diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification')
10 files changed, 2799 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Base.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Base.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4da45f880e --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Base.js @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.VerificationEvent = exports.VerificationBase = exports.SwitchStartEventError = void 0; +var _event = require("../../models/event"); +var _event2 = require("../../@types/event"); +var _logger = require("../../logger"); +var _deviceinfo = require("../deviceinfo"); +var _Error = require("./Error"); +var _CrossSigning = require("../CrossSigning"); +var _typedEventEmitter = require("../../models/typed-event-emitter"); +var _verification = require("../../crypto-api/verification"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd + Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ /** + * Base class for verification methods. + */ +const timeoutException = new Error("Verification timed out"); +class SwitchStartEventError extends Error { + constructor(startEvent) { + super(); + this.startEvent = startEvent; + } +} + +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ +exports.SwitchStartEventError = SwitchStartEventError; +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ +const VerificationEvent = _verification.VerifierEvent; + +/** @deprecated use VerifierEventHandlerMap */ +exports.VerificationEvent = VerificationEvent; +// The type parameters of VerificationBase are no longer used, but we need some placeholders to maintain +// backwards compatibility with applications that reference the class. +class VerificationBase extends _typedEventEmitter.TypedEventEmitter { + /** + * Base class for verification methods. + * + * <p>Once a verifier object is created, the verification can be started by + * calling the verify() method, which will return a promise that will + * resolve when the verification is completed, or reject if it could not + * complete.</p> + * + * <p>Subclasses must have a NAME class property.</p> + * + * @param channel - the verification channel to send verification messages over. + * TODO: Channel types + * + * @param baseApis - base matrix api interface + * + * @param userId - the user ID that is being verified + * + * @param deviceId - the device ID that is being verified + * + * @param startEvent - the m.key.verification.start event that + * initiated this verification, if any + * + * @param request - the key verification request object related to + * this verification, if any + */ + constructor(channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request) { + super(); + this.channel = channel; + this.baseApis = baseApis; + this.userId = userId; + this.deviceId = deviceId; + this.startEvent = startEvent; + this.request = request; + _defineProperty(this, "cancelled", false); + _defineProperty(this, "_done", false); + _defineProperty(this, "promise", null); + _defineProperty(this, "transactionTimeoutTimer", null); + _defineProperty(this, "expectedEvent", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "resolve", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "reject", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "resolveEvent", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "rejectEvent", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "started", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "doVerification", void 0); + } + get initiatedByMe() { + // if there is no start event yet, + // we probably want to send it, + // which happens if we initiate + if (!this.startEvent) { + return true; + } + const sender = this.startEvent.getSender(); + const content = this.startEvent.getContent(); + return sender === this.baseApis.getUserId() && content.from_device === this.baseApis.getDeviceId(); + } + get hasBeenCancelled() { + return this.cancelled; + } + resetTimer() { + _logger.logger.info("Refreshing/starting the verification transaction timeout timer"); + if (this.transactionTimeoutTimer !== null) { + clearTimeout(this.transactionTimeoutTimer); + } + this.transactionTimeoutTimer = setTimeout(() => { + if (!this._done && !this.cancelled) { + _logger.logger.info("Triggering verification timeout"); + this.cancel(timeoutException); + } + }, 10 * 60 * 1000); // 10 minutes + } + + endTimer() { + if (this.transactionTimeoutTimer !== null) { + clearTimeout(this.transactionTimeoutTimer); + this.transactionTimeoutTimer = null; + } + } + send(type, uncompletedContent) { + return this.channel.send(type, uncompletedContent); + } + waitForEvent(type) { + if (this._done) { + return Promise.reject(new Error("Verification is already done")); + } + const existingEvent = this.request.getEventFromOtherParty(type); + if (existingEvent) { + return Promise.resolve(existingEvent); + } + this.expectedEvent = type; + return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + this.resolveEvent = resolve; + this.rejectEvent = reject; + }); + } + canSwitchStartEvent(event) { + return false; + } + switchStartEvent(event) { + if (this.canSwitchStartEvent(event)) { + _logger.logger.log("Verification Base: switching verification start event", { + restartingFlow: !!this.rejectEvent + }); + if (this.rejectEvent) { + const reject = this.rejectEvent; + this.rejectEvent = undefined; + reject(new SwitchStartEventError(event)); + } else { + this.startEvent = event; + } + } + } + handleEvent(e) { + if (this._done) { + return; + } else if (e.getType() === this.expectedEvent) { + // if we receive an expected m.key.verification.done, then just + // ignore it, since we don't need to do anything about it + if (this.expectedEvent !== _event2.EventType.KeyVerificationDone) { + this.expectedEvent = undefined; + this.rejectEvent = undefined; + this.resetTimer(); + this.resolveEvent?.(e); + } + } else if (e.getType() === _event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel) { + const reject = this.reject; + this.reject = undefined; + // there is only promise to reject if verify has been called + if (reject) { + const content = e.getContent(); + const { + reason, + code + } = content; + reject(new Error(`Other side cancelled verification ` + `because ${reason} (${code})`)); + } + } else if (this.expectedEvent) { + // only cancel if there is an event expected. + // if there is no event expected, it means verify() wasn't called + // and we're just replaying the timeline events when syncing + // after a refresh when the events haven't been stored in the cache yet. + const exception = new Error("Unexpected message: expecting " + this.expectedEvent + " but got " + e.getType()); + this.expectedEvent = undefined; + if (this.rejectEvent) { + const reject = this.rejectEvent; + this.rejectEvent = undefined; + reject(exception); + } + this.cancel(exception); + } + } + async done() { + this.endTimer(); // always kill the activity timer + if (!this._done) { + this.request.onVerifierFinished(); + this.resolve?.(); + return (0, _CrossSigning.requestKeysDuringVerification)(this.baseApis, this.userId, this.deviceId); + } + } + cancel(e) { + this.endTimer(); // always kill the activity timer + if (!this._done) { + this.cancelled = true; + this.request.onVerifierCancelled(); + if (this.userId && this.deviceId) { + // send a cancellation to the other user (if it wasn't + // cancelled by the other user) + if (e === timeoutException) { + const timeoutEvent = (0, _Error.newTimeoutError)(); + this.send(timeoutEvent.getType(), timeoutEvent.getContent()); + } else if (e instanceof _event.MatrixEvent) { + const sender = e.getSender(); + if (sender !== this.userId) { + const content = e.getContent(); + if (e.getType() === _event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel) { + content.code = content.code || "m.unknown"; + content.reason = content.reason || content.body || "Unknown reason"; + this.send(_event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel, content); + } else { + this.send(_event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel, { + code: "m.unknown", + reason: content.body || "Unknown reason" + }); + } + } + } else { + this.send(_event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel, { + code: "m.unknown", + reason: e.toString() + }); + } + } + if (this.promise !== null) { + // when we cancel without a promise, we end up with a promise + // but no reject function. If cancel is called again, we'd error. + if (this.reject) this.reject(e); + } else { + // FIXME: this causes an "Uncaught promise" console message + // if nothing ends up chaining this promise. + this.promise = Promise.reject(e); + } + // Also emit a 'cancel' event that the app can listen for to detect cancellation + // before calling verify() + this.emit(VerificationEvent.Cancel, e); + } + } + + /** + * Begin the key verification + * + * @returns Promise which resolves when the verification has + * completed. + */ + verify() { + if (this.promise) return this.promise; + this.promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + this.resolve = (...args) => { + this._done = true; + this.endTimer(); + resolve(...args); + }; + this.reject = e => { + this._done = true; + this.endTimer(); + reject(e); + }; + }); + if (this.doVerification && !this.started) { + this.started = true; + this.resetTimer(); // restart the timeout + new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + const crossSignId = this.baseApis.crypto.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(this.userId)?.getId(); + if (crossSignId === this.deviceId) { + reject(new Error("Device ID is the same as the cross-signing ID")); + } + resolve(); + }).then(() => this.doVerification()).then(this.done.bind(this), this.cancel.bind(this)); + } + return this.promise; + } + async verifyKeys(userId, keys, verifier) { + // we try to verify all the keys that we're told about, but we might + // not know about all of them, so keep track of the keys that we know + // about, and ignore the rest + const verifiedDevices = []; + for (const [keyId, keyInfo] of Object.entries(keys)) { + const deviceId = keyId.split(":", 2)[1]; + const device = this.baseApis.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId); + if (device) { + verifier(keyId, device, keyInfo); + verifiedDevices.push([deviceId, keyId, device.keys[keyId]]); + } else { + const crossSigningInfo = this.baseApis.crypto.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId); + if (crossSigningInfo && crossSigningInfo.getId() === deviceId) { + verifier(keyId, _deviceinfo.DeviceInfo.fromStorage({ + keys: { + [keyId]: deviceId + } + }, deviceId), keyInfo); + verifiedDevices.push([deviceId, keyId, deviceId]); + } else { + _logger.logger.warn(`verification: Could not find device ${deviceId} to verify`); + } + } + } + + // if none of the keys could be verified, then error because the app + // should be informed about that + if (!verifiedDevices.length) { + throw new Error("No devices could be verified"); + } + _logger.logger.info("Verification completed! Marking devices verified: ", verifiedDevices); + // TODO: There should probably be a batch version of this, otherwise it's going + // to upload each signature in a separate API call which is silly because the + // API supports as many signatures as you like. + for (const [deviceId, keyId, key] of verifiedDevices) { + await this.baseApis.crypto.setDeviceVerification(userId, deviceId, true, null, null, { + [keyId]: key + }); + } + + // if one of the user's own devices is being marked as verified / unverified, + // check the key backup status, since whether or not we use this depends on + // whether it has a signature from a verified device + if (userId == this.baseApis.credentials.userId) { + await this.baseApis.checkKeyBackup(); + } + } + get events() { + return undefined; + } +} +exports.VerificationBase = VerificationBase;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Error.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Error.