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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 15:35:18 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 15:35:18 +0000 |
| commit | b750101eb236130cf056c675997decbac904cc49 (patch) | |
| tree | a5df1a06754bdd014cb975c051c83b01c9a97532 /src/tmpfiles | |
| parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
| download | systemd-b750101eb236130cf056c675997decbac904cc49.tar.xz systemd-b750101eb236130cf056c675997decbac904cc49.zip | |
Adding upstream version 252.22.upstream/252.22upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/tmpfiles')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tmpfiles/meson.build | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.c | 162 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.h | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tmpfiles/test-offline-passwd.c | 85 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c | 4228 |
5 files changed, 4496 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/meson.build b/src/tmpfiles/meson.build new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cfa3d37 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tmpfiles/meson.build @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later + +systemd_tmpfiles_sources = files( + 'tmpfiles.c', + 'offline-passwd.c', + 'offline-passwd.h') + +tests += [ + [files('test-offline-passwd.c', + 'offline-passwd.c', + 'offline-passwd.h')], +] diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.c b/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c847266 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include "chase-symlinks.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "offline-passwd.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "user-util.h" + +DEFINE_PRIVATE_HASH_OPS_WITH_KEY_DESTRUCTOR(uid_gid_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, free); + +static int open_passwd_file(const char *root, const char *fname, FILE **ret_file) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + fd = chase_symlinks_and_open(fname, root, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC, &p); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + FILE *f = fdopen(fd, "r"); + if (!f) + return -errno; + + TAKE_FD(fd); + + log_debug("Reading %s entries from %s...", basename(fname), p); + + *ret_file = f; + return 0; +} + +static int populate_uid_cache(const char *root, Hashmap **ret) { + _cleanup_(hashmap_freep) Hashmap *cache = NULL; + int r; + + cache = hashmap_new(&uid_gid_hash_ops); + if (!cache) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* The directory list is hardcoded here: /etc is the standard, and rpm-ostree uses /usr/lib. This + * could be made configurable, but I don't see the point right now. */ + + FOREACH_STRING(fname, "/etc/passwd", "/usr/lib/passwd") { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + + r = open_passwd_file(root, fname, &f); + if (r == -ENOENT) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + struct passwd *pw; + while ((r = fgetpwent_sane(f, &pw)) > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; + + n = strdup(pw->pw_name); + if (!n) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = hashmap_put(cache, n, UID_TO_PTR(pw->pw_uid)); + if (IN_SET(r, 0 -EEXIST)) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + TAKE_PTR(n); + } + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(cache); + return 0; +} + +static int populate_gid_cache(const char *root, Hashmap **ret) { + _cleanup_(hashmap_freep) Hashmap *cache = NULL; + int r; + + cache = hashmap_new(&uid_gid_hash_ops); + if (!cache) + return -ENOMEM; + + FOREACH_STRING(fname, "/etc/group", "/usr/lib/group") { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + + r = open_passwd_file(root, fname, &f); + if (r == -ENOENT) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + struct group *gr; + while ((r = fgetgrent_sane(f, &gr)) > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; + + n = strdup(gr->gr_name); + if (!n) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = hashmap_put(cache, n, GID_TO_PTR(gr->gr_gid)); + if (IN_SET(r, 0, -EEXIST)) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + TAKE_PTR(n); + } + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(cache); + return 0; +} + +int name_to_uid_offline( + const char *root, + const char *user, + uid_t *ret_uid, + Hashmap **cache) { + + void *found; + int r; + + assert(user); + assert(ret_uid); + assert(cache); + + if (!*cache) { + r = populate_uid_cache(root, cache); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + found = hashmap_get(*cache, user); + if (!found) + return -ESRCH; + + *ret_uid = PTR_TO_UID(found); + return 0; +} + +int name_to_gid_offline( + const char *root, + const char *group, + gid_t *ret_gid, + Hashmap **cache) { + + void *found; + int r; + + assert(group); + assert(ret_gid); + assert(cache); + + if (!*cache) { + r = populate_gid_cache(root, cache); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + found = hashmap_get(*cache, group); + if (!found) + return -ESRCH; + + *ret_gid = PTR_TO_GID(found); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.h b/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..587af7b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tmpfiles/offline-passwd.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +#pragma once + +#include <sys/types.h> + +#include "hashmap.h" + +int name_to_uid_offline(const char *root, const char *user, uid_t *ret_uid, Hashmap **cache); +int name_to_gid_offline(const char *root, const char *group, gid_t *ret_gid, Hashmap **cache); diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/test-offline-passwd.c b/src/tmpfiles/test-offline-passwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b70cef4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tmpfiles/test-offline-passwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <getopt.h> + +#include "offline-passwd.h" +#include "user-util.h" +#include "format-util.h" +#include "tests.h" + +static char *arg_root = NULL; + +static void test_resolve_one(const char *name) { + bool relaxed = name || arg_root; + + if (!name) + name = "root"; + + log_info("/* %s(\"%s\") */", __func__, name); + + _cleanup_(hashmap_freep) Hashmap *uid_cache = NULL, *gid_cache = NULL; + uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; + int r; + + r = name_to_uid_offline(arg_root, name, &uid, &uid_cache); + log_info_errno(r, "name_to_uid_offline: %s → "UID_FMT": %m", name, uid); + assert_se(relaxed || r == 0); + + r = name_to_uid_offline(arg_root, name, &uid, &uid_cache); + log_info_errno(r, "name_to_uid_offline: %s → "UID_FMT": %m", name, uid); + assert_se(relaxed || r == 0); + + r = name_to_gid_offline(arg_root, name, &gid, &gid_cache); + log_info_errno(r, "name_to_gid_offline: %s → "GID_FMT": %m", name, gid); + assert_se(relaxed || r == 0); + + r = name_to_gid_offline(arg_root, name, &gid, &gid_cache); + log_info_errno(r, "name_to_gid_offline: %s → "GID_FMT": %m", name, gid); + assert_se(relaxed || r == 0); +} + +static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { + static const struct option options[] = { + { "root", required_argument, NULL, 'r' }, + {} + }; + + int c; + + assert_se(argc >= 0); + assert_se(argv); + + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "r:", options, NULL)) >= 0) + switch (c) { + case 'r': + arg_root = optarg; + break; + + case '?': + return -EINVAL; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + int r; + + test_setup_logging(LOG_DEBUG); + + r = parse_argv(argc, argv); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (optind >= argc) + test_resolve_one(NULL); + else + while (optind < argc) + test_resolve_one(argv[optind++]); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c3d994 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/tmpfiles/tmpfiles.c @@ -0,0 +1,4228 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <fnmatch.h> +#include <getopt.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/xattr.h> +#include <sysexits.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "sd-path.h" + +#include "acl-util.h" +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "btrfs-util.h" +#include "capability-util.h" +#include "chase-symlinks.h" +#include "chattr-util.h" +#include "conf-files.h" +#include "copy.h" +#include "creds-util.h" +#include "def.h" +#include "devnum-util.h" +#include "dirent-util.h" +#include "dissect-image.h" +#include "env-util.h" +#include "errno-util.h" +#include "escape.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "format-util.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "glob-util.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "io-util.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "macro.h" +#include "main-func.h" +#include "missing_stat.h" +#include "missing_syscall.h" +#include "mkdir-label.h" +#include "mount-util.h" +#include "mountpoint-util.h" +#include "offline-passwd.h" +#include "pager.h" +#include "parse-argument.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "path-lookup.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "pretty-print.h" +#include "rlimit-util.h" +#include "rm-rf.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "set.h" +#include "sort-util.h" +#include "specifier.h" +#include "stdio-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "terminal-util.h" +#include "umask-util.h" +#include "user-util.h" +#include "virt.h" + +/* This reads all files listed in /etc/tmpfiles.d/?*.conf and creates + * them in the file system. This is intended to be used to create + * properly owned directories beneath /tmp, /var/tmp, /run, which are + * volatile and hence need to be recreated on bootup. */ + +typedef enum OperationMask { + OPERATION_CREATE = 1 << 0, + OPERATION_REMOVE = 1 << 1, + OPERATION_CLEAN = 1 << 2, +} OperationMask; + +typedef enum ItemType { + /* These ones take file names */ + CREATE_FILE = 'f', + TRUNCATE_FILE = 'F', /* deprecated: use f+ */ + CREATE_DIRECTORY = 'd', + TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY = 'D', + CREATE_SUBVOLUME = 'v', + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA = 'q', + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA = 'Q', + CREATE_FIFO = 'p', + CREATE_SYMLINK = 'L', + CREATE_CHAR_DEVICE = 'c', + CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE = 'b', + COPY_FILES = 'C', + + /* These ones take globs */ + WRITE_FILE = 'w', + EMPTY_DIRECTORY = 'e', + SET_XATTR = 't', + RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR = 'T', + SET_ACL = 'a', + RECURSIVE_SET_ACL = 'A', + SET_ATTRIBUTE = 'h', + RECURSIVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE = 'H', + IGNORE_PATH = 'x', + IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH = 'X', + REMOVE_PATH = 'r', + RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH = 'R', + RELABEL_PATH = 'z', + RECURSIVE_RELABEL_PATH = 'Z', + ADJUST_MODE = 'm', /* legacy, 'z' is identical to this */ +} ItemType; + +typedef enum AgeBy { + AGE_BY_ATIME = 1 << 0, + AGE_BY_BTIME = 1 << 1, + AGE_BY_CTIME = 1 << 2, + AGE_BY_MTIME = 1 << 3, + + /* All file timestamp types are checked by default. */ + AGE_BY_DEFAULT_FILE = AGE_BY_ATIME | AGE_BY_BTIME | AGE_BY_CTIME | AGE_BY_MTIME, + AGE_BY_DEFAULT_DIR = AGE_BY_ATIME | AGE_BY_BTIME | AGE_BY_MTIME +} AgeBy; + +typedef struct Item { + ItemType type; + + char *path; + char *argument; + void *binary_argument; /* set if binary data, in which case it takes precedence over 'argument' */ + size_t binary_argument_size; + char **xattrs; +#if HAVE_ACL + acl_t acl_access; + acl_t acl_default; +#endif + uid_t uid; + gid_t gid; + mode_t mode; + usec_t age; + AgeBy age_by_file, age_by_dir; + + dev_t major_minor; + unsigned attribute_value; + unsigned attribute_mask; + + bool uid_set:1; + bool gid_set:1; + bool mode_set:1; + bool uid_only_create:1; + bool gid_only_create:1; + bool mode_only_create:1; + bool age_set:1; + bool mask_perms:1; + bool attribute_set:1; + + bool keep_first_level:1; + + bool append_or_force:1; + + bool allow_failure:1; + + bool try_replace:1; + + OperationMask done; +} Item; + +typedef struct ItemArray { + Item *items; + size_t n_items; + + struct ItemArray *parent; + Set *children; +} ItemArray; + +typedef enum DirectoryType { + DIRECTORY_RUNTIME, + DIRECTORY_STATE, + DIRECTORY_CACHE, + DIRECTORY_LOGS, + _DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX, +} DirectoryType; + +typedef enum { + CREATION_NORMAL, + CREATION_EXISTING, + CREATION_FORCE, + _CREATION_MODE_MAX, + _CREATION_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL, +} CreationMode; + +static bool arg_cat_config = false; +static bool arg_user = false; +static OperationMask arg_operation = 0; +static bool arg_boot = false; +static PagerFlags arg_pager_flags = 0; + +static char **arg_include_prefixes = NULL; +static char **arg_exclude_prefixes = NULL; +static char *arg_root = NULL; +static char *arg_image = NULL; +static char *arg_replace = NULL; + +#define MAX_DEPTH 256 + +static OrderedHashmap *items = NULL, *globs = NULL; +static Set *unix_sockets = NULL; + +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(items, ordered_hashmap_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(globs, ordered_hashmap_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(unix_sockets, set_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_include_prefixes, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_exclude_prefixes, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_root, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_image, freep); + +static const char *const creation_mode_verb_table[_CREATION_MODE_MAX] = { + [CREATION_NORMAL] = "Created", + [CREATION_EXISTING] = "Found existing", + [CREATION_FORCE] = "Created replacement", +}; + +DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(creation_mode_verb, CreationMode); + +/* Different kinds of errors that mean that information is not available in the environment. */ +static inline bool ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(int r) { + return IN_SET(abs(r), + EUNATCH, /* os-release or machine-id missing */ + ENOMEDIUM, /* machine-id or another file empty */ + ENOPKG, /* machine-id is uninitialized */ + ENXIO); /* env var is unset */ +} + +static int specifier_directory(char specifier, const void *data, const char *root, const void *userdata, char **ret) { + struct table_entry { + uint64_t type; + const char *suffix; + }; + + static const struct table_entry paths_system[] = { + [DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = { SD_PATH_SYSTEM_RUNTIME }, + [DIRECTORY_STATE] = { SD_PATH_SYSTEM_STATE_PRIVATE }, + [DIRECTORY_CACHE] = { SD_PATH_SYSTEM_STATE_CACHE }, + [DIRECTORY_LOGS] = { SD_PATH_SYSTEM_STATE_LOGS }, + }; + + static const struct table_entry paths_user[] = { + [DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = { SD_PATH_USER_RUNTIME }, + [DIRECTORY_STATE] = { SD_PATH_USER_CONFIGURATION }, + [DIRECTORY_CACHE] = { SD_PATH_USER_STATE_CACHE }, + [DIRECTORY_LOGS] = { SD_PATH_USER_CONFIGURATION, "log" }, + }; + + const struct table_entry *paths; + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + unsigned i; + int r; + + assert_cc(ELEMENTSOF(paths_system) == ELEMENTSOF(paths_user)); + paths = arg_user ? paths_user : paths_system; + + i = PTR_TO_UINT(data); + assert(i < ELEMENTSOF(paths_system)); + + r = sd_path_lookup(paths[i].type, paths[i].suffix, &p); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (arg_root) { + _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; + + j = path_join(arg_root, p); + if (!j) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(j); + } else + *ret = TAKE_PTR(p); + + return 0; +} + +static int log_unresolvable_specifier(const char *filename, unsigned line) { + static bool notified = false; + + /* In system mode, this is called when /etc is not fully initialized and some specifiers are + * unresolvable. In user mode, this is called when some variables are not defined. These cases are + * not