup_data entries passed via boot_params in case they
+	 * need to be accessed by uncompressed kernel via the identity mapping.
+	 */
+	sd = (struct setup_data *)boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
+	while (sd) {
+		unsigned long sd_addr = (unsigned long)sd;
+
+		kernel_add_identity_map(sd_addr, sd_addr + sizeof(*sd) + sd->len);
+		sd = (struct setup_data *)sd->next;
+	}
+
+	sev_prep_identity_maps(top_level_pgt);
+
+	/* Load the new page-table. */
+	write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
+
+	/*
+	 * Now that the required page table mappings are established and a
+	 * GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility.
+	 */
+	snp_check_features();
+}
+
+static pte_t *split_large_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
+			      pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long __address)
+{
+	unsigned long page_flags;
+	unsigned long address;
+	pte_t *pte;
+	pmd_t pmd;
+	int i;
+
+	pte = (pte_t *)info->alloc_pgt_page(info->context);
+	if (!pte)
+		return NULL;
+
+	address     = __address & PMD_MASK;
+	/* No large page - clear PSE flag */
+	page_flags  = info->page_flag & ~_PAGE_PSE;
+
+	/* Populate the PTEs */
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		set_pte(&pte[i], __pte(address | page_flags));
+		address += PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Ideally we need to clear the large PMD first and do a TLB
+	 * flush before we write the new PMD. But the 2M range of the
+	 * PMD might contain the code we execute and/or the stack
+	 * we are on, so we can't do that. But that should be safe here
+	 * because we are going from large to small mappings and we are
+	 * also the only user of the page-table, so there is no chance
+	 * of a TLB multihit.
+	 */
+	pmd = __pmd((unsigned long)pte | info->kernpg_flag);
+	set_pmd(pmdp, pmd);
+	/* Flush TLB to establish the new PMD */
+	write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
+
+	return pte + pte_index(__address);
+}
+
+static void clflush_page(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned int flush_size;
+	char *cl, *start, *end;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardcode cl-size to 64 - CPUID can't be used here because that might
+	 * cause another #VC exception and the GHCB is not ready to use yet.
+	 */
+	flush_size = 64;
+	start      = (char *)(address & PAGE_MASK);
+	end        = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * First make sure there are no pending writes on the cache-lines to
+	 * flush.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("mfence" : : : "memory");
+
+	for (cl = start; cl != end; cl += flush_size)
+		clflush(cl);
+}
+
+static int set_clr_page_flags(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
+			      unsigned long address,
+			      pteval_t set, pteval_t clr)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgdp = (pgd_t *)top_level_pgt;
+	p4d_t *p4dp;
+	pud_t *pudp;
+	pmd_t *pmdp;
+	pte_t *ptep, pte;
+
+	/*
+	 * First make sure there is a PMD mapping for 'address'.
+	 * It should already exist, but keep things generic.
+	 *
+	 * To map the page just read from it and fault it in if there is no
+	 * mapping yet. kernel_add_identity_map() can't be called here because
+	 * that would unconditionally map the address on PMD level, destroying
+	 * any PTE-level mappings that might already exist. Use assembly here
+	 * so the access won't be optimized away.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("mov %[address], %%r9"
+		     :: [address] "g" (*(unsigned long *)address)
+		     : "r9", "memory");
+
+	/*
+	 * The page is mapped at least with PMD size - so skip checks and walk
+	 * directly to the PMD.
+	 */
+	p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, address);
+	pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, address);
+	pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
+
+	if (pmd_large(*pmdp))
+		ptep = split_large_pmd(info, pmdp, address);
+	else
+		ptep = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, address);
+
+	if (!ptep)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Changing encryption attributes of a page requires to flush it from
+	 * the caches.
+	 */
+	if ((set | clr) & _PAGE_ENC) {
+		clflush_page(address);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the encryption attribute is being cleared, change the page state
+		 * to shared in the RMP table.
+		 */
+		if (clr)
+			snp_set_page_shared(__pa(address & PAGE_MASK));
+	}
+
+	/* Update PTE */
+	pte = *ptep;
+	pte = pte_set_flags(pte, set);
+	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, clr);
+	set_pte(ptep, pte);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the encryption attribute is being set, then change the page state to
+	 * private in the RMP entry. The page state change must be done after the PTE
+	 * is updated.
+	 */
+	if (set & _PAGE_ENC)
+		snp_set_page_private(__pa(address & PAGE_MASK));
+
+	/* Flush TLB after changing encryption attribute */
+	write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int set_page_decrypted(unsigned long address)
+{
+	return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, 0, _PAGE_ENC);
+}
+
+int set_page_encrypted(unsigned long address)
+{
+	return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, _PAGE_ENC, 0);
+}
+
+int set_page_non_present(unsigned long address)
+{
+	return set_clr_page_flags(&mapping_info, address, 0, _PAGE_PRESENT);
+}
+
+static void do_pf_error(const char *msg, unsigned long error_code,
+			unsigned long address, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	error_putstr(msg);
+
+	error_putstr("\nError Code: ");
+	error_puthex(error_code);
+	error_putstr("\nCR2: 0x");
+	error_puthex(address);
+	error_putstr("\nRIP relative to _head: 0x");
+	error_puthex(ip - (unsigned long)_head);
+	error_putstr("\n");
+
+	error("Stopping.\n");
+}
+
+void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+	unsigned long address = native_read_cr2();
+	unsigned long end;
+	bool ghcb_fault;
+
+	ghcb_fault = sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(address);
+
+	address   &= PMD_MASK;
+	end        = address + PMD_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for unexpected error codes. Unexpected are:
+	 *	- Faults on present pages
+	 *	- User faults
+	 *	- Reserved bits set
+	 */
+	if (error_code & (X86_PF_PROT | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_RSVD))
+		do_pf_error("Unexpected page-fault:", error_code, address, regs->ip);
+	else if (ghcb_fault)
+		do_pf_error("Page-fault on GHCB page:", error_code, address, regs->ip);
+
+	/*
+	 * Error code is sane - now identity map the 2M region around
+	 * the faulting address.
+	 */
+	kernel_add_identity_map(address, end);
+}