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d24c03955 --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/Error.js @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.errorFactory = errorFactory; +exports.errorFromEvent = errorFromEvent; +exports.newUserCancelledError = exports.newUnknownMethodError = exports.newUnexpectedMessageError = exports.newTimeoutError = exports.newKeyMismatchError = exports.newInvalidMessageError = void 0; +exports.newVerificationError = newVerificationError; +var _event = require("../../models/event"); +var _event2 = require("../../@types/event"); +/* +Copyright 2018 - 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +/** + * Error messages. + */ + +function newVerificationError(code, reason, extraData) { + const content = Object.assign({}, { + code, + reason + }, extraData); + return new _event.MatrixEvent({ + type: _event2.EventType.KeyVerificationCancel, + content + }); +} +function errorFactory(code, reason) { + return function (extraData) { + return newVerificationError(code, reason, extraData); + }; +} + +/** + * The verification was cancelled by the user. + */ +const newUserCancelledError = errorFactory("m.user", "Cancelled by user"); + +/** + * The verification timed out. + */ +exports.newUserCancelledError = newUserCancelledError; +const newTimeoutError = errorFactory("m.timeout", "Timed out"); + +/** + * An unknown method was selected. + */ +exports.newTimeoutError = newTimeoutError; +const newUnknownMethodError = errorFactory("m.unknown_method", "Unknown method"); + +/** + * An unexpected message was sent. + */ +exports.newUnknownMethodError = newUnknownMethodError; +const newUnexpectedMessageError = errorFactory("m.unexpected_message", "Unexpected message"); + +/** + * The key does not match. + */ +exports.newUnexpectedMessageError = newUnexpectedMessageError; +const newKeyMismatchError = errorFactory("m.key_mismatch", "Key mismatch"); + +/** + * An invalid message was sent. + */ +exports.newKeyMismatchError = newKeyMismatchError; +const newInvalidMessageError = errorFactory("m.invalid_message", "Invalid message"); +exports.newInvalidMessageError = newInvalidMessageError; +function errorFromEvent(event) { + const content = event.getContent(); + if (content) { + const { + code, + reason + } = content; + return { + code, + reason + }; + } else { + return { + code: "Unknown error", + reason: "m.unknown" + }; + } +}
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/IllegalMethod.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/IllegalMethod.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..396d911eec --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/IllegalMethod.js @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.IllegalMethod = void 0; +var _Base = require("./Base"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ /** + * Verification method that is illegal to have (cannot possibly + * do verification with this method). + */ +class IllegalMethod extends _Base.VerificationBase { + constructor(...args) { + super(...args); + _defineProperty(this, "doVerification", async () => { + throw new Error("Verification is not possible with this method"); + }); + } + static factory(channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request) { + return new IllegalMethod(channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request); + } + + // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/naming-convention + static get NAME() { + // Typically the name will be something else, but to complete + // the contract we offer a default one here. + return "org.matrix.illegal_method"; + } +} +exports.IllegalMethod = IllegalMethod;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/QRCode.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/QRCode.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2334c64e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/QRCode.js @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD = exports.SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD = exports.ReciprocateQRCode = exports.QrCodeEvent = exports.QRCodeData = void 0; +var _Base = require("./Base"); +var _Error = require("./Error"); +var _olmlib = require("../olmlib"); +var _logger = require("../../logger"); +var _verification = require("../../crypto-api/verification"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 - 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ /** + * QR code key verification. + */ +const SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD = "m.qr_code.show.v1"; +exports.SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD = SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD; +const SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD = "m.qr_code.scan.v1"; + +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ +exports.SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD = SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD; +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ +const QrCodeEvent = _verification.VerifierEvent; +exports.QrCodeEvent = QrCodeEvent; +class ReciprocateQRCode extends _Base.VerificationBase { + constructor(...args) { + super(...args); + _defineProperty(this, "reciprocateQREvent", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "doVerification", async () => { + if (!this.startEvent) { + // TODO: Support scanning QR codes + throw new Error("It is not currently possible to start verification" + "with this method yet."); + } + const { + qrCodeData + } = this.request; + // 1. check the secret + if (this.startEvent.getContent()["secret"] !== qrCodeData?.encodedSharedSecret) { + throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + } + + // 2. ask if other user shows shield as well + await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + this.reciprocateQREvent = { + confirm: resolve, + cancel: () => reject((0, _Error.newUserCancelledError)()) + }; + this.emit(QrCodeEvent.ShowReciprocateQr, this.reciprocateQREvent); + }); + + // 3. determine key to sign / mark as trusted + const keys = {}; + switch (qrCodeData?.mode) { + case Mode.VerifyOtherUser: + { + // add master key to keys to be signed, only if we're not doing self-verification + const masterKey = qrCodeData.otherUserMasterKey; + keys[`ed25519:${masterKey}`] = masterKey; + break; + } + case Mode.VerifySelfTrusted: + { + const deviceId = this.request.targetDevice.deviceId; + keys[`ed25519:${deviceId}`] = qrCodeData.otherDeviceKey; + break; + } + case Mode.VerifySelfUntrusted: + { + const masterKey = qrCodeData.myMasterKey; + keys[`ed25519:${masterKey}`] = masterKey; + break; + } + } + + // 4. sign the key (or mark own MSK as verified in case of MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED) + await this.verifyKeys(this.userId, keys, (keyId, device, keyInfo) => { + // make sure the device has the expected keys + const targetKey = keys[keyId]; + if (!targetKey) throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + if (keyInfo !== targetKey) { + _logger.logger.error("key ID from key info does not match"); + throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + } + for (const deviceKeyId in device.keys) { + if (!deviceKeyId.startsWith("ed25519")) continue; + const deviceTargetKey = keys[deviceKeyId]; + if (!deviceTargetKey) throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + if (device.keys[deviceKeyId] !== deviceTargetKey) { + _logger.logger.error("master key does not match"); + throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + } + } + }); + }); + } + static factory(channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request) { + return new ReciprocateQRCode(channel, baseApis, userId, deviceId, startEvent, request); + } + + // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/naming-convention + static get NAME() { + return "m.reciprocate.v1"; + } +} +exports.ReciprocateQRCode = ReciprocateQRCode; +const CODE_VERSION = 0x02; // the version of binary QR codes we support +const BINARY_PREFIX = "MATRIX"; // ASCII, used to prefix the binary format +var Mode = /*#__PURE__*/function (Mode) { + Mode[Mode["VerifyOtherUser"] = 0] = "VerifyOtherUser"; + Mode[Mode["VerifySelfTrusted"] = 1] = "VerifySelfTrusted"; + Mode[Mode["VerifySelfUntrusted"] = 2] = "VerifySelfUntrusted"; + return Mode; +}(Mode || {}); // We do not trust the master key +class QRCodeData { + constructor(mode, sharedSecret, + // only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_OTHER_USER, master key of other party at time of generating QR code + otherUserMasterKey, + // only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_SELF_TRUSTED, device key of other party at time of generating QR code + otherDeviceKey, + // only set when mode is MODE_VERIFY_SELF_UNTRUSTED, own master key at time of generating QR code + myMasterKey, buffer) { + this.mode = mode; + this.sharedSecret = sharedSecret; + this.otherUserMasterKey = otherUserMasterKey; + this.otherDeviceKey = otherDeviceKey; + this.myMasterKey = myMasterKey; + this.buffer = buffer; + } + static async create(request, client) { + const sharedSecret = QRCodeData.generateSharedSecret(); + const mode = QRCodeData.determineMode(request, client); + let otherUserMasterKey = null; + let otherDeviceKey = null; + let myMasterKey = null; + if (mode === Mode.VerifyOtherUser) { + const otherUserCrossSigningInfo = client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(request.otherUserId); + otherUserMasterKey = otherUserCrossSigningInfo.getId("master"); + } else if (mode === Mode.VerifySelfTrusted) { + otherDeviceKey = await QRCodeData.getOtherDeviceKey(request, client); + } else if (mode === Mode.VerifySelfUntrusted) { + const myUserId = client.getUserId(); + const myCrossSigningInfo = client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(myUserId); + myMasterKey = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master"); + } + const qrData = QRCodeData.generateQrData(request, client, mode, sharedSecret, otherUserMasterKey, otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey); + const buffer = QRCodeData.generateBuffer(qrData); + return new QRCodeData(mode, sharedSecret, otherUserMasterKey, otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey, buffer); + } + + /** + * The unpadded base64 encoded shared secret. + */ + get encodedSharedSecret() { + return this.sharedSecret; + } + getBuffer() { + return this.buffer; + } + static generateSharedSecret() { + const secretBytes = new Uint8Array(11); + global.crypto.getRandomValues(secretBytes); + return (0, _olmlib.encodeUnpaddedBase64)(secretBytes); + } + static async getOtherDeviceKey(request, client) { + const myUserId = client.getUserId(); + const otherDevice = request.targetDevice; + const device = otherDevice.deviceId ? client.getStoredDevice(myUserId, otherDevice.deviceId) : undefined; + if (!device) { + throw new Error("could not find device " + otherDevice?.deviceId); + } + return device.getFingerprint(); + } + static determineMode(request, client) { + const myUserId = client.getUserId(); + const otherUserId = request.otherUserId; + let mode = Mode.VerifyOtherUser; + if (myUserId === otherUserId) { + // Mode changes depending on whether or not we trust the master cross signing key + const myTrust = client.checkUserTrust(myUserId); + if (myTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()) { + mode = Mode.VerifySelfTrusted; + } else { + mode = Mode.VerifySelfUntrusted; + } + } + return mode; + } + static generateQrData(request, client, mode, encodedSharedSecret, otherUserMasterKey, otherDeviceKey, myMasterKey) { + const myUserId = client.getUserId(); + const transactionId = request.channel.transactionId; + const qrData = { + prefix: BINARY_PREFIX, + version: CODE_VERSION, + mode, + transactionId, + firstKeyB64: "", + // worked out shortly + secondKeyB64: "", + // worked out shortly + secretB64: encodedSharedSecret + }; + const myCrossSigningInfo = client.