diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp | 3090 |
1 files changed, 3090 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp b/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eefc8688 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,3090 @@ +/* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp $ */ +/** @file + * VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2006-2022 Oracle and/or its affiliates. + * + * This file is part of VirtualBox base platform packages, as + * available from https://www.virtualbox.org. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation, in version 3 of the + * License. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses>. + * + * The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms + * of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0 + * (CDDL), a copy of it is provided in the "COPYING.CDDL" file included + * in the VirtualBox distribution, in which case the provisions of the + * CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL. + * + * You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the + * terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only OR CDDL-1.0 + */ + + +/********************************************************************************************************************************* +* Header Files * +*********************************************************************************************************************************/ +#ifdef IN_RING0 +# ifndef IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW +# define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW +# endif +# include <iprt/nt/nt.h> +# include <ntimage.h> +#else +# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h> +# include "Wintrust.h" +# include "Softpub.h" +# include "mscat.h" +# ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR +# define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800 +# endif +#endif + +#include <VBox/sup.h> +#include <VBox/err.h> +#include <iprt/ctype.h> +#include <iprt/ldr.h> +#include <iprt/log.h> +#include <iprt/path.h> +#include <iprt/string.h> +#include <iprt/utf16.h> +#include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include <iprt/crypto/store.h> + +#ifdef IN_RING0 +# include "SUPDrvInternal.h" +#else +# include "SUPLibInternal.h" +#endif +#include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h" + + +/********************************************************************************************************************************* +* Defined Constants And Macros * +*********************************************************************************************************************************/ +/** The size of static hash (output) buffers. + * Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra + * calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular + * use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's + * enough a good while. */ +#define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128 + + +#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) +# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!" +#endif + + +/********************************************************************************************************************************* +* Structures and Typedefs * +*********************************************************************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef IN_RING3 +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(LONG, WINAPI, PFNWINVERIFYTRUST,(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT,(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, + DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2,(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, + PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm, + struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, + DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE,(HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash, + DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, + DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(HCATINFO, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD cbHash, + DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, + DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT,(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, + DWORD dwFlags)); + +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(HCERTSTORE, WINAPI, PFNCERTOPENSTORE,(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, + HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv, DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE,(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags)); +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(PCCERT_CONTEXT, WINAPI, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE,(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, + PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext)); + +typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(NTSTATUS, WINAPI, PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER,(BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE *phAlgo, PCWSTR pwszAlgoId, + PCWSTR pwszImpl, DWORD dwFlags)); +#endif + + +/********************************************************************************************************************************* +* Global Variables * +*********************************************************************************************************************************/ +/** The build certificate. */ +static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert; + +/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */ +static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; +/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */ +static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; + +/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */ +static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; +/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with + * g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */ +static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; + +/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath; +/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath; +#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) +/** The full 'Program Files' path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath; +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 +/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath; +# endif +/** The full 'Common Files' path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath; +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 +/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */ +SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath; +# endif +#endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_MORE*/ + +/** + * Blacklisted DLL names. + */ +const RTSTRTUPLE g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[] = +{ + { RT_STR_TUPLE("SCROBJ.dll") }, + { NULL, 0 } /* terminator entry */ +}; + + +static union +{ + SID Sid; + uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE]; +} +/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */ + g_TrustedInstallerSid, +/** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */ + g_LocalSystemSid, +/** Builtin Administrators group alias (S-1-5-32-544). */ + g_AdminsGroupSid; + + +/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */ +static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false; + +#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3) +/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and + * SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */ +uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined; +#endif + +#ifdef IN_RING3 +/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship. + * See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */ +static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef IN_RING3 +/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */ +PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */ +PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext; +/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */ +PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext; +/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */ +PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext; + +/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */ +static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX; +/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */ +static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX; + +#endif + + +/********************************************************************************************************************************* +* Internal Functions * +*********************************************************************************************************************************/ +#ifdef IN_RING3 +static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, + PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust); +static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, + PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust); +#endif + + + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + NTSTATUS rcNt; + + /* Check for type overflow (paranoia). */ + if ((ULONG)cb != cb) + return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + +#ifdef IN_RING3 + /* Make sure the event semaphore is reset (normally we don't use one). */ + if (pNtViRdr->hEvent) + { + rcNt = NtClearEvent(pNtViRdr->hEvent); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + return RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt); + } +#endif + + /* Perform the read. */ + LARGE_INTEGER offNt; + offNt.QuadPart = off; + + IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; + rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile, + pNtViRdr->hEvent, + NULL /*ApcRoutine*/, + NULL /*ApcContext*/, + &Ios, + pvBuf, + (ULONG)cb, + &offNt, + NULL); + +#ifdef IN_RING0 + /* In ring-0 the handles shall be synchronized and not alertable. */ + AssertMsg(rcNt == STATUS_SUCCESS || !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt), ("%#x\n", rcNt)); +#else + /* In ring-3 we like our handles synchronized and non-alertable, but we + sometimes have to take what we can get. So, deal with pending I/O as + best we can. */ + if (rcNt == STATUS_PENDING) + rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(pNtViRdr->hEvent ? pNtViRdr->hEvent : pNtViRdr->hFile, FALSE /*Alertable*/, NULL); +#endif + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + rcNt = Ios.Status; + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + /* We require the caller to not read beyond the end of the file since + we don't have any way to communicate that we've read less that + requested. */ + if (Ios.Information == cb) + { + pNtViRdr->off = off + cb; /* (just for show) */ + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } +#ifdef IN_RING3 + supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, + "supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n", + Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename); +#endif + } + pNtViRdr->off = -1; + return VERR_READ_ERROR; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */ +static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + return pNtViRdr->off; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */ +static DECLCALLBACK(uint64_t) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + return pNtViRdr->cbFile; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */ +static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader; + return pNtViRdr->szFilename; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits) +{ + RT_NOREF2(pReader, ppvBits); + return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits) +{ + RT_NOREF2(pReader, pvBits); + return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + + +/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + + pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC; + pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL; +#ifdef IN_RING3 + if (pNtViRdr->hEvent) + { + NtClose(pNtViRdr->hEvent); + pNtViRdr->hEvent = NULL; + } +#endif + RTMemFree(pNtViRdr); + return VINF_SUCCESS; +} + + +/** + * Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle. + * + * @returns iprt status code. + * @param hFile Native NT file handle. + * @param pwszName Optional file name. + * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr) +{ + /* + * Try determine the size of the file. + */ + IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; + FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo; + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) + return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR; + + /* + * Figure the file mode so we can see whether we'll be needing an event + * semaphore for waiting on reads. This may happen in very unlikely + * NtCreateSection scenarios. + */ +#if defined(IN_RING3) || defined(VBOX_STRICT) + Ios.Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + ULONG fMode; + rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &fMode, sizeof(fMode), FileModeInformation); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) + return VERR_SUP_VP_FILE_MODE_ERROR; +#endif + + HANDLE hEvent = NULL; +#ifdef IN_RING3 + if (!(fMode & (FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_ALERT))) + { + rcNt = NtCreateEvent(&hEvent, EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, NotificationEvent, FALSE); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + return VERR_SUP_VP_CREATE_READ_EVT_SEM_FAILED; + } +#else + Assert(fMode & FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT); +#endif + + /* + * Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance. + */ + size_t cchFilename = 0; + if (pwszName) + cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName); + + int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY; + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename); + if (!pNtViRdr) + { +#ifdef IN_RING3 + if (hEvent != NULL) + NtClose(hEvent); +#endif + return VERR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * Initialize the structure. + */ + if (cchFilename) + { + char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0]; + rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL); + AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0'); + } + else + pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0'; + + pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap; + pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy; + pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile; + pNtViRdr->hEvent = hEvent; + pNtViRdr->off = 0; + pNtViRdr->cbFile = (uint64_t)StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart; + pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags; + *ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr; + return VINF_SUCCESS; +} + + +/** + * Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar. + * + * @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not. + * + * @param hFile The handle to the file. + * @param pwszName The name of the file. + */ +static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName) +{ + if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA) + return true; + + /* + * Get the ownership information. + */ + union + { + SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel; + SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs; + uint8_t abView[256]; + } uBuf; + ULONG cbActual; + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual); + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName)); + return false; + } + + /* + * Check the owner. + * + * Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI + * plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll" + * turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without + * the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails). + * + * We'd like to avoid allowing Builtin\Administrators here since it's the + * default owner of anything an admin user creates (at least when elevated). + * Seems windows update or someone ends up installing or modifying system + * DLL ownership to this group, so for system32 and winsxs it's unavoidable. + * And, not surprise, a bunch of products, including AV, firewalls and similar + * ends up with their files installed with this group as owner. For instance + * if we wish to have NAT continue working, we need to allow this. + * + * Hopefully, we can limit the allowed files to these owners though, so + * we won't be subject to ordinary (non-admin, or not elevated) users + * downloading or be tricked into putting evil DLLs around the place... + */ + PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner; + Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID)); + if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid)) + return true; + if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid)) + return true; + if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_AdminsGroupSid)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is administrators group.\n", pwszName)); + return true; + } + + SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n", + pwszName, ((uint8_t *)pOwner)[1] /*SubAuthorityCount*/ * sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner)); + RT_NOREF1(pwszName); + return false; +} + + +/** + * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare. + * + * @returns true if equal, false if not. + * @param pawcLeft The UTF-16 path string, not necessarily null + * terminated. + * @param cwcLeft The number of chars in the left string, + * RTSTR_MAX if unknown but terminated. + * @param pszRight The ascii string. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, size_t cwcLeft, const char *pszRight) +{ + for (;;) + { + RTUTF16 wc; + if (cwcLeft-- > 0) + wc =*pawcLeft++; + else + wc = 0; + uint8_t b = *pszRight++; + if (b != wc) + { + if (wc >= 0x80) + return false; + wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc); + if (wc != b) + { + b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b); + if (wc != b) + { + if (wc == '/') + wc = '\\'; + if (b == '/') + b = '\\'; + if (wc != b) + return false; + } + } + } + if (!b) + return true; + } +} + + +/** + * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare. + * + * @returns true if equal, false if not. + * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string. + * @param pszRight The ascii string. + */ +static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight) +{ + return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(pwszLeft, RTSTR_MAX, pszRight); +} + + +#if 0 /* unused */ +/** + * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate. + * + * @returns true if equal, false if not. + * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string. + * @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string. + */ +static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix) +{ + size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz); + size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix); + if (cwc >= cchSuffix) + return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix); + return false; +} +#endif + + +/** + * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate. + * + * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not. + * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string. + * @param pszRight The ascii prefix string. + */ +static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight) +{ + for (;;) + { + RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++; + uint8_t b = *pszRight++; + if (b != wc) + { + if (!b) + return true; + if (wc >= 0x80 || wc == 0) + return false; + wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc); + if (wc != b) + { + b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b); + if (wc != b) + { + if (wc == '/') + wc = '\\'; + if (b == '/') + b = '\\'; + if (wc != b) + return false; + } + } + } + } +} + + +/** + * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate. + * + * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not. + * @param pwszLeft The path to check. + * @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft + * @param pwszRight The starts-with path. + * @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight. + * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft, + PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash) +{ + if (cwcLeft < cwcRight || !cwcRight || !pwszRight) + return false; + + /* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */ + if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0) + pwszLeft += cwcRight; + else + { + /* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */ + uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight; + while (cLeft-- > 0) + { + RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++; + RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++; + if (wcLeft != wcRight) + { + wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft; + wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight; + if (wcLeft != wcRight) + return false; + } + } + } + + /* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */ + if ( !fCheckSlash + || *pwszLeft == '\\' + || *pwszLeft == '/') + return true; + return false; +} + + +/** + * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate. + * + * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not. + * @param pUniStrLeft The path to check. + * @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path. + * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrLeft, + UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrRight, bool fCheckSlash) +{ + return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), + pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash); +} + + +#ifndef IN_RING0 +/** + * Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string. + * + * @returns Number of slashes. + * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string. + */ +static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz) +{ + uint32_t cSlashes = 0; + RTUTF16 wc; + while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0') + if (wc == '/' || wc == '\\') + cSlashes++; + return cSlashes; +} +#endif + + +#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE +/** + * Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\. + * + * @returns true if apppatch, false if not. + * @param pwszPath The path to examine. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName) +{ + uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR); + + if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch")) + return false; + + if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR))) + return false; + + if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\")) + return false; + + return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA; +} +#else +# error should not get here.. +#endif + + + +/** + * Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not. + * + * @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc. + * @param hLdrMod The loader module handle. + * @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE. + * @param fFlags Flags. + * @param hFile The file handle. + * @param rc The status code.. + */ +static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc) +{ + RT_NOREF1(hLdrMod); + + if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)) + return rc; + + /* + * Version macros. + */ + uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined; +#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) ) +#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) ) +#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) ) +#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) ) +#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) ) +#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ) + + /* + * The System32 directory. + * + * System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics + * hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that + * actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly. + * We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from + * System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of + * anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32 + * or being loaded from it. + * + * A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed + * and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been + * replaced by an adversary with evil intentions. + */ + PCRTUTF16 pwsz; + uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName); + uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); + if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) + { + pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1; + + /* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */ + if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName)) + return rc; + + /* Core DLLs. */ + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll")) + return IS_W80() || IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll")) + return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll")) + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; /* So far, never signed... */ +#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VERIFIER_DLL + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; +#endif +#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE + if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */ + { + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll")) + return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc; + } +#endif + +#ifndef IN_RING0 + /* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows + version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */ + /** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */ + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; +#else + return rc; +#endif /* IN_RING0 */ + } + + +#ifndef IN_RING0 + /* + * The WinSxS white list. + * + * Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that + * could be required from WinSxS. + */ + cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); + if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) + { + pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1; + cwcName -= cwcOther + 1; + + /* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */ + uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz); + if (cSlashes != 1) + return rc; + + /* Must be owned by trusted installer. */ + if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName)) + return rc; + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + } +#endif /* !IN_RING0 */ + + +#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE + /* + * AppPatch whitelist. + */ + if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName)) + { + cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */ + pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1; + + if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName)) + return rc; + +# ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll")) + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll")) + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; +# elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86) + if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll")) + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; +# endif +# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */ + +# ifdef IN_RING0 + return rc; +# else + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; +# endif + } +#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */ + + +#ifndef IN_RING0 +# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) + /* + * Program files and common files. + * Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed. + */ + if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, + g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length, + true /*fCheckSlash*/) + || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, + g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length, + true /*fCheckSlash*/) +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 + || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, + g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length, + true /*fCheckSlash*/) + || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, + g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length, + true /*fCheckSlash*/) +# endif + ) + { + if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName)) + return rc; + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + } + +# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) + /* + * Anything that's owned by the trusted installer. + */ + if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + || supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName)) + return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + +# endif +#endif /* !IN_RING0 */ + + /* + * Not permitted. + */ + return rc; +} + + +/** + * @callback_method_impl{FNRTDUMPPRINTFV, Formats into RTERRINFO. } + */ +static DECLCALLBACK(void) supHardNtViAsn1DumpToErrInfo(void *pvUser, const char *pszFormat, va_list va) +{ + PRTERRINFO pErrInfo = (PRTERRINFO)pvUser; + RTErrInfoAddV(pErrInfo, pErrInfo->rc, pszFormat, va); +} + + +/** + * Attempts to locate a root certificate in the specified store. + * + * @returns IPRT status code. + * @retval VINF_SUCCESS if found. + * @retval VWRN_NOT_FOUND if not found. + * + * @param hRootStore The root certificate store to search. + * @param pSubject The root certificate subject. + * @param pPublicKeyInfo The public key of the root certificate to find. + */ +static int supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(RTCRSTORE hRootStore, PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject, + PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo) +{ + RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search; + int rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(hRootStore, pSubject, &Search); + AssertRCReturn(rc, rc); + + rc = VWRN_NOT_FOUND; + PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx; + while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(hRootStore, &Search)) != NULL) + { + PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL; + if (pCertCtx->pCert) + pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo; + else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo) + pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey; + else + pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL; + if ( pCertPubKeyInfo + && RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0) + { + RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx); + rc = VINF_SUCCESS; + break; + } + RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx); + } + + int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(hRootStore, &Search); + AssertRC(rc2); + return rc; +} + + +/** + * @callback_method_impl{FNRTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK, + * Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.} + */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths, + uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + + /* + * If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this + * callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the + * build certificate without any second thoughts. + */ + if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) + { +#ifdef VBOX_STRICT + Assert(RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths) == 1); + bool fTrusted = false; + uint32_t cNodes = UINT32_MAX; + int rcVerify = -1; + int rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, 0, &fTrusted, &cNodes, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &rcVerify); + AssertRC(rc); AssertRC(rcVerify); Assert(fTrusted); Assert(cNodes == 1); +#endif + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } + + /* + * Standard code signing capabilites required. + */ + int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo); + if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc) + && (fFlags & RTCRPKCS7VCC_F_SIGNED_DATA)) + { + /* + * For kernel code signing there are two options for a valid certificate path: + * 1. Anchored by the microsoft kernel signing root certificate (g_hNtKernelRootStore). + * 2. Anchored by an SPC root and signing entity including a 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.5 (WHQL) + * or 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.5.1 (WHQL attestation) extended usage key. + */ + if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING) + { + uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths); + uint32_t cFound = 0; + uint32_t cValid = 0; + for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++) + { + bool fTrusted; + PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject; + PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo; + int rcVerify; + rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /*pcNodes*/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo, + NULL, NULL /*pCertCtx*/, &rcVerify); + AssertRCBreak(rc); + + if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify)) + { + Assert(fTrusted); + cValid++; + + /* + * 1. Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor. + */ + rc = supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, pPublicKeyInfo); + if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS) + cFound++; + /* + * 2. Check for WHQL EKU and make sure it has a SPC root. + */ + else if ( rc == VWRN_NOT_FOUND + && ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage + & (RTCRX509CERT_EKU_F_MS_ATTEST_WHQL_CRYPTO | RTCRX509CERT_EKU_F_MS_WHQL_CRYPTO))) + { + rc = supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(g_hSpcRootStore, pSubject, pPublicKeyInfo); + if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS) + cFound++; + } + AssertRCBreak(rc); + } + } + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0) + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, + "Signature #%u/%u: Not valid kernel code signature.", + pNtViRdr->iCurSignature + 1, pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures); + + + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots) + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT, + "Signature #%u/%u: Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", + pNtViRdr->iCurSignature + 1, pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures, 2, cValid); + if (rc == VWRN_NOT_FOUND) + rc = VINF_SUCCESS; + } + } + + /* + * More requirements? NT5 build lab? + */ + + return rc; +} + + +/** + * RTTimeNow equivaltent that handles ring-3 where we cannot use it. + * + * @returns pNow + * @param pNow Where to return the current time. + */ +static PRTTIMESPEC supHardNtTimeNow(PRTTIMESPEC pNow) +{ +#ifdef IN_RING3 + /* + * Just read system time. + */ + KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *pUserSharedData = (KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *)MM_SHARED_USER_DATA_VA; +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 + uint64_t uRet = *(uint64_t volatile *)&pUserSharedData->SystemTime; /* This is what KeQuerySystemTime does (missaligned). */ + return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, uRet); +# else + + LARGE_INTEGER NtTime; + do + { + NtTime.HighPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High1Time; + NtTime.LowPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.LowPart; + } while (pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High2Time != NtTime.HighPart); + return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, NtTime.QuadPart); +# endif +#else /* IN_RING0 */ + return RTTimeNow(pNow); +#endif /* IN_RING0 */ +} + + +/** + * @callback_method_impl{FNRTLDRVALIDATESIGNEDDATA} + */ +static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTLDRSIGNATUREINFO pInfo, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser) +{ + RT_NOREF(hLdrMod); + + /* + * Check out the input. + */ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser; + Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC); + pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures = pInfo->cSignatures; + pNtViRdr->iCurSignature = pInfo->iSignature; + + AssertReturn(pInfo->enmType == RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5); + AssertReturn(!pInfo->pvExternalData, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5); + AssertReturn(pInfo->cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5); + PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pInfo->pvSignature; + AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5); + AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5); + PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.papItems[0]; + + + /* + * If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating + * the signature. These only apply to the first signature (for now). + */ + if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) + && pInfo->iSignature == 0) + { + if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert, + &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name, + &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber)) + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, + "Signature #%u/%u: Not signed with the build certificate (serial %.*Rhxs, expected %.