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diff --git a/comm/third_party/botan/src/lib/tls/tls_policy.cpp b/comm/third_party/botan/src/lib/tls/tls_policy.cpp
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+/*
+* Policies for TLS
+* (C) 2004-2010,2012,2015,2016 Jack Lloyd
+* 2016 Christian Mainka
+* 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity
+*
+* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
+*/
+
+#include <botan/tls_policy.h>
+#include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h>
+#include <botan/tls_algos.h>
+#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h>
+#include <botan/internal/stl_util.h>
+#include <botan/pk_keys.h>
+#include <sstream>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+namespace TLS {
+
+std::vector<Signature_Scheme> Policy::allowed_signature_schemes() const
+ {
+ std::vector<Signature_Scheme> schemes;
+
+ for(Signature_Scheme scheme : all_signature_schemes())
+ {
+ if(signature_scheme_is_known(scheme) == false)
+ continue;
+ const bool sig_allowed = allowed_signature_method(signature_algorithm_of_scheme(scheme));
+ const bool hash_allowed = allowed_signature_hash(hash_function_of_scheme(scheme));
+
+ if(sig_allowed && hash_allowed)
+ {
+ schemes.push_back(scheme);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return schemes;
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_ciphers() const
+ {
+ return {
+ //"AES-256/OCB(12)",
+ //"AES-128/OCB(12)",
+ "ChaCha20Poly1305",
+ "AES-256/GCM",
+ "AES-128/GCM",
+ //"AES-256/CCM",
+ //"AES-128/CCM",
+ //"AES-256/CCM(8)",
+ //"AES-128/CCM(8)",
+ //"Camellia-256/GCM",
+ //"Camellia-128/GCM",
+ //"ARIA-256/GCM",
+ //"ARIA-128/GCM",
+ //"AES-256",
+ //"AES-128",
+ //"Camellia-256",
+ //"Camellia-128",
+ //"SEED",
+ //"3DES",
+ };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_signature_hashes() const
+ {
+ return {
+ "SHA-512",
+ "SHA-384",
+ "SHA-256",
+ //"SHA-1",
+ };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_macs() const
+ {
+ /*
+ SHA-256 is preferred because the Lucky13 countermeasure works
+ somewhat better for SHA-256 vs SHA-384:
+ https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/675
+ */
+ return {
+ "AEAD",
+ "SHA-256",
+ "SHA-384",
+ "SHA-1",
+ };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_key_exchange_methods() const
+ {
+ return {
+ //"SRP_SHA",
+ //"ECDHE_PSK",
+ //"DHE_PSK",
+ //"PSK",
+ "CECPQ1",
+ "ECDH",
+ "DH",
+ //"RSA",
+ };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Policy::allowed_signature_methods() const
+ {
+ return {
+ "ECDSA",
+ "RSA",
+ //"DSA",
+ //"IMPLICIT",
+ //"ANONYMOUS" (anon)
+ };
+ }
+
+bool Policy::allowed_signature_method(const std::string& sig_method) const
+ {
+ return value_exists(allowed_signature_methods(), sig_method);
+ }
+
+bool Policy::allowed_signature_hash(const std::string& sig_hash) const
+ {
+ return value_exists(allowed_signature_hashes(), sig_hash);
+ }
+
+bool Policy::use_ecc_point_compression() const
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+Group_Params Policy::choose_key_exchange_group(const std::vector<Group_Params>& peer_groups) const
+ {
+ if(peer_groups.empty())
+ return Group_Params::NONE;
+
+ const std::vector<Group_Params> our_groups = key_exchange_groups();
+
+ for(auto g : our_groups)
+ {
+ if(value_exists(peer_groups, g))
+ return g;
+ }
+
+ return Group_Params::NONE;
+ }
+
+Group_Params Policy::default_dh_group() const
+ {
+ /*
+ * Return the first listed or just default to 2048
+ */
+ for(auto g : key_exchange_groups())
+ {
+ if(group_param_is_dh(g))
+ return g;
+ }
+
+ return Group_Params::FFDHE_2048;
+ }
+
+std::vector<Group_Params> Policy::key_exchange_groups() const
+ {
+ // Default list is ordered by performance
+ return {
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_CURVE_25519)
+ Group_Params::X25519,
+#endif
+
+ Group_Params::SECP256R1,
+ Group_Params::BRAINPOOL256R1,
+ Group_Params::SECP384R1,
+ Group_Params::BRAINPOOL384R1,
+ Group_Params::SECP521R1,
+ Group_Params::BRAINPOOL512R1,
+
+ Group_Params::FFDHE_2048,
+ Group_Params::FFDHE_3072,
+ Group_Params::FFDHE_4096,
+ Group_Params::FFDHE_6144,
+ Group_Params::FFDHE_8192,
+ };
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_dh_group_size() const
+ {
+ return 2048;
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_ecdsa_group_size() const
+ {
+ // Here we are at the mercy of whatever the CA signed, but most certs should be 256 bit by now
+ return 256;
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_ecdh_group_size() const
+ {
+ // x25519 is smallest curve currently supported for TLS key exchange
+ return 255;
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_signature_strength() const
+ {
+ return 110;
+ }
+
+bool Policy::require_cert_revocation_info() const
+ {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_rsa_bits() const
+ {
+ /* Default assumption is all end-entity certificates should
+ be at least 2048 bits these days.