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(myUserId); + if (mode === Mode.VerifyOtherUser) { + // First key is our master cross signing key + qrData.firstKeyB64 = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master"); + // Second key is the other user's master cross signing key + qrData.secondKeyB64 = otherUserMasterKey; + } else if (mode === Mode.VerifySelfTrusted) { + // First key is our master cross signing key + qrData.firstKeyB64 = myCrossSigningInfo.getId("master"); + qrData.secondKeyB64 = otherDeviceKey; + } else if (mode === Mode.VerifySelfUntrusted) { + // First key is our device's key + qrData.firstKeyB64 = client.getDeviceEd25519Key(); + // Second key is what we think our master cross signing key is + qrData.secondKeyB64 = myMasterKey; + } + return qrData; + } + static generateBuffer(qrData) { + let buf = Buffer.alloc(0); // we'll concat our way through life + + const appendByte = b => { + const tmpBuf = Buffer.from([b]); + buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]); + }; + const appendInt = i => { + const tmpBuf = Buffer.alloc(2); + tmpBuf.writeInt16BE(i, 0); + buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]); + }; + const appendStr = (s, enc, withLengthPrefix = true) => { + const tmpBuf = Buffer.from(s, enc); + if (withLengthPrefix) appendInt(tmpBuf.byteLength); + buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]); + }; + const appendEncBase64 = b64 => { + const b = (0, _olmlib.decodeBase64)(b64); + const tmpBuf = Buffer.from(b); + buf = Buffer.concat([buf, tmpBuf]); + }; + + // Actually build the buffer for the QR code + appendStr(qrData.prefix, "ascii", false); + appendByte(qrData.version); + appendByte(qrData.mode); + appendStr(qrData.transactionId, "utf-8"); + appendEncBase64(qrData.firstKeyB64); + appendEncBase64(qrData.secondKeyB64); + appendEncBase64(qrData.secretB64); + return buf; + } +} +exports.QRCodeData = QRCodeData;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SAS.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SAS.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fac79f7a00 --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SAS.js @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.SasEvent = exports.SAS = void 0; +var _anotherJson = _interopRequireDefault(require("another-json")); +var _Base = require("./Base"); +var _Error = require("./Error"); +var _logger = require("../../logger"); +var _SASDecimal = require("./SASDecimal"); +var _event = require("../../@types/event"); +var _verification = require("../../crypto-api/verification"); +function _interopRequireDefault(obj) { return obj && obj.__esModule ? obj : { default: obj }; } +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 - 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ /** + * Short Authentication String (SAS) verification. + */ +// backwards-compatibility exports + +const START_TYPE = _event.EventType.KeyVerificationStart; +const EVENTS = [_event.EventType.KeyVerificationAccept, _event.EventType.KeyVerificationKey, _event.EventType.KeyVerificationMac]; +let olmutil; +const newMismatchedSASError = (0, _Error.errorFactory)("m.mismatched_sas", "Mismatched short authentication string"); +const newMismatchedCommitmentError = (0, _Error.errorFactory)("m.mismatched_commitment", "Mismatched commitment"); +const emojiMapping = [["🐶", "dog"], +// 0 +["🐱", "cat"], +// 1 +["🦁", "lion"], +// 2 +["🐎", "horse"], +// 3 +["🦄", "unicorn"], +// 4 +["🐷", "pig"], +// 5 +["🐘", "elephant"], +// 6 +["🐰", "rabbit"], +// 7 +["🐼", "panda"], +// 8 +["🐓", "rooster"], +// 9 +["🐧", "penguin"], +// 10 +["🐢", "turtle"], +// 11 +["🐟", "fish"], +// 12 +["🐙", "octopus"], +// 13 +["🦋", "butterfly"], +// 14 +["🌷", "flower"], +// 15 +["🌳", "tree"], +// 16 +["🌵", "cactus"], +// 17 +["🍄", "mushroom"], +// 18 +["🌏", "globe"], +// 19 +["🌙", "moon"], +// 20 +["☁️", "cloud"], +// 21 +["🔥", "fire"], +// 22 +["🍌", "banana"], +// 23 +["🍎", "apple"], +// 24 +["🍓", "strawberry"], +// 25 +["🌽", "corn"], +// 26 +["🍕", "pizza"], +// 27 +["🎂", "cake"], +// 28 +["❤️", "heart"], +// 29 +["🙂", "smiley"], +// 30 +["🤖", "robot"], +// 31 +["🎩", "hat"], +// 32 +["👓", "glasses"], +// 33 +["🔧", "spanner"], +// 34 +["🎅", "santa"], +// 35 +["👍", "thumbs up"], +// 36 +["☂️", "umbrella"], +// 37 +["⌛", "hourglass"], +// 38 +["⏰", "clock"], +// 39 +["🎁", "gift"], +// 40 +["💡", "light bulb"], +// 41 +["📕", "book"], +// 42 +["✏️", "pencil"], +// 43 +["📎", "paperclip"], +// 44 +["✂️", "scissors"], +// 45 +["🔒", "lock"], +// 46 +["🔑", "key"], +// 47 +["🔨", "hammer"], +// 48 +["☎️", "telephone"], +// 49 +["🏁", "flag"], +// 50 +["🚂", "train"], +// 51 +["🚲", "bicycle"], +// 52 +["✈️", "aeroplane"], +// 53 +["🚀", "rocket"], +// 54 +["🏆", "trophy"], +// 55 +["⚽", "ball"], +// 56 +["🎸", "guitar"], +// 57 +["🎺", "trumpet"], +// 58 +["🔔", "bell"], +// 59 +["⚓️", "anchor"], +// 60 +["🎧", "headphones"], +// 61 +["📁", "folder"], +// 62 +["📌", "pin"] // 63 +]; + +function generateEmojiSas(sasBytes) { + const emojis = [ + // just like base64 encoding + sasBytes[0] >> 2, (sasBytes[0] & 0x3) << 4 | sasBytes[1] >> 4, (sasBytes[1] & 0xf) << 2 | sasBytes[2] >> 6, sasBytes[2] & 0x3f, sasBytes[3] >> 2, (sasBytes[3] & 0x3) << 4 | sasBytes[4] >> 4, (sasBytes[4] & 0xf) << 2 | sasBytes[5] >> 6]; + return emojis.map(num => emojiMapping[num]); +} +const sasGenerators = { + decimal: _SASDecimal.generateDecimalSas, + emoji: generateEmojiSas +}; +function generateSas(sasBytes, methods) { + const sas = {}; + for (const method of methods) { + if (method in sasGenerators) { + // @ts-ignore - ts doesn't like us mixing types like this + sas[method] = sasGenerators[method](Array.from(sasBytes)); + } + } + return sas; +} +const macMethods = { + "hkdf-hmac-sha256": "calculate_mac", + "org.matrix.msc3783.hkdf-hmac-sha256": "calculate_mac_fixed_base64", + "hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2": "calculate_mac_fixed_base64", + "hmac-sha256": "calculate_mac_long_kdf" +}; +function calculateMAC(olmSAS, method) { + return function (input, info) { + const mac = olmSAS[macMethods[method]](input, info); + _logger.logger.log("SAS calculateMAC:", method, [input, info], mac); + return mac; + }; +} +const calculateKeyAgreement = { + // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/naming-convention + "curve25519-hkdf-sha256": function (sas, olmSAS, bytes) { + const ourInfo = `${sas.baseApis.getUserId()}|${sas.baseApis.deviceId}|` + `${sas.ourSASPubKey}|`; + const theirInfo = `${sas.userId}|${sas.deviceId}|${sas.theirSASPubKey}|`; + const sasInfo = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS|" + (sas.initiatedByMe ? ourInfo + theirInfo : theirInfo + ourInfo) + sas.channel.transactionId; + return olmSAS.generate_bytes(sasInfo, bytes); + }, + "curve25519": function (sas, olmSAS, bytes) { + const ourInfo = `${sas.baseApis.getUserId()}${sas.baseApis.deviceId}`; + const theirInfo = `${sas.userId}${sas.deviceId}`; + const sasInfo = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS" + (sas.initiatedByMe ? ourInfo + theirInfo : theirInfo + ourInfo) + sas.channel.transactionId; + return olmSAS.generate_bytes(sasInfo, bytes); + } +}; +/* lists of algorithms/methods that are supported. The key agreement, hashes, + * and MAC lists should be sorted in order of preference (most preferred + * first). + */ +const KEY_AGREEMENT_LIST = ["curve25519-hkdf-sha256", "curve25519"]; +const HASHES_LIST = ["sha256"]; +const MAC_LIST = ["hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2", "org.matrix.msc3783.hkdf-hmac-sha256", "hkdf-hmac-sha256", "hmac-sha256"]; +const SAS_LIST = Object.keys(sasGenerators); +const KEY_AGREEMENT_SET = new Set(KEY_AGREEMENT_LIST); +const HASHES_SET = new Set(HASHES_LIST); +const MAC_SET = new Set(MAC_LIST); +const SAS_SET = new Set(SAS_LIST); +function intersection(anArray, aSet) { + return Array.isArray(anArray) ? anArray.filter(x => aSet.has(x)) : []; +} + +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ + +/** @deprecated use VerifierEvent */ +const SasEvent = _verification.VerifierEvent; +exports.SasEvent = SasEvent; +class SAS extends _Base.VerificationBase { + constructor(...args) { + super(...args); + _defineProperty(this, "waitingForAccept", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "ourSASPubKey", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "theirSASPubKey", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "sasEvent", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "doVerification", async () => { + await global.Olm.init(); + olmutil = olmutil || new global.Olm.Utility(); + + // make sure user's keys are downloaded + await this.baseApis.downloadKeys([this.userId]); + let retry = false; + do { + try { + if (this.initiatedByMe) { + return await this.doSendVerification(); + } else { + return await this.doRespondVerification(); + } + } catch (err) { + if (err instanceof _Base.SwitchStartEventError) { + // this changes what initiatedByMe returns + this.startEvent = err.startEvent; + retry = true; + } else { + throw err; + } + } + } while (retry); + }); + } + // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/naming-convention + static get NAME() { + return "m.sas.v1"; + } + get events() { + return EVENTS; + } + canSwitchStartEvent(event) { + if (event.getType() !== START_TYPE) { + return false; + } + const content = event.getContent(); + return content?.method === SAS.NAME && !!this.waitingForAccept; + } + async sendStart() { + const startContent = this.channel.completeContent(START_TYPE, { + method: SAS.NAME, + from_device: this.baseApis.deviceId, + key_agreement_protocols: KEY_AGREEMENT_LIST, + hashes: HASHES_LIST, + message_authentication_codes: MAC_LIST, + // FIXME: allow app to specify what SAS methods can be used + short_authentication_string: SAS_LIST + }); + await this.channel.sendCompleted(START_TYPE, startContent); + return startContent; + } + async verifyAndCheckMAC(keyAgreement, sasMethods, olmSAS, macMethod) { + const sasBytes = calculateKeyAgreement[keyAgreement](this, olmSAS, 6); + const verifySAS = new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + this.sasEvent = { + sas: generateSas(sasBytes, sasMethods), + confirm: async () => { + try { + await this.sendMAC(olmSAS, macMethod); + resolve(); + } catch (err) { + reject(err); + } + }, + cancel: () => reject((0, _Error.newUserCancelledError)()), + mismatch: () => reject(newMismatchedSASError()) + }; + this.emit(SasEvent.ShowSas, this.sasEvent); + }); + const [e] = await Promise.all([this.waitForEvent(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationMac).then(e => { + // we don't expect any more messages from the other + // party, and they may send a m.key.verification.done + // when they're done on their end + this.expectedEvent = _event.EventType.KeyVerificationDone; + return e; + }), verifySAS]); + const content = e.getContent(); + await this.checkMAC(olmSAS, content, macMethod); + } + async doSendVerification() { + this.waitingForAccept = true; + let startContent; + if (this.startEvent) { + startContent = this.channel.completedContentFromEvent(this.startEvent); + } else { + startContent = await this.sendStart(); + } + + // we might have switched to a different start event, + // but was we didn't call _waitForEvent there was no + // call that could throw yet. So check manually that + // we're still on the initiator side + if (!this.initiatedByMe) { + throw new _Base.SwitchStartEventError(this.startEvent); + } + let e; + try { + e = await this.waitForEvent(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationAccept); + } finally { + this.waitingForAccept = false; + } + let content = e.getContent(); + const sasMethods = intersection(content.short_authentication_string, SAS_SET); + if (!(KEY_AGREEMENT_SET.has(content.key_agreement_protocol) && HASHES_SET.has(content.hash) && MAC_SET.has(content.message_authentication_code) && sasMethods.length)) { + throw (0, _Error.newUnknownMethodError)(); + } + if (typeof content.commitment !== "string") { + throw (0, _Error.newInvalidMessageError)(); + } + const keyAgreement = content.key_agreement_protocol; + const macMethod = content.message_authentication_code; + const hashCommitment = content.commitment; + const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS(); + try { + this.ourSASPubKey = olmSAS.get_pubkey(); + await this.send(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationKey, { + key: this.ourSASPubKey + }); + e = await this.waitForEvent(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationKey); + // FIXME: make sure event is properly formed + content = e.getContent(); + const commitmentStr = content.key + _anotherJson.default.stringify(startContent); + // TODO: use selected hash function (when we support multiple) + if (olmutil.sha256(commitmentStr) !