considered a fatal error, so log at LOG_NOTICE only for the first time and then downgrade this + * to LOG_DEBUG for the rest. + * + * If we're running in a chroot (--root was used or sd_booted() reports that systemd is not running), + * always use LOG_DEBUG. We may be called to initialize a chroot before booting and there is no + * expectation that machine-id and other files will be populated. + */ + + int log_level = notified || arg_root || running_in_chroot() > 0 ? + LOG_DEBUG : LOG_NOTICE; + + log_syntax(NULL, + log_level, + filename, line, 0, + "Failed to resolve specifier: %s, skipping.", + arg_user ? "Required $XDG_... variable not defined" : "uninitialized /etc/ detected"); + + if (!notified) + log_full(log_level, + "All rules containing unresolvable specifiers will be skipped."); + + notified = true; + return 0; +} + +static int user_config_paths(char*** ret) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **config_dirs = NULL, **data_dirs = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *persistent_config = NULL, *runtime_config = NULL, *data_home = NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **res = NULL; + int r; + + r = xdg_user_dirs(&config_dirs, &data_dirs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = xdg_user_config_dir(&persistent_config, "/user-tmpfiles.d"); + if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(r)) + return r; + + r = xdg_user_runtime_dir(&runtime_config, "/user-tmpfiles.d"); + if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(r)) + return r; + + r = xdg_user_data_dir(&data_home, "/user-tmpfiles.d"); + if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(r)) + return r; + + r = strv_extend_strv_concat(&res, config_dirs, "/user-tmpfiles.d"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = strv_extend(&res, persistent_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = strv_extend(&res, runtime_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = strv_extend(&res, data_home); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = strv_extend_strv_concat(&res, data_dirs, "/user-tmpfiles.d"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = path_strv_make_absolute_cwd(res); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(res); + return 0; +} + +static bool needs_glob(ItemType t) { + return IN_SET(t, + WRITE_FILE, + IGNORE_PATH, + IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH, + REMOVE_PATH, + RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH, + EMPTY_DIRECTORY, + ADJUST_MODE, + RELABEL_PATH, + RECURSIVE_RELABEL_PATH, + SET_XATTR, + RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR, + SET_ACL, + RECURSIVE_SET_ACL, + SET_ATTRIBUTE, + RECURSIVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE); +} + +static bool takes_ownership(ItemType t) { + return IN_SET(t, + CREATE_FILE, + TRUNCATE_FILE, + CREATE_DIRECTORY, + EMPTY_DIRECTORY, + TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA, + CREATE_FIFO, + CREATE_SYMLINK, + CREATE_CHAR_DEVICE, + CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE, + COPY_FILES, + WRITE_FILE, + IGNORE_PATH, + IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH, + REMOVE_PATH, + RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH); +} + +static struct Item* find_glob(OrderedHashmap *h, const char *match) { + ItemArray *j; + + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(j, h) { + size_t n; + + for (n = 0; n < j->n_items; n++) { + Item *item = j->items + n; + + if (fnmatch(item->path, match, FNM_PATHNAME|FNM_PERIOD) == 0) + return item; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +static int load_unix_sockets(void) { + _cleanup_set_free_ Set *sockets = NULL; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + int r; + + if (unix_sockets) + return 0; + + /* We maintain a cache of the sockets we found in /proc/net/unix to speed things up a little. */ + + f = fopen("/proc/net/unix", "re"); + if (!f) + return log_full_errno(errno == ENOENT ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, + "Failed to open /proc/net/unix, ignoring: %m"); + + /* Skip header */ + r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to skip /proc/net/unix header line: %m"); + if (r == 0) + return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Premature end of file reading /proc/net/unix."); + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + char *p; + + r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read /proc/net/unix line, ignoring: %m"); + if (r == 0) /* EOF */ + break; + + p = strchr(line, ':'); + if (!p) + continue; + + if (strlen(p) < 37) + continue; + + p += 37; + p += strspn(p, WHITESPACE); + p += strcspn(p, WHITESPACE); /* skip one more word */ + p += strspn(p, WHITESPACE); + + if (!path_is_absolute(p)) + continue; + + r = set_put_strdup_full(&sockets, &path_hash_ops_free, p); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to add AF_UNIX socket to set, ignoring: %m"); + } + + unix_sockets = TAKE_PTR(sockets); + return 1; +} + +static bool unix_socket_alive(const char *fn) { + assert(fn); + + if (load_unix_sockets() < 0) + return true; /* We don't know, so assume yes */ + + return set_contains(unix_sockets, fn); +} + +/* Accessors for the argument in binary format */ +static const void* item_binary_argument(const Item *i) { + assert(i); + return i->binary_argument ?: i->argument; +} + +static size_t item_binary_argument_size(const Item *i) { + assert(i); + return i->binary_argument ? i->binary_argument_size : strlen_ptr(i->argument); +} + +static DIR* xopendirat_nomod(int dirfd, const char *path) { + DIR *dir; + + dir = xopendirat(dirfd, path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); + if (dir) + return dir; + + log_debug_errno(errno, "Cannot open %sdirectory \"%s\": %m", dirfd == AT_FDCWD ? "" : "sub", path); + if (errno != EPERM) + return NULL; + + dir = xopendirat(dirfd, path, O_NOFOLLOW); + if (!dir) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Cannot open %sdirectory \"%s\": %m", dirfd == AT_FDCWD ? "" : "sub", path); + + return dir; +} + +static DIR* opendir_nomod(const char *path) { + return xopendirat_nomod(AT_FDCWD, path); +} + +static inline nsec_t load_statx_timestamp_nsec(const struct statx_timestamp *ts) { + assert(ts); + + if (ts->tv_sec < 0) + return NSEC_INFINITY; + + if ((nsec_t) ts->tv_sec >= (UINT64_MAX - ts->tv_nsec) / NSEC_PER_SEC) + return NSEC_INFINITY; + + return ts->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC + ts->tv_nsec; +} + +static bool needs_cleanup( + nsec_t atime, + nsec_t btime, + nsec_t ctime, + nsec_t mtime, + nsec_t cutoff, + const char *sub_path, + AgeBy age_by, + bool is_dir) { + + if (FLAGS_SET(age_by, AGE_BY_MTIME) && mtime != NSEC_INFINITY && mtime >= cutoff) { + /* Follows spelling in stat(1). */ + log_debug("%s \"%s\": modify time %s is too new.", + is_dir ? "Directory" : "File", + sub_path, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(mtime / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US)); + + return false; + } + + if (FLAGS_SET(age_by, AGE_BY_ATIME) && atime != NSEC_INFINITY && atime >= cutoff) { + log_debug("%s \"%s\": access time %s is too new.", + is_dir ? "Directory" : "File", + sub_path, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(atime / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US)); + + return false; + } + + /* + * Note: Unless explicitly specified by the user, "ctime" is ignored + * by default for directories, because we change it when deleting. + */ + if (FLAGS_SET(age_by, AGE_BY_CTIME) && ctime != NSEC_INFINITY && ctime >= cutoff) { + log_debug("%s \"%s\": change time %s is too new.", + is_dir ? "Directory" : "File", + sub_path, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(ctime / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US)); + + return false; + } + + if (FLAGS_SET(age_by, AGE_BY_BTIME) && btime != NSEC_INFINITY && btime >= cutoff) { + log_debug("%s \"%s\": birth time %s is too new.", + is_dir ? "Directory" : "File", + sub_path, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(btime / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US)); + + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static int dir_cleanup( + Item *i, + const char *p, + DIR *d, + nsec_t self_atime_nsec, + nsec_t self_mtime_nsec, + nsec_t cutoff_nsec, + dev_t rootdev_major, + dev_t rootdev_minor, + bool mountpoint, + int maxdepth, + bool keep_this_level, + AgeBy age_by_file, + AgeBy age_by_dir) { + + bool deleted = false; + int r = 0; + + FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, break) { + _cleanup_free_ char *sub_path = NULL; + nsec_t atime_nsec, mtime_nsec, ctime_nsec, btime_nsec; + + if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) + continue; + + /* If statx() is supported, use it. It's preferable over fstatat() since it tells us + * explicitly where we are looking at a mount point, for free as side information. Determining + * the same information without statx() is hard, see the complexity of path_is_mount_point(), + * and also much slower as it requires a number of syscalls instead of just one. Hence, when + * we have modern statx() we use it instead of fstat() and do proper mount point checks, + * while on older kernels's well do traditional st_dev based detection of mount points. + * + * Using statx() for detecting mount points also has the benfit that we handle weird file + * systems such as overlayfs better where each file is originating from a different + * st_dev. */ + + STRUCT_STATX_DEFINE(sx); + + r = statx_fallback( + dirfd(d), de->d_name, + AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW|AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, + STATX_TYPE|STATX_MODE|STATX_UID|STATX_ATIME|STATX_MTIME|STATX_CTIME|STATX_BTIME, + &sx); + if (r == -ENOENT) + continue; + if (r < 0) { + /* FUSE, NFS mounts, SELinux might return EACCES */ + r = log_full_errno(r == -EACCES ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, r, + "statx(%s/%s) failed: %m", p, de->d_name); + continue; + } + + if (FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_attributes_mask, STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT)) { + /* Yay, we have the mount point API, use it */ + if (FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_attributes, STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT)) { + log_debug("Ignoring \"%s/%s\": different mount points.", p, de->d_name); + continue; + } + } else { + /* So we might have statx() but the STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT flag is not supported, fall + * back to traditional stx_dev checking. */ + if (sx.stx_dev_major != rootdev_major || + sx.stx_dev_minor != rootdev_minor) { + log_debug("Ignoring \"%s/%s\": different filesystem.", p, de->d_name); + continue; + } + + /* Try to detect bind mounts of the same filesystem instance; they do not differ in device + * major/minors. This type of query is not supported on all kernels or filesystem types + * though. */ + if (S_ISDIR(sx.stx_mode)) { + int q; + + q = fd_is_mount_point(dirfd(d), de->d_name, 0); + if (q < 0) + log_debug_errno(q, "Failed to determine whether \"%s/%s\" is a mount point, ignoring: %m", p, de->d_name); + else if (q > 0) { + log_debug("Ignoring \"%s/%s\": different mount of the same filesystem.", p, de->d_name); + continue; + } + } + } + + atime_nsec = FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_mask, STATX_ATIME) ? load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_atime) : 0; + mtime_nsec = FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_mask, STATX_MTIME) ? load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_mtime) : 0; + ctime_nsec = FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_mask, STATX_CTIME) ? load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_ctime) : 0; + btime_nsec = FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_mask, STATX_BTIME) ? load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_btime) : 0; + + sub_path = path_join(p, de->d_name); + if (!sub_path) { + r = log_oom(); + goto finish; + } + + /* Is there an item configured for this path? */ + if (ordered_hashmap_get(items, sub_path)) { + log_debug("Ignoring \"%s\": a separate entry exists.", sub_path); + continue; + } + + if (find_glob(globs, sub_path)) { + log_debug("Ignoring \"%s\": a separate glob exists.", sub_path); + continue; + } + + if (S_ISDIR(sx.stx_mode)) { + _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *sub_dir = NULL; + + if (mountpoint && + streq(de->d_name, "lost+found") && + sx.stx_uid == 0) { + log_debug("Ignoring directory \"%s\".", sub_path); + continue; + } + + if (maxdepth <= 0) + log_warning("Reached max depth on \"%s\".", sub_path); + else { + int q; + + sub_dir = xopendirat_nomod(dirfd(d), de->d_name); + if (!sub_dir) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + r = log_warning_errno(errno, "Opening directory \"%s\" failed, ignoring: %m", sub_path); + + continue; + } + + if (flock(dirfd(sub_dir), LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) < 0) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Couldn't acquire shared BSD lock on directory \"%s\", skipping: %m", p); + continue; + } + + q = dir_cleanup(i, + sub_path, sub_dir, + atime_nsec, mtime_nsec, cutoff_nsec, + rootdev_major, rootdev_minor, + false, maxdepth-1, false, + age_by_file, age_by_dir); + if (q < 0) + r = q; + } + + /* Note: if you are wondering why we don't support the sticky bit for excluding + * directories from cleaning like we do it for other file system objects: well, the + * sticky bit already has a meaning for directories, so we don't want to overload + * that. */ + + if (keep_this_level) { + log_debug("Keeping directory \"%s\".", sub_path); + continue; + } + + /* + * Check the file timestamps of an entry against the + * given cutoff time; delete if it is older. + */ + if (!needs_cleanup(atime_nsec, btime_nsec, ctime_nsec, mtime_nsec, + cutoff_nsec, sub_path, age_by_dir, true)) + continue; + + log_debug("Removing directory \"%s\".", sub_path); + if (unlinkat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, AT_REMOVEDIR) < 0) + if (!IN_SET(errno, ENOENT, ENOTEMPTY)) + r = log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to remove directory \"%s\", ignoring: %m", sub_path); + + } else { + /* Skip files for which the sticky bit is set. These are semantics we define, and are + * unknown elsewhere. See XDG_RUNTIME_DIR specification for details. */ + if (sx.stx_mode & S_ISVTX) { + log_debug("Skipping \"%s\": sticky bit set.", sub_path); + continue; + } + + if (mountpoint && + S_ISREG(sx.stx_mode) && + sx.stx_uid == 0 && + STR_IN_SET(de->d_name, + ".journal", + "aquota.user", + "aquota.group")) { + log_debug("Skipping \"%s\".", sub_path); + continue; + } + + /* Ignore sockets that are listed in /proc/net/unix */ + if (S_ISSOCK(sx.stx_mode) && unix_socket_alive(sub_path)) { + log_debug("Skipping \"%s\": live socket.", sub_path); + continue; + } + + /* Ignore device nodes */ + if (S_ISCHR(sx.stx_mode) || S_ISBLK(sx.stx_mode)) { + log_debug("Skipping \"%s\": a device.", sub_path); + continue; + } + + /* Keep files on this level around if this is requested */ + if (keep_this_level) { + log_debug("Keeping \"%s\".", sub_path); + continue; + } + + if (!needs_cleanup(atime_nsec, btime_nsec, ctime_nsec, mtime_nsec, + cutoff_nsec, sub_path, age_by_file, false)) + continue; + + log_debug("Removing \"%s\".", sub_path); + if (unlinkat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, 0) < 0) + if (errno != ENOENT) + r = log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to remove \"%s\", ignoring: %m", sub_path); + + deleted = true; + } + } + +finish: + if (deleted) { + struct timespec ts[2]; + + log_debug("Restoring access and modification time on \"%s\": %s, %s", + p, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(self_atime_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US), + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(self_mtime_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC, TIMESTAMP_US)); + + timespec_store_nsec(ts + 0, self_atime_nsec); + timespec_store_nsec(ts + 1, self_mtime_nsec); + + /* Restore original directory timestamps */ + if (futimens(dirfd(d), ts) < 0) + log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to revert timestamps of '%s', ignoring: %m", p); + } + + return r; +} + +static bool dangerous_hardlinks(void) { + _cleanup_free_ char *value = NULL; + static int cached = -1; + int r; + + /* Check whether the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is on. If we can't determine it we assume its off, as that's + * what the upstream default is. */ + + if (cached >= 0) + return cached; + + r = read_one_line_file("/proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks", &value); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl: %m"); + return true; + } + + r = parse_boolean(value); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl: %m"); + return true; + } + + cached = r == 0; + return cached; +} + +static bool hardlink_vulnerable(const struct stat *st) { + assert(st); + + return !S_ISDIR(st->st_mode) && st->st_nlink > 1 && dangerous_hardlinks(); +} + +static mode_t process_mask_perms(mode_t mode, mode_t current) { + + if ((current & 0111) == 0) + mode &= ~0111; + if ((current & 0222) == 0) + mode &= ~0222; + if ((current & 0444) == 0) + mode &= ~0444; + if (!S_ISDIR(current)) + mode &= ~07000; /* remove sticky/sgid/suid bit, unless directory */ + + return mode; +} + +static int fd_set_perms( + Item *i, + int fd, + const char *path, + const struct stat *st, + CreationMode creation) { + + bool do_chown, do_chmod; + struct stat stbuf; + mode_t new_mode; + uid_t new_uid; + gid_t new_gid; + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(path); + + if (!i->mode_set && !i->uid_set && !i->gid_set) + goto shortcut; + + if (!st) { + if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "fstat(%s) failed: %m", path); + st = &stbuf; + } + + if (hardlink_vulnerable(st)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), + "Refusing to set permissions on hardlinked file %s while the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is turned off.", + path); + new_uid = i->uid_set && (creation != CREATION_EXISTING || !i->uid_only_create) ? i->uid : st->st_uid; + new_gid = i->gid_set && (creation != CREATION_EXISTING || !i->gid_only_create) ? i->gid : st->st_gid; + + /* Do we need a chown()? */ + do_chown = (new_uid != st->st_uid) || (new_gid != st->st_gid); + + /* Calculate the mode to apply */ + new_mode = i->mode_set && (creation != CREATION_EXISTING || !i->mode_only_create) ? + (i->mask_perms ? process_mask_perms(i->mode, st->st_mode) : i->mode) : + (st->st_mode & 07777); + + do_chmod = ((new_mode ^ st->st_mode) & 07777) != 0; + + if (do_chmod && do_chown) { + /* Before we issue the chmod() let's reduce the access mode to the common bits of the old and + * the new mode. That way there's no time window where the file exists under the old owner + * with more than the old access modes — and not under the new owner with more than the new + * access modes either. */ + + if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) + log_debug("Skipping temporary mode fix for symlink %s.", path); + else { + mode_t m = new_mode & st->st_mode; /* Mask new mode by old mode */ + + if (((m ^ st->st_mode) & 07777) == 0) + log_debug("\"%s\" matches temporary mode %o already.", path, m); + else { + log_debug("Temporarily changing \"%s\" to mode %o.", path, m); + r = fchmod_opath(fd, m); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "fchmod() of %s failed: %m", path); + } + } + } + + if (do_chown) { + log_debug("Changing \"%s\" to owner "UID_FMT":"GID_FMT, path, new_uid, new_gid); + + if (fchownat(fd, "", + new_uid != st->st_uid ? new_uid : UID_INVALID, + new_gid != st->st_gid ? new_gid : GID_INVALID, + AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "fchownat() of %s failed: %m", path); + } + + /* Now, apply the final mode. We do this in two cases: when the user set a mode explicitly, or after a + * chown(), since chown()'s mangle the access mode in regards to sgid/suid in some conditions. */ + if (do_chmod || do_chown) { + if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) + log_debug("Skipping mode fix for symlink %s.", path); + else { + log_debug("Changing \"%s\" to mode %o.", path, new_mode); + r = fchmod_opath(fd, new_mode); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "fchmod() of %s failed: %m", path); + } + } + +shortcut: + return label_fix_full(fd, /* inode_path= */ NULL, /* label_path= */ path, 0); +} + +static int path_open_parent_safe(const char *path, bool allow_failure) { + _cleanup_free_ char *dn = NULL; + int r, fd; + + if (!path_is_normalized(path)) + return log_full_errno(allow_failure ? LOG_INFO : LOG_ERR, + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Failed to open parent of '%s': path not normalized%s.", + path, + allow_failure ? ", ignoring" : ""); + + r = path_extract_directory(path, &dn); + if (r < 0) + return log_full_errno(allow_failure ? LOG_INFO : LOG_ERR, + r, + "Unable to determine parent directory of '%s'%s: %m", + path, + allow_failure ? ", ignoring" : ""); + + r = chase_symlinks(dn, arg_root, allow_failure ? CHASE_SAFE : CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_WARN, NULL, &fd); + if (r == -ENOLINK) /* Unsafe symlink: already covered by CHASE_WARN */ + return r; + if (r < 0) + return log_full_errno(allow_failure ? LOG_INFO : LOG_ERR, + r, + "Failed to open path '%s'%s: %m", + dn, + allow_failure ? ", ignoring" : ""); + + return fd; +} + +static int path_open_safe(const char *path) { + int r, fd; + + /* path_open_safe() returns a file descriptor opened with O_PATH after + * verifying that the path doesn't contain unsafe transitions, except + * for its final component as the function does not follow symlink. */ + + assert(path); + + if (!path_is_normalized(path)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to open invalid path '%s'.", path); + + r = chase_symlinks(path, arg_root, CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_WARN|CHASE_NOFOLLOW, NULL, &fd); + if (r == -ENOLINK) + return r; /* Unsafe symlink: already covered by CHASE_WARN */ + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open path %s: %m", path); + + return fd; +} + +static int path_set_perms( + Item *i, + const char *path, + CreationMode creation) { + + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + + fd = path_open_safe(path); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, /* st= */ NULL, creation); +} + +static int parse_xattrs_from_arg(Item *i) { + const char *p; + int r; + + assert(i); + + assert_se(p = i->argument); + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL, *value = NULL, *xattr = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&p, &xattr, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse extended attribute '%s', ignoring: %m", p); + if (r <= 0) + break; + + r = split_pair(xattr, "=", &name, &value); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse extended attribute, ignoring: %s", xattr); + continue; + } + + if (isempty(name) || isempty(value)) { + log_warning("Malformed extended attribute found, ignoring: %s", xattr); + continue; + } + + if (strv_push_pair(&i->xattrs, name, value) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + name = value = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int fd_set_xattrs( + Item *i, + int fd, + const char *path, + const struct stat *st, + CreationMode creation) { + + assert(i); + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(path); + + STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(name, value, i->xattrs) { + log_debug("Setting extended attribute '%s=%s' on %s.", *name, *value, path); + if (setxattr(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), *name, *value, strlen(*value), 0) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Setting extended attribute %s=%s on %s failed: %m", + *name, *value, path); + } + return 0; +} + +static int path_set_xattrs( + Item *i, + const char *path, + CreationMode creation) { + + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + + fd = path_open_safe(path); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return fd_set_xattrs(i, fd, path, /* st = */ NULL, creation); +} + +static int parse_acls_from_arg(Item *item) { +#if HAVE_ACL + int r; + + assert(item); + + /* If append_or_force (= modify) is set, we will not modify the acl + * afterwards, so the mask can be added now if necessary. */ + + r = parse_acl(item->argument, &item->acl_access, &item->acl_default, !item->append_or_force); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse ACL \"%s\": %m. Ignoring", item->argument); +#else + log_warning("ACLs are not supported. Ignoring."); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if HAVE_ACL +static int path_set_acl( + const char *path, + const char *pretty, + acl_type_t type, + acl_t acl, + bool modify) { + + _cleanup_(acl_free_charpp) char *t = NULL; + _cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t dup = NULL; + int r; + + /* Returns 0 for success, positive error if already warned, + * negative error otherwise. */ + + if (modify) { + r = acls_for_file(path, type, acl, &dup); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = calc_acl_mask_if_needed(&dup); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else { + dup = acl_dup(acl); + if (!dup) + return -errno; + + /* the mask was already added earlier if needed */ + } + + r = add_base_acls_if_needed(&dup, path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + t = acl_to_any_text(dup, NULL, ',', TEXT_ABBREVIATE); + log_debug("Setting %s ACL %s on %s.", + type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ? "access" : "default", + strna(t), pretty); + + r = acl_set_file(path, type, dup); + if (r < 0) { + if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) + /* No error if filesystem doesn't support ACLs. Return negative. */ + return -errno; + else + /* Return positive to indicate we already warned */ + return -log_error_errno(errno, + "Setting %s ACL \"%s\" on %s failed: %m", + type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ? "access" : "default", + strna(t), pretty); + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int fd_set_acls( + Item *item, + int fd, + const char *path, + const struct stat *st, + CreationMode creation) { + + int r = 0; +#if HAVE_ACL + struct stat stbuf; + + assert(item); + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(path); + + if (!st) { + if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "fstat(%s) failed: %m", path); + st = &stbuf; + } + + if (hardlink_vulnerable(st)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), + "Refusing to set ACLs on hardlinked file %s while the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is turned off.", + path); + + if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) { + log_debug("Skipping ACL fix for symlink %s.", path); + return 0; + } + + if (item->acl_access) + r = path_set_acl(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, item->acl_access, item->append_or_force); + + /* set only default acls to folders */ + if (r == 0 && item->acl_default && S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) + r = path_set_acl(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), path, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, item->acl_default, item->append_or_force); + + if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) { + log_debug_errno(r, "ACLs not supported by file system at %s", path); + return 0; + } + + if (r > 0) + return -r; /* already warned */ + + /* The above procfs paths don't work if /proc is not mounted. */ + if (r == -ENOENT && proc_mounted() == 0) + r = -ENOSYS; + + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "ACL operation on \"%s\" failed: %m", path); +#endif + return r; +} + +static int path_set_acls(Item *item, const char *path, CreationMode creation) { + int r = 0; +#if HAVE_ACL + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + assert(item); + assert(path); + + fd = path_open_safe(path); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + r = fd_set_acls(item, fd, path, /* st= */ NULL, creation); +#endif + return r; +} + +static int parse_attribute_from_arg(Item *item) { + + static const struct { + char character; + unsigned value; + } attributes[] = { + { 'A', FS_NOATIME_FL }, /* do not update atime */ + { 'S', FS_SYNC_FL }, /* Synchronous updates */ + { 'D', FS_DIRSYNC_FL }, /* dirsync behaviour (directories only) */ + { 'a', FS_APPEND_FL }, /* writes to file may only append */ + { 'c', FS_COMPR_FL }, /* Compress file */ + { 'd', FS_NODUMP_FL }, /* do not dump file */ + { 'e', FS_EXTENT_FL }, /* Extents */ + { 'i', FS_IMMUTABLE_FL }, /* Immutable file */ + { 'j', FS_JOURNAL_DATA_FL }, /* Reserved for ext3 */ + { 's', FS_SECRM_FL }, /* Secure deletion */ + { 'u', FS_UNRM_FL }, /* Undelete */ + { 't', FS_NOTAIL_FL }, /* file tail should not be merged */ + { 'T', FS_TOPDIR_FL }, /* Top of directory hierarchies */ + { 'C', FS_NOCOW_FL }, /* Do not cow file */ + { 'P', FS_PROJINHERIT_FL }, /* Inherit the quota project ID */ + }; + + enum { + MODE_ADD, + MODE_DEL, + MODE_SET + } mode = MODE_ADD; + + unsigned value = 0, mask = 0; + const char *p; + + assert(item); + + p = item->argument; + if (p) { + if (*p == '+') { + mode = MODE_ADD; + p++; + } else if (*p == '-') { + mode = MODE_DEL; + p++; + } else if (*p == '=') { + mode = MODE_SET; + p++; + } + } + + if (isempty(p) && mode != MODE_SET) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Setting file attribute on '%s' needs an attribute specification.", + item->path); + + for (; p && *p ; p++) { + unsigned i, v; + + for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(attributes); i++) + if (*p == attributes[i].character) + break; + + if (i >= ELEMENTSOF(attributes)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Unknown file attribute '%c' on '%s'.", + *p, item->path); + + v = attributes[i].value; + + SET_FLAG(value, v, IN_SET(mode, MODE_ADD, MODE_SET)); + + mask |= v; + } + + if (mode == MODE_SET) + mask |= CHATTR_ALL_FL; + + assert(mask != 0); + + item->attribute_mask = mask; + item->attribute_value = value; + item->attribute_set = true; + + return 0; +} + +static int fd_set_attribute( + Item *item, + int fd, + const char *path, + const struct stat *st, + CreationMode creation) { + + _cleanup_close_ int procfs_fd = -1; + struct stat stbuf; + unsigned f; + int r; + + assert(item); + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(path); + + if (!item->attribute_set || item->attribute_mask == 0) + return 0; + + if (!st) { + if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "fstat(%s) failed: %m", path); + st = &stbuf; + } + + /* Issuing the file attribute ioctls on device nodes is not safe, as that will be delivered to the + * drivers, not the file system containing the device node. */ + if (!S_ISREG(st->st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Setting file flags is only supported on regular files and directories, cannot set on '%s'.", + path); + + f = item->attribute_value & item->attribute_mask; + + /* Mask away directory-specific flags */ + if (!S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) + f &= ~FS_DIRSYNC_FL; + + procfs_fd = fd_reopen(fd, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME); + if (procfs_fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(procfs_fd, "Failed to re-open '%s': %m", path); + + unsigned previous, current; + r = chattr_full(NULL, procfs_fd, f, item->attribute_mask, &previous, ¤t, CHATTR_FALLBACK_BITWISE); + if (r == -ENOANO) + log_warning("Cannot set file attributes for '%s', maybe due to incompatibility in specified attributes, " + "previous=0x%08x, current=0x%08x, expected=0x%08x, ignoring.", + path, previous, current, (previous & ~item->attribute_mask) | (f & item->attribute_mask)); + else if (r < 0) + log_full_errno(ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, + "Cannot set file attributes for '%s', value=0x%08x, mask=0x%08x, ignoring: %m", + path, item->attribute_value, item->attribute_mask); + + return 0; +} + +static int path_set_attribute(Item *item, const char *path, CreationMode creation) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + if (!item->attribute_set || item->attribute_mask == 0) + return 0; + + fd = path_open_safe(path); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return fd_set_attribute(item, fd, path, /* st= */ NULL, creation); +} + +static int write_argument_data(Item *i, int fd, const char *path) { + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(path); + + if (item_binary_argument_size(i) == 0) + return 0; + + assert(item_binary_argument(i)); + + log_debug("Writing to \"%s\".", path); + + r = loop_write(fd, item_binary_argument(i), item_binary_argument_size(i), /* do_poll= */ false); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write file \"%s\": %m", path); + + return 0; +} + +static int write_one_file(Item *i, const char *path, CreationMode creation) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, dir_fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + assert(i->type == WRITE_FILE); + + r = path_extract_filename(path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for writing, is a directory.", path); + + /* Validate the path and keep the fd on the directory for opening the file so we're sure that it + * can't be changed behind our back. */ + dir_fd = path_open_parent_safe(path, i->allow_failure); + if (dir_fd < 0) + return dir_fd; + + /* Follows symlinks */ + fd = openat(dir_fd, bn, + O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|(i->append_or_force ? O_APPEND : 0), + i->mode); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Not writing missing file \"%s\": %m", path); + return 0; + } + + if (i->allow_failure) + return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open file \"%s\", ignoring: %m", path); + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open file \"%s\": %m", path); + } + + /* 'w' is allowed to write into any kind of files. */ + + r = write_argument_data(i, fd, path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, NULL, creation); +} + +static int create_file(Item *i, const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, dir_fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + struct stat stbuf, *st = NULL; + CreationMode creation; + int r = 0; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + assert(i->type == CREATE_FILE); + + /* 'f' operates on regular files exclusively. */ + + r = path_extract_filename(path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for writing, is a directory.", path); + + /* Validate the path and keep the fd on the directory for opening the file so we're sure that it + * can't be changed behind our back. */ + dir_fd = path_open_parent_safe(path, i->allow_failure); + if (dir_fd < 0) + return dir_fd; + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(path, S_IFREG); + fd = RET_NERRNO(openat(dir_fd, bn, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY, i->mode)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + + if (fd < 0) { + /* Even on a read-only filesystem, open(2) returns EEXIST if the file already exists. It + * returns EROFS only if it needs to create the file. */ + if (fd != -EEXIST) + return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to create file %s: %m", path); + + /* Re-open the file. At that point it must exist since open(2) failed with EEXIST. We still + * need to check if the perms/mode need to be changed. For read-only filesystems, we let + * fd_set_perms() report the error if the perms need to be modified. */ + fd = openat(dir_fd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH, i->mode); + if (fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to re-open file %s: %m", path); + + if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "stat(%s) failed: %m", path); + + if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EEXIST), + "%s exists and is not a regular file.", + path); + + st = &stbuf; + creation = CREATION_EXISTING; + } else { + r = write_argument_data(i, fd, path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + creation = CREATION_NORMAL; + } + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, st, creation); +} + +static int truncate_file(Item *i, const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, dir_fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + struct stat stbuf, *st = NULL; + CreationMode creation; + bool erofs = false; + int r = 0; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + assert(i->type == TRUNCATE_FILE || (i->type == CREATE_FILE && i->append_or_force)); + + /* We want to operate on regular file exclusively especially since O_TRUNC is unspecified if the file + * is neither a regular file nor a fifo nor a terminal device. Therefore we first open the file and + * make sure it's a regular one before truncating it. */ + + r = path_extract_filename(path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for truncation, is a directory.", path); + + /* Validate the path and keep the fd on the directory for opening the file so we're sure that it + * can't be changed behind our back. */ + dir_fd = path_open_parent_safe(path, i->allow_failure); + if (dir_fd < 0) + return dir_fd; + + creation = CREATION_EXISTING; + fd = RET_NERRNO(openat(dir_fd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY, i->mode)); + if (fd == -ENOENT) { + creation = CREATION_NORMAL; /* Didn't work without O_CREATE, try again with */ + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(path, S_IFREG); + fd = RET_NERRNO(openat(dir_fd, bn, O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY, i->mode)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + } + + if (fd < 0) { + if (fd != -EROFS) + return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open/create file %s: %m", path); + + /* On a read-only filesystem, we don't want to fail if the target is already empty and the + * perms are set. So we still proceed with the sanity checks and let the remaining operations + * fail with EROFS if they try to modify the target file. */ + + fd = openat(dir_fd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH, i->mode); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EROFS), + "Cannot create file %s on a read-only file system.", + path); + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to re-open file %s: %m", path); + } + + erofs = true; + creation = CREATION_EXISTING; + } + + if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "stat(%s) failed: %m", path); + + if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EEXIST), + "%s exists and is not a regular file.", + path); + + if (stbuf.st_size > 0) { + if (ftruncate(fd, 0) < 0) { + r = erofs ? -EROFS : -errno; + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to truncate file %s: %m", path); + } + } else + st = &stbuf; + + log_debug("\"%s\" has been created.", path); + + if (item_binary_argument(i)) { + r = write_argument_data(i, fd, path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, st, creation); +} + +static int copy_files(Item *i) { + _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -1, fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + struct stat st, a; + int r; + + log_debug("Copying tree \"%s\" to \"%s\".", i->argument, i->path); + + r = path_extract_filename(i->path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", i->path); + + /* Validate the path and use the returned directory fd for copying the target so we're sure that the + * path can't be changed behind our back. */ + dfd = path_open_parent_safe(i->path, i->allow_failure); + if (dfd < 0) + return dfd; + + r = copy_tree_at(AT_FDCWD, i->argument, + dfd, bn, + i->uid_set ? i->uid : UID_INVALID, + i->gid_set ? i->gid : GID_INVALID, + COPY_REFLINK | COPY_MERGE_EMPTY | COPY_MAC_CREATE | COPY_HARDLINKS); + + fd = openat(dfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + if (r < 0) /* Look at original error first */ + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to copy files to %s: %m", i->path); + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to openat(%s): %m", i->path); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (stat(i->argument, &a) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat(%s): %m", i->argument); + + if (((st.st_mode ^ a.st_mode) & S_IFMT) != 0) { + log_debug("Can't copy to %s, file exists already and is of different type", i->path); + return 0; + } + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, i->path, &st, _CREATION_MODE_INVALID); +} + +static int create_directory_or_subvolume( + const char *path, + mode_t mode, + bool subvol, + bool allow_failure, + struct stat *ret_st, + CreationMode *ret_creation) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int pfd = -1; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + int r, fd; + + assert(path); + + r = path_extract_filename(path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", path); + + pfd = path_open_parent_safe(path, allow_failure); + if (pfd < 0) + return pfd; + + if (subvol) { + r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_TMPFILES_FORCE_SUBVOL"); + if (r < 0) { + if (r != -ENXIO) /* env var is unset */ + log_warning_errno(r, "Cannot parse value of $SYSTEMD_TMPFILES_FORCE_SUBVOL, ignoring."); + r = btrfs_is_subvol(empty_to_root(arg_root)) > 0; + } + if (r == 0) + /* Don't create a subvolume unless the root directory is one, too. We do this under + * the assumption that if the root directory is just a plain directory (i.e. very + * light-weight), we shouldn't try to split it up into subvolumes (i.e. more + * heavy-weight). Thus, chroot() environments and suchlike will get a full brtfs + * subvolume set up below their tree only if they specifically set up a btrfs + * subvolume for the root dir too. */ + + subvol = false; + else { + RUN_WITH_UMASK((~mode) & 0777) + r = btrfs_subvol_make_fd(pfd, bn); + } + } else + r = 0; + + if (!subvol || ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) + r = mkdirat_label(pfd, bn, mode); + + creation = r >= 0 ? CREATION_NORMAL : CREATION_EXISTING; + + fd = openat(pfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + /* We couldn't open it because it is not actually a directory? */ + if (errno == ENOTDIR) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EEXIST), "\"%s\" already exists and is not a directory.", path); + + /* Then look at the original error */ + if (r < 0) + return log_full_errno(allow_failure ? LOG_INFO : LOG_ERR, + r, + "Failed to create directory or subvolume \"%s\"%s: %m", + path, + allow_failure ? ", ignoring" : ""); + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory/subvolume we just created '%s': %m", path); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", path); + + assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)); /* we used O_DIRECTORY above */ + + log_debug("%s directory \"%s\".", creation_mode_verb_to_string(creation), path); + + if (ret_st) + *ret_st = st; + if (ret_creation) + *ret_creation = creation; + + return fd; +} + +static int create_directory(Item *i, const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + + assert(i); + assert(IN_SET(i->type, CREATE_DIRECTORY, TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY)); + + fd = create_directory_or_subvolume(path, i->mode, /* subvol= */ false, i->allow_failure, &st, &creation); + if (fd == -EEXIST) + return 0; + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, &st, creation); +} + +static int create_subvolume(Item *i, const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + int r, q = 0; + + assert(i); + assert(IN_SET(i->type, CREATE_SUBVOLUME, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA)); + + fd = create_directory_or_subvolume(path, i->mode, /* subvol = */ true, i->allow_failure, &st, &creation); + if (fd == -EEXIST) + return 0; + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + if (creation == CREATION_NORMAL && + IN_SET(i->type, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA)) { + r = btrfs_subvol_auto_qgroup_fd(fd, 0, i->type == CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA); + if (r == -ENOTTY) + log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't adjust quota for subvolume \"%s\" (unsupported fs or dir not a subvolume): %m", i->path); + else if (r == -EROFS) + log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't adjust quota for subvolume \"%s\" (fs is read-only).", i->path); + else if (r == -ENOTCONN) + log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't adjust quota for subvolume \"%s\" (quota support is disabled).", i->path); + else if (r < 0) + q = log_error_errno(r, "Failed to adjust quota for subvolume \"%s\": %m", i->path); + else if (r > 0) + log_debug("Adjusted quota for subvolume \"%s\".", i->path); + else if (r == 0) + log_debug("Quota for subvolume \"%s\" already in place, no change made.", i->path); + } + + r = fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, &st, creation); + if (q < 0) /* prefer the quota change error from above */ + return q; + + return r; +} + +static int empty_directory(Item *i, const char *path, CreationMode creation) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(i->type == EMPTY_DIRECTORY); + + r = chase_symlinks(path, arg_root, CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_WARN, NULL, &fd); + if (r == -ENOLINK) /* Unsafe symlink: already covered by CHASE_WARN */ + return r; + if (r == -ENOENT) { + /* Option "e" operates only on existing objects. Do not print errors about non-existent files + * or directories */ + log_debug_errno(r, "Skipping missing directory: %s", path); + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", path); + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", path); + if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + log_warning("'%s' already exists and is not a directory.", path); + return 0; + } + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, path, &st, creation); +} + +static int create_device(Item *i, mode_t file_type) { + _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -1, fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(IN_SET(i->type, CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE, CREATE_CHAR_DEVICE)); + assert(IN_SET(file_type, S_IFBLK, S_IFCHR)); + + r = path_extract_filename(i->path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", i->path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for creating device node, is a directory.", i->path); + + /* Validate the path and use the returned directory fd for copying the target so we're sure that the + * path can't be changed behind our back. */ + dfd = path_open_parent_safe(i->path, i->allow_failure); + if (dfd < 0) + return dfd; + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, file_type); + r = RET_NERRNO(mknodat(dfd, bn, i->mode | file_type, i->major_minor)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + creation = r >= 0 ? CREATION_NORMAL : CREATION_EXISTING; + + /* Try to open the inode via O_PATH, regardless if we could create it or not. Maybe everything is in + * order anyway and we hence can ignore the error to create the device node */ + fd = openat(dfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + /* OK, so opening the inode failed, let's look at the original error then. */ + + if (r < 0) { + if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) + goto handle_privilege; + + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create device node '%s': %m", i->path); + } + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open device node '%s' we just created: %m", i->path); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (((st.st_mode ^ file_type) & S_IFMT) != 0) { + + if (i->append_or_force) { + fd = safe_close(fd); + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, file_type); + r = mknodat_atomic(dfd, bn, i->mode | file_type, i->major_minor); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) + goto