Adding upstream version 1:115.7.0.upstream/1%115.7.0upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 431 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js b/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e96ea2df6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+"use strict";
+
+// These tests ensure content signatures are working correctly.
+
+const TEST_DATA_DIR = "test_content_signing/";
+
+const ONECRL_NAME = "oneCRL-signer.mozilla.org";
+const ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME = "remotenewtab.content-signature.mozilla.org";
+var VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM = Services.telemetry.getHistogramById(
+  "CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_STATUS"
+);
+var ERROR_HISTOGRAM = Services.telemetry.getKeyedHistogramById(
+  "CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS"
+);
+
+function getSignatureVerifier() {
+  return Cc["@mozilla.org/security/contentsignatureverifier;1"].getService(
+    Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier
+  );
+}
+
+function getCertHash(name) {
+  let cert = constructCertFromFile(`test_content_signing/${name}.pem`);
+  return cert.sha256Fingerprint.replace(/:/g, "");
+}
+
+function loadChain(prefix, names) {
+  let chain = [];
+  for (let name of names) {
+    let filename = `${prefix}_${name}.pem`;
+    chain.push(readFile(do_get_file(filename)));
+  }
+  return chain;
+}
+
+function check_telemetry(expected_index, expected, expectedId) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    let expected_value = 0;
+    if (i == expected_index) {
+      expected_value = expected;
+    }
+    let errorSnapshot = ERROR_HISTOGRAM.snapshot();
+    for (let k in errorSnapshot) {
+      // We clear the histogram every time so there should be only this one
+      // category.
+      equal(k, expectedId);
+      equal(errorSnapshot[k].values[i] || 0, expected_value);
+    }
+    equal(
+      VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.snapshot().values[i] || 0,
+      expected_value,
+      "count " +
+        i +
+        ": " +
+        VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.snapshot().values[i] +
+        " expected " +
+        expected_value
+    );
+  }
+  VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.clear();
+  ERROR_HISTOGRAM.clear();
+}
+
+add_task(async function run_test() {
+  // set up some data
+  const DATA = readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + "test.txt"));
+  const GOOD_SIGNATURE =
+    "p384ecdsa=" +
+    readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + "test.txt.signature")).trim();
+
+  const BAD_SIGNATURE =
+    "p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2r" +
+    "UWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1G" +
+    "q25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L";
+
+  let remoteNewTabChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "remote_newtab_ee",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  let oneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "onecrl_ee",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  let oneCRLBadKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "onecrl_wrong_key_ee",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  let noSANChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "onecrl_no_SAN_ee",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  let expiredOneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "onecrl_ee_expired",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  let notValidYetOneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
+    "onecrl_ee_not_valid_yet",
+    "int",
+  ]);
+
+  // Check signature verification works without throwing when using the wrong
+  // root
+  VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.clear();
+  let chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  let verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier.ContentSignatureProdRoot
+    )),
+    "using the wrong root, signatures should fail to verify but not throw."
+  );
+  // Check for generic chain building error.
+  check_telemetry(6, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
+
+  // Check good signatures from good certificates with the correct SAN
+  ok(
+    await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    ),
+    "A OneCRL signature should verify with the OneCRL chain"
+  );
+  let chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain2,
+      ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    ),
+    "A newtab signature should verify with the newtab chain"
+  );
+  // Check for valid signature
+  check_telemetry(0, 2, getCertHash("content_signing_remote_newtab_ee"));
+
+  // Check a bad signature when a good chain is provided
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      BAD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A bad signature should not verify"
+  );
+  // Check for invalid signature
+  check_telemetry(1, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
+  // one used to create the signature
+  let badKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      badKeyChain,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong"
+  );
+  // Check for wrong key in cert.
+  check_telemetry(9, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_wrong_key_ee"));
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
+  // one used to create the signature (this time, an RSA key)
+  let rsaKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      rsaKeyChain,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong (RSA)"
+  );
+  // Check for wrong key in cert.
+  check_telemetry(9, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_wrong_key_ee"));
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with no path to root
+  let missingInt = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      missingInt,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing int)"
+  );
+  // Check for generic chain building error.
+  check_telemetry(6, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
+
+  // Check good signatures from good certificates with the wrong SANs
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A OneCRL signature should not verify if we require the newtab SAN"
+  );
+  // Check for invalid EE cert.