== hashCommitment) { + throw newMismatchedCommitmentError(); + } + this.theirSASPubKey = content.key; + olmSAS.set_their_key(content.key); + await this.verifyAndCheckMAC(keyAgreement, sasMethods, olmSAS, macMethod); + } finally { + olmSAS.free(); + } + } + async doRespondVerification() { + // as m.related_to is not included in the encrypted content in e2e rooms, + // we need to make sure it is added + let content = this.channel.completedContentFromEvent(this.startEvent); + + // Note: we intersect using our pre-made lists, rather than the sets, + // so that the result will be in our order of preference. Then + // fetching the first element from the array will give our preferred + // method out of the ones offered by the other party. + const keyAgreement = intersection(KEY_AGREEMENT_LIST, new Set(content.key_agreement_protocols))[0]; + const hashMethod = intersection(HASHES_LIST, new Set(content.hashes))[0]; + const macMethod = intersection(MAC_LIST, new Set(content.message_authentication_codes))[0]; + // FIXME: allow app to specify what SAS methods can be used + const sasMethods = intersection(content.short_authentication_string, SAS_SET); + if (!(keyAgreement !== undefined && hashMethod !== undefined && macMethod !== undefined && sasMethods.length)) { + throw (0, _Error.newUnknownMethodError)(); + } + const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS(); + try { + const commitmentStr = olmSAS.get_pubkey() + _anotherJson.default.stringify(content); + await this.send(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationAccept, { + key_agreement_protocol: keyAgreement, + hash: hashMethod, + message_authentication_code: macMethod, + short_authentication_string: sasMethods, + // TODO: use selected hash function (when we support multiple) + commitment: olmutil.sha256(commitmentStr) + }); + const e = await this.waitForEvent(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationKey); + // FIXME: make sure event is properly formed + content = e.getContent(); + this.theirSASPubKey = content.key; + olmSAS.set_their_key(content.key); + this.ourSASPubKey = olmSAS.get_pubkey(); + await this.send(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationKey, { + key: this.ourSASPubKey + }); + await this.verifyAndCheckMAC(keyAgreement, sasMethods, olmSAS, macMethod); + } finally { + olmSAS.free(); + } + } + sendMAC(olmSAS, method) { + const mac = {}; + const keyList = []; + const baseInfo = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC" + this.baseApis.getUserId() + this.baseApis.deviceId + this.userId + this.deviceId + this.channel.transactionId; + const deviceKeyId = `ed25519:${this.baseApis.deviceId}`; + mac[deviceKeyId] = calculateMAC(olmSAS, method)(this.baseApis.getDeviceEd25519Key(), baseInfo + deviceKeyId); + keyList.push(deviceKeyId); + const crossSigningId = this.baseApis.getCrossSigningId(); + if (crossSigningId) { + const crossSigningKeyId = `ed25519:${crossSigningId}`; + mac[crossSigningKeyId] = calculateMAC(olmSAS, method)(crossSigningId, baseInfo + crossSigningKeyId); + keyList.push(crossSigningKeyId); + } + const keys = calculateMAC(olmSAS, method)(keyList.sort().join(","), baseInfo + "KEY_IDS"); + return this.send(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationMac, { + mac, + keys + }); + } + async checkMAC(olmSAS, content, method) { + const baseInfo = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC" + this.userId + this.deviceId + this.baseApis.getUserId() + this.baseApis.deviceId + this.channel.transactionId; + if (content.keys !== calculateMAC(olmSAS, method)(Object.keys(content.mac).sort().join(","), baseInfo + "KEY_IDS")) { + throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + } + await this.verifyKeys(this.userId, content.mac, (keyId, device, keyInfo) => { + if (keyInfo !== calculateMAC(olmSAS, method)(device.keys[keyId], baseInfo + keyId)) { + throw (0, _Error.newKeyMismatchError)(); + } + }); + } +} +exports.SAS = SAS;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SASDecimal.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SASDecimal.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cd8fb2505 --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/SASDecimal.js @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.generateDecimalSas = generateDecimalSas; +/* +Copyright 2018 - 2022 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +/** + * Implementation of decimal encoding of SAS as per: + * https://spec.matrix.org/v1.4/client-server-api/#sas-method-decimal + * @param sasBytes - the five bytes generated by HKDF + * @returns the derived three numbers between 1000 and 9191 inclusive + */ +function generateDecimalSas(sasBytes) { + /* + * +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + * | Byte 0 | Byte 1 | Byte 2 | Byte 3 | Byte 4 | + * +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + * bits: 87654321 87654321 87654321 87654321 87654321 + * \____________/\_____________/\____________/ + * 1st number 2nd number 3rd number + */ + return [(sasBytes[0] << 5 | sasBytes[1] >> 3) + 1000, ((sasBytes[1] & 0x7) << 10 | sasBytes[2] << 2 | sasBytes[3] >> 6) + 1000, ((sasBytes[3] & 0x3f) << 7 | sasBytes[4] >> 1) + 1000]; +}
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/Channel.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/Channel.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..430afc16cd --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/Channel.js @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +});
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/InRoomChannel.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/InRoomChannel.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15c7fcae5a --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/InRoomChannel.js @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.InRoomRequests = exports.InRoomChannel = void 0; +var _VerificationRequest = require("./VerificationRequest"); +var _logger = require("../../../logger"); +var _event = require("../../../@types/event"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd + Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ +const MESSAGE_TYPE = _event.EventType.RoomMessage; +const M_REFERENCE = "m.reference"; +const M_RELATES_TO = "m.relates_to"; + +/** + * A key verification channel that sends verification events in the timeline of a room. + * Uses the event id of the initial m.key.verification.request event as a transaction id. + */ +class InRoomChannel { + /** + * @param client - the matrix client, to send messages with and get current user & device from. + * @param roomId - id of the room where verification events should be posted in, should be a DM with the given user. + * @param userId - id of user that the verification request is directed at, should be present in the room. + */ + constructor(client, roomId, userId) { + this.client = client; + this.roomId = roomId; + this.userId = userId; + _defineProperty(this, "requestEventId", void 0); + } + get receiveStartFromOtherDevices() { + return true; + } + + /** The transaction id generated/used by this verification channel */ + get transactionId() { + return this.requestEventId; + } + static getOtherPartyUserId(event, client) { + const type = InRoomChannel.getEventType(event); + if (type !== _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + return; + } + const ownUserId = client.getUserId(); + const sender = event.getSender(); + const content = event.getContent(); + const receiver = content.to; + if (sender === ownUserId) { + return receiver; + } else if (receiver === ownUserId) { + return sender; + } + } + + /** + * @param event - the event to get the timestamp of + * @returns the timestamp when the event was sent + */ + getTimestamp(event) { + return event.getTs(); + } + + /** + * Checks whether the given event type should be allowed to initiate a new VerificationRequest over this channel + * @param type - the event type to check + * @returns boolean flag + */ + static canCreateRequest(type) { + return type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE; + } + canCreateRequest(type) { + return InRoomChannel.canCreateRequest(type); + } + + /** + * Extract the transaction id used by a given key verification event, if any + * @param event - the event + * @returns the transaction id + */ + static getTransactionId(event) { + if (InRoomChannel.getEventType(event) === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + return event.getId(); + } else { + const relation = event.getRelation(); + if (relation?.rel_type === M_REFERENCE) { + return relation.event_id; + } + } + } + + /** + * Checks whether this event is a well-formed key verification event. + * This only does checks that don't rely on the current state of a potentially already channel + * so we can prevent channels being created by invalid events. + * `handleEvent` can do more checks and choose to ignore invalid events. + * @param event - the event to validate + * @param client - the client to get the current user and device id from + * @returns whether the event is valid and should be passed to handleEvent + */ + static validateEvent(event, client) { + const txnId = InRoomChannel.getTransactionId(event); + if (typeof txnId !== "string" || txnId.length === 0) { + return false; + } + const type = InRoomChannel.getEventType(event); + const content = event.getContent(); + + // from here on we're fairly sure that this is supposed to be + // part of a verification request, so be noisy when rejecting something + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + if (!content || typeof content.to !== "string" || !content.to.length) { + _logger.logger.log("InRoomChannel: validateEvent: " + "no valid to " + content.to); + return false; + } + + // ignore requests that are not direct to or sent by the syncing user + if (!InRoomChannel.getOtherPartyUserId(event, client)) { + _logger.logger.log("InRoomChannel: validateEvent: " + `not directed to or sent by me: ${event.getSender()}` + `, ${content.to}`); + return false; + } + } + return _VerificationRequest.VerificationRequest.validateEvent(type, event, client); + } + + /** + * As m.key.verification.request events are as m.room.message events with the InRoomChannel + * to have a fallback message in non-supporting clients, we map the real event type + * to the symbolic one to keep things in unison with ToDeviceChannel + * @param event - the event to get the type of + * @returns the "symbolic" event type + */ + static getEventType(event) { + const type = event.getType(); + if (type === MESSAGE_TYPE) { + const content = event.getContent(); + if (content) { + const { + msgtype + } = content; + if (msgtype === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + return _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE; + } + } + } + if (type && type !== _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + return type; + } else { + return ""; + } + } + + /** + * Changes the state of the channel, request, and verifier in response to a key verification event. + * @param event - to handle + * @param request - the request to forward handling to + * @param isLiveEvent - whether this is an even received through sync or not + * @returns a promise that resolves when any requests as an answer to the passed-in event are sent. + */ + async handleEvent(event, request, isLiveEvent = false) { + // prevent processing the same event multiple times, as under + // some circumstances Room.timeline can get emitted twice for the same event + if (request.hasEventId(event.getId())) { + return; + } + const type = InRoomChannel.getEventType(event); + // do validations that need state (roomId, userId), + // ignore if invalid + + if (event.getRoomId() !