*Rhxs)", + pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, + pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.cb, + pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.uData.pv, + g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.cb, + g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.uData.pv); + } + + /* + * We instruction the verifier to use the signing time counter signature + * when present, but provides the linker time then the current time as + * fallbacks should the timestamp be missing or unusable. + * + * Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and + * use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert + * validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that + * we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt). + * + * Update: If the validation fails, retry with the current timestamp. This + * is a workaround for NTDLL.DLL in build 14971 having a weird + * timestamp: 0xDF1E957E (Sat Aug 14 14:05:18 2088). + */ + uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT + | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT + | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY; + + /* In ring-0 we don't have all the necessary timestamp server root certificate + * info, so we have to allow using counter signatures unverified there. + * Ditto for the early period of ring-3 hardened stub execution. */ +#ifndef IN_RING0 + if (!g_fHaveOtherRoots) +#endif + fFlags |= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED; + + /* Fallback timestamps to try: */ + struct { RTTIMESPEC TimeSpec; const char *pszDesc; } aTimes[2]; + unsigned cTimes = 0; + + /* 1. The linking timestamp: */ + uint64_t uTimestamp = 0; + int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &uTimestamp, sizeof(uTimestamp)); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { +#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */ + if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING) + && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT) + && uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack) + uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack; +#endif + RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&aTimes[0].TimeSpec, uTimestamp); + aTimes[0].pszDesc = "link"; + cTimes++; + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %s: %Rrc", pNtViRdr->szFilename, rc)); + + /* 2. Current time. */ + supHardNtTimeNow(&aTimes[cTimes].TimeSpec); + aTimes[cTimes].pszDesc = "now"; + cTimes++; + + /* Make the verfication attempts. */ + for (unsigned i = 0; ; i++) + { + Assert(i < cTimes); + rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, + &aTimes[i].TimeSpec, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + if (rc != VINF_SUCCESS) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: info status: %d\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, rc)); + if (pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure == VINF_SUCCESS) + pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = rc; + } + pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures++; + +#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */ + if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && cTimes > 1) + g_uBuildTimestampHack = uTimestamp; +#endif + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } + + if (rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME && i + 1 < cTimes) + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME for %#RX64; retrying against current time: %#RX64.\n", + pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, + RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[0].TimeSpec), RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[1].TimeSpec))); + else + { + /* There are a couple of failures we can tollerate if there are more than + one signature and one of them works out fine. The RTLdrVerifySignature + caller will have to check the failure counts though to make sure + something succeeded. + + VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH: Nvidia 391.35 nvldumpx.dll has an misconfigured + certificate "CN=NVIDIA Corporation PE Sign v2016" without valid Key Usage. It is + rooted by "CN=NVIDIA Subordinate CA 2016 v2,DC=nvidia,DC=com", so homebrewn. + Sysinternals' sigcheck util ignores it, while MS sigtool doesn't trust the root. + It's possible we're being too strict, but well, it's the only case so far, so no + need to relax the Key Usage restrictions just for a certificate w/o a trusted root. + + VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: Intel 27.20.100.9126 igdumdim64.dll + has three signatures, the first is signed with a certificate (C=US,ST=CA, + L=Santa Clara,O=Intel Corporation,CN=IntelGraphicsPE2021) that has a critical + subject key identifier. This used to trip up the path validator. However, the + other two signatures are from microsoft and checks out fine. So, in future + situations like this it would be nice to simply continue with the next signature. + See bugref{10130} for details. + + VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE: Is related to the above intel problem, + but this is what we get if suppressing the unknown critical subjectKeyIdentifier + in IPRT. We don't need all signatures to be valid kernel signatures, we should be + happy with just one and ignore any additional signatures as long as they don't look + like they've been compromised. Thus continue with this status too. */ + pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = rc; + if ( rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME + || rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS + || rc == VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH + || rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + || rc == VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: %s (%d) w/ timestamp=%#RX64/%s.\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, + rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME" + : rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS" + : rc == VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH ? "VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH" + : rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION" + : "VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE", + rc, RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[i].TimeSpec), aTimes[i].pszDesc)); + + /* This leniency is not applicable to build certificate requirements (signature #1 only). */ + if ( !(pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) + || pInfo->iSignature != 0) + { + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures++; + rc = VINF_SUCCESS; + } + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: %Rrc w/ timestamp=%#RX64/%s.\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, + rc, RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[i].TimeSpec), aTimes[i].pszDesc)); + return rc; + } + } +} + + +/** + * Verifies the given loader image. + * + * @returns IPRT status code. + * @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file. + * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for + * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for + * error/logging. + * @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags. + * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of + * deadlock or other loader related dangers. + * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr, + bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + if (pfWinVerifyTrust) + *pfWinVerifyTrust = false; + +#ifdef IN_RING3 + /* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */ + if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert)) + return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, + "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called."); +#endif + + /* + * Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat + * cheaper than the rest. + * + * We relax this for system32 and a little for WinSxS, like we used to, as + * there are apparently some systems out there where the user, admin, or + * someone has changed the ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll + * and comctl32.dll. Since we need user32.dll and will be checking it's + * digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let this thru. (The report + * was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS + * owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.) + * + * We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll + * and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result + * that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also + * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS. + * + * In one report by 'thor' the WinSxS resident comctl32.dll was owned by + * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS (with 4.3.16). + */ + /** @todo Since we're now allowing Builtin\\Administrators after all, perhaps we + * could drop these system32 + winsxs hacks?? */ + if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER) + && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName)) + { + if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName), + g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), + true /*fCheckSlash*/)) + SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName)); + else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName), + g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), + true /*fCheckSlash*/)) + SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in WinSxS).\n", pwszName)); + else + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER, + "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName); + } + + /* + * Verify it. + * + * The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any + * signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there. + */ + pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures = 0; + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures = 0; + pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures = 0; + pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = VINF_SUCCESS; + int rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + Assert(pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures == pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures); + if ( !pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures + || pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures < pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures /* paranoia */) + { + rc = pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure; + AssertStmt(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc), rc = VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3); + } + else if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS && RT_SUCCESS(pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure)) + rc = pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure; + } + + /* + * Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to + * ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine. + */ + if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED) + rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName); + + /* + * Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so. + */ + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)) + { + bool fEnforced = false; + int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced)); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc2)) + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.", + pwszName, rc2); + else if (!fEnforced) + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED, + "The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName); + } + +#ifdef IN_RING3 + /* + * Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible. + */ + if (!fAvoidWinVerifyTrust) + rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo); +#else + RT_NOREF1(fAvoidWinVerifyTrust); +#endif + + /* + * Check for blacklisted DLLs, both internal name and filename. + */ + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + size_t const cwcName = RTUtf16Len(pwszName); + char szIntName[64]; + int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_INTERNAL_NAME, szIntName, sizeof(szIntName)); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2)) + { + size_t const cchIntName = strlen(szIntName); + for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++) + if ( cchIntName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch + && RTStrICmpAscii(szIntName, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0) + { + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE, + "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName); + break; + } + } + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++) + if (cwcName >= g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch) + { + PCRTUTF16 pwszTmp = &pwszName[cwcName - g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch]; + if ( ( cwcName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch + || pwszTmp[-1] == '\\' + || pwszTmp[-1] == '/') + && RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pwszTmp, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0) + { + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE, + "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName); + break; + } + } + } + } + +#ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3 + /* + * Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports. + */ + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName); +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/** + * Verifies the given executable image. + * + * @returns IPRT status code. + * @param hFile File handle to the executable file. + * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for + * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for + * error/logging. + * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of + * deadlock or other loader related dangers. + * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, + bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + /* + * Create a reader instance. + */ + PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr; + int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + /* + * Open the image. + */ + RTLDRMOD hLdrMod; + RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST; + uint32_t fLdrFlags = RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION | RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE; + if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_IGNORE_ARCHITECTURE) + fLdrFlags |= RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE; + rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, fLdrFlags, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + /* + * Verify it. + */ + rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo); + int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2); + } + else + supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core); + } + SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n", + rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? " WinVerifyTrust" : "")); + return rc; +} + + +#ifdef IN_RING3 +/** + * supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name. + * + * The name is derived from the handle. + * + * @returns IPRT status code. + * @param hFile File handle to the executable file. + * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + /* + * Determine the NT name and call the verification function. + */ + union + { + UNICODE_STRING UniStr; + uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2]; + } uBuf; + + ULONG cbIgn; + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile, + ObjectNameInformation, + &uBuf, + sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), + &cbIgn); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; + else + uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3"; + + return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, + NULL /*pfWinVerifyTrust*/, pErrInfo); +} +#endif /* IN_RING3 */ + + +/** + * Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub + * directories. + * + * This code is also used by the support driver. + * + * @returns VBox status code. + * @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a + * UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's + * discretion) the string buffer. + * @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to. + * @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're + * interested in. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; + + UNICODE_STRING NtName; + switch (enmDir) + { + case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32: + { + static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\"; + NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32; + NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR); + NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32); + break; + } + case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS: + { + static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\"; + NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS; + NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR); + NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS); + break; + } + default: + AssertFailed(); + return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); + + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, + FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, + &ObjAttr, + &Ios, + NULL /* Allocation Size*/, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, + FILE_OPEN, + FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, + NULL /*EaBuffer*/, + 0 /*EaLength*/); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + rcNt = Ios.Status; + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + ULONG cbIgn; + rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile, + ObjectNameInformation, + pvBuf, + cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR), + &cbIgn); + NtClose(hFile); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf; + if (pUniStr->Length > 0) + { + /* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/ + pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } + + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, + "NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer); + } + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt); + } + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt); +} + + +/** + * Initialize one certificate entry. + * + * @returns VBox status code. + * @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init. + * @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate. + * @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate. + * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional. + * @param pszErrorTag Error tag. + */ +static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert, + PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag) +{ + AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K, + RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert)); + AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert), + RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag)); + + RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor; + RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL); + int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag); + return rc; +} + + +static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++) + { + int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + return rc; + } + return VINF_SUCCESS; +} + + +/** + * Initialize a certificate table. + * + * @param phStore Where to return the store pointer. + * @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table. + * @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table. + * @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table. + * @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table. + * @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table. + * @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table. + * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional. + * @param pszErrorTag Error tag. + */ +static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore, + PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1, + PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2, + PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3, + PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag) +{ + AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER); + RT_NOREF1(pszErrorTag); + + int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc); + + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo); + return rc; +} + + +#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) +/** + * Initializes the windows paths. + */ +static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void) +{ + /* + * Windows paths that we're interested in. + */ + static const struct + { + SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath; + WCHAR const *pwszRegValue; + const char *pszLogName; + } s_aPaths[] = + { + { &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" }, + { &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" }, +# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 + { &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" }, + { &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" }, +# endif + }; + + /* + * Open the registry key containing the paths. + */ + UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion"); + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); + HANDLE hKey; + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + /* + * Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths. + */ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++) + { + /* + * Query the value first. + */ + UNICODE_STRING ValueName; + ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue; + ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR)); + ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); + + union + { + KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo; + uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128]; + uint64_t uAlign; + } uBuf; + + ULONG cbActual = 0; + rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + /* + * Must be a simple string value, terminate it. + */ + if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ + || uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ) + { + /* + * Expand any environment variable references before opening it. + * We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path, + * reserving space for the windows name space prefix. + */ + UNICODE_STRING Src; + Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data; + Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength; + if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0') + Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR); + Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); + Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; + + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\'; + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?'; + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?'; + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\'; + UNICODE_STRING Dst; + Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4]; + Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5; + Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength; + + if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ) + rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL); + else + { + memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length); + Dst.Length = Src.Length; + } + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; + + /* + * Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path. + */ + Dst.Buffer -= 4; + Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR); + Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR); + InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); + HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, + FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, + &ObjAttr, + &Ios, + NULL /* Allocation Size*/, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, + FILE_OPEN, + FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT + | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, + NULL /*EaBuffer*/, + 0 /*EaLength*/); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + rcNt = Ios.Status; + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + /* + * Query the real NT name. + */ + ULONG cbIgn; + rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile, + ObjectNameInformation, + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath, + sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR), + &cbIgn); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0) + { + /* Make sure it's terminated.