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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c4072
1 files changed, 4072 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64a6a37dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4072 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ * Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for NetLabel
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "policycap_names.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+ struct selinux_state *state;
+ struct policydb *oldp;
+ struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data {
+ struct convert_context_args args;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params sidtab_params;
+};
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+ const struct security_class_mapping *map,
+ struct selinux_map *out_map)
+{
+ u16 i, j;
+ unsigned k;
+ bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+ /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+ if (!map)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ i = 0;
+ while (map[i].name)
+ i++;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+ out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!out_map->mapping)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Store the raw class and permission values */
+ j = 0;
+ while (map[j].name) {
+ const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+ struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+
+ /* An empty class string skips ahead */
+ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+ if (!p_out->value) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ k = 0;
+ while (p_in->perms[k]) {
+ /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+ k++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+ p_in->perms[k]);
+ if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+ p_out->num_perms = k;
+ }
+
+ if (print_unknown_handle)
+ pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+ pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+ out_map->size = i;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ kfree(out_map->mapping);
+ out_map->mapping = NULL;
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size)
+ return map->mapping[tclass].value;
+
+ return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
+{
+ u16 i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+ if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ int allow_unknown)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size) {
+ struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+ unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
+ u32 result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ avd->allowed = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ avd->auditallow = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ /*
+ * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+ * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+ * should audit that denial
+ */
+ for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ avd->auditdeny = result;
+ }
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ int mls_enabled;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ mls_enabled = policy->policydb.mls_enabled;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ struct context *xcontext,
+ struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+ u32 val1, val2;
+ struct context *c;
+ struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+ struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index;
+ u32 length;
+ bool need_comma = false;
+
+ if (!permissions)
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+ tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if (common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(&common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (hashtab_map(&tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* audit a message */
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = true;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ kfree(tcontext_name);
+ kfree(scontext_name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context lo_scontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
+ struct av_decision lo_avd;
+ struct type_datum *source;
+ struct type_datum *target;
+ u32 masked = 0;
+
+ source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!source);
+
+ if (!source->bounds)
+ return;
+
+ target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!target);
+
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+ if (target->bounds) {
+ memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+ lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+ tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
+ tcontextp,
+ tclass,
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
+
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+
+ if (likely(!masked))
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
+}
+
+/*
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+ struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+ xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+ security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+ node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+ }
+
+ xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (xperms) {
+ memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+ avd, xperms);
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+ (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the given source and target types have boundary
+ * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+ * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+ */
+ type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct policydb *p = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+ u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+ kfree(o);
+ kfree(n);
+ kfree(t);
+
+ if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!user)
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ else
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ oentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!oentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, oldsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!nentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, newsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tasksid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, &oentry->context,
+ &nentry->context, &tentry->context,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ if (user)
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ else
+ rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+ policy,
+ oentry,
+ nentry,
+ tentry,
+ tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
+ struct type_datum *type;
+ int index;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid);
+ if (!old_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, old_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ new_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, new_sid);
+ if (!new_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, new_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+ /* type/domain unchanged */
+ if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type)
+ goto out;
+
+ index = new_entry->context.type;
+ while (true) {
+ type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!type);
+
+ /* not bounded anymore */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!type->bounds)
+ break;
+
+ /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+ rc = 0;
+ if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)
+ break;
+
+ index = type->bounds;
+ }
+
+ if (rc) {
+ char *old_name = NULL;
+ char *new_name = NULL;
+ u32 length;
+
+ if (!sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, old_entry,
+ &old_name, &length) &&
+ !sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, new_entry,
+ &new_name, &length)) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_bounded_transition "
+ "seresult=denied "
+ "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+ old_name, new_name);
+ }
+ kfree(new_name);
+ kfree(old_name);
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_policy *policy, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (policy)
+ avd->seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+ else
+ avd->seqno = 0;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+ return;
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+ xpermd->driver))
+ return;
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+ xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+ xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+ xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u8 driver,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ xpermd->driver = driver;
+ xpermd->used = 0;
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+ cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
+ &avkey, xpermd);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ xperms);
+ map_decision(&policy->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+ policydb->allow_unknown);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ NULL);
+ out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (context->len) {
+ *scontext_len = context->len;
+ if (scontext) {
+ *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*scontext))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the size of the context. */
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
+
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+ */
+ scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+ mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
+
+ *scontextp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ int rc = sidtab_sid2str_get(sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len);
+
+ if (rc != -ENOENT)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(p, &entry->context, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext)
+ sidtab_sid2str_put(sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial load_policy\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ rc = sidtab_hash_stats(policy->sidtab, page);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+ return NULL;
+ return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len, int force,
+ int only_invalid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ char *scontextp;
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1;
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+ scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (force)
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid);
+ else
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 0, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it
+ * is invalid.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the
+ * context is invalid in the current policy. Set @scontext to point to
+ * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to
+ * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid).
