Adding upstream version 252.22.upstream/252.22upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1146 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/docs/USER_RECORD.md b/docs/USER_RECORD.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a0910d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/USER_RECORD.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1146 @@
+---
+title: JSON User Records
+category: Users, Groups and Home Directories
+layout: default
+SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+---
+
+# JSON User Records
+
+systemd optionally processes user records that go beyond the classic UNIX (or
+glibc NSS) `struct passwd`. Various components of systemd are able to provide
+and consume records in a more extensible format of a dictionary of key/value
+pairs, encoded as JSON. Specifically:
+
+1. [`systemd-homed.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-homed.service.html)
+   manages `human` user home directories and embeds these JSON records
+   directly in the home directory images
+   (see [Home Directories](HOME_DIRECTORY.md) for details).
+
+2. [`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+   processes these JSON records for users that log in, and applies various
+   settings to the activated session, including environment variables, nice
+   levels and more.
+
+3. [`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html)
+   processes these JSON records of users that log in, and applies various
+   resource management settings to the per-user slice units it manages. This
+   allows setting global limits on resource consumption by a specific user.
+
+4. [`nss-systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html)
+   is a glibc NSS module that synthesizes classic NSS records from these JSON
+   records, providing full backwards compatibility with the classic UNIX APIs
+   both for look-up and enumeration.
+
+5. The service manager (PID 1) exposes dynamic users (i.e. users synthesized as
+   effect of `DynamicUser=` in service unit files) as these advanced JSON
+   records, making them discoverable to the rest of the system.
+
+6. [`systemd-userdbd.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-userdbd.service.html)
+   is a small service that can translate UNIX/glibc NSS records to these JSON
+   user records. It also provides a unified [Varlink](https://varlink.org/) API
+   for querying and enumerating records of this type, optionally acquiring them
+   from various other services.
+
+JSON user records may contain various fields that are not available in `struct
+passwd`, and are extensible for other applications. For example, the record may
+contain information about:
+
+1. Additional security credentials (PKCS#11 security token information,
+   biometrical authentication information, SSH public key information)
+
+2. Additional user metadata, such as a picture, email address, location string,
+   preferred language or timezone
+
+3. Resource Management settings (such as CPU/IO weights, memory and tasks
+   limits, classic UNIX resource limits or nice levels)
+
+4. Runtime parameters such as environment variables or the `nodev`, `noexec`,
+   `nosuid` flags to use for the home directory
+
+5. Information about where to mount the home directory from
+
+And various other things. The record is intended to be extensible, for example
+the following extensions are envisioned:
+
+1. Windows network credential information
+
+2. Information about default IMAP, SMTP servers to use for this user
+
+3. Parental control information to enforce on this user
+
+4. Default parameters for backup applications and similar
+
+Similar to JSON User Records there are also
+[JSON Group Records](GROUP_RECORD.md) that encapsulate UNIX groups.
+
+JSON User Records may be transferred or written to disk in various protocols
+and formats. To inquire about such records defined on the local system use the
+[User/Group Lookup API via Varlink](USER_GROUP_API.md). User/group records may
+also be dropped in number of drop-in directories as files. See
+[`nss-systemd(8)`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html)
+for details.
+
+## Why JSON?
+
+JSON is nicely extensible and widely used. In particular it's easy to
+synthesize and process with numerous programming languages. It's particularly
+popular in the web communities, which hopefully should make it easy to link
+user credential data from the web and from local systems more closely together.
+
+Please note that this specification assumes that JSON numbers may cover the full
+integer range of -2^63 … 2^64-1 without loss of precision (i.e. INT64_MIN …
+UINT64_MAX). Please read, write and process user records as defined by this
+specification only with JSON implementations that provide this number range.
+
+## General Structure
+
+The JSON user records generated and processed by systemd follow a general
+structure, consisting of seven distinct "sections". Specifically:
+
+1. Various fields are placed at the top-level of user record (the `regular`
+   section). These are generally fields that shall apply unconditionally to the
+   user in all contexts, are portable and not security sensitive.
+
+2. A number of fields are located in the `privileged` section (a sub-object of
+   the user record). Fields contained in this object are security sensitive,
+   i.e. contain information that the user and the administrator should be able
+   to see, but other users should not. In many ways this matches the data
+   stored in `/etc/shadow` in classic Linux user accounts, i.e. includes
+   password hashes and more. Algorithmically, when a user record is passed to
+   an untrusted client, by monopolizing such sensitive records in a single
+   object field we can easily remove it from view.
+
+3. A number of fields are located in objects inside the `perMachine` section
+   (an array field of the user record). Primarily these are resource
+   management-related fields, as those tend to make sense on a specific system
+   only, e.g. limiting a user's memory use to 1G only makes sense on a specific
+   system that has more than 1G of memory. Each object inside the `perMachine`
+   array comes with a `matchMachineId` or `matchHostname` field which indicate
+   which systems to apply the listed settings to. Note that many fields
+   accepted in the `perMachine` section can also be set at the top level (the
+   `regular` section), where they define the fallback if no matching object in
+   `perMachine` is found.
+
+4. Various fields are located in the `binding` section (a sub-sub-object of the
+   user record; an intermediary object is inserted which is keyed by the
+   machine ID of the host). Fields included in this section "bind" the object
+   to a specific system. They generally include non-portable information about
+   paths or UID assignments, that are true on a specific system, but not
+   necessarily on others, and which are managed automatically by some user
+   record manager (such as `systemd-homed`). Data in this section is considered
+   part of the user record only in the local context, and is generally not
+   ported to other systems. Due to that it is not included in the reduced user
+   record the cryptographic signature defined in the `signature` section is
+   calculated on. In `systemd-homed` this section is also removed when the
+   user's record is stored in the `~/.identity` file in the home directory, so
+   that every system with access to the home directory can manage these
+   `binding` fields individually. Typically, the binding section is persisted
+   to the local disk.
+
+5. Various fields are located in the `status` section (a sub-sub-object of the
+   user record, also with an intermediary object between that is keyed by the
+   machine ID, similar to the way the `binding` section is organized). This
+   section is augmented during runtime only, and never persisted to disk. The
+   idea is that this section contains information about current runtime
+   resource usage (for example: currently used disk space of the user), that
+   changes dynamically but is otherwise immediately associated with the user
+   record and for many purposes should be considered to be part of the user
+   record.
+
+6. The `signature` section contains one or more cryptographic signatures of a
+   reduced version of the user record. This is used to ensure that only user
+   records defined by a specific source are accepted on a system, by validating
+   the signature against the set of locally accepted signature public keys. The
+   signature is calculated from the JSON user record with all sections removed,
+   except for `regular`, `privileged`, `perMachine`. Specifically, `binding`,
+   `status`, `signature` itself and `secret` are removed first and thus not
+   covered by the signature. This section is optional, and is only used when
+   cryptographic validation of user records is required (as it is by
+   `systemd-homed.service` for example).