*/ + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "", + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer)); + } + else + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName)); + rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt)); + NtClose(hFile); + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n", + s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer)); + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n", + s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer)); + } + else + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type)); + rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt)); + + /* Stub the entry on failure. */ + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0; + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL; + } + } + NtClose(hKey); + } + else + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt)); + + /* Stub all the entries on failure. */ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++) + { + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0; + s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL; + } + } +} +#endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */ + + +/** + * This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them + * every time we need to verify an image. + * + * @returns IPRT status code. + * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER); + + /* + * Get the system root paths. + */ + int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer)); + SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer)); +#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) + supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(); +#endif + + /* + * Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call. + */ + rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate"); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot"); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot"); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, + g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs, + g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs, + g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs, + pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot"); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental"); + +#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */ + /* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a + trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */ + if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc) + && RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0) +#else + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) +#endif + rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER, + g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo); + + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + /* + * Finally initialize known SIDs that we use. + */ + SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY; + NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464; + + rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID; + + rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, &s_NtAuth, 2); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + { + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 0) = SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID; + *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 1) = DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS; + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } + } + } + rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt); + } + supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(); + } + return rc; +} + + +/** + * Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void) +{ + if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert)) + RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core); + + RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore); + g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; + RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore); + g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; + + RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore); + g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; + RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore); + g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE; +} + +#ifdef IN_RING3 + +/** + * This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need. + * + * @returns true if wanted, false if not. + * @param pCert The certificate. + */ +static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert) +{ + char szSubject[512]; + szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0'; + RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL); + + /* + * Check that it's a plausible root certificate. + */ + if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject)); + return false; + } + + if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0) + { + if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN) + && (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) ) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject)); + return false; + } + if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints + && !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject)); + return false; + } + } + if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */ + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n", + pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject)); + return false; + } + uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1]; + +# if 0 + /* + * Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want. + */ + static struct + { + uint64_t u64KeyId; + const char *pszName; + } const s_aWanted[] = + { + /* SPC */ + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" }, + + /* TS */ + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." }, + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." }, + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" }, + + /* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */ + { UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" }, + { UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" }, + { UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" }, + { UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" }, + { UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" }, + { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" }, + { UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" }, + { UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" }, + { UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" }, + { UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" }, + { UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" }, + { UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" }, + { UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" }, + { UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, Email=info@valicert.com" }, + { UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" }, + { UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" }, + { UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" }, + }; + + + uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted); + while (i-- > 0) + if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId + || s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX) + if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject)); + return true; + } + + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject)); + return false; +# else + /* + * Blacklist approach. + */ + static struct + { + uint64_t u64KeyId; + const char *pszName; + } const s_aUnwanted[] = + { + { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */ + }; + + uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted); + while (i-- > 0) + if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId + || s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX) + if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject)); + return false; + } + + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject)); + return true; +# endif +} + + +/** + * Loads a module in the system32 directory. + * + * @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on failure if fMandatory = true. + * @param pszName The name of the DLL to load. + * @param fMandatory Whether the library is mandatory. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName, bool fMandatory) +{ + WCHAR wszName[200+60]; + UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60); + wszName[cwcDir] = '\\'; + RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName); + + DWORD fFlags = 0; + if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) + fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32; + HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags); + if ( hMod == NULL + && fFlags + && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) + && RtlGetLastWin32Error() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER) + { + fFlags = 0; + hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags); + } + if ( hMod == NULL + && fMandatory) + supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, RtlGetLastWin32Error(), wszName); + return hMod; +} + + +/** + * Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to + * import selected root CAs from the system certificate store. + * + * These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs. + */ +static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void) +{ + uint32_t cAdded = 0; + + /* + * Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need. + */ + HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll", true /*fMandatory*/); + +#define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \ + a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \ + if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error()) + RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE); + RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE); + RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE); +#undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API + + /* + * Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use. + */ + DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG; + HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING, + NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE | fOpenStore, L"Root"); + if (!hStore) + hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING, + NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER | fOpenStore, L"Root"); + if (hStore) + { + PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL; + while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL) + { + if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING) + { + RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo; + RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor; + RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, + RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo), + &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx"); + RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert; + int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert"); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert)) + { + rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER, + pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/); + AssertRC(rc); + + rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER, + pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/); + AssertRC(rc); + cAdded++; + } + + RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert); + } + /* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity + timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets. + Ignore these failures and certificates. */ + else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING) + AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg)); + } + } + pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG); + g_fHaveOtherRoots = true; + } + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded)); +} + + +/** + * Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and + * installs a thread creation hook. + * + * The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification + * code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag + * set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set + * and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the + * authenticode signature will be checked two or three times. + * + * @param pszProgName The program name. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName) +{ +# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3 + /* + * Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the + * security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or + * whatever they are). + * + * The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by + * irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them. + */ + char szPath[RTPATH_MAX]; + supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL")); + suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL"); + HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /*fSystem32Only*/, 0 /*fMainFlags*/); + if (hSupLibMod == NULL) + supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error()); +# endif + + /* + * Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention. + */ + DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc(); + if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES) + g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls; + else + supR3HardenedError(RtlGetLastWin32Error(), false /*fFatal*/, "TlsAlloc failed"); + + /* + * Resolve the imports we need. + */ + HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll", true /*fMandatory*/); +#define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \ + do { \ + g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \ + if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \ + supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error()); \ + } while (0) + + PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust"); + if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust) + supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error()); + + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0); + + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80); + RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80); + +# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3 + /* + * Load