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+ struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *ctx,
+ u32 def_sid)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ context_init(ctx);
+
+ /* Parse the security context. */
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ scontextp = scontext;
+
+ /* Extract the user. */
+ p = scontextp;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_users, scontextp);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Extract role. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ role = symtab_search(&pol->p_roles, scontextp);
+ if (!role)
+ goto out;
+ ctx->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Extract type. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+ oldc = *p;
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_types, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+ goto out;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (rc)
+ context_destroy(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+ int force)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+ struct context context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* An empty security context is never valid. */
+ if (!scontext_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+ if (!scontext2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+ if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (force) {
+ /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+ if (!str)
+ goto out;
+ }
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
+ &context, def_sid);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+ context.str = str;
+ context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ str = NULL;
+ } else if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (context.str) {
+ str = context.str;
+ context.str = NULL;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+ kfree(scontext2);
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+ sid, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=");
+ /* no need to record the NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n, nlen - 1);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ kfree(s);
+ kfree(t);
+ kfree(n);
+ if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key ft;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+
+ /*
+ * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+ * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+ * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+ */
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+ return;
+
+ ft.ttype = ttype;
+ ft.tclass = tclass;
+ ft.name = objname;
+
+ datum = policydb_filenametr_search(policydb, &ft);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) {
+ newcontext->type = datum->otype;
+ return;
+ }
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ const char *objname,
+ u32 *out_sid,
+ bool kern)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool sock;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ switch (orig_tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+ *out_sid = ssid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *out_sid = tsid;
+ break;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ cladatum = NULL;
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+ if (kern) {
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+ } else {
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&policy->map,
+ tclass));
+ }
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!sentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ scontext = &sentry->context;
+ tcontext = &tentry->context;
+
+ if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+ cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ } else {
+ /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock)
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ else
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the type to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) {
+ /* Use the type of process. */
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else {
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = specified;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if (!avdatum) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+ for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avdatum = &node->datum;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (avdatum) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+ }
+
+ /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+ if (objname)
+ filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+ tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd;
+ struct role_trans_key rtk = {
+ .role = scontext->role,
+ .type = tcontext->type,
+ .tclass = tclass,
+ };
+
+ rtd = policydb_roletr_search(policydb, &rtk);
+ if (rtd)
+ newcontext.role = rtd->new_role;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+ &newcontext, sock);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, policy, sentry,
+ tentry, tclass,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state,
+ ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+ s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp', storing the new context
+ * in `newc'. Verify that the context is valid
+ * under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p,
+ gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ struct convert_context_args *args;
+ struct ocontext *oc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ args = p;
+
+ if (oldc->str) {
+ s = kstrdup(oldc->str, gfp_flags);
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+ newc, SECSID_NULL);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /*
+ * Retain string representation for later mapping.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: We need to copy the contents of oldc->str
+ * back into s again because string_to_context_struct()
+ * may have garbled it.