+
+7. The `secret` section contains secret user credentials, such as password or
+   PIN information. This data is never persisted, and never returned when user
+   records are inquired by a client, privileged or not. This data should only
+   be included in a user record very briefly, for example when certain very
+   specific operations are executed. For example, in tools such as
+   `systemd-homed` this section may be included in user records, when creating
+   a new home directory, as passwords and similar credentials need to be
+   provided to encrypt the home directory with.
+
+Here's a tabular overview of the sections and their properties:
+
+| Section    | Included in Signature | Persistent | Security Sensitive | Contains Host-Specific Data |
+|------------|-----------------------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
+| regular    | yes                   | yes        | no                 | no                          |
+| privileged | yes                   | yes        | yes                | no                          |
+| perMachine | yes                   | yes        | no                 | yes                         |
+| binding    | no                    | yes        | no                 | yes                         |
+| status     | no                    | no         | no                 | yes                         |
+| signature  | no                    | yes        | no                 | no                          |
+| secret     | no                    | no         | yes                | no                          |
+
+Note that services providing user records to the local system are free to
+manage only a subset of these sections and never include the others in
+them. For example, a service that has no concept of signed records (for example
+because the records it manages are inherently trusted anyway) does not have to
+bother with the `signature` section. A service that only defines records in a
+strictly local context and without signatures doesn't have to deal with the
+`perMachine` or `binding` sections and can include its data exclusively in the
+regular section. A service that uses a separate, private channel for
+authenticating users (or that doesn't have a concept of authentication at all)
+does not need to be concerned with the `secret` section of user records, as
+the fields included therein are only useful when executing authentication
+operations natively against JSON user records.
+
+The `systemd-homed` manager uses all seven sections for various
+purposes. Inside the home directories (and if the LUKS2 backend is used, also
+in the LUKS2 header) a user record containing the `regular`, `privileged`,
+`perMachine` and `signature` sections is stored. `systemd-homed` also stores a
+version of the record on the host, with the same four sections and augmented
+with an additional, fifth `binding` section. When a local client enquires about
+a user record managed by `systemd-homed` the service will add in some
+additional information about the user and home directory in the `status`
+section — this version is only transferred via IPC and never written to
+disk. Finally the `secret` section is used during authentication operations via
+IPC to transfer the user record along with its authentication tokens in one go.
+
+## Fields in the `regular` section
+
+As mentioned, the `regular` section's fields are placed at the top level
+object. The following fields are currently defined:
+
+`userName` → The UNIX user name for this record. Takes a string with a valid
+UNIX user name. This field is the only mandatory field, all others are
+optional. Corresponds with the `pw_name` field of of `struct passwd` and the
+`sp_namp` field of `struct spwd` (i.e. the shadow user record stored in
+`/etc/shadow`). See [User/Group Name Syntax](USER_NAMES.md) for
+the (relaxed) rules the various systemd components enforce on user/group names.
+
+`realm` → The "realm" a user is defined in. This concept allows distinguishing
+users with the same name that originate in different organizations or
+installations. This should take a string in DNS domain syntax, but doesn't have
+to refer to an actual DNS domain (though it is recommended to use one for
+this). The idea is that the user `lpoetter` in the `redhat.com` realm might be
+distinct from the same user in the `poettering.hq` realm. User records for the
+same user name that have different realm fields are considered referring to
+different users. When updating a user record it is required that any new
+version has to match in both `userName` and `realm` field. This field is
+optional, when unset the user should not be considered part of any realm. A
+user record with a realm set is never compatible (for the purpose of updates,
+see above) with a user record without one set, even if the `userName` field matches.
+
+`realName` → The real name of the user, a string. This should contain the
+user's real ("human") name, and corresponds loosely to the GECOS field of
+classic UNIX user records. When converting a `struct passwd` to a JSON user
+record this field is initialized from GECOS (i.e. the `pw_gecos` field), and
+vice versa when converting back. That said, unlike GECOS this field is supposed
+to contain only the real name and no other information. This field must not
+contain control characters (such as `\n`) or colons (`:`), since those are used
+as record separators in classic `/etc/passwd` files and similar formats.
+
+`emailAddress` → The email address of the user, formatted as
+string. [`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+initializes the `$EMAIL` environment variable from this value for all login
+sessions.
+
+`iconName` → The name of an icon picked by the user, for example for the
+purpose of an avatar. This must be a string, and should follow the semantics
+defined in the [Icon Naming
+Specification](https://standards.freedesktop.org/icon-naming-spec/icon-naming-spec-latest.html).
+
+`location` → A free-form location string describing the location of the user,
+if that is applicable. It's probably wise to use a location string processable
+by geo-location subsystems, but this is not enforced nor required. Example:
+`Berlin, Germany` or `Basement, Room 3a`.
+
+`disposition` → A string, one of `intrinsic`, `system`, `dynamic`, `regular`,
+`container`, `reserved`. If specified clarifies the disposition of the user,
+i.e. the context it is defined in. For regular, "human" users this should be
+`regular`, for system users (i.e. users that system services run under, and
+similar) this should be `system`. The `intrinsic` disposition should be used
+only for the two users that have special meaning to the OS kernel itself,
+i.e. the `root` and `nobody` users. The `container` string should be used for
+users that are used by an OS container, and hence will show up in `ps` listings
+and such, but are only defined in container context. Finally `reserved` should
+be used for any users outside of these use-cases. Note that this property is
+entirely optional and applications are assumed to be able to derive the
+disposition of a user automatically from a record even in absence of this
+field, based on other fields, for example the numeric UID. By setting this
+field explicitly applications can override this default determination.
+
+`lastChangeUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer value, referring to a timestamp in µs
+since the epoch 1970, indicating when the user record (specifically, any of the
+`regular`, `privileged`, `perMachine` sections) was last changed. This field is
+used when comparing two records of the same user to identify the newer one, and
+is used for example for automatic updating of user records, where appropriate.
+
+`lastPasswordChangeUSec` → Similar, also an unsigned 64bit integer value,
+indicating the point in time the password (or any authentication token) of the
+user was last changed. This corresponds to the `sp_lstchg` field of `struct
+spwd`, i.e. the matching field in the user shadow database `/etc/shadow`,
+though provides finer resolution.
+
+`shell` → A string, referring to the shell binary to use for terminal logins of
+this user. This corresponds with the `pw_shell` field of `struct passwd`, and
+should contain an absolute file system path. For system users not suitable for
+terminal log-in this field should not be set.
