diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp | 1206 |
1 files changed, 1206 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e299810cb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,1206 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h" + +#include "NSSSocketControl.h" +#include "PSMRunnable.h" +#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" +#include "SharedCertVerifier.h" +#include "SharedSSLState.h" +#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/Assertions.h" +#include "mozilla/Casting.h" +#include "mozilla/Logging.h" +#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" +#include "mozilla/ScopeExit.h" +#include "mozilla/Span.h" +#include "mozilla/SpinEventLoopUntil.h" +#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" +#include "mozilla/Unused.h" +#include "mozilla/intl/Localization.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" +#include "nsIChannel.h" +#include "nsIHttpChannel.h" +#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h" +#include "nsIPrompt.h" +#include "nsIProtocolProxyService.h" +#include "nsISupportsPriority.h" +#include "nsIStreamLoader.h" +#include "nsIUploadChannel.h" +#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h" +#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h" +#include "nsNSSCertificate.h" +#include "nsNSSComponent.h" +#include "nsNSSHelper.h" +#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h" +#include "nsNetUtil.h" +#include "nsProxyRelease.h" +#include "nsStringStream.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "SSLTokensCache.h" + +#include "TrustOverrideUtils.h" +#include "TrustOverride-SymantecData.inc" +#include "TrustOverride-AppleGoogleDigiCertData.inc" + +using namespace mozilla; +using namespace mozilla::pkix; +using namespace mozilla::psm; + +extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog; + +static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, + const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo); + +namespace { + +// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe +// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values. +// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results. +const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4; +const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2; +const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1; + +} // namespace + +class OCSPRequest final : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver, public nsIRunnable { + public: + OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation, + const OriginAttributes& originAttributes, + const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], + size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout); + + NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS + NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLOADEROBSERVER + NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE + + nsresult DispatchToMainThreadAndWait(); + nsresult GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response); + + private: + ~OCSPRequest() = default; + + static void OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure); + nsresult NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& proofOfLock); + + // mMonitor provides the memory barrier protecting these member variables. + // What happens is the originating thread creates an OCSPRequest object with + // the information necessary to perform an OCSP request. It sends the object + // to the main thread and waits on the monitor for the operation to complete. + // On the main thread, a channel is set up to perform the request. This gets + // dispatched to necko. At the same time, a timeout timer is initialized. If + // the necko request completes, the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone + // is set to true, and the monitor is notified. The original thread then wakes + // up and continues with the results that have been filled out. If the request + // times out, again the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone is set to + // true, and the monitor is notified. The first of these two events wins. That + // is, if the timeout timer fires but the request completes shortly after, the + // caller will see the request as having timed out. + // When the request completes (i.e. OnStreamComplete runs), the timer will be + // cancelled. This is how we know the closure in OnTimeout is valid. If the + // timer fires before OnStreamComplete runs, it should be safe to not cancel + // the request because necko has a strong reference to it. + Monitor mMonitor MOZ_UNANNOTATED; + bool mNotifiedDone; + nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamLoader> mLoader; + const nsCString mAIALocation; + const OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes; + const mozilla::Span<const char> mPOSTData; + const TimeDuration mTimeout; + nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer; + TimeStamp mStartTime; + nsresult mResponseResult; + Vector<uint8_t> mResponseBytes; +}; + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(OCSPRequest, nsIStreamLoaderObserver, nsIRunnable) + +OCSPRequest::OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation, + const OriginAttributes& originAttributes, + const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], + size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout) + : mMonitor("OCSPRequest.mMonitor"), + mNotifiedDone(false), + mLoader(nullptr), + mAIALocation(aiaLocation), + mOriginAttributes(originAttributes), + mPOSTData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocspRequest), ocspRequestLength), + mTimeout(timeout), + mTimeoutTimer(nullptr), + mStartTime(), + mResponseResult(NS_ERROR_FAILURE), + mResponseBytes() { + MOZ_ASSERT(ocspRequestLength <= OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH); +} + +nsresult OCSPRequest::DispatchToMainThreadAndWait() { + MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread()); + if (NS_IsMainThread()) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); + nsresult rv = NS_DispatchToMainThread(this); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return rv; + } + while (!mNotifiedDone) { + lock.Wait(); + } + + TimeStamp endTime = TimeStamp::Now(); + // CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT: + // 0: request timed out + // 1: request