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-rw-r--r--modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c803
1 files changed, 803 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c b/modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03f8dc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,803 @@
+/*
+ * pam_xauth module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2001-2003 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/label.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+
+#define DATANAME "pam_xauth_cookie_file"
+#define XAUTHENV "XAUTHORITY"
+#define HOMEENV "HOME"
+#define XAUTHDEF ".Xauthority"
+#define XAUTHTMP ".xauthXXXXXX"
+
+/* Hurd compatibility */
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+#define PATH_MAX 4096
+#endif
+
+/* Possible paths to xauth executable */
+static const char * const xauthpaths[] = {
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_XAUTH
+ PAM_PATH_XAUTH,
+#endif
+ "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth",
+ "/usr/bin/xauth",
+ "/usr/bin/X11/xauth"
+};
+
+/* Run a given command (with a NULL-terminated argument list), feeding it the
+ * given input on stdin, and storing any output it generates. */
+static int
+run_coprocess(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *input, char **output,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const char *command, ...)
+{
+ int ipipe[2], opipe[2], i;
+ char buf[LINE_MAX];
+ pid_t child;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ size_t buffer_size = 0;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ *output = NULL;
+
+ /* Create stdio pipery. */
+ if (pipe(ipipe) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not create pipe: %m");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(opipe) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not create pipe: %m");
+ close(ipipe[0]);
+ close(ipipe[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Fork off a child. */
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not fork: %m");
+ close(ipipe[0]);
+ close(ipipe[1]);
+ close(opipe[0]);
+ close(opipe[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (child == 0) {
+ /* We're the child. */
+ size_t j;
+ const char *args[10];
+ /* Drop privileges. */
+ if (setgid(gid) == -1)
+ {
+ int err = errno;
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "setgid(%lu) failed: %m",
+ (unsigned long) getegid ());
+ _exit (err);
+ }
+ if (setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+ {
+ int err = errno;
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "setgroups() failed: %m");
+ _exit (err);
+ }
+ if (setuid(uid) == -1)
+ {
+ int err = errno;
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "setuid(%lu) failed: %m",
+ (unsigned long) geteuid ());
+ _exit (err);
+ }
+ /* Set the pipe descriptors up as stdin and stdout, and close
+ * everything else, including the original values for the
+ * descriptors. */
+ if (dup2(ipipe[0], STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) {
+ int err = errno;
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdin");
+ _exit(err);
+ }
+ if (dup2(opipe[1], STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO) {
+ int err = errno;
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdout");
+ _exit(err);
+ }
+ if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_NULL_FD) < 0) {
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Initialize the argument list. */
+ memset(args, 0, sizeof(args));
+ /* Convert the varargs list into a regular array of strings. */
+ va_start(ap, command);
+ args[0] = command;
+ for (j = 1; j < PAM_ARRAY_SIZE(args) - 1; j++) {
+ args[j] = va_arg(ap, const char*);
+ if (args[j] == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Run the command. */
+ DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ execv(command, (char *const *) args);
+ DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ /* Never reached. */
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* We're the parent, so close the other ends of the pipes. */
+ close(opipe[1]);
+ /* Send input to the process (if we have any), then send an EOF. */
+ if (input) {
+ (void)pam_modutil_write(ipipe[1], input, strlen(input));
+ }
+ close(ipipe[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+ close(ipipe[1]);
+
+ /* Read data output until we run out of stuff to read. */
+ i = pam_modutil_read(opipe[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+ while ((i != 0) && (i != -1)) {
+ char *tmp;
+ /* Resize the buffer to hold the data. */
+ tmp = realloc(buffer, buffer_size + i + 1);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ /* Uh-oh, bail. */
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ free(buffer);
+ }
+ close(opipe[0]);
+ waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Save the new buffer location, copy the newly-read data into
+ * the buffer, and make sure the result will be
+ * nul-terminated. */
+ buffer = tmp;
+ memcpy(buffer + buffer_size, buf, i);
+ buffer[buffer_size + i] = '\0';
+ buffer_size += i;
+ /* Try to read again. */
+ i = pam_modutil_read(opipe[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+ /* No more data. Clean up and return data. */
+ close(opipe[0]);
+ *output = buffer;
+ waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Free a data item. */
+static void
+cleanup (pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *data, int err UNUSED)
+{
+ free (data);
+}
+
+/* Check if we want to allow export to the other user, or import from the
+ * other user. */
+static int
+check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
+ int noent_code, int debug)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ int i, fd = -1, save_errno;
+ struct stat st;
+ PAM_MODUTIL_DEF_PRIVS(privs);
+
+ /* Check this user's <sense> file. */
+ pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "error determining home directory for '%s'",
+ this_user);
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ /* Figure out what that file is really named. */
+ i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
+ if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "name of user's home directory is too long");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ if (pam_modutil_drop_priv(pamh, &privs, pwd))
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ if (!stat(path, &st)) {
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ else
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY);
+ }
+ save_errno = errno;
+ if (pam_modutil_regain_priv(pamh, &privs)) {
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ if (!fstat(fd, &st)) {
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ else
+ fp = fdopen(fd, "r");
+ }
+ if (!fp) {
+ save_errno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+ if (fp) {
+ char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
+ /* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
+ tmp = memchr(buf, '\r', sizeof(buf));
+ if (tmp != NULL) {
+ *tmp = '\0';
+ }
+ tmp = memchr(buf, '\n', sizeof(buf));
+ if (tmp != NULL) {
+ *tmp = '\0';
+ }
+ if (fnmatch(buf, other_user, 0) == 0) {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "%s %s allowed by %s",
+ other_user, sense, path);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If there's no match in the file, we fail. */
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "%s not listed in %s",
+ other_user, path);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
+ } else {
+ /* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
+ errno = save_errno;
+ switch (errno) {
+ case ENOENT:
+ if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "%s does not exist, ignoring",
+ path);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "%s does not exist, failing",
+ path);
+ }
+ }
+ return noent_code;
+ default:
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "error opening %s: %m", path);
+ }
+ return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int
+pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ char *cookiefile = NULL, *xauthority = NULL,
+ *cookie = NULL, *display = NULL, *tmp = NULL,
+ *xauthlocalhostname = NULL;
+ const char *user, *xauth = NULL;
+ struct passwd *tpwd, *rpwd;
+ int fd, i, debug = 0;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ uid_t systemuser = 499, targetuser = 0;
+
+ /* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so no sense in breaking
+ * this into a separate function. */
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ const char *str;
+
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
+ debug = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((str = pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "xauthpath=")) != NULL) {
+ xauth = str;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((str = pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "targetuser=")) != NULL) {
+ long l = strtol(str, &tmp, 10);
+ if ((*str != '\0') && (*tmp == '\0')) {
+ targetuser = l;
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "invalid value for targetuser (`%s')",
+ argv[i] + 11);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((str = pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "systemuser=")) != NULL) {
+ long l = strtol(str, &tmp, 10);
+ if ((*str != '\0') && (*tmp == '\0')) {
+ systemuser = l;
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "invalid value for systemuser (`%s')",
+ argv[i] + 11);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
+ argv[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (xauth == NULL) {
+ size_t j;
+ for (j = 0; j < PAM_ARRAY_SIZE(xauthpaths); j++) {
+ if (access(xauthpaths[j], X_OK) == 0) {
+ xauth = xauthpaths[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (xauth == NULL) {
+ /* xauth executable not found - nothing to do */
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If DISPLAY isn't set, we don't really care, now do we? */
+ if ((display = getenv("DISPLAY")) == NULL) {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "user has no DISPLAY, doing nothing");
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the target user's name. */
+ if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "cannot determine user name");
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ rpwd = pam_modutil_getpwuid(pamh, getuid());
+ if (rpwd == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "error determining invoking user's name");
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the target user's UID and primary GID, which we'll need to set
+ * on the xauthority file we create later on. */
+ tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user);
+ if (tpwd == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "error determining target user's UID");
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "requesting user %lu/%lu, target user %lu/%lu",
+ (unsigned long) rpwd->pw_uid,
+ (unsigned long) rpwd->pw_gid,
+ (unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid,
+ (unsigned long) tpwd->pw_gid);
+ }
+
+ /* If the UID is a system account (and not the superuser), forget
+ * about forwarding keys. */
+ if ((tpwd->pw_uid != 0) &&
+ (tpwd->pw_uid != targetuser) &&
+ (tpwd->pw_uid <= systemuser)) {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "not forwarding cookies to user ID %lu",
+ (unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid);
+ }
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+
+ /* If current user and the target user are the same, don't
+ check the ACL list, but forward X11 */
+ if (strcmp (rpwd->pw_name, tpwd->pw_name) != 0) {
+
+ /* Check that both users are amenable to this. By default, this
+ * boils down to this policy:
+ * export(ruser=root): only if <user> is listed in .xauth/export
+ * export(ruser=*) if <user> is listed in .xauth/export, or
+ * if .xauth/export does not exist
+ * import(user=*): if <ruser> is listed in .xauth/import, or
+ * if .xauth/import does not exist */
+ i = (getuid() != 0 || tpwd->pw_uid == 0) ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_PERM_DENIED;
+ i = check_acl(pamh, "export", rpwd->pw_name, user, i, debug);
+ if (i != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ i = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ i = check_acl(pamh, "import", user, rpwd->pw_name, i, debug);
+ if (i != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "current and target user are the same, forward X11");
+ }
+
+ /* Figure out where the source user's .Xauthority file is. */
+ if (getenv(XAUTHENV) != NULL) {
+ cookiefile = strdup(getenv(XAUTHENV));
+ } else {
+ cookiefile = malloc(strlen(rpwd->pw_dir) + 1 +
+ strlen(XAUTHDEF) + 1);
+ if (cookiefile == NULL) {
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ strcpy(cookiefile, rpwd->pw_dir);
+ strcat(cookiefile, "/");
+ strcat(cookiefile, XAUTHDEF);
+ }
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "reading keys from `%s'",
+ cookiefile);
+ }
+
+ /* Read the user's .Xauthority file. Because the current UID is
+ * the original user's UID, this will only fail if something has
+ * gone wrong, or we have no cookies. */
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "running \"%s %s %s %s %s\" as %lu/%lu",
+ xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nlist", display,
+ (unsigned long) getuid(), (unsigned long) getgid());
+ }
+ if (run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
+ getuid(), getgid(),
+ xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nlist", display,
+ NULL) == 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *context_raw = NULL;
+#endif
+ PAM_MODUTIL_DEF_PRIVS(privs);
+
+ /* Check that we got a cookie. If not, we get creative. */
+ if (((cookie == NULL) || (strlen(cookie) == 0)) &&
+ (pam_str_skip_prefix(display, "localhost:") != NULL ||
+ pam_str_skip_prefix(display, "localhost/unix:") != NULL)) {
+ char *t, *screen;
+ size_t tlen, slen;
+ /* Free the useless cookie string. */
+ if (cookie != NULL) {
+ free(cookie);
+ cookie = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Allocate enough space to hold an adjusted name. */
+ tlen = strlen(display) + LINE_MAX + 1;
+ t = malloc(tlen);
+ if (t != NULL) {
+ memset(t, 0, tlen);
+ if (gethostname(t, tlen - 1) != -1) {
+ /* Append the protocol and then the
+ * screen number. */
+ if (strlen(t) < tlen - 6) {
+ strcat(t, "/unix:");
+ }
+ screen = strchr(display, ':');
+ if (screen != NULL) {
+ screen++;
+ slen = strlen(screen);
+ if (strlen(t) + slen < tlen) {
+ strcat(t, screen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "no key for `%s', "
+ "trying `%s'",
+ display, t);
+ }
+ /* Read the cookie for this display. */
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "running "
+ "\"%s %s %s %s %s\" as "
+ "%lu/%lu",
+ xauth,
+ "-f",
+ cookiefile,
+ "nlist",
+ t,
+ (unsigned long) getuid(),
+ (unsigned long) getgid());
+ }
+ run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
+ getuid(), getgid(),
+ xauth, "-f", cookiefile,
+ "nlist", t, NULL);
+ }
+ free(t);
+ t = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we got a cookie, this time for real. */
+ if ((cookie == NULL) || (strlen(cookie) == 0)) {
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "no key");
+ }
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the environment variable
+ * "XAUTHORITY=<homedir>/filename". */
+ if (asprintf(&xauthority, "%s=%s/%s",
+ XAUTHENV, tpwd->pw_dir, XAUTHTMP) < 0) {
+ xauthority = NULL;
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "out of memory");
+ }
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate a new file to hold the data. */
+ if (pam_modutil_drop_priv(pamh, &privs, tpwd)) {
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0) {
+ struct selabel_handle *ctx = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ if (selabel_lookup_raw(ctx, &context_raw,
+ xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV), S_IFREG) != 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "could not get SELinux label for '%s'",
+ xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
+ }
+ selabel_close(ctx);
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(context_raw)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "setfscreatecon_raw(%s) failed: %m", context_raw);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+ fd = mkstemp(xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
+ if (fd < 0)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "error creating temporary file `%s': %m",
+ xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (context_raw != NULL) {
+ free(context_raw);
+ setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ if (pam_modutil_regain_priv(pamh, &privs) || fd < 0) {
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Get a copy of the filename to save as a data item for
+ * removal at session-close time. */
+ free(cookiefile);
+ cookiefile = strdup(xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
+
+ /* Save the filename. */
+ if (pam_set_data(pamh, DATANAME, cookiefile, cleanup) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "error saving name of temporary file `%s'",
+ cookiefile);
+ unlink(cookiefile);
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the new variable in the environment. */
+ if (pam_putenv (pamh, xauthority) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "can't set environment variable '%s'",
+ xauthority);
+ putenv (xauthority); /* The environment owns this string now. */
+ xauthority = NULL; /* Don't free environment variables. */
+
+ /* set $DISPLAY in pam handle to make su - work */
+ {
+ char *d;
+
+ if (asprintf(&d, "DISPLAY=%s", display) < 0)
+ {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "out of memory");
+ cookiefile = NULL;
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (pam_putenv (pamh, d) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "can't set environment variable '%s'", d);
+ free (d);
+ }
+
+ /* set XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME to make sure that su - work under gnome */
+ if ((xauthlocalhostname = getenv("XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME")) != NULL) {
+ char *d;
+
+ if (asprintf(&d, "XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME=%s", xauthlocalhostname) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "out of memory");
+ retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (pam_putenv (pamh, d) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "can't set environment variable '%s'", d);
+ free (d);
+ }
+
+ /* Merge the cookie we read before into the new file. */
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "writing key `%s' to temporary file `%s'",
+ cookie, cookiefile);
+ }
+ if (debug) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "running \"%s %s %s %s %s\" as %lu/%lu",
+ xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nmerge", "-",
+ (unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid,
+ (unsigned long) tpwd->pw_gid);
+ }
+ run_coprocess(pamh, cookie, &tmp,
+ tpwd->pw_uid, tpwd->pw_gid,
+ xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nmerge", "-", NULL);
+
+ /* We don't need to keep a copy of these around any more. */
+ cookiefile = NULL;
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+cleanup:
+ /* Unset any old XAUTHORITY variable in the environment. */
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS && getenv (XAUTHENV))
+ unsetenv (XAUTHENV);
+ free(cookiefile);
+ free(cookie);
+ free(xauthority);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int
+pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ int i, debug = 0;
+ const char *user;
+ const void *data;
+ const char *cookiefile;
+ struct passwd *tpwd;
+ PAM_MODUTIL_DEF_PRIVS(privs);
+
+ /* Try to retrieve the name of a file we created when
+ * the session was opened. */
+ if (pam_get_data(pamh, DATANAME, &data) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ cookiefile = data;
+
+ /* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so
+ * no sense in breaking this into a separate function. */
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
+ debug = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "xauthpath=") != NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "systemuser=") != NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (pam_str_skip_prefix(argv[i], "targetuser=") != NULL)
+ continue;
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
+ argv[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "cannot determine user name");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ if (!(tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user))) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "error determining target user's UID");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (debug)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "removing `%s'", cookiefile);
+ if (pam_modutil_drop_priv(pamh, &privs, tpwd))
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ if (unlink(cookiefile) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "Couldn't remove `%s': %m", cookiefile);
+ if (pam_modutil_regain_priv(pamh, &privs))
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}