diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/NSSSocketControl.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/NSSSocketControl.cpp | 699 |
1 files changed, 699 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/NSSSocketControl.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/NSSSocketControl.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eaeae754a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/manager/ssl/NSSSocketControl.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,699 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "NSSSocketControl.h" + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "nsISocketProvider.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "mozilla/Base64.h" +#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h" + +using namespace mozilla; +using namespace mozilla::psm; + +extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog; + +NSSSocketControl::NSSSocketControl(const nsCString& aHostName, int32_t aPort, + SharedSSLState& aState, + uint32_t providerFlags, + uint32_t providerTlsFlags) + : CommonSocketControl(aHostName, aPort, providerFlags), + mFd(nullptr), + mCertVerificationState(BeforeCertVerification), + mSharedState(aState), + mForSTARTTLS(false), + mTLSVersionRange{0, 0}, + mHandshakePending(true), + mPreliminaryHandshakeDone(false), + mEarlyDataAccepted(false), + mDenyClientCert(false), + mFalseStartCallbackCalled(false), + mFalseStarted(false), + mIsFullHandshake(false), + mNotedTimeUntilReady(false), + mEchExtensionStatus(EchExtensionStatus::kNotPresent), + mIsShortWritePending(false), + mShortWritePendingByte(0), + mShortWriteOriginalAmount(-1), + mKEAUsed(nsITLSSocketControl::KEY_EXCHANGE_UNKNOWN), + mKEAKeyBits(0), + mMACAlgorithmUsed(nsITLSSocketControl::SSL_MAC_UNKNOWN), + mProviderTlsFlags(providerTlsFlags), + mSocketCreationTimestamp(TimeStamp::Now()), + mPlaintextBytesRead(0), + mClaimed(!(providerFlags & nsISocketProvider::IS_SPECULATIVE_CONNECTION)), + mPendingSelectClientAuthCertificate(nullptr) {} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetKEAUsed(int16_t* aKea) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aKea = mKEAUsed; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetKEAKeyBits(uint32_t* aKeyBits) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aKeyBits = mKEAKeyBits; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetSSLVersionOffered(int16_t* aSSLVersionOffered) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aSSLVersionOffered = mTLSVersionRange.max; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetMACAlgorithmUsed(int16_t* aMac) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aMac = mMACAlgorithmUsed; + return NS_OK; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::NoteTimeUntilReady() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (mNotedTimeUntilReady) { + return; + } + mNotedTimeUntilReady = true; + + auto timestampNow = TimeStamp::Now(); + if (!(mProviderFlags & nsISocketProvider::IS_RETRY)) { + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_READY_FIRST_TRY, + mSocketCreationTimestamp, timestampNow); + } + + if (mProviderFlags & nsISocketProvider::BE_CONSERVATIVE) { + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_READY_CONSERVATIVE, + mSocketCreationTimestamp, timestampNow); + } + + switch (GetEchExtensionStatus()) { + case EchExtensionStatus::kGREASE: + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_READY_ECH_GREASE, + mSocketCreationTimestamp, timestampNow); + break; + case EchExtensionStatus::kReal: + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_READY_ECH, + mSocketCreationTimestamp, timestampNow); + break; + default: + break; + } + // This will include TCP and proxy tunnel wait time + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_READY, + mSocketCreationTimestamp, timestampNow); + + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] NSSSocketControl::NoteTimeUntilReady\n", mFd)); +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetHandshakeCompleted() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mHandshakeCompleted) { + enum HandshakeType { + Resumption = 1, + FalseStarted = 2, + ChoseNotToFalseStart = 3, + NotAllowedToFalseStart = 4, + }; + + HandshakeType handshakeType = !IsFullHandshake() ? Resumption + : mFalseStarted ? FalseStarted + : mFalseStartCallbackCalled + ? ChoseNotToFalseStart + : NotAllowedToFalseStart; + // This will include TCP and proxy tunnel wait time + if (mKeaGroupName.isSome()) { + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED_KEYED_BY_KA, + *mKeaGroupName, mSocketCreationTimestamp, TimeStamp::Now()); + } + + // If the handshake is completed for the first time from just 1 callback + // that means that TLS session resumption must have been used. + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_RESUMED_SESSION, + handshakeType == Resumption); + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_TYPE, handshakeType); + } + + // Remove the plaintext layer as it is not needed anymore. + // The plaintext layer is not always present - so it's not a fatal error if it + // cannot be removed. + // Note that PR_PopIOLayer may modify its stack, so a pointer returned by + // PR_GetIdentitiesLayer may not point to what we think it points to after + // calling PR_PopIOLayer. We must operate on the pointer returned by + // PR_PopIOLayer. + if (PR_GetIdentitiesLayer(mFd, + nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity)) { + PRFileDesc* poppedPlaintext = + PR_PopIOLayer(mFd, nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity); + poppedPlaintext->dtor(poppedPlaintext); + } + + mHandshakeCompleted = true; + + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] NSSSocketControl::SetHandshakeCompleted\n", (void*)mFd)); + + mIsFullHandshake = false; // reset for next handshake on this connection + + if (mTlsHandshakeCallback) { + auto callback = std::move(mTlsHandshakeCallback); + Unused << callback->HandshakeDone(); + } +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetNegotiatedNPN(const char* value, uint32_t length) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!value) { + mNegotiatedNPN.Truncate(); + } else { + mNegotiatedNPN.Assign(value, length); + } + mNPNCompleted = true; +} + +#define MAX_ALPN_LENGTH 255 + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetAlpnEarlySelection(nsACString& aAlpnSelected) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + aAlpnSelected.Truncate(); + + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo info; + SECStatus rv = SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(mFd, &info, sizeof(info)); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !info.canSendEarlyData) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + SSLNextProtoState alpnState; + unsigned char chosenAlpn[MAX_ALPN_LENGTH]; + unsigned int chosenAlpnLen; + rv = SSL_GetNextProto(mFd, &alpnState, chosenAlpn, &chosenAlpnLen, + AssertedCast<unsigned int>(ArrayLength(chosenAlpn))); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + if (alpnState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE) { + aAlpnSelected.Assign(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(chosenAlpn), + chosenAlpnLen); + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetEarlyDataAccepted(bool* aAccepted) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aAccepted = mEarlyDataAccepted; + return NS_OK; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetEarlyDataAccepted(bool aAccepted) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mEarlyDataAccepted = aAccepted; +} + +bool NSSSocketControl::GetDenyClientCert() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + return mDenyClientCert; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetDenyClientCert(bool aDenyClientCert) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mDenyClientCert = aDenyClientCert; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::DriveHandshake() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mFd) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + if (IsCanceled()) { + PRErrorCode errorCode = GetErrorCode(); + MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(errorCode, "handshake cancelled without error code"); + return GetXPCOMFromNSSError(errorCode); + } + + SECStatus rv = SSL_ForceHandshake(mFd); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PRErrorCode errorCode = PR_GetError(); + MOZ_ASSERT(errorCode, "handshake failed without error code"); + // There is a bug in NSS. Sometimes SSL_ForceHandshake will return + // SECFailure without setting an error code. In these cases, cancel + // the connection with SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE. + if (!errorCode) { + errorCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + if (errorCode == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + return NS_BASE_STREAM_WOULD_BLOCK; + } + + SetCanceled(errorCode); + return GetXPCOMFromNSSError(errorCode); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +bool NSSSocketControl::GetForSTARTTLS() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + return mForSTARTTLS; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetForSTARTTLS(bool aForSTARTTLS) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mForSTARTTLS = aForSTARTTLS; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::ProxyStartSSL() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + return ActivateSSL(); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::StartTLS() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + return ActivateSSL(); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::SetNPNList(nsTArray<nsCString>& protocolArray) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mFd) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + + // the npn list is a concatenated list of 8 bit byte strings. + nsCString npnList; + + for (uint32_t index = 0; index < protocolArray.Length(); ++index) { + if (protocolArray[index].IsEmpty() || protocolArray[index].Length() > 255) + return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE; + + npnList.Append(protocolArray[index].Length()); + npnList.Append(protocolArray[index]); + } + + if (SSL_SetNextProtoNego( + mFd, BitwiseCast<const unsigned char*, const char*>(npnList.get()), + npnList.Length()) != SECSuccess) + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult NSSSocketControl::ActivateSSL() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (SECSuccess != SSL_OptionSet(mFd, SSL_SECURITY, true)) + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + if (SECSuccess != SSL_ResetHandshake(mFd, false)) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + + mHandshakePending = true; + + return SetResumptionTokenFromExternalCache(mFd); +} + +nsresult NSSSocketControl::GetFileDescPtr(PRFileDesc** aFilePtr) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + *aFilePtr = mFd; + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult NSSSocketControl::SetFileDescPtr(PRFileDesc* aFilePtr) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mFd = aFilePtr; + return NS_OK; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetCertVerificationWaiting() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + // mCertVerificationState may be BeforeCertVerification for the first + // handshake on the connection, or AfterCertVerification for subsequent + // renegotiation handshakes. + MOZ_ASSERT(mCertVerificationState != WaitingForCertVerification, + "Invalid state transition to WaitingForCertVerification"); + mCertVerificationState = WaitingForCertVerification; +} + +// Be