+ */
+ memcpy(s, oldc->str, oldc->len);
+ context_init(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = oldc->len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kfree(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+ pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ oldc->str, -rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ oldc->str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ context_init(newc);
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_users,
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1));
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_roles,
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1));
+ if (!role)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_types,
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1));
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+ if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ /*
+ * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+ * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+ * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+ * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+ * initial SIDs.
+ */
+ oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+ oc = oc->next;
+ if (!oc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up"
+ " the initial SIDs list\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+ args->oldp,
+ oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ context_destroy(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = len;
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ newc->str);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ p = &policy->policydb;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->policycap[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+ pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
+ selinux_policycap_names[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
+ i);
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy);
+
+static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ if (!policy)
+ return;
+
+ sidtab_destroy(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy->map.mapping);
+ policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+static void selinux_policy_cond_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ cond_policydb_destroy_dup(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
+ selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+}
+
+static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 seqno)
+{
+ /* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */
+ avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
+ selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+ selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, *newpolicy = load_state->policy;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 seqno;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+ else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy)
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ else
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ sidtab_freeze_begin(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ sidtab_freeze_end(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ } else {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ }
+
+ /* Load the policycaps from the new policy */
+ security_load_policycaps(state, newpolicy);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ /*
+ * After first policy load, the security server is
+ * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and
+ * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled.
+ */
+ selinux_mark_initialized(state);
+ selinux_complete_init();
+ }
+
+ /* Free the old policy */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+ newpolicy = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ newpolicy->sidtab = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy->sidtab), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy->sidtab) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_policy;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_sidtab;
+
+ newpolicy->policydb.len = len;
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map,
+ &newpolicy->map);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_policydb;
+
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, newpolicy->sidtab);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+ goto err_mapping;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */
+ rc = security_preserve_bools(oldpolicy, newpolicy);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ convert_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*convert_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!convert_data) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ * in the new SID table.
+ */
+ convert_data->args.state = state;
+ convert_data->args.oldp = &oldpolicy->policydb;
+ convert_data->args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb;
+
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.func = convert_context;
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.args = &convert_data->args;
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.target = newpolicy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = sidtab_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab, &convert_data->sidtab_params);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
+ " representation of contexts in the new SID"
+ " table\n");
+ goto err_free_convert_data;
+ }
+
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = convert_data;
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_convert_data:
+ kfree(convert_data);
+err_free_isids:
+ sidtab_destroy(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_mapping:
+ kfree(newpolicy->map.mapping);
+err_policydb:
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicy->policydb);
+err_sidtab:
+ kfree(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_policy:
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+ c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port_num: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+ !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+ dev_name,
+ IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u16 domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ u32 addr;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+ goto out;
+
+ addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+ goto out;
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rc = 0;
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ u32 **sids,
+ u32 *nel)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+ u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 i, j, mynel, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ struct user_datum *user;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
+ int rc;
+
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+retry:
+ mynel = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ context_init(&usercon);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ user = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, username);
+ if (!user)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ usercon.user = user->value;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
+ role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+ &usercon))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids2)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+ kfree(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (rc || !mynel) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ struct av_decision dummy_avd;
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
+ fromsid, mysids[i],
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+ &dummy_avd);
+ if (!rc)
+ mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ kfree(mysids);
+ *sids = mysids2;
+ *nel = j;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ int len;
+ u16 sclass;
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int cmp = 0;
+
+ while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+ path++;
+
+ sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass);
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ retval = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path,
+ orig_sclass, sid);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ } while (retval == -ESTALE);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ /* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */
+ return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
+ SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+
+ rc = 0;
+ *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (!*len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*names)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*values)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+ (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*names)[i])
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+err:
+ if (*names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
+ kfree(*names);
+ }
+ kfree(*values);
+ *len = 0;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, seqno = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Consistency check on number of booleans, should never fail */
+ if (WARN_ON(len != oldpolicy->policydb.p_bools.nprim))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ newpolicy = kmemdup(oldpolicy, sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Deep copy only the parts of the policydb that might be
+ * modified as a result of changing booleans.