+  check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
+
+  chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain2,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A newtab signature should not verify if we require the OneCRL SAN"
+  );
+  // Check for invalid EE cert.
+  check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_remote_newtab_ee"));
+
+  // Check good signatures with good chains with some other invalid names
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      "",
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match an empty name"
+  );
+  // Check for invalid EE cert.
+  check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
+
+  // Test expired certificate.
+  let chainExpired = expiredOneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chainExpired,
+      "",
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the signing certificate is expired"
+  );
+  // Check for expired cert.
+  check_telemetry(4, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee_expired"));
+
+  // Test not valid yet certificate.
+  let chainNotValidYet = notValidYetOneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chainNotValidYet,
+      "",
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the signing certificate is not valid yet"
+  );
+  // Check for not yet valid cert.
+  check_telemetry(5, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee_not_valid_yet"));
+
+  let relatedName = "subdomain." + ONECRL_NAME;
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      relatedName,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a related name"
+  );
+
+  let randomName =
+    "\xb1\x9bU\x1c\xae\xaa3\x19H\xdb\xed\xa1\xa1\xe0\x81\xfb" +
+    "\xb2\x8f\x1cP\xe5\x8b\x9c\xc2s\xd3\x1f\x8e\xbbN";
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      randomName,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a random name"
+  );
+
+  // check good signatures with chains that have strange or missing SANs
+  chain1 = noSANChain.join("\n");
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a supplied name"
+  );
+
+  // Check malformed signature data
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  let bad_signatures = [
+    // wrong length
+    "p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-" +
+      "7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L==",
+    // incorrectly encoded
+    "p384ecdsa='WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi" +
+      "-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L=",
+    // missing directive
+    "other_directive=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ec" +
+      "HiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L",
+    // actually sha256 with RSA
+    "p384ecdsa=XS_jiQsS5qlzQyUKaA1nAnQn_OvxhvDfKybflB8Xe5gNH1wNmPGK1qN-jpeTfK" +
+      "6ob3l3gCTXrsMnOXMeht0kPP3wLfVgXbuuO135pQnsv0c-ltRMWLe56Cm4S4Z6E7WWKLPWaj" +
+      "jhAcG5dZxjffP9g7tuPP4lTUJztyc4d1z_zQZakEG7R0vN7P5_CaX9MiMzP4R7nC3H4Ba6yi" +
+      "yjlGvsZwJ_C5zDQzWWs95czUbMzbDScEZ_7AWnidw91jZn-fUK3xLb6m-Zb_b4GAqZ-vnXIf" +
+      "LpLB1Nzal42BQZn7i4rhAldYdcVvy7rOMlsTUb5Zz6vpVW9LCT9lMJ7Sq1xbU-0g==",
+  ];
+  for (let badSig of bad_signatures) {
+    await Assert.rejects(
+      verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+        DATA,
+        badSig,
+        chain1,
+        ONECRL_NAME,
+        Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+      ),
+      /NS_ERROR/,
+      `Bad or malformed signature "${badSig}" should be rejected`
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Check malformed and missing certificate chain data
+  let chainSuffix = [oneCRLChain[1], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
+  let badChains = [
+    // no data
+    "",
+    // completely wrong data
+    "blah blah \n blah",
+  ];
+
+  let badSections = [
+    // data that looks like PEM but isn't
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n",
+    // data that will start to parse but won't base64decode
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+    // data with garbage outside of PEM sections
+    "this data is garbage\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n" +
+      "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+  ];
+
+  for (let badSection of badSections) {
+    // ensure we test each bad section on its own...
+    badChains.push(badSection);
+    // ... and as part of a chain with good certificates
+    badChains.push(badSection + "\n" + chainSuffix);
+  }
+
+  for (let badChain of badChains) {
+    await Assert.rejects(
+      verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+        DATA,
+        GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+        badChain,
+        ONECRL_NAME,
+        Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+      ),
+      /NS_ERROR/,
+      `Bad chain data starting "${badChain.substring(0, 80)}" ` +
+        "should be rejected"
+    );
+  }
+
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA + "appended data",
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (append)"
+  );
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      "prefixed data" + DATA,
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (prefix)"
+  );
+  ok(
+    !(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
+      DATA.replace(/e/g, "i"),
+      GOOD_SIGNATURE,
+      chain1,
+      ONECRL_NAME,
+      Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
+    )),
+    "A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (modify)"
+  );
+});