+
+ If you are connecting to arbitrary servers on the Internet
+ (ie as a web browser or SMTP client) you'll probably have to reduce this
+ to 1024 bits, or perhaps even lower.
+ */
+ return 2048;
+ }
+
+size_t Policy::minimum_dsa_group_size() const
+ {
+ // FIPS 186-3
+ return 2048;
+ }
+
+void Policy::check_peer_key_acceptable(const Public_Key& public_key) const
+ {
+ const std::string algo_name = public_key.algo_name();
+
+ const size_t keylength = public_key.key_length();
+ size_t expected_keylength = 0;
+
+ if(algo_name == "RSA")
+ {
+ expected_keylength = minimum_rsa_bits();
+ }
+ else if(algo_name == "DH")
+ {
+ expected_keylength = minimum_dh_group_size();
+ }
+ else if(algo_name == "DSA")
+ {
+ expected_keylength = minimum_dsa_group_size();
+ }
+ else if(algo_name == "ECDH" || algo_name == "Curve25519")
+ {
+ expected_keylength = minimum_ecdh_group_size();
+ }
+ else if(algo_name == "ECDSA")
+ {
+ expected_keylength = minimum_ecdsa_group_size();
+ }
+ // else some other algo, so leave expected_keylength as zero and the check is a no-op
+
+ if(keylength < expected_keylength)
+ throw TLS_Exception(Alert::INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY,
+ "Peer sent " +
+ std::to_string(keylength) + " bit " + algo_name + " key"
+ ", policy requires at least " +
+ std::to_string(expected_keylength));
+ }
+
+uint32_t Policy::session_ticket_lifetime() const
+ {
+ return 86400; // ~1 day
+ }
+
+bool Policy::send_fallback_scsv(Protocol_Version version) const
+ {
+ return version != latest_supported_version(version.is_datagram_protocol());
+ }
+
+bool Policy::acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version version) const
+ {
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V12 && allow_tls12())
+ return true;
+
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::DTLS_V12 && allow_dtls12())
+ return true;
+
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V10)
+
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V11 && allow_tls11())
+ return true;
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::TLS_V10 && allow_tls10())
+ return true;
+ if(version == Protocol_Version::DTLS_V10 && allow_dtls10())
+ return true;
+
+#endif
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+Protocol_Version Policy::latest_supported_version(bool datagram) const
+ {
+ if(datagram)
+ {
+ if(acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version::DTLS_V12))
+ return Protocol_Version::DTLS_V12;
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V10)
+ if(acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version::DTLS_V10))
+ return Protocol_Version::DTLS_V10;
+#endif
+ throw Invalid_State("Policy forbids all available DTLS version");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if(acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version::TLS_V12))
+ return Protocol_Version::TLS_V12;
+#if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_V10)
+ if(acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version::TLS_V11))
+ return Protocol_Version::TLS_V11;
+ if(acceptable_protocol_version(Protocol_Version::TLS_V10))
+ return Protocol_Version::TLS_V10;
+#endif
+ throw Invalid_State("Policy forbids all available TLS version");
+ }
+ }
+
+bool Policy::acceptable_ciphersuite(const Ciphersuite& ciphersuite) const
+ {
+ return value_exists(allowed_ciphers(), ciphersuite.cipher_algo()) &&
+ value_exists(allowed_macs(), ciphersuite.mac_algo());
+ }
+
+bool Policy::allow_client_initiated_renegotiation() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_server_initiated_renegotiation() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_insecure_renegotiation() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_tls10() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_tls11() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_tls12() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::allow_dtls10() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_dtls12() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::include_time_in_hello_random() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::hide_unknown_users() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::server_uses_own_ciphersuite_preferences() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::negotiate_encrypt_then_mac() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::support_cert_status_message() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::allow_resumption_for_renegotiation() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::only_resume_with_exact_version() const { return true; }