+ */
+ rc = cond_policydb_dup(&newpolicy->policydb, &oldpolicy->policydb);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Update the boolean states in the copy */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ int new_state = !!values[i];
+ int old_state = newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ if (new_state != old_state) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+ sym_name(&newpolicy->policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ new_state,
+ old_state,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Re-evaluate the conditional rules in the copy */
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy */
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+
+ /*
+ * Free the conditional portions of the old policydb
+ * that were copied for the new policy, and the oldpolicy
+ * structure itself but not what it references.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_cond_free(oldpolicy);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 index)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (index >= len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+ int rc, *bvalues = NULL;
+ char **bnames = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ u32 i, nbools = 0;
+
+ rc = security_get_bools(oldpolicy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+ booldatum = symtab_search(&newpolicy->policydb.p_bools,
+ bnames[i]);
+ if (booldatum)
+ booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+ }
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+out:
+ if (bnames) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+ kfree(bnames[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(bnames);
+ kfree(bvalues);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *context1;
+ struct context *context2;
+ struct context newcon;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ context_init(&newcon);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
+ if (!context2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, mls_sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ newcon.user = context1->user;
+ newcon.role = context1->role;
+ newcon.type = context1->type;
+ rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, policydb,
+ &newcon);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+ &len)) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_sid_mls_copy invalid_context=");
+ /* don't record NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, s, len - 1);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ * | function return | @sid
+ * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
+ * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+ struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+ * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+ * single or absent peer SID/label */
+ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+ * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+ * is present */
+ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
+ * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+ * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+ */
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+ if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, nlbl_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+ if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, xfrm_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct class_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **classes = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!classes[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
+ *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*classes)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+ *classes);
+ if (rc) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ kfree((*classes)[i]);
+ kfree(*classes);
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **perms = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!perms[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc, i;
+ struct class_datum *match;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class);
+ if (!match) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ __func__, class);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+ *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*perms)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (match->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+ get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+ *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+ kfree((*perms)[i]);
+ kfree(*perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.reject_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.allow_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+ unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+ u32 au_seqno;
+ struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+ if (rule) {
+ context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+ kfree(rule);
+ }
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+ struct role_datum *roledatum;
+ struct type_datum *typedatum;
+ struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ *rule = NULL;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+ if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* only the above fields are valid */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmprule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr);
+ if (!userdatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr);
+ if (!roledatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr);
+ if (!typedatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (rc) {
+ selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+ tmprule = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *rule = tmprule;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct context *ctxt;
+ struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+ int match = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+ if (rule->au_seqno < policy->latest_granting) {
+ match = -ESTALE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ sid);
+ match = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+ without a match */
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_lt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
+ break;
+ case Audit_le:
+ match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_gt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ break;
+ case Audit_ge:
+ match = mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return match;
+}
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)
+ return audit_update_lsm_rules();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+ if (err)
+ panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ u32 *sid_cache;
+
+ sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (sid_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+ kfree(sid_cache);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *sid_cache = sid;
+ secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+ secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+ struct context ctx_new;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+ *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+ *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ context_init(&ctx_new);
+ ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+ ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+ ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+ mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+ rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+ } else
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+ mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+ rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * __security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @policy: SELinux policy
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+static int __security_read_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_file fp;
+
+ fp.data = data;
+ fp.len = *len;
+
+ rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @state: selinux_state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+ void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_state_kernel - read the policy.
+ * @state: selinux_state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
+ * This function is for internal use only and should not
+ * be used for returning data to user space.
+ *
+ * This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
+ */
+int security_read_state_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
+ void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+ if (err) {
+ vfree(*data);
+ *data = NULL;
+ *len = 0;
+ }
+ return err;
+}