diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc | 121 |
1 files changed, 121 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db532d618d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be +// found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "base/win/windows_version.h" +#include "sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.h" +#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h" +#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_factory.h" +#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h" +#include "sandbox/win/tests/common/controller.h" +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" + +namespace sandbox { + +SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int NamedPipe_Create(int argc, wchar_t** argv) { + if (argc < 1 || argc > 2 || !argv || !argv[0]) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND; + + HANDLE pipe = ::CreateNamedPipeW( + argv[0], PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE, 1, 4096, 4096, 2000, nullptr); + if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == pipe) + return SBOX_TEST_DENIED; + + // The second parameter allows us to enforce an allowlist for where the + // pipe should be in the object namespace after creation. + if (argc == 2) { + std::wstring handle_name; + if (GetHandleName(pipe, &handle_name)) { + if (handle_name.compare(0, wcslen(argv[1]), argv[1]) != 0) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } else { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } + + OVERLAPPED overlapped = {0}; + overlapped.hEvent = ::CreateEvent(nullptr, true, true, nullptr); + bool result = ::ConnectNamedPipe(pipe, &overlapped); + + if (!result) { + DWORD error = ::GetLastError(); + if (ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED != error && ERROR_IO_PENDING != error) { + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + } + } + + if (!::CloseHandle(pipe)) + return SBOX_TEST_FAILED; + + ::CloseHandle(overlapped.hEvent); + return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED; +} + +// Tests if we can create a pipe in the sandbox. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipe) { + TestRunner runner; + // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a + // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603 + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, + TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\bleh")); +} + +// Tests if we can create a pipe with a path traversal in the sandbox. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeTraversal) { + TestRunner runner; + // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a + // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603 + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, + TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test\\..\\bleh")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test/../bleh")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test\\../bleh")); + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test/..\\bleh")); +} + +// This tests that path canonicalization is actually disabled if we use \\?\ +// syntax. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeCanonicalization) { + // "For file I/O, the "\\?\" prefix to a path string tells the Windows APIs to + // disable all string parsing and to send the string that follows it straight + // to the file system." + // http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa365247(VS.85).aspx + const wchar_t* argv[2] = {L"\\\\?\\pipe\\test\\..\\bleh", + L"\\Device\\NamedPipe\\test"}; + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + NamedPipe_Create(2, const_cast<wchar_t**>(argv))); +} + +// The same test as CreatePipe but this time using strict interceptions. +TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeStrictInterceptions) { + TestRunner runner; + runner.GetPolicy()->SetStrictInterceptions(); + + // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a + // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603 + EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, + TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, + L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh")); + + EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED, + runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\bleh")); +} + +} // namespace sandbox |