== this.roomId) { + return; + } + // set userId if not set already + if (!this.userId) { + const userId = InRoomChannel.getOtherPartyUserId(event, this.client); + if (userId) { + this.userId = userId; + } + } + // ignore events not sent by us or the other party + const ownUserId = this.client.getUserId(); + const sender = event.getSender(); + if (this.userId) { + if (sender !== ownUserId && sender !== this.userId) { + _logger.logger.log(`InRoomChannel: ignoring verification event from non-participating sender ${sender}`); + return; + } + } + if (!this.requestEventId) { + this.requestEventId = InRoomChannel.getTransactionId(event); + } + + // With pendingEventOrdering: "chronological", we will see events that have been sent but not yet reflected + // back via /sync. These are "local echoes" and are identifiable by their txnId + const isLocalEcho = !!event.getTxnId(); + + // Alternatively, we may see an event that we sent that is reflected back via /sync. These are "remote echoes" + // and have a transaction ID in the "unsigned" data + const isRemoteEcho = !!event.getUnsigned().transaction_id; + const isSentByUs = event.getSender() === this.client.getUserId(); + return request.handleEvent(type, event, isLiveEvent, isLocalEcho || isRemoteEcho, isSentByUs); + } + + /** + * Adds the transaction id (relation) back to a received event + * so it has the same format as returned by `completeContent` before sending. + * The relation can not appear on the event content because of encryption, + * relations are excluded from encryption. + * @param event - the received event + * @returns the content object with the relation added again + */ + completedContentFromEvent(event) { + // ensure m.related_to is included in e2ee rooms + // as the field is excluded from encryption + const content = Object.assign({}, event.getContent()); + content[M_RELATES_TO] = event.getRelation(); + return content; + } + + /** + * Add all the fields to content needed for sending it over this channel. + * This is public so verification methods (SAS uses this) can get the exact + * content that will be sent independent of the used channel, + * as they need to calculate the hash of it. + * @param type - the event type + * @param content - the (incomplete) content + * @returns the complete content, as it will be sent. + */ + completeContent(type, content) { + content = Object.assign({}, content); + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.READY_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE) { + content.from_device = this.client.getDeviceId(); + } + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + // type is mapped to m.room.message in the send method + content = { + body: this.client.getUserId() + " is requesting to verify " + "your key, but your client does not support in-chat key " + "verification. You will need to use legacy key " + "verification to verify keys.", + msgtype: _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE, + to: this.userId, + from_device: content.from_device, + methods: content.methods + }; + } else { + content[M_RELATES_TO] = { + rel_type: M_REFERENCE, + event_id: this.transactionId + }; + } + return content; + } + + /** + * Send an event over the channel with the content not having gone through `completeContent`. + * @param type - the event type + * @param uncompletedContent - the (incomplete) content + * @returns the promise of the request + */ + send(type, uncompletedContent) { + const content = this.completeContent(type, uncompletedContent); + return this.sendCompleted(type, content); + } + + /** + * Send an event over the channel with the content having gone through `completeContent` already. + * @param type - the event type + * @returns the promise of the request + */ + async sendCompleted(type, content) { + let sendType = type; + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + sendType = MESSAGE_TYPE; + } + const response = await this.client.sendEvent(this.roomId, sendType, content); + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + this.requestEventId = response.event_id; + } + } +} +exports.InRoomChannel = InRoomChannel; +class InRoomRequests { + constructor() { + _defineProperty(this, "requestsByRoomId", new Map()); + } + getRequest(event) { + const roomId = event.getRoomId(); + const txnId = InRoomChannel.getTransactionId(event); + return this.getRequestByTxnId(roomId, txnId); + } + getRequestByChannel(channel) { + return this.getRequestByTxnId(channel.roomId, channel.transactionId); + } + getRequestByTxnId(roomId, txnId) { + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByRoomId.get(roomId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + return requestsByTxnId.get(txnId); + } + } + setRequest(event, request) { + this.doSetRequest(event.getRoomId(), InRoomChannel.getTransactionId(event), request); + } + setRequestByChannel(channel, request) { + this.doSetRequest(channel.roomId, channel.transactionId, request); + } + doSetRequest(roomId, txnId, request) { + let requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByRoomId.get(roomId); + if (!requestsByTxnId) { + requestsByTxnId = new Map(); + this.requestsByRoomId.set(roomId, requestsByTxnId); + } + requestsByTxnId.set(txnId, request); + } + removeRequest(event) { + const roomId = event.getRoomId(); + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByRoomId.get(roomId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + requestsByTxnId.delete(InRoomChannel.getTransactionId(event)); + if (requestsByTxnId.size === 0) { + this.requestsByRoomId.delete(roomId); + } + } + } + findRequestInProgress(roomId) { + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByRoomId.get(roomId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + for (const request of requestsByTxnId.values()) { + if (request.pending) { + return request; + } + } + } + } +} +exports.InRoomRequests = InRoomRequests;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/ToDeviceChannel.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/ToDeviceChannel.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..781ec9358f --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/ToDeviceChannel.js @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.ToDeviceRequests = exports.ToDeviceChannel = void 0; +var _randomstring = require("../../../randomstring"); +var _logger = require("../../../logger"); +var _VerificationRequest = require("./VerificationRequest"); +var _Error = require("../Error"); +var _event = require("../../../models/event"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 New Vector Ltd + Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ +/** + * A key verification channel that sends verification events over to_device messages. + * Generates its own transaction ids. + */ +class ToDeviceChannel { + // userId and devices of user we're about to verify + constructor(client, userId, devices, transactionId, deviceId) { + this.client = client; + this.userId = userId; + this.devices = devices; + this.transactionId = transactionId; + this.deviceId = deviceId; + _defineProperty(this, "request", void 0); + } + isToDevices(devices) { + if (devices.length === this.devices.length) { + for (const device of devices) { + if (!this.devices.includes(device)) { + return false; + } + } + return true; + } else { + return false; + } + } + static getEventType(event) { + return event.getType(); + } + + /** + * Extract the transaction id used by a given key verification event, if any + * @param event - the event + * @returns the transaction id + */ + static getTransactionId(event) { + const content = event.getContent(); + return content && content.transaction_id; + } + + /** + * Checks whether the given event type should be allowed to initiate a new VerificationRequest over this channel + * @param type - the event type to check + * @returns boolean flag + */ + static canCreateRequest(type) { + return type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE; + } + canCreateRequest(type) { + return ToDeviceChannel.canCreateRequest(type); + } + + /** + * Checks whether this event is a well-formed key verification event. + * This only does checks that don't rely on the current state of a potentially already channel + * so we can prevent channels being created by invalid events. + * `handleEvent` can do more checks and choose to ignore invalid events. + * @param event - the event to validate + * @param client - the client to get the current user and device id from + * @returns whether the event is valid and should be passed to handleEvent + */ + static validateEvent(event, client) { + if (event.isCancelled()) { + _logger.logger.warn("Ignoring flagged verification request from " + event.getSender()); + return false; + } + const content = event.getContent(); + if (!content) { + _logger.logger.warn("ToDeviceChannel.validateEvent: invalid: no content"); + return false; + } + if (!content.transaction_id) { + _logger.logger.warn("ToDeviceChannel.validateEvent: invalid: no transaction_id"); + return false; + } + const type = event.getType(); + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + if (!Number.isFinite(content.timestamp)) { + _logger.logger.warn("ToDeviceChannel.validateEvent: invalid: no timestamp"); + return false; + } + if (event.getSender() === client.getUserId() && content.from_device == client.getDeviceId()) { + // ignore requests from ourselves, because it doesn't make sense for a + // device to verify itself + _logger.logger.warn("ToDeviceChannel.validateEvent: invalid: from own device"); + return false; + } + } + return _VerificationRequest.VerificationRequest.validateEvent(type, event, client); + } + + /** + * @param event - the event to get the timestamp of + * @returns the timestamp when the event was sent + */ + getTimestamp(event) { + const content = event.getContent(); + return content && content.timestamp; + } + + /** + * Changes the state of the channel, request, and verifier in response to a key verification event. + * @param event - to handle + * @param request - the request to forward handling to + * @param isLiveEvent - whether this is an even received through sync or not + * @returns a promise that resolves when any requests as an answer to the passed-in event are sent. + */ + async handleEvent(event, request, isLiveEvent = false) { + const type = event.getType(); + const content = event.getContent(); + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.READY_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE) { + if (!this.transactionId) { + this.transactionId = content.transaction_id; + } + const deviceId = content.from_device; + // adopt deviceId if not set before and valid + if (!this.deviceId && this.devices.includes(deviceId)) { + this.deviceId = deviceId; + } + // if no device id or different from adopted one, cancel with sender + if (!this.deviceId || this.deviceId !== deviceId) { + // also check that message came from the device we sent the request to earlier on + // and do send a cancel message to that device + // (but don't cancel the request for the device we should be talking to) + const cancelContent = this.completeContent(_VerificationRequest.CANCEL_TYPE, (0, _Error.errorFromEvent)((0, _Error.newUnexpectedMessageError)())); + return this.sendToDevices(_VerificationRequest.CANCEL_TYPE, cancelContent, [deviceId]); + } + } + const wasStarted = request.phase === _VerificationRequest.PHASE_STARTED || request.phase === _VerificationRequest.PHASE_READY; + await request.handleEvent(event.getType(), event, isLiveEvent, false, false); + const isStarted = request.phase === _VerificationRequest.PHASE_STARTED || request.phase === _VerificationRequest.PHASE_READY; + const isAcceptingEvent = type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.READY_TYPE; + // the request has picked a ready or start event, tell the other devices about it + if (isAcceptingEvent && !wasStarted && isStarted && this.deviceId) { + const nonChosenDevices = this.devices.filter(d => d !== this.deviceId && d !