careful that SetCertVerificationResult does NOT get called while we are +// processing a SSL callback function, because SSL_AuthCertificateComplete will +// attempt to acquire locks that are already held by libssl when it calls +// callbacks. +void NSSSocketControl::SetCertVerificationResult(PRErrorCode errorCode) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + SetUsedPrivateDNS(GetProviderFlags() & nsISocketProvider::USED_PRIVATE_DNS); + MOZ_ASSERT(mCertVerificationState == WaitingForCertVerification, + "Invalid state transition to AfterCertVerification"); + + if (mFd) { + SECStatus rv = SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(mFd, errorCode); + // Only replace errorCode if there was originally no error. + // SSL_AuthCertificateComplete will return SECFailure with the error code + // set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR if there is a pending event to select a + // client authentication certificate. This is not an error. + if (rv != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR && + errorCode == 0) { + errorCode = PR_GetError(); + if (errorCode == 0) { + NS_ERROR("SSL_AuthCertificateComplete didn't set error code"); + errorCode = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; + } + } + } + + if (errorCode) { + mFailedVerification = true; + SetCanceled(errorCode); + } + + if (mPlaintextBytesRead && !errorCode) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_BYTES_BEFORE_CERT_CALLBACK, + AssertedCast<uint32_t>(mPlaintextBytesRead)); + } + + mCertVerificationState = AfterCertVerification; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::ClientAuthCertificateSelected( + nsTArray<uint8_t>& certBytes, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& certChainBytes) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + // If mFd is nullptr, the connection has been closed already, so we don't + // need to do anything here. + if (!mFd) { + return; + } + SECItem certItem = { + siBuffer, + const_cast<uint8_t*>(certBytes.Elements()), + static_cast<unsigned int>(certBytes.Length()), + }; + UniqueCERTCertificate cert(CERT_NewTempCertificate( + CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &certItem, nullptr, false, true)); + UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey key; + if (cert) { + key.reset(PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert.get(), nullptr)); + mClientCertChain.reset(CERT_NewCertList()); + if (key && mClientCertChain) { + for (const auto& certBytes : certChainBytes) { + SECItem certItem = { + siBuffer, + const_cast<uint8_t*>(certBytes.Elements()), + static_cast<unsigned int>(certBytes.Length()), + }; + UniqueCERTCertificate cert(CERT_NewTempCertificate( + CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &certItem, nullptr, false, true)); + if (cert) { + if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(mClientCertChain.get(), cert.get()) == + SECSuccess) { + Unused << cert.release(); + } + } + } + } + } + + bool sendingClientAuthCert = cert && key; + if (sendingClientAuthCert) { + mSentClientCert = true; + Telemetry::ScalarAdd(Telemetry::ScalarID::SECURITY_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_USAGE, + u"sent"_ns, 1); + } + + Unused << SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete( + mFd, sendingClientAuthCert ? SECSuccess : SECFailure, + sendingClientAuthCert ? key.release() : nullptr, + sendingClientAuthCert ? cert.release() : nullptr); +} + +SharedSSLState& NSSSocketControl::SharedState() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + return mSharedState; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetSharedOwningReference(SharedSSLState* aRef) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mOwningSharedRef = aRef; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::DisableEarlyData() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mFd) { + return NS_OK; + } + if (IsCanceled()) { + return NS_OK; + } + + if (SSL_OptionSet(mFd, SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA, false) != SECSuccess) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::SetHandshakeCallbackListener( + nsITlsHandshakeCallbackListener* callback) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mTlsHandshakeCallback = callback; + return NS_OK; +} + +PRStatus NSSSocketControl::CloseSocketAndDestroy() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + + mPendingSelectClientAuthCertificate = nullptr; + + PRFileDesc* popped = PR_PopIOLayer(mFd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER); + MOZ_ASSERT( + popped && popped->identity == nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerIdentity, + "SSL Layer not on top of stack"); + + // The plaintext layer is not always present - so it's not a fatal error if it + // cannot be removed. + // Note that PR_PopIOLayer may modify its stack, so a pointer returned by + // PR_GetIdentitiesLayer may not point to what we think it points to after + // calling PR_PopIOLayer. We must operate on the pointer returned by + // PR_PopIOLayer. + if (PR_GetIdentitiesLayer(mFd, + nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity)) { + PRFileDesc* poppedPlaintext = + PR_PopIOLayer(mFd, nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity); + poppedPlaintext->dtor(poppedPlaintext); + } + + // We need to clear the callback to make sure the ssl layer cannot call the + // callback after mFD is nulled. + SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback(mFd, nullptr, nullptr); + + PRStatus status = mFd->methods->close(mFd); + + // the NSSSocketControl instance can out-live the connection, so we need some + // indication that the connection has been closed. mFd == nullptr is that + // indication. This is needed, for example, when the connection is closed + // before we have finished validating the server's certificate. + mFd = nullptr; + + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) return status; + + popped->identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER; + popped->dtor(popped); + + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetEsniTxt(nsACString& aEsniTxt) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + aEsniTxt = mEsniTxt; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::SetEsniTxt(const nsACString& aEsniTxt) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mEsniTxt = aEsniTxt; + + if (mEsniTxt.Length()) { + nsAutoCString esniBin; + if (NS_OK != Base64Decode(mEsniTxt, esniBin)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error, + ("[%p] Invalid ESNIKeys record. Couldn't base64 decode\n", + (void*)mFd)); + return NS_OK; + } + + if (SECSuccess != + SSL_EnableESNI(mFd, reinterpret_cast<const PRUint8*>(esniBin.get()), + esniBin.Length(), nullptr)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error, + ("[%p] Invalid ESNIKeys record %s\n", (void*)mFd, + PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); + return NS_OK; + } + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetEchConfig(nsACString& aEchConfig) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + aEchConfig = mEchConfig; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::SetEchConfig(const nsACString& aEchConfig) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mEchConfig = aEchConfig; + + if (mEchConfig.Length()) { + if (SECSuccess != + SSL_SetClientEchConfigs( + mFd, reinterpret_cast<const PRUint8*>(aEchConfig.BeginReading()), + aEchConfig.Length())) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Error, + ("[%p] Invalid EchConfig record %s\n", (void*)mFd, + PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); + return NS_OK; + } + UpdateEchExtensionStatus(EchExtensionStatus::kReal); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetRetryEchConfig(nsACString& aEchConfig) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mFd) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + ScopedAutoSECItem retryConfigItem; + SECStatus rv = SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs(mFd, &retryConfigItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + aEchConfig = nsCString(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(retryConfigItem.data), + retryConfigItem.len); + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +NSSSocketControl::GetPeerId(nsACString& aResult) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!mPeerId.IsEmpty()) { + aResult.Assign(mPeerId); + return NS_OK; + } + + if (mProviderFlags & + nsISocketProvider::ANONYMOUS_CONNECT) { // See bug 466080 + mPeerId.AppendLiteral("anon:"); + } + if (mProviderFlags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE) { + mPeerId.AppendLiteral("private:"); + } + if (mProviderFlags & nsISocketProvider::BE_CONSERVATIVE) { + mPeerId.AppendLiteral("beConservative:"); + } + + mPeerId.AppendPrintf("tlsflags0x%08x:", mProviderTlsFlags); + + mPeerId.Append(mHostName); + mPeerId.Append(':'); + mPeerId.AppendInt(GetPort()); + nsAutoCString suffix; + mOriginAttributes.CreateSuffix(suffix); + mPeerId.Append(suffix); + + aResult.Assign(mPeerId); + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult NSSSocketControl::SetResumptionTokenFromExternalCache(PRFileDesc* fd) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + if (!fd) { + return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; + } + + // If SSL_NO_CACHE option was set, we must not use the cache + PRIntn val; + if (SSL_OptionGet(fd, SSL_NO_CACHE, &val) != SECSuccess) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + if (val != 0) { + return NS_OK; + } + + nsTArray<uint8_t> token; + nsAutoCString peerId; + nsresult rv = GetPeerId(peerId); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return rv; + } + + uint64_t tokenId = 0; + mozilla::net::SessionCacheInfo info; + rv = mozilla::net::SSLTokensCache::Get(peerId, token, info, &tokenId); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + if (rv == NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) { + // It's ok if we can't find the token. + return NS_OK; + } + + return rv; + } + + SECStatus srv = SSL_SetResumptionToken(fd, token.Elements(), token.Length()); + if (srv == SECFailure) { + PRErrorCode error = PR_GetError(); + mozilla::net::SSLTokensCache::Remove(peerId, tokenId); + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("Setting token failed with NSS error %d [id=%s]", error, + PromiseFlatCString(peerId).get())); + // We don't consider SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR as a hard error, + // since this error means this token is just expired or can't be decoded + // correctly. + if (error == SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR) { + return NS_OK; + } + + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + SetSessionCacheInfo(std::move(info)); + + return NS_OK; +} + +void NSSSocketControl::SetPreliminaryHandshakeInfo( + const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo, const SSLCipherSuiteInfo& cipherInfo) { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mResumed = channelInfo.resumed; + mCipherSuite.emplace(channelInfo.cipherSuite); + mProtocolVersion.emplace(channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF); + mKeaGroupName.emplace(getKeaGroupName(channelInfo.keaGroup)); + mSignatureSchemeName.emplace(getSignatureName(channelInfo.signatureScheme)); + mIsDelegatedCredential.emplace(channelInfo.peerDelegCred); + mIsAcceptedEch.emplace(channelInfo.echAccepted); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP NSSSocketControl::Claim() { + COMMON_SOCKET_CONTROL_ASSERT_ON_OWNING_THREAD(); + mClaimed = true; + return NS_OK; +} |