+
+`umask` → The `umask` to set for the user's login sessions. Takes an
+integer. Note that usually on UNIX the umask is noted in octal, but JSON's
+integers are generally written in decimal, hence in this context we denote it
+umask in decimal too. The specified value should be in the valid range for
+umasks, i.e. 0000…0777 (in octal as typical in UNIX), or 0…511 (in decimal, how
+it actually appears in the JSON record). This `umask` is automatically set by
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+for all login sessions of the user.
+
+`environment` → An array of strings, each containing an environment variable
+and its value to set for the user's login session, in a format compatible with
+[`putenv()`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/putenv.3.html). Any
+environment variable listed here is automatically set by
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+for all login sessions of the user.
+
+`timeZone` → A string indicating a preferred timezone to use for the user. When
+logging in
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+will automatically initialize the `$TZ` environment variable from this
+string. The string should be a `tzdata` compatible location string, for
+example: `Europe/Berlin`.
+
+`preferredLanguage` → A string indicating the preferred language/locale for the
+user. When logging in
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+will automatically initialize the `$LANG` environment variable from this
+string. The string hence should be in a format compatible with this environment
+variable, for example: `de_DE.UTF8`.
+
+`niceLevel` → An integer value in the range -20…19. When logging in
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+will automatically initialize the login process' nice level to this value with,
+which is then inherited by all the user's processes, see
+[`setpriority()`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setpriority.2.html) for
+more information.
+
+`resourceLimits` → An object, where each key refers to a Linux resource limit
+(such as `RLIMIT_NOFILE` and similar). Their values should be an object with
+two keys `cur` and `max` for the soft and hard resource limit. When logging in
+[`pam_systemd`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/pam_systemd.html)
+will automatically initialize the login process' resource limits to these
+values, which is then inherited by all the user's processes, see
+[`setrlimit()`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setrlimit.2.html) for more
+information.
+
+`locked` → A boolean value. If true, the user account is locked, the user may
+not log in. If this field is missing it should be assumed to be false,
+i.e. logins are permitted. This field corresponds to the `sp_expire` field of
+`struct spwd` (i.e. the `/etc/shadow` data for a user) being set to zero or
+one.
+
+`notBeforeUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer value, indicating a time in µs since
+the UNIX epoch (1970) before which the record should be considered invalid for
+the purpose of logging in.
+
+`notAfterUSec` → Similar, but indicates the point in time *after* which logins
+shall not be permitted anymore. This corresponds to the `sp_expire` field of
+`struct spwd`, when it is set to a value larger than one, but provides finer
+granularity.
+
+`storage` → A string, one of `classic`, `luks`, `directory`, `subvolume`,
+`fscrypt`, `cifs`. Indicates the storage mechanism for the user's home
+directory. If `classic` the home directory is a plain directory as in classic
+UNIX. When `directory`, the home directory is a regular directory, but the
+`~/.identity` file in it contains the user's user record, so that the directory
+is self-contained. Similar, `subvolume` is a `btrfs` subvolume that also
+contains a `~/.identity` user record; `fscrypt` is an `fscrypt`-encrypted
+directory, also containing the `~/.identity` user record; `luks` is a per-user
+LUKS volume that is mounted as home directory, and `cifs` a home directory
+mounted from a Windows File Share. The five latter types are primarily used by
+`systemd-homed` when managing home directories, but may be used if other
+managers are used too. If this is not set, `classic` is the implied default.
+
+`diskSize` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the intended home directory
+disk space in bytes to assign to the user. Depending on the selected storage
+type this might be implemented differently: for `luks` this is the intended size
+of the file system and LUKS volume, while for the others this likely translates
+to classic file system quota settings.
+
+`diskSizeRelative` → Similar to `diskSize` but takes a relative value, but
+specifies a fraction of the available disk space on the selected storage medium
+to assign to the user. This unsigned integer value is normalized to 2^32 =
+100%.
+
+`skeletonDirectory` → Takes a string with the absolute path to the skeleton
+directory to populate a new home directory from. This is only used when a home
+directory is first created, and defaults to `/etc/skel` if not defined.
+
+`accessMode` → Takes an unsigned integer in the range 0…511 indicating the UNIX
+access mask for the home directory when it is first created.
+
+`tasksMax` → Takes an unsigned 64bit integer indicating the maximum number of
+tasks the user may start in parallel during system runtime. This counts
+all tasks (i.e. threads, where each process is at least one thread) the user starts or that are
+forked from these processes even if the user identity is changed (for example
+by setuid binaries/`su`/`sudo` and similar).
+[`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html)
+enforces this by setting the `TasksMax` slice property for the user's slice
+`user-$UID.slice`.
+
+`memoryHigh`/`memoryMax` → These take unsigned 64bit integers indicating upper
+memory limits for all processes of the user (plus all processes forked off them
+that might have changed user identity), in bytes. Enforced by
+[`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html),
+similar to `tasksMax`.
+
+`cpuWeight`/`ioWeight` → These take unsigned integers in the range 1…10000
+(defaults to 100) and configure the CPU and IO scheduling weights for the
+user's processes as a whole. Also enforced by
+[`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html),
+similar to `tasksMax`, `memoryHigh` and `memoryMax`.
+
+`mountNoDevices`/`mountNoSuid`/`mountNoExecute` → Three booleans that control
+the `nodev`, `nosuid`, `noexec` mount flags of the user's home
+directories. Note that these booleans are only honored if the home directory
+is managed by a subsystem such as `systemd-homed.service` that automatically
+mounts home directories on login.
+
+`cifsDomain` → A string indicating the Windows File Sharing domain (CIFS) to
+use. This is generally useful, but particularly when `cifs` is used as storage
+mechanism for the user's home directory, see above.
+
+`cifsUserName` → A string indicating the Windows File Sharing user name (CIFS)
+to associate this user record with. This is generally useful, but particularly
+useful when `cifs` is used as storage mechanism for the user's home directory,
+see above.
+
+`cifsService` → A string indicating the Windows File Share service (CIFS) to
+mount as home directory of the user on login. Should be in format
+`//<host>/<service>/<directory/…>`. The directory part is optional. If missing
+the top-level directory of the CIFS share is used.
+
+`cifsExtraMountOptions` → A string with additional mount options to pass to
+`mount.cifs` when mounting the home directory CIFS share.
+
+`imagePath` → A string with an absolute file system path to the file, directory
+or block device to use for storage backing the home directory. If the `luks`
+storage is used, this refers to the loopback file or block device node to store
+the LUKS volume on. For `fscrypt`, `directory`, `subvolume` this refers to the
+directory to bind mount as home directory on login. Not defined for `classic`
+or `cifs`.
+
+`homeDirectory` → A string with an absolute file system path to the home
+directory. This is where the image indicated in `imagePath` is mounted to on
+login and thus indicates the application facing home directory while the home
+directory is active, and is what the user's `$HOME` environment variable is set
+to during log-in. It corresponds to the `pw_dir` field of `struct passwd`.