== this.client.getDeviceId()); + if (nonChosenDevices.length) { + const message = this.completeContent(_VerificationRequest.CANCEL_TYPE, { + code: "m.accepted", + reason: "Verification request accepted by another device" + }); + await this.sendToDevices(_VerificationRequest.CANCEL_TYPE, message, nonChosenDevices); + } + } + } + + /** + * See {@link InRoomChannel#completedContentFromEvent} for why this is needed. + * @param event - the received event + * @returns the content object + */ + completedContentFromEvent(event) { + return event.getContent(); + } + + /** + * Add all the fields to content needed for sending it over this channel. + * This is public so verification methods (SAS uses this) can get the exact + * content that will be sent independent of the used channel, + * as they need to calculate the hash of it. + * @param type - the event type + * @param content - the (incomplete) content + * @returns the complete content, as it will be sent. + */ + completeContent(type, content) { + // make a copy + content = Object.assign({}, content); + if (this.transactionId) { + content.transaction_id = this.transactionId; + } + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.READY_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE) { + content.from_device = this.client.getDeviceId(); + } + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE) { + content.timestamp = Date.now(); + } + return content; + } + + /** + * Send an event over the channel with the content not having gone through `completeContent`. + * @param type - the event type + * @param uncompletedContent - the (incomplete) content + * @returns the promise of the request + */ + send(type, uncompletedContent = {}) { + // create transaction id when sending request + if ((type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.START_TYPE) && !this.transactionId) { + this.transactionId = ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId(); + } + const content = this.completeContent(type, uncompletedContent); + return this.sendCompleted(type, content); + } + + /** + * Send an event over the channel with the content having gone through `completeContent` already. + * @param type - the event type + * @returns the promise of the request + */ + async sendCompleted(type, content) { + let result; + if (type === _VerificationRequest.REQUEST_TYPE || type === _VerificationRequest.CANCEL_TYPE && !this.deviceId) { + result = await this.sendToDevices(type, content, this.devices); + } else { + result = await this.sendToDevices(type, content, [this.deviceId]); + } + // the VerificationRequest state machine requires remote echos of the event + // the client sends itself, so we fake this for to_device messages + const remoteEchoEvent = new _event.MatrixEvent({ + sender: this.client.getUserId(), + content, + type + }); + await this.request.handleEvent(type, remoteEchoEvent, /*isLiveEvent=*/true, /*isRemoteEcho=*/true, /*isSentByUs=*/true); + return result; + } + async sendToDevices(type, content, devices) { + if (devices.length) { + const deviceMessages = new Map(); + for (const deviceId of devices) { + deviceMessages.set(deviceId, content); + } + await this.client.sendToDevice(type, new Map([[this.userId, deviceMessages]])); + } + } + + /** + * Allow Crypto module to create and know the transaction id before the .start event gets sent. + * @returns the transaction id + */ + static makeTransactionId() { + return (0, _randomstring.randomString)(32); + } +} +exports.ToDeviceChannel = ToDeviceChannel; +class ToDeviceRequests { + constructor() { + _defineProperty(this, "requestsByUserId", new Map()); + } + getRequest(event) { + return this.getRequestBySenderAndTxnId(event.getSender(), ToDeviceChannel.getTransactionId(event)); + } + getRequestByChannel(channel) { + return this.getRequestBySenderAndTxnId(channel.userId, channel.transactionId); + } + getRequestBySenderAndTxnId(sender, txnId) { + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByUserId.get(sender); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + return requestsByTxnId.get(txnId); + } + } + setRequest(event, request) { + this.setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(event.getSender(), ToDeviceChannel.getTransactionId(event), request); + } + setRequestByChannel(channel, request) { + this.setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(channel.userId, channel.transactionId, request); + } + setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(sender, txnId, request) { + let requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByUserId.get(sender); + if (!requestsByTxnId) { + requestsByTxnId = new Map(); + this.requestsByUserId.set(sender, requestsByTxnId); + } + requestsByTxnId.set(txnId, request); + } + removeRequest(event) { + const userId = event.getSender(); + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByUserId.get(userId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + requestsByTxnId.delete(ToDeviceChannel.getTransactionId(event)); + if (requestsByTxnId.size === 0) { + this.requestsByUserId.delete(userId); + } + } + } + findRequestInProgress(userId, devices) { + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByUserId.get(userId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + for (const request of requestsByTxnId.values()) { + if (request.pending && request.channel.isToDevices(devices)) { + return request; + } + } + } + } + getRequestsInProgress(userId) { + const requestsByTxnId = this.requestsByUserId.get(userId); + if (requestsByTxnId) { + return Array.from(requestsByTxnId.values()).filter(r => r.pending); + } + return []; + } +} +exports.ToDeviceRequests = ToDeviceRequests;
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/VerificationRequest.js b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/VerificationRequest.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d7987f367f --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/chat/protocols/matrix/lib/matrix-sdk/crypto/verification/request/VerificationRequest.js @@ -0,0 +1,870 @@ +"use strict"; + +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { + value: true +}); +exports.VerificationRequestEvent = exports.VerificationRequest = exports.START_TYPE = exports.REQUEST_TYPE = exports.READY_TYPE = exports.Phase = exports.PHASE_UNSENT = exports.PHASE_STARTED = exports.PHASE_REQUESTED = exports.PHASE_READY = exports.PHASE_DONE = exports.PHASE_CANCELLED = exports.EVENT_PREFIX = exports.DONE_TYPE = exports.CANCEL_TYPE = void 0; +var _logger = require("../../../logger"); +var _Error = require("../Error"); +var _QRCode = require("../QRCode"); +var _event = require("../../../@types/event"); +var _typedEventEmitter = require("../../../models/typed-event-emitter"); +function _defineProperty(obj, key, value) { key = _toPropertyKey(key); if (key in obj) { Object.defineProperty(obj, key, { value: value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true }); } else { obj[key] = value; } return obj; } +function _toPropertyKey(arg) { var key = _toPrimitive(arg, "string"); return typeof key === "symbol" ? key : String(key); } +function _toPrimitive(input, hint) { if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input; var prim = input[Symbol.toPrimitive]; if (prim !== undefined) { var res = prim.call(input, hint || "default"); if (typeof res !== "object") return res; throw new TypeError("@@toPrimitive must return a primitive value."); } return (hint === "string" ? String : Number)(input); } /* + Copyright 2018 - 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + */ +// How long after the event's timestamp that the request times out +const TIMEOUT_FROM_EVENT_TS = 10 * 60 * 1000; // 10 minutes + +// How long after we receive the event that the request times out +const TIMEOUT_FROM_EVENT_RECEIPT = 2 * 60 * 1000; // 2 minutes + +// to avoid almost expired verification notifications +// from showing a notification and almost immediately +// disappearing, also ignore verification requests that +// are this amount of time away from expiring. +const VERIFICATION_REQUEST_MARGIN = 3 * 1000; // 3 seconds + +const EVENT_PREFIX = "m.key.verification."; +exports.EVENT_PREFIX = EVENT_PREFIX; +const REQUEST_TYPE = EVENT_PREFIX + "request"; +exports.REQUEST_TYPE = REQUEST_TYPE; +const START_TYPE = EVENT_PREFIX + "start"; +exports.START_TYPE = START_TYPE; +const CANCEL_TYPE = EVENT_PREFIX + "cancel"; +exports.CANCEL_TYPE = CANCEL_TYPE; +const DONE_TYPE = EVENT_PREFIX + "done"; +exports.DONE_TYPE = DONE_TYPE; +const READY_TYPE = EVENT_PREFIX + "ready"; +exports.READY_TYPE = READY_TYPE; +let Phase = /*#__PURE__*/function (Phase) { + Phase[Phase["Unsent"] = 1] = "Unsent"; + Phase[Phase["Requested"] = 2] = "Requested"; + Phase[Phase["Ready"] = 3] = "Ready"; + Phase[Phase["Started"] = 4] = "Started"; + Phase[Phase["Cancelled"] = 5] = "Cancelled"; + Phase[Phase["Done"] = 6] = "Done"; + return Phase; +}({}); // Legacy export fields +exports.Phase = Phase; +const PHASE_UNSENT = Phase.Unsent; +exports.PHASE_UNSENT = PHASE_UNSENT; +const PHASE_REQUESTED = Phase.Requested; +exports.PHASE_REQUESTED = PHASE_REQUESTED; +const PHASE_READY = Phase.Ready; +exports.PHASE_READY = PHASE_READY; +const PHASE_STARTED = Phase.Started; +exports.PHASE_STARTED = PHASE_STARTED; +const PHASE_CANCELLED = Phase.Cancelled; +exports.PHASE_CANCELLED = PHASE_CANCELLED; +const PHASE_DONE = Phase.Done; +exports.PHASE_DONE = PHASE_DONE; +let VerificationRequestEvent = /*#__PURE__*/function (VerificationRequestEvent) { + VerificationRequestEvent["Change"] = "change"; + return VerificationRequestEvent; +}({}); +exports.VerificationRequestEvent = VerificationRequestEvent; +/** + * State machine for verification requests. + * Things that differ based on what channel is used to + * send and receive verification events are put in `InRoomChannel` or `ToDeviceChannel`. + */ +class VerificationRequest extends _typedEventEmitter.TypedEventEmitter { + constructor(channel, verificationMethods, client) { + super(); + this.channel = channel; + this.verificationMethods = verificationMethods; + this.client = client; + _defineProperty(this, "eventsByUs", new Map()); + _defineProperty(this, "eventsByThem", new Map()); + _defineProperty(this, "_observeOnly", false); + _defineProperty(this, "timeoutTimer", null); + _defineProperty(this, "_accepting", false); + _defineProperty(this, "_declining", false); + _defineProperty(this, "verifierHasFinished", false); + _defineProperty(this, "_cancelled", false); + _defineProperty(this, "_chosenMethod", null); + // we keep a copy of the QR Code data (including other user master key) around + // for QR reciprocate verification, to protect against + // cross-signing identity reset between the .ready and .start event + // and signing the wrong key after .start + _defineProperty(this, "_qrCodeData", null); + // The timestamp when we received the request event from the other side + _defineProperty(this, "requestReceivedAt", null); + _defineProperty(this, "commonMethods", []); + _defineProperty(this, "_phase", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "_cancellingUserId", void 0); + // Used in tests only + _defineProperty(this, "_verifier", void 0); + _defineProperty(this, "cancelOnTimeout", async () => { + try { + if (this.initiatedByMe) { + await this.cancel({ + reason: "Other party didn't accept in time", + code: "m.timeout" + }); + } else { + await this.cancel({ + reason: "User didn't accept in time", + code: "m.timeout" + }); + } + } catch (err) { + _logger.logger.error("Error while cancelling verification request", err); + } + }); + this.channel.request = this; + this.setPhase(PHASE_UNSENT, false); + } + + /** + * Stateless validation logic not specific to the channel. + * Invoked by the same static method in either channel. + * @param type - the "symbolic" event type, as returned by the `getEventType` function on the channel. + * @param event - the event to validate. Don't call getType() on it but use the `type` parameter instead. + * @param client - the client to get the current user and device id from + * @returns whether the event is valid and should be passed to handleEvent + */ + static validateEvent(type, event, client) { + const content = event.getContent(); + if (!type || !type.startsWith(EVENT_PREFIX)) { + return false; + } + + // from here on we're fairly sure that this is supposed to be + // part of a verification request, so be noisy when rejecting something + if (!content) { + _logger.logger.log("VerificationRequest: validateEvent: no content"); + return false; + } + if (type === REQUEST_TYPE || type === READY_TYPE) { + if (!Array.isArray(content.methods)) { + _logger.logger.log("VerificationRequest: validateEvent: " + "fail because methods"); + return false; + } + } + if (type === REQUEST_TYPE || type === READY_TYPE || type === START_TYPE) { + if (typeof content.from_device !