handle_privilege; + if (IN_SET(r, -EISDIR, -EEXIST, -ENOTEMPTY)) { + r = rm_rf_child(dfd, bn, REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "rm -rf %s failed: %m", i->path); + + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, file_type); + r = RET_NERRNO(mknodat(dfd, bn, i->mode | file_type, i->major_minor)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create device node '%s': %m", i->path); + + fd = openat(dfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open device node we just created '%s': %m", i->path); + + /* Validate type before change ownership below */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (((st.st_mode ^ file_type) & S_IFMT) != 0) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), "Device node we just created is not a device node, refusing."); + + creation = CREATION_FORCE; + } else { + log_warning("\"%s\" already exists and is not a device node.", i->path); + return 0; + } + } + + log_debug("%s %s device node \"%s\" %u:%u.", + creation_mode_verb_to_string(creation), + i->type == CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE ? "block" : "char", + i->path, major(i->mode), minor(i->mode)); + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, i->path, &st, creation); + +handle_privilege: + log_debug_errno(r, + "We lack permissions, possibly because of cgroup configuration; " + "skipping creation of device node '%s'.", i->path); + return 0; +} + +static int create_fifo(Item *i) { + _cleanup_close_ int pfd = -1, fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(i); + assert(i->type == CREATE_FIFO); + + r = path_extract_filename(i->path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", i->path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for creating FIFO, is a directory.", i->path); + + pfd = path_open_parent_safe(i->path, i->allow_failure); + if (pfd < 0) + return pfd; + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFIFO); + r = RET_NERRNO(mkfifoat(pfd, bn, i->mode)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + + creation = r >= 0 ? CREATION_NORMAL : CREATION_EXISTING; + + /* Open the inode via O_PATH, regardless if we managed to create it or not. Maybe it is is already the FIFO we want */ + fd = openat(pfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create FIFO %s: %m", i->path); /* original error! */ + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open FIFO we just created %s: %m", i->path); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (!S_ISFIFO(st.st_mode)) { + + if (i->append_or_force) { + fd = safe_close(fd); + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFIFO); + r = mkfifoat_atomic(pfd, bn, i->mode); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + if (IN_SET(r, -EISDIR, -EEXIST, -ENOTEMPTY)) { + r = rm_rf_child(pfd, bn, REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "rm -rf %s failed: %m", i->path); + + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFIFO); + r = RET_NERRNO(mkfifoat(pfd, bn, i->mode)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create FIFO %s: %m", i->path); + + fd = openat(pfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open FIFO we just created '%s': %m", i->path); + + /* Validate type before change ownership below */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (!S_ISFIFO(st.st_mode)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), "FIFO inode we just created is not a FIFO, refusing."); + + creation = CREATION_FORCE; + } else { + log_warning("\"%s\" already exists and is not a FIFO.", i->path); + return 0; + } + } + + log_debug("%s fifo \"%s\".", creation_mode_verb_to_string(creation), i->path); + + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, i->path, &st, creation); +} + +static int create_symlink(Item *i) { + _cleanup_close_ int pfd = -1, fd = -1; + _cleanup_free_ char *bn = NULL; + CreationMode creation; + struct stat st; + bool good = false; + int r; + + assert(i); + + r = path_extract_filename(i->path, &bn); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from path '%s': %m", i->path); + if (r == O_DIRECTORY) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Cannot open path '%s' for creating FIFO, is a directory.", i->path); + + pfd = path_open_parent_safe(i->path, i->allow_failure); + if (pfd < 0) + return pfd; + + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFLNK); + r = RET_NERRNO(symlinkat(i->argument, pfd, bn)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + + creation = r >= 0 ? CREATION_NORMAL : CREATION_EXISTING; + + fd = openat(pfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create symlink '%s': %m", i->path); /* original error! */ + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open symlink we just created '%s': %m", i->path); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; + + r = readlinkat_malloc(fd, "", &x); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "readlinkat(%s) failed: %m", i->path); + + good = streq(x, i->argument); + } else + good = false; + + if (!good) { + if (!i->append_or_force) { + log_debug("\"%s\" is not a symlink or does not point to the correct path.", i->path); + return 0; + } + + fd = safe_close(fd); + + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFLNK); + r = symlinkat_atomic_full(i->argument, pfd, bn, /* make_relative= */ false); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + if (IN_SET(r, -EISDIR, -EEXIST, -ENOTEMPTY)) { + r = rm_rf_child(pfd, bn, REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "rm -rf %s failed: %m", i->path); + + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(i->path, S_IFLNK); + r = RET_NERRNO(symlinkat(i->argument, pfd, i->path)); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "symlink(%s, %s) failed: %m", i->argument, i->path); + + fd = openat(pfd, bn, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open symlink we just created '%s': %m", i->path); + + /* Validate type before change ownership below */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fstat(%s): %m", i->path); + + if (!S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), "Symlink we just created is not a symlink, refusing."); + + creation = CREATION_FORCE; + } + + log_debug("%s symlink \"%s\".", creation_mode_verb_to_string(creation), i->path); + return fd_set_perms(i, fd, i->path, &st, creation); +} + +typedef int (*action_t)(Item *i, const char *path, CreationMode creation); +typedef int (*fdaction_t)(Item *i, int fd, const char *path, const struct stat *st, CreationMode creation); + +static int item_do( + Item *i, + int fd, + const char *path, + CreationMode creation, + fdaction_t action) { + + struct stat st; + int r = 0, q; + + assert(i); + assert(path); + assert(fd >= 0); + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + r = log_error_errno(errno, "fstat() on file failed: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + /* This returns the first error we run into, but nevertheless tries to go on */ + r = action(i, fd, path, &st, creation); + + if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; + + /* The passed 'fd' was opened with O_PATH. We need to convert it into a 'regular' fd before + * reading the directory content. */ + d = opendir(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd)); + if (!d) { + log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to opendir() '%s': %m", FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd)); + if (r == 0) + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, q = -errno; goto finish) { + int de_fd; + + if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) + continue; + + de_fd = openat(fd, de->d_name, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (de_fd < 0) + q = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open() file '%s': %m", de->d_name); + else { + _cleanup_free_ char *de_path = NULL; + + de_path = path_join(path, de->d_name); + if (!de_path) + q = log_oom(); + else + /* Pass ownership of dirent fd over */ + q = item_do(i, de_fd, de_path, CREATION_EXISTING, action); + } + + if (q < 0 && r == 0) + r = q; + } + } +finish: + safe_close(fd); + return r; +} + +static int glob_item(Item *i, action_t action) { + _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t g = { + .gl_opendir = (void *(*)(const char *)) opendir_nomod, + }; + int r = 0, k; + + k = safe_glob(i->path, GLOB_NOSORT|GLOB_BRACE, &g); + if (k < 0 && k != -ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(k, "glob(%s) failed: %m", i->path); + + STRV_FOREACH(fn, g.gl_pathv) { + /* We pass CREATION_EXISTING here, since if we are globbing for it, it always has to exist */ + k = action(i, *fn, CREATION_EXISTING); + if (k < 0 && r == 0) + r = k; + } + + return r; +} + +static int glob_item_recursively(Item *i, fdaction_t action) { + _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t g = { + .gl_opendir = (void *(*)(const char *)) opendir_nomod, + }; + int r = 0, k; + + k = safe_glob(i->path, GLOB_NOSORT|GLOB_BRACE, &g); + if (k < 0 && k != -ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(k, "glob(%s) failed: %m", i->path); + + STRV_FOREACH(fn, g.gl_pathv) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + + /* Make sure we won't trigger/follow file object (such as + * device nodes, automounts, ...) pointed out by 'fn' with + * O_PATH. Note, when O_PATH is used, flags other than + * O_CLOEXEC, O_DIRECTORY, and O_NOFOLLOW are ignored. */ + + fd = open(*fn, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH); + if (fd < 0) { + log_error_errno(errno, "Opening '%s' failed: %m", *fn); + if (r == 0) + r = -errno; + continue; + } + + k = item_do(i, fd, *fn, CREATION_EXISTING, action); + if (k < 0 && r == 0) + r = k; + + /* we passed fd ownership to the previous call */ + fd = -1; + } + + return r; +} + +static int rm_if_wrong_type_safe( + mode_t mode, + int parent_fd, + const struct stat *parent_st, /* Only used if follow_links below is true. */ + const char *name, + int flags) { + _cleanup_free_ char *parent_name = NULL; + bool follow_links = !FLAGS_SET(flags, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(name); + assert((mode & ~S_IFMT) == 0); + assert(!follow_links || parent_st); + assert((flags & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0); + + if (!filename_is_valid(name)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "\"%s\" is not a valid filename.", name); + + r = fstatat_harder(parent_fd, name, &st, flags, REMOVE_CHMOD | REMOVE_CHMOD_RESTORE); + if (r < 0) { + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + return log_full_errno(r == -ENOENT? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, r, + "Failed to stat \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", name, strna(parent_name)); + } + + /* Fail before removing anything if this is an unsafe transition. */ + if (follow_links && unsafe_transition(parent_st, &st)) { + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOLINK), + "Unsafe transition from \"%s\" to \"%s\".", parent_name, name); + } + + if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == mode) + return 0; + + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + log_notice("Wrong file type 0o%o; rm -rf \"%s/%s\"", st.st_mode & S_IFMT, strna(parent_name), name); + + /* If the target of the symlink was the wrong type, the link needs to be removed instead of the + * target, so make sure it is identified as a link and not a directory. */ + if (follow_links) { + r = fstatat_harder(parent_fd, name, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, REMOVE_CHMOD | REMOVE_CHMOD_RESTORE); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to stat \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", name, strna(parent_name)); + } + + /* Do not remove mount points. */ + r = fd_is_mount_point(parent_fd, name, follow_links ? AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW : 0); + if (r < 0) + (void) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to check if \"%s/%s\" is a mount point: %m; Continuing", + strna(parent_name), name); + else if (r > 0) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBUSY), + "Not removing \"%s/%s\" because it is a mount point.", strna(parent_name), name); + + if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) { + _cleanup_close_ int child_fd = -1; + + child_fd = openat(parent_fd, name, O_NOCTTY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY); + if (child_fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", name, strna(parent_name)); + + r = rm_rf_children(TAKE_FD(child_fd), REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_SUBVOLUME|REMOVE_PHYSICAL, &st); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remove contents of \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", name, strna(parent_name)); + + r = unlinkat_harder(parent_fd, name, AT_REMOVEDIR, REMOVE_CHMOD | REMOVE_CHMOD_RESTORE); + } else + r = unlinkat_harder(parent_fd, name, 0, REMOVE_CHMOD | REMOVE_CHMOD_RESTORE); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remove \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", name, strna(parent_name)); + + /* This is covered by the log_notice "Wrong file type..." It is logged earlier because it gives + * context to other error messages that might follow. */ + return -ENOENT; +} + +/* If child_mode is non-zero, rm_if_wrong_type_safe will be executed for the last path component. */ +static int mkdir_parents_rm_if_wrong_type(mode_t child_mode, const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int parent_fd = -1; + struct stat parent_st; + size_t path_len; + int r; + + assert(path); + assert((child_mode & ~S_IFMT) == 0); + + path_len = strlen(path); + + if (!is_path(path)) + /* rm_if_wrong_type_safe already logs errors. */ + return child_mode != 0 ? rm_if_wrong_type_safe(child_mode, AT_FDCWD, NULL, path, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) : 0; + + if (child_mode != 0 && endswith(path, "/")) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Trailing path separators are only allowed if child_mode is not set; got \"%s\"", path); + + /* Get the parent_fd and stat. */ + parent_fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, path_is_absolute(path) ? "/" : ".", O_NOCTTY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY); + if (parent_fd < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open root: %m"); + + if (fstat(parent_fd, &parent_st) < 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat root: %m"); + + /* Check every parent directory in the path, except the last component */ + for (const char *e = path;;) { + _cleanup_close_ int next_fd = -1; + char t[path_len + 1]; + const char *s; + + /* Find the start of the next path component. */ + s = e + strspn(e, "/"); + /* Find the end of the next path component. */ + e = s + strcspn(s, "/"); + + /* Copy the path component to t so it can be a null terminated string. */ + *((char*) mempcpy(t, s, e - s)) = 0; + + /* Is this the last component? If so, then check the type */ + if (*e == 0) + return child_mode != 0 ? rm_if_wrong_type_safe(child_mode, parent_fd, &parent_st, t, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) : 0; + + r = rm_if_wrong_type_safe(S_IFDIR, parent_fd, &parent_st, t, 0); + /* Remove dangling symlinks. */ + if (r == -ENOENT) + r = rm_if_wrong_type_safe(S_IFDIR, parent_fd, &parent_st, t, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); + if (r == -ENOENT) { + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) + r = mkdirat_label(parent_fd, t, 0755); + if (r < 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *parent_name = NULL; + + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mkdir \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", t, strnull(parent_name)); + } + } else if (r < 0) + /* rm_if_wrong_type_safe already logs errors. */ + return r; + + next_fd = RET_NERRNO(openat(parent_fd, t, O_NOCTTY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY)); + if (next_fd < 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *parent_name = NULL; + + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + return log_error_errno(next_fd, "Failed to open \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", t, strnull(parent_name)); + } + r = RET_NERRNO(fstat(next_fd, &parent_st)); + if (r < 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *parent_name = NULL; + + (void) fd_get_path(parent_fd, &parent_name); + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to stat \"%s\" at \"%s\": %m", t, strnull(parent_name)); + } + + close_and_replace(parent_fd, next_fd); + } +} + +static int mkdir_parents_item(Item *i, mode_t child_mode) { + int r; + if (i->try_replace) { + r = mkdir_parents_rm_if_wrong_type(child_mode, i->path); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) + return r; + } else + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) + (void) mkdir_parents_label(i->path, 0755); + + return 0; +} + +static int create_item(Item *i) { + int r; + + assert(i); + + log_debug("Running create action for entry %c %s", (char) i->type, i->path); + + switch (i->type) { + + case IGNORE_PATH: + case IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH: + case REMOVE_PATH: + case RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH: + return 0; + + case TRUNCATE_FILE: + case CREATE_FILE: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, S_IFREG); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if ((i->type == CREATE_FILE && i->append_or_force) || i->type == TRUNCATE_FILE) + r = truncate_file(i, i->path); + else + r = create_file(i, i->path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case COPY_FILES: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = copy_files(i); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case WRITE_FILE: + r = glob_item(i, write_one_file); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + break; + + case CREATE_DIRECTORY: + case TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, S_IFDIR); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = create_directory(i, i->path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, S_IFDIR); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = create_subvolume(i, i->path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case EMPTY_DIRECTORY: + r = glob_item(i, empty_directory); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case CREATE_FIFO: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, S_IFIFO); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = create_fifo(i); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case CREATE_SYMLINK: + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, S_IFLNK); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = create_symlink(i); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + break; + + case CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE: + case CREATE_CHAR_DEVICE: + if (have_effective_cap(CAP_MKNOD) == 0) { + /* In a container we lack CAP_MKNOD. We shouldn't attempt to create the device node in that + * case to avoid noise, and we don't support virtualized devices in containers anyway. */ + + log_debug("We lack CAP_MKNOD, skipping creation of device node %s.", i->path); + return 0; + } + + r = mkdir_parents_item(i, i->type == CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE ? S_IFBLK : S_IFCHR); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = create_device(i, i->type == CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE ? S_IFBLK : S_IFCHR); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + break; + + case ADJUST_MODE: + case RELABEL_PATH: + r = glob_item(i, path_set_perms); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case RECURSIVE_RELABEL_PATH: + r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_perms); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case SET_XATTR: + r = glob_item(i, path_set_xattrs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR: + r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_xattrs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case SET_ACL: + r = glob_item(i, path_set_acls); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case RECURSIVE_SET_ACL: + r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_acls); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case SET_ATTRIBUTE: + r = glob_item(i, path_set_attribute); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case RECURSIVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE: + r = glob_item_recursively(i, fd_set_attribute); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int remove_item_instance(Item *i, const char *instance, CreationMode creation) { + int r; + + assert(i); + + switch (i->type) { + + case REMOVE_PATH: + if (remove(instance) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(errno, "rm(%s): %m", instance); + + break; + + case RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH: + /* FIXME: we probably should use dir_cleanup() here instead of rm_rf() so that 'x' is honoured. */ + log_debug("rm -rf \"%s\"", instance); + r = rm_rf(instance, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_SUBVOLUME|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(r, "rm_rf(%s): %m", instance); + + break; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int remove_item(Item *i) { + int r; + + assert(i); + + log_debug("Running remove action for entry %c %s", (char) i->type, i->path); + + switch (i->type) { + + case TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY: + /* FIXME: we probably should use dir_cleanup() here instead of rm_rf() so that 'x' is honoured. */ + log_debug("rm -rf \"%s\"", i->path); + r = rm_rf(i->path, REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) + return log_error_errno(r, "rm_rf(%s): %m", i->path); + + return 0; + + case REMOVE_PATH: + case RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH: + return glob_item(i, remove_item_instance); + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static char *age_by_to_string(AgeBy ab, bool is_dir) { + static const char ab_map[] = { 'a', 'b', 'c', 'm' }; + size_t j = 0; + char *ret; + + ret = new(char, ELEMENTSOF(ab_map) + 1); + if (!ret) + return NULL; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(ab_map); i++) + if (FLAGS_SET(ab, 1U << i)) + ret[j++] = is_dir ? ascii_toupper(ab_map[i]) : ab_map[i]; + + ret[j] = 0; + return ret; +} + +static int clean_item_instance( + Item *i, + const char* instance, + CreationMode creation) { + + _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; + STRUCT_STATX_DEFINE(sx); + int mountpoint, r; + usec_t cutoff, n; + + assert(i); + + if (!i->age_set) + return 0; + + n = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); + if (n < i->age) + return 0; + + cutoff = n - i->age; + + d = opendir_nomod(instance); + if (!d) { + if (IN_SET(errno, ENOENT, ENOTDIR)) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Directory \"%s\": %m", instance); + return 0; + } + + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory %s: %m", instance); + } + + r = statx_fallback(dirfd(d), "", AT_EMPTY_PATH, STATX_MODE|STATX_INO|STATX_ATIME|STATX_MTIME, &sx); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "statx(%s) failed: %m", instance); + + if (FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_attributes_mask, STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT)) + mountpoint = FLAGS_SET(sx.stx_attributes, STATX_ATTR_MOUNT_ROOT); + else { + struct stat ps; + + if (fstatat(dirfd(d), "..", &ps, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "stat(%s/..) failed: %m", i->path); + + mountpoint = + sx.stx_dev_major != major(ps.st_dev) || + sx.stx_dev_minor != minor(ps.st_dev) || + sx.stx_ino != ps.st_ino; + } + + if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { + _cleanup_free_ char *ab_f = NULL, *ab_d = NULL; + + ab_f = age_by_to_string(i->age_by_file, false); + if (!ab_f) + return log_oom(); + + ab_d = age_by_to_string(i->age_by_dir, true); + if (!ab_d) + return log_oom(); + + log_debug("Cleanup threshold for %s \"%s\" is %s; age-by: %s%s", + mountpoint ? "mount point" : "directory", + instance, + FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_STYLE(cutoff, TIMESTAMP_US), + ab_f, ab_d); + } + + return dir_cleanup(i, instance, d, + load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_atime), + load_statx_timestamp_nsec(&sx.stx_mtime), + cutoff * NSEC_PER_USEC, + sx.stx_dev_major, sx.stx_dev_minor, mountpoint, + MAX_DEPTH, i->keep_first_level, + i->age_by_file, i->age_by_dir); +} + +static int clean_item(Item *i) { + assert(i); + + log_debug("Running clean action for entry %c %s", (char) i->type, i->path); + + switch (i->type) { + case CREATE_DIRECTORY: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA: + case TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY: + case IGNORE_PATH: + case COPY_FILES: + clean_item_instance(i, i->path, CREATION_EXISTING); + return 0; + case EMPTY_DIRECTORY: + case IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH: + return glob_item(i, clean_item_instance); + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int process_item(Item *i, OperationMask operation) { + OperationMask todo; + _cleanup_free_ char *_path = NULL; + const char *path; + int r, q, p; + + assert(i); + + todo = operation & ~i->done; + if (todo == 0) /* Everything already done? */ + return 0; + + i->done |= operation; + + path = i->path; + if (string_is_glob(path)) { + /* We can't easily check whether a glob matches any autofs path, so let's do the check only + * for the non-glob part. */ + + r = glob_non_glob_prefix(path, &_path); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deglob path: %m"); + if (r >= 0) + path = _path; + } + + r = chase_symlinks(path, arg_root, CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_WARN, NULL, NULL); + if (r == -EREMOTE) { + log_notice_errno(r, "Skipping %s", i->path); /* We log the configured path, to not confuse the user. */ + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether '%s' is below autofs, ignoring: %m", i->path); + + r = FLAGS_SET(operation, OPERATION_CREATE) ? create_item(i) : 0; + /* Failure can only be tolerated for create */ + if (i->allow_failure) + r = 0; + + q = FLAGS_SET(operation, OPERATION_REMOVE) ? remove_item(i) : 0; + p = FLAGS_SET(operation, OPERATION_CLEAN) ? clean_item(i) : 0; + + return r < 0 ? r : + q < 0 ? q : + p; +} + +static int process_item_array(ItemArray *array, OperationMask operation) { + int r = 0; + size_t n; + + assert(array); + + /* Create any parent first. */ + if (FLAGS_SET(operation, OPERATION_CREATE) && array->parent) + r = process_item_array(array->parent, operation & OPERATION_CREATE); + + /* Clean up all children first */ + if ((operation & (OPERATION_REMOVE|OPERATION_CLEAN)) && !set_isempty(array->children)) { + ItemArray *c; + + SET_FOREACH(c, array->children) { + int k; + + k = process_item_array(c, operation & (OPERATION_REMOVE|OPERATION_CLEAN)); + if (k < 0 && r == 0) + r = k; + } + } + + for (n = 0; n < array->n_items; n++) { + int k; + + k = process_item(array->items + n, operation); + if (k < 0 && r == 0) + r = k; + } + + return r; +} + +static void item_free_contents(Item *i) { + assert(i); + free(i->path); + free(i->argument); + free(i->binary_argument); + strv_free(i->xattrs); + +#if HAVE_ACL + if (i->acl_access) + acl_free(i->acl_access); + + if (i->acl_default) + acl_free(i->acl_default); +#endif +} + +static ItemArray* item_array_free(ItemArray *a) { + size_t n; + + if (!a) + return NULL; + + for (n = 0; n < a->n_items; n++) + item_free_contents(a->items + n); + + set_free(a->children); + free(a->items); + return mfree(a); +} + +static int item_compare(const Item *a, const Item *b) { + /* Make sure that the ownership taking item is put first, so + * that we first create the node, and then can adjust it */ + + if (takes_ownership(a->type) && !takes_ownership(b->type)) + return -1; + if (!takes_ownership(a->type) && takes_ownership(b->type)) + return 1; + + return CMP(a->type, b->type); +} + +static bool item_compatible(const Item *a, const Item *b) { + assert(a); + assert(b); + assert(streq(a->path, b->path)); + + if (takes_ownership(a->type) && takes_ownership(b->type)) + /* check if the items are the same */ + return memcmp_nn(item_binary_argument(a), item_binary_argument_size(a), + item_binary_argument(b), item_binary_argument_size(b)) == 0 && + + a->uid_set == b->uid_set && + a->uid == b->uid && + a->uid_only_create == b->uid_only_create && + + a->gid_set == b->gid_set && + a->gid == b->gid && + a->gid_only_create == b->gid_only_create && + + a->mode_set == b->mode_set && + a->mode == b->mode && + a->mode_only_create == b->mode_only_create && + + a->age_set == b->age_set && + a->age == b->age && + + a->age_by_file == b->age_by_file && + a->age_by_dir == b->age_by_dir && + + a->mask_perms == b->mask_perms && + + a->keep_first_level == b->keep_first_level && + + a->major_minor == b->major_minor; + + return true; +} + +static bool should_include_path(const char *path) { + STRV_FOREACH(prefix, arg_exclude_prefixes) + if (path_startswith(path, *prefix)) { + log_debug("Entry \"%s\" matches exclude prefix \"%s\", skipping.", + path, *prefix); + return false; + } + + STRV_FOREACH(prefix, arg_include_prefixes) + if (path_startswith(path, *prefix)) { + log_debug("Entry \"%s\" matches include prefix \"%s\".", path, *prefix); + return true; + } + + /* no matches, so we should include this path only if we have no allow list at all */ + if (strv_isempty(arg_include_prefixes)) + return true; + + log_debug("Entry \"%s\" does not match any include prefix, skipping.", path); + return false; +} + +static int specifier_expansion_from_arg(const Specifier *specifier_table, Item *i) { + int r; + + assert(i); + + if (!i->argument) + return 0; + + switch (i->type) { + case COPY_FILES: + case CREATE_SYMLINK: + case CREATE_FILE: + case TRUNCATE_FILE: + case WRITE_FILE: { + _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL, *resolved = NULL; + ssize_t l; + + l = cunescape(i->argument, 0, &unescaped); + if (l < 0) + return log_error_errno(l, "Failed to unescape parameter to write: %s", i->argument); + + r = specifier_printf(unescaped, PATH_MAX-1, specifier_table, arg_root, NULL, &resolved); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return free_and_replace(i->argument, resolved); + } + case SET_XATTR: + case RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR: + STRV_FOREACH(xattr, i->xattrs) { + _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL; + + r = specifier_printf(*xattr, SIZE_MAX, specifier_table, arg_root, NULL, &resolved); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + free_and_replace(*xattr, resolved); + } + return 0; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int patch_var_run(const char *fname, unsigned line, char **path) { + const char *k; + char *n; + + assert(path); + assert(*path); + + /* Optionally rewrites lines referencing /var/run/, to use /run/ instead. Why bother? tmpfiles merges lines in + * some cases and detects conflicts in others. If files/directories are specified through two equivalent lines + * this is problematic as neither case will be detected. Ideally we'd detect these cases by resolving symlinks + * early, but that's precisely not what we can do here as this code very likely is running very early on, at a + * time where the paths in question are not available yet, or even more importantly, our own tmpfiles rules + * might create the paths that are intermediary to the listed paths. We can't really cover the generic case, + * but the least we can do is cover the specific case of /var/run vs. /run, as /var/run is a legacy name for + * /run only, and we explicitly document that and require that on systemd systems the former is a symlink to + * the latter. Moreover files below this path are by far the primary usecase for tmpfiles.d/. */ + + k = path_startswith(*path, "/var/run/"); + if (isempty(k)) /* Don't complain about other paths than /var/run, and not about /var/run itself either. */ + return 0; + + n = path_join("/run", k); + if (!n) + return log_oom(); + + /* Also log about this