+
+`uid` → An unsigned integer in the range 0…4294967295: the numeric UNIX user ID (UID) to
+use for the user.  This corresponds to the `pw_uid` field of `struct passwd`.
+
+`gid` → An unsigned integer in the range 0…4294967295: the numeric UNIX group
+ID (GID) to use for the user. This corresponds to the `pw_gid` field of
+`struct passwd`.
+
+`memberOf` → An array of strings, each indicating a UNIX group this user shall
+be a member of. The listed strings must be valid group names, but it is not
+required that all groups listed exist in all contexts: any entry for which no
+group exists should be silently ignored.
+
+`fileSystemType` → A string, one of `ext4`, `xfs`, `btrfs` (possibly others) to
+use as file system for the user's home directory. This is primarily relevant
+when the storage mechanism used is `luks` as a file system to use inside the
+LUKS container must be selected.
+
+`partitionUuid` → A string containing a lower-case, text-formatted UUID, referencing
+the GPT partition UUID the home directory is located in. This is primarily
+relevant when the storage mechanism used is `luks`.
+
+`luksUuid` → A string containing a lower-case, text-formatted UUID, referencing
+the LUKS volume UUID the home directory is located in. This is primarily
+relevant when the storage mechanism used is `luks`.
+
+`fileSystemUuid` → A string containing a lower-case, text-formatted UUID,
+referencing the file system UUID the home directory is located in. This is
+primarily relevant when the storage mechanism used is `luks`.
+
+`luksDiscard` → A boolean. If true and `luks` storage is used, controls whether
+the loopback block devices, LUKS and the file system on top shall be used in
+`discard` mode, i.e. erased sectors should always be returned to the underlying
+storage. If false and `luks` storage is used turns this behavior off. In
+addition, depending on this setting an `FITRIM` or `fallocate()` operation is
+executed to make sure the image matches the selected option.
+
+`luksOfflineDiscard` → A boolean. Similar to `luksDiscard`, it controls whether
+to trim/allocate the file system/backing file when deactivating the home
+directory.
+
+`luksExtraMountOptions` → A string with additional mount options to append to
+the default mount options for the file system in the LUKS volume.
+
+`luksCipher` → A string, indicating the cipher to use for the LUKS storage mechanism.
+
+`luksCipherMode` → A string, selecting the cipher mode to use for the LUKS storage mechanism.
+
+`luksVolumeKeySize` → An unsigned integer, indicating the volume key length in
+bytes to use for the LUKS storage mechanism.
+
+`luksPbkdfHashAlgorithm` → A string, selecting the hash algorithm to use for
+the PBKDF operation for the LUKS storage mechanism.
+
+`luksPbkdfType` → A string, indicating the PBKDF type to use for the LUKS storage mechanism.
+
+`luksPbkdfTimeCostUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the intended
+time cost for the PBKDF operation, when the LUKS storage mechanism is used, in
+µs.
+
+`luksPbkdfMemoryCost` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the intended
+memory cost for the PBKDF operation, when LUKS storage is used, in bytes.
+
+`luksPbkdfParallelThreads` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the intended
+required parallel threads for the PBKDF operation, when LUKS storage is used.
+
+`luksSectorSize` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the sector size to
+use for the LUKS storage mechanism, in bytes. Must be a power of two between
+512 and 4096.
+
+`autoResizeMode` → A string, one of `off`, `grow`, `shrink-and-grow`. Unless
+set to `off`, controls whether the home area shall be grown automatically to
+the size configured in `diskSize` automatically at login time. If set to
+`shrink-and-grown` the home area is also shrunk to the minimal size possible
+(as dictated by used disk space and file system constraints) on logout.
+
+`rebalanceWeight` → An unsigned integer, `null` or a boolean. Configures the
+free disk space rebalancing weight for the home area. The integer must be in
+the range 1…10000 to configure an explicit weight. If unset, or set to `null`
+or `true` the default weight of 100 is implied. If set to 0 or `false`
+rebalancing is turned off for this home area.
+
+`service` → A string declaring the service that defines or manages this user
+record. It is recommended to use reverse domain name notation for this. For
+example, if `systemd-homed` manages a user a string of `io.systemd.Home` is
+used for this.
+
+`rateLimitIntervalUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer that configures the
+authentication rate limiting enforced on the user account. This specifies a
+timer interval (in µs) within which to count authentication attempts. When the
+counter goes above the value configured n `rateLimitIntervalBurst` log-ins are
+temporarily refused until the interval passes.
+
+`rateLimitIntervalBurst` → An unsigned 64bit integer, closely related to
+`rateLimitIntervalUSec`, that puts a limit on authentication attempts within
+the configured time interval.
+
+`enforcePasswordPolicy` → A boolean. Configures whether to enforce the system's
+password policy when creating the home directory for the user or changing the
+user's password. By default the policy is enforced, but if this field is false
+it is bypassed.
+
+`autoLogin` → A boolean. If true the user record is marked as suitable for
+auto-login. Systems are supposed to automatically log in a user marked this way
+during boot, if there's exactly one user on it defined this way.
+
+`stopDelayUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the time in µs the
+per-user service manager is kept around after the user fully logged out.  This
+value is honored by
+[`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html). If
+set to zero the per-user service manager is immediately terminated when the
+user logs out, and longer values optimize high-frequency log-ins as the
+necessary work to set up and tear down a log-in is reduced if the service
+manager stays running.
+
+`killProcesses` → A boolean. If true all processes of the user are
+automatically killed when the user logs out. This is enforced by
+[`systemd-logind.service`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-logind.service.html). If
+false any processes left around when the user logs out are left running.
+
+`passwordChangeMinUSec`/`passwordChangeMaxUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer,
+encoding how much time has to pass at least/at most between password changes of
+the user. This corresponds with the `sp_min` and `sp_max` fields of `struct
+spwd` (i.e. the `/etc/shadow` entries of the user), but offers finer
+granularity.
+
+`passwordChangeWarnUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer, encoding how much time to
+warn the user before their password expires, in µs. This corresponds with the
+`sp_warn` field of `struct spwd`.
+
+`passwordChangeInactiveUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer, encoding how much
+time has to pass after the password expired that the account is
+deactivated. This corresponds with the `sp_inact` field of `struct spwd`.
+
+`passwordChangeNow` → A boolean. If true the user has to change their password
+on next login. This corresponds with the `sp_lstchg` field of `struct spwd`
+being set to zero.
+
+`pkcs11TokenUri` → An array of strings, each with an RFC 7512 compliant PKCS#11
+URI referring to security token (or smart card) of some form, that shall be
+associated with the user and may be used for authentication. The URI is used to
+search for an X.509 certificate and associated private key that may be used to
+decrypt an encrypted secret key that is used to unlock the user's account (see
+below). It's undefined how precise the URI is: during log-in it is tested
+against all plugged in security tokens and if there's exactly one matching
+private key found with it it is used.
