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-rw-r--r--auth2-pubkeyfile.c501
1 files changed, 501 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cfacac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.3 2022/07/01 03:52:57 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+ int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
+ const char *loc)
+{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ char buf[64];
+
+ /*
+ * Check keys/principals file expiry time.
+ * NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
+ */
+ if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
+ opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
+ format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Consistency checks */
+ if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
+ debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+ /* deny access */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
+ if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
+ debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+ /* deny access */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Perform from= checks */
+ if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
+ switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+ opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
+ case 1:
+ /* Host name matches. */
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ default:
+ debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 0:
+ logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
+ loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
+ opts->required_from_host_keys);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
+ "permitted to use this key for login.",
+ loc, remote_host);
+ /* deny access */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
+ if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
+ switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
+ opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
+ case 1:
+ /* accepted */
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ default:
+ /* invalid */
+ error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 0:
+ logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
+ "certificate but not from a permitted source "
+ "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
+ "permitted to use this certificate for login.",
+ loc, remote_ip);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ *
+ * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
+ * that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
+ * tests.
+ */
+ auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+ char *result;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+ principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+ result);
+ free(result);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
+ * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
+ * log preamble for file/line information.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
+ const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+ u_int i, found = 0;
+ char *ep, *line_opts;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
+ if (authoptsp != NULL)
+ *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+ /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
+ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
+ while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
+ *ep-- = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
+ * key options.
+ */
+ line_opts = NULL;
+ if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
+ (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
+ for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
+ ;
+ line_opts = cp;
+ cp = ep;
+ }
+ if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Check principals in cert against those on line */
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
+ continue;
+ debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
+ loc, cert->principals[i]);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
+ *authoptsp = opts;
+ opts = NULL;
+ }
+ sshauthopt_free(opts);
+ return found ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+auth_process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file,
+ const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+ char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
+ u_int found_principal = 0;
+
+ if (authoptsp != NULL)
+ *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ /* Always consume entire input */
+ if (found_principal)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
+ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
+ *ep = '\0';
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+
+ nonblank++;
+ snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+ if (auth_check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
+ found_principal = 1;
+ }
+ debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
+ free(line);
+ return found_principal;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
+ * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
+ * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+ char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc,
+ struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+ int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
+ struct sshkey *found = NULL;
+ struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
+ char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (authoptsp != NULL)
+ *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+ if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
+ debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
+
+ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+ /* no key? check for options */
+ debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
+ key_options = cp;
+ if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+ reason = "invalid key option string";
+ goto fail_reason;
+ }
+ skip_space(&cp);
+ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+ /* still no key? advance to next line*/
+ debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
+ if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
+ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
+ !keyopts->cert_authority)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
+ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+ SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+
+ debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
+ sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
+
+ if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts,
+ sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
+ reason = "Refused by key options";
+ goto fail_reason;
+ }
+ /* That's all we need for plain keys. */
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+ verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
+ sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+ finalopts = keyopts;
+ keyopts = NULL;
+ goto success;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Additional authorisation for certificates.
+ */
+
+ /* Parse and check options present in certificate */
+ if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
+ reason = "Invalid certificate options";
+ goto fail_reason;
+ }
+ if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0,
+ remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
+ reason = "Refused by certificate options";
+ goto fail_reason;
+ }
+ if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
+ goto fail_reason;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+ * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+ * their username in the certificate principals list.
+ */
+ if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
+ !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
+ reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
+ goto fail_reason;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0,
+ keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
+ &reason) != 0)
+ goto fail_reason;
+
+ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
+ "signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
+ key->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+
+ success:
+ if (finalopts == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: missing options");
+ if (authoptsp != NULL) {
+ *authoptsp = finalopts;
+ finalopts = NULL;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+ fail_reason:
+ error("%s", reason);
+ auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ out:
+ free(fp);
+ sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
+ sshauthopt_free(certopts);
+ sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
+ sshkey_free(found);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file,
+ struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip,
+ const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+ char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ int found_key = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
+
+ if (authoptsp != NULL)
+ *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ /* Always consume entire file */
+ if (found_key)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ cp = line;
+ skip_space(&cp);
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ nonblank++;
+ snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+ if (auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp,
+ remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
+ found_key = 1;
+ }
+ free(line);
+ debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+static FILE *
+auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
+ int log_missing, char *file_type)
+{
+ char line[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ logit("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
+ pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
+ } else if (log_missing) {
+ debug("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
+ pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ logit("User '%s' %s '%s' is not a regular file",
+ pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (strict_modes &&
+ safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return f;
+}
+
+
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+ return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
+}
+
+FILE *
+auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+ return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
+ "authorized principals");
+}
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-05-04 03:10:07 +0000