succeeded + // 2: request failed + // 3: internal error + // If mStartTime was never set, we consider this an internal error. + // Otherwise, we managed to at least send the request. + if (mStartTime.IsNull()) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 3); + } else if (mResponseResult == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 0); + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_CANCELED_TIME, mStartTime, + endTime); + } else if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mResponseResult)) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 1); + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_SUCCEEDED_TIME, mStartTime, + endTime); + } else { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 2); + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_FAILED_TIME, mStartTime, + endTime); + } + return rv; +} + +nsresult OCSPRequest::GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response) { + MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread()); + if (NS_IsMainThread()) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); + if (!mNotifiedDone) { + return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS; + } + if (NS_FAILED(mResponseResult)) { + return mResponseResult; + } + response.clear(); + if (!response.append(mResponseBytes.begin(), mResponseBytes.length())) { + return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + return NS_OK; +} + +static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE = "application/ocsp-request"_ns; +static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD = "POST"_ns; + +NS_IMETHODIMP +OCSPRequest::Run() { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService(); + if (!ios) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mAIALocation); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock); + } + nsAutoCString scheme; + rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http")) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock); + } + + // See bug 1219935. + // We should not send OCSP request if the PAC is still loading. + nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolProxyService> pps = + do_GetService(NS_PROTOCOLPROXYSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + + if (pps->GetIsPACLoading()) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel; + rv = ios->NewChannel(mAIALocation, nullptr, nullptr, + nullptr, // aLoadingNode + nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(), + nullptr, // aTriggeringPrincipal + nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL, + nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, getter_AddRefs(channel)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + + // Security operations scheduled through normal HTTP channels are given + // high priority to accommodate real time OCSP transactions. + nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsPriority> priorityChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel); + if (priorityChannel) { + priorityChannel->AdjustPriority(nsISupportsPriority::PRIORITY_HIGHEST); + } + + channel->SetLoadFlags( + nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS | nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE | + nsIRequest::INHIBIT_CACHING | nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER | + nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_URL_CLASSIFIER); + + nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo(); + + // Prevent HTTPS-Only Mode from upgrading the OCSP request. + uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus(); + httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT; + loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus); + + // allow deprecated HTTP request from SystemPrincipal + loadInfo->SetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests(true); + + // For OCSP requests, only the first party domain and private browsing id + // aspects of origin attributes are used. This means that: + // a) if first party isolation is enabled, OCSP requests will be isolated + // according to the first party domain of the original https request + // b) OCSP requests are shared across different containers as long as first + // party isolation is not enabled and none of the containers are in private + // browsing mode. + if (mOriginAttributes != OriginAttributes()) { + OriginAttributes attrs; + attrs.mFirstPartyDomain = mOriginAttributes.mFirstPartyDomain; + attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId = mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId; + + rv = loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> uploadStream; + rv = NS_NewByteInputStream(getter_AddRefs(uploadStream), mPOSTData, + NS_ASSIGNMENT_COPY); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel)); + if (!uploadChannel) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(uploadStream, OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE, -1); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + // Do not use SPDY or HTTP3 for internal security operations. It could result + // in the silent upgrade to ssl, which in turn could require an SSL + // operation to fulfill something like an OCSP fetch, which is an + // endless loop. + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internalChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel); + if (!internalChannel) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + rv = internalChannel->SetAllowSpdy(false); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + rv = internalChannel->SetAllowHttp3(false); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + rv = internalChannel->SetIsOCSP(true); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(channel); + if (!hchan) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + rv = hchan->SetAllowSTS(false); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + rv = hchan->SetRequestMethod(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + + rv = NS_NewStreamLoader(getter_AddRefs(mLoader), this); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + + rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback( + getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer), OCSPRequest::OnTimeout, this, + mTimeout.ToMilliseconds(), nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT, "OCSPRequest::Run"); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + rv = hchan->AsyncOpen(this->mLoader); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now(); + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult OCSPRequest::NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& lock) { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + if (mNotifiedDone) { + return mResponseResult; + } + mLoader = nullptr; + mResponseResult = rv; + if (mTimeoutTimer) { + Unused << mTimeoutTimer->Cancel(); + } + mNotifiedDone = true; + lock.Notify(); + return rv; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +OCSPRequest::OnStreamComplete(nsIStreamLoader* aLoader, nsISupports* aContext, + nsresult aStatus, uint32_t responseLen, + const uint8_t* responseBytes) { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req; + nsresult rv = aLoader->GetRequest(getter_AddRefs(req)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + + if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) { + return NotifyDone(aStatus, lock); + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(req); + if (!hchan) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + + bool requestSucceeded; + rv = hchan->GetRequestSucceeded(&requestSucceeded); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + if (!requestSucceeded) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + + unsigned int rcode; + rv = hchan->GetResponseStatus(&rcode); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return NotifyDone(rv, lock); + } + if (rcode != 200) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock); + } + + mResponseBytes.clear(); + if (!mResponseBytes.append(responseBytes, responseLen)) { + return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, lock); + } + mResponseResult = aStatus; + + return NotifyDone(NS_OK, lock); +} + +void OCSPRequest::OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure) { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { + return; + } + + // We know the OCSPRequest is still alive because if the request had completed + // (i.e. OnStreamComplete ran), the timer would have been cancelled in + // NotifyDone. + OCSPRequest* self = static_cast<OCSPRequest*>(closure); + MonitorAutoLock lock(self->mMonitor); + self->mTimeoutTimer = nullptr; + self->NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT, lock); +} + +mozilla::pkix::Result DoOCSPRequest( + const nsCString& aiaLocation, const OriginAttributes& originAttributes, + uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], size_t ocspRequestLength, + TimeDuration timeout, /*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& result) { + MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread()); + if (NS_IsMainThread()) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT; + } + + if (ocspRequestLength > OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + result.clear(); + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("DoOCSPRequest to '%s'", aiaLocation.get())); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + MOZ_ASSERT(sts); + if (!sts) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE; + } + bool onSTSThread; + nsresult rv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + MOZ_ASSERT(!onSTSThread); + if (onSTSThread) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE; + } + + RefPtr<OCSPRequest> request(new OCSPRequest( + aiaLocation, originAttributes, ocspRequest, ocspRequestLength, timeout)); + rv = request->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait(); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + rv = request->GetResponse(result); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + if (rv == NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION; + } + return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR; + } + return Success; +} + +static char* ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIPrompt* prompt) { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + MOZ_ASSERT(slot); + MOZ_ASSERT(prompt); + if (!NS_IsMainThread() || !slot || !prompt) { + return nullptr; + } + + // Dispatch a background task to (eventually) call C_Login. The call will + // block until the protected authentication succeeds or fails. + Atomic<bool> done; + Atomic<SECStatus> result; + nsresult rv = + NS_DispatchBackgroundTask(NS_NewRunnableFunction(__func__, [&]() mutable { + result = PK11_CheckUserPassword(slot, nullptr); + done = true; + })); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return nullptr; + } + + nsTArray<nsCString> resIds = { + "security/pippki/pippki.ftl"_ns, + }; + RefPtr<mozilla::intl::Localization> l10n = + mozilla::intl::Localization::Create(resIds, true); + auto l10nId = "protected-auth-alert"_ns; + auto l10nArgs = mozilla::dom::Optional<intl::L10nArgs>(); + l10nArgs.Construct(); + auto dirArg = l10nArgs.Value().Entries().AppendElement(); + dirArg->mKey = "tokenName"_ns; + dirArg->mValue.SetValue().SetAsUTF8String().Assign(PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); + nsAutoCString promptString; + ErrorResult errorResult; + l10n->FormatValueSync(l10nId, l10nArgs, promptString, errorResult); + if (NS_FAILED(errorResult.StealNSResult())) { + return nullptr; + } + rv = prompt->Alert(nullptr, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(promptString).get()); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return nullptr; + } + + MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(SpinEventLoopUntil( + "ShowProtectedAuthPrompt"_ns, [&]() { return static_cast<bool>(done); })); + + switch (result) { + case SECSuccess: + return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_AUTHENTICATED)); + case SECWouldBlock: + return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_RETRY)); + default: + return nullptr; + } +} + +class PK11PasswordPromptRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase { + public: + PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir) + : mResult(nullptr), mSlot(slot), mIR(ir) {} + virtual ~PK11PasswordPromptRunnable() = default; + + char* mResult; // out + virtual void RunOnTargetThread() override; + + private: + static bool mRunning; + + PK11SlotInfo* mSlot; + nsIInterfaceRequestor* mIR; +}; + +bool PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::mRunning = false; + +void PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::RunOnTargetThread() { + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { + return; + } + + // If we've reentered due to the nested event loop implicit in using + // nsIPrompt synchronously (or indeed the explicit nested event loop in the + // protected authentication case), bail early, cancelling the password + // prompt. This will probably cause the operation that resulted in the prompt + // to fail, but this is better than littering the screen with a bunch of + // password prompts that the user will probably just cancel anyway. + if (mRunning) { + return; + } + mRunning = true; + auto setRunningToFalseOnExit = MakeScopeExit([&]() { mRunning = false; }); + + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt; + if (!mIR) { + rv = nsNSSComponent::GetNewPrompter(getter_AddRefs(prompt)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return; + } + } else { + prompt = do_GetInterface(mIR); + MOZ_ASSERT(prompt, "Interface requestor should implement nsIPrompt"); + } + + if (!prompt) { + return; + } + + if (PK11_ProtectedAuthenticationPath(mSlot)) { + mResult = ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(mSlot, prompt); + return; + } + + nsAutoString promptString; + if (PK11_IsInternal(mSlot)) { + rv = GetPIPNSSBundleString("CertPasswordPromptDefault", promptString); + } else { + AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = { + NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(mSlot))}; + rv = PIPBundleFormatStringFromName("CertPasswordPrompt", formatStrings, + promptString); + } + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return; + } + + nsString password; + bool userClickedOK = false; + rv = prompt->PromptPassword(nullptr, promptString.get(), + getter_Copies(password), &userClickedOK); + if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !userClickedOK) { + return; + } + + mResult = ToNewUTF8String(password); +} + +char* PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, PRBool /*retry*/, void* arg) { + if (!slot) { + return nullptr; + } + RefPtr<PK11PasswordPromptRunnable> runnable(new PK11PasswordPromptRunnable( + slot, static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(arg))); + runnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait(); + return runnable->mResult; +} + +nsCString getKeaGroupName(uint32_t aKeaGroup) { + nsCString groupName; + switch (aKeaGroup) { + case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1: + groupName = "P256"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1: + groupName = "P384"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1: + groupName = "P521"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519: + groupName = "x25519"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048: + groupName = "FF 2048"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072: + groupName = "FF 3072"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_none: + groupName = "none"_ns; + break; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom: + groupName = "custom"_ns; + break; + // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See namedGroups in + // nsNSSIOLayer.cpp. + default: + // This really shouldn't happen! + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid key exchange group."); + groupName = "unknown group"_ns; + } + return groupName; +} + +nsCString getSignatureName(uint32_t aSignatureScheme) { + nsCString signatureName; + switch (aSignatureScheme) { + case ssl_sig_none: + signatureName = "none"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA256"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA384"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA512"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + signatureName = "ECDSA-P256-SHA256"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + signatureName = "ECDSA-P384-SHA384"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + signatureName = "ECDSA-P521-SHA512"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA256"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA384"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA512"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + signatureName = "ECDSA-SHA1"_ns; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1MD5"_ns; + break; + // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See sEnabledSignatureSchemes + // in nsNSSIOLayer.cpp. + default: + // This really shouldn't happen! + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid signature scheme."); + signatureName = "unknown signature"_ns; + } + return signatureName; +} + +static void PreliminaryHandshakeDone(PRFileDesc* fd) { + NSSSocketControl* socketControl = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret; + if (!socketControl) { + return; + } + if (socketControl->IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone()) { + return; + } + + SSLChannelInfo channelInfo; + if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) { + return; + } + SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo; + if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo, + sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) { + return; + } + socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeInfo(channelInfo, cipherInfo); + socketControl->SetSSLVersionUsed(channelInfo.protocolVersion); + socketControl->SetEarlyDataAccepted(channelInfo.earlyDataAccepted); + socketControl->SetKEAUsed(channelInfo.keaType); + socketControl->SetKEAKeyBits(channelInfo.keaKeyBits); + socketControl->SetMACAlgorithmUsed(cipherInfo.macAlgorithm); + + // Get the NPN value. + SSLNextProtoState state; + unsigned char npnbuf[256]; + unsigned int npnlen; + + if (SSL_GetNextProto(fd, &state, npnbuf, &npnlen, + AssertedCast<unsigned int>(ArrayLength(npnbuf))) == + SECSuccess) { + if (state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED || + state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { + socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN( + BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(npnbuf), npnlen); + } else { + socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0); + } + mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_NPN_TYPE, state); + } else { + socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0); + } + + socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone(); +} + +SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, + PRBool* canFalseStart) { + *canFalseStart = false; + + NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret; + if (!infoObject) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled(); + + PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd); + + uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0; + + SSLChannelInfo channelInfo; + if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo; + if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo, + sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - " + " KEA %d\n", + fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType))); + return SECSuccess; + } + + // Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for + // TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why. + if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - " + "SSL Version must be TLS 1.2, was %x\n", + fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion))); + reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE; + } + + // See bug 952863 for why ECDHE is allowed, but DHE (and RSA) are not. + if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - " + "unsupported KEA %d\n", + fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType))); + reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + // Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC + // mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt + // design. See bug 1109766 for more details. + if (cipherInfo.macAlgorithm != ssl_mac_aead) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - non-AEAD cipher used, %d, " + "is not supported with False Start.\n", + fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher))); + reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE; + } + + // XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the + // NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability + // of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start + // to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the + // first successful connection to the server. + + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING, + reasonsForNotFalseStarting); + + if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) { + *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE; + infoObject->SetFalseStarted(); + infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady(); + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd)); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, + uint32_t bits) { + unsigned int value = bits < 512 ? 1 + : bits == 512 ? 2 + : bits < 768 ? 3 + : bits == 768 ? 4 + : bits < 1024 ? 5 + : bits == 1024 ? 6 + : bits < 1280 ? 7 + : bits == 1280 ? 8 + : bits < 1536 ? 9 + : bits == 1536 ? 10 + : bits < 2048 ? 11 + : bits == 2048 ? 12 + : bits < 3072 ? 13 + : bits == 3072 ? 14 + : bits < 4096 ? 15 + : bits == 4096 ? 16 + : bits < 8192 ? 17 + : bits == 8192 ? 18 + : bits < 16384 ? 19 + : bits == 16384 ? 20 + : 0; + Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value); +} + +// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In +// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available. +// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves +// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple +// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on +// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674. +static void AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, uint32_t bits) { + unsigned int value = bits == 255 ? 29 // Curve25519 + : bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256 + : bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384 + : bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521 + : 0; // Unknown + Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value); +} + +static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, + const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo) { + uint32_t value; + switch (channelInfo.cipherSuite) { + // ECDHE key exchange + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + value = 1; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + value = 2; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 3; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 4; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 5; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 6; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 7; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 10; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + value = 11; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + value = 12; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + value = 13; + break; + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + value = 14; + break; + // DHE key exchange + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 21; + break; + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 22; + break; + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 23; + break; + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 24; + break; + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 25; + break; + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 26; + break; + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 27; + break; + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 28; + break; + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 29; + break; + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 30; + break; + // ECDH key exchange + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 41; + break; + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 42; + break; + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 43; + break; + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 44; + break; + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 45; + break; + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 46; + break; + // RSA key exchange + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 61; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA: + value = 62; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 63; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA: + value = 64; + break; + case SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 65; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + value = 66; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA: + value = 67; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + value = 