briefly. We do so at LOG_NOTICE level, as we fixed up the situation automatically, hence + * there's no immediate need for action by the user. However, in the interest of making things less confusing + * to the user, let's still inform the user that these snippets should really be updated. */ + log_syntax(NULL, LOG_NOTICE, fname, line, 0, + "Line references path below legacy directory /var/run/, updating %s → %s; please update the tmpfiles.d/ drop-in file accordingly.", + *path, n); + + free_and_replace(*path, n); + + return 0; +} + +static int find_uid(const char *user, uid_t *ret_uid, Hashmap **cache) { + int r; + + assert(user); + assert(ret_uid); + + /* First: parse as numeric UID string */ + r = parse_uid(user, ret_uid); + if (r >= 0) + return r; + + /* Second: pass to NSS if we are running "online" */ + if (!arg_root) + return get_user_creds(&user, ret_uid, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); + + /* Third, synthesize "root" unconditionally */ + if (streq(user, "root")) { + *ret_uid = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Fourth: use fgetpwent() to read /etc/passwd directly, if we are "offline" */ + return name_to_uid_offline(arg_root, user, ret_uid, cache); +} + +static int find_gid(const char *group, gid_t *ret_gid, Hashmap **cache) { + int r; + + assert(group); + assert(ret_gid); + + /* First: parse as numeric GID string */ + r = parse_gid(group, ret_gid); + if (r >= 0) + return r; + + /* Second: pass to NSS if we are running "online" */ + if (!arg_root) + return get_group_creds(&group, ret_gid, 0); + + /* Third, synthesize "root" unconditionally */ + if (streq(group, "root")) { + *ret_gid = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Fourth: use fgetgrent() to read /etc/group directly, if we are "offline" */ + return name_to_gid_offline(arg_root, group, ret_gid, cache); +} + +static int parse_age_by_from_arg(const char *age_by_str, Item *item) { + AgeBy ab_f = 0, ab_d = 0; + + static const struct { + char age_by_chr; + AgeBy age_by_flag; + } age_by_types[] = { + { 'a', AGE_BY_ATIME }, + { 'b', AGE_BY_BTIME }, + { 'c', AGE_BY_CTIME }, + { 'm', AGE_BY_MTIME }, + }; + + assert(age_by_str); + assert(item); + + if (isempty(age_by_str)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (const char *s = age_by_str; *s != 0; s++) { + size_t i; + + /* Ignore whitespace. */ + if (strchr(WHITESPACE, *s)) + continue; + + for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(age_by_types); i++) { + /* Check lower-case for files, upper-case for directories. */ + if (*s == age_by_types[i].age_by_chr) { + ab_f |= age_by_types[i].age_by_flag; + break; + } else if (*s == ascii_toupper(age_by_types[i].age_by_chr)) { + ab_d |= age_by_types[i].age_by_flag; + break; + } + } + + /* Invalid character. */ + if (i >= ELEMENTSOF(age_by_types)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* No match. */ + if (ab_f == 0 && ab_d == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + item->age_by_file = ab_f > 0 ? ab_f : AGE_BY_DEFAULT_FILE; + item->age_by_dir = ab_d > 0 ? ab_d : AGE_BY_DEFAULT_DIR; + + return 0; +} + +static bool is_duplicated_item(ItemArray *existing, const Item *i) { + + assert(existing); + assert(i); + + for (size_t n = 0; n < existing->n_items; n++) { + const Item *e = existing->items + n; + + if (item_compatible(e, i)) + continue; + + /* Only multiple 'w+' lines for the same path are allowed. */ + if (e->type != WRITE_FILE || !e->append_or_force || + i->type != WRITE_FILE || !i->append_or_force) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +static int parse_line( + const char *fname, + unsigned line, + const char *buffer, + bool *invalid_config, + Hashmap **uid_cache, + Hashmap **gid_cache) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *action = NULL, *mode = NULL, *user = NULL, *group = NULL, *age = NULL, *path = NULL; + _cleanup_(item_free_contents) Item i = { + /* The "age-by" argument considers all file timestamp types by default. */ + .age_by_file = AGE_BY_DEFAULT_FILE, + .age_by_dir = AGE_BY_DEFAULT_DIR, + }; + ItemArray *existing; + OrderedHashmap *h; + int r, pos; + bool append_or_force = false, boot = false, allow_failure = false, try_replace = false, unbase64 = false, from_cred = false; + + assert(fname); + assert(line >= 1); + assert(buffer); + + const Specifier specifier_table[] = { + { 'a', specifier_architecture, NULL }, + { 'b', specifier_boot_id, NULL }, + { 'B', specifier_os_build_id, NULL }, + { 'H', specifier_hostname, NULL }, + { 'l', specifier_short_hostname, NULL }, + { 'm', specifier_machine_id, NULL }, + { 'o', specifier_os_id, NULL }, + { 'v', specifier_kernel_release, NULL }, + { 'w', specifier_os_version_id, NULL }, + { 'W', specifier_os_variant_id, NULL }, + + { 'h', specifier_user_home, NULL }, + + { 'C', specifier_directory, UINT_TO_PTR(DIRECTORY_CACHE) }, + { 'L', specifier_directory, UINT_TO_PTR(DIRECTORY_LOGS) }, + { 'S', specifier_directory, UINT_TO_PTR(DIRECTORY_STATE) }, + { 't', specifier_directory, UINT_TO_PTR(DIRECTORY_RUNTIME) }, + + COMMON_CREDS_SPECIFIERS(arg_user ? LOOKUP_SCOPE_USER : LOOKUP_SCOPE_SYSTEM), + COMMON_TMP_SPECIFIERS, + {} + }; + + r = extract_many_words( + &buffer, + NULL, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE, + &action, + &path, + &mode, + &user, + &group, + &age, + NULL); + if (r < 0) { + if (IN_SET(r, -EINVAL, -EBADSLT)) + /* invalid quoting and such or an unknown specifier */ + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to parse line: %m"); + } else if (r < 2) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Syntax error."); + } + + if (!empty_or_dash(buffer)) { + i.argument = strdup(buffer); + if (!i.argument) + return log_oom(); + } + + if (isempty(action)) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Command too short '%s'.", action); + } + + for (pos = 1; action[pos]; pos++) { + if (action[pos] == '!' && !boot) + boot = true; + else if (action[pos] == '+' && !append_or_force) + append_or_force = true; + else if (action[pos] == '-' && !allow_failure) + allow_failure = true; + else if (action[pos] == '=' && !try_replace) + try_replace = true; + else if (action[pos] == '~' && !unbase64) + unbase64 = true; + else if (action[pos] == '^' && !from_cred) + from_cred = true; + else { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unknown modifiers in command '%s'", action); + } + } + + if (boot && !arg_boot) { + log_syntax(NULL, LOG_DEBUG, fname, line, 0, "Ignoring entry %s \"%s\" because --boot is not specified.", action, path); + return 0; + } + + i.type = action[0]; + i.append_or_force = append_or_force; + i.allow_failure = allow_failure; + i.try_replace = try_replace; + + r = specifier_printf(path, PATH_MAX-1, specifier_table, arg_root, NULL, &i.path); + if (ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(r)) + return log_unresolvable_specifier(fname, line); + if (r < 0) { + if (IN_SET(r, -EINVAL, -EBADSLT)) + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to replace specifiers in '%s': %m", path); + } + + r = patch_var_run(fname, line, &i.path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (!path_is_absolute(i.path)) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), + "Path '%s' not absolute.", i.path); + } + + path_simplify(i.path); + + switch (i.type) { + + case CREATE_DIRECTORY: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA: + case CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA: + case EMPTY_DIRECTORY: + case TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY: + case CREATE_FIFO: + case IGNORE_PATH: + case IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH: + case REMOVE_PATH: + case RECURSIVE_REMOVE_PATH: + case ADJUST_MODE: + case RELABEL_PATH: + case RECURSIVE_RELABEL_PATH: + if (i.argument) + log_syntax(NULL, + LOG_WARNING, + fname, + line, + 0, + "%c lines don't take argument fields, ignoring.", + (char) i.type); + + break; + + case CREATE_FILE: + case TRUNCATE_FILE: + break; + + case CREATE_SYMLINK: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for symlink targets."); + } + break; + + case WRITE_FILE: + if (!i.argument) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Write file requires argument."); + } + break; + + case COPY_FILES: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for copy sources."); + } + break; + + case CREATE_CHAR_DEVICE: + case CREATE_BLOCK_DEVICE: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for device node creation."); + } + + if (!i.argument) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Device file requires argument."); + } + + r = parse_devnum(i.argument, &i.major_minor); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Can't parse device file major/minor '%s'.", i.argument); + } + + break; + + case SET_XATTR: + case RECURSIVE_SET_XATTR: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for extended attributes."); + } + if (!i.argument) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), + "Set extended attribute requires argument."); + } + r = parse_xattrs_from_arg(&i); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case SET_ACL: + case RECURSIVE_SET_ACL: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for ACLs."); + } + if (!i.argument) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), + "Set ACLs requires argument."); + } + r = parse_acls_from_arg(&i); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case SET_ATTRIBUTE: + case RECURSIVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE: + if (unbase64) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "base64 decoding not supported for file attributes."); + } + if (!i.argument) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), + "Set file attribute requires argument."); + } + r = parse_attribute_from_arg(&i); + if (IN_SET(r, -EINVAL, -EBADSLT)) + *invalid_config = true; + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + default: + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), + "Unknown command type '%c'.", (char) i.type); + } + + if (!should_include_path(i.path)) + return 0; + + if (!unbase64) { + /* Do specifier expansion except if base64 mode is enabled */ + r = specifier_expansion_from_arg(specifier_table, &i); + if (ERRNO_IS_NOINFO(r)) + return log_unresolvable_specifier(fname, line); + if (r < 0) { + if (IN_SET(r, -EINVAL, -EBADSLT)) + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to substitute specifiers in argument: %m"); + } + } + + switch (i.type) { + case CREATE_SYMLINK: + if (!i.argument) { + i.argument = path_join("/usr/share/factory", i.path); + if (!i.argument) + return log_oom(); + } + break; + + case COPY_FILES: + if (!i.argument) { + i.argument = path_join("/usr/share/factory", i.path); + if (!i.argument) + return log_oom(); + } else if (!path_is_absolute(i.argument)) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Source path '%s' is not absolute.", i.argument); + + } + + if (!empty_or_root(arg_root)) { + char *p; + + p = path_join(arg_root, i.argument); + if (!p) + return log_oom(); + free_and_replace(i.argument, p); + } + + path_simplify(i.argument); + + if (laccess(i.argument, F_OK) == -ENOENT) { + /* Silently skip over lines where the source file is missing. */ + log_syntax(NULL, LOG_DEBUG, fname, line, 0, "Copy source path '%s' does not exist, skipping line.", i.argument); + return 0; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + if (from_cred) { + if (!i.argument) + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Reading from credential requested, but no credential name specified."); + if (!credential_name_valid(i.argument)) + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential name not valid: %s", i.argument); + + r = read_credential(i.argument, &i.binary_argument, &i.binary_argument_size); + if (IN_SET(r, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) { + /* Silently skip over lines that have no credentials passed */ + log_syntax(NULL, LOG_DEBUG, fname, line, 0, + "Credential '%s' not specified, skipping line.", i.argument); + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read credential '%s': %m", i.argument); + } + + /* If base64 decoding is requested, do so now */ + if (unbase64 && item_binary_argument(&i)) { + _cleanup_free_ void *data = NULL; + size_t data_size = 0; + + r = unbase64mem(item_binary_argument(&i), item_binary_argument_size(&i), &data, &data_size); + if (r < 0) + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to base64 decode specified argument '%s': %m", i.argument); + + free_and_replace(i.binary_argument, data); + i.binary_argument_size = data_size; + } + + if (!empty_or_root(arg_root)) { + char *p; + + p = path_join(arg_root, i.path); + if (!p) + return log_oom(); + free_and_replace(i.path, p); + } + + if (!empty_or_dash(user)) { + const char *u; + + u = startswith(user, ":"); + if (u) + i.uid_only_create = true; + else + u = user; + + r = find_uid(u, &i.uid, uid_cache); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to resolve user '%s': %m", u); + } + + i.uid_set = true; + } + + if (!empty_or_dash(group)) { + const char *g; + + g = startswith(group, ":"); + if (g) + i.gid_only_create = true; + else + g = group; + + r = find_gid(g, &i.gid, gid_cache); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Failed to resolve group '%s'.", g); + } + + i.gid_set = true; + } + + if (!empty_or_dash(mode)) { + const char *mm; + unsigned m; + + for (mm = mode;; mm++) { + if (*mm == '~') + i.mask_perms = true; + else if (*mm == ':') + i.mode_only_create = true; + else + break; + } + + r = parse_mode(mm, &m); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Invalid mode '%s'.", mode); + } + + i.mode = m; + i.mode_set = true; + } else + i.mode = IN_SET(i.type, CREATE_DIRECTORY, TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY, CREATE_SUBVOLUME, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA, CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA) ? 0755 : 0644; + + if (!empty_or_dash(age)) { + const char *a = age; + _cleanup_free_ char *seconds = NULL, *age_by = NULL; + + if (*a == '~') { + i.keep_first_level = true; + a++; + } + + /* Format: "age-by:age"; where age-by is "[abcmABCM]+". */ + r = split_pair(a, ":", &age_by, &seconds); + if (r == -ENOMEM) + return log_oom(); + if (r < 0 && r != -EINVAL) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse age-by for '%s': %m", age); + if (r >= 0) { + /* We found a ":", parse the "age-by" part. */ + r = parse_age_by_from_arg(age_by, &i); + if (r == -ENOMEM) + return log_oom(); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Invalid age-by '%s'.", age_by); + } + + /* For parsing the "age" part, after the ":". */ + a = seconds; + } + + r = parse_sec(a, &i.age); + if (r < 0) { + *invalid_config = true; + return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, fname, line, r, "Invalid age '%s'.", a); + } + + i.age_set = true; + } + + h = needs_glob(i.type) ? globs : items; + + existing = ordered_hashmap_get(h, i.path); + if (existing) { + if (is_duplicated_item(existing, &i)) { + log_syntax(NULL, LOG_NOTICE, fname, line, 0, + "Duplicate line for path \"%s\", ignoring.", i.path); + return 0; + } + } else { + existing = new0(ItemArray, 1); + if (!existing) + return log_oom(); + + r = ordered_hashmap_put(h, i.path, existing); + if (r < 0) { + free(existing); + return log_oom(); + } + } + + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(existing->items, existing->n_items + 1)) + return log_oom(); + + existing->items[existing->n_items++] = i; + i = (struct Item) {}; + + /* Sort item array, to enforce stable ordering of application */ + typesafe_qsort(existing->items, existing->n_items, item_compare); + + return 0; +} + +static int cat_config(char **config_dirs, char **args) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL; + int r; + + r = conf_files_list_with_replacement(arg_root, config_dirs, arg_replace, &files, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return cat_files(NULL, files, 0); +} + +static int exclude_default_prefixes(void) { + int r; + + /* Provide an easy way to exclude virtual/memory file systems from what we do here. Useful in + * combination with --root= where we probably don't want to apply stuff to these dirs as they are + * likely over-mounted if the root directory is actually used, and it wouldbe less than ideal to have + * all kinds of files created/adjusted underneath these mount points. */ + + r = strv_extend_strv( + &arg_exclude_prefixes, + STRV_MAKE("/dev", + "/proc", + "/run", + "/sys"), + true); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + return 0; +} + +static int help(void) { + _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; + int r; + + r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-tmpfiles", "8", &link); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + printf("%s [OPTIONS...] [CONFIGURATION FILE...]