== "string" || content.from_device.length === 0) { + _logger.logger.log("VerificationRequest: validateEvent: " + "fail because from_device"); + return false; + } + } + return true; + } + get invalid() { + return this.phase === PHASE_UNSENT; + } + + /** returns whether the phase is PHASE_REQUESTED */ + get requested() { + return this.phase === PHASE_REQUESTED; + } + + /** returns whether the phase is PHASE_CANCELLED */ + get cancelled() { + return this.phase === PHASE_CANCELLED; + } + + /** returns whether the phase is PHASE_READY */ + get ready() { + return this.phase === PHASE_READY; + } + + /** returns whether the phase is PHASE_STARTED */ + get started() { + return this.phase === PHASE_STARTED; + } + + /** returns whether the phase is PHASE_DONE */ + get done() { + return this.phase === PHASE_DONE; + } + + /** once the phase is PHASE_STARTED (and !initiatedByMe) or PHASE_READY: common methods supported by both sides */ + get methods() { + return this.commonMethods; + } + + /** the method picked in the .start event */ + get chosenMethod() { + return this._chosenMethod; + } + calculateEventTimeout(event) { + let effectiveExpiresAt = this.channel.getTimestamp(event) + TIMEOUT_FROM_EVENT_TS; + if (this.requestReceivedAt && !this.initiatedByMe && this.phase <= PHASE_REQUESTED) { + const expiresAtByReceipt = this.requestReceivedAt + TIMEOUT_FROM_EVENT_RECEIPT; + effectiveExpiresAt = Math.min(effectiveExpiresAt, expiresAtByReceipt); + } + return Math.max(0, effectiveExpiresAt - Date.now()); + } + + /** The current remaining amount of ms before the request should be automatically cancelled */ + get timeout() { + const requestEvent = this.getEventByEither(REQUEST_TYPE); + if (requestEvent) { + return this.calculateEventTimeout(requestEvent); + } + return 0; + } + + /** + * The key verification request event. + * @returns The request event, or falsey if not found. + */ + get requestEvent() { + return this.getEventByEither(REQUEST_TYPE); + } + + /** current phase of the request. Some properties might only be defined in a current phase. */ + get phase() { + return this._phase; + } + + /** The verifier to do the actual verification, once the method has been established. Only defined when the `phase` is PHASE_STARTED. */ + get verifier() { + return this._verifier; + } + get canAccept() { + return this.phase < PHASE_READY && !this._accepting && !this._declining; + } + get accepting() { + return this._accepting; + } + get declining() { + return this._declining; + } + + /** whether this request has sent it's initial event and needs more events to complete */ + get pending() { + return !this.observeOnly && this._phase !== PHASE_DONE && this._phase !== PHASE_CANCELLED; + } + + /** Only set after a .ready if the other party can scan a QR code */ + get qrCodeData() { + return this._qrCodeData; + } + + /** Checks whether the other party supports a given verification method. + * This is useful when setting up the QR code UI, as it is somewhat asymmetrical: + * if the other party supports SCAN_QR, we should show a QR code in the UI, and vice versa. + * For methods that need to be supported by both ends, use the `methods` property. + * @param method - the method to check + * @param force - to check even if the phase is not ready or started yet, internal usage + * @returns whether or not the other party said the supported the method */ + otherPartySupportsMethod(method, force = false) { + if (!force && !this.ready && !this.started) { + return false; + } + const theirMethodEvent = this.eventsByThem.get(REQUEST_TYPE) || this.eventsByThem.get(READY_TYPE); + if (!theirMethodEvent) { + // if we started straight away with .start event, + // we are assuming that the other side will support the + // chosen method, so return true for that. + if (this.started && this.initiatedByMe) { + const myStartEvent = this.eventsByUs.get(START_TYPE); + const content = myStartEvent && myStartEvent.getContent(); + const myStartMethod = content && content.method; + return method == myStartMethod; + } + return false; + } + const content = theirMethodEvent.getContent(); + if (!content) { + return false; + } + const { + methods + } = content; + if (!Array.isArray(methods)) { + return false; + } + return methods.includes(method); + } + + /** Whether this request was initiated by the syncing user. + * For InRoomChannel, this is who sent the .request event. + * For ToDeviceChannel, this is who sent the .start event + */ + get initiatedByMe() { + // event created by us but no remote echo has been received yet + const noEventsYet = this.eventsByUs.size + this.eventsByThem.size === 0; + if (this._phase === PHASE_UNSENT && noEventsYet) { + return true; + } + const hasMyRequest = this.eventsByUs.has(REQUEST_TYPE); + const hasTheirRequest = this.eventsByThem.has(REQUEST_TYPE); + if (hasMyRequest && !hasTheirRequest) { + return true; + } + if (!hasMyRequest && hasTheirRequest) { + return false; + } + const hasMyStart = this.eventsByUs.has(START_TYPE); + const hasTheirStart = this.eventsByThem.has(START_TYPE); + if (hasMyStart && !hasTheirStart) { + return true; + } + return false; + } + + /** The id of the user that initiated the request */ + get requestingUserId() { + if (this.initiatedByMe) { + return this.client.getUserId(); + } else { + return this.otherUserId; + } + } + + /** The id of the user that (will) receive(d) the request */ + get receivingUserId() { + if (this.initiatedByMe) { + return this.otherUserId; + } else { + return this.client.getUserId(); + } + } + + /** The user id of the other party in this request */ + get otherUserId() { + return this.channel.userId; + } + get isSelfVerification() { + return this.client.getUserId() === this.otherUserId; + } + + /** + * The id of the user that cancelled the request, + * only defined when phase is PHASE_CANCELLED + */ + get cancellingUserId() { + const myCancel = this.eventsByUs.get(CANCEL_TYPE); + const theirCancel = this.eventsByThem.get(CANCEL_TYPE); + if (myCancel && (!theirCancel || myCancel.getId() < theirCancel.getId())) { + return myCancel.getSender(); + } + if (theirCancel) { + return theirCancel.getSender(); + } + return undefined; + } + + /** + * The cancellation code e.g m.user which is responsible for cancelling this verification + */ + get cancellationCode() { + const ev = this.getEventByEither(CANCEL_TYPE); + return ev ? ev.getContent().code : null; + } + get observeOnly() { + return this._observeOnly; + } + + /** + * Gets which device the verification should be started with + * given the events sent so far in the verification. This is the + * same algorithm used to determine which device to send the + * verification to when no specific device is specified. + * @returns The device information + */ + get targetDevice() { + const theirFirstEvent = this.eventsByThem.get(REQUEST_TYPE) || this.eventsByThem.get(READY_TYPE) || this.eventsByThem.get(START_TYPE); + const theirFirstContent = theirFirstEvent?.getContent(); + const fromDevice = theirFirstContent?.from_device; + return { + userId: this.otherUserId, + deviceId: fromDevice + }; + } + + /* Start the key verification, creating a verifier and sending a .start event. + * If no previous events have been sent, pass in `targetDevice` to set who to direct this request to. + * @param method - the name of the verification method to use. + * @param targetDevice.userId the id of the user to direct this request to + * @param targetDevice.deviceId the id of the device to direct this request to + * @returns the verifier of the given method + */ + beginKeyVerification(method, targetDevice = null) { + // need to allow also when unsent in case of to_device + if (!this.observeOnly && !this._verifier) { + const validStartPhase = this.phase === PHASE_REQUESTED || this.phase === PHASE_READY || this.phase === PHASE_UNSENT && this.channel.canCreateRequest(START_TYPE); + if (validStartPhase) { + // when called on a request that was initiated with .request event + // check the method is supported by both sides + if (this.commonMethods.length && !this.commonMethods.includes(method)) { + throw (0, _Error.newUnknownMethodError)(); + } + this._verifier = this.createVerifier(method, null, targetDevice); + if (!this._verifier) { + throw (0, _Error.newUnknownMethodError)(); + } + this._chosenMethod = method; + } + } + return this._verifier; + } + + /** + * sends the initial .request event. + * @returns resolves when the event has been sent. + */ + async sendRequest() { + if (!this.observeOnly && this._phase === PHASE_UNSENT) { + const methods = [...this.verificationMethods.keys()]; + await this.channel.send(REQUEST_TYPE, { + methods + }); + } + } + + /** + * Cancels the request, sending a cancellation to the other party + * @param reason - the error reason to send the cancellation with + * @param code - the error code to send the cancellation with + * @returns resolves when the event has been sent. + */ + async cancel({ + reason = "User declined", + code = "m.user" + } = {}) { + if (!this.observeOnly && this._phase !== PHASE_CANCELLED) { + this._declining = true; + this.emit(VerificationRequestEvent.Change); + if (this._verifier) { + return this._verifier.cancel((0, _Error.errorFactory)(code, reason)()); + } else { + this._cancellingUserId = this.client.getUserId(); + await this.channel.send(CANCEL_TYPE, { + code, + reason + }); + } + } + } + + /** + * Accepts the request, sending a .ready event to the other party + * @returns resolves when the event has been sent. + */ + async accept() { + if (!this.observeOnly && this.phase === PHASE_REQUESTED && !this.initiatedByMe) { + const methods = [...this.verificationMethods.keys()]; + this._accepting = true; + this.emit(VerificationRequestEvent.Change); + await this.channel.send(READY_TYPE, { + methods + }); + } + } + + /** + * Can be used to listen for state changes until the callback returns true. + * @param fn - callback to evaluate whether the request is in the desired state. + * Takes the request as an argument. + * @returns that resolves once the callback returns true + * @throws Error when the request is cancelled + */ + waitFor(fn) { + return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + const check = () => { + let handled = false; + if (fn(this)) { + resolve(this); + handled = true; + } else if (this.cancelled) { + reject(new Error("cancelled")); + handled = true; + } + if (handled) { + this.off(VerificationRequestEvent.Change, check); + } + return handled; + }; + if (!check()) { + this.on(VerificationRequestEvent.Change, check); + } + }); + } + setPhase(phase, notify = true) { + this._phase = phase; + if (notify) { + this.emit(VerificationRequestEvent.Change); + } + } + getEventByEither(type) { + return this.eventsByThem.get(type) || this.eventsByUs.get(type); + } + getEventBy(type, byThem = false) { + if (byThem) { + return this.eventsByThem.get(type); + } else { + return this.eventsByUs.get(type); + } + } + calculatePhaseTransitions() { + const transitions = [{ + phase: PHASE_UNSENT + }]; + const phase = () => transitions[transitions.length - 1].phase; + + // always pass by .request first to be sure channel.userId has been set + const hasRequestByThem = this.eventsByThem.has(REQUEST_TYPE); + const requestEvent = this.getEventBy(REQUEST_TYPE, hasRequestByThem); + if (requestEvent) { + transitions.push({ + phase: PHASE_REQUESTED, + event: requestEvent + }); + } + const readyEvent = requestEvent && this.getEventBy(READY_TYPE, !hasRequestByThem); + if (readyEvent && phase() === PHASE_REQUESTED) { + transitions.push({ + phase: PHASE_READY, + event: readyEvent + }); + } + let startEvent; + if (readyEvent || !requestEvent) { + const theirStartEvent = this.eventsByThem.get(START_TYPE); + const ourStartEvent = this.eventsByUs.get(START_TYPE); + // any party can send .start after a .ready or unsent + if (theirStartEvent && ourStartEvent) { + startEvent = theirStartEvent.getSender() < ourStartEvent.getSender() ? theirStartEvent : ourStartEvent; + } else { + startEvent = theirStartEvent ? theirStartEvent : ourStartEvent; + } + } else { + startEvent = this.getEventBy(START_TYPE, !hasRequestByThem); + } + if (startEvent) { + const fromRequestPhase = phase() === PHASE_REQUESTED && requestEvent?.getSender() !