68; + break; + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + value = 69; + break; + // TLS 1.3 PSK resumption + case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + value = 70; + break; + case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + value = 71; + break; + case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + value = 72; + break; + // unknown + default: + value = 0; + break; + } + MOZ_ASSERT(value != 0); + Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value); +} + +void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { + SECStatus rv; + + NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret; + + // Do the bookkeeping that needs to be done after the + // server's ServerHello...ServerHelloDone have been processed, but that + // doesn't need the handshake to be completed. + PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd); + + nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& ioLayerHelpers = + infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers(); + + SSLVersionRange versions(infoObject->GetTLSVersionRange()); + + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] HandshakeCallback: succeeded using TLS version range " + "(0x%04x,0x%04x)\n", + fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.min), + static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.max))); + + // If the handshake completed, then we know the site is TLS tolerant + ioLayerHelpers.rememberTolerantAtVersion(infoObject->GetHostName(), + infoObject->GetPort(), versions.max); + + SSLChannelInfo channelInfo; + rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)); + MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + // Get the protocol version for telemetry + // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2 + unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF; + MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0); + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_VERSION, versionEnum); + AccumulateCipherSuite(infoObject->IsFullHandshake() + ? Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_FULL + : Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_RESUMED, + channelInfo); + + SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo; + rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo, + sizeof cipherInfo); + MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + // keyExchange null=0, rsa=1, dh=2, fortezza=3, ecdh=4 + Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake() + ? Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_FULL + : Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_RESUMED, + channelInfo.keaType); + + if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) { + switch (channelInfo.keaType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, + channelInfo.keaKeyBits); + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL, + channelInfo.keaKeyBits); + break; + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL, + channelInfo.keaKeyBits); + break; + default: + MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA"); + break; + } + + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ALGORITHM_FULL, + channelInfo.authType); + + // RSA key exchange doesn't use a signature for auth. + if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_rsa) { + switch (channelInfo.authType) { + case ssl_auth_rsa: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: + AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, + channelInfo.authKeyBits); + break; + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL, + channelInfo.authKeyBits); + break; + default: + MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm"); + break; + } + } + } + + Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake() + ? Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_FULL + : Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_RESUMED, + cipherInfo.symCipher); + } + } + + PRBool siteSupportsSafeRenego; + if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(fd, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, + &siteSupportsSafeRenego); + MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + siteSupportsSafeRenego = false; + } + } else { + // TLS 1.3 dropped support for renegotiation. + siteSupportsSafeRenego = true; + } + bool renegotiationUnsafe = !siteSupportsSafeRenego && + ioLayerHelpers.treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(); + + bool deprecatedTlsVer = + (channelInfo.protocolVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + uint32_t state; + if (renegotiationUnsafe || deprecatedTlsVer) { + state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN; + } else { + state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE; + SSLVersionRange defVersion; + rv = SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &defVersion); + if (rv == SECSuccess && versions.max >= defVersion.max) { + // we know this site no longer requires a version fallback + ioLayerHelpers.removeInsecureFallbackSite(infoObject->GetHostName(), + infoObject->GetPort()); + } + } + + if (infoObject->HasServerCert()) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("HandshakeCallback KEEPING existing cert\n")); + } else { + infoObject->RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache(); + } + + // Check if the user has added an override for a certificate error. + if (infoObject->HasUserOverriddenCertificateError()) { + state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_USER_OVERRIDDEN; + } + + infoObject->SetSecurityState(state); + + // XXX Bug 883674: We shouldn't be formatting messages here in PSM; instead, + // we should set a flag on the channel that higher (UI) level code can check + // to log the warning. In particular, these warnings should go to the web + // console instead of to the error console. Also, the warning is not + // localized. + if (!siteSupportsSafeRenego) { + NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 msg(infoObject->GetHostName()); + msg.AppendLiteral(" : server does not support RFC 5746, see CVE-2009-3555"); + + nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError( + msg, "SSL"_ns, !!infoObject->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId, + true /* from chrome context */); + } + + infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady(); + infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted(); +} |