\n" + "\n%sCreates, deletes and cleans up volatile and temporary files and directories.%s\n\n" + " -h --help Show this help\n" + " --user Execute user configuration\n" + " --version Show package version\n" + " --cat-config Show configuration files\n" + " --create Create marked files/directories\n" + " --clean Clean up marked directories\n" + " --remove Remove marked files/directories\n" + " --boot Execute actions only safe at boot\n" + " --prefix=PATH Only apply rules with the specified prefix\n" + " --exclude-prefix=PATH Ignore rules with the specified prefix\n" + " -E Ignore rules prefixed with /dev, /proc, /run, /sys\n" + " --root=PATH Operate on an alternate filesystem root\n" + " --image=PATH Operate on disk image as filesystem root\n" + " --replace=PATH Treat arguments as replacement for PATH\n" + " --no-pager Do not pipe output into a pager\n" + "\nSee the %s for details.\n", + program_invocation_short_name, + ansi_highlight(), + ansi_normal(), + link); + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { + + enum { + ARG_VERSION = 0x100, + ARG_CAT_CONFIG, + ARG_USER, + ARG_CREATE, + ARG_CLEAN, + ARG_REMOVE, + ARG_BOOT, + ARG_PREFIX, + ARG_EXCLUDE_PREFIX, + ARG_ROOT, + ARG_IMAGE, + ARG_REPLACE, + ARG_NO_PAGER, + }; + + static const struct option options[] = { + { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' }, + { "user", no_argument, NULL, ARG_USER }, + { "version", no_argument, NULL, ARG_VERSION }, + { "cat-config", no_argument, NULL, ARG_CAT_CONFIG }, + { "create", no_argument, NULL, ARG_CREATE }, + { "clean", no_argument, NULL, ARG_CLEAN }, + { "remove", no_argument, NULL, ARG_REMOVE }, + { "boot", no_argument, NULL, ARG_BOOT }, + { "prefix", required_argument, NULL, ARG_PREFIX }, + { "exclude-prefix", required_argument, NULL, ARG_EXCLUDE_PREFIX }, + { "root", required_argument, NULL, ARG_ROOT }, + { "image", required_argument, NULL, ARG_IMAGE }, + { "replace", required_argument, NULL, ARG_REPLACE }, + { "no-pager", no_argument, NULL, ARG_NO_PAGER }, + {} + }; + + int c, r; + + assert(argc >= 0); + assert(argv); + + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "hE", options, NULL)) >= 0) + + switch (c) { + + case 'h': + return help(); + + case ARG_VERSION: + return version(); + + case ARG_CAT_CONFIG: + arg_cat_config = true; + break; + + case ARG_USER: + arg_user = true; + break; + + case ARG_CREATE: + arg_operation |= OPERATION_CREATE; + break; + + case ARG_CLEAN: + arg_operation |= OPERATION_CLEAN; + break; + + case ARG_REMOVE: + arg_operation |= OPERATION_REMOVE; + break; + + case ARG_BOOT: + arg_boot = true; + break; + + case ARG_PREFIX: + if (strv_push(&arg_include_prefixes, optarg) < 0) + return log_oom(); + break; + + case ARG_EXCLUDE_PREFIX: + if (strv_push(&arg_exclude_prefixes, optarg) < 0) + return log_oom(); + break; + + case ARG_ROOT: + r = parse_path_argument(optarg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_root); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case ARG_IMAGE: +#ifdef STANDALONE + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "This systemd-tmpfiles version is compiled without support for --image=."); +#else + r = parse_path_argument(optarg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_image); + if (r < 0) + return r; +#endif + /* Imply -E here since it makes little sense to create files persistently in the /run mountpoint of a disk image */ + _fallthrough_; + + case 'E': + r = exclude_default_prefixes(); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + break; + + case ARG_REPLACE: + if (!path_is_absolute(optarg) || + !endswith(optarg, ".conf")) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "The argument to --replace= must an absolute path to a config file"); + + arg_replace = optarg; + break; + + case ARG_NO_PAGER: + arg_pager_flags |= PAGER_DISABLE; + break; + + case '?': + return -EINVAL; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + + if (arg_operation == 0 && !arg_cat_config) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "You need to specify at least one of --clean, --create or --remove."); + + if (arg_replace && arg_cat_config) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Option --replace= is not supported with --cat-config"); + + if (arg_replace && optind >= argc) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "When --replace= is given, some configuration items must be specified"); + + if (arg_root && arg_user) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Combination of --user and --root= is not supported."); + + if (arg_image && arg_root) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Please specify either --root= or --image=, the combination of both is not supported."); + + return 1; +} + +static int read_config_file( + char **config_dirs, + const char *fn, + bool ignore_enoent, + bool *invalid_config) { + + _cleanup_(hashmap_freep) Hashmap *uid_cache = NULL, *gid_cache = NULL; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *_f = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *pp = NULL; + unsigned v = 0; + FILE *f; + ItemArray *ia; + int r = 0; + + assert(fn); + + if (streq(fn, "-")) { + log_debug("Reading config from stdin%s", special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ELLIPSIS)); + fn = "<stdin>"; + f = stdin; + } else { + r = search_and_fopen(fn, "re", arg_root, (const char**) config_dirs, &_f, &pp); + if (r < 0) { + if (ignore_enoent && r == -ENOENT) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open \"%s\", ignoring: %m", fn); + return 0; + } + + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open '%s': %m", fn); + } + + log_debug("Reading config file \"%s\"%s", pp, special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ELLIPSIS)); + fn = pp; + f = _f; + } + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + bool invalid_line = false; + char *l; + int k; + + k = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line); + if (k < 0) + return log_error_errno(k, "Failed to read '%s': %m", fn); + if (k == 0) + break; + + v++; + + l = strstrip(line); + if (IN_SET(*l, 0, '#')) + continue; + + k = parse_line(fn, v, l, &invalid_line, &uid_cache, &gid_cache); + if (k < 0) { + if (invalid_line) + /* Allow reporting with a special code if the caller requested this */ + *invalid_config = true; + else if (r == 0) + /* The first error becomes our return value */ + r = k; + } + } + + /* we have to determine age parameter for each entry of type X */ + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(ia, globs) + for (size_t ni = 0; ni < ia->n_items; ni++) { + ItemArray *ja; + Item *i = ia->items + ni, *candidate_item = NULL; + + if (i->type != IGNORE_DIRECTORY_PATH) + continue; + + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(ja, items) + for (size_t nj = 0; nj < ja->n_items; nj++) { + Item *j = ja->items + nj; + + if (!IN_SET(j->type, CREATE_DIRECTORY, + TRUNCATE_DIRECTORY, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_INHERIT_QUOTA, + CREATE_SUBVOLUME_NEW_QUOTA)) + continue; + + if (path_equal(j->path, i->path)) { + candidate_item = j; + break; + } + + if (candidate_item + ? (path_startswith(j->path, candidate_item->path) && fnmatch(i->path, j->path, FNM_PATHNAME | FNM_PERIOD) == 0) + : path_startswith(i->path, j->path) != NULL) + candidate_item = j; + } + + if (candidate_item && candidate_item->age_set) { + i->age = candidate_item->age; + i->age_set = true; + } + } + + if (ferror(f)) { + log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read from file %s: %m", fn); + if (r == 0) + r = -EIO; + } + + return r; +} + +static int parse_arguments(char **config_dirs, char **args, bool *invalid_config) { + int r; + + STRV_FOREACH(arg, args) { + r = read_config_file(config_dirs, *arg, false, invalid_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int read_config_files(char **config_dirs, char **args, bool *invalid_config) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + int r; + + r = conf_files_list_with_replacement(arg_root, config_dirs, arg_replace, &files, &p); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + STRV_FOREACH(f, files) + if (p && path_equal(*f, p)) { + log_debug("Parsing arguments at position \"%s\"%s", *f, special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ELLIPSIS)); + + r = parse_arguments(config_dirs, args, invalid_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else + /* Just warn, ignore result otherwise. + * read_config_file() has some debug output, so no need to print anything. */ + (void) read_config_file(config_dirs, *f, true, invalid_config); + + return 0; +} + +static int read_credential_lines(bool *invalid_config) { + _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; + const char *d; + int r; + + r = get_credentials_dir(&d); + if (r == -ENXIO) + return 0; + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get credentials directory: %m"); + + j = path_join(d, "tmpfiles.extra"); + if (!j) + return log_oom(); + + (void) read_config_file(/* config_dirs= */ NULL, j, /* ignore_enoent= */ true, invalid_config); + return 0; +} + +static int link_parent(ItemArray *a) { + const char *path; + char *prefix; + int r; + + assert(a); + + /* Finds the closest "parent" item array for the specified item array. Then registers the specified item array + * as child of it, and fills the parent in, linking them both ways. This allows us to later create parents + * before their children, and clean up/remove children before their parents. */ + + if (a->n_items <= 0) + return 0; + + path = a->items[0].path; + prefix = newa(char, strlen(path) + 1); + PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) { + ItemArray *j; + + j = ordered_hashmap_get(items, prefix); + if (!j) + j = ordered_hashmap_get(globs, prefix); + if (j) { + r = set_ensure_put(&j->children, NULL, a); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + a->parent = j; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_PRIVATE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(item_array_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, + ItemArray, item_array_free); + +static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { +#ifndef STANDALONE + _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; + _cleanup_(umount_and_rmdir_and_freep) char *unlink_dir = NULL; +#endif + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **config_dirs = NULL; + bool invalid_config = false; + ItemArray *a; + enum { + PHASE_REMOVE_AND_CLEAN, + PHASE_CREATE, + _PHASE_MAX + } phase; + int r, k; + + r = parse_argv(argc, argv); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + log_setup(); + + /* We require /proc/ for a lot of our operations, i.e. for adjusting access modes, for anything + * SELinux related, for recursive operation, for xattr, acl and chattr handling, for btrfs stuff and + * a lot more. It's probably the majority of invocations where /proc/ is required. Since people + * apparently invoke it without anyway and are surprised about the failures, let's catch this early + * and output a nice and friendly warning. */ + if (proc_mounted() == 0) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOSYS), + "/proc/ is not mounted, but required for successful operation of systemd-tmpfiles. " + "Please mount /proc/. Alternatively, consider using the --root= or --image= switches."); + + /* Descending down file system trees might take a lot of fds */ + (void) rlimit_nofile_bump(HIGH_RLIMIT_NOFILE); + + if (arg_user) { + r = user_config_paths(&config_dirs); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to initialize configuration directory list: %m"); + } else { + config_dirs = strv_split_nulstr(CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("tmpfiles.d")); + if (!config_dirs) + return log_oom(); + } + + if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { + _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, config_dirs) { + _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; + + j = path_join(arg_root, *i); + if (!j) + return log_oom(); + + if (!strextend(&t, "\n\t", j)) + return log_oom(); + } + + log_debug("Looking for configuration files in (higher priority first):%s", t); + } + + if (arg_cat_config) { + pager_open(arg_pager_flags); + + return cat_config(config_dirs, argv + optind); + } + + umask(0022); + + r = mac_selinux_init(); + if (r < 0) + return r; + +#ifndef STANDALONE + if (arg_image) { + assert(!arg_root); + + r = mount_image_privately_interactively( + arg_image, + DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT | + DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT | + DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS | + DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK | + DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK | + DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS, + &unlink_dir, + &loop_device); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + arg_root = strdup(unlink_dir); + if (!arg_root) + return log_oom(); + } +#else + assert(!arg_image); +#endif + + items = ordered_hashmap_new(&item_array_hash_ops); + globs = ordered_hashmap_new(&item_array_hash_ops); + if (!items || !globs) + return log_oom(); + + /* If command line arguments are specified along with --replace, read all + * configuration files and insert the positional arguments at the specified + * place. Otherwise, if command line arguments are specified, execute just + * them, and finally, without --replace= or any positional arguments, just + * read configuration and execute it. + */ + if (arg_replace || optind >= argc) + r = read_config_files(config_dirs, argv + optind, &invalid_config); + else + r = parse_arguments(config_dirs, argv + optind, &invalid_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = read_credential_lines(&invalid_config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* Let's now link up all child/parent relationships */ + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, items) { + r = link_parent(a); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, globs) { + r = link_parent(a); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + /* If multiple operations are requested, let's first run the remove/clean operations, and only then the create + * operations. i.e. that we first clean out the platform we then build on. */ + for (phase = 0; phase < _PHASE_MAX; phase++) { + OperationMask op; + + if (phase == PHASE_REMOVE_AND_CLEAN) + op = arg_operation & (OPERATION_REMOVE|OPERATION_CLEAN); + else if (phase == PHASE_CREATE) + op = arg_operation & OPERATION_CREATE; + else + assert_not_reached(); + + if (op == 0) /* Nothing requested in this phase */ + continue; + + /* The non-globbing ones usually create things, hence we apply them first */ + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, items) { + k = process_item_array(a, op); + if (k < 0 && r >= 0) + r = k; + } + + /* The globbing ones usually alter things, hence we apply them second. */ + ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, globs) { + k = process_item_array(a, op); + if (k < 0 && r >= 0) + r = k; + } + } + + if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE(r)) + return r; + if (invalid_config) + return EX_DATAERR; + if (r < 0) + return EX_CANTCREAT; + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_WITH_POSITIVE_FAILURE(run); |