bcrypt.dll and instantiate a few hashing and signing providers to + * make sure the providers are cached for later us. Avoid recursion issues. + */ + HMODULE hBCrypt = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("bcrypt.dll", false /*fMandatory*/); + if (hBCrypt) + { + PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER pfnOpenAlgoProvider; + pfnOpenAlgoProvider = (PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER)GetProcAddress(hBCrypt, "BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider"); + if (pfnOpenAlgoProvider) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("bcrypt.dll loaded at %p, BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider at %p, preloading providers:\n", + hBCrypt, pfnOpenAlgoProvider)); +# define PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(a_Name) \ + do { \ + BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgo = NULL; \ + NTSTATUS rcNt = pfnOpenAlgoProvider(&hAlgo, a_Name, NULL, 0); \ + SUP_DPRINTF(("%sBCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(,'%ls',0,0) -> %#x (hAlgo=%p)\n", \ + NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) ? " " : "warning: ", a_Name, rcNt, hAlgo)); \ + } while (0) + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD2_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD4_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD5_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA1_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA256_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA512_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_RSA_ALGORITHM); + PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_DSA_ALGORITHM); +# undef PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to find BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider in bcrypt.dll\n")); + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to load bcrypt.dll\n")); + + /* + * Call the verification API on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it works + * and loads more stuff it needs, preventing any recursive fun we'd run + * into after we set g_pfnWinVerifyTrust. + */ + RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic; + RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic); + int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0, + &ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, + "WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg); +# else + RT_NOREF1(pszProgName); +# endif + + if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */ + supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL); + supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust); + + g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust; + SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust)); + +# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3 + /* + * Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent + * recursion trouble. + */ + supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll"); + supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll"); +# endif + + /* + * Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures. + */ + supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(); +} + + +static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath, + PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf) +{ + static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT"; + + if (*pwszNtName != '\\' && *pwszNtName != '/') + return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT; + + size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName); + if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf) + return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG; + + memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix)); + memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16)); + *ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf; + return VINF_SUCCESS; +} + + +/** + * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image. + * + * @returns VBox status code. + * @param hFile File handle to the executable file. + * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for + * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for + * error/logging. + * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API. + * @param phrcWinVerifyTrust Where to WinVerifyTrust error status on failure, + * optional. + */ +static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, + PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust) +{ + RT_NOREF1(fFlags); + if (phrcWinVerifyTrust) + *phrcWinVerifyTrust = S_OK; + + /* + * Convert the name into a Windows name. + */ + RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH]; + PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath; + int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf)); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName); + + /* + * Construct input parameters and call the API. + */ + WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo; + RT_ZERO(FileInfo); + FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo); + FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath; + FileInfo.hFile = hFile; + + GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2; + + WINTRUST_DATA TrustData; + RT_ZERO(TrustData); + TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData); + TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */ + TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY; + TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE; + TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0; + if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) + TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL; + else + TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE; + TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE; + TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo; + + HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData); +# ifdef DEBUG_bird /* TEMP HACK */ + if (hrc == CERT_E_EXPIRED) + hrc = S_OK; +# endif + if (hrc == S_OK) + rc = VINF_SUCCESS; + else + { + /* + * Failed. Format a nice error message. + */ +# ifdef DEBUG_bird + if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */) + __debugbreak(); +# endif + const char *pszErrConst = NULL; + switch (hrc) + { + case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break; + case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break; + case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break; + case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break; + case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break; + case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break; + case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break; + case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break; + case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break; + case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break; + case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break; + case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break; + case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break; + case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break; + case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break; + case CERT_E_EXPIRED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_EXPIRED"; break; + case CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING"; break; + case CERT_E_ROLE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ROLE"; break; + case CERT_E_PATHLENCONST: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PATHLENCONST"; break; + case CERT_E_CRITICAL: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CRITICAL"; break; + case CERT_E_PURPOSE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PURPOSE"; break; + case CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING"; break; + case CERT_E_MALFORMED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_MALFORMED"; break; + case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT"; break; + case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break; + case CERT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOKED"; break; + case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT"; break; + case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break; + case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH"; break; + case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE"; break; + case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA"; break; + case CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY"; break; + case CERT_E_INVALID_NAME: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_NAME"; break; + case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR"; break; + case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_REVOKED"; break; + } + if (pszErrConst) + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH, + "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName); + else + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH, + "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n", + hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName)); + if (phrcWinVerifyTrust) + *phrcWinVerifyTrust = hrc; + } + + /* clean up state data. */ + TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE; + FileInfo.hFile = NULL; + hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData); + + return rc; +} + + +/** + * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files. + * + * @returns VBox status code. + * @param hFile File handle to the executable file. + * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for + * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for + * error/logging. + * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API. + */ +static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, + PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust) +{ + RT_NOREF1(fFlags); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName)); + + /* + * Convert the name into a Windows name. + */ + RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH]; + PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath; + int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf)); + if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName); + + /* + * Open the file if we didn't get a handle. + */ + HANDLE hFileClose = NULL; + if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE || hFile == NULL) + { + hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; + + UNICODE_STRING NtName; + NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName; + NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR)); + NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); + + OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; + InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); + + NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, + FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, + &ObjAttr, + &Ios, + NULL /* Allocation Size*/, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + FILE_SHARE_READ, + FILE_OPEN, + FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, + NULL /*EaBuffer*/, + 0 /*EaLength*/); + if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + rcNt = Ios.Status; + if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) + return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt), + "NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName); + hFileClose = hFile; + } + + /* + * On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice. + */ + int fNoSignedCatalogFound = -1; + rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + static struct + { + /** The digest algorithm name. */ + const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm; + /** Cached catalog admin handle. */ + HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin; + } s_aHashes[] = + { + { NULL, NULL }, + { L"SHA256", NULL }, + }; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++) + { + /* + * Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies + * required for successfully validating different catalog signatures. + */ + bool fTryNextPolicy; + uint32_t iPolicy = 0; + static const GUID s_aPolicies[] = + { + DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */ + WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */ + }; + do + { + /* + * Create a context. + */ + fTryNextPolicy = false; + bool fFreshContext = false; + BOOL fRc; + HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL); + if (hCatAdmin) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin)); + fFreshContext = false; + fRc = TRUE; + } + else + { +l_fresh_context: + fFreshContext = true; + if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2) + fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm, + NULL /*pStrongHashPolicy*/, 0 /*dwFlags*/); + else + fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /*dwFlags*/); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin)); + } + if (fRc) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin)); + + /* + * Hash the file. + */ + BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE]; + DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash); + if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2) + fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/); + else + fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/); + if (fRc) + { + /* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */ + RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1]; + int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER); + if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2)) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest)); + + /* + * Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash. + */ + uint32_t iCat = 0; + HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL; + do + { + /* Get the next match. */ + HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev); + if (!hCatInfo) + { + if (!fFreshContext) + { + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), iCat)); + if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL) + g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/); + g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/); + goto l_fresh_context; + } + ULONG ulErr = RtlGetLastWin32Error(); + fNoSignedCatalogFound = ulErr == ERROR_NOT_FOUND && fNoSignedCatalogFound != 0; + if (iCat == 0) + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed ERROR_NOT_FOUND (%u)\n", ulErr)); + else if (iCat == 0) + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", ulErr)); + break; + } + fNoSignedCatalogFound = 0; + Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL); + hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo; + + /* + * Call WinVerifyTrust. + */ + CATALOG_INFO CatInfo; + CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo); + CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0'; + if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /*dwFlags*/)) + { + WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo; + RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo); + WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo); + WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0; + WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile; + WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest; + WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath; + WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash; + WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash; + WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL; + + WINTRUST_DATA TrustData; + RT_ZERO(TrustData); + TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData); + TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */ + TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY; + TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE; + TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0; + if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) + TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL; + else + TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE; + TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG; + TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo; + + HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n", + hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName)); + + if (SUCCEEDED(hrc)) + rc = VINF_SUCCESS; + else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE) + { /* ignore because it's useless. */ } + else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER) + { /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ } + else + { + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE, + "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.", + hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile); + fTryNextPolicy |= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT); + } + + /* clean up state data. */ + TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE; + hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData); + Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc)); + } + else + { + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()), + "CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]", + RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n")); + } + iCat++; + } while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128); + + if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL) + if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/)) + AssertFailed(); + } + else + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc); + } + else + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()), + "CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName); + + if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL)) + if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/)) + AssertFailed(); + } + else + rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()), + "CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName); + iPolicy++; + } while ( fTryNextPolicy + && iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies)); + + /* + * Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm. + */ + if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2) + break; + if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED) + break; + } + + if (hFileClose != NULL) + NtClose(hFileClose); + + /* + * DLLs that are likely candidates for local modifications. + */ + if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED) + { + bool fCoreSystemDll = false; + PCRTUTF16 pwsz; + uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName); + uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); + if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) + { + pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1; + if ( supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "uxtheme.dll") + || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll") + || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "gdi32.dll") + || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "opengl32.dll") + || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "KernelBase.dll")) + || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll")) + || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll")) + ) + { + if (RTErrInfoIsSet(pErrInfo)) + RTErrInfoAdd(pErrInfo, rc, "\n"); + RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, "'%ls' is most likely modified.", pwszName); + } + } + + /* Kludge for ancient windows versions we don't want to support but + users still wants to use. Keep things as safe as possible without + unnecessary effort. Problem is that 3rd party catalog files cannot + easily be found. Showstopper for ATI users. */ + if ( fNoSignedCatalogFound == 1 + && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA + && !fCoreSystemDll) + { + rc = VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + } + } + + return rc; +} + + +/** + * Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way. + * + * This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as + * supR3HardenedScreenImage. + * + * @returns IPRT status code, modified @a rc. + * @param hFile Handle of the file to verify. + * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for + * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for + * error/logging. + * @param fFlags SUPHNTVI_F_XXX. + * @param rc The current status code. + * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was + * actually used. + * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc, + bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) +{ + if (pfWinVerifyTrust) + *pfWinVerifyTrust = false; + + /* + * Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in + * some obvious recursion. + */ + if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL) + { + uint32_t const idCurrentThread = RTNtCurrentThreadId(); + + /* Check if loader lock owner. */ + struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION volatile *pLoaderLock = NtCurrentPeb()->LoaderLock; + bool fOwnsLoaderLock = pLoaderLock + && pLoaderLock->OwningThread == (HANDLE)(uintptr_t)idCurrentThread + && pLoaderLock->RecursionCount > 0; + if (!fOwnsLoaderLock) + { + /* Check for recursion. */ + bool fNoRecursion; + if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX) + { + fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0; + if (fNoRecursion) + TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1); + } + else + fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX); + + if (fNoRecursion && !fOwnsLoaderLock) + { + /* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */ + if (pfWinVerifyTrust) + *pfWinVerifyTrust = true; + + if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED) + { + if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED) + { + if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION) + { + int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, + g_pfnWinVerifyTrust); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc)); + rc = rc2; + } + else + { + AssertFailed(); + rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; + } + } + else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) + { + HRESULT hrcWinVerifyTrust; + rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust, + &hrcWinVerifyTrust); + + /* DLLs signed with special roots, like "Microsoft Digital Media Authority 2005", + may fail here because the root cert is not in the normal certificate stores + (if any). Our verification code has the basics of these certificates included + and can verify them, which is why we end up here instead of in the + VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED case above. Current workaround is to do as above. + (Intel graphics driver DLLs, like igdusc64.dll. */ + if ( RT_FAILURE(rc) + && hrcWinVerifyTrust == CERT_E_CHAINING + && (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)) + { + rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust); + SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (was CERT_E_CHAINING)\n", rc)); + } + } + else + { + int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL); + AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2), + ("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>")); + RT_NOREF_PV(rc2); + } + } + + /* Unwind recursion. */ + if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX) + TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0); + else + ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX); + } + /* + * No can do. + */ + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName)); + } + else + SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected loader lock ownership: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName)); + } + return rc; +} + + +/** + * Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread. + * + * Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an + * image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet. + * + * @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void) +{ + return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL + && ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX + ? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0 + : g_idActiveThread != RTNtCurrentThreadId() ); +} + + + +/** + * Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo. + * Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit. + */ +DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(bool fEarly) +{ + /* + * Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and + * GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on + * the application manifest). + * + * Note! Windows 10 build 14267+ touches BSS when calling RtlGetVersion, so we + * have to use the fallback for the call from the early init code. + */ + OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo; + + RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo); + NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW); + if ( fEarly + || !NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo))) + { + RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo); + PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb(); + NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion; + NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion; + NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSBuildNumber; + } + + g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber, + NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor); +} + +#endif /* IN_RING3 */ + |