+bool Policy::require_client_certificate_authentication() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::request_client_certificate_authentication() const { return require_client_certificate_authentication(); }
+bool Policy::abort_connection_on_undesired_renegotiation() const { return false; }
+bool Policy::allow_dtls_epoch0_restart() const { return false; }
+
+size_t Policy::maximum_certificate_chain_size() const { return 0; }
+
+// 1 second initial timeout, 60 second max - see RFC 6347 sec 4.2.4.1
+size_t Policy::dtls_initial_timeout() const { return 1*1000; }
+size_t Policy::dtls_maximum_timeout() const { return 60*1000; }
+
+size_t Policy::dtls_default_mtu() const
+ {
+ // default MTU is IPv6 min MTU minus UDP/IP headers
+ return 1280 - 40 - 8;
+ }
+
+std::vector<uint16_t> Policy::srtp_profiles() const
+ {
+ return std::vector<uint16_t>();
+ }
+
+namespace {
+
+class Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering final
+ {
+ public:
+ Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering(const std::vector<std::string>& ciphers,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& macs,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& kex,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& sigs) :
+ m_ciphers(ciphers), m_macs(macs), m_kex(kex), m_sigs(sigs) {}
+
+ bool operator()(const Ciphersuite& a, const Ciphersuite& b) const
+ {
+ if(a.kex_method() != b.kex_method())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_kex.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.kex_algo() == m_kex[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.kex_algo() == m_kex[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.cipher_algo() != b.cipher_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_ciphers.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.cipher_algo() == m_ciphers[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.cipher_algo() == m_ciphers[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.cipher_keylen() != b.cipher_keylen())
+ {
+ if(a.cipher_keylen() < b.cipher_keylen())
+ return false;
+ if(a.cipher_keylen() > b.cipher_keylen())
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if(a.auth_method() != b.auth_method())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_sigs.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.sig_algo() == m_sigs[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.sig_algo() == m_sigs[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(a.mac_algo() != b.mac_algo())
+ {
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != m_macs.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ if(a.mac_algo() == m_macs[i])
+ return true;
+ if(b.mac_algo() == m_macs[i])
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false; // equal (?!?)
+ }
+ private:
+ std::vector<std::string> m_ciphers, m_macs, m_kex, m_sigs;
+ };
+
+}
+
+std::vector<uint16_t> Policy::ciphersuite_list(Protocol_Version version,
+ bool have_srp) const
+ {
+ const std::vector<std::string> ciphers = allowed_ciphers();
+ const std::vector<std::string> macs = allowed_macs();
+ const std::vector<std::string> kex = allowed_key_exchange_methods();
+ const std::vector<std::string> sigs = allowed_signature_methods();
+
+ std::vector<Ciphersuite> ciphersuites;
+
+ for(auto&& suite : Ciphersuite::all_known_ciphersuites())
+ {
+ // Can we use it?
+ if(!suite.valid())
+ continue;
+
+ // Can we use it in this version?
+ if(!suite.usable_in_version(version))
+ continue;
+
+ // Is it acceptable to the policy?
+ if(!this->acceptable_ciphersuite(suite))
+ continue;
+
+ // Are we doing SRP?