+
+`fido2HmacCredential` → An array of strings, each with a Base64-encoded FIDO2
+credential ID that shall be used for authentication with FIDO2 devices that
+implement the `hmac-secret` extension. The salt to pass to the FIDO2 device is
+found in `fido2HmacSalt`.
+
+`recoveryKeyType` → An array of strings, each indicating the type of one
+recovery key. The only supported recovery key type at the moment is `modhex64`,
+for details see the description of `recoveryKey` below. An account may have any
+number of recovery keys defined, and the array should have one entry for each.
+
+`privileged` → An object, which contains the fields of the `privileged` section
+of the user record, see below.
+
+`perMachine` → An array of objects, which contain the `perMachine` section of
+the user record, and thus fields to apply on specific systems only, see below.
+
+`binding` → An object, keyed by machine IDs formatted as strings, pointing
+to objects that contain the `binding` section of the user record,
+i.e. additional fields that bind the user record to a specific machine, see
+below.
+
+`status` → An object, keyed by machine IDs formatted as strings, pointing to
+objects that contain the `status` section of the user record, i.e. additional
+runtime fields that expose the current status of the user record on a specific
+system, see below.
+
+`signature` → An array of objects, which contain cryptographic signatures of
+the user record, i.e. the fields of the `signature` section of the user record,
+see below.
+
+`secret` → An object, which contains the fields of the `secret` section of the
+user record, see below.
+
+## Fields in the `privileged` section
+
+As mentioned, the `privileged` section is encoded in a sub-object of the user
+record top-level object, in the `privileged` field. Any data included in this
+object shall only be visible to the administrator and the user themselves, and
+be suppressed implicitly when other users get access to a user record. It thus
+takes the role of the `/etc/shadow` records for each user, which has similarly
+restrictive access semantics. The following fields are currently defined:
+
+`passwordHint` → A user-selected password hint in free-form text. This should
+be a string like "What's the name of your first pet?", but is entirely for the
+user to choose.
+
+`hashedPassword` → An array of strings, each containing a hashed UNIX password
+string, in the format
+[`crypt(3)`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/crypt.3.html) generates. This
+corresponds with `sp_pwdp` field of `struct spwd` (and in a way the `pw_passwd`
+field of `struct passwd`).
+
+`sshAuthorizedKeys` → An array of strings, each listing an SSH public key that
+is authorized to access the account. The strings should follow the same format
+as the lines in the traditional `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file.
+
+`pkcs11EncryptedKey` → An array of objects. Each element of the array should be
+an object consisting of three string fields: `uri` shall contain a PKCS#11
+security token URI, `data` shall contain a Base64-encoded encrypted key and
+`hashedPassword` shall contain a UNIX password hash to test the key
+against. Authenticating with a security token against this account shall work
+as follows: the encrypted secret key is converted from its Base64
+representation into binary, then decrypted with the PKCS#11 `C_Decrypt()`
+function of the PKCS#11 module referenced by the specified URI, using the
+private key found on the same token. The resulting decrypted key is then
+Base64-encoded and tested against the specified UNIX hashed password. The
+Base64-encoded decrypted key may also be used to unlock further resources
+during log-in, for example the LUKS or `fscrypt` storage backend. It is
+generally recommended that for each entry in `pkcs11EncryptedKey` there's also
+a matching one in `pkcs11TokenUri` and vice versa, with the same URI, appearing
+in the same order, but this should not be required by applications processing
+user records.
+
+`fido2HmacSalt` → An array of objects, implementing authentication support with
+FIDO2 devices that implement the `hmac-secret` extension. Each element of the
+array should be an object consisting of three string fields: `credential`,
+`salt`, `hashedPassword`, and three boolean fields: `up`, `uv` and
+`clientPin`. The first two string fields shall contain Base64-encoded binary
+data: the FIDO2 credential ID and the salt value to pass to the FIDO2
+device. During authentication this salt along with the credential ID is sent to
+the FIDO2 token, which will HMAC hash the salt with its internal secret key and
+return the result. This resulting binary key should then be Base64-encoded and
+used as string password for the further layers of the stack. The
+`hashedPassword` field of the `fido2HmacSalt` field shall be a UNIX password
+hash to test this derived secret key against for authentication. The `up`, `uv`
+and `clientPin` booleans map to the FIDO2 concepts of the same name and encode
+whether the `uv`/`up` options are enabled during the authentication, and
+whether a PIN shall be required. It is generally recommended that for each
+entry in `fido2HmacSalt` there's also a matching one in `fido2HmacCredential`,
+and vice versa, with the same credential ID, appearing in the same order, but
+this should not be required by applications processing user records.
+
+`recoveryKey`→ An array of objects, each defining a recovery key. The object
+has two mandatory fields: `type` indicates the type of recovery key. The only
+currently permitted value is the string `modhex64`. The `hashedPassword` field
+contains a UNIX password hash of the normalized recovery key. Recovery keys are
+in most ways similar to regular passwords, except that they are generated by
+the computer, not chosen by the user, and are longer. Currently, the only
+supported recovery key format is `modhex64`, which consists of 64
+[modhex](https://developers.yubico.com/yubico-c/Manuals/modhex.1.html)
+characters (i.e. 256bit of information), in groups of 8 chars separated by
+dashes,
+e.g. `lhkbicdj-trbuftjv-tviijfck-dfvbknrh-uiulbhui-higltier-kecfhkbk-egrirkui`. Recovery
+keys should be accepted wherever regular passwords are. The `recoveryKey` field
+should always be accompanied by a `recoveryKeyType` field (see above), and each
+entry in either should map 1:1 to an entry in the other, in the same order and
+matching the type. When accepting a recovery key it should be brought
+automatically into normalized form, i.e. the dashes inserted when missing, and
+converted into lowercase before tested against the UNIX password hash, so that
+recovery keys are effectively case-insensitive.
+
+## Fields in the `perMachine` section
+
+As mentioned, the `perMachine` section contains settings that shall apply to
+specific systems only. This is primarily interesting for resource management
+properties as they tend to require a per-system focus, however they may be used
+for other purposes too.
+
+The `perMachine` field in the top-level object is an array of objects. When
+processing the user record first the various fields on the top-level object
+should be parsed. Then, the `perMachine` array should be iterated in order, and
+the various settings within each contained object should be applied that match
+either the indicated machine ID or host name, overriding any corresponding
+settings previously parsed from the top-level object. There may be multiple
+array entries that match a specific system, in which case all settings should
+be applied. If the same option is set in the top-level object as in a
+per-machine object then the per-machine setting wins and entirely undoes the
+setting in the top-level object (i.e. no merging of properties that are arrays
+is done). If the same option is set in multiple per-machine objects the one
+specified later in the array wins (and here too no merging of individual fields
+is done, the later field always wins in full). To summarize, the order of
+application is (last one wins):
+
+1. Settings in the top-level object
+2. Settings in the first matching `perMachine` array entry
+3. Settings in the second matching `perMachine` array entry
+4. …
+5. Settings in the last matching `perMachine` array entry
+
+The following fields are defined in this section:
+
+`matchMachineId` → An array of strings that are formatted 128bit IDs in
+hex. If any of the specified IDs match the system's local machine ID
+(i.e. matches `/etc/machine-id`) the fields in this object are honored. (As a
+special case, if only a single machine ID is listed this field may be a single
+string rather than an array of strings.)