== startEvent.getSender(); + const fromUnsentPhase = phase() === PHASE_UNSENT && this.channel.canCreateRequest(START_TYPE); + if (fromRequestPhase || phase() === PHASE_READY || fromUnsentPhase) { + transitions.push({ + phase: PHASE_STARTED, + event: startEvent + }); + } + } + const ourDoneEvent = this.eventsByUs.get(DONE_TYPE); + if (this.verifierHasFinished || ourDoneEvent && phase() === PHASE_STARTED) { + transitions.push({ + phase: PHASE_DONE + }); + } + const cancelEvent = this.getEventByEither(CANCEL_TYPE); + if ((this._cancelled || cancelEvent) && phase() !== PHASE_DONE) { + transitions.push({ + phase: PHASE_CANCELLED, + event: cancelEvent + }); + return transitions; + } + return transitions; + } + transitionToPhase(transition) { + const { + phase, + event + } = transition; + // get common methods + if (phase === PHASE_REQUESTED || phase === PHASE_READY) { + if (!this.wasSentByOwnDevice(event)) { + const content = event.getContent(); + this.commonMethods = content.methods.filter(m => this.verificationMethods.has(m)); + } + } + // detect if we're not a party in the request, and we should just observe + if (!this.observeOnly) { + // if requested or accepted by one of my other devices + if (phase === PHASE_REQUESTED || phase === PHASE_STARTED || phase === PHASE_READY) { + if (this.channel.receiveStartFromOtherDevices && this.wasSentByOwnUser(event) && !this.wasSentByOwnDevice(event)) { + this._observeOnly = true; + } + } + } + // create verifier + if (phase === PHASE_STARTED) { + const { + method + } = event.getContent(); + if (!this._verifier && !this.observeOnly) { + this._verifier = this.createVerifier(method, event); + if (!this._verifier) { + this.cancel({ + code: "m.unknown_method", + reason: `Unknown method: ${method}` + }); + } else { + this._chosenMethod = method; + } + } + } + } + applyPhaseTransitions() { + const transitions = this.calculatePhaseTransitions(); + const existingIdx = transitions.findIndex(t => t.phase === this.phase); + // trim off phases we already went through, if any + const newTransitions = transitions.slice(existingIdx + 1); + // transition to all new phases + for (const transition of newTransitions) { + this.transitionToPhase(transition); + } + return newTransitions; + } + isWinningStartRace(newEvent) { + if (newEvent.getType() !== START_TYPE) { + return false; + } + const oldEvent = this._verifier.startEvent; + let oldRaceIdentifier; + if (this.isSelfVerification) { + // if the verifier does not have a startEvent, + // it is because it's still sending and we are on the initator side + // we know we are sending a .start event because we already + // have a verifier (checked in calling method) + if (oldEvent) { + const oldContent = oldEvent.getContent(); + oldRaceIdentifier = oldContent && oldContent.from_device; + } else { + oldRaceIdentifier = this.client.getDeviceId(); + } + } else { + if (oldEvent) { + oldRaceIdentifier = oldEvent.getSender(); + } else { + oldRaceIdentifier = this.client.getUserId(); + } + } + let newRaceIdentifier; + if (this.isSelfVerification) { + const newContent = newEvent.getContent(); + newRaceIdentifier = newContent && newContent.from_device; + } else { + newRaceIdentifier = newEvent.getSender(); + } + return newRaceIdentifier < oldRaceIdentifier; + } + hasEventId(eventId) { + for (const event of this.eventsByUs.values()) { + if (event.getId() === eventId) { + return true; + } + } + for (const event of this.eventsByThem.values()) { + if (event.getId() === eventId) { + return true; + } + } + return false; + } + + /** + * Changes the state of the request and verifier in response to a key verification event. + * @param type - the "symbolic" event type, as returned by the `getEventType` function on the channel. + * @param event - the event to handle. Don't call getType() on it but use the `type` parameter instead. + * @param isLiveEvent - whether this is an even received through sync or not + * @param isRemoteEcho - whether this is the remote echo of an event sent by the same device + * @param isSentByUs - whether this event is sent by a party that can accept and/or observe the request like one of our peers. + * For InRoomChannel this means any device for the syncing user. For ToDeviceChannel, just the syncing device. + * @returns a promise that resolves when any requests as an answer to the passed-in event are sent. + */ + async handleEvent(type, event, isLiveEvent, isRemoteEcho, isSentByUs) { + // if reached phase cancelled or done, ignore anything else that comes + if (this.done || this.cancelled) { + return; + } + const wasObserveOnly = this._observeOnly; + this.adjustObserveOnly(event, isLiveEvent); + if (!this.observeOnly && !isRemoteEcho) { + if (await this.cancelOnError(type, event)) { + return; + } + } + + // This assumes verification won't need to send an event with + // the same type for the same party twice. + // This is true for QR and SAS verification, and was + // added here to prevent verification getting cancelled + // when the server duplicates an event (https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/3365) + const isDuplicateEvent = isSentByUs ? this.eventsByUs.has(type) : this.eventsByThem.has(type); + if (isDuplicateEvent) { + return; + } + const oldPhase = this.phase; + this.addEvent(type, event, isSentByUs); + + // this will create if needed the verifier so needs to happen before calling it + const newTransitions = this.applyPhaseTransitions(); + try { + // only pass events from the other side to the verifier, + // no remote echos of our own events + if (this._verifier && !this.observeOnly) { + const newEventWinsRace = this.isWinningStartRace(event); + if (this._verifier.canSwitchStartEvent(event) && newEventWinsRace) { + this._verifier.switchStartEvent(event); + } else if (!isRemoteEcho) { + if (type === CANCEL_TYPE || this._verifier.events?.includes(type)) { + this._verifier.handleEvent(event); + } + } + } + if (newTransitions.length) { + // create QRCodeData if the other side can scan + // important this happens before emitting a phase change, + // so listeners can rely on it being there already + // We only do this for live events because it is important that + // we sign the keys that were in the QR code, and not the keys + // we happen to have at some later point in time. + if (isLiveEvent && newTransitions.some(t => t.phase === PHASE_READY)) { + const shouldGenerateQrCode = this.otherPartySupportsMethod(_QRCode.SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD, true); + if (shouldGenerateQrCode) { + this._qrCodeData = await _QRCode.QRCodeData.create(this, this.client); + } + } + const lastTransition = newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1]; + const { + phase + } = lastTransition; + this.setupTimeout(phase); + // set phase as last thing as this emits the "change" event + this.setPhase(phase); + } else if (this._observeOnly !== wasObserveOnly) { + this.emit(VerificationRequestEvent.Change); + } + } finally { + // log events we processed so we can see from rageshakes what events were added to a request + _logger.logger.log(`Verification request ${this.channel.transactionId}: ` + `${type} event with id:${event.getId()}, ` + `content:${JSON.stringify(event.getContent())} ` + `deviceId:${this.channel.deviceId}, ` + `sender:${event.getSender()}, isSentByUs:${isSentByUs}, ` + `isLiveEvent:${isLiveEvent}, isRemoteEcho:${isRemoteEcho}, ` + `phase:${oldPhase}=>${this.phase}, ` + `observeOnly:${wasObserveOnly}=>${this._observeOnly}`); + } + } + setupTimeout(phase) { + const shouldTimeout = !this.timeoutTimer && !this.observeOnly && phase === PHASE_REQUESTED; + if (shouldTimeout) { + this.timeoutTimer = setTimeout(this.cancelOnTimeout, this.timeout); + } + if (this.timeoutTimer) { + const shouldClear = phase === PHASE_STARTED || phase === PHASE_READY || phase === PHASE_DONE || phase === PHASE_CANCELLED; + if (shouldClear) { + clearTimeout(this.timeoutTimer); + this.timeoutTimer = null; + } + } + } + async cancelOnError(type, event) { + if (type === START_TYPE) { + const method = event.getContent().method; + if (!this.verificationMethods.has(method)) { + await this.cancel((0, _Error.errorFromEvent)((0, _Error.newUnknownMethodError)())); + return true; + } + } + const isUnexpectedRequest = type === REQUEST_TYPE && this.phase !== PHASE_UNSENT; + const isUnexpectedReady = type === READY_TYPE && this.phase !== PHASE_REQUESTED && this.phase !== PHASE_STARTED; + // only if phase has passed from PHASE_UNSENT should we cancel, because events + // are allowed to come in in any order (at least with InRoomChannel). So we only know + // we're dealing with a valid request we should participate in once we've moved to PHASE_REQUESTED. + // Before that, we could be looking at somebody else's verification request and we just + // happen to be in the room + if (this.phase !== PHASE_UNSENT && (isUnexpectedRequest || isUnexpectedReady)) { + _logger.logger.warn(`Cancelling, unexpected ${type} verification ` + `event from ${event.getSender()}`); + const reason = `Unexpected ${type} event in phase ${this.phase}`; + await this.cancel((0, _Error.errorFromEvent)((0, _Error.newUnexpectedMessageError)({ + reason + }))); + return true; + } + return false; + } + adjustObserveOnly(event, isLiveEvent = false) { + // don't send out events for historical requests + if (!isLiveEvent) { + this._observeOnly = true; + } + if (this.calculateEventTimeout(event) < VERIFICATION_REQUEST_MARGIN) { + this._observeOnly = true; + } + } + addEvent(type, event, isSentByUs = false) { + if (isSentByUs) { + this.eventsByUs.set(type, event); + } else { + this.eventsByThem.set(type, event); + } + + // once we know the userId of the other party (from the .request event) + // see if any event by anyone else crept into this.eventsByThem + if (type === REQUEST_TYPE) { + for (const [type, event] of this.eventsByThem.entries()) { + if (event.getSender() !== this.otherUserId) { + this.eventsByThem.delete(type); + } + } + // also remember when we received the request event + this.requestReceivedAt = Date.now(); + } + } + createVerifier(method, startEvent = null, targetDevice = null) { + if (!targetDevice) { + targetDevice = this.targetDevice; + } + const { + userId, + deviceId + } = targetDevice; + const VerifierCtor = this.verificationMethods.get(method); + if (!VerifierCtor) { + _logger.logger.warn("could not find verifier constructor for method", method); + return; + } + return new VerifierCtor(this.channel, this.client, userId, deviceId, startEvent, this); + } + wasSentByOwnUser(event) { + return event?.getSender() === this.client.getUserId(); + } + + // only for .request, .ready or .start + wasSentByOwnDevice(event) { + if (!this.wasSentByOwnUser(event)) { + return false; + } + const content = event.getContent(); + if (!content || content.from_device !== this.client.getDeviceId()) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + onVerifierCancelled() { + this._cancelled = true; + // move to cancelled phase + const newTransitions = this.applyPhaseTransitions(); + if (newTransitions.length) { + this.setPhase(newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1].phase); + } + } + onVerifierFinished() { + this.channel.send(_event.EventType.KeyVerificationDone, {}); + this.verifierHasFinished = true; + // move to .done phase + const newTransitions = this.applyPhaseTransitions(); + if (newTransitions.length) { + this.setPhase(newTransitions[newTransitions.length - 1].phase); + } + } + getEventFromOtherParty(type) { + return this.eventsByThem.get(type); + } +} +exports.VerificationRequest = VerificationRequest;
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