+ if(!have_srp && suite.kex_method() == Kex_Algo::SRP_SHA)
+ continue;
+
+ if(!value_exists(kex, suite.kex_algo()))
+ continue; // unsupported key exchange
+
+ if(!value_exists(ciphers, suite.cipher_algo()))
+ continue; // unsupported cipher
+
+ if(!value_exists(macs, suite.mac_algo()))
+ continue; // unsupported MAC algo
+
+ if(!value_exists(sigs, suite.sig_algo()))
+ {
+ // allow if it's an empty sig algo and we want to use PSK
+ if(suite.auth_method() != Auth_Method::IMPLICIT || !suite.psk_ciphersuite())
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ CECPQ1 always uses x25519 for ECDH, so treat the applications
+ removal of x25519 from the ECC curve list as equivalent to
+ saying they do not trust CECPQ1
+ */
+ if(suite.kex_method() == Kex_Algo::CECPQ1)
+ {
+ if(value_exists(key_exchange_groups(), Group_Params::X25519) == false)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // OK, consider it
+ ciphersuites.push_back(suite);
+ }
+
+ if(ciphersuites.empty())
+ {
+ throw Invalid_State("Policy does not allow any available cipher suite");
+ }
+
+ Ciphersuite_Preference_Ordering order(ciphers, macs, kex, sigs);
+ std::sort(ciphersuites.begin(), ciphersuites.end(), order);
+
+ std::vector<uint16_t> ciphersuite_codes;
+ for(auto i : ciphersuites)
+ ciphersuite_codes.push_back(i.ciphersuite_code());
+ return ciphersuite_codes;
+ }
+
+namespace {
+
+void print_vec(std::ostream& o,
+ const char* key,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& v)
+ {
+ o << key << " = ";
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != v.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ o << v[i];
+ if(i != v.size() - 1)
+ o << ' ';
+ }
+ o << '\n';
+ }
+
+void print_vec(std::ostream& o,
+ const char* key,
+ const std::vector<Group_Params>& v)
+ {
+ o << key << " = ";
+ for(size_t i = 0; i != v.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ o << group_param_to_string(v[i]);
+ if(i != v.size() - 1)
+ o << ' ';
+ }
+ o << '\n';
+ }
+
+void print_bool(std::ostream& o,
+ const char* key, bool b)
+ {
+ o << key << " = " << (b ? "true" : "false") << '\n';
+ }
+
+}
+
+void Policy::print(std::ostream& o) const
+ {
+ print_bool(o, "allow_tls10", allow_tls10());
+ print_bool(o, "allow_tls11", allow_tls11());
+ print_bool(o, "allow_tls12", allow_tls12());
+ print_bool(o, "allow_dtls10", allow_dtls10());
+ print_bool(o, "allow_dtls12", allow_dtls12());
+ print_vec(o, "ciphers", allowed_ciphers());
+ print_vec(o, "macs", allowed_macs());
+ print_vec(o, "signature_hashes", allowed_signature_hashes());
+ print_vec(o, "signature_methods", allowed_signature_methods());
+ print_vec(o, "key_exchange_methods", allowed_key_exchange_methods());
+ print_vec(o, "key_exchange_groups", key_exchange_groups());
+
+ print_bool(o, "allow_insecure_renegotiation", allow_insecure_renegotiation());
+ print_bool(o, "include_time_in_hello_random", include_time_in_hello_random());
+ print_bool(o, "allow_server_initiated_renegotiation", allow_server_initiated_renegotiation());
+ print_bool(o, "hide_unknown_users", hide_unknown_users());
+ print_bool(o, "server_uses_own_ciphersuite_preferences", server_uses_own_ciphersuite_preferences());
+ print_bool(o, "negotiate_encrypt_then_mac", negotiate_encrypt_then_mac());
+ print_bool(o, "support_cert_status_message", support_cert_status_message());
+ o << "session_ticket_lifetime = " << session_ticket_lifetime() << '\n';
+ o << "minimum_dh_group_size = " << minimum_dh_group_size() << '\n';
+ o << "minimum_ecdh_group_size = " << minimum_ecdh_group_size() << '\n';
+ o << "minimum_rsa_bits = " << minimum_rsa_bits() << '\n';
+ o << "minimum_signature_strength = " << minimum_signature_strength() << '\n';
+ }
+
+std::string Policy::to_string() const
+ {
+ std::ostringstream oss;
+ this->print(oss);
+ return oss.str();
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Strict_Policy::allowed_ciphers() const
+ {
+ return { "ChaCha20Poly1305", "AES-256/GCM", "AES-128/GCM" };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Strict_Policy::allowed_signature_hashes() const
+ {
+ return { "SHA-512", "SHA-384"};
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Strict_Policy::allowed_macs() const
+ {
+ return { "AEAD" };
+ }
+
+std::vector<std::string> Strict_Policy::allowed_key_exchange_methods() const
+ {
+ return { "CECPQ1", "ECDH" };
+ }
+
+bool Strict_Policy::allow_tls10() const { return false; }
+bool Strict_Policy::allow_tls11() const { return false; }
+bool Strict_Policy::allow_tls12() const { return true; }
+bool Strict_Policy::allow_dtls10() const { return false; }
+bool Strict_Policy::allow_dtls12() const { return true; }
+
+}
+
+}