+
+`matchHostname` → An array of strings that are valid hostnames. If any of the
+specified hostnames match the system's local hostname, the fields in this
+object are honored. If both `matchHostname` and `matchMachineId` are used
+within the same array entry, the object is honored when either match succeeds,
+i.e. the two match types are combined in OR, not in AND. (As a special case, if
+only a single machine ID is listed this field may be a single string rather
+than an array of strings.)
+
+These two are the only two fields specific to this section. All other fields
+that may be used in this section are identical to the equally named ones in the
+`regular` section (i.e. at the top-level object). Specifically, these are:
+
+`iconName`, `location`, `shell`, `umask`, `environment`, `timeZone`,
+`preferredLanguage`, `niceLevel`, `resourceLimits`, `locked`, `notBeforeUSec`,
+`notAfterUSec`, `storage`, `diskSize`, `diskSizeRelative`, `skeletonDirectory`,
+`accessMode`, `tasksMax`, `memoryHigh`, `memoryMax`, `cpuWeight`, `ioWeight`,
+`mountNoDevices`, `mountNoSuid`, `mountNoExecute`, `cifsDomain`,
+`cifsUserName`, `cifsService`, `cifsExtraMountOptions`, `imagePath`, `uid`,
+`gid`, `memberOf`, `fileSystemType`, `partitionUuid`, `luksUuid`,
+`fileSystemUuid`, `luksDiscard`, `luksOfflineDiscard`, `luksCipher`,
+`luksCipherMode`, `luksVolumeKeySize`, `luksPbkdfHashAlgorithm`,
+`luksPbkdfType`, `luksPbkdfTimeCostUSec`, `luksPbkdfMemoryCost`,
+`luksPbkdfParallelThreads`, `luksSectorSize`, `autoResizeMode`, `rebalanceWeight`,
+`rateLimitIntervalUSec`, `rateLimitBurst`, `enforcePasswordPolicy`,
+`autoLogin`, `stopDelayUSec`, `killProcesses`, `passwordChangeMinUSec`,
+`passwordChangeMaxUSec`, `passwordChangeWarnUSec`,
+`passwordChangeInactiveUSec`, `passwordChangeNow`, `pkcs11TokenUri`,
+`fido2HmacCredential`.
+
+## Fields in the `binding` section
+
+As mentioned, the `binding` section contains additional fields about the user
+record, that bind it to the local system. These fields are generally used by a
+local user manager (such as `systemd-homed.service`) to add in fields that make
+sense in a local context but not necessarily in a global one. For example, a
+user record that contains no `uid` field in the regular section is likely
+extended with one in the `binding` section to assign a local UID if no global
+UID is defined.
+
+All fields in the `binding` section only make sense in a local context and are
+suppressed when the user record is ported between systems. The `binding` section
+is generally persisted on the system but not in the home directories themselves
+and the home directory is supposed to be fully portable and thus not contain
+the information that `binding` is supposed to contain that binds the portable
+record to a specific system.
+
+The `binding` sub-object on the top-level user record object is keyed by the
+machine ID the binding is intended for, which point to an object with the
+fields of the bindings. These fields generally match fields that may also be
+defined in the `regular` and `perMachine` sections, however override
+both. Usually, the `binding` value should not contain settings different from
+those set via `regular` or `perMachine`, however this might happen if some
+settings are not supported locally (think: `fscrypt` is recorded as intended
+storage mechanism in the `regular` section, but the local kernel does not
+support `fscrypt`, hence `directory` was chosen as implicit fallback), or have
+been changed in the `regular` section through updates (e.g. a home directory
+was created with `luks` as storage mechanism but later the user record was
+updated to prefer `subvolume`, which however doesn't change the actual storage
+used already which is pinned in the `binding` section).
+
+The following fields are defined in the `binding` section. They all have an
+identical format and override their equally named counterparts in the `regular`
+and `perMachine` sections:
+
+`imagePath`, `homeDirectory`, `partitionUuid`, `luksUuid`, `fileSystemUuid`,
+`uid`, `gid`, `storage`, `fileSystemType`, `luksCipher`, `luksCipherMode`,
+`luksVolumeKeySize`.
+
+## Fields in the `status` section
+
+As mentioned, the `status` section contains additional fields about the user
+record that are exclusively acquired during runtime, and that expose runtime
+metrics of the user and similar metadata that shall not be persisted but are
+only acquired "on-the-fly" when requested.
+
+This section is arranged similarly to the `binding` section: the `status`
+sub-object of the top-level user record object is keyed by the machine ID,
+which points to the object with the fields defined here. The following fields
+are defined:
+
+`diskUsage` → An unsigned 64bit integer. The currently used disk space of the
+home directory in bytes. This value might be determined in different ways,
+depending on the selected storage mechanism. For LUKS storage this is the file
+size of the loopback file or block device size. For the
+directory/subvolume/fscrypt storage this is the current disk space used as
+reported by the file system quota subsystem.
+
+`diskFree` → An unsigned 64bit integer, denoting the number of "free" bytes in
+the disk space allotment, i.e. usually the difference between the disk size as
+reported by `diskSize` and the used already as reported in `diskFree`, but
+possibly skewed by metadata sizes, disk compression and similar.
+
+`diskSize` → An unsigned 64bit integer, denoting the disk space currently
+allotted to the user, in bytes. Depending on the storage mechanism this can mean
+different things (see above). In contrast to the top-level field of the same
+(or the one in the `perMachine` section), this field reports the current size
+allotted to the user, not the intended one. The values may differ when user
+records are updated without the home directory being re-sized.
+
+`diskCeiling`/`diskFloor` → Unsigned 64bit integers indicating upper and lower
+bounds when changing the `diskSize` value, in bytes. These values are typically
+derived from the underlying data storage, and indicate in which range the home
+directory may be re-sized in, i.e. in which sensible range the `diskSize` value
+should be kept.
+
+`state` → A string indicating the current state of the home directory. The
+precise set of values exposed here are up to the service managing the home
+directory to define (i.e. are up to the service identified with the `service`
+field below). However, it is recommended to stick to a basic vocabulary here:
+`inactive` for a home directory currently not mounted, `absent` for a home
+directory that cannot be mounted currently because it does not exist on the
+local system, `active` for a home directory that is currently mounted and
+accessible.
+
+`service` → A string identifying the service that manages this user record. For
+example `systemd-homed.service` sets this to `io.systemd.Home` to all user
+records it manages. This is particularly relevant to define clearly the context
+in which `state` lives, see above. Note that this field also exists on the
+top-level object (i.e. in the `regular` section), which it overrides. The
+`regular` field should be used if conceptually the user record can only be
+managed by the specified service, and this `status` field if it can
+conceptually be managed by different managers, but currently is managed by the
+specified one.
+
+`signedLocally` → A boolean. If true indicates that the user record is signed
+by a public key for which the private key is available locally. This means that
+the user record may be modified locally as it can be re-signed with the private
+key. If false indicates that the user record is signed by a public key
+recognized by the local manager but whose private key is not available
+locally. This means the user record cannot be modified locally as it couldn't
+be signed afterwards.
+
+`goodAuthenticationCounter` → An unsigned 64bit integer. This counter is
+increased by one on every successful authentication attempt, i.e. an
+authentication attempt where a security token of some form was presented and it
+was correct.
+
+`badAuthenticationCounter` → An unsigned 64bit integer. This counter is
+increased by one on every unsuccessfully authentication attempt, i.e. an
+authentication attempt where a security token of some form was presented and it
+was incorrect.
+
+`lastGoodAuthenticationUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer, indicating the time
+of the last successful authentication attempt in µs since the UNIX epoch (1970).
+
+`lastBadAuthenticationUSec` → Similar, but the timestamp of the last
+unsuccessfully authentication attempt.
+
+`rateLimitBeginUSec` → An unsigned 64bit integer: the µs timestamp since the
+UNIX epoch (1970) where the most recent rate limiting interval has been
+started, as configured with `rateLimitIntervalUSec`.
+
+`rateLimitCount` → An unsigned 64bit integer, counting the authentication
+attempts in the current rate limiting interval, see above. If this counter
+grows beyond the value configured in `rateLimitBurst` authentication attempts
+are temporarily refused.
+
+`removable` → A boolean value. If true the manager of this user record
+determined the home directory being on removable media. If false it was
+determined the home directory is in internal built-in media. (This is used by
+`systemd-logind.service` to automatically pick the right default value for
+`stopDelayUSec` if the field is not explicitly specified: for home directories
+on removable media the delay is selected very low to minimize the chance the
+home directory remains in unclean state if the storage device is removed from
+the system by the user).
+
+`accessMode` → The access mode currently in effect for the home directory
+itself.
+
+`fileSystemType` → The file system type backing the home directory: a short
+string, such as "btrfs", "ext4", "xfs".
+
+## Fields in the `signature` section
+
+As mentioned, the `signature` section of the user record may contain one or
+more cryptographic signatures of the user record. Like all others, this section
+is optional, and only used when cryptographic validation of user records shall
+be used. Specifically, all user records managed by `systemd-homed.service` will
+carry such signatures and the service refuses managing user records that come
+without signature or with signatures not recognized by any locally defined
+public key.
+
+The `signature` field in the top-level user record object is an array of
+objects. Each object encapsulates one signature and has two fields: `data` and
+`key` (both are strings). The `data` field contains the actual signature,
+encoded in Base64, the `key` field contains a copy of the public key whose
+private key was used to make the signature, in PEM format. Currently only
+signatures with Ed25519 keys are defined.
+
+Before signing the user record should be brought into "normalized" form,
+i.e. the keys in all objects should be sorted alphabetically. All redundant
+white-space and newlines should be removed and the JSON text then signed.
+
+The signatures only cover the `regular`, `perMachine` and `privileged` sections
+of the user records, all other sections (include `signature` itself), are
+removed before the signature is calculated.
+
+Rationale for signing and threat model: while a multi-user operating system
+like Linux strives for being sufficiently secure even after a user acquired a
+local login session reality tells us this is not the case. Hence it is
+essential to restrict carefully which users may gain access to a system and
+which ones shall not. A minimal level of trust must be established between
+system, user record and the user themselves before a log-in request may be
+permitted. In particular if the home directory is provided in its own LUKS2
+encapsulated file system it is essential this trust is established before the
+user logs in (and hence the file system mounted), since file system
+implementations on Linux are well known to be relatively vulnerable to rogue
+disk images. User records and home directories in many context are expected to
+be something shareable between multiple systems, and the transfer between them
+might not happen via exclusively trusted channels. Hence it's essential that
+the user record is not manipulated between uses. Finally, resource management
+(which may be done by the various fields of the user record) is security
+sensitive, since it should forcefully lock the user into the assigned resource
+usage and not allow them to use more. The requirement of being able to trust
+the user record data combined with the potential transfer over untrusted
+channels suggest a cryptographic signature mechanism where only user records
+signed by a recognized key are permitted to log in locally.
+
+Note that other mechanisms for establishing sufficient trust exist too, and are
+perfectly valid as well. For example, systems like LDAP/ActiveDirectory
+generally insist on user record transfer from trusted servers via encrypted TLS
+channels only. Or traditional UNIX users created locally in `/etc/passwd` never
+exist outside of the local trusted system, hence transfer and trust in the
+source are not an issue. The major benefit of operating with signed user
+records is that they are self-sufficiently trusted, not relying on a secure
+channel for transfer, and thus being compatible with a more distributed model
+of home directory transfer, including on USB sticks and such.
+
+## Fields in the `secret` section
+
+As mentioned, the `secret` section of the user record should never be persisted
+nor transferred across machines. It is only defined in short-lived operations,
+for example when a user record is first created or registered, as the secret
+key data needs to be available to derive encryption keys from and similar.
+
+The `secret` field of the top-level user record contains the following fields:
+
+`password` → an array of strings, each containing a plain text password.
+
+`tokenPin` → an array of strings, each containing a plain text PIN, suitable
+for unlocking security tokens that require that. (The field `pkcs11Pin` should
+be considered a compatibility alias for this field, and merged with `tokenPin`
+in case both are set.)
+
+`pkcs11ProtectedAuthenticationPathPermitted` → a boolean. If set to true allows
+the receiver to use the PKCS#11 "protected authentication path" (i.e. a
+physical button/touch element on the security token) for authenticating the
+user. If false or unset, authentication this way shall not be attempted.
+
+`fido2UserPresencePermitted` → a boolean. If set to true allows the receiver to
+use the FIDO2 "user presence" flag. This is similar to the concept of
+`pkcs11ProtectedAuthenticationPathPermitted`, but exposes the FIDO2 "up"
+concept behind it. If false or unset authentication this way shall not be
+attempted.
+
+`fido2UserVerificationPermitted` → a boolean. If set to true allows the
+receiver to use the FIDO2 "user verification" flag. This is similar to the
+concept of `pkcs11ProtectedAuthenticationPathPermitted`, but exposes the FIDO2
+"uv" concept behind it. If false or unset authentication this way shall not be
+attempted.
+
+## Mapping to `struct passwd` and `struct spwd`
+
+When mapping classic UNIX user records (i.e. `struct passwd` and `struct spwd`)
+to JSON user records the following mappings should be applied:
+
+| Structure       | Field       | Section      | Field                        | Condition                  |
+|-----------------|-------------|--------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_name`   | `regular`    | `userName`                   |                            |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_passwd` | `privileged` | `password`                   | (See notes below)          |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_uid`    | `regular`    | `uid`                        |                            |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_gid`    | `regular`    | `gid`                        |                            |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_gecos`  | `regular`    | `realName`                   |                            |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_dir`    | `regular`    | `homeDirectory`              |                            |
+| `struct passwd` | `pw_shell`  | `regular`    | `shell`                      |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_namp`   | `regular`    | `userName`                   |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_pwdp`   | `privileged` | `password`                   | (See notes below)          |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_lstchg` | `regular`    | `lastPasswordChangeUSec`     | (if `sp_lstchg` > 0)       |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_lstchg` | `regular`    | `passwordChangeNow`          | (if `sp_lstchg` == 0)      |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_min`    | `regular`    | `passwordChangeMinUSec`      |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_max`    | `regular`    | `passwordChangeMaxUSec`      |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_warn`   | `regular`    | `passwordChangeWarnUSec`     |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_inact`  | `regular`    | `passwordChangeInactiveUSec` |                            |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_expire` | `regular`    | `locked`                     | (if `sp_expire` in [0, 1]) |
+| `struct spwd`   | `sp_expire` | `regular`    | `notAfterUSec`               | (if `sp_expire` > 1)       |
+
+At this time almost all Linux machines employ shadow passwords, thus the
+`pw_passwd` field in `struct passwd` is set to `"x"`, and the actual password
+is stored in the shadow entry `struct spwd`'s field `sp_pwdp`.
+
+## Extending These Records
+
+User records following this specifications are supposed to be extendable for
+various applications. In general, subsystems are free to introduce their own
+keys, as long as:
+
+* Care should be taken to place the keys in the right section, i.e. the most
+  appropriate for the data field.
+
+* Care should be taken to avoid namespace clashes. Please prefix your fields
+  with a short identifier of your project to avoid ambiguities and
+  incompatibilities.
+
+* This specification is supposed to be a living specification. If you need
+  additional fields, please consider submitting them upstream for inclusion in
+  this specification. If they are reasonably universally useful, it would be
+  best to list them here.
+
+## Examples
+
+The shortest valid user record looks like this:
+
+```json
+{
+        "userName" : "u"
+}
+```
+
+A reasonable user record for a system user might look like this:
+
+```json
+{
+        "userName" : "httpd",
+        "uid" : 473,
+        "gid" : 473,
+        "disposition" : "system",
+        "locked" : true
+}
+```
+
+A fully featured user record associated with a home directory managed by
+`systemd-homed.service` might look like this:
+
+```json
+{
+        "autoLogin" : true,
+        "binding" : {
+                "15e19cf24e004b949ddaac60c74aa165" : {
+                        "fileSystemType" : "ext4",
+                        "fileSystemUuid" : "758e88c8-5851-4a2a-b88f-e7474279c111",
+                        "gid" : 60232,
+                        "homeDirectory" : "/home/grobie",
+                        "imagePath" : "/home/grobie.home",
+                        "luksCipher" : "aes",
+                        "luksCipherMode" : "xts-plain64",
+                        "luksUuid" : "e63581ba-79fb-4226-b9de-1888393f7573",
+                        "luksVolumeKeySize" : 32,
+                        "partitionUuid" : "41f9ce04-c827-4b74-a981-c669f93eb4dc",
+                        "storage" : "luks",
+                        "uid" : 60232
+                }
+        },
+        "disposition" : "regular",
+        "enforcePasswordPolicy" : false,
+        "lastChangeUSec" : 1565950024279735,
+        "memberOf" : [
+                "wheel"
+        ],
+        "privileged" : {
+                "hashedPassword" : [
+                        "$6$WHBKvAFFT9jKPA4k$OPY4D4TczKN/jOnJzy54DDuOOagCcvxxybrwMbe1SVdm.Bbr.zOmBdATp.QrwZmvqyr8/SafbbQu.QZ2rRvDs/"
+                ]
+        },
+        "signature" : [
+                {
+                        "data" : "LU/HeVrPZSzi3MJ0PVHwD5m/xf51XDYCrSpbDRNBdtF4fDVhrN0t2I2OqH/1yXiBidXlV0ptMuQVq8KVICdEDw==",
+                        "key" : "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA/QT6kQWOAMhDJf56jBmszEQQpJHqDsGDMZOdiptBgRk=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+                }
+        ],
+        "userName" : "grobie",
+        "status" : {
+                "15e19cf24e004b949ddaac60c74aa165" : {
+                        "goodAuthenticationCounter" : 16,
+                        "lastGoodAuthenticationUSec" : 1566309343044322,
+                        "rateLimitBeginUSec" : 1566309342340723,
+                        "rateLimitCount" : 1,
+                        "state" : "inactive",
+                        "service" : "io.systemd.Home",
+                        "diskSize" : 161118667776,
+                        "diskCeiling" : 190371729408,
+                        "diskFloor" : 5242880,
+                        "signedLocally" : true
+                }
+        }
+}
+```
+
+When `systemd-homed.service` manages a home directory it will also include a
+version of the user record in the home directory itself in the `~/.identity`
+file. This version lacks the `binding` and `status` sections which are used for
+local management of the user, but are not intended to be portable between
+systems. It would hence look like this:
+
+```json
+{
+        "autoLogin" : true,
+        "disposition" : "regular",
+        "enforcePasswordPolicy" : false,
+        "lastChangeUSec" : 1565950024279735,
+        "memberOf" : [
+                "wheel"
+        ],
+        "privileged" : {
+                "hashedPassword" : [
+                        "$6$WHBKvAFFT9jKPA4k$OPY4D4TczKN/jOnJzy54DDuOOagCcvxxybrwMbe1SVdm.Bbr.zOmBdATp.QrwZmvqyr8/SafbbQu.QZ2rRvDs/"
+                ]
+        },
+        "signature" : [
+                {
+                        "data" : "LU/HeVrPZSzi3MJ0PVHwD5m/xf51XDYCrSpbDRNBdtF4fDVhrN0t2I2OqH/1yXiBidXlV0ptMuQVq8KVICdEDw==",
+                        "key" : "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA/QT6kQWOAMhDJf56jBmszEQQpJHqDsGDMZOdiptBgRk=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+                }
+        ],
+        "userName" : "grobie",
+}
+```